

Ss. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje



INSTITUTE FOR
SOCIOLOGICAL
POLITICAL AND
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**INSTITUTE FOR SOCIOLOGICAL,
POLITICAL AND JURIDICAL RESEARCH**



CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY II

Proceedings from the International conference

17 November 2017, Skopje, Macedonia



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Institute for sociological, political and juridical research

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**LANDMINES AND REFUGEES: OUT OF THE FRYING PAN,
INTO THE FIRE**

Abstract

MSince September 2015, when Hungary started to secure its borders with Serbia with militarized razor-wire fences and closing the routes for displaced people, refugees and migrants seeking refuge in European countries have to find alternative routes to the hope. Their desperation has compelled thousands of them to take long journey through cornfields toward the mine suspected areas in the Serbian-Croatian border. Due to their lack of knowledge about the area and having limited contact with local communities makes them more vulnerable to landmines and unexploded ordinances. On the other hand, being outside of the protection of a state increases the vulnerability. According to the latest reports by Croatian Mine Action Center, "the current status of mine suspected areas in Croatia amounts to 444 km²" Mine suspected areas are contaminated with 43,361 mines and also large number of unexploded ordinances. This study aims to take a comprehensive look at the dangers displaced people face when fleeing through minefields. Surveys, reports and case studies conducted by agencies and organizations involved in mine action and the protection of refugees, will be analyzed dealing with this tragic problem of landmines and unexploded ordnance.

Keywords: refugees, landmines, unexploded ordnance, migration, Croatia

Overview of challenges that refugees face in the Western Balkans Route

‘When the law and morality contradict each other, the citizen has the cruel alternative of either losing his moral sense or losing his respect for the law’ says French Politician Frederic Bastiat. In this quote Bastiat did not just mention the moral and law, he also mentioned the nature of a war. Since the beginning of the Arab Spring, it was not just the rebellion against dictators; it was also struggle not to losing their moral sense and their respect for the natural rights. Some Reformists have partly succeeded some could not. But things never went which are expected by Modern Democracies that supported so-called revolutions. Conflicts were taking lives, destroyed families, and destroyed the law or in other words ruined respect for the law in the Middle East. This hopelessness brought almost 11 million homeless and 6 million refugees who desire to have better life and brighter future in Europe, the land of peace and prosperity. However those refugees brought Europe reactionary ideas. Now the pest of unnatural laws and immoral behaviors by former Middle Eastern Pharaohs are spreading through Western Balkans, Central Europe and finally all over the world like a deadly virus.

News from the Guardian states that “After the closure of the Western Balkans route as a result of the EU-Turkey Statement in March 2016, the number of people reaching Greece via the Eastern Mediterranean route drastically decreased. The Central Mediterranean Route from North Africa to Italy has become the primary entry point to Europe.”¹

Although after the EU-Turkey Statement seems like changed the migration route, it might not be so. After the Agreement, the migration via Central Mediterranean Route has just gone underground and there are still suffers from harsh migrate policies by governments in Eastern Europe.

The Greek-Turkish borderline ‘River Meriç’ is still the most usual land route and Aegean Sea is still most usual sea route for refugees from Syria, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and even Turkey. The coast of River Meric

¹ Migrant sea route to Italy is world’s most lethal, The Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/11/migrant-death-toll-rises-after-clampdown-on-east-european-borders> (accessed 5 November 2017)

might be the biggest black market and safer harbor for the human traffickers in the East Europe. The bottle water prices start from \$5 to \$15 and bread prices start from \$2 to \$5 which are more than 1000% expensive than Turkish market prices. By that exploitation, Syrian Refugees still desire to cross the river however they do not want to get beaten and robbed by Greek Border Police and exiled from Greece, but only 5% of them can successfully pass and head to the Republic of Macedonia via Gevgelija border. On the other hand, Due to the fact that people cannot leave, hundreds of refugees are continuing to arrive every day. Limited infrastructure and capacity of the facilities lead to horrible congestion and many unaccompanied children who are the most vulnerable to abuse, exploitation and trafficking are paying the heaviest price. According to latest report which was published by the UNICEF in May 2017, at least 300,000 unaccompanied and separated children crossing borders alone have been documented in 80 countries in the years 2015 and 2016.

It is impossible to mention all challenges refugees face here but only a few of them can leave Republic of Macedonia behind and head through the dangerous land mine zone in Croatia, or to the wall in Hungary.

Landmines and Refugees

The conflict in Syria has caused the largest refugee crisis of the beginning of 21th century. This crisis has brought the world's attention the frightening risks that refugees face. Landmine and unexploded ordnance are two of them. From the beginning of their long journey to peace, Syrian refugees encounter risks due to landmines or unexploded ordnance contamination in Syria and the minefields along Syria's border with Turkey that had been mined by the Turkish Armed Forces in 1950s. Almost at the end of their long journey to peace, the Europe, this insidious threat welcomes them at the Croatian border where about a million landmines were laid along, during the breakup of former Yugoslavia.

Many landmine and unexploded ordnance victims are, or have been, refugees in the Europe².

The Council of Europe's former Commissioner for Human Rights, Thomas Hammarberg has stated that "... in certain areas of Europe, migrants in search of asylum have stepped on mines. They do not see the warning signs when they are trying to cross these contaminated areas during the night."³ Here are two examples that corroborate this statement. In Greece, immigrants made up most of all civilian casualties. 104 non-national had been killed and another 187 were injured in the border minefields, according to an official from Greek Army Land Minefield Clearance Battalion.⁴ According to national database of mine victims in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 948 of 1,846 civilian landmines and unexploded ordnance casualties were returnees, refugees, or IDPs between 1992 and 2009.⁵

As we highlighted above, for many years, landmines and unexploded ordnance along the borders of some European countries have caused casualties among displaced people. Croatia's border has a potential to be one of those. This study aims to take a comprehensive look at the dangers displaced people face at the door of peace when fleeing to Europe through minefields.

Overview of Demographics of Landmine Casualties

Landmine and unexploded ordnance are two of the most insidious threats to civilians. Peace agreements may be signed, hostile aggression may be ceased but landmines and unexploded ordnance are left behind as the one of the enduring heritages of war. Landmines

² International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munitions Coalition (ICBL-CMC) (2015) Landmines/ERW, Refugees and Displacement, 20 June 2015.

³ Child Rights International Network <http://www.crin.org/en/home/what-we-do/crinmail/crinmail-1185> (accessed 17 October 2017)

⁴ International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munitions Coalition (ICBL-CMC) (2013) Landmines and Refugees: The Risks and the Responsibilities to Protect and Assist Victims, Briefing Paper, Geneva

⁵ BHMIC (2009) Report and Analysis of the Landmine Victim Database (1996–2009), Sarajevo, p.11.

are explosive devices that are triggered by mostly pressure or movement. They are designed as anti-personnel or anti-tank. Anti-personnel mines are designed to be activated by people and that are often aimed to injure them, while anti-tank mines are intended to defeat vehicles. Unexploded ordnance is explosive weapons that didn't explode when they were used in conflict. Both pose a serious and continuous threat to civilians until they are removed. These explosive devices can be found on roads, footpaths, forests, deserts, agricultural lands or in other places surrounding living areas where people are carrying out their daily routines. Because their locations are unknown, they are invisible and they can remain active long after conflict has ended⁶. Although it is easy and cheap to make a landmine because of its simple technology, clearing mines is dangerous, time-consuming and costly work. It costs as little as \$3 to make a landmine.⁷ It costs \$300-\$1000 to remove one.⁸ Until 1999, for every 5,000 mines that are demined, one deminer has been killed and two have been injured. There were 1,675 casualties among deminers since 1999⁹ (Figure 2).

In 84 countries, there are an estimated 110 million landmines still planted in the ground. More than 200,000 km² of the world's surface is contaminated with landmines.¹⁰ This area is larger than half of Germany. Despite the inadequate data of collection on landmines and unexploded ordnance incidents, a total of 102,970 landmines and unexploded ordnance casualties¹¹ have been recorded that

⁶ Gözübenli A S (2016) A Socio-economic Perspective on the Need for Humanitarian Demining, Proceedings of 5th International Conference on Management, Business and Economics IC-MBE, ISBN 978-9951-550-12-3, Durrës, Albania.

⁷ Keeley R (2003) Understanding Landmines and Mine Action, Mines Action Canada p. 7.

⁸ Andersson, N, da Sousa C P, Paredes S (1995) Social cost of land mines in four countries: Afghanistan, Bosnia, Cambodia, and Mozambique. *British Medical Journal*, 311, p. 718.

⁹ International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munitions Coalition (ICBL-CMC) (2016) *Landmine Monitor*.

¹⁰ Kasban H Zahran, O Elaraby S M El-Kordy M Abd El-Samie F E (2010) A Comparative Study of Landmine Detection Techniques. *Sensing and Imaging: an International Journal*, 11, pp. 89-112.

¹¹ *Ibid.* 9, p. 44.

between 1999–2015 26,230 people killed,¹² according to the Landmine Monitor 2016, the latest annual monitoring report by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (hereinafter referred to as ICBL). This number does not include the thousands of casualties that go unreported when victims are killed or injured in remote areas, where communication options are limited.

In 1999, there were averages of more than 24 landmines and unexploded ordnance casualties daily. According to the latest monitoring report, there were averages of 17 landmines and unexploded ordnance casualties occurring each day in 2015. Latest statistics shows a sharp increase of 75% from casualties recorded for 2014 (Figure 1). The reason of this sharp increase can be explained by armed conflicts in Libya, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen.




Figure 1: Number of mine/UXO casualties per year (1999–2015)¹³

Between 1999 and 2003, the percentage of civilian casualties averaged 81% per year. Since 2005, civilians have represented approximately 73% of casualties for which the civilian status was known.¹⁴ Since 1999, civilians have accounted on average for 76.3% of all casualties (Figure 2).

¹² Ibid. 9.

¹³ Ibid. 9, p. 44.

¹⁴ Ibid. 6, p. 3.




Figure 2: Percentage of mine/UXO casualties by civilian/military status recorded (1999–2015)

11,774 child casualties of a total of 27,990 civilian was recorded¹⁵ since 2005, when systematically collect collecting of age-disaggregated landmines and unexploded ordinance casualty data in began.




Figure 3: Percentage of mine/UXO casualties by age (1999–2015)

¹⁵ International Campaign to Ban Landmines – Cluster Munitions Coalition (IC- BL-CMC) (2016) The Impact of Mines/Erw on Children.

Insidious Danger at the Door of Europe

Overview of Mine situation in the Republic of Croatia

According to the latest reports by Croatian Mine Action Center, “the current status of mine suspected areas in Croatia amounts to 444 km²” Mine suspected areas are contaminated with 43,361 mines and also large number of unexploded ordinances left over from the war in former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1995¹⁶. A total of 1,980 landmines and unexploded ordnance casualties, including 512 killed, 31 unknown and 1437 injured, have been recorded in the country since 1999. There are no reliable estimates for the total number of people killed by landmines in Croatia. It’s estimated that more than 300 civilian have been killed by landmines since the 1991-1995 war in former Yugoslavia has ended.



Figure 4: Movement of refugees and migrants through the Balkans¹⁷

¹⁶ Croatian Mine Action Centre: CROMAC (2017) Mine Situation, <https://www.hcr.hr/en/minSituac.asp> (accessed 18 October 2017)

¹⁷ ACAPS (2015) Briefing Note – Balkans: Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Transit.



Figure 5: Minefields at Croatian-Serbian border¹⁸

Hazards Refugees Face after Hungarian Border Barrier

As stated in the United Nations Mine Action Project Portfolio “During four years of armed conflict in Croatia, mines were laid by all the warring parties, mainly to protect defensive positions, which changed frequently, but also in areas of strategic importance, such as railway lines, power stations and pipelines,”¹⁹ landmine locations are well marked and are known to the local population. But “the majority of suspected mined areas are woods and forests followed by agricultural land, underbrush, meadows and pastures.”²⁰

After Hungary built a border barrier along its Serbian border, refugees dreaming to reach their target have found a new route to the European countries (Figure 4). Their desperation has compelled thousands of them to take long journey through cornfields toward the mine suspected areas in the Serbian-Croatian border. Just two days after the completion of Hungarian border barrier, on 16 September

¹⁸ Dear refugees: Welcome to Croatia and website welcome.cms.hr

¹⁹ United Nations Mine Action Project Portfolio <http://www.mineaction.org/taxonomy/term/992> (accessed 1 November 2017)

²⁰ Ibid. 19.

2015, Croatia became one of the main transit countries for refugees with about 12,000 entries per day.²¹

A map by the Croatian Mine Action Centre shows a heavily contaminated stretch of eastern Croatia, near Serbia which is the only way for refugees and migrants trying to reach Western Europe (Figure 5). The entire mine suspected area on the territory of the country is marked with 14,018 mine warning signs. This corresponds to one-third of the number of landmines contaminated in the country.

When they flee their own countries due to desperate conditions of conflict, war and poverty, refugees no longer have the protection of their own state. They often lack official recognition as refugees, citizenship status; and adequate documentation to regularize their status. So refugee mine victims are caught this insidious danger outside the protection of the state. On the other hand, lack of knowledge of the area and having little or no contact with more informed local communities make refugees and migrants more vulnerable to landmines and unexploded ordnance.

Landmines and unexploded ordnance incidents effect not only direct victims, but also their families and immediate vicinity struggling under psychological and socio-economic problems. Refugees who are survivors or other persons with disabilities face rising risks due to a lack of essential items, accessibility to necessary health and rehabilitative services as well as due to other forms of neglect and discrimination. Men and boys are the largest groups of landmines and unexploded ordnance casualties. For example in 2015, There were 546 females recorded as casualties in 2015 where 2,435 casualties the sex was not known.²² (Figure 6). Considering that most refugees come from patriarchal societies, male landmines and unexploded ordnance victims make their family more vulnerable. On the other hand female victims can be the most disadvantaged group and suffer different forms of discrimination as survivor. Child survivors also have more specific needs in all aspects of assistance, particularly psycho-

²¹ European Economic and Social Committee (2016) EESC fact-finding missions on the situation of refugees, as seen by civil society organizations, Mission Report – Croatia, 12-13 January 2016.

²² Ibid. 9, p. 47.

social support and special education. Challenges from displacement multiple additional barriers to their full and equal participation..




Figure 6: Percentage of mine/UXO casualties by sex (2015)²³

Instead of Conclusion

At the beginning of this year, the UNHCR announced that 65.3 million people around the world became refugees, asylum-seekers, and IDPs around the world. Day by day, the need of ensuring safety of displaced persons from the risks of landmines and unexploded ordnance heightens.

While the lack of necessary protection during their journey on the EU migration routes remains undetected, the measures taken by the EU countries to prevent further movement to their preferred destination increase their vulnerability to become a victim of landmines and unexploded ordinance.

The lack of official recognition as refugees, conflict victims and landmine or cluster munitions victims; citizenship status; and adequate documentation to regularize their status presents both immediate and longer term challenges to receiving needed assistance. It's clear that victims and other displaced persons with disabilities often face

²³ Only the casualties for which the sex was known

insufficient and unequal access to shelter, education, specialized healthcare and rehabilitation within refugee camps. States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty and Convention on Cluster Munitions, also known as Ottawa Treaty, are responsible for ensuring adequate assistance for landmines and unexploded ordnance victims on their territory, no matter their citizenship status. As of June 2015, all the member states of the European Union became bound by Ottawa Treaty. EU and the country at the door of the EU should increase the accessibility of assistance to victims.

Due to their lack of knowledge of the arrival area and having limited contact with more informed locals, refugees and migrants need to access scarce local resources. In this context, in the Republic of Croatia some initiatives were established by local citizens. For example, Facebook page entitled “Dear refugees: Welcome to Croatia” that campaigns to provide useful information have been warning them of the dangers of landmines in English, Croatian, Arabic and Dari languages. States should take lessons from this example and should clearly express their commitment and mobilize national and international resources to overcome such barriers for refugees and asylum seekers.

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Other Resources

Child Rights International Network <http://www.crin.org/en/home/what-we-do/crinmail/crinmail-1185>

Croatian Mine Action Centre (CROMAC) MIS Portal <https://misportal.hcr.hr/HCRweb/faces/intro/introduction.jspx>

Croatian Mine Action Centre: CROMAC (2017) Mine Situation, <https://www.hcr.hr/en/minSituac.asp>

Dear refugees: Welcome to Croatia and website welcome.cms.hr

The Guardian, (2017) Migrant sea route to Italy is world's most lethal, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/11/migrant-death-toll-rises-after-clampdown-on-east-european-borders>

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**SOCIAL INVESTMENT POLICIES - TRENDS AND
PERSPECTIVES IN MODERN WELFARE STATES**

Abstract

The discussions so far related to social policies are characterized by the negative effects of the economic crises and the emergence of new social risks to which the majority of the population is exposed. It is considered that there is a need to redesign the welfare state, which should take into consideration the new needs and trends, including the demographic changes in the labor market and the family structure. A possible response to the indicated changes and challenges, especially in the countries of the European Union is the concept of social investment.

The paper is focused on analysis of social investment policies, their development and foundation in the European areas. The social investment determinants are presented, that is, the manner of development of social investment policies in the European strategic documents. Social investment is a new concept that essentially implies a double return on investment: a financial return of the investment capital and a provision of a positive social contribution. The social investment policy is focused on supporting children and families, working activity and new social risks in the context of people's life cycle. Using existing data, the long-term changes in the structure of social costs in European countries are presented. The analyses of these policies show that it is not possible to speak about changes in European welfare states in regard to social investment. In this segment,

Scandinavian countries are an exception because social investment policies are largely developed in these countries. Still, the concept of social investment is increasingly becoming a specific normative-platform policy for balancing the economic and social logic of welfare states in the new conditions.

Keywords: welfare state, social costs, social investment

INTRODUCTION

According to the Esping-Anderson, the welfare state is in crisis ever since the beginning of its formation. On the other hand, most researchers of comparative social policy divide the development of European welfare states into two periods: the period from 1945 until 1970, called the “golden age” of the welfare state characterized by the expansion of the welfare state, and the second period after 1970, marked by the “protracting” of welfare states caused by economic crises and the expansion of neoliberal ideologies and economic policies. (Esping-Anderson, 2001).

In terms of today’s debate on social policy, the main focus is on the negative effects of the economic crisis with an increased pressure to reduce social expenditures. The global economic crisis encourages questions about the efficient targeting and functioning of the welfare state in meeting the social needs of social groups affected by social risk. Welfare states in Europe for a long time have postponed the serious confrontation that occurred as a result of the emergence of new social risks related to family changes, new demographic conditions of low natality, aging of the population and market failure in regard to private provision of social security. According to some authors, the concept of social investment arises as a result of the need to provide adequate responses to the emergence and spread of new social risks in the long run in European countries.

The text that follows has two important goals. The first goal of the text is to provide an insight into the development of the concept of social investment showing the potential of the concept in terms of significant changes in welfare states and the emergence of new social risks, as

well as the opportunities for certain “reconstructions” of the welfare state. The second important goal is to examine the application of the concept of social investment in the European countries that show long-term changes in the structure of social costs. In addition, this paper will include an analysis of the institutional impacts and trends in the application of this policy in European countries by putting an emphasis on certain perspectives and potentials for implementing these policies in other welfare states.

Social investments: development and institutional relations

The contemporary approach of social policy is targeted towards elimination of the new social risks that the citizen is exposed to during his or her life. The approach of social investments refers to the fact that social and economic performances depend on the identification of institutional arrangements at the micro/meso/macro level where productive social policies are formulated and implemented, making it impossible to expect quick and new solutions. The approach of social investments is directed towards better coping with new risks, focusing on policies that prepare the individual, the families and the society for various and intensive changes such as: change of profession, working conditions, demographic challenges, development of new risks instead of the past dominant compensatory actions that are focused on mitigation of the “damages” caused as a result of the inefficient labor market or existing policies. In essence, the concept of social investment implies a double return on investment: a financial return on investment capital on one hand, and a realization of a positive social return on the other hand. It also implies a certain redistribution of the public consumption of the state from passive compensatory into active and preventive social programs in the domains of the labor market, education, and family policies. (Cousins, 2005).

The very concept of social investments is borrowed from the economy. In economic terminology, investments involve determination of the consumption wherewith the investments from the saved income would increase production and consumption in the future. In the economic theory before the emergence of the theory of human capital, the term investment referred to investments that dominantly

referred to “specific investments” in infrastructure and physical capital. Therefore, with the emergence of the theory of human capital in the 1960s, investments in people and their potentials became an increasingly important determinant of economic growth and the economic theory. Education contributes for an increase of productivity and an improvement of the workforce among workers who become capable of technological innovations and implementation of new technologies. In this manner, a significant step from physical to social investments has been made in the economic theory, whereby the concept of social investment includes a number of additional social aspects. In that regard, one can point out that ***the concept of social investments is directed towards conditioning for economic efficiency of the market on one hand and social orientation of modern welfare states on the other hand.*** One can conclude that the social investment approach has its own bidirectional goal oriented towards the modernization of the welfare state aimed at more efficient coping with social risks and political sustainability of the state in a changed economic environment. (Morel et al, 2012).

An imperative is set that social policy displaces the form of post festum action towards social changes. Contrary to this, a concept of social policy is promoted as a propulsive, preventive and productive factor. The new focus on social investments is directed towards the expectations of the preventative effects that should contribute for a mitigation of the intergenerational reproduction of poverty through focused education and educational reintegration programs for those who had limited access to educational services. Namely, the compensatory social policy allows individuals who face with various social risks such as: unemployment, aging, and poverty, to receive certain financial compensation. Another form of social investment is oriented towards preventive risk insurance in the future, making this policy more targeted towards the needs of young generations. In its essence, the concept of social innovation generates certain challenges because it carries the danger of minimizing the protective/unproductive programs of social policy (Taylor-Gooby, 2004).

The social policy is directed towards investments in people and their opportunities to participate in a productive way in the economy and the society. A social investment is perceived as an investment that strengthens the individual’s capacity to actively face life risks. Investing

in people is the dominant policy that generates the largest consensus among the advocates of the paradigm of the social investment concept.

Social investments and new social risks

There are several key domains with an emphasis on the perspective of social investments in the elimination of new social risks. As indicated by certain authors, the concept of social investments is related to the emergence of new social risks that refer to: a) challenges for harmonization between work and family, b) increased number of single-parent families, c) inefficient knowledge, skills and low level of qualifications, d) insufficient coverage with social security in the part of the working activity. In this regard, the attitude of family policies in regard to social investments should be directed towards programs that enable successful connection of work and family obligations. The mentioned dimension of social-investment programs is usually provided with programs for provision of quality services for the protection of preschool children. Accessible and quality preschool teaching and education is considered one of the key mechanisms for quality response to new social risks (Babic, 2013). Such an approach enables resolution of three significant problems. First, it helps parents in the effective harmonization of family and work obligations, it prevents long-term adverse consequences in children from poverty and it prepares children to become productive workforce in the future. A number of empirical researches suggest that investing in children, especially in early childhood development programs for children from socially deprived families, is a highly cost-effective investment. Researchers from different disciplines agree that if health, economic, psychological-emotional, and social conditions are better during the first years of the child's life, the likelihood of optimization would increase, and the conditions for overall development, thereby providing educational achievement and economic return during the course of life. (Grunewald & Rolnick, 2003)

In terms of social investment in active employment policies, the goal is to adjust the labor market and the workers in the programs for further improvement. The concept of social investments through education and training programs, points out that most of the

problems of unemployment refer to people who are unemployed with low qualifications, and unemployment is partly due to structural discrepancy between supply and demand in the labor market. According to Cedefop's report for the period from 2006 until 2015, the increase of jobs and employment in Europe happened as the result of jobs that mostly require high qualifications, while the participation of employees in jobs with middle and low qualifications significantly lags behind the jobs that require high qualifications. These data is not surprising, taking into consideration the fact that in post-industrial societies, physical capital and labor were not a determinant of accumulation of wealth, rather they were knowledge and skills for which people work in the field of information and communication technologies. Therefore, the concept of social investments promotes investments in programs on continuous education and increase of competitiveness programs which is in correlation with the increase of the unexpected life expectancy and education of young people, which is considered not sufficient to cope with the challenges of the labor market. Regarding employment, the goal of full employment is the search of different models of employment in the people's life cycle. It is considered that the increase in employment should be the primary goal in reducing poverty. For this reason, this concept strives for an easier transition to the labor market by including a wide range of different functions such as full or partial employment, self-employment, family care, retirement, etc.

The concept of social investments in the European strategic documents

In its strategic documents, the European Union shows a significant orientation towards social investments. In the practice of the European Union, the concept of social investment is mentioned for the first time in the Lisbon Strategy from 2000, which outlines the need to modernize the welfare state with an emphasis on investments in human capital and coping social exclusion. The EU 2020 strategy puts its emphasis on the achievement of economic growth, but also social and environmental sustainability. Social investment in strategies is particularly emphasized through targeted investments in human capital in the domains of education aimed at reduction of

poverty. The key strategic documents that suggest a perspective of social investment were a package of social investments from 2013. The European Parliament, in its resolution on the social investment package states that these policies represent a public policy framework for redirecting the public policies of member states in terms of social investment throughout life in order to maintain appropriate and sustainable budgets intended for social policy of the Governments and the private sector (European Commission, 2013a). Member states are urged to make progress and to focus their policies towards social investment, especially in the fields of child protection, education, active labor market policies, housing, rehabilitation, and health care. The Commission on Economic Growth and Development points out that in the future, economic growth and competitiveness will be a key investment for human capital, which is the basis of productivity and innovation.

The package of services is adjusted to the package of employment services that provides clear directions for economic recovery accompanied by employment growth, followed by the White Paper on Pensions that offers strategies for appropriate, sustainable and safe pensions, and with the employment package for young people. The recommendations of the Commission for investments in the field of child protection refer to reduction of the cycle of child poverty. The promotion of the concept of social investment was accompanied by two publications focused on further elaboration of social investment needs. The first publication Social Agenda 33-Social Investment emphasizes the need of a state that must focus on investing in people or human capital, which requires a transition from a welfare state to a social investment state. (European Commission, 2013.d) The publication Investing in Social Europe brings nearer the manner of implementation of the concept of social investments as a “new reality” in Europe, the key actors in the field, as well as the EU funds for support of social investment policies. (European Commission, 2013.c)

Social investment policies in the EU countries

The previous findings based on literature indicate that social investments are the main component of active employment policy programs, programs designed to protect children and families, and programs that refer to public expenditure in the field of education. This part of the text contains a representation of the trends of expenditures in the European countries since the early 2000s with two main objectives: a) identifying countries that have a significant component of social investments in the structure of their social spending and b) changes in the trends of investments in the programs for social investments in the European countries.

In most European countries in 2011 there was an increase in costs for social programs compared to the costs of 2005. The largest increase in investments in the period from 2005 until 2011 is recorded in Ireland (7.7% of GDP in 2005 to 10.3% of GDP in 2011), followed by two Southern European countries: Malta with 1.5 points increase and Cyprus with 1.1 point. Significant increase in funds for traditional social investment programs is observed in Denmark, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Finland, Spain and the Baltic countries such as Estonia and Lithuania. Completely expected, the Scandinavian countries are leaders in investments in social programs. These countries have exceeded the investment level of 10.0% of GDP in these programs. According to the amount of investments that exceed 10.0% of GDP in addition to the Scandinavian countries in 2011, Ireland and Cyprus also joined, and Belgium and Malta are very close to the limit of 10% of GDP. They are followed by the group of countries that allocate between 8.0% and 9.0% of GDP for social investments. This group of countries includes: Austria, France, Germany, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, Hungary and the Netherlands. At the end of this second larger group are the countries of Eastern and Southern Europe which allocate significantly less funds for social investments compared to other countries (between 6.0% and 7.3% of GDP). (Hudson & Kühner, 2009)

The trends of public consumption in education as a key component of social investments show that in the period from 2000 until 2011, the majority of countries have increased the public consumption in education (measured according to a % of GDP in 2011 compared to

2000). A certain reduction in expenditure of investments in education is recorded in the Baltic countries such as France, Portugal, Italy, Slovenia and Bulgaria. The largest increase in public investments in education for the period from 2000 until 2011 is observed in Malta, where the percentage of public investments in 2005 was 4.5% of GDP, and in 2011 it amounted to 8.0% of GDP. Overall, the public expenditure for education in 2011 was highest in Denmark (9.0% of GDP), followed by Cyprus and Malta with an allocation of approximately 8.0% of GDP, followed by Finland and Sweden with 6.8% GDP. On the other hand, Romania has the lowest level of public investments in education with approximately 3.0% of GDP.

The investment trends for different programs within the domain of family policies show that in most European countries there is an observable trend of increasing funds intended for families. More specifically, an increase in social investments is observed in 18 countries of the European Union, 2 countries in stagnation, and 7 countries where a slight decline was registered, of 0.2% to 0.3% of GDP investments intended for families and children. It is considered that the trend of investments in children and family policies will increase in the future as a result of the need to adequately address the challenges for better work coordination, family responsibilities and new social risks. (Jenson, 2009)

The data from Table no. 1 show that according to the degree of investments, Scandinavian countries are leaders in the implementation of investment programs in the domain of family policies by investing 3-4, 0% of GDP in Denmark. Similar to the Scandinavian countries, Austria and Germany have joined these investment trends as well. The highest increase in social investments in this component is recorded in Ireland (1 percentage point of GDP) and Cyprus (a rise of 0.7 percentage points).

