The Human Security Doctrine for Europe: A View from Below

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This article offers a critical perspective on the Human Security Doctrine for Europe both from a global and regional (Balkan) perspective. Having securitized the human security concept, the doctrine tries to legitimize a certain global political agenda that is based on the understanding of human security as a justification for an emerging system of global governance. Instead of promotion of the EU as a peace project, the doctrine may serve as one more instance of the ongoing militarization of the Union. One can argue that its value to recipient countries would be small, while it serves to boost the EU’s ambitions to become a serious actor in a world dominated by biopolitical rationale. The article argues that, instead of being a form of foreign and security policy of global actors, human security should rather be promoted as a form of internal policy focused on human rights, especially in the socioeconomic sphere in post- or pre-conflict societies.

Bird’s-eye Perspective of Human Security in a Globalized World

Two opposing perceptions of global security are shaping the current scholarly and policy debate. According to the first, at the beginning of the twenty-first century the world is becoming increasingly violent and insecure. The second, however, claims that today’s world is more peaceful but less secure. The differing assessments may be due to the different methodologies applied – or even to different perceptions. Conventional wisdom says that (in)security can be ‘objective’ (authentic and real) and/or ‘subjective’, that is, subject to actors’ feelings and perceptions. With regard to security (or conflict), the ‘golden rule’ is that perceptions matter! A substantial problem arises, however, when the perceptions of policymakers and security-providers differ from those of people who desire greater security and stability. The situation becomes even more complicated in the light of the securitization process. What is undeniable is that those (others) who are in power and control resources are in a much better position to assess how (in)-secure ‘we’ are, our main security concerns and priorities, and how they could provide greater security for ‘us’. As I come from the Republic of Macedonia, a post-conflict country seen as benefiting from international assistance, I can offer a view from below, especially as the evidence for securitization that I draw upon – the Human Security Doctrine for Europe – refers directly to Macedonia in the context of successful EU external actions.

The ‘securitization’ of individual well-being and safety is, at first sight, a considerable step forward. The concept of human security has focused attention on individuals and their basic interests and needs, which implies that human beings matter more than states. At first glance, the whole idea seems amazingly
altruistic, especially with regard to the foreign policy of some states. It is also seen as a result of the allegedly growing humanism within the international system. Nevertheless, in reality the international decisions and actions that have been undertaken have used the rationale of human security in a rather dubious way – both morally and legally. Some authors rightly stress that human security has become the essence of bio-politics, that is, the core of a new form of global governance that can differentiate between ‘homeland’ and ‘borderland’ populations and between so-called ‘developmental’ and ‘humanitarian’ life. Having allegedly excluded politics, post-modern humanitarianism reproduces the isolation of ‘bare life’. At the same time, state-building policies divorced from domestic politics create phantom states where sovereignty is an empty shell. This goal is not even hidden by proponents of this global policy. Continuing globalization is mostly seen through the current trend of a growing accumulation of wealth and power in ever-fewer hands, which creates massive poverty in the so-called Third World, resistance movements against foreign domination and the use of military force by some major powers to maintain inequality and access to natural resources throughout the world. This form of globalization contributes to structural violence and war and undermines human security. Some analysts see a new empire in the making, that is, a new global form of sovereignty or even a paradigmatic form of biopower that seeks to rule directly over human nature. One of the problems is that the ‘empire’ is attempting to shed its power and accountability and responsibility for undertaking state-building interventions.

The militaristic policies have intelligently embraced the rhetoric and rationale of human security. Not a single military intervention and action across the globe led by western powers has been made without reference to its main goal in terms of human rights protection, democratization, humanitarianism and peace and stability promotion, which are subsumed under the rubric of the ‘responsibility to protect’. A problem arises, however, when people are put in danger by precisely those who are supposedly protecting them from local dictators or oppressors. For example, on September 2006 UN rapporteur Manfred Nowak said that torture in Iraq is ‘out of hand’, and many Iraqis believe that today’s situation is worse than in the time of Saddam Hussein. The wanton destruction of the civilian infrastructure and cultural heritage in Iraq by the multinational forces was seen as unavoidable ‘collateral damage’ and not as a factor that directly contributed to the horrific scale of human insecurity in that country.

The double standard can also be illustrated by the Iraqi example. For instance, while US and UK citizens were being persuaded that it is better to enjoy security than liberal rights, Iraqi citizens were being exposed to a different philosophy: that it is better to have (pseudo) democracy than to enjoy basic physical security. Thus, in the western world there is a growing ‘fear of freedom’, while for the Iraqis or Afghans the priority is defined as ‘freedom from fear’ (from Saddam or the Taliban). Ultimately, everyone lives in an atmosphere of fear and insecurity. The conclusion is simple: both westerners and Iraqis equally need ‘freedom from fear’. Paradoxically, to provide greater security and freedom from fear, western governments reduce and sacrifice the liberal rights of their citizens, and at the
same time act against other people in order to give them more liberal rights and democracy, and to fight against invisible terrorists.

In contrast to the basic idea that human security represents a fusion between development and security, today the situation is defined in ‘either/or’ terms, or even more problematic, the security needs of homeland populations tend to outweigh the developmental needs of borderland populations. In the artificial clash between the two versions of human security, the freedom from fear is winning. Most western governments assume that once people are liberated from fear (physical vulnerability) they will more readily start working on ‘freedom from want’ and will devote their efforts to poverty eradication and development. They also use the emergency argument: as a result of physical force and oppression lives may be put at risk, while ‘freedom from want’ is less drastic and immediate. However, this issue is far from abstract and academic, because the threshold of an ‘acceptable’ death toll from direct or from structural violence (to use Johan Galtung’s terms) is never decided by those who are dying but by those who have the power to intervene. Thus one revisits the question of human suffering.

