A (not quite) friendly treaty and the EU enlargement impasse
Journal
Annuaire de la Faculté de Philosophie
Date Issued
2021
Author(s)
DOI
10.37510/godzbo2174381v
Abstract
The Friendship Treaty between Sofia and Skopje was one of the first foreign
policy achievements of the newly formed Zoran Zaev-led government in 2017. It was
presented as a closure of the long-lasting bilateral dispute between the two neighbouring
countries, which would remove one obstacle on the way to EU integration. However,
the subsequent Prespa agreement (signed almost a year later) took all the glory and
public attention. The Friendship Treaty’s real political weight and imperfections became
obvious only in December 2020, when the Bulgarian veto prevented the opening of
the negotiation process for the country. The article analyses and evaluates the Treaty
and its implication through the political and legal lenses. The basic premise is that
instead of paving the way to the full EU membership, the hastily signed agreement
proved to be not only a new obstacle on the road but also a factor of deepening mutual
distrust and tensions between the two peoples. The twist with the introduction of the
new methodology of EU enlargement along with the Bulgarian veto makes the Balkan
entanglement even more complex. The Macedonian state is back to square one, just
like in the dispute with Greece, now being knotted with another bilateral dispute
and identity issues that have nothing to do with good neighbourly relations and/or
Copenhagen criteria. Conversely, this downplayed dispute may have a strong impact on
the Macedonian state’s viability in the mid- and long run. The key conclusion is that the
stalemate of the EU enlargement process is at the same time a cause and a consequence
of Brussel’s inability to understand and resolve the protracted conflicts in the Balkans
as well as a proof that EU membership is not a panacea for the age-old nationalism and
chauvinism.
policy achievements of the newly formed Zoran Zaev-led government in 2017. It was
presented as a closure of the long-lasting bilateral dispute between the two neighbouring
countries, which would remove one obstacle on the way to EU integration. However,
the subsequent Prespa agreement (signed almost a year later) took all the glory and
public attention. The Friendship Treaty’s real political weight and imperfections became
obvious only in December 2020, when the Bulgarian veto prevented the opening of
the negotiation process for the country. The article analyses and evaluates the Treaty
and its implication through the political and legal lenses. The basic premise is that
instead of paving the way to the full EU membership, the hastily signed agreement
proved to be not only a new obstacle on the road but also a factor of deepening mutual
distrust and tensions between the two peoples. The twist with the introduction of the
new methodology of EU enlargement along with the Bulgarian veto makes the Balkan
entanglement even more complex. The Macedonian state is back to square one, just
like in the dispute with Greece, now being knotted with another bilateral dispute
and identity issues that have nothing to do with good neighbourly relations and/or
Copenhagen criteria. Conversely, this downplayed dispute may have a strong impact on
the Macedonian state’s viability in the mid- and long run. The key conclusion is that the
stalemate of the EU enlargement process is at the same time a cause and a consequence
of Brussel’s inability to understand and resolve the protracted conflicts in the Balkans
as well as a proof that EU membership is not a panacea for the age-old nationalism and
chauvinism.
Subjects
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