Table no. 1. Investment trends in the function of families and children in EU countries (% of GDP)

	2002	2005	2011	Difference 2011-2012
Denmark	3,9	3,8	4,1	0,2
Luxemburg	3,5	3,6	3,6	0,1
Germany	3,3	3,1	3,1	-0,2
Austria	3,0	3,0	2,8	-0,2
Finland	2,9	3,0	3,3	0,4
Sweden	2,8	2,9	3,1	0,3
Ireland	2,4	2,5	3,4	1,0
France	2,5	2,5	2,5	0,0
Hungary	2,5	2,5	2,8	0,3
Cyprus	1,3	2,1	2,0	0,7
Belgium	2,1	2,0	2,2	0,1
Slovenia	2,0	1,9	2,2	0,2
Romania	1,7	1,8	1,5	-0,2
Slovakia	1,6	1,7	1,8	0,3
Greece	1,5	1,6	1,8	0,2
United Kingdom	1,7	1,6	1,9	0,2
Estonia	1,4	1,5	2,0	0,6
Czech Republic	1,5	1,3	1,2	-0,3
Latvia	1,4	1,3	1,1	-0,3
Netherlands	1,2	1,3	1,2	0,0
Spain	0,9	1,2	1,4	0,5
Lithuania	1,1	1,2	1,7	0,6
Portugal	1,4	1,2	1,2	-0,2
Italy	1,1	1,1	1,4	0,3
Malta	1,3	1,1	1,2	-0,1
Bulgaria		1,0	1,9	0,9
Poland	1,0	0,9	1,3	0,3
EU28			2,2	
Croatia			1,6	

Source: EUROSTAT – database (Social protection module)

The third component of social investment refers to active employment policies. The trends and the level of investment in the active employment policy programs in the European countries for the period from 2002 until 2011 are presented in Table no. 2. In terms of investments in these programs, it is not possible to determine a univocal trend if the investments from 2011 and the investments from 2002 or 2005 are compared. An equal number of countries (6 compared to 7) for which there are available data in the Eurostat database are the ones from 2011 compared to 2002 that increased (6 countries) or decreased (7 countries) the investments in active employment policies programs. However, if one compares the investments in active employment policies from 2011 with the level of investments in 2005, a conclusion is made that a larger number of countries (15 countries) from the EU have a positive trend in terms of an increase of funds intended for programs for active employment policies. At the same time, only 7 EU countries have reduced their funds intended for this program. However, the analyses in regard to the average level of costs intended for active employment policies in the EU28 countries according to Eurostat's database for 2005 (0.506% of GDP) and 2011 (0.471% of GDP) show an almost unchanged trend in this component of social investments.

Table no. 2: Costs for programs for active employment policies in the EU countries (% GDP)

	2002	2005	2011	Difference 2011-2002	Difference 2011-2005
Belgium		0,483	0,647		0,164
Bulgaria		0,406	0,131		-0,275
Czech Republic	0,112	0,117	0,178	0,066	0,061
Denmark	1,714	1,251	1,538	-0,176	0,287
Germany	1,039	0,673	0,446	-0,593	-0,227
Estonia		0,047	0,146		0,099
Ireland	0,641	0,487	0,714	0,073	0,227
Greece	0,17	0,057			
Spain	0,564	0,582	0,708	0,144	0,126
France	0,899	0,665	0,673	-0,226	0,008

Italy	0,702	0,475	0,312	-0,39	-0,163
Cyprus			0,311		
Latvia		0,163	0,332		0,169
Lithuania		0,145	0,182		0,037
Luxemburg	0,2	0,4	0,459	0,259	0,059
Hungary		0,235	0,35		0,115
Malta			0,05		
Netherlands	1,054	0,858	0,725	-0,329	-0,133
Austria	0,402	0,457	0,571	0,169	0,114
Poland		0,356	0,333		-0,023
Portugal	0,47	0,499	0,458	-0,012	-0,041
Romania		0,108	0,029		-0,079
Slovenia		0,195	0,252		0,057
Slovakia		0,168	0,223		0,055
Finland	0,674	0,731	0,857	0,183	0,126
Sweden	1,213	0,938	0,934	-0,279	-0,004
United Kingdom		0,049			

Source: EUROSTAT – database (Labour market policy module)

CONCLUSION

Contemporary social policy requires systemic orientation towards the future with previously planned results. Welfare states that are constantly facing structural challenges must adjust and they must provide appropriate sustainable social systems that will be directed towards stable economic policies. For that purpose, it is necessary to increase the adequacy of the social system in the implementation of public policies aimed at facilitating access to work through the use of effective support and facilitation of social investments throughout the life. (Jenson & Saint-Martin, 2003). The concept of social investment is a new attempt to improve the quality of life of citizens, the companies by changing the labor market, the demographic and the social conditions. In this concept all actors have their role in social policy, such as the market, the family, the state, and the community. Social investment policies are considered an approach that should be directed

towards the development of new policies within the framework of the operationalization of certain social programs intended for vulnerable categories.

From the analyses of the data it is shown that although there are long-term changes in terms of social investments in European countries, still it is difficult to speak of a turn of the European welfare states towards social investments. What the data show is that Scandinavian countries have a traditionally high level of investment in these functions, while other countries rarely give a positive example of costs intended for investments such as Ireland, Cyprus, and Malta. On the other hand, a question arises as to why there is no significant change of social investments in European countries? - Some of the possible answers refer to the fact that new social programs that welfare states would establish, would be unadjusted to social forms. Currently it seems that not even the "voters" in the wider European context would not support changes oriented towards a change of the welfare state for new investments in social programs at the expense of reducing traditional programs. However, the countries' orientation towards social investments could be a strategy that involves all actors and organizations in the uncertain environment by adapting the changes and risks that affect the welfare state in recent decades. One can conclude that the concept of social investments, except in the Scandinavian countries and Ireland, is increasingly becoming a specific normative-platform policy for balancing the economic and social logic of welfare states in the new conditions. Still, the concept of social investment is becoming a part of social policy. It remains to be seen whether the concept will further develop as a potential response of welfare states to face the challenges and risks brought by the modern way of living.

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SEMI-AUTHORITARIANISM ACCEPTED: THE EUROPEAN UNION'S PROBLEMATIC INVOLVEMENT IN SERBIA

Abstract

The relationship between Brussels and Belgrade has never been straightforward. Following the overthrow of Slobodan Milošević, EU authorities have welcomed different opposition forces and altogether failed to pursue reforms and consolidate institutional infrastructure. Accordingly, this paper examines the EU's position vis-à-vis the increasing semi-authoritarianism in Serbia. It is argued that as long as the problematic Serbian elites pretend, or even manage to meet some of the EU's expectations, the Brussels administration will continue to ignore the pursuit of a wide range of unfavourable domestic policies. Such an approach has regrettably given the Serbian regime the opportunity to cement its power base, thereby obstructing the implementation of any substantial democratic improvements.

Keywords: Serbia, European Union, semi-authoritarianism

The relationship between the European Union (EU) and Serbia has never been straightforward. Following the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia as independent states in the early 1990s, the EU's participation in economic sanctions against the newly established Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, severely affected the Serbian citizens but not the regime of Slobodan Milošević. It consolidated further by benefiting from the proceeds of a black market economy and various media outlets constantly accusing the West, as well as the democratic opposition, of being anti-Serbian. Moreover, when different opposition representatives requested Western support for the emerging democratic force necessary to oust Milošević and prevent additional violence, their efforts were ignored (Panić, 2015: 78). This, together with the rejection by the EU's representatives in late 1996 of the opposition Zajedno [Together] alliance's municipal victories in favour of Milošević's decision to annul the results and demand new elections, were interpreted as the West's intention to assist Milošević, the perceived key factor in the whole process, to stay in power (Spoerri, 2015: 46-47).

Later, with the progress of the Kosovo crisis and the 1999 NATO intervention, the West started to promote narrative suggesting that the time to get rid of Milošević had come. In contrast to previous years, substantial foreign aid was allocated to the democratic opposition, which seemed to have become more united in contrast to a decline in popular support for the regime (Spoerri, 2015). Once Milošević was overthrown in October 2000, the West welcomed the new democratic forces. Although initially cooperative, the coalition leadership faced several internal conflicts with various members trying to promote their separate visions for the country's future. The politics of alternatives or other opportunities, as well as an ever-present struggle with the processes of democratisation and Europeanisation, provided enough space for the opposition (many of whose members had once sided with and played important roles under the Milošević regime, although they were never subjected to a lustration afterwards) to organise and challenge the political elite (Radeljić, 2014; Radeljić, 2017). Consequently, the Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) was established in 2008 by Tomislav Nikolić and Aleksandar Vučić, the former Deputy President and General Secretary respectively of the ultranationalist Serbian Radical Party (its leader, Vojislav Šešelj, was on trial at the

International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia at the time). As soon as the former Radicals turned into Progressivists, they started to place an emphasis on their apparently new profile and, even more so, on expected outcomes. The reasoning behind this is that they would appear to differ significantly from their previous affiliation. Apart from discrediting the performance of the then leadership, the SNS invested efforts in promoting military neutrality, greater social justice, worldwide cooperation and EU membership. In 2012, Nikolić's advocacy secured him the presidency. Two years later, Vučić progressed from being First Deputy Prime Minister to Prime Minister, a position which he held until becoming President of Serbia in May 2017. Their radical past and far-right rhetoric no longer seemed relevant.

In this paper I look at the EU's position vis-à-vis the increasing semi-authoritarianism in Serbia. In her seminal work, Marina Ottaway defines semi-authoritarian regimes as 'ambiguous systems that combine rhetorical acceptance of liberal democracy, the existence of some formal democratic institutions, and respect for a limited sphere of civil and political liberties with essentially illiberal or even authoritarian traits. This ambiguous character, furthermore, is deliberate. Semi-authoritarian systems are not imperfect democracies struggling toward improvement and consolidation but regimes determined to maintain the appearance of democracy without exposing themselves to the political risks that free competition entails' (Ottaway, 2003: 3). With this in mind, the Progressivists' behaviour in Serbia is undoubtedly semi-authoritarian and the EU has largely refrained from confronting it. While welcoming the Progressivists with Aleksandar Vučić at the forefront, the Brussels authorities have regularly suggested that they expected a lot from him in terms of regional developments – primarily in the case of the Kosovo's status, but also in terms of Serbia's problematic ambition to position itself between the East and the West. This in turn could be interpreted as indicating that, as long as Vučić was prone to responding to their demands, a whole range of domestic policies—some more detrimental than others— would be of secondary concern. Aware of the expected dynamics, the regime has used every opportunity to further reinforce its power.

The EU welcomes the former Radicals turned Progressivists

The literature tackling Western support of corrupt, military and authoritarian regimes is voluminous. For example, during the Cold War, the West (in particular the USA) supported such regimes in its fight against Communism, whilst the Soviets tended to support undemocratic regimes against the West. This suggests that the international system can play a permissive role, as well as a very active role, in democratization, and it can support or block democratic change' (Bunce, McFaul and Stoner-Weiss, 2010: 10). The present EU has regularly collaborated with countries whose regimes are authoritarian (Babayan and Risse, 2015) and, furthermore, its recent involvement in the Arab Spring has led to its actions being questioned in the context of whether they actually assisted authoritarian instead of democratic rule (Börzel and van Hüllen, 2014). Even more recently, we have seen how mutual interests in the Russo-Hungarian case can alienate an existing EU member state from the Brussels authorities (Buzogány, 2017). This logically encourages a debate about possible alternatives and regime preferences, as authoritarians are likely to oppose and negatively affect support for the EU (Tillman, 2013). This is even more striking if we consider projections suggesting that authoritarianism is likely to rise (Bloom, 2016; Diamond, 2008; Puddington, 2008), accompanied by more international collaboration among authoritarian regimes with the aim of maximising domestic survival (von Soest, 2015). Looking at the Balkans, '[m]any countries in the region have a record of electing persons who behave in an authoritarian way after the "democratic" election' (Farkas, 2007: 65). Still, before fully endorsing authoritarianism, political actors may embrace semi-authoritarian *modus operandi* as a starting point; as some authors have put it, 'unfavourable conditions – including weak democratic institutions and political organizations, persistent authoritarian traditions, major socioeconomic problems, and ethnic and religious conflicts – create formidable obstacles to the establishment and, above all, the consolidation of democracy' (Ottaway, 2003: 4-5).

In the case of Serbia, the Serbian Progressive Party has, since its inauguration, continuously pursued the idea of doing what it deemed necessary for Serbia to move forward. Indeed, by continuously accusing the then Democratic Party-led government of (1) having failed to

address Serbia's unsatisfactory economic performance, high levels of corruption across all sectors, poverty and unemployment rates, and (2) having allowed some of its own representatives to develop individual and often corrupt activities contradicting the party's original aims, the SNS, notwithstanding, received impressive support in the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections. Following Tomislav Nikolić's victory, some EU officials noted that Serbia was 'at a crossroads;' his victory 'proved that the country's political landscape had become more complex and that the EU needs to be involved in an intensive dialogue with Serbian authorities and all political leaders from the very first moment' (Lajčák, 2012). Indeed, José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, welcomed Nikolić to Brussels, interpreting his choice for his first official visit abroad as 'a clear sign of the priority the President and Serbia attach to their European reform agenda' (Barroso, 2012). Aleksandar Vučić, the First Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia after the 2012 parliamentary elections and subsequently, the most visible member of the Serbian political elite, had an abrupt volte-face regarding reformist, Zoran Djindjić, whom he had initially vehemently opposed. For example, after Djindjić's assassination in 2003, he even posted a fake street plaque with the name of war crimes fugitive, Ratko Mladić, on a Belgrade boulevard named after Djindjić in 2007. Vučić has since altered his position to the extent that he started recalling and expressing appreciation for Djindjić's pro-EU stance and vision of Serbia's future. He is even on record as saying that he actually felt flattered when compared to him (B92, 2013) and in interview with the German daily *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (FAZ, 2014), he tried to defend his drastic transformation by claiming that he misinterpreted the post-Cold War trends for a long time and thus developed wrong ideas.

Overall, by analysing the period following the 2012 elections, it can be argued that the Progressivists have decided to switch their focus from an advocacy of life for politics to a life from politics – a tendency largely confirmed by the growing intention to replace political figures with different political affiliations with the most trustworthy members of the Serbian Progressive Party. Securing a whole range of positions in public administration institutions has meant direct influence on those institutions, cross-sectoral collaboration and also involvement in numerous private sector endeavours whose approval and realisation

directly depend on state permission. More problematically, by the 2014 snap elections, viable opposition in Serbia had vanished with political plurality being seriously endangered. However, the Brussels authorities welcomed newly-elected Prime Minister Vučić as someone who could be trusted. For example, Commissioner Barroso said that '[he is] confident that under [Vučić's] determined guidance, Serbia will succeed in addressing the key challenges ahead' (European Commission, 2014a). And, when EU foreign policy chief, Catherine Ashton, told him that the EU is 'determined to help and support Serbia in its efforts to ensure a strong economic path for its people,' Vučić reassured her: 'We are not poor people seeking charity, we need support for true reforms' (RFE, 2014). German Chancellor Angela Merkel also congratulated Vučić on his election and invited him to visit Berlin, which he eventually did. On this occasion, she praised his efforts and assured him that Germany would support Serbia on its road to the EU, although she also underscored the significance of reforms, the rule of law and further normalisation of relations with Kosovo (Mitrović, 2014).

The EU's welcoming stance and signature of the 2013 Brussels Agreement between the governments of Serbia and Kosovo on the normalisation of relations between them, as well as the opening of negotiations for Serbia's EU accession in 2014, provided Vučić with more credibility and potential for manoeuvring at home and vis-à-vis the EU. His apparent readiness to pursue economic reforms and market liberalisation sounded much more attractive to foreigners' ears than them getting involved in discussions over his intentions to minimise any competition for power and the suppression of the opposition. The studies on semi-authoritarian regimes also make a reference to the pursuit of economic reforms and reduction of government control in the context of international pressure: '[S]emi-authoritarian regimes can undergo market liberalization with little political liberalization or separation of economic elites from political elites. The linkage between economic liberalization and democratization is complex, and it is dangerous to assume that the former always encourages the latter' (Ottaway, 2003: 18). So, Western governments have intentionally avoided adopting a firmer stance against any government policies going against so-called Western values. They expect much from the Vučić government that would not only serve the West's geopolitical

and geoeconomic interests in Serbia, but also in the Western Balkan region as a whole. Different European Commission statements about Serbia's progress have communicated a highly problematic message that the status quo, with some occasional baby-steps, is actually acceptable. For example, one statement in 2014 indicated that '[t] here is a strong political impetus to fight corruption' and '[t]he new government remains fully committed to EU integration' (European Commission, 2014b: 1, 8). A year later the Brussels technocrats agreed that 'Serbia's institutions for preventing corruption broadly meet international standards and have shown good potential' with sporadic suggestions as to what should be improved (European Commission, 2015: 52).

In reality, the government failed to enhance the business climate, downsize the public sector or come up with measures that would introduce meritocracy in the public sector. More precisely, the Vučić regime took control of it and poured enormous subsidies into public enterprises, the so-called big budget losers. Altogether, they have employed thousands of new party members, many of them in fictional jobs. The German sociologist, Max Weber – whom Vučić paradoxically tends to quote when saying that the Serbian people should adopt the protestant work ethic and be more like the Germans (Malić, 2016) – used to write about the benefit-inspired relationship between leaders and their supporters: 'The party following, above all the party official and party entrepreneur, naturally expect personal compensation from the victory of their leader – that is, offices or other advantages ... They expect that the demagogic effect of the leader's personality during the election fight of the party will increase votes and mandates and thereby power, and, thereby, as far as possible, will extend opportunities to their followers to find the compensation for which they hope' (Weber, 2009[1919]: 103). So, many members joined the SNS purely because of available benefits and not because of the party's programme and ideological doctrine. The more the leadershipAs succeeded in proving that party membership leads to benefits (such as employment, career change, promotion, additional capital accumulation, etc.), the stronger the interest in being affiliated with the party.

‘L’État, c’est moi’

The outcome of the April 2016 parliamentary elections, which reconfirmed Vučić’s dominance, came as no surprise. As a prime minister, he had been craftily solidifying power during the previous few years, taking control over state institutions as well as non-state actors, such as media. The scholarship discussing power diffusion has carefully explained that ‘in today’s information age, so many decisions are made outside the control of even the most powerful states. Power diffusion also widens the scope of coalition-building. Leaders must win the support of not only other states but also a whole range of non-state actors including media, NGOs, and businesses’ (Cooper, 2015: 42). In Serbia, ninety-seven local and national-level opposition leaders were arrested in the previous four years. In almost all of these cases the charges were dropped and no indictments were handed down. Of the remainder, only four trials actually commenced, but no verdicts were delivered (Vasić, 2015). In local elections, tens of opposition activists were attacked or kidnapped and the police did not resolve a single case (Novi Magazin, 2014). Finally, the elections confirmed that the relevant administration had not been reformed and, even worse, that the elections suffered serious irregularities which cast a shadow on the democratic process (Balkanist, 2016).

Since 2012, the dominant media in Serbia have generally tended to support Vučić’s actions and reactions at home and abroad. By avoiding criticism and, even more worryingly, applying auto-censorship as a result of warnings and pressures about what can or cannot be reported, the media have indirectly facilitated the continuation of well-embedded practices. One analysis uses a pyramidal structure to illustrate the trend; in this case, ‘[m]anipulations under the mask of free media help the pyramid to expand in ways [in which] it sustains itself. This is most obviously reflected in the leader’s unusually frequent appearances in the media. Moreover, there are more and more journalists and celebrities joining the pyramid. These are exactly the conditions for self-censorship and inferiority to the leader ... Many people choose to obey the rules of practice in order to preserve their positions and benefits’ (Kelić, 2016). It is also worth remembering that Vučić was in charge of the Ministry of Information in the late 1990s when Slobodan Milošević was in power: ‘[He] was the hatchet man

for the media who defended the vast ethnic cleansing by paramilitary police of more than 60% of the 90%-majority Albanians living in the Serbian province of Kosovo' (Pond, 2013: 7). Back then, newspapers were regularly fined or, even worse, closed, so that the public would primarily gather information from the state-controlled media or other media working in favour of the ruling elite. In fact, as Timothy Garton Ash (2009: 6-7, 16) has put it, '[t]he single most important pillar of [the Milošević] regime was the state television, which he used to sustain a nationalist siege mentality, especially among people in the country and small towns who had few other sources of information ... Milošević's dictatorship was a television dictatorship. And television was equally central to the revolution. From teledictatorship, via telerevolution, to teledemocracy.' Thus, aware of this and the ever-increasing relevance of the media in an information age, the Vučić regime has been determined to secure support from as many channels of communication as possible.

If we consider some of the European Commission's assessments regarding the media situation in Serbia, we can see that the former has been conscious of the problems. For example, in 2012, the annual progress report stressed that 'violence and threats against journalists remain of concern, although their frequency has decreased slightly. The Serbian authorities have continued to provide police protection for journalists and media outlets which have received threats. Investigations into murders of journalists dating back to the late 1990s/early 2000s and into recurring threats against journalists have so far failed to identify the perpetrators ... Access to advertising in the media remains under the control of a few economic and political actors, entailing a significant risk of influence on the media and of self-censorship' (European Commission, 2012: 14). Two years later, the Brussels administration seemed even more concerned; this time around, it supported its findings by citing the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, according to which, 'media reporting was insufficiently analytical and was influenced by the political parties in power, including through public funding, which led to widespread media self-censorship' (European Commission, 2014b: 7). In the Commission's view, 'efforts are expected to identify and prosecute suspects of violations of internet freedoms. Pending the full implementation of the newly adopted legislative package, the

Serbian media continued to operate in a blurred legal environment which delayed the state's withdrawal from media ownership, one of the cornerstones of the 2011 media strategy' (Ibid: 46). Most recently, the Commission noted that '[c]ivil society organisations (CSOs) and human rights defenders, who play a key role in raising awareness of civil, political and socioeconomic rights, continued to operate in a public and media environment often hostile to criticism' (European Commission, 2016: 8), while '[h]ate speech is often tolerated in the media and is rarely tackled by regulatory authorities or prosecutors. Statements by state officials in relation to the investigative work of journalists have not been conducive to creating an environment in which freedom of expression can be exercised without hindrance' (Ibid: 61).

Looking more closely at media performance during the 2016 election campaign, there was no record of a debate between government and opposition; prominent journalists were fired for reporting about government failures (Hadrović, 2017; Petrović, 2016). For example, the Crime and Corruption Reporting Network's journalist, Stevan Dojčinović, who was investigating the property of public officials including Vučić (Dojčinović and Petrović, 2016), was attacked by a pro-government tabloid with Vučić's aides labelling him a 'foreign spy' and 'conspirator' working for 'the Western forces' (Informer, 2016a; Informer, 2016b). In fact, in its earlier extensive study, Human Rights Watch (2015) had exposed and criticised '[t]he inadequate state response to attacks and threats against journalists and media outlets, political interference including through the courts and curbs on funding, and smear campaigns targeting critical media and journalists.' It also urged EU institutions, the OSCE Representative on Media Freedom and different Council of Europe departments to pressure the relevant authorities in Serbia to address the problems. In return, Prime Minister Vučić called the independent Balkan Investigative Reporting Network 'liars' financed by Michael Davenport, the Head of the EU delegation in Serbia, to attack the Serbian government (Balkan Insight, 2015; Dragojlo, 2016). This was a similar reaction to the one he had when addressing the OSCE: 'They are lying, and when you're lying, it is elementary decency to apologize. I will not let anyone attack Serbia ... The OSCE has uttered falsehood and lies, and I'm telling the truth' (cited in Barlovac, 2014).

None of the above has significantly eroded the government's popularity. Based on his previous involvement in politics, the Vučić regime has clearly understood what works with both domestic and international audiences. As it has always insisted, multiparty elections are held, the rights of citizens are theoretically recognised (although not always in practice), civil society and non-governmental organisations exist and manage to conduct research and communicate their findings (usually thanks to foreign financial assistance), the media reporting goes on, with the Internet being loaded with critical thinking, etc. Alongside this and in the context of semi-authoritarianism, 'incumbent governments and parties are in no danger of losing their hold on power, not because they are popular but because they know how to play the democracy game and still retain control' (Ottaway, 2003: 6). In the case of Serbia, playing the democracy game is further facilitated when the profile of the average voter is considered. Back in 2013, some surveys demonstrated that the typical voter tended to be largely uninformed or undereducated, with an interest in tabloids, reality TV shows and sports events. Even though he used to vote for the Democratic Party in the past, he now voted for the Serbian Progressive Party – a switch outlining the disloyal nature of half of the electorate and a tendency to vote for the majority party (Latković, 2013). Right before the 2016 elections, different surveys repeated the previous description of the electorate, confirming that the support for the Progressivists was still strong and likely to remain so, at least for the foreseeable future (Vukadinović, 2016).

In 2017, Aleksandar Vučić became the President of Serbia after crushing his opponents in the first round by winning 55% of the vote. While Vučić himself stated that '[w]hen you have results like this, there is no instability – Serbia is strong and it will be even stronger' (cited in Macdowall, 2017), some academics nevertheless pointed out that '[t]his election was over before it began, for the same reason that last year's parliamentary elections were. The tight control that the governing party exercises over media, information, employment, and the distribution of benefits means that there is no level playing field and voters are not in a position to freely make an informed choice' (Gordy, 2017). Given his dominance in the party and the Progressivists' majority in the parliament, this particular victory turned Vučić into the strongest and most influential political figure in Serbia which, in

the long run, could mean more authoritarianism. EU representatives congratulated him in a similar manner as before; for example, in a joint letter, Donald Tusk and Jean-Claude Juncker, on behalf of the European Council and the European Commission, stated that Vučić's straight victory is a clear confirmation of the people's support for his EU-orientated programme. They also expressed confidence in his ability to promote regional stability and cooperation as well as moving forward the dialogue between Belgrade and Priština (EURACTIV, 2017). A direct consequence of the glorification of Vučić's regional engagement is that the West's reliance on him will continue to keep him in power, whilst EU accession becomes of secondary relevance to him and the Brussels administration, alike. As could be expected, the street protests, which took place immediately after the election outcome – mostly attended by young people and students, shouting that the elections were not fair and that Serbia was becoming a dictatorship (Krajňák, 2017; Rudić and Djurić, 2017) – did not generate any critical reflection among the Brussels authorities. Cognisant of the external favourable position, Vučić himself reflected upon the chants Vučić, You Stole the Election! and End the Dictatorship!: 'There are always people not satisfied with election results ... It's a democratic process. Nobody intervened, we allowed them to protest' (cited in Rudić and Djurić, 2017). Even here, by remaining calm in front of social discontent (mainly because of the participants' lack of organisation and therefore the unlikelihood of challenging the regime) (Pešić, 2017), Vučić secured additional points internationally as being someone truly committed to functioning democracy.

Conclusion

The failure of post-Milošević and, even more worryingly, post-Djindjić leaderships to consolidate democracy and develop a clear future orientation of the Serbian state, has provided space for the formation of the Serbian Progressive Party and the subsequent semi-authoritarian regime. The Vučić government has taken control of the media and numerous in-desperate-need-of-reform public sector institutions, leaving an impression that he has engineered his own system and is capable of remaining dominant over time. The Progressivists' insistence on the politics of opportunity has undoubtedly helped them generate public support at home as well as strengthening the Serbian regime's

relevance internationally.

European Union representatives have welcomed Radicals turned Progressivists whilst turning a blind eye to numerous questionable moves and decisions. As pointed out, as long as the Progressivists continue to cooperate with the West or, at least, leave an impression of such an intention, the quality of political pluralism, state institutions, electoral procedures and media reporting, among others, is left to the regime to regulate. Nevertheless, the support for the EU in Serbia is at its lowest since 2000, which means that the EU is actually a big underachiever in the Serbian case (Cvijić, 2017). More and more voices have argued that the rise of Vučić has, in fact, weakened the support for the EU because it revealed the EU's hypocrisy towards its core principles and values, such as the rule of law and human rights. Many from the intellectual elite, who firmly advocated EU accession in the past, are now disenchanted with the EU's lack of reaction to Vučić's alleged undermining of democratic principles. The result is that the forces underpinning the pro-EU agenda in public appearances have rapidly diminished, so it has become quite difficult to find those who would publicly confront the anti-EU forces. Vučić and his closest associates are known for being prone to sending mixed messages. On the one hand, they have declaratively supported EU values, pledged for EU accession and so on whilst, on the other hand, the slightest external criticism has resulted in a narrative that the West wants to overthrow Vučić, that big powers are working against Serbia and that Russia makes for a more honest friend. As rightly noted elsewhere, 'Russia is positioned as the first friendly Other in the anti-European debates ... [It] is recognized as having historical ties with Serbia based on economic and energy collaboration, as well as certain cultural and religious commonalities and a similar language' (Russell-Omaljev, 2016: 55, 103-5). With this in mind, it is not possible to exclude the scenario in which Vučić will turn to Russia upon realising that his pro-EU agenda is capable of generating more harm than benefit in terms of votes.

In case of the above turn, the Brussels administration would most likely start putting pressure on the regime, labelling its domestic policies as detrimental and not in accordance with the EU's accession agenda. At this point, Vučić's semi-authoritarian behaviour would suddenly become highly problematic and the West could claim the need to come up with a new approach so as to allow Serbia to genuinely pursue processes of

democratisation and Europeanisation. As in other cases, the foreigners could opt for sanctions, which are generally ineffective, often causing more problems than they resolve. Accordingly, the West might decide to take the opposition seriously and provide it with necessary assistance so as to overthrow the regime - repeating what it already did with Milošević. In such a case, the infamous notion of 'lessons learnt' would be defeated and become quite irrelevant for any future EU involvement in Serbia.