Unfortunately, states and international actors (including the media and international public opinion) usually wait until a crisis erupts before they take action. When a situation calls for ‘urgency’ and when morality finally ‘wakes up’ – it is usually rather late to prevent the loss of innocent lives. All major international actors prefer to act under the flag of humanitarianism when there is obvious bloodshed and, in the face of shocking violence, nobody looks for reasons, but rather there is a call for urgent measures to be taken. In other words, post festum actions get much more publicity and even support than preventive measures.

The leading theoretical position on ‘wars of the third kind’ and/or ‘new wars’ rests on two premises. First, the conflict or crisis in non-western states is held to be the product of domestic or internal problems, which are exacerbated by rapacious or criminal elites. Therefore the UN’s Cold War approach of neutrality and respect for states’ internal affairs can no longer be tolerated; instead, the international community must intervene and safeguard a just peace. Second, and more importantly, politics is taken out of the conflict by portraying the intervention (military or otherwise) of western powers as being above politics. According to this interpretation, there is no self-interest at work in external intervention; rather it is equated with the neutrality of policing – merely enforcing international or ‘cosmopolitan’ norms and laws. However, there is growing strategic unevenness of aid dispensation as well as variations in levels of response to humanitarian crises, depending on powerful actors’ political will. In other words, the bio-politics of the rich inevitably means the politicization of aid. On the other hand, by accepting the official version of apolitical humanitarian aid, despite their best intentions humanitarians actually ‘maintain a secret solidarity with the very powers they ought to fight’ and join the game in which humanitarianism reproduces the isolation of bare life.

Obviously, the world has learned nothing about early warning and prevention, while the western powers have not relinquished their hypocrisy and arrogance. It is rare to hear official criticism about the role of wealthy nations in increasing human insecurity. Global prejudices usually depict a black and white
image of some primitive and warmongering people who hate each other and particularly hate the West (allegedly with no actual reason), set against the civilized and generous United States, NATO or EU, whose aims are to alleviate human suffering and pacify fighting tribes. The truth is, however, rather more complex.

Global institutions remain blind and deaf to global injustices and the growing gap between the rich North and the impoverished South. They actually embody structural violence, that is, they are responsible for the deaths of millions without a single bullet being fired – not to mention the fact that the main arms dealers in the world are the powerful western manufacturers, some of whose ‘best customers’, especially when it comes to small and light weapons, can be found among the poorest and least democratic societies. As of mid-2006, press reports indicate that in an unjust world vulnerable people tend to become even more vulnerable, and can even be ‘sentenced to death’ by the business interests of multinational corporations and the national interests of powerful states. Africa’s population, for instance, is endangered by hazardous western waste that is dispatched to their countries.

The hypocrisy of global powers (who have the capacity to change the world for the better because they control the world’s resources) can be illustrated by the empty promises made by the G-8 to the African people. In summit after summit, not a single significant ‘promise’ has ever been kept. Indeed, they are little more than a sham. G-8 programmes may even hamper poverty reduction in Africa. Entirely conditional on fierce and discredited economic programmes imposed by the World Bank and the IMF, the ‘package’ of the 2005 Summit was guaranteed to ensure that the ‘chosen’ countries would slide ever more deeply into poverty. The very same countries that call for more democracy, human rights and human security impose unfair international trade rules, such as high tariffs on imported food, clothing and other goods, thus preventing poorer countries from developing their economies. Aid is often in the form of loans and is tied to products coming from the donor countries, or is directly tied to the privatization of public services. Many of the least developed nations are crippled by the huge burden of debt that has been forced on them by economic circumstance and by other governments and international financial institutions. Multinational corporations exploit the natural resources of countries with little or no benefit to the local population and little concern for the social and environmental impacts of their actions.

It does not call for a greater intellectual effort to understand that international security ultimately depends on the security of individuals. However, it is often forgotten that it is a two-way street because human security also depends on international factors such as globalization, hegemonic power, liberal policies, corporate interests and militarization. The first premise is deeply embedded in the Human Security Doctrine for Europe. Its promoters claim that Europeans cannot possibly be safe and secure as long as violent turmoil, instability and gross violations of human rights exist elsewhere – and particularly in the ‘traditionally close states and societies’. The doctrine implies that the best way to provide security for the EU and its citizens is to protect other human beings who are less fortunate and secure than they are. At this point two basic problems
can be identified. While one can hardly question the thesis that European security indeed depends on security elsewhere in the world, and that human insecurity within a nation can easily erupt into an international armed conflict, it is also true that as a global actor the EU is not immune from its responsibility for the growing human insecurity across the globe. Many EU member states as well as the EU as such will not always act in the best interests of impoverished nations. It is naive to believe in their righteousness: their protection of national interests is still governed by real-politik. The Human Security Doctrine undoubtedly points out an extremely important aspect of human security, but as a political document it fails to identify how the EU contributes to human insecurity in many parts of the world. In other words, the document has not embraced many important ways in which the EU could support human security agenda through its own actions and exemplary behaviour. It focuses more on post festum actions in situations of extreme urgency (that is, when a conflict has already broken out) or through the period of post-conflict stabilization.

