Меѓу мечот и перото: македонската фаланга и нејзиното историографско бреме

Abstract

Especially in Hellenistic times, the Macedonian phalanx was thought to be a cumbersome and vulnerable formation, whose eventual success was far too dependent of the terrain, so that it could be an equal opponent of the fluid and flexible Roman legions.

This impression of the inferiority of the phalanx as opposed to the legion is based not only on the outcome of the battle of Pydna, but also on a comprehensive breakdown offered by Polybius, who observes the peculiarities and differences between the legion and the phalanx in the context of the battle at Cynoscephalae. At first glance, his conclusions appear logical and entirely justified; Polybius skillfuly exposes and explains the weaknesses of the phalanx, the advantages of the Roman legion and the reasons for the constant defeats of the Hellenistic armies. However, a more thorough scrutiny of the events at Aoi Stena and Atrax, along with certain sequences from the battles of Selasia, Cynoscephalae and Pydna, shows that the interpretation offered by Polybius is neither entirely convincing, nor entirely appropriate. It is an indisputable fact that the Roman army was stronger than the armies of the Hellenistic kingdoms: the wars of the 2nd century BC prove this quite clearly and indisputably. The main question, however, is something entirely different: is the inadequacy of the phalanx indeed the main reason for the persistent defeats of the Hellenistic armies, especially when our sources clearly show that, contrary to whatever Polybius tends to prove, it was neither cumbersome, nor helpless?

The problem is that both Polybius and countless other historians influenced by his views identify the Macedonian phalanx – which was only a part, though undeniably the most important part of the Macedonian army – with the entire army; however, in the episodes intented to serve as proof, the legions do not defeat the phalanx, but the army. One should not explain the persistent defeats of the Hellenistic armies with the inadequacies of the phalanx as a formation, but rather with the inadequate composition of the armies and, above all, with the inadequate tactical principles of their military leaders. Taken as a whole, the Macedonian army proved to be incapable of adapting to the Roman system of maniples; but Polybius and others overlook that the phalanx and the army are not synonymous. In order to explain the constant inferiority of the Hellenistic armies to the Roman legions, we ought to look at the other constituent units and formations.