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INTERPLAY OF (NON-)DEMOCRATIC FORCES IN SERBIA – PARTIES, INITIATIVES, MOVEMENTS AND THE INTERNET

Abstract

Since the information about the project Belgrade Waterfront was brought in the public domain, an initiative called „*Ne da(vi)mo Beograd*“ (Let’s not give/drown/choke Belgrade) appeared on the scene, mostly by arguing against that project in form of protest in the parliament and on the streets. Their rallies were and are a new form of protest, which clearly was not indicated to operate only on Belgrade territory, but to spread in the whole country. Therefore, in fact there are now more and more citizen’s initiatives spreading all over the country, mainly in the bigger cities like Novi Sad, Niš and so on, but also in the smaller ones. They all have in common that the protests are organized mostly via internet, hence social media – Facebook plays a very important role, especially because it can send live from an event. The lack of media information on state television can be evaded in that way. Since nearly all parties, respectively members are using social media to stay in contact with the people or to tell about what’s going on, there are also fake profiles – and many mock sites. Initiatives use that as well, not only to make problems public but also to show their support for the different parties/persons. As the civil movements are rising, so are their opponents. Serbia claims to be a democratic, constitutional state. However, members of the movements are often the subject of

criminal prosecution as well as journalists who write about „*Ne da(vi)mo Beograd*“ and/or in a critical way write about the project Belgrade Waterfront. Often, they are facing public humiliation (in interviews), persecution or, charges are dropped because of lack of evidence, if the movements or their members press charges. Depending on the social networks filter bubbles, movements seem to take over the public space and therefore may be the future challenges for a liberal democracy (if one can call Serbia a liberal democracy). One of the biggest and most visibly subjects, the yellow rubber duck, symbol of „*Ne da(vi)mo Beograd*“, is often placed in public space to raise the awareness, that the movement is there and watching – although, if not via social media, hardly anyone would know about because the main media stations do not report about them. How the democratic forces in Serbia are dealing with that movements, or if the movements itself will become democratic forces will be seen again at the next elections, first predicted for December 2017.

Keywords: Serbia, citizens' initiative, „*Ne da(vi)mo Beograd*“, elections, protests

Introduction – civil movements and the internet

In this article, I will try to give an overview about the citizen's initiative „*Ne da(vi)mo Beograd*“ and what they stand for, as well as their anticipation in protests and prosecutions. More and more citizens organize in countries all over the world, fighting for their right to the city and against the fact that they can only watch what happens with their home e.g. city without any possibility of participation in decision-making. They stand for the right to housing and are against the privatization of the public space as well as the public sector and his duties like municipal services such as water or electricity supply and public transport. They do not want profit-driven urban developments but developments accessible for all whether rich or poor. The main goal is to create decent living conditions for everyone who lives or works within the city or even the wholestate.

Hence, the initiative is an excellent example of civil movement,

citizen's participation, citizen's awakening and the use of mainly social media to get involved with future supporters or members, too. Vowe (2014:25) claims, that political communication and participation change throughout the development of communication routines used by "digital citizens". He states, that their actions and interactions can lead to structural changes in micro-, meso-, and macro-level of political communication. Therefore, by using and mastering these new forms of communication, citizen's initiatives are also able to change the political dialog inside and outside the internet – the internet does not forget. To organize protests, meetings or even rallies that way is not only easier, it also allows a direct and quick transfer of knowledge and information, which otherwise would be ignored or censored by political biased media stations.¹

Depending on which media people interested in happenings going on in Serbia, mainly in her capital Belgrade, are following, since the elections and its aftermath in May 2017, the initiative gains more space and power in the public. Especially media (TV, radio or online/ newspapers) who are critical of the government support the initiative by emitting podcasts about the initiative, their members e.g. positions and of course their actions such as protests and moves. One of the main reasons of the initiative's success is without a doubt the usage of social media networks, where forms of convergences become more and more important. In addition to Vowes four forms of convergence (2014:29,30), the 4th addressing to the merging of individual, mass, group, organization and computer communication, in my opinion initiatives, which count social media experts in their rows, have a highly bigger possibility of becoming a movement and / or political party after a time of consolidation. Information is available 24/7, interaction with the community as well, therefore, the participation rises. Although initiatives like „Ne da(vi)mo Beograd“ are aware that

¹ As noticed in the lack of coverage of the protests after the presidential elections in May 2016 or the proportional mentioning / direct statements of A. Vučić and his Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) in contrast with every other party / politician / Initiative during the presidential elections campaign in Serbian media, see Pavlica, Dražen (2017) Predsedjnički izbori 2017. u medijskom ogledalu. In Annual report of Biro za društvena istraživanja – BIRODI, Mediji, Javnost I Izbori 2017., regarding the campaign p. 10: Aleksandar Vučić 61.2% over-all media presence, Vuk Jeremić 6.4%, Saša Janković 5.9%, Vojislav Šešelj 5.3%.

there is a lack of political motivation, but by using the internet for information transfer, communication and organization at a marginal cost, the potential to mobilize rises. In addition, the internet increases the possibility of mobilization; it connects highly motivated initiative members with nonmainstream political concerns (Muhlberger 2004:226). In the following part, I will outline the development of the initiative as well as adumbrate the main figures of the initiative and the main figures against the initiative works.

The initiative „*NE DA(VI)MO BEOGRAD*“ – a fight against Belgrade Waterfront and corruption in general

Already in 2011, a collective of artists founded the “Ministry of Space” (Ministarstvo prostora), among them Iva Čukić, an architect from Belgrade. The ministry is one of the movements who fight for the defense of public space and monitors the transformations of Belgrade and other cities in Serbia. They do not only research different approaches to public space and its use but also organize exhibitions, actions, cultural practices and intervention within the urban space as well as collect and supply information about urban development and its consequences. The ministry of Space is one of the Co-initiators of the initiative „*Ne da(vi)mo Beograd*“. One of the main goals of the ministry is the further communication between citizens, activists, urban planners and city service employees (officehk 2017). The citizen’s initiative first started to work in 2014. Then, for the first time, the public heard what was planned to happen in the district of Savamala (a former working-class district) as well as on the bank of the river Sava – an area that was public space before, partly „cleansed“ already in the summer of 2009 due to the XXV Summer Universiade held in Belgrade.²

² This refers to the forced resettlement of Romani people in 2009 and again in 2012. For more information, see <https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/1758123.html> (last access 28.11.2017), https://www.b92.net/info/vesti/index.php?yyyy=2009&m=06&dd=17&nav_id=366577 (last access 28.11.2017), <http://www.seecult.org/vest/peticija-protiv-ogradivanja-romskog-naselja> (last access 28.11.2017), <http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/beograd.74.html:377228-Raseljeno-romsko-naselje-kod-Belvila> (last access 28.11.2017).

The project *Belgrade Waterfront*³ was launched. The district of Savamala was/is one of Belgrade's number one Arts districts, since the 2010s art galleries, bars, clubs, handcraft markets etc. pop up and make Belgrade more interesting for tourists as well as for its inhabitants. By rearranging the whole Sava riverside, therefore also the whole Savamala district, not only are these new projects doomed but also the “face of the city” will change permanently – a fact that is stressed out by many experts⁴ since the plans about the new look of the city are official. There are many contradictions about the contract, which is stressed out mainly by „Ne da(vi)mo Beograd“(Kmezić 2017) as well as in newspapers, for instance in the daily newspaper *Danas*, since Ksenija Radovanović, one of the main figures of the initiative, publishes her articles there, or *Belgrade Insight*, the official newspaper of BIRN (Balkan Investigative Reporting Network). What is also visible, and speaks for the lack of media freedom in Serbia, is the fact that “objective”, “free” and “independent” media is reporting about the inconsistencies around the project, but the mainstream media, or,



Illustration 1

only are these new projects doomed but also the “face of the city” will change permanently – a fact that is stressed out by many experts⁴ since the plans about the new look of the city are official. There are many contradictions about the contract, which is stressed out mainly by „Ne da(vi)mo Beograd“(Kmezić 2017) as well as in newspapers, for instance in the daily newspaper *Danas*, since Ksenija Radovanović, one of the main figures of the initiative, publishes her articles there, or *Belgrade Insight*, the official newspaper of BIRN (Balkan Investigative Reporting Network). What is also visible, and speaks for the lack of media freedom in Serbia, is the fact that “objective”, “free” and “independent” media is reporting about the inconsistencies around the project, but the mainstream media, or,

³ Since it is not possible to present the project *Belgrade Waterfront* and explain pro and contra, the interested reader may visit the official homepage of Eagle Hills, <https://www.eaglehills.com/our-developments/serbia/belgrade-waterfront>; and for further information Eror, A. Belgrade's ‘top-down’ gentrification is far worse than any cereal café, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2015/dec/10/belgrade-top-down-gentrification-worse-than-cereal-cafe>; or *Belgrade Waterfront VR*, available at: <http://www.case-3d.com/projects/belgrade-waterfront-vr> and the later mentioned AAS article.

⁴ For more information about that read Nemanja Rulević's interview with Dragoljub Bakić, architect and member of the Academy of Architecture Serbia (AAS) in Dojče vele, 17.3.2015 (<http://aas.org.rs/d-bakic-polako/> last access 02.12.2017) or the statement of the AAS in: Architects demand construction-stop of Belgrade Waterfront in <http://www.gradnja.rs/arhitekta-traze-da-se-obustavi-gradnja-beograda-na-vodi/> (last access 02.12.2017).

better said, governmental orientated press (like newspapers Večernje novosti, Blic, Informer, ALO!, 24 sata as well as the TV stations RTS, TV Pink, Prva etc.) write mostly positive about the projects and the effects it will have. The lack of press freedom and the lack of free media in Serbia is increasing in general, visible at the annual reports of media freedom (Index on Censorship, Mapping Media freedom Q1/Q2 2017) or shown at the Transparency International homepage (<https://www.transparency.org/country/SRB>). Here, we learn that Serbia scores 42/100 at the Corruption Perception Index of 2016, the Freedom House (<https://freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-press:2017>) gives Serbia a score of 49 in 2017, mentioning the following: „Among the countries that suffered the largest declines were Poland, Turkey, Burundi, Hungary, Bolivia, Serbia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo” (Freedom House: 2017), also effectively shown in the following drawing. The last name of Serbia’s president speaks for itself on this drawing (Illustration 1).

Furthermore, the report points out, that critical media in Serbia is often declared as foreign-backed propagandists (SrbijaDanas/Informer:12.06.2016), who do not seek to investigate or inform the broader public about grievances in the country, their only goal is to attack the president himself. This discrediting of critical press is not only harming the democratization in Serbia, it also leads to attacks against journalists or members of initiatives⁵. As we see, lack of media freedom and corruption go often hand in hand. This is what makes the wave of protest so special that took place immediately after the presidential elections in May 2017. Although it was factually impossible

⁵ For example, read Petrušić: Krajnje smešno suđenje. Stefanović: Povređen sam about the indictment against Sandra Petrušić, a NIN-journalist, filed by Nebojša Stefanović, ministry of police and the following physical attack on Simon Simonović, activist of „Ne da(vi)mo Beograd” (<https://www.cenzolovka.rs/pritisci-i-napadi/petrusic-krajnje-smesno-sudjenje-stefanovic-povreden-sam/>) or S. Č.Žs article Osude napada na novinarku Danasa ispred skupštine in Danas (http://danas.rs/drustvo.55.html?news_id=347241&title=Osude+napada+na+novinarku+Danasa+ispred+skup%C5%A1tine) about the physical attack on Danas’s journalist Lidija Valter in May 2017 and the dismiss of the case by the first public prosecutor’s office in november 2017 (http://www.danas.rs/drustvo.55.html?news_id=362542&title=Odba%4%8dene+krivi%4%8dne+prijave+zbog+dogac%4%91aja+sa+inauguracije).

to watch or read something about the protests in the newspapers or in the TV (and one could assume that, if mass protests take place in a capital, nearly every day for about a month⁶, the state television would emit something about it), nothing (except of some allegations that the people protesting do not work, so they have time to protest, they are foreign-backed activists and so on) was mentioned. „Ne da(vi)mo Beograd“’s Facebook site counts ~75.500 followers (stand November 2017), their twitter account are following ~13.300 people (stand November 2017) – and most of their protests are organized via these and other social media platforms. Since 2012 there is free Wi-Fi installed in most of Belgrade’s public transport. During the time of the protests (verified by the author of this article herself April 10-, April 30-May 1 in different busses or tramways in Belgrade), the internet did not work in any of them. A technical malfunction is highly questionable.

Initially, „Ne da(vi)mo Beograd“ was formed as a platform against the Belgrade Waterfront project, as mentioned above. Over the years, the initiative now fights against corruption and for the free media, since these two are often tied together. These may be the main goals, but the initiative is expanding – and new initiatives that root in the movement develop. Since the movement plans to contest at the next elections in Belgrade (the last possible date is in mart), the question of union with or support of the opposition rises. However, the initiative works local in Belgrade’s local communities’ offices⁷ as well as between the cities by connecting with other initiatives and movements. In addition, initiatives from other cities are called to support protests as well as the Belgrade settled initiative supports movements and actions in other cities. In the meantime, similar slogans like the ones used in Serbia (Čiji je grad? – Naš grad! in Belgrade versus Zagreb je naš! in Zagreb) are spreading. Banners and their inscriptions as well as the used has htags, often are mocking or a restatement of the names of politicians, movie titles etc. For example ,Beograd nije Mali, and Sliniša, are referring

⁶ For example, read/watch Kurir’s article about the 26th day of protesting in <http://www.kurir.rs/vesti/politika/2807695/uzivo-protest-26-dan-gradani-poceli-da-se-ok-upljaju-ispred-skupstine-srbije>.

⁷ The initiative held and is going to hold informational evening in the community offices (Mesna zajednica) if possible; the dates and places are visible at <https://neda-vimobeograd.wordpress.com/>.

to Belgrade's mayor Siniša Mali (mali meaning little in Serbian, slina meaning snot), Ko to tamo ruši? (referring to one of the most famous Yugoslav movies Ko to tamo peva?), U moje vreme fantom je bio superheroj (referring to Vlada Vasiljević, a man who stole expensive cars in 1979 and always escaped the police in breath-taking chases, people were watching him on the streets like an action hero. A movie by Jovan B Todorović titled "The Belgrade Phantom" was released in 2009 and highly popular), U potraži sa državom, predizborno raskopavanje. Unfortunately, they cannot be fully described and researched in this article. However, it opens a various new field for future research.

Therefore, as we can see for now, the initiative came quite a long way from a collective that first started as protest movement against another megalomaniac project in Belgrade's urban planning. Now, several years later, the initiative grew into a movement and Belgradians will be able to pick them in the next city's elections in spring 2018. Although it is not settled yet, if the initiative will form an alliance or will go into the elections all by itself, the voters will have on more opposition's party, which is effectively showing its work in the last couple of years, especially since the elections in May. Due to the fact that more and more people were following (in social media) and attending the meetings, even the police union and the military union, although attenders faced prosecution and were threatened to lose their jobs, joined them and called protests by themselves. Still, in the "mainstream" media these events simply did not show or were obviously of marginal interest – hence, there was very few information about it, if at all. But, as mentioned above, if they (the protests or the initiative, or as well former ombudsperson and presidential candidate Saša Janković) got some spare room in the media, it was usually about them being foreign paid agents or people with too much time (ergo no jobs ergo they have time for walking when important people like the former premier and now president works)⁸. The last major protest was

⁸ Read further Vučić: Neka šetaju što je moguće duže, bolje za mene, 13.04.2017 in: https://www.b92.net/info/komentari.php?nav_id=1249961 or Vučić: Ne postoje spontane demonstracije, mogu da protestuju i 10 godina, ali MIRNO in: <http://pink.rs/vesti/22329/vucic-ne-postoje-spontane-demonstracije-mogu-da-protestuju-i-10-godina-ali-mirno>, were Vučić outlines his understanding of the cause and creation of protests, but also that he allows them to take place, as long as they are peacefully – and the slogan that the protesters want him down is already used violence and everything is organized by his two major opponents Vuk Jeremić and Saša Janković.

in October 2017, were the military union, the police union and several initiatives like „Ne da(vi)mo Beograd“, Pokret protiv diktature, workers from the company Jastrebac in Niš and many more joined forces. However, the work of the initiative is not just on the streets. By interacting with the people throughout social media accounts or their homepage or, for example, the newspaper Danas as well as in press conferences when there is new information Belgrade Waterfront or other city projects available, the initiative tries to raise the citizens' consciousness about the environment and circumstances they want to live in. As observer from the outside, the election results sometimes seem quite strange and the results look manipulated because of the high percentage the SNS is getting in every city or town she is participating in elections. Nevertheless, the next months will show if something is going to change.

Conclusion – an uncertain future?

The Ministry of Space can somehow be seen as the birthplace of „Ne da(vi)mo Beograd“ – since the collective are Iva Čukić, Ksenija Radovanović, Marko Aksentijević, Dobrica Veselinović, Robert Kozma and Radomir (Mika) Lazović, except Čukić they are all main figures in the initiative. As Radovanović works as a journalist for Danas, a lot of information about the initiative is published in this newspaper, also shown in the last special edition of December 21. The people behind the initiative are mainly known for their newspaper articles and appearances in public when trying to talk to politicians or similar. Because of their work and actions, they often face persecution and accusation as well as threats, as mentioned above in footnote 3. This lack of democracy rises every year (Ralev 2017) and relates to the most significant recognized problems related to media freedom, the treatment of the media by the government (EWB 2017). This often goes unpunished and therefore gives another example of the problem that protesters, who are just using their constitutional rights, are facing in most of autocratic or nearly autocratic systems – opposition or something similar is not wanted. Another example for this is the “Savamala case”. Here, several buildings on the riverbank and future Belgrade Waterfront area were demolished by men in masks in the night of 24/25 April 2017, without the authority to do so and without

the police responding to calls of citizens (Dragojlo 2017). The case is still unsolved, and was an event that happened within Belgrade, in a frequented neighborhood. Even though there were several requests by ombudsperson Saša Janković and others, at the end even premier Vučić, until today nobody had to take responsibility (Ralev 2017). Moreover, the initiative's members are threatened for questioning the case and the juridical process. „Ne da(vi)mo Beograd“ is one of several “ne” initiatives in Serbia – and it will hopefully carry on with its mission to develop a more democratic Serbia, where constitutional violation, criminalization of the opposition or persecution of dissidents are happening on a casual every day base.

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MORAL MOTIVATION AS PREDICTOR FOR ACTIVITY IN STUDENTS ORGANIZATION

Abstract

Student organizations exist and should exist to protect the rights and interests of their members. Experiences show that membership in student organizations helps develop critical thinking about processes that occur in higher education institutions in the state, and wider, in society. It also influences the process of identification with the peer group, as well as encouraging the motivation to take coordinated action to realize their own rights and needs. Membership in student organizations should also affect the development of skills that imply the improvement of personal and professional self, such as moral judgment, non-violent means of communication, conflict resolution.

If certain research is correct and say that more than 80% of students in Macedonia are not members of any student organization, then the situation is worrying and of course it is necessary to find suitable ways to change it.

Therefore, a research team at the Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research conducted a research on student organization, in particular about the ways in which students work, their attitudes

and opinions about student organization, and their motivation to behave in accordance with the concepts of social justice.

In the period of May 2017, 669 students from different faculties at the University “Ss. Cyril and Methodius” were examined about their views and opinions for student organization, as well as their moral motivation, or whether they are morally motivated to behave in accordance with the principles of social justice in society.

The results show that students do not understand the concept of social justice and are very little aware that with their behavior they contribute to the fight for social justice. This also means that if they are not fully aware about their potential contribution in society they will not be active in the processes of student’s life and their future.

Keywords: students organization, moral motivation, social justice, University “Ss. Cyril and Methodius”, Republic of Macedonia

Introduction

The study of morality has had an extensive history in various disciplines; schools of philosophy have studied it descriptively and normatively, evolutionary psychology has attempted to explain specific moral behavior in terms of natural selection, and political science has studied the influence of moral codes on political ideology. Indeed, morality plays a central role in events ranging from an individual’s daily life to major political and global events, thus warranting the attention of many academic disciplines.

(<http://scholarworks.umass.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1062&context=theses>).

The first step towards conceptualizing morality in terms of motivation is to start with an established theoretical framework. An essential distinction in motivation is the one between approach and avoidance tendencies; in approach motivation, behavior is directed by a positive or desirable event or outcome, whereas in avoidance motivation, behavior is directed by a negative or undesirable event or outcome (Elliot, 1999). This distinction dates back to the work on ethical hedonism by ancient Greek philosophers Democritus (460-370 B.C.) and Aristippus (430-360 B.C.). It has a particularly rich history

in psychology; most influential motivational theories have in some manner incorporated approach-avoidance concepts (Elliot, 1999).

In recent years, theoretical interest in the approach-avoidance distinction has extended to diverse areas of the field. The work on achievement (McClelland, Atkinson, Clarke, & Lowell, 1953), interpersonal relations (e.g., Impett, Gable, & Peplau, 2005), personality types (e.g., Elliot & Thrash, 2002; Emmons, 1996; Markus & Nurius, 1986), bio-physiology (e.g., Gray, 1982, 1990), and the “feared self,” personal strivings, and subjective well-being (Emmons, 1996; Markus & Nurius, 1986) all make the distinction between approach and avoidance.

The interest of this research is to put approach-avoidance distinction in the context of student activism, which is understood broadly as civic activism. Therefore, since civic engagement is important for the individual and the communal well-being, since sociopolitical attitudes relate to civic engagement (Hope and Jagers, 2014), since civic engagement maintains the viability of democratic society and promotes positive outcomes for those who participate, and since there is a relationship between sociopolitical beliefs and some forms of civic engagement (Moore, Hope, Eisman and Zimmerman, 2016), the focus was placed on the social attitude of students toward students organization and representation as relation of moral motivation with that social attitude.

The Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research (ISPJR) – Skopje in May 2017 conducted research on 669 students from the State University “Ss. Cyril and Methodius” (UKIM). The research was conducted with quota sample in the first phase and convenience sampling in the second. Male students were 33.2 and female were 61.8. The measuring instruments used included Questionnaire with 25 questions designed for the purpose of the research to examine students’ attitude toward their organization and Subscale for Social Justice Motive, part of the Moralism Scale (Sheikh, 2014). The research team was interdisciplinary and consisted of 6 researchers. This research was part of the broader project entitled “UKIM Students Perception of Their Organization and Representation”. The project also included two more instruments and questions which are not the subject of this article. This University-funded project was intended to hear students’ thoughts on current situations, problems, needs, as well as modalities and solutions related to student organization in UKIM.

Moral Motivations: The Role of Self-Regulation in Morality

An essential distinction in motivation is the distinction between two tendencies: the tendency of approach and the tendency of avoidance; in the motivation of approach, behavior is directed by a positive or desirable event or outcome, while in the motivation for avoidance, behavior is directed by a negative or unwanted event or outcome.

Positive outcomes in the domain of morality are those moral behaviors that an individual should apply, while negative outcomes are immoral behaviors that the individual should not apply. The key to self-regulation is to activate positive, moral behaviors – to do what is moral, despite the inhibition of negative, immoral behaviors – not to do what is immoral. If an individual has self-regulation, then he/she will be motivated to behave morally, and he/she will avoid being immoral. (Janoff-Bulman & Sheikh, 2006).

The next distinction in motivation is the distinction between the self and the others, more precisely, personal and social responsibility. Individuals who have perceived the concept of responsibility will be able to understand which behavior means personal responsibility, and which social responsibility.

By combining these two concepts: the concept of self-regulation and the concept of responsibility we come to the 2 x 2 Model of Moral Motivation, which consists of 4 cells that are referred to as: Self-Restraint, Self-Reliance, Social Order, and Social Justice. Although all these four motives are present to some degree in the moral system of each individual, the unique socializing history and life experience created a greater focus on one or more motives in each individual.

<i>Model of moral motivation</i>		Responsibility	
		Personal responsibility	Social responsibility
Self-Regulation	Tendency for avoidance	Self-Restraint	Social Order
	Tendency for approaching		

Graph no.1 2 x 2 Model of moral motivation

Self-Restraint and Self-Reliance reflect the differences between the self-regulation orientations of activation and the inhibition in the domain of personal responsibility, whereas Social Order and Social Justice represent these regulatory orientations in the realm of social responsibility.

The Self-Restraint motive can be best understood in terms of general self-protection, and in particular, as self-control and restraint in the face of threatening temptations. This is the realm of most of our popularized “seven deadly sins,” for it is personal control in the face of these undesirable behaviors that is believed to protect an individual. Within this moral domain, the focus is on the negative outcomes and the appropriate response is restraint and inhibition; giving in, personal indulgence and weakness are to be avoided through strength of character.

Reliance is essentially a matter of providing for the self; the focus is on one’s own advancement and achievement – positive outcomes – and involves willingness to depend on the self, as well as a sense of personal industry. This domain reflects beliefs in personal autonomy and is closest to our understanding of the Protestant work ethic, with its focus on working hard to get ahead. Both Self-Restraint and Self-Reliance entail forms of discipline; neither involves a lax orientation towards the self. These behaviors take on a moral quality, meaning that an individual will not freeload and unnecessarily take advantage of the group; however, it is important to emphasize that Self-Restraint focuses on what we should not do and inhibitory behaviors, whereas Self-Reliance focuses on what we should do and activation behaviors.

In the social responsibility domain, the Social Order motive involves the application of restraint motives to other people, particularly one’s larger community. Given that the focus is on preventing and avoiding dangers in the moral realm, this protect-based, social responsibility orientation involves the desire to restrain and control others’ behaviors in an effort to maximize a sense of security through homogeneity and conformity. Attunement to negative outcomes creates a need for explicit boundaries for right and wrong, and for knowing what is not permitted or acceptable, so that it can be avoided and dangerous consequences averted. To some extent, virtually all members of a community invoke Social Order, for we have societal rules all are expected to follow (e.g., criminal law).

Given that this protection motive addresses security needs, it typically responds to threats to the safety of the group; thus the regulatory strategy involves restraint and control of the group as a means to avoid harm or danger. Individuals with a Social Order motive do not expect to be rewarded for their moral behavior – social conformity and adherence to moral proscriptions – but they do expect to be punished for deviating or disobeying. Not surprisingly, the Social Order motive is associated with high scores on right-wing authoritarianism (Altmeyer, 1981) and social dominance (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) and with political conservatism (Janoff-Bulman, 2009).

The Social Justice motive involves a very different set of communal obligations involving the motivation to provide for others and to help others in the community advance, and is associated with efforts to insure greater economic and material support, often involving matters of opportunity, income and equity.

Moral behavior from a Social Justice perspective is equivalent to contributing to the social welfare of others, and individuals expect to be rewarded for good behavior, but do not expect to be punished in the absence of this behavior. In contrast to the Social Order motive, Social Justice is associated with political liberalism and low scores on right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance (Janoff-Bulman & Sheikh, 2006; Janoff-Bulman, 2009). Both involve beliefs in social responsibility; however, Social Order is focused primarily on what we should not do and inhibitory behaviors so as to maintain a moral, ordered community, whereas Social Justice focuses primarily on what we should do and activation behaviors in promoting a moral, just society. It was this motive that was the subject of analysis in this research, because we believe that this motive should be associated with students' activism, or more precisely, students' attitude toward their organization and representation.

Social attitudes

In psychology, an attitude refers to a set of emotions, beliefs, and behaviors toward a particular object, person, thing or event. Attitudes are often the result of experience or upbringing, and they can have a powerful influence over behavior. While attitudes are enduring,

they can also change (Chaiklin, 2011). A social attitude is defined as “a behavior pattern, anticipatory set or tendency, predisposition to specific adjustment or more simply, a conditioned response to social stimuli” (Dockery & Bedeian, 1989, p.11).

Attitudes structure can be described in terms of three components: Affective component: this involves a person’s feelings/emotions about the attitude object, Behavioral (or conative) component: the way the attitude we have influences how we act or behave and Cognitive component: this involves a person’s belief/knowledge about an attitude object. This model is known as the ABC model of attitudes.

One of the underlying assumptions about the link between attitudes and behavior is that of consistency. This means that we often or usually expect the behavior of a person to be consistent with the attitudes they hold. This is called the principle of consistency. The principle of consistency reflects the idea that people are rational and attempt to behave rationally at all times and that a person’s behavior should be consistent with their attitude(s). Whilst this principle may be a sound one, it is clear that people do not always follow it, sometimes behaving in seemingly quite illogical ways. There is evidence that the cognitive and the affective components of behavior do not always match with the behavior (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).

Components of the attitude about student organization and representation

The attitude about student organization and representation according to the ABC model, was disassembled into its components, which were actually presented in three subscales: the Cognitive Component (Cognitive Subscale = sum of 13 questions about student’s information about the activities of the student organization and the leading persons of the organization), the Affective Component (Affective Subscale = sum of 4 questions about the student’s satisfaction with several aspects of student organizations), and the Behavioral Component (Behavior Subscale = sum of 8 questions about the student’s involvement in the student’s formal organization).

The Cronbach Alpha coefficients for each subscale separately (for the Cognitive subscale = 0.883; for the Behavior subscale = 0.661 and for

the Affective subscale = 0.834), as well as the item total correlation of each item of all subscales (all significant at the 0.01 level) indicated that all the subscales can be seen as separate scales with their own sum score.

A descriptive analysis of all subscales demonstrated the following results.