Bearing in mind that the Human Security Doctrine is still to be fully developed and implemented, it seems worthwhile to look ahead to the main security threats that are likely to destabilize the world in the coming decades. One of the most profound and thought-provoking reports on these issues is the Oxford Research Group’s Global Responses to Global Threats: Sustainable Security for the 21st Century. Its basic premise is that since 9/11, the war against terrorism has quite unjustifiably dominated the global security discourse. To the contrary, the authors offer enough solid proof that international terrorism is a relatively minor threat and basically a distraction from a set of more fundamental, long-term issues that seriously threaten the well-being of humanity. In their view, four groups of factors are identified as the root causes of conflict and insecurity and the likely determinants of future conflict. They include: (1) climate change; (2) competition over resources; (3) marginalization of the majority world; and (4) global militarization. Unlike the currently dominant ‘control paradigm’, which calls for ‘attack on the symptoms’, the proposed ‘sustainable security paradigm’ is meant to resolve the root causes of those threats using the most effective means available (‘curing the disease’). The authors stress many important points, but three deserve to be specially emphasized. First, they rightly expect that governments will be unwilling to embrace this new paradigm without pressure from below – that is, through the pressure of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the wider civil society. Second, the ‘majority world’ (Asia, Africa and Latin America) is being marginalized because North America and Europe are trying to maintain their political, cultural, economic and military global dominance, which implies that the governments that would strongly resist any radical change on the global level are indeed the governments of the rich and powerful countries. In other words, they are being pressurized by civil society. Third, there is a high level of urgency because unless action is taken in the next five to ten years, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to avoid a highly unstable global system by the middle of the twenty-first century.

Bearing in mind the complexities involved, there are plenty of ways to promote and contribute to human security. It is understandable that the doctrine’s
authors call for a more focused approach. However, it is necessary to remedy the root cause of problems, and not just react to crisis situations. Also one should clearly identify the main actors who contribute to global human insecurity. Who is to be blamed for growing human misery? Are the locals responsible for their misfortunes, and should the EU respond merely with compassion and generosity? The struggle for human security begins at home, in the western and the richest countries, which are often the source of global insecurity. Otherwise, human security reflects a victimized view of humanity that is incapable of acting or improving without intervention.16

There are good reasons to believe that the Human Security Doctrine does not really represent an avant-garde contribution to European security but rather a continuation of its evolution. The doctrine’s reference document is the European Security Strategy of December 2003, which was endorsed by the European Council. It offers a soft-power approach but has been unable to apply it in such a way that it would promote human rather than state (and EU) security. The doctrine ‘speaks softly’ but still fails to find a solution to the dominant ‘hard-power approach’ pursued by the United States. Some analysts point out that the ‘special political flavour’ of the doctrine is due to its emphasis on the different worldviews of the EU and the United States – but in very diplomatic terms.17 However, it is still open to question whether the doctrine’s vocabulary is due to ‘diplomatic politeness’ or because of an inability or unwillingness to separate the common global political, economic and military interests of Venus (Europe) and Mars (USA).18

Before discussing the effects of the European Security Strategy (ESS) and its supplement the Human Security Doctrine, we shall examine some of the reasons for caution that sceptics bear in mind.

First, the human security concept has already been misused as a justification for actions that have nothing to do with human security and even contribute to growing human insecurity. In other words, human security (as well as human rights) has become an object of securitization, especially in its responsibility to protect and freedom from fear version. The lessons not learned from the 1999 NATO intervention in Kosovo are often bypassed, for the world faces two horrendous situations in Darfur and Iraq. In the first case, the world is passively watching or even turning a blind eye to an immense human tragedy, while in the other the international community failed to prevent the US and allied invasion under a false pretext.

Second, the human security concept, by definition, cannot and must not be selective. Care for human beings must be universal as are human rights – or there is no human security at all. In this case the answer to the crucial question ‘security for whom?’ is to be answered in the only possible way – for the humans in need. The doctrine necessarily limits itself to some international problems according to certain criteria, but they are mostly related to the EU’s own interests and capabilities – and largely to freedom from fear (that is, a *post festum* reaction). For instance, it is pure exaggeration to point to the EU’s successful intervention in the Macedonian conflict of 2001, bearing in mind that it can hardly be called a conflict (with a death toll of fewer than 200 people for the 6–7 month period, especially in comparison to some other ‘civil wars’ like Iraq
or the other ex-Yugoslav wars). To put it bluntly, in 2001 and after, Macedonia was far from being a real test for EU conflict management capabilities. We shall discuss this alleged ‘success story’ further, but at this point it is important to stress something else. The relationship between the ‘targets’ of EU intervention and the EU itself is somewhat strange. Instead of shifting towards a more demand-led rather than supply-led relationship, the EU interventions are products of the EU’s thinking principally about its own agenda (that is, its own interests, capabilities, chances of success and historic responsibilities). In other words, ‘locals’ and people in need are rarely in a position to be heard – unless they literally scream in terror. Unfortunately, reality proves that ‘all human lives are invaluable but some lives are more invaluable than others’. This was the case in Rwanda, for instance, in contrast to the ‘public concern’ in the case of Kosovo in 1999. Another example demonstrates the different values towards human lives that western governments hold when the lives of ‘westerners’ and ‘others’ are endangered. When a plot to attack planes taking off from London was prevented, the British senior police officer claimed that the Heathrow plot ‘was intended to be mass murder on an unimaginable scale’. In this hypothetical terrorist plot a few thousand people would have been killed (which would indeed have been an unspeakable tragedy). But not many officials seem to have been shocked and appalled by the fact that in the previous three years over 100,000 people had already died in Iraq (of which some 6,500 died in July–August 2006 alone). As John Pilger points out, the real difference between the Heathrow scare and Iraq is that mass murder on an unimaginable scale has actually happened in Iraq.19

