Panovski, Stefan
Preferred name
Panovski, Stefan
Official Name
Panovski, Stefan
Translated Name
Стефан Пановски
Alternative Name
Пановски, Стефан
Panovski, S.
Пановски, С.
Main Affiliation
Email
panovski@fzf.ukim.edu.mk
36 results
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Item type:Publication, Memnon, the Strategist(Филозофски факултет, Скопје, 2011); The general impression on Memnon of Rhodes that is transmitted by our sources – and is more or less unanimously accepted in modern historiography – is that he may have been the only military commander able to bring the relentless Alexander III to a halt and disrupt his plans. This opinion seems to be based on Memnon’s few successes, which could purportedly imperil the Asian expedition of Alexander: namely, Memnon’s achievements against Parmenio; his sensible proposal to avoid direct altercation with the Macedonians; the gallant defence of Halicarnassus; and particularly, his dangerous naval campaign in the Aegean Sea in 333 BC. In this paper, we will consider whether Memnon’s actions, as well as their results, truly validate the impression and reputation he has acquired both in antiquity and today. - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
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Item type:Publication, How to Etch a Philhellene: Alexander I, Herodotus and historiography as a tool(ZKFM Antika, 2019); The aim of the paper is to re‐evaluate the role and importance of Alexander I during the Persian invasion of Greece, particularly pertaining the embassy to Athens and the night visit before the battle of Plataea. It is maintained that his role and importance in the back‐door dealings between the Athenians and Spartans while he was at Athens is probably exaggerated; while at the same time, in overstepping his role as an envoy of Mardonius, he had in fact harmed his reputation as benefactor and friend of Athens. Concerning the visit before Plataea, there is admittedly a certain pro‐Macedonian nuance in the narrative; yet, this does not mean that it should be treated as a standalone affair, separated from the rest of the narrative, but rather in context of a much larger piece of propaganda which aims to glorify the deeds of Athens at the expense of the Spartan ones – certainly not as an example of an interpretatio Macedonica. - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Две белешки за битката кај Лада(Институт за национална историја, Скопје, 2018)The aim of the paper „Two Notes on the Battle of Lade“ is to re-examine two of the arguments pertaining the order of the battles of Lade and Chios. Firstly, it questions yet again the meaning of συμμιγνύναι in Polybios’ analysis of the situation after the battle of Lade (16.10.1). While it is admitted that Walbank’s solution is not convincing, it is maintained that considering the use of συμμιγνύναι, it does seem unlikely that Polybios here meant that the war between Attalos and Philip had not yet begun. Secondly, it re-evaluates the importance of the omission of the name of the Rhodian nauarch in the battle of Lade in Polybios’ polemic against Zeno and Antisthenes (16.15). Considering the introduction in the polemic (16.14) the conclusion is that the stakes are much higher than it might seem, since it is not just a methodological polemic, but a question of veracity and therefore the omission of Theophiliskos is much more suggestive than it might seem. - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
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Item type:Publication, Gallograeci and elephants at Megara(Živa Antika / Antiquité Vivante, 2015)The aim of this paper is to re-examine the arguments concerning the question whether Antiochos I did indeed send military aid to Antigonos Gonatas during the Chremonidean War. The assumption rests on three pieces of evidence - the inscription of Brikkon, the elephants at Megara and the presence of Celtic troops from Gallograecia. Since it has been proven long ago that the inscription of Brikkon has been misunderstood and is from a later date, there is nothing more to be added in this instance. As for the elephants, the argument is far less convincing once it is realized that in the years prior to the Chremonidean War Antigonos already had some in his army, and therefore there is no need to assume that the ones he deployed at Megara were sent from Antiochos I. The argument becomes even less persuasive if we take into account that the situation in Asia Minor was far less settled than once thought, and especially since there are some indications that at the time Antiochos did not even had a huge number of elephants in his army and consequently seems doubtful whether he would have been ready to further weaken his elephant corps by sending some of them to Antigonos. Similarly, the mention of troops from Gallograecia, though convincing at first glance, is far less persuasive on closer examination. Considering the problems with Justin’s description, his authority without the support of the other two arguments should not be accepted at face value. On top of that, since on another occasion he uses the name to denote not the Celts from Asia Minor but from the Balkans, the possibility that we are dealing with Celts from the Balkans can not be ruled out. In conclusion, though nothing can be said with absolute certainty, until some new evidence emerges, there is not a single compelling argument that Antiochos took part in the Chremonidean War. - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
