Cooperation dynamics of generalized reciprocity in state-based social dilemmas
Journal
Physical Review E
Date Issued
2018-05-14
Author(s)
Stojkoski, Viktor
Utkovski, Zoran
Kocarev, Ljupcho
Abstract
We introduce a framework for studying social dilemmas in networked societies where individuals follow a simple state-based behavioral mechanism based on generalized reciprocity, which is
rooted in the principle “help anyone if helped by someone”. Within this general framework, which
applies to a wide range of social dilemmas including, among others, public goods, donation and
snowdrift games, we study the cooperation dynamics on a variety of complex network examples.
By interpreting the studied model through the lenses of nonlinear dynamical systems, we show
that cooperation through generalized reciprocity always emerges as the unique attractor in which
the overall level of cooperation is maximized, while simultaneously exploitation of the participating
individuals is prevented. The analysis elucidates the role of the network structure, here captured
by a local centrality measure which uniquely quantifies the propensity of the network structure to
cooperation by dictating the degree of cooperation displayed both at microscopic and macroscopic
level. We demonstrate the applicability of the analysis on a practical example by considering an
interaction structure that couples a donation process with a public goods game.
rooted in the principle “help anyone if helped by someone”. Within this general framework, which
applies to a wide range of social dilemmas including, among others, public goods, donation and
snowdrift games, we study the cooperation dynamics on a variety of complex network examples.
By interpreting the studied model through the lenses of nonlinear dynamical systems, we show
that cooperation through generalized reciprocity always emerges as the unique attractor in which
the overall level of cooperation is maximized, while simultaneously exploitation of the participating
individuals is prevented. The analysis elucidates the role of the network structure, here captured
by a local centrality measure which uniquely quantifies the propensity of the network structure to
cooperation by dictating the degree of cooperation displayed both at microscopic and macroscopic
level. We demonstrate the applicability of the analysis on a practical example by considering an
interaction structure that couples a donation process with a public goods game.
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