Third, freedom from fear and freedom from want are closely connected, or even interdependent. Neglect for human security problems that derive from poverty, poor health, famine, scarce resources, illness and so on, means turning a blind eye to tomorrow’s violent problems, which are more difficult to treat and heal. At the same time, one should be honest and admit that the EU’s protection of its own economic interests in the globalization race could be seen as one of the factors that actually increases human insecurity in the underdeveloped countries (especially in Africa). Because of its selectiveness, the EU could fail to help individuals for whose insecurity it is partly responsible, and instead help others because of ‘historical ties’ or pragmatism. The Human Security Doctrine’s cry for morality could sound hypocritical (or like Orwellian newspeak) if this point is not seriously addressed. It is also important to stress that the EU political and economic space is not entirely free from human security concerns. Perhaps the following examples are not so dramatic as to raise serious public concern, but due attention should be paid to the violent riots in France, as well to as the growing signs of ethnic and religious intolerance as a by-product of the war on terrorism. Analysts already warn that the unhealthy public atmosphere of fear is leading to greater budget investment in the security apparatus of European countries. There is always more money for ‘security’ than for butter, environmental issues, social care, health or education.

Third, closely related to the previous point, it is also questionable whether the Human Security Doctrine (and the ESS) focuses on the right security threats. For instance, both documents seem to emphasize the dangers of terrorism,20 weapons...
of mass destruction,21 failed states and so on, over the problems of impoverishment and global social injustice, scarce resources and climate change. Indeed, the doctrine fails to address these issues even though in all likelihood they may become the most urgent security threats in the coming five to ten years. David Chandler rightly points out that the danger of failed states is grossly exaggerated by the international community’s policy of ‘state-building’,22 while the Oxford Research Group claims the same with regard to international terrorism. Even if the doctrine’s prognosis is correct, it remains unclear how the 15,000 troops it envisions as being mobilized can make any significant difference unless the other security providers in the international arena act in concert. For instance, despite the level of tragedy and destruction, the 2006 Lebanon war could barely mobilize European powers into committing troops for the UN mission. The situation in Afghanistan also manifests NATO’s fatigue, while the results are more than gloomy. According to an Oxfam report of 22 September 2006, as many as 2.5 million Afghans are starving.23 Having opted for the ‘freedom from fear’ variant, the Human Security Doctrine is faced with the imperative to act quickly; however, a ‘quick fix’ is not possible. On the contrary, the post-conflict situations in the Balkans (Bosnia, Kosovo), let alone some other parts of the world, show that once deployed the EU (or other international) troops become ‘hostages’ of the unstable and fragile local situation. It is always easier to achieve a ceasefire and impose a ‘peace agreement’ than to secure sustainable peace and development. Therefore, the ‘chances of success’ criterion of the Human Security Doctrine should be carefully defined. If Macedonia is taken as a good example of EU involvement the logical conclusion is that the EU would not readily intervene in more risky places.

The final point is that the Human Security Doctrine seems to be costly in several ways. First, EU taxpayers face serious problems. Perhaps it would be too dramatic or even inappropriate to call them ‘human security-related problems’, but some European countries stubbornly refuse to see the growing conflict potential in their own societies (such as France or Britain, for instance, let alone the 2006 riots in Hungary). Some of these problems could be amortized through spending ‘more on butter than on weapons’, even if the weapons are intended to help other human beings by improving their security. Second, some of the EU countries are security providers through other forms of engagement (NATO, the UN or as members of the US-led ‘Alliance of the Willing’ in Iraq), which means that their budgets and militaries are already overstretched. Beneath the fine rhetoric about Human Security Rapid Forces, it is still undeniable that two-thirds (10,000) of the troops will be military orientated. Furthermore, the military components need considerable funding, through human and financial resources and appropriate equipment, to be effective and efficient. In other words, one should carefully re-think whether some of the doctrine’s goals may be achieved through other methods – or other forms (for example, through the UN or NATO). Although it is understandable that the EU seeks its own security and military identity as a global actor, any fragmentation or non-coordination of international efforts leads to more human suffering and insecurity.
Human Insecurity in the Western Balkans

The Balkan area, or more precisely the territory of former Yugoslavia, has been seen as a European strategic area. But it is also true that this region has proved to be extremely important from the point of view of US national interests. In sum, this is a region that has served as a stage for the re-definition of post-Cold War international relations and particularly of transatlantic relations. Since the beginning of the Yugoslav turmoil in the last decade of the twentieth century, various international ‘cures’ and ‘doctors’ have operated throughout the region. The Balkan countries have participated in various old (and counter-productive) interventions, such as economic sanctions, but have also helped in shaping new international mechanisms and forms of interventions, beginning with the military intervention in Bosnia (although very late in the conflict), the ‘humanitarian’ intervention in Kosovo, and a series of post-conflict missions in Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia. Interestingly, this theatre seems to have given satisfaction to all involved actors, except for the local population which paid the price both for the ‘victories’ of their belligerent ethnic leaders and for the ‘successful’ remedies of the international actors. This is not to say that we should blame the external actors for the bloody conflicts here, but we should also be honest when evaluating their role and the effects of their actions. The international interventions were untimely, inadequate and often biased. The reasons should be sought both in the immaturity and incompetence of the EC/EU and also in the hidden agendas of some European states. The situation became even more complex with the direct involvement of US/NATO forces. However, ultimately everyone took credit for ‘handling the situation’ and pacifying the region: the UN could claim success in Croatia, in its paradigmatic preventive mission in Macedonia; NATO, the United States and the EU could be proud of the peace enforcement mission in Bosnia, its fulfilled ‘responsibility to protect’ in Kosovo and the post-conflict missions in both cases. Macedonia is an exception because it bore the epithet of ‘success story’ prior to the 2001 conflict as well as in its aftermath. Obviously, the EU takes special pride in its first peace missions, Concordia and Proxima. Even the doctrine of Human Security stresses this. The missions in Kosovo were of more dubious success, but the UN, NATO and the EU have been unwilling to admit it, especially while the negotiations over its final status continue.