Table no.1 *Descriptive analysis of Cognitive, Behavior and Affective subscales*

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Cognitive Subscale	0	13	2.76	3.076
Behavior Subscale	0	7	.77	1.222
Affective	4	20	10.42	3.485


As it can be seen from the table, the theoretical and the obtained range of the scale which presents the cognitive component is from 0 to 13, and M is 2.76; the theoretical and the obtained range of the scale which presents the behavioral component is from 0 to 7, and the arithmetic mean is 0.77; the theoretical and the obtained range of the scale which presents the affective component is from 4 to 20, and the arithmetic mean is 10.42.

A graphic display of the frequencies distribution follows.

Graph no.2 *Score distribution of Cognitive component* Graph no.3 *Score distribution of Behavioral component*



Graph no.4 *Score distribution of Affective component*



The data show the unequal distribution of the Cognitive Subscale and, in particular, the uneven distribution of the Behavioral Subscale. The majority of respondents have low scores close to zero on the two presented subscales. Only the affective component has a certain score shifting towards the middle.

The relation of all three components of the students' social attitude toward student organization represented by the coefficient of correlation is presented in the following table.

Table no.2 *Correlations among attitude's components*

	Cognitive component (subscale)	Behavior component (subscale)	Affective component (subscale)
Cognitive component (subscale)	1	.628**	.385**
Behavior component (subscale)	.628**	1	.178**
Affective component (subscale)	.385**	.178**	1

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

The coefficients speak of a statistically significant positive correlation between all three components. A high score of the cognitive component is paired with a high score of the behavioral component, as well as a high score of the affective component. This result suggests that those students who have greater knowledge and more information about the student organization are more active in the organization, and they have a more positive attitude towards their formal organization.

Student's motive for social justice

The introduction section mentioned that this research used the Subscale for Social Justice Motive as part of Moralism Scale. Moralism Scale is a 24-item scale that incorporates items representing each of the four cells of the proposed model of moral motivations: Self-Restraint, Self-Reliance, Social Order and Social Justice (see Appendix E). Each item consists of a scenario in which the target person decides whether to engage in a particular behavior. Participants are asked to make two types of ratings: first, they rate the extent to which they view the scenario to be a matter of personal preference, from 1 ("not at all a

matter of personal preference”) to 9 (“completely a matter of personal preference”). Second, participants rate the extent to which they believe the subject in the scenario should or should not perform the behavior, from 1 (“feel very strongly he/she should not”) to 9 (“feel very strongly he/she should”), where 5 is the midpoint (“neutral”). These are called the Moralism Preference subscale and the Moralism Evaluation subscale, respectively. Since we predict that the motive for social justice is the one in relation with student’s activism, we extract only those 6 scenarios which examine what we should do and activation behaviors in promoting a moral, just society.


Table no.3 Descriptive Analysis of Moralism Preference and Moralism Evaluation Subscales

	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Deviation
Moralism Preference-Extent to which a person views the scenario to be a matter of personal preference	6	54	46.16	8.680
Moralism Evaluation-Extent to which they view the scenario to be a matter of personal preference	6	54	38.58	7.699

As it can be seen from the table no.3, the theoretical and the obtained range of the scale which presents the first type of ratings about the matter of personal preference (Moralism Preference) is from 0 to 54, and M is 46.16; the theoretical and the obtained range of the second type of rating (Moralism Evaluation) is from 6 to 54, and the arithmetic mean is 38.58. If theoretical mean is 30, than it can be seen that in both ratings the respondents are above that score, and the first rating (about the extent to which a person views the scenario to be a matter of personal preference) is more extreme.

The Cronbach Alpha coefficient for the first type of ratings (Moralism Preference) was 0.846, and the Cronbach coefficient for the second ratings was 0.701.


This is the graphical presentation of the theoretical model of Social Justice coordinate system.



Graph no.5 Graphical presentation of motive for social justice

Since the respondents first rate the extent to which they view the scenario to be a matter of personal preference (from “not at all a matter of personal preference” to “completely a matter of personal preference”), the horizontal axis divides the respondents into those on the left side (up and down) who understand the social responsibility and those on the right side of the coordinate system (up and down) who do not understand social responsibility. Afterwards the respondents rate the extent to which they believe the subject in the scenario should or should not perform the behavior, (from “feel very strongly he/she should not” to “feel very strongly he/she should”), so that the vertical axis divides the respondents into those who are below (left and right) and who haven’t got a tendency to do what is good and socially desirable and those who are above (left and right) who do have a tendency to do what is good and socially desirable.


According to this coordinate system, the desirable moral motivation is placed on the left upper side, which presents the people who have a tendency to do what is good and socially desirable and they



understand the concept of social responsibility (they know that their action affects the other). But where are UKIM students positioned on this coordinate system?

Graph no.6 Score distribution on Moral Justice subscale

As can it be seen from this graph, the respondents are grouped in the right upper side, which is the place for those who do have a tendency to do what is good and socially desirable, but they still do not understand the concept of social responsibility, and think that doing things, such as giving charity or helping the old lady in the supermarket, is a matter a personal choice.



Graph no.7 Frequencies and percentages of respondents in the coordinate system

Graph no. 7 again presents the fact that majority of students belong in the right upper corner. However, this graph illustrates another important fact that more than a quarter of students are in the neutral zone, zone somewhat in the middle of the coordinate system, zone with no extreme preferences and attitudes.

There was no significant correlation between a student's attitude toward their organization (cognitive, behavioral and affective component/scale) and the Scale for Social Responsibility (Moralism Preference subscale and the Moralism Evaluation subscale), which means that these two variables are not in any kind of relationship. And, expectedly, there was retention of the null hypothesis for these two variables.

	Null Hypothesis	Test	Sig.	Decision
1	The distribution of CognitiveSubscale is the same across categories of SocialJusticeScale.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.577	Retain the null hypothesis.
2	The distribution of BehavioralSubscale is the same across categories of SocialJusticeScale.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.420	Retain the null hypothesis.
3	The distribution of AffectiveSubscale is the same across categories of SocialJusticeScale.	Independent-Samples Kruskal-Wallis Test	.317	Retain the null hypothesis.

Asymptotic significances are displayed. The significance level is .05.

Graph no.8 Null hypothesis testing

Discussion

There are several reasons for beginning research about students' motive for their activism. First, there is no doubt about the actuality of the student organization in the Republic of Macedonia. In the past year, there have been several events that brought to light many problems, but also many reasons for discussion and debate of specific steps in the field of student organization. Second, the University "Ss. Cyril and Methodius", Skopje (UKIM) is the largest and leading educational institution, only supporting the thesis of the great importance a UKIM student organization might have.

The third reason comes from the fact that student organizations exist and should exist to protect the rights and interests of their members.

If some of the research data is correct, we face the fact that more than 80% of students are not members of any student organization, which makes the situation worrying and, certainly, calls for appropriate ways to be found for it to change. Even if that percentage were not so high, however, the fact remains that there needs to be constant investment in good student organization, because investing in it signifies a literal investment in the future of the Republic of Macedonia.

Another reason are experiences which show that membership in student organizations helps develop critical thinking about processes occurring in higher education institutions in the state, and wider, in society. It also influences the process of identification with the peer group, as well as encouraging the motivation to undertake coordinated action for the realization of their own rights and needs. Membership in student organizations should also influence the development of skills that imply the improvement of personal and professional self, such as moral judgment, non-violent communication and conflict resolution.

The next very important reason for this research is that students' civic engagement is important for the individual and the community well-being (Hope and Jagers, 2014), as it maintains the viability of democratic society and promotes positive outcomes for those who participate. On the other hand, research literature shows that there is significant positive relation between social responsibility and civic activism and political activism (https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/psych_diss/85).

All these facts were precursors to research the social attitude of students toward student organization and relation of moral motivation with that social attitude.

The data show three main findings: on the motivation scale for social justice UKIM students show that although they have a tendency to behave in a socially desirable and moral way, they still do not adopt the concept of social justice and do not realize that socially desirable behavior does not concern only them; UKIM students have a rudimentary and undeveloped attitude towards such an important topic as social organization. The behavioral component of the attitude is least developed, and thus is the cognitive component; there is no relation between the motive for social justice and students' activism, or more general, students' attitude toward their organization.

The first finding touches upon adults, society, educational systems: schools, universities because the motive for social justice is primarily socially conditioned. Although students tend to behave in a socially desirable and moral way, they still cannot realize that socially desirable behavior does not concern only them, and this is a concept which should be encouraged in childhood by all persons who are in position to be adults, teachers and educators.

Even though the second finding looks like it should primarily concern students themselves, it is still obligation of adults to provide safe environment for students (youth in general) to freely express their potentials.

The third finding logically follows from the research data: there is no variation in dependent variables, such as were the cognitive, behavioral and cognitive component of the attitude, and especially the behavioral component where more than 90 percent of the respondents have score 0 or 1 on that subscale.

The conclusion from these research findings will be as follows: the educational system of the country has to invest in its students because good student organization, in addition to exercising rights, freedoms and needs, and engaging in improving students' standard and their well-being, means investing in an efficient, motivated and democratic youth.

According to all previous experiences around the world, it can be said that one of the basic goals of universities and society in general should be investing in providing a suitable ground for student parliaments to become true temples of democracy, tolerance, understanding, a sense of community and, of course, desire, motive, vision, but also knowledge for a better university as a better educational environment and a better society in general.

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**HEALTH MIGRATION INTEGRATION POLICY AND
RESPONSE IN REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA**

Abstract

Problem: Traditionally country of emigration Republic of Macedonia recently has become country of transit and permanent immigration, facing increased influx of migrants in 2015. 477.861 migrants entered from Greece and departed to Serbia from 19th June 2015 to 19th September 2016, with daily arrivals up to 10.000, mostly from Syria. 27% are children (4% without companion). The main goal was to analyze the health migration integration policy in Macedonia and the response to the migrant crisis applying Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015 health strand questionnaire.

Policy: Targeted migrant health policies are stronger and services more responsive in countries with greater wealth in Europe, with highest health strand score 70 in Switzerland and lowest in Latvia 17. Macedonia is in the middle with score 38 higher than in Greece and Bulgaria. Health care is a constitutionally-guaranteed universal right for all citizens in Macedonia financed by compulsory health insurance and central budget. Legal migrants are covered by the same risk-sharing system for health care with additional requirements. Compulsory health insurance is available to persons with granted

refugee status, under subsidiary protection or in detention on equal terms with nationals. Undocumented migrants have no access to the same system. In 2015 the Government responded to migrant influx with free health care for all migrants who entered from Greece.

Response: The crisis management team is coordinating the action of national and local authorities, Red Cross, UN and civil-society organizations. Two transit centers have been established on the south and north border with 24 hours free medical care with more than 1.000 daily interventions. Macedonia offers migrants legal entitlements to health care, but has many problems to adapt services to their needs: huge number of undocumented migrants, lack of interpreters, mediators, health professionals and standard medical procedures for heal.

Keywords: migrant, health, integration policy, MIPEX, Macedonia

Introduction

Traditionally country of emigration Republic of Macedonia recently has become country of transit and permanent immigration, facing increased influx of migrants in 2015. There have been evident changes in the type of immigrants coming from other countries in the Republic of Macedonia. With the expansion of the European Union into South East Europe, there has been a notable growth of transit and illegal migration in the Republic of Macedonia (Tozija F, 2015). Thousands of migrants illegally were coming from Greece in Macedonia and continued transit through Serbia to final destination in rich EU countries. 477.861 migrants entered from Greece and departed to Serbia from 19th June 2015 to 19th September 2016, with daily arrivals up to 10.000, mostly from Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Somalia, Palestine etc.. 27% were children (4% without companion) (UNHCR, 2017). However, many asylum-seekers and refugees moved on before their international protection needs have been assessed. Such movements are prompted in part by: difficulties in applying for asylum, for example at borders; inadequate or insufficient reception

conditions; low recognition rates; or a lack of local integration prospects (Tozija F, 2015).

The influx of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants into the Region is not an isolated crisis but an ongoing reality that will affect European countries for some time to come, with medium- and longer-term security, economic and health implication. It is estimated that 75 million international migrants live in the European Region, amounting to 8.4% of the total European population and one third of all international migrants worldwide. The number of refugees and migrants entering European states is increasing, driven by the wars in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Eritrea and elsewhere (WHO, 2016). Over 1 million refugees and migrants entered the European Region in 2015. Since 2013, the numbers of refugees and migrants crossing the Mediterranean has increased significantly. Increases in arrivals have also been recorded in Greece and Spain (UNHCR, 2017). More than 3.700 refugees drowned in the Mediterranean between, according to UNHCR estimates. The most attractive EU countries for asylum seekers are Germany, France, Sweden, Italy and the United Kingdom (WHO, 2016).

Undocumented migrants are considered at higher risk for health problems because of their irregular status and the consequences of economic and social marginalization. Undocumented migrants mostly have only access to emergency care across Europe, and even in the countries where they are fully entitled to health care, formal and informal barriers hinder their access (WHO, 2015).

Macedonia experienced several refugee crises, during which continuously expressed readiness to provide care and environment where refugee rights are fully accessible and respected (Tozija F, 2015). Given the geographic position of the country, there is a high likelihood of further growth of such migratory developments in Republic of Macedonia. (Figure 1)

Figure 1: Migrant Balkan Route



Source: UNHCR 2017 (UNHCR, 2017)

Net migration in Republic of Macedonia has been continuously increasing within the period 2009-2015, from 1.065 to 4.342, mainly due to immigrants foreigners with temporary stay, but in 2016 it has decreased to 4.113. At the same time there is negative net migration of Macedonian residents which improves slightly from -510 to 2009 to -157 in 2016 (State Statistical Office, 2016). There is “brain drain” process when young and educated residents are temporary or permanently leaving the country.

The main goal was to analyze the health migration integration policy in Republic of Macedonia and the response to the migrant crisis applying Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015 health strand questionnaire. Four dimensions of health migrant integration policy were analyzed: entitlements to health services, accessibility of health services, responsiveness to migrants’ needs and measures to achieve change.

Material and methods

Migration Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) Health strand questionnaire (2015) has been applied as the most comprehensive, published in 2004 as the European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index. The MIPEX health strand was developed by Migration Policy Group (MPG), IOM and COST Action ADAPT (Adapting European Health Services to Diversity). COST is the EU Association for European Cooperation in Science and Technology. The normative framework underlying the health strand was provided by the Council of Europe's (2011) Recommendations on mobility, migration and access to health care (see <http://bit.ly/rKs2YD> and <http://bit.ly/xF0g6U>). These recommendations were formulated during a two-year process of consultation with researchers, health professionals, national and international organizations, as well as NGOs serving or run by migrants. The process of developing and piloting the questionnaire was undertaken by ADAPT, which is a network of 120 experts on migrant health working in 30 countries. Data collection was organized by the IOM, while experts and peer reviewers responsible for completing the Health strand questionnaire were members of ADAPT.

Migrant Health Integration Policy

The Government of Republic of Macedonia in cooperation with national and international institutions especially with the UN Refugee Agency ratified the main ILO and UN conventions and has developed integration policies that incorporate respect for cultural and social differences, human rights and respect for human dignity. In 2008 the first national strategy on integration of refugees and foreigners 2008-2015 (Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, 2008) was adopted, providing a national policy framework for an integration process targeting recognized refugees and persons under humanitarian/subsidiary protection and other vulnerable categories. In 2009, the National Plan of Action (Ministry of Labor and Social Policy, 2009) was adopted by the Government outlining the activities for integration of refugees and foreigners within six-core components, as per the strategy. These policy and operational documents specify activities across sectors relevant to support the refugee integration (Tozija F, 2015).

Health care is a constitutionally-guaranteed universal right for citizens in Republic of Macedonia (Constitution, 1991)) and is financed by compulsory health insurance and from the central budget through Ministry of Health (MOH) vertical programs (Ministry of Health, 2013). Compulsory health insurance is based on solidarity, equity and equality providing universal coverage with basic benefit package (horizontal and vertical equity) defined by Health Insurance Law (Health Insurance Fund, 2017)). Compulsory health insurance payroll contributions from the salaries are paid to the Health insurance fund for a defined package of benefits. In principle, these benefits may be supplemented with private insurance, but this practice is still limited. Risk sharing system is equitable but access to this system is unequal (Tozija F, 2015).


Foreigners (or legal migrants) in Macedonia are covered by the same risk-sharing system for health care but are subjected to additional requirements such permission to stay, paid employment. Entitlement to health services including right to health insurance is regulated with Law on Foreigners (Official Gazette of RM, 2011) and with the Health Insurance Law. Systematic use of out-of-pocket payments exists for all. Migrants with access to compulsory health insurance are obliged to pay co-payments at the same level as nationals. Health care of asylum seekers is regulated with Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection (Official Gazette of RM, 2009) and with Health Insurance Law, compulsory health insurance with right to basic benefit package, covers asylum granted persons, under subsidiary protection and asylum seekers. Ministry of labour and Social Policy covers the costs of health services at the point of use.

Undocumented migrants have no access to the same system as nationals; they have private insurance or payment of full costs of the services. Emergency care in life threatening situations should be provided without patient documentation. Migrants that entered the country illegally are transferred to the Transition centre of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) in Gazi Baba (Skopje) where health services are organized in collaboration with Red Cross. The costs for health services during their stay at this centre are paid by Government through MOI. If they seek asylum they become asylum seekers and are being transferred to asylum Reception Center in Visbegovo, Skopje, where have the same entitlements to health care as asylum seekers. The sanitary conditions and health care provisions, including psychosocial

support in these centers, are poor, posing a threat to the health of migrants which number is growing (Tozija F, 2015).

Republic of Macedonia has health strand total score 38, lower than the highest score 70 in Switzerland, but much higher than the lowest score in Latvia 17 and higher than the neighboring countries Greece and Bulgaria. Republic of Macedonia is in the same score group with Turkey and Cyprus (IOM, 2016). (Figure 2)

Figure 2: MIPEX Health Strand total scores



Source: IOM 2016

Entitlements: As most Southeast European countries. Republic of Macedonia offers migrants legal entitlements to healthcare, but still little to adapt services to their needs (Tozija F, 2015; IOM, 2016). Although the law may grant migrants certain entitlements to healthcare coverage, administrative procedures (e.g. requirements for documentation or discretionary decisions) often prevent them from exercising these rights in Macedonia. The complexity, bureaucracy and delays characterizing immigration procedures, combined with the

extent of informal employment, are the major obstacles to immigrants' access to care in Macedonia, as a large share remains uninsured. The precarious socio-economic condition of many also gravely restricts their access to health care services, mainly to specialized services and secondary care (Tozija F, 2015).

Despite the EU's declared aim to harmonize the entitlements for legal migrants and for asylum seekers there are wide variations (WHO, 2016; IOM, 2016). Coverage for undocumented migrants remains a controversial issue in most countries. In many countries, administrative barriers prevent undocumented migrants from exercising their legal entitlements (WHO, 2015).

Access policies: Multiple methods and languages are not used to inform all categories of migrants about entitlements and the use of health services neither in Macedonia. Cultural mediators or trained patient navigators are provided to a certain degree in 18 countries in Europe (IOM, 2016). In Macedonia there are only Roma mediators (Tozija F, 2008).

Responsive services: Services are not adapted to the needs of migrants in Macedonia. Language support is not provided where necessary in Macedonia, like in most Central and Southeast European countries (Tozija F, 2015; IOM, 2016). Migrants are not involved in information provision, service design and delivery in Macedonia. Staff is not prepared for migrants' specific needs in Macedonia.

Mechanisms for change: Active measures promoting change and promising efforts are missing, with little policy support to achieve change. There is no research and data needed to address migrants' specific health needs in Macedonia. Action plans on migrant health have been developed in 22 countries including Macedonia.

Government Response

There are differences in migration integration policy between countries in Europe. Targeted migrant health policies are usually stronger and services more responsive in countries with greater wealth, more immigrants and tax-based as opposed to insurance-based health systems. Most Southeast European countries offer migrants legal

entitlements to healthcare, but make little effort to adapt services to their needs (Tozija F, 2015; IOM, 2016).

The Macedonian policies for societal integration are just below the European average and slightly better than other countries in the region, such as Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and Bulgaria. The country's anti-discrimination legislation could contribute the most to the integration of future immigrants, as in other countries with similar laws in Central and Eastern Europe (Tozija F, CIDOB, 2015).

The Government responded to a migrant influx in 2015 with many activities: crisis management team was established and was coordinating the action of national and local authorities, Red Cross, UN and civil-society organizations. Two transit centers have been established on the south and north border with 24 hours free medical care with more than 1.000 daily interventions.

Republic of Macedonia offered migrants legal entitlements to health care, but had many problems to adapt services to their needs: huge number of undocumented migrants upon arrival at entry points, lack of cultural sensitive health services for migrants, no resources such as interpreters, intercultural mediators, health and social care professionals trained on multicultural approaches are available, communication problems between migrants and the health care personnel and administrative staff, lack of standards or guidelines for health services responsive to diverse cultures.

The main barriers to health care for some mobile groups are caused by the considerable variation of national regulations, laws and policies which regulate the entitlements to health services for refugees, asylum seekers and un-documented migrants in EU Member States (WHO/ UNHCR/IOM, 2013; London School of Economics and Political Science, 2010). Specifically, for undocumented migrants, current regulations and legislations in EU Member States do not guarantee access to health care and tend to become more restrictive (WHO, 2015).

Other barriers refer to language, cultural differences in concepts of health and disease, the expression of symptoms and to the recognition of the need to seek treatment and the presence of racism. In many cases migrants and refugees when referring to health concerns involve cultural factors that make them hesitant to seek health care. It is evident that problems arise primarily from difficulties of adapting

to a new climate when confronting health problems and dealing with health professionals. Cultural competence needs to be developed in relation to social and health care (IOM, 2010).

Effective health care delivery to migrant and minority groups in Macedonia is compromised by the absence of cultural sensitive services such as interpreters, cultural mediators, health and social care professionals trained on multicultural approaches. Communication barriers seem to be important, not only regarding access to health as such, but mostly in respect to information, negotiation and communication with health care administrators and providers. In Macedonia there are only Roma mediators. Migrants are not involved in information provision, service design and delivery (Tozija F, 2015).

Health services are not adapted to the needs of migrants and are not responsive to diverse cultures. Staff is not prepared for migrants' specific needs. Standards or guidelines that require health services to be competent in intercultural communication and take in account diversity of patients such individual and family characteristics, experiences and situation, respect for different beliefs, religion, culture are not in place. There is a need to invest more, and sooner, in the health care, language and vocational training of refugees—there is no societal benefit in denying these rights (IOM, 2016).

Routine data collection on health in Macedonia does not include information about migrant status and country of origin. There is a need for research and data to address migrants' specific health needs. This includes building the infrastructure to improve collection of routine health data on migrants and asylum seekers; such data are not available (or only in a highly aggregated format) in most EU member states. In the absence of reliable data, the full extent of human suffering and health tragedies remains invisible. Public health professionals also need to develop strategies to address health threats and health care needs of refugees across the continuum of peri- and post-migration phases. This includes effective protection from infectious diseases, access to comprehensive primary care particularly for vulnerable groups with mental and maternal health needs, and last but not least decent coverage of existential human needs (EUGATE, 2015).

Conclusion

The Government adopted national legal framework and strategic documents on integration and established institutional framework creating conditions to start new development processes and transfer from provision of basic emergency/humanitarian assistance to the provision of assistance supporting self-reliance and sustainability. Republic of Macedonia offers migrants legal entitlements to health care, but has many problems to adapt services to their needs. It is necessary to create appropriate structures in health system accessible to refugees responsive to their needs and different cultures based on universal human rights.

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TOWARDS A TRANSCULTURAL PEDAGOGY AND EDUCATION

*“...there must arise out of them all a mixed race,
that of a European man.”*

Friedrich Nietzsche (1984: 228)

Abstract

The idea of transculturality was introduced on European level by German philosopher and art historian, Wolfgang Welsch (Welsch, 1999). It was the response to already existing concepts of multi- and interculturality, which are understood as excessively static. Multiculturalism implies harmonious coexistence of differing cultural or ethnic groups in a given society (e. g. Cashmore et al., 1994; Nikitorowicz, 2009). Interculturality, although promises dialogue and exchange between the cultures, unlike multiculturalism comes from the traditional, close to Herderian one, approach to culture as a whole. These concepts, according to Welsch and other authors (e. g. Misiejuk, 2011), create and sustain barriers between different cultures, recognizing cultures as its foundation. Transculturality breaks with such separatist, rival understanding of the cultures in which social effect is usually appropriation of cultural heritage and conflict of traditions. In place of comprehensive cultures idea it introduces the model of culture networks (Welsch, 1998). Thus, transculturality does not imply, the relationship between cultural unities. It is the individual network

elements that mutually merge. The result of it is the process of culture hybridization during which the content of other cultures becomes an elements of a given culture, creating a new kind of cultural quality.

Keywords: transculturality, pedagogy, multimodal learning, transculturating, archaeological perspective

Introduction

Until now the idea of transculturality has been applied (to some extent) to social sciences, humanities and other disciplines, such as medicine and architecture. Although transculturality also includes pedagogy, its transcultural “foundations” are not so deeply rooted. This is indicated for instance in a quite general definition, according to which transcultural education “refers to something what pervades culture (as in the fields of cross – cultural psychology and trans – cultural psychiatry)” (Portera, 2008: 484). To illustrate the current transcultural discourse in pedagogy and education examples taken from Europe, the United States and Australia will be used.

Multimodal learning

Christoph Wulf (2010) from the University of Berlin regards transcultural education as a global challenge. In his opinion, education has been designed in all European countries as a tool for nation building, i.e. national identity and consciousness as well as nation states. Such an orientation dominated in the 19th and 20th centuries. After the Second World War and then following the fall of the Berlin Wall, education in countries forming today’s European Union began to include elements of European and cultural heterogeneity. The UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005) indicates that culture can no longer be identified with national culture. Instead, we should concentrate on a cultural rather than national identity. Cultural borders become permeable, dynamic and

changeable. They allow for the penetration of certain phenomena, but refuse to accept others. Cultural phenomena overlap, mix and change with one another; within and between cultures. Hence, the mission of transcultural education is to promote contact with the Other and otherness in a non-violent manner. From a UNESCO perspective, to cope effectively with cultural diversity education should be an education for peace, as well as an education that promotes sustainable development (Wulf, 2010).

During the course of globalisation, which not only accepts but also promotes cultural diversity, the question arises of how to cope constructively with representatives of other cultures; hence what kind of skills should be the object of education. Unintentionally adopting Welsch's standpoint (the majority of cultures do not exist independently, but rather contain elements of other cultures), Wulf reckons that the "Other" is likewise no longer a static category and depends on the relationship between the perceiver and the perceived. What is perceived as different always depends on us and in this sense is relative. If people were to become aware of the otherness in themselves and in their cultures, it would open up new possibilities for understanding the otherness of other people as well as other cultures, just as it would also develop ways of thinking from the viewpoint of the Other. An increased awareness of differences in turn increases the likelihood of identifying shared aspects of different cultures and breaking down the barriers between them. Although recognising and accepting differences is key to preventing conflicts this approach does, however, have its limitations. Wulf contends that it should be included within the framework of Human Rights and global ethics (op. cit.). The aim is to develop so called heterological thinking, concentrated on the relationship between the known and the alien, between knowledge and lack of knowledge, between certainty and uncertainty.

In Wulf's concept of transcultural education three categories take centre stage: differentiation, transformation, and hybridity. All three are closely interconnected. Differentiation plays a key role in the formation of identity (whether this be national, European or cultural) as well as in the very understanding of otherness. To analyse social and cultural development, the category of transformation is used, along with the processes of transgression contained therein. Transgression involves the overstepping of limits and restrictions set by rules, norms,

customs and laws. On the other hand, it also includes crossing of the culturally grounded boundaries of the Other. These acts may occur without the use of violence. In managing cultural diversity boundaries are often transgressed, which leads to the formation of new values. Transgressions change (transform) the norms and rules, styles and practices of everyday life. By shifting boundaries, they create new cultural constellations. The emerging hybrids constitute a “third space” (Bhabha, 2004) formed through differentiation and transgression. This is a “in-between” borderline space, in which a new transcultural identity is located. However, this identity is not constituted by distinguishing oneself from the Other, but rather through mimetic assimilation of oneself with the Other.

Transcultural learning is by its nature multimodal in form (Kress, 2010). Transcultural learning is also a synesthetic process, which means that it takes place through different senses and the main role in it is played by pictures, sounds, and touch. Stoller highlights the importance of sensory cognition when conducting scientific research. He contends that university education sharpens intellectual vision and narrows sensory horizon. However, it is “(...) through the senses that we gain access to something which rational thinking is unable to give us” (Stoller; see: Wiczorkiewicz, 2004: 107).

Multimodal learning comprises four fundamental components: mimetic learning, performativity of learning, inquiry learning, and learning and communication rituals. Mimetic learning is the basic component of transcultural multimodal education. It concerns the body and the senses. Without mimetic representation, learning is lifeless and fails to enrich the imagination of children (Wulf, 2010). The behavioural model for the teacher fulfils here the basic function of initiating and facilitating mimetic learning processes in children. However, it is not solely a question of copying. Rather, it is a creative process involving references to representatives of other cultures. Mimetic processes not only concern face-to-face situations with Others, but also imaginary activities, improvised scenes and themes. These processes play a greater role than is ordinarily perceived. An analysis of gestures during a staged interaction indicate the role which facial expressions, gestures, and body posture play in teaching (learning). Transcultural learning is also a performative process, i.e. one which focuses on action and constituting reality. The relationship

between symbolic and practical action are analysed. Body language and words overlap. Pedagogy is understood here to mean knowledge of action, and hence its focus of interest is the generation of practical knowledge as the foundation of pedagogical action. Hence, teaching (learning) is not an exclusively cognitive process; it also embraces social processes in which interaction between students plays an important role. Contemporary education that is open to the Other no longer thus entails learning facts. It also involves learning how to learn, how to live together, how to act, and how to be (Delors, 1996). Such inquiry learning integrates mimetic and performative experience. It endeavours to understand how people learn. Inquiry learning requires time to accurately study material, which is to be discovered, structured and interpreted. Learning and communicating rituals also play an important role in it. Rituals form structures and social functions and also shape the community in which the educational process takes place. In the case of transcultural education it is important to make the transition from knowledge transfer to active learning. Hence, soft and more flexible school/university rituals forge the conditions that ensure greater individual territory, methodological freedom and more efficient communication.