Item type:Publication, Меѓу мечот и перото: македонската фаланга и нејзиното историографско бреме(ЗКФМ Антика, 2018); Especially in Hellenistic times, the Macedonian phalanx was thought to be a cumbersome and vulnerable formation, whose eventual success was far too dependent of the terrain, so that it could be an equal opponent of the fluid and flexible Roman legions. This impression of the inferiority of the phalanx as opposed to the legion is based not only on the outcome of the battle of Pydna, but also on a comprehensive breakdown offered by Polybius, who observes the peculiarities and differences between the legion and the phalanx in the context of the battle at Cynoscephalae. At first glance, his conclusions appear logical and entirely justified; Polybius skillfuly exposes and explains the weaknesses of the phalanx, the advantages of the Roman legion and the reasons for the constant defeats of the Hellenistic armies. However, a more thorough scrutiny of the events at Aoi Stena and Atrax, along with certain sequences from the battles of Selasia, Cynoscephalae and Pydna, shows that the interpretation offered by Polybius is neither entirely convincing, nor entirely appropriate. It is an indisputable fact that the Roman army was stronger than the armies of the Hellenistic kingdoms: the wars of the 2nd century BC prove this quite clearly and indisputably. The main question, however, is something entirely different: is the inadequacy of the phalanx indeed the main reason for the persistent defeats of the Hellenistic armies, especially when our sources clearly show that, contrary to whatever Polybius tends to prove, it was neither cumbersome, nor helpless? The problem is that both Polybius and countless other historians influenced by his views identify the Macedonian phalanx – which was only a part, though undeniably the most important part of the Macedonian army – with the entire army; however, in the episodes intented to serve as proof, the legions do not defeat the phalanx, but the army. One should not explain the persistent defeats of the Hellenistic armies with the inadequacies of the phalanx as a formation, but rather with the inadequate composition of the armies and, above all, with the inadequate tactical principles of their military leaders. Taken as a whole, the Macedonian army proved to be incapable of adapting to the Roman system of maniples; but Polybius and others overlook that the phalanx and the army are not synonymous. In order to explain the constant inferiority of the Hellenistic armies to the Roman legions, we ought to look at the other constituent units and formations. - Some of the metrics are blocked by yourconsent settings
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Item type:Publication, Whither the Winds Blow: Philip’s Persian Policies, or the Lack Thereof(Živa Antika, 2012); The question of the “Persian policies” of Philip II is still disputed; the data from our extant sources does not indicate that the Macedonian king had active plans to invade Persia before solving the question of hegemony in Greece proper. The approximating political positions of Athens and Persia, as well as the desire for security in the immediate surroundings of the extended Macedonian kingdom, undoubtedly had some bearing on his decision. There is a reasonable amount of evidence that Philip kept the developments in Asia under close scrutiny; however, not a single extant source shows much more than that. One can speculate that Persia caught the king’s eye, for no other venture would offer such prospects for financial gain; furthermore, there was a real danger that Persia would draw near to some of the stronger Greek poleis, which would complicate the intricate political situation in Greece even further. It is practically certain that Philip had these things in mind; however, one is unable to determine whether these designs were clearly defined by 340 BC. The answer to the question whether Philip had (or, to begin with, whether he was aware that he should have) a Persian policy, depends on the connotation and weight that one chooses to assign to Isocrates’ Philippos. What stems from the whole lot is that, at this time, there were certain circles in Greece who were willing to entertain the thought of waging war against Persia. However, this does not imply that every Greek man of politics wished for such a development of events – but only that Isocrates, and several other members of his circle, dealt with the validity of a theoretical idea. No matter whether it happened in 346 BC, 340 BC, or only after the outcome of Chaeronea, there came a moment when the war against Persia was no longer just a possibility, but a reality. Philip's death stopped the largest enterprise in the history of the kingdom up to that time; its final stage was not achieved during his lifetime. The small amount of extant data prevents us from venturing into speculations about Philip’s intentions and final aims; however, it is fairly obvious that his endeavours do not imply a complete conquest of the Persian kingdom. If one wishes to make assumptions, it could be said that our sources indicate two things: that, as long as the Persians did not interfere in his endeavours in Thrace, Philip did not have clearly objectified ambitions in Asia; and that in no case did he show interest and ambition for the events beyond the Western satrapies. The extant data does not provide basis for speculation that Philip seriously thought about territories beyond Cilicia and Taurus, not to mention the entire territory of the Achaemenid kingdom.