The post-conflict landscape of the Balkans is an ambiguous picture. At first sight, it seems that since 2001 the region has entered a more peaceful stage of stabilization and reconstruction. New borders and new state entities have been born; elections have been held regularly, and there are several democratically elected governments. The incentive for joining NATO and the EU is strong, especially among the populations of the most underdeveloped states. For instance, there was very moderate enthusiasm for the EU and even less for NATO membership in Slovenia, the most developed country, in contrast to far greater support among the populations of Macedonia and Kosovo. However, by default, all new states and (semi)protectorates have officially adopted the EU integration strategy as the only solution for lasting peace and security in the region. On the
other hand, the EU assists the region through the process of post-conflict peace-
building and state building. After a decade of horror, the situation appears to
be improving.

But the reality is somewhat different. Indeed, many nations and ethnic groups
now have states of their own or are close to doing so. With few exceptions, the
new state entities are territorially determined, so that the responsibility for human
rights protection and human security rests on their governments. The region
enjoys a negative peace, but there are few signs of a burgeoning positive peace.
Susan Woodward points out that the international arrangements for the ex-Yugo-
slav nations proved to be ‘friendly to the radical ethnic elites’, those who were
responsible for starting the wars in the first place.\textsuperscript{24} In sum, there are ethnically
divided societies and constitutions that acknowledge the ‘reality’ that different
ethnic groups cannot live together unless embraced in some form of consociational
(power-sharing) arrangement. The problem with consociational democracy is that
it is scarcely affordable by impoverished societies. Indeed, the only workable
examples are to be found in more developed countries, such as Belgium, Austria
or Switzerland; in poor societies, this model gives results that have much more to
do with ethnocracy than with genuine democracy. So the divisions are being institu-
tionalized and ethnic cleansing (in Croatia and Kosovo) legitimized.

The speeches and compliments pay lip-service to a multiethnic Bosnia, Kosovo
or Macedonia, but are proof of the international community’s incapacity to admit
that it failed in such society building. In these countries people live their separate
lives in fear and distrust, unable to comprehend their common interests. The defi-
nition for these ‘common interests’ is precisely the concept of human security. The
former Yugoslav peoples have states of their own, and even state security tends to
be satisfactory (almost no national security doctrine claims that there are external
military threats for their countries). Furthermore, most of them want to join inter-
national peace missions in Afghanistan or Iraq, with the clear aim of proving that
they are prepared for Partnership for Peace membership in NATO.

Thus a vicious circle ensues. The logic of local elites is as follows: ‘Let’s first
invest in defence reforms (mostly military professionalization and moderniz-
ation); then we should join international peace missions in order to prove our mili-
tary capabilities; once we are admitted to NATO the country’s image will be
radically improved and foreign investors will rush to launch economic projects
in the country. And then we shall be able to meet human security priorities
(that is, create more jobs, better social and health care, education and so on).
And, of course, once we are in NATO, the doors of the EU’s promised land will
open automatically’. In other words, the well-known dilemma of any modern
democracy – ‘more weapons or more butter’ – is resolved in such a way that
‘butter’ is temporarily sacrificed for the sake of more and better weapons in
order to join NATO, membership of which is expected to reap rewards in terms
of more butter at some later point. It is a vicious circle, of course, because less
butter increases the country’s internal tensions and instability, while the US and
NATO demands are expanding rather than becoming more modest, especially
given the poor results of their missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. If judged
through statistics (that is, the number of troops) Macedonia’s participation in
alleged peace missions and state-building missions in Bosnia, Afghanistan and Iraq is extremely modest. It has a ‘symbolical value’ for the country’s image as a NATO partner (in Afghanistan) and ‘political value’ for the United States (in the case of Iraq). Macedonia’s leadership believes that the short cut to Brussels is through Washington, DC – or, better, through supporting the US administration, even if this means breaching international law or EU recommendations. For instance, Macedonia signed the bilateral agreement with the US government concerning the International Criminal Court (ICC) and thus violated its voluntarily undertaken international obligations under the Vienna Convention, the ICC Rome Statute and the EU Council’s recommendations. In other words, it is hard to convince local elites to abide by the rule of law on a national level if they are encouraged to break international law with impunity. On the other hand, a post-conflict society needs genuine peacebuilding and demilitarization, which can hardly be done when the military logic dominates over the strategies of defending national interests. Macedonia’s military capabilities (in terms of well-trained and professional special units) are already overstretched and the state can scarcely bear the burden; yet when in May 2006 the UK government asked for an additional 500 troops to be deployed in southern Afghanistan the answer was positive.