What is interesting is that Wulf refers nowhere in his concept of transcultural education to his fellow countryman Welsch. Although his proposal includes many inspiring elements the image of transculturality does not itself appear to be fully crystallised.

Transculturing

An attempt is being made in a North American environment to provide a comprehensive definition of the term “transcultural education” and at the same time prepare a new model for it. Transcultural education is education across culture, education – so to speak – penetrating right across cultures. However, this still does not give a sufficiently satisfactory description. To provide a more precise definition, Aldridge, Kilgo and Christensen (2014) propose treating “culture” not as a noun but as a verb (sic!). They argue that “culture” represented as a noun appears too static and entrenched, while its essence today

is more fluid. "If we refer to culturing, then we are discussing action within and between individuals and groups of people" (op. cit.: 108). As a consequence, the authors assign five meanings to the prefix "trans" in transcultural education. "Trans" encompasses the following: transreferential, transactional, transformational, transmutational and transcendent.

Transferential culturing is "(...) operating, interacting, or using the dominant culture's expectations" (op. cit: 109). The dominant in this case refers to a concrete group in which the Others constitute a minority. A key role is played here by code switching, what means customizing a style of speech and interaction to the group being addressed. Code switching occurs when a person adjusts his/her way of speaking and interacting to the listener or group which is the object of interest. The question arises of how far this strategy should go. For example, should we learn foreign languages and dialects when we communicate with Others? Or should this responsibility also lie on their side. Where is the line of compromise?

The transaction is one of the basic categories of teaching (Aldridge, Goldman, 2007). In transaction teaching knowledge is perceived as being constructed and reconstructed by the participants of the teaching – learning process (Jungck, Marshall, 1992). Similarly, transactional culturing is "(...) construction of knowledge within and among diverse individuals and groups participating in the teaching – learning process" (Aldridge, Kilgo, Christensen, 2014: 110). Transactional culturing may be treated as a synonym for intercultural communication, although with the clear proviso that representatives of different cultures find themselves in the same negotiating position.

Transformational culturing is a process of teaching students to change their own culture by working on existing injustices while at the same time working to change the world as a whole (Aldridge, Kilgo, Christensen, 2014). However, once more the question arises: who is this transformation supposed to affect? Who and what is to be changed and in what way? Due to the complexity of this issue, authors suggest that transcultural educators should help in the teaching process.

Transmutational culturing is similar to the transformational one. The difference lies in the added value of the higher form. It is thus a question of changing the existing culture in this higher form. There

is once more the open question of what this higher form takes. What criteria should be used for assessment purposes?

The essence of transcultural education from the perspective presented above is transcendent culturizing, understood as “(...) interacting with others through transcending or overcoming cultural barriers that limit human interaction ” (op. cit: 111). The authors propose deconstructing traditional cultural labels, and in exchange building a community on the basis of unique individual identities emerging from ever changing group structures. It is important thus to concentrate more on the individual level than on the diversified total cultural content. Hybridization is worth studying above all else within the family unit as well as between families in which synthesis of at least two cultures yields a synergy effect. Equally important is the question of intracultural diversity, which has been neglected in concepts of multi- and intercultural education. In the transcultural approach, the tendency is to recognise the interweaving of cultures in every individual, the same as with the cultural relationship existing between the individual and Others. However, certain aspects of family and culture must be called into question. In the opinion of authors these include the cultural conditioning of sexual discrimination. We may also note here certain inhuman (from the perspective of Western culture) tribal customs, such as, for example, the circumcision of girls, designed to maintain intergroup boundaries between African villages (Shweder, 2003). If transcendence is a goal of transcultural education, religious factors should not be overlooked. Besides showing respect for all religions (something which had already been demanded by earlier movements of multi- and intercultural education), transculturality must also point out the restrictive nature of world religions, just as it should also recognise their ability to forge a relationship between individuals and a higher power. This is especially important for the theme of gender noted earlier. Also open to question is how exactly transcultural education can tackle these sensitive issues.

To sum up, the new paradigm of transcultural education is a unique call to adventure (Campbell, 2008). It is the creative journey of someone who can step outside culture and follow their destiny. It is not gender, place of residence or age that defines an individual. Nor is the individual defined by nationality, religion or the century in which he or she lives, and thus also not by culture.

Archaeological perspective

If the examples taken from Europe and USA primarily concerned transcultural education, Australian examples are directly connected with transcultural pedagogy. Kate Cadman and Xialin Song (2012) analysed higher education in Australia (mainly Asian studies), and advocate redefining both the entire system and pedagogy itself. What characterises the Australian system of higher education today is – as is true of many countries in the world – its internationalisation. Already at the beginning of the 21st Century it was estimated that approximately 2 million students around the world participated in various study programmes outside their own country (Davis, 2003). This large-scale movement of students has given rise to competition on the market for education services. However, this market has not been able to cope with all students' needs. In general, there has been no consideration of the adequacy of the education provided. Despite the widespread internationalisation of courses, the education system is still based on an Anglo-Celtic model of teaching. However, the existing situation requires a change in the model of education; abandoning one-way knowledge transfer usually happening in the English language, in favour of a reciprocal exchange of knowledge. For teaching staff, this means the need to recognise unknown student profiles and needs as well as make an effort to expand their skills beyond the English language to include other languages [Birrel, 2006]. This aim can be achieved by taking a critical attitude towards one's own beliefs, prejudices and assumptions as well as by understanding in what way these emerged and came to be regarded as natural (Spivak, 1990). A monoculture of knowledge should be replaced by an ecology of knowledge, by promoting a dialogue between different knowledge variants. In this new world, one that is characterised by epistemological diversity and possibilities of dialogue, another pedagogy becomes possible.

As a conceptual framework for their own pedagogical theory and practice Cadman and Song adopted the idea of social regularities developed by James Scheurich (1997), which in turn build on Foucault's idea of "discursive regularities" and "archaeological" systems (1972). Social regularities are "the rules or assumptions that constitute the nature of reality, the way to know reality, the nature of the subjectivity of the knower, etc." (Scheurich, 1997: 163). The social structure is

represented by a network of such regularities, which in turn constitute social behaviour. These regularities allow us to understand what it means to be in the world, since cultures establish “forming sets” that are a product precisely of the social regularities currently in force. To be a member of a culture means to live – think, act, speak, be – literally according to these interconnected categories or bonds in a social structure. Scheurich defines these interactive bonds (social points) of categories as “archaeology”, and the perception of culture in this way as an “archaeological” perspective. He observes that the deepest-rooted rules and assumptions of this emerging archaeology function outside the reflexive consciousness of the members of a culture and hence are for the most part reproduced unconsciously. They became so deeply rooted that they tend to be perceived as natural or suitable norms rather than historically developed social constructs.

If we wish thus to tackle globalising trends in education, we should begin by using the name diversity, focusing on this issue and subjecting it to analysis. The next step should be to build bridges between different approaches to education. Both teachers and students can share experienced differences, although the first step should be taken by the teachers. They should problematize their own well-established archaeological perspectives, opening up in this way the path to a transcultural pedagogy. One source of inspiration in this respect is Roberto Salvadori (1997), who adapts Ortiz’s idea of transculturation directly to the relationship between the teacher and the student. In his opinion, both parties in a transcultural relationship are engaged in the same way and change one another. Something changes in the culture of each. The objective is to achieve transculturality and create a shared culture, which will differ from the original cultures of both teachers and students. Salvadori notes the problems this process entails, mainly confusion, loss and a weakening of identity.

Cadman and Song (2012) feel that a proposed reorientation of pedagogy in a transcultural direction stands in contrast to the dominant mode of thinking prevailing in Western universities. Paradoxically, in response to the increasing cultural diversity of their students these universities are standardising course profiles and creating one-dimensional demands for all. These steps fall within the broader trend of acculturation, or even assimilation. They are forcing students to reject their intellectual heritage and adapt to a

canon of knowledge that excludes or marginalises another system of knowledge as well as the ways in which it is taught. By way of contrast, Singh, Kenway and Apple (2005) believe there is a need to develop a “responsive education”, which would necessitate considering innovative ways of renewing policy and pedagogy aimed at preparing students for life. This approach not only entails fostering in students critical thinking and a deep understanding of ideas, but also creating knowledge using resources from different fields and integrating it with their own knowledge acquired through experience, so that the whole resonates with real life contexts. The goal is to make effective use of the intellectual capital of students from different cultures, a capital that the teacher usually does not recognise. Instead of this approach, the usual practice is to stress students’ problems and weaknesses. This is thus the task facing transcultural pedagogy, which constitutes a practical step towards the international (transnational) emancipation of students. With this aim in mind it is important to deal with every aspect of academic space, and thus reconfigure the content of courses, the aims of teaching, processes, tasks, activities, materials, assessments and reporting methods. The essence of such an environment rests on the horizontal relationship between the teacher and the student, a relationship in which epistemological investments lead to mutual transformation. Such a relationship lies at the heart of transcultural pedagogy.

The examples of educational transcultural thinking set out above show the current progress achieved by transcultural pedagogy/education in the world. We can observe certain differences in the way the transcultural idea is applied in the fields of pedagogy and education depending on the continent, the conditions prevailing there and the specific interests of particular authors. In spite of these differences pedagogy and transcultural education appear to be emerging as movements with a global reach and significance.

Transcultural harmonisation of interpersonal relationships

In Poland, I was probably the first (in parallel with, and independently of the Australian proposal) to use the term "transcultural pedagogy". In

my case, it was to refer to the optional pedagogical workshop module in the 2012-2013 academic year, which was part of the new curriculum for the Institute of Pedagogy of the Jagiellonian University in Kraków (Bylica, 2015). The module comprised two seminars: "Postmodernism and challenges facing social rehabilitation theory and practice" as well as "Cross - cultural competence when working with the Roma community". When evaluating the cross - cultural competences, I first described transcultural pedagogy as "cross - cultural pedagogy in action" (op. cit.: 177) and further as "pedagogical practice geared towards perceiving cultural difference" (Bylica, 2014: 149). Courses provided in Polish and English (including for students in the Erasmus+ programme) encompass a number of assumptions resulting from concepts of pedagogy and transcultural education adopted from around the world. They include, among other things, mimetic learning through arranged real-life scenes, the objective of which is to deepen students' understanding of people from other cultures, role playing, ethnographic surveys, increasing awareness of the need to learn at least the basic words of the language of the recipient of services, a participatory model of teaching – learning, and, finally, a highly practical approach in classes. The method of ethnographic empathy I developed was employed during action research conducted among public sector employees performing tasks for, and in collaboration with, the Roma community in Nowy Sącz (Bylica, 2011). The basic objective of such a research and education strategy was to foster in students and employees social action competences in conditions of cultural diversity, via individual self-assessments of knowledge and attitudes towards the Other, as well as by developing vital language skills.

Generally speaking, upbringing in conditions of transculturality may be treated as a subject of transcultural pedagogy when transcultural education plays the leading role in it. This education is geared towards changing perceptions of cultural processes taking place in the world as well as promoting actions aimed at the transcultural harmonisation of interpersonal relationships. In its broadest context, this type of education can even be implemented within a single culture (even at the micro level of a single family or a partner relationship). After all, each of us represents a specific microculture, unique and different from others. Thus, the process of transcultural exchange at the micro

level, as well as within a single culture, is presented as a promising alternative to the struggle for domination and antagonism. Generally speaking, however, when speaking of the transcultural harmonisation of interpersonal relationships we have in mind those relationships that exist between representatives of different cultures. Transcultural pedagogy (like every other kind of pedagogy) lies at the boundary between the humanities and the social sciences, which naturally implies a transdisciplinary character. It seems thus that as a borderline discipline pedagogy is, due to its very academic character, an ideal arena for transculturality. This obviously concerns all its subdisciplines as well as social prevention. In light of increasing intercultural conflict around the world, social prevention may be the most urgent issue in a transcultural dimension. This is because education is a long-term process that extends over time and generally begins in childhood. In light of the fluid situation in the world (the war against terrorism, waves of refugees arriving in Europe, the poor conditions of Roma communities, etc.), effective preventative action to offset the escalation of conflict is becoming essential. It should be clearly pointed out that many modern conflicts revolve around cultural differences. Transculturality, which advocates cultural interpenetration rather than antagonism, offers a tangible answer to the problems of the modern world. Pivotal to such a brand of social prevention are transcultural competences, which in the paradigm outlined here constitute key pedagogical competences. Another factor which plays a key role is psychoanalysis, which delivers the most suitable tools for exploring unconscious transcultural processes at the individual and group level. By developing transcultural theory and practice “in depth” based on insights into these “archaeological” processes we increase our understanding of the social life of communities and individuals at higher level.

Conclusion

In addition to the other meanings set out in the present paper, the prefix “trans” in pedagogy would also give “pedagogic trans”, and thus full engagement and passion for upbringing (teaching) of a transcultural individual. In this context it would be possible to speak

of TRANSPEDAGOGY. I propose that the term should include both a pedagogic aspiration to bring up the individual in conditions of transculturality, as well as appropriate educational and preventative strategies, a search for theoretical and practical solutions through intuitive cognition and the essential ingredient of all-penetrating passion. It is this passion, especially visible in the praxiological sphere, which distinguishes pedagogy from other humanities and social sciences, and constitutes its unique theoretical-practical status. It likewise appears that a pedagogy located at the boundary between the humanities and social sciences merges these fields together by offering a kind of transdisciplinary structure. The proposed shift towards intuitionism is a result of appreciating the value of all paths of cognition, including sensory ones. Transcultural pedagogy thus goes beyond the framework of rational cognition; it has already done so by proclaiming its use of the achievements of psychoanalysis as a cognitive tool. In terms of methodology it goes beyond methodological nationalism, i. e. represents a tendency to conduct comparative transnational studies by the transdisciplinary research teams. Summing up, it appears that pedagogy as a natural transdisciplinary mosaic is ready for a “new form of humanism” offered by transculturality.

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**CHANGES IN THE AGE STRUCTURE OF THE POPULATION IN
THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA**

Abstract

The demographic and social crisis in Macedonia implies the need for this paper to deal with the following issues:

- The process of population aging which is apparently deepened;
- The factor of age dependence.

The findings of the above-stated issues at the aggregate level are undoubtedly very important as the main basis for the formulation of the fundamental principles and objectives of social and population policy. However, it is not enough to determine the immediate measures of that policy due to the striking regional and local differences in solving the respective social problems. By means of detailed familiarity with the state and the changes in this respect and possible assessment of the trends in the future scientific basis is created for specific social action and inclusion of social development in social objectives.

The subject of the paper presents an analysis of the process of population aging in the Republic of Macedonia. Despite the positive developments of the total number of population in Macedonia, within the region there are significant differences in the demographic

characteristics and processes. While big cities experience positive trends, many municipalities and towns are affected by depopulation and demographic aging. The purpose of this paper is to determine the extent to which regions in the Republic of Macedonia are affected by the level of aging of the population, what impact it will have on the future demographic and socio-economic development. This paper elaborates on the problem of population aging from a demographic aspect and the burdening of the work contingent with the pre-working and post-working contingent.

The paper analyses data at the administrative-territorial level by regions. The territory of the Republic of Macedonia is divided into 8 regions (Vardar, Eastern, South-Western, South-Eastern, Pelagonia, Polog, North-Eastern and Skopje region).

Keywords: regional policy, population aging, age- structure, age dependence.

Introduction

In the total depopulation, population aging is a dominant demographic reproduction process in the Republic of Macedonia. It involves increasing the share of the population aged 60 and older or 65 and older in the total population. The continuous migration, the unfavourable economic policy, the negative natural movement and population aging affect the further expansion of space with striking depopulation. Given that depopulation and population aging in many residential areas in Macedonia have significantly increased, many of them in the foreseeable future will lose their population.

The analysis of the degree of aging of the population in certain regions shows significantly large differences. The population in a number of regions including the Eastern region is characterized as old. Out of a total of eight regions, five (Skopje, South-Eastern, Vardar, Eastern and Pelagonia Region) are in the fifth stadium of demographic aging, that is, are in the state of demographic old age.

The demographic policy is accomplished through social impact of the significant determinants of the development of the population: fertility, mortality and migrations. Through social action in certain areas of social

life creating economic, social, psychological and other conditions for the reproduction of the population. Among the prerequisites for implementation of the process of reproduction of the population at a certain level of social development, are those economic and social factors that influence in the direction of improving the financial situation of families with children and creating favourable conditions for their socio-economic prosperity. Childbirth should not worsen the economic and social status of the family, and this can be achieved if a large part of the burden (cost) of birth, care and upbringing of children is taken over by the state. Hence, the improvement of the economic conditions of reproduction is a prerequisite for the birth of the desired number of children, and this can be achieved by various measures of the economic and social policy. This primarily includes improved opportunities and conditions of employment and earnings in general and especially for the young population, which provides the pillar for reproduction of the population and social development, stimulation tax policy and price, particularly on goods and services for children and youth), residential policy- stimulating credit policy, society oriented towards the family and employed women (specifically social care to children and education policy).

Regional policy in the Republic of Macedonia

In the middle of the second decade of the 21st century, Republic of Macedonia faces a number of serious problems in the area of regional development. In the current economic and political reality of the Republic of Macedonia, besides a range of other problems, there is a presence of large differences in the degree of development among the regions and micro-regions.

The Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia in 2007 adopted the Law on Balanced Regional Development which defines the key policy objectives to encourage balanced regional development including: balanced and sustainable development on the whole territory of the Republic of Macedonia, reduction of disparities between and within the planning regions, increasing the competitiveness of the regions, the preservation and development of special identity of the planning regions and support to the inter-municipal and cross-

border cooperation of the local self-government (Article 3 of the Law). However, in the Republic of Macedonia, considerably more attention is dedicated to structural problems than to the regional development although regional development is a structural problem in the full meaning of the word. The effects of privatization are far lower in underdeveloped regions, due to underdeveloped infrastructure, low level of human capital and low level of development of society activities.

Table 1: *Basic economic indicators (Republic of Macedonia = 100.00)*

	Gross value added, 2013	Gross fixed capital formation, 2013	Average net paid per employee, 2015
Republic of Macedonia	100	100	100
Vardar region	8,22	6,87	8,22
East region	8,06	8,79	8,06
Southwest region	7,84	4,7	7,84
Southeast region	9,21	5,37	9,21
Pelagonia region	11,26	9,03	11,26
Polog region	7,52	6,35	7,52
Northeast region	5,31	2,09	5,31
Skopje region	42,58	56,8	42,58

Source: Regions of the Republic of Macedonia 2016.

The complete area of the North-East region creates approximately 5% of the newly created value in the Republic of Macedonia, while the Skopje region 43% (in the year of 2013).

The Regional Development Strategy of the Republic of Macedonia 2009-2019 adopted in 2009 (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia No. 119/2009) highlights two main strategic goals, as follows:

- Competitive planning regions which are characterized by dynamic and sustainable development and
- Greater demographic, economic, social and spatial cohesion among and within the planning regions in the Republic of Macedonia.

The overview that follows clearly illustrates the fact that the most important goals in the Regional Development Strategy of the Republic of Macedonia, include the stimulation of economic growth, development of contemporary and modern infrastructure, raising the level of human capital, creating competitive advantages, environmental protection, demographic revitalization and balanced distribution of the population, building of functional spatial structures, increased and more balanced distribution of investment and employment, raising the level of social development, support for areas with specific development needs, developing of cross-border and mutual cooperation and capacity building for planning and implementation of the development of planning regions, which have not been achieved. Not only is the situation deteriorating, but negative economic and demographic trends are even intensified. The population in the four regions (Vardar, East, South-West and Pelagonia Region) in 2015 was 1.9% lower compared to the 2002 census. The situation is alarming, since the decline of the population is still the greatest in the underdeveloped micro-regions and municipalities, so that with such trends individual geographic units will remain completely deserted and without any prospects for further development.

Table 2: *Live births, deaths and natural increase by regions of period 2010-2015*

	Live births	Deaths	Natural increase
Republic of Macedonia	140 443	118 099	22 344
Vardar region	9 847	10 099	-252
East region	9 757	11 340	-1 583
Southwest region	13 189	11 674	1 515
Southeast region	11 571	10 531	1 040
Pelagonia region	14 147	17 887	-3 740
Polog region	21 650	13 999	7 651
Northeast region	12 042	9 973	2 069
Skopje region	48 240	32 596	15 644

Source: My calculations & SSO, Population, News Release, No: 2.1.11.21, No: 2.1.12.22, No: 2.1.13.23, No: 2.1.14.23, No: 2.1.15.23, No: 2.1.16.26. Skopje.

By regions, Skopje had the largest share of the total number natural increase (15 644), while the Pelagonia, the East and Vardar regions show negative natural increase.

The biggest and most serious causes for clearing of certain regional units are probably low living standards and the uncertain existence of the people who live in those regions.

Defeating is also the structure of investments in fixed assets, which are not only in accordance with the proclaimed goals of the strategy, but increasingly contribute to the distancing from them. Approximately 57% of the total investments in fixed assets in the Republic of

Macedonia have been allocated to the Skopje region, whereas the North-East region participates with only 2% of the total investments (status of 2013).

Interestingly, despite the strenuous efforts of the regional policy-makers, the investment in underdeveloped regions declines. If such an investment policy continues, it will be devastating for many regions and will directly contribute to their demographic clearing.

Large and strategically important micro-regions remain uncovered in terms of the population and their resources unused. The population of the Republic of Macedonia as a whole does not decrease, but in the short and long-term some regions/micro-regions face reduction of the total and the working population, due to the process of aging and migration. Therefore, a large area in the micro-regions remains uncovered in terms of population (demographic empty), their resources unused and in Skopje and larger urban centres there is excessive concentration of population, which produces negative consequences in the economic, social, spatial and ecological sphere. In many micro-regions the population is suffocating in: poverty, unemployment, abandoned facilities, without roads, without constant traffic with municipal centres and humiliating presentation in front of the government.

Socially and economically disadvantaged individuals are especially concentrated in rural areas. There are inefficient services of the public sector, feeling of collapse of the surroundings, mistrust in the government, depression, reduced social organisation, decline of services of the private sector, empty houses, poor living conditions, lack of social and cultural events for young people and closing of public institutions (schools, clinics, post offices and shops). Agriculture is the only source of income, which cannot maintain the micro system and the diverse needs of the population. Except due to the minor income, there is great dissatisfaction of the population in these areas as a result of the underdeveloped public infrastructure - roads, water-supply systems, etc. (Jakimovski, 2010).

Relations between the migration and age structure of the population

Migrations are selective by gender, age, family status, occupation, educational level, economic characteristics and the like (Peterson, 1961; Shaw, 1975; Ogden, 1984).

It is common knowledge that women participate more in migration at a short distance, no matter how steady the population between 15-40 years of age is. R. P. Shaw (1975) states that research on migration confirms that people aged between 15 and 35 years migrate more than others, which can be understood that young people adapt easily to new environments. Elderly population finds it difficult to decide to change the place of residence, primarily due to the habits to live in a particular place, and the association with a certain lifestyle.

H. Browning (1971) believes that the selective migration is characteristic of the initial stage of urbanization, and industrialization decreases in time. The longer accelerated urbanization lasts, the more likely it is to reduce education selectivity between migrants from rural areas.

The pressure of agrarian overpopulation has weakened in time due to the increasing employment of the population in the industry and mining. Migration from the village to seek work opportunities outside of the agriculture became "necessity" and not rarely a one-way "path without return". The unfavorable conditions in which agriculture developed and especially the poor socio-economic situation of the agriculture producers, along with the high agrarian overpopulation and very unfavorable living conditions in the villages have forced the population to immensely migrate from the village and abandon agriculture and migrate to the cities (Miljovski, 1973).

In the Republic of Macedonia deagrarianization not only moved faster, but deagrarianized population migrated to the cities, becoming city population and on that basis there is a relatively high rate of depopulation of the rural population. Namely from 8900 inhabitants that abandoned agriculture on an annual basis, only about 3,000 remained to live in the villages (Georgiev, 1985).

Migration from rural to urban areas has a twofold impact: it weakens the participation of generations between 15-40 years in the rural population, and in the cities it is strengthened. Consequences in both

directions affect the natural population growth, and its recovery which does not have a positive nature. In the first case, that is, among the rural population, there is a constant exodus of generations on which reproduction of the population mostly depends, and the impact of urban areas to control and plan the birth give rise to a lower birth rate and increased mortality and reduced number of births and the capacities of its own recovery. When this process is a long-term one and when it is socially uncontrolled as is the case in the Eastern and Pelagonia Region, the process of population aging expands and it is difficult to stop such a process and existential and other social problems appear to old population. The rejuvenation of the city population by means of migration undoubtedly improves the age structure, increasing the reproductive force at a certain period, but from a social perspective, this process does not compensate for the loss that occurred in the rural population. The immigrated population due to education, and the acquisition of qualifications, unemployment, lack of housing, lower standard of living than the expected one and rapid integration into the urban mentality, easily accepts the celibacy, delays marriage and does not create a family with many children. These favorable conditions created through migration to urban centers are not sufficiently utilized. Changes in natural movement and migration of the population, especially because of the high level of migration from villages to cities, determined the following characteristics and trends in the age structure of the population:

- Firstly, in huge number inhabited areas and municipalities the number of children and young people (0-19) declines, whereby the process is faster in the villages, because in these areas despite the declining birth rate, emigration steadily reduces the number of the population capable to give birth.
- Secondly, age groups 40-59 in the urban areas expand their own relative participation to a greater extent in urban areas and the old population of 60 years and more in village settlements.
- Thirdly, the age structure of urban population in the Eastern and Pelagonia region has a characteristic of a progressive type, but with real conditions for the basis of the age pyramid to narrow further, due to the declining birth rate and the top of the pyramid to expand for the same reason also due to the longer life expectancy (see in Table 3).

The population imbalance shows on the one hand positive trends in some regions, unlike the demographic devastation of the border and underdeveloped micro-regions (Jakimovski, 2011). Multiple negative effects of these movements are felt by many segments: the age structure of the population, employment, urbanization, social and health climate etc.

Based on the above-stated facts, a general conclusion emerges that in the inhabited areas where demographic transformation occurred and where the level of urbanization is higher, there are visible changes in the age structure of the population and large distinction between the city and the village, especially in the state of high concentration of urbanization.

After the profound changes in the age structure of the population of the village and in terms of improvement of the conditions in the city significant changes in the movement of birth rate and natural growth, as well as recovery of the population are expected, but more in the qualitative than in the quantitative respect. Namely, it can be expected that by the strengthening of the process of urbanization of the population and decreasing of the rural population, the focus of these demographic processes will gradually be transferred from the rural to the urban population. This type of transformation encompasses the cities where the demographic transition is completed and the level of urbanization is high.

Age structure of the population

Changes in the contingents of the population as a reflection of the changes in the age groups of the population are very significant, because one recognizes what the conditions and the ratio between the active and supported population are, then the opportunities for reproduction of the population, aging or rejuvenation of the population. Future changes in the population will depend largely on changes in the age structure of the population that can be predicted because they are of long-term nature and in the future largely determine the changes in the natural movement of the population.

Population aging affects the developments in the labour market, the financial and the market of goods. At the macroeconomic level, labour is relatively insufficient (and capital is relatively big) in countries in which the process of population aging is accelerated. Changes in the relations of the price of labour will lead to greater capital investment and can generate major changes in the flow of labour, capital and goods in the countries in which the population is aging more slowly. At the microeconomic level, changes in the age structure of the workforce will have an effect on labour productivity (Borsch-Supan, 2005).

Table 3: *Indicators of demographic aging in the Republic of Macedonia in 2015 and stages of demographic aging, by regions*

Regions	% of the total population		Stadium of demographic aging			
	Average age	Young population	Young and middle-aged population	Old population	Aging index	
		(0-19)	(0-39)	(60+)	(4/2)	
	1	2	3	4	5	
REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA	38,5	23,00	53,63	18,78	0,81417	Deep demographic old age
Vardar region	39,8	21,49	50,54	20,68	0,96222	Deep demographic old age
Eastern region	40,6	19,92	49,21	21,46	1,07697	Demographic old age
South-Western region	37,7	22,39	55,83	16,59	0,74106	Deep demographic old age
South-Eastern region	39,1	22,3	51,99	19,44	0,87179	Deep demographic old age
Pelagonia region	40,7	20,88	49,51	22,41	1,07316	Demographic old age

Polog region	35,8	24,56	59,12	13,44	0,54738	Deep demographic old age
North-Eastern region	37,6	24,45	55,29	17,54	0,7171	Demographic old age
Skopje region	38,4	24,25	53,56	19,72	0,81321	Deep demographic old age

Source: My calculations & SSO, Statistical Review: Population and Social Statistics, Population Percentages on 30 June 2015 and 31 December 2015 by gender and age, by municipalities and statistical regions: (NUTS 3-2007).

