Кикерон, Помпеј и Македонија

Abstract

In a recently published article on the status of Macedonia and the Macedonians during the Roman civil wars, M. B. Panov offered a rather new interpretation of the subject. By linking together several pieces of information given by Cassius Dio and Plutarch, the author argues that his exile in Macedonia stirred Cicero towards a new interpretation of the role of the province of Macedonia, which had allegedly served as a basis for a redefined Roman policy towards the Balkans and Macedonia in particular; furthermore, the author presumes that this standpoint of Cicero convinced Pompey the Great to choice Macedonia, at first as a centre of operations against Julius Caesar, later as a foundation for a new, independent empire (sic), with Thessalonica as its capital; lastly, the author argues that this idea received an overwhelming support by Macedonians and Eastern peoples alike, fighting in the ranks of Pompey's army as allies.

This interpretation deserves a scrutiny on several points. It seems highly improbable that historians and classicists alike have for more than a century – ever since Mommsen's Romische Geschichte – disregarded such an important association between the province of Macedonia and some of the main Roman political figures of the time. With this in mind, we have tended to reassess all the extant sources and find potential evidence for the claims of M. B. Panov — first-hand and later accounts, commentaries within the time span and up to late Antiquity, historical, literary and biographical works, as well as epigraphic evidence. However, this considerable body of evidence does not appear to attest the hypotheses we have briefly presented above.

The circumstances concerning Cicero's Macedonian exile are kno-'vn almost in details; however, modern scholars – T. A. Dorey, W. K. Lacey, C. Haticht, to mention only a few – have found little evidence of significant contemplations about Macedonia in his correspondence, even less in his later political speeches. M. B. Panov quotes two pieces of information from Cicero's public speeches — Plane. 98-99 and De prov. cons. 2 – both of them flattering Macedonia in terms of respect and friendship towards the Roman people; what he fails to do, however, is to interpret them in their wider context. Unfortunately, this turns out to be a rather compromising error: the context clearly shows that the province of Macedonia is far off the span of Cicero's interest at the time. To a certain extent, Macedonia serves as a conventional Ciceronian rhetorical implement for achieving quite a concrete goal — forcing an exoneration of a tribune accused of erred conduct in the former instance, exerting a political sentence to Cicero's foes in the latter. Considering the fact that other historical and literary evidence is missing — a fact repeatedly stressed by Th. Sarikakis, for example — we fail to see a reason for assuming the existence of an alleged Ciceronian-inspired “New Deal” in Macedonia. Quite the opposite, we have to collaborate the widely accepted opinion that, few mentions of Macedonia apart, Cicero's interest in Macedonia is at least as scanty arid circumstantial as his references to this province.

There is even less evidence for an alleged influence of Cicero during Pompey's deliberations on a possible departure from Italy in 49 B.C. Ever since F. Abbott's published his famous commentaries, Cicero's quest or peace and harmony in a city ridden by discord has become a common place in scholar literature; thus, the private correspondence of Cicero has been thoroughly studied for the most of the last century, and the evidence found within is far from intriguing. As we can see from his letters — mainly Ad. fam. 16.11.2, as well as Ad Att.9.10.3. and subsequent – Cicero equal distance off both Caesar and Pompey. He is puzzled by Pompey's decision to leave Italy to defend the State; even when he finally does seem to acknowledge the fact that he must leave Italy, he seems to be unaware that he would have to travel to Macedonia to join Pompey's camp. In fact, as A. Nofi has recently shown, Pompey's decision had probably more to do with pondering the benefits and disadvantages of Africa, Hispania and Macedonia – the territories that he had in his grasp at the time – than with any influence that Cicero might have ever exerted on him.

It is a common fact that the gens Pompeia was well known and established in the Eastern Provinces. Being a grandson of a former procurator of Macedonia who died on the battlefield defending the province from barbarian raids, Pompey sought to bring into play his large political influence. Contrary to what M. B. Panov believes, this does not seem to have impressed the Macedonians. He stresses the fact that Pompey received the help of some two hundred cavalry and an uncertain number of Macedonian infantry; however, he fails to mention that this is by no means equal to what Caesar had been promised — a nearly unanimous support of all the princes from Upper Macedonia.

Having dismissed the alleged influence of Cicero and the wide support of the Macedonians, we observe the veracity of the proposed “Pompeian” empire. Panov argues that the presumed Senate in Thessalonica is a clear indication that Pompey had statesmanlike ambitions that did not exclude establishing a new state in the East; his actions, however, as well as the rudimentary legislation put forth by this temporary body in exile, stress the opposite. There are numerous indications that these former senators did not tend to establish a new and independent legislative system, but to follow Roman legislature – therefore passing a decree proposed by M. Cato, which ’was problematic, but refraining from arranging comitial voting or consular elections, which would have been an outrage if done outside of the walls of Rome. However, another question that should be addressed is the question of source interpretation. There are but two sources that inform us about this Pompeian empire-to-be in Macedonia: a third-hand account by Cassius Dio and a shaky characterisation by Plutarch. It is perfectly understandable that — with sources as few and as unreliable as these are — one can eas ly slip into overinterpretation and treat this problem as a historical reality, just because it fits into a certain scheme of events. However, we fail to understand the fact that Panov does not mention either Appian's or Caesar's own Commentaries on the Civil war, especially Caes. Bell. Civ. 3.82., a passage that clearly shows that the exiles intended to rule Rome, not Macedonia.

On the basis of our analysis of the factual evidence, as presented oy the extant sources, we conclude that the province of Macedonia did not have an important role in Cicero's political agenda; that Cicero did not influence Pompey the Great in choosing Macedonia as a basis for further operations; that Pompey the Great had no intention to establish of establishing in Macedonia; and finally, that there was no stake of importance as to impress the Macedonians, who in fact supported both sides in the conflict. The analysis of M. B. Panov seems to be confined to an insufficient number of sources, that are interpreted without the benefit of a doubt and assuming there are no problems of composition and authenticity; this has led him to put forth an interpretation that unjustifiably opposes previous scholar works.