Numerous surveys and analyses, despite different methodologies and standards, are almost unanimous in depicting human insecurity in the region. An increase in poverty and a decrease in the middle class in the Western Balkans were caused by war, destruction, a large decrease in GDP and economic deprivation during the 1990s, as well as by the transition process. Insufficient income and resources are especially exacerbated by an increased economic, but also legal and personal insecurity and by the deterioration of institutions that previously provided ‘free of charge’ social and other services. A large portion of the population lives below the poverty line (Macedonia: 30 per cent; Bosnia: 25 per cent; and Kosovo: 50 per cent); many people are extremely poor meaning not even basic food needs can be met (12 per cent in Kosovo). The very high rates of unemployment testify to the abysmal employment record. Economic instability makes personal security very uncertain. Even worse, poverty is usually coupled with inequality. Subjective perceptions of poverty in the entire region are quite high. Such perceptions are formed by various factors. First, people still remember the relatively high living standards in the former Yugoslavia. Increased insecurity (especially with respect to job loss) is an important factor of the new reality, which together with other factors such as a decreased sense of personal security, exacerbates the feeling of vulnerability and risk of poverty. Subjective poverty is magnified by the high expectations that living standards would rise in a relatively short time following democratic changes or military destruction. These expectations were further nurtured by politicians with their continuous promises of a quick entry into NATO and/or the EU. On the other hand, when the perceived unequal distribution of jobs and wealth, access to resources and so on is along ethnic lines, then the general socio-economic problems translate into ethnically motivated injustices. The countries in the region also ‘compete’ with one another when it comes to organized crime and corruption. In sum, the region is still marred by weak states with relatively high internal conflict potential.
The political elites that dominate the political scene in the region are not only corrupt but some of them have also inherited a huge legacy of war ‘heroism’. Bearing in mind that ‘internationals’ are pragmatic and work with what they have at hand (that is, with the local elites), they are not very choosy regarding background and previous credentials. In a post-conflict society, this means that they have to cooperate with and assist even the groups that used to be militant, corrupt and/or non-democratic. (Presumably, if there had not been any such, there would have been no violent conflict in the first place.) This is not a problem per se as long as the militants are not empowered to assume important political positions. In other words, one should make a distinction between the necessary DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants) and political co-option of militant ethnic leaders. Significantly, disarmament in Kosovo was never truly carried out, while Kosovo Liberation Army commanders have become guarantors of the safety of the international administration. In the post-conflict period, Macedonia has witnessed a partial disarmament and demobilization process, but the dimension of reintegration of former combatants has been absent. The top brass of the disbanded National Liberation Army transformed themselves into a political party and on the wings of ‘military victory’ (as the Albanians perceived it in 2001–02) won over the hearts and ballots of the citizens in the Albanian community during the first post-conflict parliamentary elections in 2002. Even prior to the elections there was a kind of ‘electoral engineering’: EU High Commissioner Javier Solana went to Skopje to deliver a message on the impending government coalition building, which, according to the EU (although not according to Macedonia’s constitution), should comprise the political winners in the two ethnic blocs. Quite expectedly, the winners on the Albanian side were the ex-rebels, while on the Macedonian side it was the opposition (because the ruling party was punished for ‘military failure’ in 2001).

To the complaints from intellectuals and civil society that the international community often assists and legitimizes crooks, the usual answer is: ‘It is what we find on the ground and you (that is, the locals) have allowed them to be your elite!’ During the ‘oasis of peace’ period in Macedonia (1991–2001), the international presence was quite sufficient and competent to see that the elites-in-making were democratic. The regime they could sustain was a demokratura (that is, autocracy with democratic legitimacy, or illiberal democracy). But as long as the regime did not spoil the image of the ‘oasis of peace’ it was acceptable to the international community. In sum, for years the international community was lenient towards the local politicians for one reason or another. The latter behaved recklessly, as they knew that the international community would always forgive them because ‘peace and order’ in the country were paramount. As long as they paid lip-service to the internationals and cooperated with them over some issues (for instance, support for their regional interventions in Kosovo or later on cooperation in Iraq, and signing the bilateral agreement with the United States regarding the ICC), they could rely on the ‘injection’ of external legitimacy for all the failures at home. This situation was brilliantly described by the Bulgarian analyst Ivan Krastev: ‘Our governments make love with the people but are always loyal to the international community’.
This is not to say that the international community intentionally supports corrupt and suspiciously democratic elites, but it is true that its main concern is ‘stability’ rather than ‘quality of democracy’. Because they are aware of the necessity for stability, the political elites often become too self-confident and do not take seriously the warnings issued by the internationals. When they have gone too far and the international community can no longer allow such behaviour, disciplinary measures are taken. The party leaders who misbehave are then called to task in the US embassy or the EU delegation’s office. To the general public, this sends an obvious message about who is ‘in charge’ and to whom their elected politicians are accountable.