From the indicators that determine the extent of demographic aging, especially interesting for analysis is the so-called aging index, which represents the ratio between the number of the population aged 60 and older and the population younger than 20 years. In the Pelagonia and Eastern Region the prevailing share of the population is the age contingent of 60 years and older. In this regions, for one person aged 0-19 years there is 1,1 person aged 60 and older, and in the Polog region 0,5 persons.

Factor of age dependence

The process of population aging also affects the changes of the aging of the workforce in the region. It is extremely importance to determine the workload of the contingent of the population able to work, which is a demographic framework for the creation of most of the workforce depending on the possibilities for activation of the workforce. Indicators for utilization of the work contingent are the factor of age dependence of the total population, the age dependence factor for the young population and for the old population.

The factor of total age dependence shows the extent of the burden of the population at working age with young and elderly, that is, the burdening of the work contingent with the pre-working and post-working contingent.

The factor of age dependence of young people is the degree of workload of the population at working age with the contingent of

young people, that is, people with pre-working ability (0-14 years of age).

The factor of age dependence of old people is the degree of workload of the population at working age with a contingent of senior citizens or persons of post-working age (65 and above).

Depending elderly population can greatly burden the public spending (pensions, healthcare, etc.) because a smaller number of active working people support a growing number of pensioners.

Table 4: *Age dependency ratio*

	Age dependency ratio		Youth dependency ratio		Elderly dependency ratio	
	2002	2015	2002	2015	2002	2015
Republic of Macedonia	46,3	42	30,9	23,8	15,5	18,2
Vardar region	43,1	42,7	27	22,6	16,1	20,1
East region	42,1	40,4	26,1	20,1	16	20,3
Southwest region	50,4	36,4	35,2	21	15,2	15,4
Southeast region	43,9	42,1	28,5	23,3	15,4	18,8
Pelagonia region	49	45,1	26,6	22,4	22,4	22,7
Polog region	51,2	35,2	39,4	23	11,8	12,2
Northeast region	48,9	41,7	33,7	24,8	15,2	16,9
Skopje region	43,6	47,1	29,2	26,9	14,4	20,2

Source: & SSO Census of population, households and dwellings in the Republic of Macedonia, 2002. Total population, households and dwellings according to the territorial organization of the Republic of Macedonia, 2004 and Statistical review: Population and Social Statistics, Population Percentages on 30 June 2015 and 31 December 2015 by gender and age, by municipalities and statistical regions: (NUTS 3-2007).

Statistics shows that the ratio of total age dependence in the Republic of Macedonia moves from 46.3% in 2002 to 42.0% in 2015. This shift results from the significant reduction in the burden on the population of working age with those at pre-working age (from 30.9% at 23.8%).

The ratio of the total working capacity in the analysed period shows that the pre-working contingent declines (0-14 years) in all regions compared to the working contingent, while the factor of age dependence shows that the number of the post-working contingent grows.

Conclusion

Due to the fact that demographic processes can deepen the existing demographic gap between the regions in the Republic of Macedonia, additional efforts are needed for such processes to change their course of movement. Basically, underdeveloped regions/micro-regions must be attractive for immigrants only if there is economic convergence, because the development of the economy is the most relevant factor for retaining the existing population and attracting immigrants. The question is whether convergence will develop quickly, since the differences in the regions and micro-regions could reach such a level from which there will be no return.

There is a need for diversification of the economic structure, industry and even tertiary activities. "The areas that depend on only one sector suffered severe damage due to the increased mobility and rapid changes in the comparative advantage "(William and Karen (1995) 2009:74). In that case, a significant role would be given to dispersion and development of the industry. This development would use local resources and available workforce. There is a need for construction of small and medium-sized plants that would cooperate with the large systems. It is feasible in the typical industries (textile, leather, construction materials) and the food industry. Such branches are not suitable for cities, but in the micro-regions (rural areas) they can function well. The low profit from these branches can be compensated by additional revenues from agriculture, and the housing and other infrastructure in the villages is much cheaper than in the cities.

A network of small urban neighbourhoods and rural centres should be developed, which will provide the necessary services to the surrounding villages.

Assistance to these regions should be achieved by financial measures (unreturnable funds or no-interest loans, tax exemptions) for the development of additional activities of rural households (tourism, home workshops), state funding of the communal infrastructure and necessary facilities for the social standard, free assistance in education, obtaining construction permits, introduction of entrepreneurship and the like.

Taking into account the disorder of the spatial distribution of population, the state will have to create relatively developed perspectives and encourage the development of small, medium-sized cities, and internal rural areas, promoting the advantage of the way of life in them. This inevitably requires, encouraging and subsidizing the construction of new industrial facilities and other types of investments outside the major cities, in order to increase the employment of the workforce.

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YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT IN REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Abstract

This research paper sublimes the main empirical findings from the research study about the Macedonian Youth Unemployment, conducted in 2016 by the authors of this paper and financed by Friedrich Ebert Foundation. For the needs of the particular research a combined methodological approach was used, i.e. quantitative and qualitative analyzes were applied. For the quantitative analysis the data was collected by face-to-face questionnaire on a sample (N=1009) consisted of young unemployed people in the country (aged between 15 and 29), while for the qualitative analysis the data was collected by two focus groups held with representatives of the NGO sector, business sector and Agencies for employment and/or recruitment. The main objective of this research paper is to investigate the key factors, which make the process of finding a job or even starting an own business difficult for the young people in Republic of Macedonia, especially when we know that the Macedonian youth

unemployment rate is very high (50%) almost double than the general unemployment rate (23,7%). The results can be considered as original and novelty also because for the first time the personal characteristics of the Macedonian unemployed young people as self-confidence, self-efficacy and work locus of control have been measured. We believe that the results might provide valuable information to the government and the relevant institutions for further policy creation and/or implementation. It is hoped that the study also contributes to better understanding of the nature of the problem regarding the youth unemployment from a scientific perspective.

Keywords: Macedonian youth unemployment, professional determination, work preferences, career maturity, personal characteristics.

Introduction

Youth unemployment has been burdening economies and generating crises around the globe. Both developed and developing countries have been faced by the challenge of creating decent and sustainable jobs for an enormous inflow of young people entering the labor market yearly. Their inability to integrate and accommodate young people in the workforce will have serious consequences on the future prosperity and development of each individual country. Youth unemployment, coupled with situations when young people are discouraged or altogether give up on searching jobs, or accept jobs under inadequate working conditions are an indisputable loss to the economy, the society and youth themselves.

The youth unemployment is a very serious problem in Republic of Macedonia as its rate for the last several years is almost double (approximately 50%) than the general unemployment rate (23,7% in this moment) according the State Statistical Office.

Lack of appropriate employment opportunities early on in professional life, i.e. at young age, oftentimes compromises future employment perspectives, leading to inappropriate work ethics and attitudes and threatening to compromise the individual's character in life. Youth

unemployment is also linked to social exclusion since difficulties in finding a job propel in young people feelings of vulnerability, marginalization and uselessness, especially if one bears in mind that people's self-value and self-esteem are expressed through roles they play when engaging in social interactions. Occupation, expressed through professional engagement, is one of the most important social roles youth play (Super, 1980).

It is highly likely that stumbling across multiple barriers while setting on the path towards (financial) independence will create feelings of frustration, stress and negative perception of the self and the surrounding environment. This is even more applicable to young people, at this delicate biological age, full of hope and excitement about the future and what it brings (Feather and O'Brien, 1987).

On the other hand, educational and professional choices are greatly determined by a range of other factors, such as: personal traits, interests, skills and preferences, family/parents, the young person's living arrangements, etc. (Kolvereid, 1996; Holland, 1997). Parents represent a major influencing factor for young people, because they have a unique relation with their children. They make their best in providing for all children's needs, they protect them and bring them up, while helping them develop their individual identity and integrity. Although every individual is entitled to his/her own professional choice, young people's financial dependency on their parents (according to FEF's Macedonian Youth Study from 2013 as many as 80% of young people aged above 18 in the Republic of Macedonia still live with their parents) infers that parents are oftentimes largely involved in their children's choices regarding work.

The Macedonian Youth Study (Topuzovska Latkovic, Borota Popovska, Serafimovska, Cekic, 2013) revealed a number of interesting research results and findings, such as data confirming that over 60% of young people over 18 believe they will have troubles finding a job; that personal and political ties rank first on the scale of factors for landing a job; that a significant share of young people prefer to be employed in public administration; and that over 50% consider or would be ready to move out of the country, mainly for reasons of employment and/or improving their financial situation.

This research paper will present not only their attitudes on education (either formal or non-formal); work/job; national measures and youth employment assistance programs in the country, but also, for the first time in Macedonia, concepts like career maturity of unemployed youth in the Republic of Macedonia (career planning, information on career opportunities and the process of undertaking real steps and measures for career development); professional determination (the ways in which young people choose their profession and career); their “dream job”, as well as the personal traits of unemployed young people, such as self-esteem and self-efficacy levels and the work locus of control.

The research uses the broadest and most commonly accepted definition of career – the continuous life-long process of progressive achievement, focused on the demand, provision and processing of information about oneself, professional and educational opportunities and the pursuit of different roles in one’s lifetime. Profession is defined as an activity that requires specialized training, knowledge, qualification and skills.

The research study about the Macedonian youth unemployment (Topuzovska Latkovikj, Borota Popovska and Starova, 2016) is financed by Friedrich Ebert Foundation - Office in Skopje.

Methodology

The research methodology of the Study was developed to suit the needs and demands of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. It relies on a combined methodological approach, i.e. data are analyzed both quantitatively and qualitatively through a use of adequate procedures and techniques characteristic for the explorative, descriptive and explanatory research methods. Activities across various stages of the Study were conducted between June and October 2016. The research team designed a questionnaire for quantitative analysis, comprised of a total of 47 questions (150 variables), and divided in several thematic sections.

The sample design for the purposes of this quantitative research relied on Macedonia’s State Statistics Office official data and EUROSTAT’s definition of young unemployed people (target research population). So, even though young individuals are typically defined as persons

between 15 and 24 years of age, we have decided to raise the upper limit to 29 year-olds not only because many young individuals remain in the education process beyond 24 years of age, but primarily because they are still financially dependent and as such cannot be included in the adult category. Young people were considered unemployed if, at the time field research was carried out, they fulfilled one of the following criteria: 1) had no job; 2) were actively seeking for a job or were making concrete efforts to start own businesses; 3) expressed their availability to start working within two weeks.

The sample was designed drawing on quotas of percentage representation of economically active population – young unemployed population in the country in three age brackets (15-19; 21-24; 25-29). As far as gender, place of residence and ethnicities are concerned, the design reflected the demographic characteristics of young persons in the eight statistical regions of the Republic of Macedonia. The sample is very close to representative (N=1055 with confidence interval set at 3 and a 95% confidence level), while the response rate is 95.6% (N=1009).

Results

Professional self-determination

Choosing a profession is one of the most important moments in an individual's life. Choosing the right career is closely tied to finding a job that will be stimulating, challenging, provide for career advancement and reap good salary and benefits. Wrong profession choice might prevent an individual from adapting to professional demands and responsibilities, eventually losing the job as a result of professional dissatisfaction. Social adaptability might suffer as well.

Consequently, respondents were asked whether they thought they had chosen the right profession for themselves. The analysis has shown that 53.5% of respondents believe the chosen profession suits them perfectly, while 30.3% are still uncertain whether they had made the right profession choice. Less than one-fifth of respondents (7.2%) responded "I blew it totally profession-wise. I have entirely different

talents I could have developed”; 4.9% said “I blew it. My profession is not relevant at the labor market”; while 4.2% responded “I blew it. My profession is not for me”.

The time for making profession choices coincides with passage from childhood to early adolescence. Broadly speaking, all respondents follow this pattern, with only 10.8% of respondents declaring they had chosen their profession in early childhood or during elementary school (16%). Half of respondents chose their profession early on or during secondary school - 23.6% after completing elementary school and 24.1% while attending high school, 20.3% chose their profession after completing high school, and only 1.7% while studying at University. Training influenced merely 1.6% of respondents in making profession choices.

Profession choices are influenced by multiple factors, generally subdivided in three main groups: economic, psychological and sociological. Psychological factors include interests, and abilities or levels of intelligence; the sociological encompass the individual's opinions and life style, but also issues such as values shared by the community in general; the economic, finally, refer to the economic status provided by the chosen vocation, i.e. whether that particular profession is rewarding and in demand at the labor market. Bearing in mind vocation choices are usually made in early childhood, a period when respondents are subjected to various influences, it was interesting to see who played the greatest role in influencing their profession choices.

More than half of the respondents or 55.9% said their choice was not shaped by a particular person. Parents, however, seem to have the greatest influence over profession choices (29.9% of respondents gave this answer), distantly followed by sisters/brothers (2.4%), relatives (3.4%), friends (3%) and professors (3%). Successful managers (1.6%) and politicians (0.8%) exert the least influence.

Over half of ethnic Albanian respondents (53.70%) said their parents' opinion was critical in the profession choices they made, compared to 20.80% respondents of Macedonian ethnic background. Likewise, 64.30% of ethnic Macedonian respondents declared they chose their career independently, compared to 33.60% of ethnic Albanian respondents. The Chi-square test has confirmed the statistically significant difference ($\chi^2=141.038$; $p<0.01$).

The analysis showed that young people believe that university education is detrimental for acquisition of knowledge and skills ($m=4.04$; sub-sample comprising of respondents with university degree); followed by post-graduate studies ($m=3.95$; sub-sample comprising of respondents with Master's degree and/or Ph.D.) and secondary school degree ($m=3.11$; sub-sample comprising of respondents ranging from minimum high school diploma to a Ph.D. degree). Previous work experience ranks at the fourth place ($m=3.01$; sub-sample comprising of respondents with previous work experience), while non-formal training ranks at the bottom ($m=2.9$; sub-sample comprising of respondents with experience in non-formal education).

Likelihood to make a profession switch in case no employment is found in the near future was measured on a 1 to 5 scale, whereby 1 corresponded to the negative "I disagree fully" and 5 to the positive "I fully agree". The mean was $m=2.98$. Additionally, respondents were asked whether they would accept working something else in case they couldn't land the job they desired. Data analysis showed that 43% of respondents would accept any job offered, 38.7% of respondents would accept a different career path provided they are paid more, while 18.3% would refuse a different profession altogether.

Career orientation

Bearing in mind the respondents' unemployed status, the next battery of questions tried to determine what type of work they hope to find in the future. The survey also aimed at seeing what type of (prospective) employees the respondents hoped to be, as well as what they believe characterizes them best. Respondents were also asked to share their opinion on the impact (prospective) employment would have on their quality of life.

Half of the respondents (50%) expect to work for a fixed salary. One-third (or rather 29%) would like to start up an own business, 8% would like to freelance or be self-employed working on assignment contracts, i.e. provide services to others (e.g. consultants, translators, designers, accountants, etc.), only 4% would take over and run a family business, while 3% would pursue a career in politics.

Respondents were asked to express their attitudes on a scale from 1 to 5, whereby 1 corresponded to the negative “No, not at all” and 5 to the positive “To a large degree”. The mean for respondents choosing “I’d like to do things involving interaction with other people” was 4.04, followed by $m=3.72$ “I’d like to do things that require a lot of thinking and creativity”, $m=3.59$ “I’d like to manage and be responsible for the performance of others”, $m=3.33$ “I’d like to do artistic stuff and be allowed to express myself freely” and finally $m=3.31$ “I’d like to do things that follow a certain pattern.” In terms of choosing things that require the use of physical force, the mean was $m=2.52$, showing that most respondents expressed a negative stand.

As far as preferred working positions are concerned, i.e. employment sectors most attractive to young people, the respondents hinted at an almost identical split between private sector and public administration preferences. More concretely, 40.6% of respondents said they would like to land a job in the private sector, while 39.4% said that a public administration job would meet their expectations. Inconsiderable share of respondents expressed their desire to work in the non-governmental sector (3%), international organizations (8%) or somewhere else (9%).

Job acceptance factors

Respondents were provided with a list of 20 factors and asked to choose three they consider fundamental for accepting a job. The three most frequently selected options were: income levels (57.6%); interesting and challenging job (36.4%) and feeling of self-satisfaction and life-fulfillment. In the 10-20% interval, other significant factors should be singled out, such as: job safety (18.5%), career advancement (17.7%), service to others (11.9%), community service (11.8%), being my own boss (11%). All other factors fall below the 10% threshold.

“Dream job”

In an open-ended question where all respondents were allowed to express themselves freely, it became clear that young unemployed people dream about becoming: business owners/businessmen/businesswomen (N=43), managers (N=37), directors (N=18), lawyers (N=15), bosses (N=14), professors (N=14), and doctors (N=11). All other professions appear in less than 10 cases.

“Dream job” was explained narratively in the following manner:

- “A big and successful company, with career advancement opportunities, high salary and a spacious office. I’d like to be a unit manager.”
- “A big company in Japan. Teamwork, top-notch technology, advancement opportunities.”
- “I’d like to go to work with a smile on my face.”
- “I’d like to help people from different walks of life and status in society.”
- “Help others be happy.”
- “Work in the field I was trained in.”
- “I’d like to sit in my office, work honorably and earn 60,000 Macedonian denars or 1000 euros per month.”
- “Become a millionaire.”
- “Well paid job, with all benefits.”
- “A job that will provides opportunities for professional and personal advancement, without pressure.”
- “Challenging, well-paid job”
- “Pleasant working environment and possibilities for career advancement, teamwork and a highly-regarded and valued position.”
- “A job I can excel in and show my skills and capacities, contribute to its development and advancement in a positive way.”
- “Work abroad.”

- “A job that will earn me enough money for a normal life.”
- “A job making me happy.”
- “Flexible working hours, good salary and career advancement opportunities.”
- “Flexible working hours, no stress, high salary.”

Career maturity

In terms of having a plan to overcome unemployment within 5 years, 52.5% of respondents said they have made a partial plan, 10.2% said they have a fully-elaborated plan, while 37.2% have no plan whatsoever.

Next, we tried to determine the activities pursued in view of implementing the plan. In terms of their own perception on the quality of their Curriculum vitae, the mean was set at $m=3.01$ on a scale from 1 (poor) to 5 (excellent). Similarly, perceptions on professional barriers and ways for overcoming them measured through the statement “When I face challenges in implementing my career plan, I always develop concrete steps for overcoming problems tied to my career development” followed the same pattern with mean set at $m=3.31$.

In terms of the steps undertaken in view of implementing the plan, the following tendencies were recorded: one fourth of respondents (25%) declared they were interested in continuing their formal education (secondary, university, post-graduate); one fifth (20%) were interested in pursuing various forms of non-formal education (courses); 19% were interested in alternative career paths; 16% were interested in innovative trends in their area of interest and 11% said they were interested in the activities pursued by specialized organizations. Almost 10% responded they were not interested in any of the above.

Job search

Young people were asked to answer how they assess/perceive themselves in terms of time/effort spent in finding a job. Results show that over half of the respondents (55%) believe they are actively trying to find a job, while one-fourth of them (24%) are not trying at all. Only

9% of respondents said they regularly register with the Employment Agency of the Republic of Macedonia (AVRM), while 6% of them hope someone else will find them a job.

Research findings show that only 14% of young unemployed people regularly apply to job announcements, 45.9% have applied a few times; while as many as 40.1% of respondents have never applied to a job announcement.

From those who had applied to a job announcement, a total of N=323 were called for an interview, whereupon as many as 60.9% said they believe that the main reason for not being selected was the fact they had no one to “pull the strings”. 11.40% said they had education inappropriate for the position, 9.80% were offered, but declined the job, 8.90% said they did not possess the skills and competencies required, 6.40% blamed it on the jitters, while 2.70% believed they scored poorly on the work-related knowledge and skills test.

Respondents believe that the main reason for not finding a job are work-place shortage (34.8%) and “string-pulling” for jobs (23.6%), i.e. not knowing the right people to help them get the job (10.90%). A smaller percentage believe that it owes to lack of relevant work experience (13.50%) or inappropriate education (7.70%); 15% of respondents said that the remuneration for the job offered was low; 8.60% believe there are work opportunities at the labor market, but they lack the information, while 6.10% think there were some other reasons.

Internet is the most commonly sought source for searching job opportunities (39%), followed by heart-to-heart conversations with people who have succeeded in the field of interest (27%). A smaller percentage of respondents (17%) singled out their interest in companies/institutions/employers relevant for their career opportunities. Less than a fifth of respondents (16.3%) said they do none of the above.

Previous work experience

Asked about previous work experience (if any), 40% responded they were never employed, while only 7% of respondents said they were employed full-time on an indeterminate term contract.

Most respondents were employed temporarily as seasonal workers (27.40%), on service agreements (16.80%) or on short-term assignments (8.80%).

Barriers for starting an own business

Next in line was to determine the factors that encourage or hinder young people from starting or running an own business. The three most frequently singled-out barriers were: lack of information on the access to financial resources (35.6%), unfavorable socio-economic circumstances in the country/expectations for better business conditions (30%) and reluctance to risk-taking (27%). One-fifth (19%) of respondents admitted they don't have a business idea, 14.2% said they lack the necessary skills for running a business; 14.2% responded they lack positive business models in the country; 13.3% claimed they had no desire investing money in business; 11.4% refuse to take on business responsibilities; 6.2% said they lacked support from the family; 3.4% said they had no time because they look after family members; while 5.6% had different reasons from the ones listed above.

Awareness of unemployment-reduction measures and their rating

In order to overcome youth unemployment, the Macedonian Government launched a number of measures and policies aimed at improving conditions for decent youth employment. These measures include: (1) strengthening labor market institutions (for young people); (2) improving youth employment opportunities, primarily through active labor market policies and programs (APPT); (3) improving youth employment by implementing measures for private sector development; and (4) guaranteeing labor market social inclusion measures for deprived youth.

The purpose of this section was to evaluate the effectiveness of government employment measures in terms of how they are perceived by young unemployed people in the Republic of Macedonia. Gathered data show that almost half of respondents (47%) are only partially familiar with the measures, 34% are fully aware of them, while 19% do not know such measures exist.

Asked how they would assess the measures (on a school grading-scale from 1 to 5), respondents claiming to be partially or fully familiar with the employment measures (N=811) gave a relatively low mean value, set at $m=2.80$. Nonparametric tests do not reveal considerable statistical variance with regards to the three age brackets (15-19, 20-24, 25-29).

Furthermore, when inquired whether state-pursued policies and measures are adequate for active inclusion and encouragement of young people to partake in the labor market, 40% of respondents answered negatively, almost half (47%) believe the authorities are partially successful, while only 11.9% believe that the policies implemented are successful and driving young people to partake in the labor market.

Self-esteem

Self-esteem represents self-assessment/self-perception of personal self-worth. The self-esteem scale is a global 10-item Likert scale, using 4-item value scale format (ranging from 3 – I fully agree, 2 – I agree, 1 – I disagree, 0 – I fully disagree) measuring the positive and negative feelings about the self. The scale is uni-dimensional. Items number 2, 5, 6, 8 and 9 are coded reversely (0 – I fully agree, 1 – I agree, 2 – I disagree, 3 – I fully disagree). Individual score is commuted by adding up the values obtained for all 10 items. The theoretical range of the scale ranges between a minimum score of 0 to a maximum of 30. The higher the score, the higher the individual's self-esteem.

Internal consistency of the survey was tested by using the Cronbach alpha coefficient. Calculated at $\alpha=.787$, it can be inferred that the scale possesses a high degree of reliability, falling between the 0.72 and 0.87 reliability range, commonly accepted as satisfactory in all similar surveys around the globe.

A total of 998 respondents gave valid answers at the self-esteem scale, ranging from an individual score of 10 to a maximum of 30. With mean score of $M=22.31$ and standard deviation of $.36$, it can be concluded that young unemployed people in the Republic of Macedonia have fairly high self-esteem.

Self-efficacy

Self-efficacy is the trust in one's own ability for successfully accomplishing various tasks/problem solving/reaching goals.

The general self-efficacy scale is a 10-item Likert scale, using 4-item value scale format (ranging from 1 – Not at all true, 2 – Hardly true, 3 – Moderately true, 4 – Exactly true). Total individual score is commuted by adding up the values obtained for all 10 items. The theoretical range of the scale ranges between a minimum score of 10 to a maximum of 40. The higher the score, the higher the individual's self-efficacy is.

Internal consistency of the survey was tested by using the Cronbach alpha coefficient. Calculated at $\alpha=.893$, it can be inferred that the scale possesses a high degree of reliability, falling between the 0.76 and 0.90 reliability range, commonly accepted as satisfactory in similar surveys around the globe.

A total of 1,000 respondents gave valid answers at the self-efficacy scale, ranging from an individual score of 10 to a maximum of 40. With mean score of $M=31.97$ and standard deviation of .98, it can be concluded that young unemployed people in the Republic of Macedonia have fairly high self-efficacy.

Work locus of control

Work locus of control refers to the level to which people believe they have control over events/circumstances in their professional environment (at a general level, not on a concrete position).

The Work Locus of Control scale is a 16-item scale, using 6-item value scale format (ranging from 1 – disagree very much, 2 – disagree moderately, 3 – disagree slightly, 4 – agree slightly, 5 – agree moderately and 6 – agree very much) designed to measure control beliefs in work settings. Items number 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 11, 14, and 15 are coded reversely (1=6, 2=5, 3=4, 4=3, 5=2, 6=1). The scale is in positive correlation with the general locus of control ($r=.50$ to $r=.55$). Individual score is commuted by adding up the values obtained from all items. The theoretical range of the scale ranges between a minimum score of 16 to a maximum of 95, and a mean set at 56. Higher scores reflect higher external locus of control, while lower scores infer higher internal locus of control.

Internal consistency of the survey was tested by using the Cronbach alpha coefficient. Calculated at $\alpha=.707$, it can be inferred that the scale possesses a high degree of reliability, falling between the 0.57 and 0.85 reliability range, commonly accepted as satisfactory in similar surveys around the globe.

A total of 1,002 respondents gave valid answers at the work locus of control scale, ranging from an individual score of 22 to a maximum of 82. With mean score in the middle of the theoretical range set at $M=55.15$ and standard deviation of 8.73, it can be concluded that young unemployed people in the Republic of Macedonia are somewhat ambivalent.

Discussion and conclusions

High school career counseling centers for professional orientation are particularly important in this regard, since, as results confirm, high school is the period when young people make their career choices.

It is recommended that institutions providing non-formal education adapt their programs to training young unemployed people and offer comprehensive guidance for development of employability skills and capacities. Young people will thus be provided with competitive advantage in the recruitment and selection process in accordance with labor market demands.

Companies and human resources professionals should take these personal characteristics and job preferences into account both upon recruiting young candidates for employment and upon designing working positions, because there is high probability that young people would prefer remaining unemployed rather than accepting a job below their expectations. If they do accept and remain on the position, they will most likely be unsatisfied, demotivated and manifest lower performance levels and weak loyalty.

Young people obviously have dire need for financial assistance (preferably in the form of non-repayable funds), but also stimulation and development of entrepreneurial spirit and skills in a comprehensive process of development of appropriate entrepreneurial climate in the country.

Bearing in mind that young unemployed people do not discriminate against any sector, it is important that public administration/public sector institutions open up for employment of young people by planning new working positions and/or filling positions vacated pursuant to regular retirement of older employees. Formal qualifications of young people and their individual abilities relevant for the working position must be paramount in the selection process. On the other side, the private sector must gain the trust of the young people as a serious employment possibility.

Information on the measures and their availability must be stepped up, so young people from across the Republic of Macedonia can easily access them. Effects of the measures must be monitored and evaluated continuously by national authorities, even modified occasionally if need be.

Young people should be exposed to role models they can take examples by, including through public awareness campaigns championing successful youth; information disseminated by high school and university career centers on former students' career paths; or special initiatives under the patronages of business chambers and professional associations recognizing young successful professionals across various occupations and industries.

Since salary is obviously the key external motivator, employers should initially offer the realistic or, at least, the average salary paid in the profession/working position/industry. Young people might be further attracted and convinced to stay if employers provide opportunities for career advancement.

Cooperation between faculties and the business sector should continue and improve.

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**CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES OF YOUTH PARTICIPATION
IN ELECTIONS IN SLOVAKIA**

Abstract

Low voter turnout and no interest in politics are characteristic for the majority of young people. Nowadays, broadly discussed topics in many countries include the radicalization of the youth, and the high number of young voters who vote for far-right political parties. In the 2016 parliamentary elections in Slovakia, a neo-Nazi political party was one of the parties with the biggest support received from first-time voters. The paper introduces the results of a survey which was conducted among 100 young people after the elections. The respondents' profile was specific due to their previous participation in youth exchange programs or trainings abroad. In addition, at the time of the survey, more than half of the respondents were active members of student organizations or youth parliaments, or volunteers in NGOs. The survey reveals the reasons which influenced the decision of the young people to participate in the elections, as well as the factors which had an impact on their choice.

Keywords: elections, participation, youth, voter turnout, radicalization

Introduction

One of the serious challenges of our times is the increasing popularity of right-wing extremist, populist and Eurosceptic parties in many countries. The underlying causes of this development, and the mobilization tools of these parties, are the large refugee waves, the frequent terrorist attacks, and the still high unemployment rates. The consequence of these phenomena is growing xenophobia, intolerance, racism, extremism, and hate-speech.

