Iustinianus Primus Faculty of Law

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Author: search.filters.author.Stojkovski, LjupchoSubject: search.filters.subject.Responsibility to Protect (R2P, RToP)

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    Non-UN Sanctions and the ‘Responsibility to Protect’: Legality, Legitimacy and their Significance for R2P
    (University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Law, 2023-05)
    Stojkovski, Ljupcho
    The Russian aggression on Ukraine has been accompanied by two things – the ineffectiveness of the UN Security Council regarding this war, and the enormous amount of non-UN sanctions against Russia for its violation of international law. When it comes to the Responsibility to protect (R2P), sanctions are part of its third Pillar since “collective action” in the name of R2P is a broad term that is not limited only to military intervention but can include other measures with or without the use of force. Under the accepted R2P version of 2005, however, collective action should be undertaken by the UN Security Council only. What remains unanswered is what should the international community’s response be under Pillar 3 in cases when the UN Security Council is ineffective because it is passive or blocked, and especially when one of the perpetrators of R2P crime(s) is a permanent member of the Council, like there are indications today, for example, with Russia’s war on Ukraine or with China’s treatment of its Uyghur population. If the use of force is not an option in these situations because of prudent reasons, are sanctions adopted outside of the UN (Security Council) warranted and sufficient under the R2P norm? What does the answer to this question, in turn, say about R2P’s potential (especially regarding Pillar 3) as a norm? The paper will deal with the present questions and will argue that non-UN sanctions are a legitimate R2P response that should be undertaken by the international community on a case-by-case basis when the Security Council is unable or unwilling to fulfill its responsibility. On the other hand, there is no easy answer when it comes to the sanctions’ sufficiency and their effects on R2P, and these aspects will depend and should be assessed in accordance with numerous situational factors.
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    The Importance of the “Responsibility not to Veto” Debate
    (University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Law, 2017-05)
    Stojkovski, Ljupcho
    The six year war in Syria which has taken over 400.000 lives, led to the displacement of more than 11 million persons and has included war crimes and crimes against humanity, poses a serious challenge for R2P. One of the main reasons for inaction in this conflict is the blockade of the Security Council – as permanent members Russia and China have used their vetoes several times (Russia 6, China 5) to block proposed draft resolutions. The blockade has reinvigorated the appeals for a restrain in the use of the veto by the Permanent Members. This paper examines the Responsibility not to Veto (RN2V) idea – the idea to restraint the veto in the four cases susceptible to R2P. It briefly explores the idea’s history and then focuses on the two latest initiatives – the French proposal and the ACT’s Code of conduct. An analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of these proposals is being conducted, after which an assessment of their chances of success takes place. The paper concludes that similarly to other attempts to reform the UN Security Council, these initiatives do not have a real chance of succeeding any time soon. Nevertheless, the paper offers three reasons why the debate surrounding these proposals is significant and hence should continue. First, the debates indicate an alternative approach in cases when the Security Council is blocked and therefore could improve the issue of right authority for R2P. Second, the wide support that these initiatives enjoy, indicates that the 2005 R2P formula – preparedness for a case-by-case reaction in situations of manifest failure – is not a satisfactory outcome for the international community. Thus, they signal a search for a new understanding of Pillar 3 of R2P. Finally, they show the need for further development and upgrade of ‘R2P-lite’.