The state-building process in the Balkan region has been carried out under the watchful eye of the EU. More precisely, Europeanization has been seen as the only panacea for all the country’s ills. The Macedonian example may look quite different and not necessarily comparable with others in the region, but it is also quite instructive: the ‘therapy’ began during the 2001 conflict, when the lack of creativity on how to deal with the violence was replaced by the well-known ‘stick-and-carrot’ policy of the international community. The ‘carrot’ (that is, the EU Stabilization and Association Agreement) was offered undeservedly during the hostilities. Another undeserved ‘reward’ came in late 2005 when Macedonia achieved EU candidate status. For democracy this created a harmful self-confidence among the political elites, who started boasting to the domestic public that the international community highly appreciated their achievements. Actually the only ‘achievement’ since 2001 has been the implementation of the Framework Agreement (FA) for peace, no matter how imperfect and with how much direct international involvement it has been carried out. Macedonia is lagging behind in respect of all the other Copenhagen criteria for EU membership, while apparently it shows extraordinary progress in something that has nothing to do with a normal democracy. In a way, both Macedonia and the EU have become ‘hostages’ of the FA implementation, both sides dependent on this process. As soon as the FA was signed, Macedonia became even more valuable for EU external action policies. Relatively soon, in March 2003, the EU launched its first military peace-support mission abroad, Concordia, which was replaced after nine months by the police mission Proxima. In the words of Lord George Robertson, on launching the Concordia mission in Skopje, ‘the EU is demonstrating that its project of a European Security and Defence Policy has come of age’, while Germany’s Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer declared the mission an ‘improvement in the EU’s capacity to act in terms of European security and defence policy’. Some observers rightly noted that the missions appeared to be more important to the EU than to Macedonia. In other words, Macedonia was a successful testing ground for the EU’s fledgling security and defence policy. Throughout the whole post-conflict period, the EU emphasized FA implementation as the country’s primary goal and the ‘carrot’ was always related to this achievement. This created a misperception with the Macedonian leadership that the other goals were less important for the country’s recovery and progress. Actually, the 2002 government had no governmental policy other than implementation of the FA, which
often undermined the very significance of the rule of law principle for the sake of ethnic elites’ co-existence.

The political establishment and citizens live in two parallel worlds, each one preoccupied with their own perceptions and priorities. In contrast to the rather euphoric political claims about the country’s readiness to join NATO or the EU, the citizens are caught in a vicious circle of insecurity that originates mainly in social and economic spheres. The existing gap between political elites and military leadership, on one side, and the citizens, on the other, is supposed to be bridged through the active role of NGOs, the media, research institutions and so on. The ideal picture would be that democracy, and even democratization, is all about alternatives and a dialogue between the leaders and the led. However, Europeanization is purely an elitist project (although of unequal partners), which is based on frequent dialogues between the national and European elites. Both elites are often out of touch with the reality in which people live, or they simply turn a blind eye to the fact that citizens are mostly concerned with unemployment, corruption and poverty – and not with the FA, inter-ethnic relations and the country’s foreign policy goals. Due to the ‘Schengen Wall’, most Macedonian citizens are deprived of even an opportunity to visit an EU member state and to see the situation at first hand. Thus, they have no other choice but to trust their leaders. The only ones who can bridge the Macedonian and EU realities are intellectuals and those with good business or other connections between the two worlds. Only those with personal experience gained by frequent visits to EU countries, and contacts with European policy-community and academia, can clearly see the true challenges and how far Macedonian reforms have progressed.

Impoverished and poorly informed citizens can be fed a diet of EU dogma for only so long; in the long run, the effects can be counterproductive. People become distrustful, tired and even radical – and of course, susceptible to other ‘ideologies’, such as populism and demagoguery. The only way to avoid such an outcome is to create realistic policies and to demystify all mantras, including that of the EU. The task is far from easy because it faces resistance from both EU bureaucrats and local elites. Anybody who dares to challenge the myth of the Macedonian success story runs the risk of being called a traitor, an anti-EU/anti-NATO/anti-US element, or even a populist and nationalist. Intellectuals are the only ones who continue to warn of the unfinished business of human insecurity, because they are the only ones who speak a ‘language’ that ordinary citizens understand and appreciate. The professional politicians, be they local or international, use ‘politically correct’ rhetoric, mostly about the FA and EU prospects, which automatically qualifies them as democrats. The truth is that they depend on the level of optimism and success in their office, so they rarely appreciate ‘reality checks’. The easiest way to silence their critics is to try to entice them into various well-paid projects – or to blacklist them. In other words, the well-known ‘carrot-and-stick’ tactics are applied here, too.

The way civil society is empowered in Macedonia, but also in the other countries in the region, casts a shadow over the so-called ‘ownership issue’ in the state-building process. The European Commission puts much emphasis on civil society empowerment. For instance, in one of its strategic documents, it
criticizes the prospective EU member states because ‘none of the countries can yet claim to have the level of vibrant and critical media and civil society that is necessary to safeguard democratic advances. For example, public and media access to information, public participation in policy debate and accountability of government and its agencies are aspects of civil society which are still largely undeveloped in all five of the countries’. However, the practice highlights the controversy between the two understandings of the very concept of civil society with regard to the internationals and the locals. Indeed, even the modern debate on civil society raises somewhat loud voices regarding the relationship between civil society and good governance. The crucial point of divergence is whether civil society should be understood and developed as merely an ‘apolitical’ sphere of a ‘dense network of civil associations’, or a strong political civil society that would energize alternative and independent political activity against democratura-like regimes. The EU tends to have the first perception in mind, that is, it prefers to see civil society as a constructive and cooperative partner of the democratically elected governments in the region. However, most of the civil society organizations suffer from the so-called ‘dependency syndrome’, and are heavily dependent on external grants try to act accordingly. Very few organizations can afford to take a more critical stand towards both the state and international authorities.