After the last parliamentary elections in 2016, Slovakia joined countries with a far-right political party in the parliament, and discussions began in the society about the reasons for its popularity. According to a 2015 Eurobarometer opinion poll, Slovakia shows one of the worse results among all EU countries with respect to discrimination in the EU. For example, the largest number of the people who declared that they would not feel comfortable if their child was in a relationship with a black person, an Asian, a Muslim, or a Jew, were from Slovakia (Eurobarometer, 2015). There are many other surveys and studies about this topic but, generally, the vast majority of the Slovak population acknowledge their negative attitudes towards minorities and refugees, which gives Slovakia an unpleasant “stamp” as one of the most racist and xenophobic countries in Europe. Before the 2016 parliamentary elections, 70% of the Slovaks expressed their refusal to accept refugees (Pravda, 2015). However, given that none of the registered political parties explicitly advocated the acceptance of refugees, no one expected, and the public opinion polls did not indicate, either, that the extremist political party “LSNS”, Ľudová strana – Naše Slovensko/ People’s Party–Our Slovakia, would be successful. Therefore, the results of an exit poll conducted among first-time voters, which revealed that this party was the most popular among them, came as an even bigger surprise.

We were concerned about this development. Therefore, immediately after the elections, the author of this paper conducted a survey among young people to help explain the reasons and factors that influenced their decision in the elections, to see what they considered to be the most serious problems, and to gain other related information. These will be introduced in this article. The hypothesis of the study states that young people who participate in exchange programs abroad do not tend to vote extremist parties.

The Participation of Slovak Youth in the 2016 Parliamentary Elections

The 2016 Slovak parliamentary elections are considered to be astonishing due to the rejection of some stable political parties and, in particular, due to the election of unusual political parties. However, the biggest surprise was that the neo-Nazi political party LSNS received 8.4% of the votes and got into the parliament for the first time.

The political program of the party was, of course, quite controversial. Firstly, it was based on the exclusion of migrants, refugees, and the Romani. Slovakia has a high proportion of Romani minority, which is still not well-integrated, and part of the public perceive them as poor, uneducated people, as criminals, and recipients of social benefits. One of the main elements of the program was to reduce their social benefits and to “eliminate the favoritism of Gypsy spongers... parasites who refuse to work will not get anything”. Almost every speech to the public on the squares during the election campaign started with greetings like “wish you a nice white day”. The program also contained a proposal to tighten control over the illegal employment of foreigners, over the immigration and the visa policy, and to enable all Slovaks to work. Moreover, the party gained support thanks to their proposal to reduce the salaries of politicians and civil servants, to introduce their criminal liability, and to reduce the number of MPs from the current 150 to 100. In the field of international politics, they want Slovakia to exit the NATO, to ban the euro, and to return to the previous currency, the Slovak crown. The program also included a proposal about loans for newlywed couples, and the possibility to obtain support for renting a flat (LSNS Election Program).

It should also be emphasized that the representatives of the party repeatedly expressed their positive opinions about the ideology and the period of the Slovak wartime state (1939-1945) that was funded with the help of Germany and forced to cooperate with them. The leader of the political party, Marian Kotleba, established a political party called "Slovenska pospolitost/Slovak Brotherhood" already in 2005. However, the party was dissolved by the Supreme Court because of its extremely radical views and because it violated the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and other laws. The LSNS was created thanks to a

possibility to rename the party as “Friends of Wine Party”. Meseznikov and Gyarfasova (2016) claim that the insufficient procedures applied by state institutions, unqualified dissolution proposals, and an ignorance of the party members’ racist speeches, also contributed to the electoral success of the party. The situation that arose was a country which tolerated the spread of racist ideas.

More than 200,000 voters supported this program in the elections, which represents 8.4% of all the valid votes, and which resulted in 14 seats in the parliament. The political party was successful for the first time in 2014 when the leader of the party, Marian Kotleba, was elected as president of the Banska Bystrica self-governing region with a numerous Romani minority and a high unemployment rate. In the two previous parliamentary elections, in 2010 and 2012, the party gained only around 1% of the votes. However, public opinion polls before the parliamentary elections did not indicate that the party could achieve significant success; it moved generally around 2%. The information that the party could enter the parliament with 6.8% of the votes was published for the first time based on the results of an exit poll after the closure of the polling stations. In addition, a survey among first-time voters was also conducted, which revealed that the largest number of them, 22.7%, voted for this party. Another interesting finding was that the 4th most popular party, according to an exit poll, was the political party called “We are Family”, led by a famous but controversial businessman (TV Noviny, 2016). Besides, surveys conducted a few months after the elections showed that 1/3 of the young people between 18-39 sympathized with the LSNS party (Velsic, 2016).

Thus, after the elections, a lot of discussions and efforts to explain the reasons behind the popularity of this party among young people, by several experts, appeared in the media. Sociologist Michal Vasecka underlined that young people are attracted to “anti-establishment” parties that offer radical and unconventional solutions to problems. In addition, with respect to this target group, communication through the social media in simple language is another strength of the party (Aktuality, 2016). Daniel Milo from GLOBSEC Policy Institute thinks that young people do not trust existing political parties. They desire a leader and quick solutions, although they are not able to assess the possibility to implement the promised measures. He also points out that there is little space left in the history curriculum for post-1938 Slovakia, and

pupils do not know about the thousands of victims of the fascist and communist regimes (Sme, 2016). Sociologist Zuzana Kusa agrees that young people like to go against the system in any form. Young people spend a lot of time on social media, and everybody wants to be part of some community, even if only in an electronic form (TV Noviny, 2016).

Survey about the Participation of Slovak Youth in the Elections

In April 2016, a few weeks after the elections, we conducted a survey among the youth on a sample of 100 respondents. Although we are aware of the limits of this survey and of the overall small number of the respondents, the survey revealed some interesting facts. The respondents' average age was 22, and the survey was conducted among young people who had participated in youth exchange programmes or trainings abroad. 91 of them participated in the elections and 25 of them were first-time voters. More than half, 60 respondents were active members of student organizations, youth parliament or are volunteers in some NGOs in the time of survey. Their further profile was as follows:

Table 1. Profile of respondents

Variable	Categories	Number of respondents
Gender	Female	72
	Male	28
Place of residence	city over 100 thousands inhabitants	31
	town between 50-100 thousands inhabitants	8
	town between 10-50 thousands inhabitants	25
	town between 2-10 thousands inhabitants	13
	village between 500 -2000 inhabitants	19
	village under 500 inhabitants	4

Current status	university student	61
	high-school student	19
	employed	15
	unemployed	3
	other	2

Besides standard socio-demographic indices, it was important for us to find out also the extent to which they were interested in politics apart from the elections. The respondents answered the question of “How often do you discuss politics with friends / family?” as follows: 9% discussed politics every day, while the majority, 27% of the respondents, discussed politics at least once a week, 14% several times a week, and 16% at least once a month. The rest of the respondents talked about politics only occasionally.

We were also interested in their political activities, and the results represented unexpected and, at the same time, positive findings. As many as 60% of the respondents had signed a petition, 53% followed political programmes and discussions, 37% shared political content on social media, and 36% followed political developments every day in the media. 35% of the respondents had participated in public events or discussions about a political topic, 19% had contributed to a political discussion on the Internet, 19% had participated in a protest, 17% in a pre-election meeting of a political party, and 3% were even members of a political party.


The other question in the survey was: “What issues or problems are the most important for you?” The majority, as many as 74% of the respondents, identified education as the most serious problem, followed by healthcare at 70%, unemployment at 47%, and the migrant crisis at 34%. About 20% of the respondents considered even the judicial system, social politics, the issue of the Romani people, or terrorism, as a serious problem.

The number of the respondents who took part in the elections was large, 91%, and that is why the survey also contained the question “What reasons influenced your decision to participate in the elections?” The most frequently stated phrases in their responses included civic

responsibility and rights, dissatisfaction, change, corruption, and interest in the future. They also emphasized that they thought everyone should vote in the country, that they believed in democracy, and that the elections were the only chance for people to make decisions about what was happening in their country. Some of them also pointed out the fact that they did not want others to decide for them, or that those who did not vote should not complain.

The chart below depicts the respondents' answers to the question "To what extent were you satisfied with the activities of the previous government?"


Graph 1. Satisfaction with previous government



It is evident that the respondents' main motivation to vote was their dissatisfaction and their desire for a change in the government. However, they had as many as 23 entities as candidates to vote from, so we asked them "what factors played a role in their selection of a political party". Their responses varied significantly, they most often cited the chance of a political party to be elected, its election programme, the leader and the people in the party, and their expertise, their previous activities, and sympathy. Many of them also stated that their decision was influenced also by their family, religion, or personal contact with the candidates. Among the reasons, some of the respondents also mentioned corruption scandals, and the possibility to form a coalition or a party who did not cooperate with the current government.

We also wanted to know whether they had checked in the programmes of the political parties how they wanted to implement steps to solve the issues they considered to be serious.

Therefore, the next question was: "Did you read the programmes of the political parties before you decided which party you would vote?"

Graph 2. Information about programs of political parties before elections

How did this enquiry turn out, and which party did the respondents vote in the end?

Table 2. Results – political party that respondents elected

SAS	42
OĽaNO-NOVA	19
MOST - HÍD	9
SIĚŤ	5
SNS	3
SKOK	2
ĽS Naše Slovensko	2
SDKÚ	1
SMER-SD	1
Odvaha	1
SMK	1
didn't answer	5
didn't vote	9

As can be seen, only 2 of our respondents voted the Neo-Nazi political party LS Nase Slovensko. The vast majority voted the centre-right and liberal political party SAS, or the coalition of Ordinary People and Independent Personalities. None of the respondents voted another controversial political party, “We are Family”, which stood as candidates and made their way to the parliament.

The most interesting findings of this survey are connected not only to its results but particularly to the profile of our respondents. These were young people with experiences abroad, who were in touch with their peers from other countries, and as many as 60% of them were members of student organizations, or youth parliaments, or helped out as volunteers in non-governmental organizations. Based on the above, we may assume that young people who spend their free time efficiently, take part in extracurricular activities, and travel, do not tend to vote extremist parties. In addition, not only do these young people participate in the elections, but they are also interested in the political developments, and some of them even take part in public events, discussions, and protests.

Conclusion

In conclusion, I would like to underline that I am convinced that it is important to provide as many opportunities as possible for young people to spend their free time efficiently. We keep hearing how apathetic and passive young people are, and how they are disinterested in public life and politics. A lot of free time in the case of several young people may lead to socio-pathological phenomena like addiction to drugs or alcohol, or truancy. However, in most cases, it occurs due to the fact that they do not have, or do not know of, any other alternative. If this is combined with a shortage of jobs, low wages, and their peers leaving for abroad in large numbers, no wonder that many young people adopt views which pursue radical solutions.

Xenophobia is the fear of anything foreign and unknown, that is why there is a certain correlation between travelling and extremism. If the youth gets the chance to travel and meet their peers from other countries, they tend to lose their prejudices and, based on our survey, too, it is less likely that they support parties whose campaign is based on differentiations and hatred of others. To destroy prejudices and to strengthen tolerance and mutual understanding, it is necessary to create as many opportunities for education and for the interaction of the youth from different countries and cultures as possible. Through programmes like Erasmus+, or Europe for Citizens, the European Union implements such youth exchange programmes, although only

a small percentage of young people is aware of these possibilities, and an even smaller number takes part in them. Consequently, it is very important to inform them about these possibilities.

In addition, non-governmental organizations launched various education programmes in Slovakia, such as summer schools, or weekend trainings and workshops beyond the scope of formal education. By games and non-formal educational methods, they can learn more about diversity and about other cultures, or even about topics such as media literacy, and how to verify the truthfulness of information. Our survey also revealed that it is definitely welcome if NGOs involve young people as volunteers in their activities

One is not born a citizen but becomes one gradually. Therefore, education for citizenship and for respecting human rights has to start at schools at an early age. That is why it is also important to educate the teachers on how to solve and approach any expressions of hate speech at their schools. Discussions on current problems and topics, which resonate in the media, are still very rare at schools. Schools should not be only a place for memorizing facts and information but also a space for the exchange of opinions and thoughts, and their evaluation. By integrating elements of non-formal education, debates, or even so-called “human libraries”, the students’ information and knowledge of other countries, cultures, and religions, could be expanded.

In the past year in Slovakia, several civil campaigns and initiatives fighting manifestations of intolerance and discrimination were also launched. Even president Andrej Kiska announced a challenge, a “hackaton”, to develop various applications, websites, games, or videos, which deal with the growing extremism in the society in a creative way. As many as 139 teams applied, and the winner team was offered assistance and mentoring by specialists in their implementation.

The EU was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 partly for its fight against intolerance, xenophobia, racism, and hostility. “What does peace mean to you?” This was the question in the competition by the European Commission in reaction to being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The answer of the winner who participated in the award was: My grandparents would say “dream”. My parents would say “process”. I say it is my everyday “reality”.” Yes, truly, young people across the EU consider peace almost as a commonplace and do not

have any experience with conflicts or violations of human rights. However, we should learn from the experience of the two world wars, and a resurgence of nationalistic hostility must not be tolerated in the society. Although the growing trend of extremism is certainly a serious challenge to be addressed, there are ways in which schools, universities, and the civil society, may also contribute to tackling this phenomenon.

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**CONTEMPORARY CHANGES OF MARITAL BEHAVIOR - A
CASE STUDY OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA**

Abstract

The numerous social, economic, political, cultural and other changes in all spheres of human life have greatly stimulated the demogeographic changes that the majority of the population in the world faces today. These demogeographic changes are expressed through the changes in fertility and fertility rates, extended life expectancy, new understanding of marriage and family, reduced number of so-called "universal marriages", new types of illegitimate communities, delayed marriage, celibacy, an increased number of divorces, children born outside marriage, etc. Therefore, the marital status of the population as one of the basic demographic indicators, with all its characteristics and specificities, is very challenging to study, because it largely reflects on some segments of the demographic development of the country.

Marriage as an institution is still associated with the creation of the family as one of the most important sociological forms and pillars of society.

This paper elaborates the trend of marriages in the Republic of Macedonia, the crude marriage rate, the number of marriages per 1,000 inhabitants older than 15 and the general marriage rate. Marriages are processed according to certain characteristics of the bride and groom and an analysis of the regional differences are made.

The analysis of the contemporary demographic conditions is very important for policy makers, social scientists, demogeographers, and anyone seeking to understand society, family and marital behavior in order to predict the future trends.

Keywords: number of marriages, marriage rate, Republic of Macedonia.

Introduction

The union of a man and a woman, recognized by the society or ceremony is as old as the human civilization itself and marriage of any kind is seen in all the human societies (Rasool, 2016). Marriage is most often defined as state of living together of two persons of the opposite sex, as husband and wife in an agreed relationship, regulated by law or custom (Kjurciev et al., 2011) In fact, marriage represents the social framework of reproduction (Devedžić, 2004).

The right to marriage is one of the basic human rights and according to the legislation in the Republic of Macedonia, it can be concluded between the citizens of our country, but also between our citizens and foreigners (Madjevikj, 2009). According Marriage Law, the lowest limit for marriage is determined by adulthood, with the age of 18 years (there are cases of marriage under the age of 18 while the upper age limit for marriage is not determined). The age of 18 years is the minimum legal age for marriage without parents' approval and 16 years with parents' approval in the Republic of Macedonia, both for men and women (Miladinov, 2015).

Marriage has its social and individual significance. The social significance refers to the perception of marriage as an institution, i.e. a

social structure that ensures the maintenance of cultural needs; it is a system of obligations, rights and privileges of roles that are legalized by a civil contract that can be terminated if both sides agree. Individual significance is reflected in the intimate connection and commitment to the sustainability of a relationship with the loved one (Pernar, 2010).

Marriage and divorce behaviors are of interest to both demographers and the general public as they shed light on family formation, family composition and fertility (Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, 2015), but over time, the marriage has evolved and has taken different forms. In this regard, people today marry less than before, and when they decide to do so, then it happens later in life.

However, we must mention the influence of the increasing number of illegitimate communities (cohabitation). The practice of living together without a legal marriage is widespread and is on the increase worldwide. In some areas, it is a well-established practice; in other areas, it is fairly new (Faust K, 2004). In fact, cohabitation before marriage is considered as a substitute for marriage (Golubović, Marković Krstić, 2004) and with the rise of cohabitation, the marriage rates decline (Devedžić, 2004). These kinds of communities in the Republic of Macedonia are particularly frequent in the last ten years, but no state institution keeps any records.

However, apart from new thoughts about life and new types of informal communities, in most countries, even in the most developed, the expectations of marriage as a lifetime commitment in their own marriages remain strong (Thornton & Young-DeMarco, 2001; Byrt, 2009). The research on population marriage trends, followed by the analysis in the composition of the population by marital status are of great importance because within marriage occurs the majority of the population reproduction (Golubović, Marković Krstić, 2004).

Methods of work and data sources

The available census data, as well as the data from the vital statistics, enable analysis of the population structures and processes (Madjevikj, 2005). Observed through the published statistical data by the official statistics, which refer to the Population Natural Change in the Republic of Macedonia, among the other data on the vital events and processes (number of births, deaths, number of divorces), also can be find data

on the number of marriages, the number of marriages by the age of the spouses, marriages according to the marriage order, marriages according to the previous marital status of the groom and the bride, as well as the number of marriages according to certain characteristics of the spouses as ethnicity and educational attainment. By examining the marital status in relation to other demographic and socioeconomic characteristics such as age, race, ethnicity, income, and education, understanding marital status as a demographic characteristic can be advanced.

A much clearer picture of the number of marriages can be obtained through calculating the marriage rates. The simplest measure of marriage is the crude marriage rate, or the number of marriages in a year per 1.000 population at midyear. Rate, as a relative number that represents the frequency of an event in a given time interval, is one of the most important indicators of certain events. The crude marriage rate has disadvantages since it expresses the number of marriages compared to the entire population, including children and singles, instead of concentrating on the population at risk, that is, of married people.

The marriage rate is directly conditioned by the number of marriages. The greater the number of marriages is, the highest the marriage rate will be and vice versa (Ivkov, 2005; Blagojević et. al, 2015). Crude marriage rates are used most effectively for gross analyses in areas that may not have the additional data to calculate more refined measures. Note that the crude marriage rate represents the number of marriages, not the number of people getting married (Faust, 2004).

In addition to the crude marriage rate, the marriage rate according age is also calculated. That is, the number of marriages in a given year is divided by the number of the population aged over 15 in the same year, as well as the general marriage rate, which is expressed as the number of marriages per 1.000 women aged 15 and over (Faust, 2004). Changes in the number of marriages do not explain marriage trends, unless account is taken of the number of people available to marry (Wilson, Smallwood, 2007). This way, the research could give even stronger results. In order to calculate the marriage rates, it is necessary to have available data on the total number of the population. Therefore, the data from the regular annual publications by the State Statistical

Office, Population estimates by sex and age by municipalities and statistical regions for the analyzed years and the Statistical Yearbooks were used, taking into account the fact that the last Census of the population, households and dwellings in the Republic of Macedonia was conducted in 2002.

For the purposes of this research, analytical-statistical, mathematical-statistical and comparative methods were used. During the analysis and data processing, the results of the research were compared to what has been done so far, and treats this issue, that is, relevant demographic studies.


Results and discussion

The marital status of the population with all its characteristics and specificities is a special challenge for studying by geographers, because it reflects at some segments in the demographic development of the country or its separate regions (Madjevikj, 2009). Unfortunately, the experiences point out that marriage, although one of the oldest universal institutions of humankind, in the post-transitional phase of European societies gradually loses its significance.

Table 1: Number of marriages in the Republic of Macedonia in the period 1991-2016

Year	Number of marriages	Index 1991 = 100
1991	15,311	100
1994	15,736	102.8
2002	14,522	94.8
2011	14,736	96.2
2016	13,199	86.2

Graph 1: Number of marriages in the Republic of Macedonia in the period 1991-2016



Data source: SSORM, Natural population change, 1991-2016.

For the number of marriages in the Republic of Macedonia and how their number has changed over the years, we can see data in Table 1 and Graph 1. The number of marriages significantly decreased in the analyzed period, i.e. 13.8%. The highest number of marriages was recorded in 1994 and this number was only slightly lower in 1991. The lowest number of marriages was recorded in 2016, or 1,537 marriages less compared to the previous analyzed year. However, a clearer picture of the trend in the number of marriages can be obtained by calculating the crude marriage rate and the general marriage rate. The highest value of the crude marriage rate in the analyzed period was recorded in 1994, and since then it is constantly decreasing, reaching 6.4 in 2016. This same trend is recorded in the general marriage rate and in the number of marriages per 1,000 inhabitants older than 15. The number of divorces per 1,000 marriages points out to the fact that the number of marriages in the Republic of Macedonia is decreasing, while the number of divorces is continually increasing. Following consistent falls in marriage rates in the last quarter of the 20th century and the early years of this century have seen some relatively large fluctuations in marriage numbers and rates (Wilson, Smallwood, 2007).

Table 2: Marriage rates in the Republic of Macedonia in the period 1991-2016

Year	Crude marriage rate	General marriage rate	Number of marriages per 1,000 inhabitants older than 15 years	Number of divorces per 1,000 marriages
1991	7.5	20.1	10.0	32.4
1994	8.1	21.4	10.8	38.9
2002	7.2	18.2	9.1	90.2
2011	7.2	17.2	8.7	119.0
2016	6.4	15.2	7.6	150.4

Data source: Authors' calculations using SSORM data.

The changes in the marriage rate are related to the idea of changes, the increased level of education and changes in women's participation in the labor market, the manner of choosing a spouse, changes in the age of getting married, etc. Therefore, significant results can be gained

when analyzing the demographic characteristics of married people (Madjeviki, 2009).

Number of marriages according to the age of the bride and groom

The lifetime in which most men and women enter a marital union is determined by the characteristics of the global social system, family and marriage (Petrović, 1981; Golubović, Marković Krstić, 2004). The age of marriage to a large extent depends on the territorial and ethnic affiliation, on cultural characteristics and accepted norms of behavior. As the age of getting married is one of the most important determinants of reproductive behavior, the best years of marriage are those in which there is a maximum of biological preconditions in order to achieve the greatest reproduction. However, with the changes in the lifestyle in contemporary societies, with the process of individualization and the adopted system of values, the attitude of individuals to marriage as an institution, as well as the "ideal time" for marriage changes (Golubović, Marković Krstić, 2004).

Table 3: Marriages by the age of the bride and groom in the period 1991-2016

Year	Total	under 20	20-24	25-29	30-34	35-39	40-49	50-59	Over 60	*
Percentage share of the number of marriages by the age of the bride										
1991	100	28.2	45.7	17.7	4.3	1.6	1.2	0.5	0.4	0.4
1994	100	27.7	44.2	18.3	4.6	1.8	1.4	0.6	0.4	1.0
2002	100	19.8	44.1	23.8	6.3	2.6	2.3	0.7	0.3	0.1
2011	100	13.1	36.5	30.4	11.6	4.2	3.0	1.0	0.2	0.0
2016	100	9.0	33.7	31.8	13.7	5.1	4.6	1.6	0.5	0.0
Percentage share of the number of marriages by the age of the groom										
1991	100	4.2	40.3	37.1	11.5	3.2	1.9	0.8	0.9	0.1
1994	100	5.1	39.8	35.5	11.8	3.7	2.3	0.8	0.9	0.1
2002	100	3.3	34.1	38.0	14.5	5.3	3.0	0.8	1.0	0.0
2011	100	2.1	24.0	37.9	20.7	7.6	5.2	1.8	0.7	0.0
2016	100	1.4	20.0	37.1	23.0	8.6	6.3	2.4	1.2	0.0

*unknown

Data source: SSORM, Natural population change, 1991-2016 and authors' calculations.

Thus, in the analyzed period, a significant "marriage aging" was recorded, that is, postponing the first marriage in the older year of the marital contingent, and accordingly, it can be expected the "aging of fertility" (Golubović, Marković Krstić, 2004). In Table 3, we can note that in the entire analyzed period, the highest share in the number of marriages was recorded in the age group of 20 to 24, but with an increased participation of the age groups of 25-29 and 30-34 in the recent years for the bride, i.e. the age groups of 20 to 29 years for the groom, also with an increased participation of the age group of 30-34 in the recent years. The general trend of moving the age limits when concluding marriage (Madjevijk, 2005), to a large extent is due to the appearance of many adults cohabiting with a partner before ever marrying (Copen et. al, 2012). Demographic data support later ages of first marriage. Marital timing is impacted by school enrollment and higher levels of education; conversely, income, employment stability, and home ownership facilitate marriage formation, particularly for men (Lloyd & South, 1996; Byrd, 2009). Also, late marriages in recent years can be explained by the way of thinking of modern girls, their higher level of education, and poor material conditions because of which the young people are deciding for later marriages (Blagojević et. al, 2015). In other words, females are getting into marriage later year by year due to the growth of urbanization and engagement among women in economic areas (Karimov, 2014).

Table 4: Number of marriages by the average age of the bride and groom

Year	Average age of bride	Average age of groom	Average age of bride at first marriage	Average age of groom at first marriage
1991	23.0	26.3	-	-
1994	23.0	26.4	22.9	26.0
2002	24.3	27.4	23.8	26.8
2011	25.9	29.1	25.4	28.3
2016	27.1	30.1	26.5	29.3


Data source: SSORM, 25 years of Independent Macedonia, and authors' calculations.

It is noted that the increase in the mean age occurs for both men and women, as we approach the end of the research period. Men marry for the first time at older ages than women (Copen et. al, 2012), but, while men continued to marry at older ages than women, the gap narrowed from about 3 years.


Number of marriages by the marriage order for the bride and groom

In the graphs below, we can note that the most of the marriages that were recorded in the analyzed period were first marriages for both, bride and groom.

Graph 2: Marriages by marriage order for the bride, in %



Graph 3: Marriages by marriage order for the groom, in %



Data source: SSORM, Natural population change, 1991-2016 and authors' calculations


Although this trend continues in recent years, the number of marriages of higher order for the spouses is constantly increasing, especially for the groom.

Marriages by former marital status of the bride and groom


Most of the spouses that are getting married were never married before, but the share of the never married before brides is higher than the share of the never married before grooms. The number and share of the spouses that were divorced is increasing for both, bride and

groom. The participation of the widowers in the number of people getting married is insignificant, with less than 1% for the bride and less than 2% for the groom.

Graph 2:Marriages by marriage order for the bride, in %



Graph 3:Marriages by marriage order for the groom, in %



Data source: SSORM, Natural population change, 1991-2016 and authors' calculations

Number of marriages according to the ethnic affiliation of the bride and groom

In the mutual connection of traditional understandings, cultural achievements, religious affiliation, and other, the ethnic affiliation, to some extent, influences some of the following: age of getting married, norms and attitudes for the number of children, size of family, divorces and more.

Table 7: Marriages by the ethnic affiliation of the bride and groom in the period 1991-2016

	1991	1994	2002	2011	2016	1991	1994	2002	2011	2016
Marriages by the ethnic affiliation of the bride						Percentage share				
Total	15,311	15,736	14,522	14,736	13,199	100	100	100	100	100
Macedonians	9,082	8,794	7,710	7,572	7,042	59.3	55.9	53.1	51.4	53.4
Albanians	3,940	4,853	4,773	5,134	4,428	25.7	30.8	32.9	34.8	33.5
Turks	647	638	568	653	496	4.2	4.1	3.9	4.4	3.8

Roma	667	500	551	645	437	4.4	3.2	3.8	4.4	3.3
Vlachs	0	19	7	25	17	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.2	0.1
Serbs	0	227	122	140	149	0.0	1.4	0.8	1.0	1.1
Bosnians	0	0	0	120	91	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.7
Other	941	550	733	428	522	6.1	3.5	5.0	2.9	4.0
Unknown	34	155	58	19	17	0.2	1.0	0.4	0.1	0.1
Marriages by the ethnic affiliation of the groom						Percentage share				
Total	15,311	15,736	14,522	14,736	13,199	100	100	100	100	100
Macedonians	9,160	8,852	7,819	7,704	7,162	59.8	56.3	53.8	52.3	54.3
Albanians	3,998	4,938	5,033	5,059	4,508	26.1	31.4	34.7	34.3	34.2
Turks	661	673	572	697	523	4.3	4.3	3.9	4.7	4.0
Roma	685	525	574	656	454	4.5	3.3	4.0	4.5	3.4
Vlachs	0	32	16	17	17	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1
Serbs	0	221	130	138	101	0.0	1.4	0.9	0.9	0.8
Bosnians	0	0	0	123	108	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.8	0.8
Other	777	369	337	328	308	5.1	2.3	2.3	2.2	2.3
Unknown	30	126	41	14	18	0.2	0.8	0.3	0.1	0.1

Data source: SSORM, Natural population change, 1991-2016 and authors' calculations

In Table 7 we can note that in the number of marriages, dominant are the marriages of the bride and groom of Macedonian ethnicity, by more than 50% in all analyzed years, (although a decreasing trend is noted), followed by the number of marriages by the bride and groom from the Albanian ethnic affiliation. This can be explained by the percentage share of the Macedonian and Albanian population in the total. The number of marriages between bride and groom by other ethnic affiliation participates in the total number of marriages with less than 5% per year.

Number of marriages by the educational attainment of the bride and groom

Important to this research is the availability of data on the educational attainment of both spouses (SSORM publications), so that analysis of the trend of marriages according to the educational attainment can be done.


