Критиката на методот: Вико и φρόνησις

Abstract

By criticizing the geometrical method, which tends to be the only instrument, not only in the sciences, but also within all domains of human life, Vico returns to Aristotle’s φρόνησις. In his early works where he sketches the basic principles of his “New Science”, he sets φρόνησις both as a principle of humanistic education, as well as a basis for human behavior. According to him, “the deeds of men cannot be assessed by a straight and unbending rule of the mind; they must be viewed according to the supple Lesbic rule, which does not conform bodies to it, but alters itself according to them” (De Nostri, VII, 34). In this text, the concept φρόνησις in the early works of Vico will be examined through several aspects: the ethical function of φρόνησις, the function of φρόνησις in the critique of the geometrical method, verum-factum and φρόνησις, ingenium and φρόνησις, ars topica and φρόνησις, providence and φρόνησις. Through these thematic points, the characteristics of φρόνησις in Vico’s works will be drawn, which will show his strategy in the battle against “the barbarism of the intellect”.