The internationals barely accept that a vibrant civil society is supposed to play the role of a watch-dog equally with regard to both the local political actors and the representatives of the international community. For example, following the July 2006 parliamentary elections, the EU ambassador to Macedonia, Erwan Fuere, became involved in the coalition-building process. The party that won the largest number of seats in parliament decided to invite into its coalition an Albanian party that did not win the majority of the Albanian votes but did win enough to support the new ruling coalition. The EU ambassador tried to lobby on behalf of the ‘Albanian winning party’ even before the judicial process was completed. In its monthly report, the Macedonian Helsinki Committee (MHC) condemned such behaviour from the international community and even implied that such interference in the inherently national political process may be seen as undermining the rule of law principle. As soon as the media published the report of this influential NGO, the ambassador’s aide tried to set up a meeting with the president of the MHC, claiming that the ambassador was ‘outraged and shocked’ by the report. There was considerable discussion among the Helsinki Committee’s executive board members about whether it was appropriate to accept such an urgent invitation (received late on the Friday evening) for the early Monday morning meeting at the ambassador’s office. The place and timing of the meeting, the presence of as many as ten advisers (only two were entitled to represent the MHC), and even more important, the undiplomatic tone of the whole meeting, leads to certain conclusions. Internationals are as sensitive to public criticism as the local politicians; after dealing with Macedonian politicians, the internationals wrongly perceive that ‘they are all the same’, that is, that the NGO sector is as dependent and responsive to their expressions of displeasure as is the case with the politicians; the watch-dog mission should be
directed only at the local elites; and prior to any public criticism of the internationals, the Macedonians should consult them and inform them of their findings; ‘internationals’ do care about their public image but fail to see that disciplining the local critical voices is undermining the very foundations of civil society.

A Human Security Doctrine for the Balkans?

To paraphrase Mahatma Gandhi, human security for Europe could be a very good idea, even from the point of view of EU citizens. In other words, consideration for individual security is the essence of any democratic state or supranational entity such as the EU. Its citizens may not be as vulnerable as others in non-EU parts of Europe and other parts of the world. Yet the perceptions of being insecure are growing due to the disastrous effects of the war on terrorism and the evolving spiral of violence at the global level.

However, the Human Security Doctrine focuses on a specific concept of human security – as a form of foreign and security policy for the EU. In other words, it is being designed to respond to urgent humanitarian catastrophes in a selected number of cases. The profile of the proposed Human Security Response Forces (with their mix of military and civilian staff) and their defined objectives raise doubts as to whether it would be applicable to the Balkans today. It is not the kind of human security concept that the region really needs. In order to stabilize the current negative peace, the EU should help the region turn towards a positive peace strategy. Otherwise, the grave socioeconomic situation coupled with unresolved war trauma and lack of post-conflict reconciliation will provide fertile ground for a new round of bloody upheaval – perhaps not immediately, but at some time in the future. The Balkan region badly needs ‘freedom from want’ and grassroots democracy. It needs to translate the ‘human security paradigm’ as a basis for an internal policy agenda. In other words, the EU may consider human security as a guideline for its external actions, but some of its recipients may need another type of doctrine. Indeed, talking about human security concerns in the internal political scene causes international representatives to raise their eyebrows because it smells of ‘populism’ and radical thinking.

As a powerful global actor, the EU could promote human security in many different ways. There are vast opportunities and means, for which the EU countries have a large reservoir of excellent knowledge and skills. They need only the political will to do so. An attempt to build new military–civil capabilities could provide entry into a game in which the United States is far superior. It would be a pity to see Venus turning into Mars.

NOTES


11. These facts are easily obtainable for the Blair government, for instance: in addition to its best customers, Saudi Arabia and Israel, the government has also been selling arms and military equipment to General Suharto’s genocidal regime and to Tanzania, the poorest country in the world, which purchased an extremely expensive military air traffic control system in 2002.

12. According to Greenpeace, inspections of 18 European ports in 2005 found that 47 per cent of all waste destined for export out of Europe was illegal. It is illegal to ship hazardous waste, but old electronic items can be sent to developing countries for ‘recycling’ (according to DEFRA, the UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) (http://news.independent.co.uk/world/afrika/article1640485.ece).


19. John Pilger, ‘The real threat we face in Britain is Blair’ (www.countercurrents.org/pilger190806.htm).

20. According to Prof. Jack Mendelsohn (US Department of State, 1963–85 and professor of National Security Affairs, US Naval Academy, 1998–99), ‘the war against terrorism has been a near-term distraction from a set of more fundamental, long-term issues that seriously threaten the future well-being of the globe’. In the words of Jan Oberg, director of TFF (Lund): ‘The post 9/11 mainstream security discourse has run on three myths: that terrorism has no causes worth discussing, that terrorism is only non-governmental, and that the “war on terror” should be given priority over all other global challenges’. Endorsements to Abbott et al. (n.14 above), p.2.

21. Three years after the beginning of the war in Iraq no trace of Weapons of Mass Destruction were found; yet this war endangered millions of human lives and worsened regional and global security.

22. See Chandler (n.8 above).


25. In this context, one can mention IDEA surveys, UN Development Programme Human Development and Early Warning Reports, and World Bank analyses and reports.

26. See more in Gordana Matković, ‘Overview of poverty and social exclusion in the Western Balkans’, UN Development Programme (intra.rbec.undp.org/mdg_forum/overview.htm).

27. In particular the fear of becoming unemployed and the uncertainty of keeping a job, the non-functioning of the rule of law, increased crime, insecurity regarding the return of some refugees and Internally Displaced Persons.

28. Primarily free health care, education, but often also low-priced food in the factory canteen, inexpensive vacations at trade union holiday resorts, purchase of different goods through trade union organizations, low electricity and utility prices, and so on.


30. On the occasion of the 2000 presidential elections, which were grossly marred with irregularities and even violent incidents and are still seen as one of the most fraudulent electoral processes in Macedonian political history, the first and overt greetings to the 'new President' (Boris Trajkovski) arrived directly from the US State Department even before the appeals were considered by the Supreme Court.


32. See Macedonia Helsinki Committee at www.mhc.org.mk.

33. The author, a member of the Helsinki Committee’s Board was asked to talk to Ambassador Ervan Fuere on the Committee’s behalf.