Table 8: Marriages by the educational attainment of the bride and groom in the period 1991-2016

Year	Total	No education	Less than primary	Primary school	School for skilled and high-skilled	Secondary school	Vocational school, faculty and higher	*
Marriages by the educational attainment of the bride								
1991	15,311	380	1,090	5,868	1,757	4,773	1,229	214
1994	15,736	285	781	6,549	1,215	5,383	1,299	224
2002	14,522	289	474	5,418	980	5,724	1,456	181
2011	14,736	451	124	4,218	0	6,137	3,679	127
2016	13,199	227	96	2,587	0	5,861	3,888	540
Marriages by the educational attainment of the groom								
1991	15,311	171	694	4,610	3,114	5,033	1,497	192
1994	15,736	137	518	5,417	2,340	5,735	1,383	206
2002	14,522	161	362	5,169	1,729	5,617	1,318	166
2011	14,736	332	93	3,840	0	7,592	2,759	120
2016	13,199	148	79	2,444	0	6,964	3,043	521


*= unknown

Data source: SSORM, Natural population change, 1991-2016 and authors' calculations

Graph 6: Percentage share of marriages by educational attainment of the bride, in the period 1991-2015



Graph 7: Percentage share of marriages by educational attainment of the groom, in the period 1991-2015



Data source: SSORM, Natural population increase, 1991-2016 and authors' calculations

The number of marriages in which the spouses have completed university is increasing, especially among women, but on the other hand, increasing the level of education, increases the age of marriage (Golubović, Marković Krstić, 2004). To enter the university and get higher education means to get into marriage at higher ages (Karimov, 2014).


Women with more education and better economic prospects are more likely to delay first marriage to older ages, but are ultimately more likely to become married and stay married (Copen et. al, 2012).

Regional differences in the number of marriages


The place of residence we choose affects every aspect of our being. It can be determined by the income we earn, the people we meet, the friends we create, the partners we choose, and the opportunities offered to our children and families (Scott et. al, 2011). It also affects acquired attitudes about life, habits and customs, while cultural and demographic differences that refer to marriage, can also play an important role.

Given the differences in the distribution of the population and its structure, as well as the differences in the level of development among regions, there are certainly regional differences in the marriage trend. To a large extent, despite other factors influencing the territorial concentration or dispersion of the total population, depending on its ethnic affiliation of traditional views and opinions; cultural achievements, the enclosure of the environment, the religious structure of the population in mutual connection with the ethnic affiliation, social and political situations in the state, inter-ethnic relations and other also have their influence (Madjevikj, 2009).

Graph 8: Number of marriages per regions



Graph 9: Number of marriages per regions, in %



Data source: Authors' calculations using SSORM data.

Most of the marriages were recorded in the Skopje region. This can be related to the massive internal migrations, mainly directed towards the Skopje region, which caused the highest concentration of population in the region, i.e., almost 1/3 of the total population in the Republic of Macedonia lives in this region. However, if we analyze the crude marriage rate, we will note that the primacy is recorded in the Polog region, followed by the Southeast, Southwest and Northeast region.

Table 9: Crude marriage rates by regions for the period 1991 - 2016

Regions	1991	1994	2002	2011	2016
East	7.1	6.9	6.0	6.1	5.3
Southeast	7.7	7.6	6.5	6.7	6.6
Southwest	8.2	8.9	8.5	8.2	6.5
Pelagonia	6.9	7.8	6.1	6.3	5.5
Polog	8.5	10.3	9.7	9.1	8.0
Northeast	7.6	8.2	6.1	6.5	6.5
Skopje	7.2	7.7	7.0	6.9	6.1
Vardar	7.3	6.4	6.0	6.4	6.0
R. Macedonia	7.5	8.1	7.2	7.2	6.4

Data source: Authors' calculations using SSORM data.

The changes arise from the changes in the total number of population and its ethnic structure, the spatial distribution of the population, the concentration of nationalities in certain regions or their dispersion to a larger area, migration, social relations, political events in the state and immediate surroundings, inter-ethnic relations, the general marriage trends, the educational and cultural achievements, the attitudes about marriage etc. The results of the regional analysis show that there are differences in the number of marriages and the geographical location that could serve as a basis for new, additional research on multiple indicators in order to determine the impact of culture, tradition, customs and habits in all of the regions.

Conclusion

The opinion of marriage and divorce is of interest to demographers as well as the general public, since they participate in the formation of the family, the composition of the family and the fertility. Marriage (partnership) and family (parenthood) represent very important life goals, both at the level of value preferences and life practices (Bobić, 2003). Namely, study of marriages is usually approached from the perspective of the importance of marriage for reproduction, bearing in mind that marriage is a dominant frame for the population reproduction (Ivković et. al, 2014).

Changes in the marital behavior of the population are considered in the context of socio-economic transformation and in line with the peculiarities of modern society: urbanization, long-lasting education process, increased consumer opportunities, emancipation of women, aspiration to personal success, individualization etc. The main reasons that condition the changes in the number of marriages are in the socioeconomic sphere, sex and age-related irregularities expressed at the regional and local level, the migration, social and political changes, stability of the state, transition processes and more (Madjevikj, 2009).

Preference of people to have a career before tying the knot is the main reason that more and more people are opting to marry in their thirties. Education and finding a job are both time consuming. By the time people find some sort of financial stability, and this is irrespective of gender, they have already crossed the 30age mark. There is not

a single cause that is associated with the delayed marriage of either one or both the sexes (Rasool, 2016).

The changes in the marital behavior that the most of the World is facing today, are also present in the Republic of Macedonia. They can be recognized in the reduced number of marriages, reduced marriage rates, increased age at the time of marriage, increased participation of the spouses with university education in the total number of marriages, etc.

Therefore, the analysis of the unemployment rates from the aspect of the demographic variables (as the age and the marital status of the population), social variables (such as education and traditions) and economic variables (such as income and participation in the labor force), as well as the definition of the main reasons to get married or not, the regional differences in the number of marriages and, ultimately, their impact on the fertility is necessary. Our findings are the first stepping-stone to more research on the subject, which would eventually help create social policies, as well as creating a population policy in harmony with the trend of the population development and population marital status.

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EUROPEANIZATION REVISITED – THE CASE OF KOSOVO

Abstract

Many credible international organizations have echoed the urge of the Kosovo institutions to bear the burden of vigorous fight against corruption. Insofar, Kosovo holds the champions ring of corruption in the Western Balkan region being firmly at the bottom of the corruption index rank, 103rd out of 168, countries as stipulated in the Transparency International Corruption Index ranking in 2015.

Kosovo, which has declared independence from Serbia in 2008, has numerous corruption fighting institutions such as the Agency for Anti-Corruption, EULEX – the biggest so far Rule of Law Mission launched by the European Union, the Council for Anti-Corruption within the Office of the President, as well as myriad laws and regulations all aligned to the EU law as imposed by the EU itself, which have not been at all, or only little implemented on the ground.

This paper will examine the role of the EU Rule of Law mission in Kosovo in combating corruption while providing, firstly legislative basis for its exclusive competence in tackling high profile corruption cases, examining the number of cases prosecuted and finished with a sentencing so far taking two case studies that of the sentencing of the Prizren mayor, Ramadan Muja for corruption and the peculiar case of municipal court president, Judge NuhiUka, and lastly, analyzing the imposed reforms, being them legislative and/or executive by the European Union to the Government of Kosovo, which have proven to be highly ineffective.

The results of the paper found that EULEX despite its strength in numbers and budget has failed to deliver on its promises regarding the fight against corruption and organized crime, while in their mandate has little or no influence at all in implementation of existing legislation and removing political influence from the national judiciary.

Keywords: corruption, Kosovo, EULEX

Introduction

Corruption may as well be one of the most used phrases in Kosovo. That, subsequent with the repeated idiom often heard by the politicians such as “fight against corruption”.

However, in the country that declared independence from Serbia in 2008, being recognized so far by 108 other countries, including United States and EU 23 member states, corruption is perceived to be of endemic proportion, and in reality, it seriously hinders foreign investment that would boost economic as well as social development. The danger of corruptive manifest in Kosovo has been echoed by various monitoring international organizations, foreign diplomats as well as heads of states and governments within and out of the EU.

Insofar, the corruption index of Kosovo is the highest amongst the Western Balkans countries, placing Kosovo on the top of the most corrupted countries of the region. Kosovo, for that matter doesn't stand much better in global ranking of corrupt states, 103rd place of 167 (e.V., 2017) – placing itself only in front of third world countries, such as Somalia, Sudan and Eritrea whilst overcome by other less developed countries such as Lesotho, Maldives or even Montenegro, according to the GDP countries ranking from October 2016.(IMF, 2017) With excessive donations from international development fund, as well as the presence of numerous international organizations specialized in the rule of law sector from developed democracies, Kosovo managed to have an up to date and very modern corruption combating mechanisms.

Several established institutions that are being supposed to inter-alia work together on issues pertaining national interest, laws and agencies sponsored and funded by international organisms, look pretty fancy on paper. However, the dark side of the coin is their actual implementation inability of these laws and lack of effectiveness in combating corruption, having a spot reserved in all this failure to address the issue, for the biggest rule of law mission ever deployed by the European Union External Action Service (EEAS) named The European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo(EULEX,) and the incompetence in enforcement of their mandate.

Talking about Europeanization in this postulate, when thinking about the definition of the term as stipulated by Radaelli (2003), Oslen (2003) and Featherstone (2003), gives a clear point of the failures that the European Union has suffered especially in Kosovo in reforming, and moreover, fulfilling its mandate as stipulated in the joint action. This can largely be argued by the EU officials as it has been done by far, but the facts of the matter prove the contrary. (Soós, 2015)

The legal framework

Since Kosovo has stated its EU integration as a number one priority, pledging of fulfilling all the necessary criteria as required by the EU on its path toward accession, the fight against organized crime and corruption has been and still is one of the most often stated problems that the Kosovo government just doesn't seem to get a grasp on. The requirements to have modern legislation and a set of mechanisms to prevent and combat corruption is stipulated also in the Chapter 23 of the Acquis Communitaire which asks for a "solid legislative framework and reliable institutions are needed to enforce a coherent politics of prevention and halting corruption.

The current legislative framework for fight against corruption in Kosovo are to a large extent adequate, and well written. The Law on the Financial Declaration and the Law for the extended competences in confiscation of illegally obtained wealth have been adopted in 2013, after the new Penal Code of Kosovo was signed and entered into power in 2012.

EULEX in this process has been involved in the drafting, commenting or advising on nearly 98% of the Laws on the rule of law pillar. (EULEX. 2017)

From a technical and legal observation, the new legal disposition stipulated in the Penal Code, have expanded the ability of Kosovo institutions to tackle corruption at least in three different aspects. Firstly, the Penal Code foresees heavier sentences compared to the last. Currently for a corruption case, an official can get sentenced to 6 months up to 5 years of imprisonment.

Secondly, the financial statement provision, obligatory to all senior management civil servants as well as senior political appointees together with their advisors, has survived a change in the Penal Code. While non-compliance with the declaration or giving false information was previously sanctioned with a very low administrative fine, with the changes of the penal code it is foreseen a heavy fine or imprisonment of up to 3 years.

And finally, provisions of confiscation of illegally obtained fortune/capital has been enforced with the new penal code. (KDI Kosova 2016) That said, my conclusion is that Kosovo has an, up to date, state of the art legislation which largely fulfills its need for effective combat of corruption. However, the lag behind serious commitment in tackling corruption, as also stipulated in the European Commission Progress Report for years in a row now, is due to other reasons, primarily being that not all pieces of legislation were made “tailored to fit”, secondly the lack of political willingness on both Kosovo government and EU side via EULEX and finally the out of date human factor in the judiciary which is prone to political and other influence, all of these to be discussed subsequently by presenting real time case studies.

The Anti–Corruption High Council and the Anti–Corruption Agency

Since the declaration of independence, Kosovo has been declaratively committed in tackling all forms of corruption and organized crime.

However, the ground results do not reflect the statements made as they have proven not to be as nearly as sufficient in tackling corruption, which hinders economic and social development of the war torn country.

We shall go back and take a look at the institutions designed specifically – apart from EULEX which we will discuss separately – to fight corruption, and where the problem with these institutions stand.

The Anti – Corruption Agency (2006)

The Anti-Corruption Agency (AAC) is an independent body, conceptualized as a core mechanism in prevention and combat of corruption phenomena as well as anti-corruption policy coordination body in Kosovo. Its basis for functioning is the Law on the Agency of Anti-Corruption, while it has been established in July 2006, while reach full operational capabilities in February 2007. (Raportivjetor i Agjensionit Kosovar kundër Korrupsionit, 2008)

Its aim is concentrated in uncovering and combating corruption related cases, prevention of the corruption phenomena and builds a law abiding society free from corruptive affairs (aa).

This is at least what the paper on the establishment of the AAC says. However, the lack of political will and the unwillingness of the judiciary to further pursue cases brought by the Agency have minimized the impact that this mechanism have, limiting its scope to pursuing cases of petty corruption, rather than tackling the senior officials allegedly involved in corruption affairs.

It has not been also able to create a coherent strategy, just as the case was with the Anti-Corruption strategy 2013-2017, that was vigorously criticized by the Assembly of Kosovo members as well as the civil society for being very weak in content, and it serves the purpose of just ticking a box in the EU required benchmarks.(Policy analysis on institutional mechanisms for combating corruption in Kosovo, 2016)

The problem with Kosovo in this regard is not the petty corruption. Kosovo is regarded to have the most uncorrupted police in the region, and the local healthcare to an extent fulfills the needs of the citizens. The biggest issue is the public procurement, i.e. the tenders, the vague and complicated tendering procedures which have been identified with a lot of loopholes where irresponsible senior officials working within the institutions find a way to illegally obtain financial gains, very fast and a lot of it.

The Anti – Corruption High Council (2012)

Second important institution is the Anti-Corruption High Council (February 2012), placed under the Office of the President of Kosovo.

However, this institution is rather seen as a ceremonial bellafigura, rather than an effective mechanism to tackle corruption, primarily because of its role which is vastly political and it lacks any systematic approach. As fancy as it may sound, this Council established under the former President of Kosovo, Mrs. Atifete Jahjaga, met seldom, and there were only unsubstantial statements as well as no concrete measures to step up the notch in combating organized crime and high level corruption.

Concluding from the above, Kosovo has numerous bodies and agencies that have been beneficiary of large sums of financial aid from external donors to fight corruption and organized crime. However, the purpose of the existence of such institutions has been transformed into being the least interested into fighting corruption, but ultimately representing a show off for some the requirements of the European Union.

European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX)

Taking upon the advice of the US and other influential UNSC member states, the European Union, after the declaration of independence in Kosovo has continuously taken up the leading role in aiding Kosovo towards a building a democratic and solid society, boosting economic development, enhancing rule of law and ultimately prepare Kosovo for its future membership in the EU family.

On 4 February 2008, the Council adopted a Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP on the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX Kosovo.(Council Joint Action 2009/445/CFSP, 11.6.2009)

EULEX is the largest civilian crisis-management mission under the EU Common Security and Defense Policy and the first fully integrated rule of law mission of the EU that balances executive functions with highly ambitious rule of law sector and capacity reforms.

Its mandate is based on the Mentoring, Monitoring and Advising the Kosovar authorities in the rule of law component, yet retaining some of the executive competences in extraordinary circumstances.

But, the hybrid nature of its functioning affected by the 5 non recognizing EU member states*, has added uncertainty and confusion to the judicial branch in Kosovo. Moreover, the composition of the EULEX staff members coming from different backgrounds, being that technical or cultural aspect, different legal practices, but yet operating under the Kosovo Law, the Penal Code and the Penal Procedure Code has just inflated ambiguity and lack of trust by the local population that something might even change.

No relationship can be established between the invitation made by the Kosovo authorities and EULEX's mandate under the joint action as that invitation was not given any relevance as a legal basis for EULEX's establishment and operations. This is further reinforced by the fact that EULEX was placed under the "status neutrality" of Resolution 1244, which is evidently in contradiction to the wording and spirit of the Ahtisaari Plan, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of Kosovo, all of which clearly assert the independence and sovereignty of Kosovo. Having accepted to operate under Resolution 1244 and within the UN framework of "status neutrality", EULEX, by implication, has renounced all documents listed by Kosovo authorities as a legal basis for its mandate in Kosovo.(Muharremi,2010)

However, the legal ambiguity does not end here. Since, EULEX is not bound by the Constitution of Kosovo, nor its mandate derives from Kosovo's highest state document, but in contrary relies on the Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council. However, many of its operational tasks, do conflict with the legal knot that the EU has tied itself in vis-à-vis Kosovo.

Since neither the Constitution nor the Ahtisaari Plan recognize the United Nation Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) to be a legitimate public authority, any appointment by the UNMIK SRSG of EULEX judges, who are meant to serve within the judicial system of the Republic of Kosovo, would have to be considered unconstitutional. As a consequence, every decision rendered by a EULEX judge or by a judicial tribunal where a EULEX judge participates, provided such EULEX judge has been appointed

under the authority of the UNMIK SRSB under Resolution 1244, is challengeable before the Kosovo Constitutional Court.(aa, 377)

In theory, it is impossible for EULEX to accomplish its mandate under such circumstances, i.e. pretending to operate formally under the status-neutral framework of Resolution 1244 while at the same time co-operating de-facto in justice and other legal matters with the authorities of the Republic of Kosovo. It would be sufficient for a single ruling from the Kosovo Constitutional Court by which a decision made by a EULEX judge is declared unconstitutional to destroy the card house built by the EU by deploying EULEX under such legal uncertainties. (aa, 378)

Nevertheless, the current state of play shows that, despite the uncertainty, EULEX is continuing its operations in Kosovo, albeit still not seriously challenged.

EULEX judges have delivered 620 verdicts, including 460 verdicts in criminal cases, including corruption, organized crime, money laundering, war crimes, and human trafficking, and 146 verdicts in civil cases. These verdicts have included former judges, police officers, assembly member's prosecutors and high-level officials. The Mission investigated or filed indictments on 250 war crimes cases, thus substantially clearing the backlog of war crimes in Kosovo. Apart from the "inherited cases", the Mission initiated 98 new war crime investigations and conducted the first investigations into rape as a war crime prosecuting a number of such cases.(EULEX. 2017.)

Contrary to what the figures show, there is a substantial consensus among the public and analysts in Kosovo, and even some EU officials that EULEX has largely failed to address politicized or serious crime. (Radin, 2014)

As good as it may sound, EULEX has not delivered what was expected. The costly mission of the European Union member states countries, has so far opened several investigations into alleged corruption cases against, what they call them today as, "big fishes" such as the former Minister of Infrastructure, Fatmir Limaj, mayors, judges and prosecutors, as well as the head of Central Bank of Kosovo. But, none of these cases ended with a conviction. A theatre show transmitted in the media with Special Forces storming the center of Pristina, the capital of Kosovo in raids organized by the EULEX, yielded no results.

EULEX has proven craven, passive and fearful of taking on Kosovo's elite. (Capussela, 2015)

Moreover, EULEX itself for a long time has been plagued by corruption accusations and internal investigation and disciplinary hearings. A whistleblower, British prosecutor working in EULEX, in 2014 has gone public claiming she had evidence of senior EULEX staff members being engaged into corruptive activities, namely the president of the EULEX judges, the Italian Francesco Florit and chief prosecutor Jaroslava Novotna.

The investigation into the case conducted by a special envoy of Frederica Mogherini, the High Representative for EU Foreign Policy and Security, concluded years after these allegations were raised. The result was: the organization has serious flaws, however, no evidence of such corruptive activities have been found. (Jacqué 2015)

Criticizing the mandate of EULEX, the report stipulates that oversight is poor. In the beginning no real statistics were kept on judicial work, which doubtless hindered the development of a working culture rooted in strict standards akin to that found in many member states and international courts. It was therefore difficult to assess whether the mission was achieving its goals. After such statistics became available, revealing low level of performance no one really paid serious attention to them. (aa, 16)

The false narrative story told by the EU officials about the success of the costly Rule of Law Mission should stop, while immediate reconstruction of the Missions human capacities as well as mandate need to take place. In order to achieve success, EULEX should concentrate more on its mentoring and advising mandate, by transferring knowledge from the best practices in Europe on judges and prosecutors education and selection, and aligning the corruption and organized crime legislation to the cultural, social and political aspect of Kosovo. Otherwise, EULEX will be doomed to have the same adjective as UNMIK did in the past—that of an ultimately failed mission.

During the monitoring of the work of the judiciary, the Kosovo Institute for Justice (IKD), it has been concluded that the performance of the EULEX judiciary hasn't been as nearly efficient or up to the expectations of the Kosovo citizens. (Betim Musliu, Director of IDK, 2016)

As a result of the monitoring it was clearly seen that, contrary to the expectations for EULEX judges and prosecutors to adopt and implement the European best practices in the Kosovo system in order to enforce the “learn by doing” process, these judges have often in their actions been below the standard – taking unlawful decisions that have jeopardized the legal security of the citizens of the Republic of Kosovo.

The grim side of the rainbow - cases of Nuhi Uka and Ramadan Muja

The failures of the judiciary in Kosovo, being on a national level or that of EULEX can best be illustrated with the cases of Nuhi Uka and Ramadan Muja, the former a president of the Municipal Court in Pristina, while the latter the mayor of the second biggest city in Kosovo, Prizren.

Both of them have been investigated and charged on serious corruption and organized crime allegations, however, none of them has so far spent a single day in prison for several reasons. Primarily because of the inefficacy of the Court, leaving the case to be outdated thus not being able to continue with proceedings, or prolonging the case by exercising political influence onto different layers of the judiciary.

Nuhi Uka as a president of the Municipal court, has been dragged into court proceeding for 6 years now, on allegations for being part of organized crime group that have profited and/or damaged the Kosovo budget with approximately 60 million EUR. Ramadan Muja, as a mayor of the second biggest city in Kosovo, Prizren, has signed a contract, illegally giving a municipal owned property to a private owned enterprise.

The case of Ramadan Muja

One of the most intriguing cases in the post-independence Kosovo when it comes to corruption charges, is undoubtedly the case of the Prizren mayor, Ramadan Muja. Prizren is the second largest city in Kosovo after the capital Pristina, and it is considered as PDK-s (the biggest ruling political party, the Democratic Party of Kosovo) stronghold.

Ramadan Muja together with 5 other senior management defendants, were accused on misuse of official position or authority, as stipulated in the article 422 of the Penal Procedure Code of Kosovo.

The accused are suspected to have damaged the budget, or have gained illegal financial benefits of at least 60 thousand euros (estimated that the total value of the illegally expropriated land is estimated at around 2 million EUR), while it was proven beyond any reasonable doubt that the mayor Ramadan Muja has been signing contracts in contradiction with his authorization, and engaged himself into abuse of Kosovo Property Agency managed parcels, noncompliance with orders of the Supreme Court and privation of geodesy experts to testify in court.

The investigation started in year 2011, and in March 2014, Ramadan Muja was found guilty as charged on four accounts. However, showing the fragility of the judicial system and the failure of standard impose of sanctions, all the defendants were sentenced with no jail time but instead only two years of conditional imprisonment (probation period), and the ban of exercising any public related job for 30 months.(Report on Court Monitoring, 2016)

It is imperative mentioning that when the indictment against Muja was raised, and the court proceedings were underway, it did not hinder him to run for a mayor for his third term, and surprisingly win again.

He was shown support by the at that time the Prime Minister and currently the President of Kosovo, Mr. Hashim Thaçi who gave statements of support together with the president of Turkey, Tayyip Erdogan**.

One of the most memorable moments in the court against Muja is undoubtedly his request “not to be disturbed by the Court during the pre-electoral campaign as it puts him into a unequal position vis-à-vis other candidates. And with this approach, he did gain his third mandate, which he was exercising until October 2017.

In 2014, right after he got elected as a mayor the court found him guilty on four charges of corruption, but sentenced him with a two years’ probation imprisonment. This meant new elections for the city as the Law on Local Governance stipulates that “the mandate of the mayor automatically ceases if he/she is convicted for a criminal act with a sentence of more than 6 months of imprisonment”.

But, this verdict was challenged by the defense attorneys in the Appeal Court. The latter decided after 15 months of prolongation to send the case back to retrial. However, the prosecutor of the case did file another appeal against the second instance court in the Supreme Court of Kosovo.

In the ambiguous legal net, the Supreme Court has annulled the decision of the Appeal Court and asked for reconsideration by a new judge panel.

While the prolongation continues, Ramadan Muja is coming to the end of his term with local elections scheduled around April 2017.

The case of Ramadan Muja cannot be considered as the biggest failure of the EULEX mission, but can be considered as one of the biggest problems in the deliberate misinterpretation of the Penal Procedure Code, creating thus a precedent were EULEX, with the verdict of the Supreme Court, after the final verdict of the Appeal Court, have created a brand new legal penal system by creating three regular courts and not two as it is foreseen with the legal instruments.

The Supreme Court in this case has approved the appeal of the Prosecution in the Appeal Court on the verdict of the latter – while the Supreme Court ruling in favor of the Appeal, has returned the case in retrial within the Basic Court in Prizren.

At the same time, EULEX have appealed this verdict with the Supreme Court. The latter ruling on the same case, return it to the Appeal Court for retrial. Furthermore, to make things even worse, against all dispositions of the Criminal Procedure Code, they have ordered for the entire judging panel to be changed, thus creating an ambiguous legal environment.

The importance of this matter lies in the fact that in both cases the majority of the panels were EULEX judges, and clearly show the disparity of their legal practice and the misinterpretation, or even violation of the legal criminal procedures in the Kosovo system.

The case of Nuhi Uka

The other case is that of the President of the Municipal Court, Judge Nuhi Uka, who was accused in fraudulent activities that damaged the Kosovo budget with 60 million euros.

The Judge, has had 3 different indictments against him, including, misuse of his senior official position, misconduct, corruption and organized crime.

In a marathon investigation and trial that lasted since 2013 when Uka was arrested by EULEX, the end result yielded utmost disappointment.

One the case of damaging the Kosovo budget by illegally privatizing state owned property, with fake signatures and documents, Uka was found guilty as charged, but sentenced only to two years' probation imprisonment, a verdict which was - to the least - interpreted as a joke.

Moreover, in the Appeal procedure, the Court decided to annul the decision, and set the defendant free, dropping all charges against him.

On both cases, the majority of the panel were EULEX international judges.

Nuhi Uka, will be tried for one last case of participating in an organized crime enterprise together with senior PDK member of the Parliament and a former top senior KLA official, Azem Sylja as well as other defendants.

The two cases give a disrupted message on the strong statements given insofar about the vigorous fight against corruption. Considering the facts of these two cases, it can be concluded that the rhetoric of fight against corruption remains only a rhetoric. Allowing cases to be prolonged and outdated, is a deteriorating signal in the struggle for combating corruption, thus the legislation should be immediately amended not to allow such cases to be outdated, and at the same time a special task force to expedite deal with such cases in a prompt and professional manner.

Conclusion

There is a serious lack of zeal to fight corruption in Kosovo. Being that from political or professional aspect. As it was seen from above, EULEX is failing to deliver, because it is prone to rather keeping a political stability in the country than chasing after “big fishes”, or it just doesn’t have the stamina for it.

Moreover some problems also stem from the very nature of EULEX which consists in entrusting the execution of justice to prosecutors and judges from outside of Kosovo who come from a variety of member states. Justice cannot be dispensed without taking into account of the local culture, and the Kosovar society has certain specific features which must be born in mind or the work of the judiciary will not be understood.

EULEX has insofar sentenced only several low level figures on corruption charges, which is very insignificant when that is compared to the perception of high level corruption in the country. The perception remains that the senior the defendant is, the lesser the conviction he gets.

As said, in Kosovo there is lack of political willingness to tackle corruption. The establishment of myriad mechanisms to cosmetically fulfill requirements on paper by the EU, have been nothing but means to disperse the responsibility of the failure of the judiciary and the law enforcement agencies.

As a recommendation, EULEX should revise its mandate thoroughly, and concentrate more on the vetting and the advising national prosecutors and judges, influencing the dismissal of those with shady backgrounds and injection of new blood into the judicial system. It should also focus on two key aspects and that is witness protection and instead of paying approximately 100 million EUR per year for its operations, use funds in increase security and training for the national judges and prosecutors.

The Parliament of Kosovo should give the Agency Anti-Corruption a more robust role into combating corruption, and not limit its scope into only technical aspects which have proved to be inefficient so far. The latter needs to work closely with the State Prosecutors office in all matters regarding organized crime, and the appointment of the Head

of this institution should be done by an independent body consisted of academics, civil society, and international experts with proven track record. The laws and Strategies adopted should in reality reflect a result oriented approach instead of a theoretical one, adoption of which is perceived as a document “just for having one to show”.

That addressed, the Law on Public Procurement, which is seen as the core of the corruption problem needs drastic changes in order to fill in the gaps left, and limit the possibilities for bypassing the law for individual gains and benefits.

Bottom line, EULEX hasn't achieved its goal to improve the enforcing corruption fighting mechanisms, but instead has decided to cohabit with the political elite, instead of engaging in their prosecution.

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**Kosovo has not been recognized by the following EU member states: Greece, Slovakia, Cyprus, Spain, Romania*

***Authors note: Prizren is a city inhabited largely by Albanians with Turkish decent, and seen as a stronghold of the Turkish minority political parties. Erdogans party has a strong influence in the city, thus his endorsement of a particular candidate would increase chances of winning.*

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THE INTERCONNECTION BETWEEN PERSONALITY DIMENSIONS AND PARTICIPATORY BEHAVIOUR OF STUDENTS IN STUDENT ORGANIZATION

Abstract

During May 2017 year the field research among students at University of “Ss. Cyril and Methodius” (UKIM) in Skopje was conducted. The main goal of this research was to explore the perception of student participation (as an indicator for citizenship participative behavior) in student organization at the University of “Ss. Cyril and Methodius” and the image of this organization among students. The total number of respondents was 669. Respondents were students from 1 till 4 year from almost all faculties which constitute UKIM. Questioner has been prepared for the purpose of this research and also Five Factorial personality test was used - short version of IPIP NEO, which is constructed according to McCrae and Costa’s personality theory. Regarding to this theory five basic dimensions, which are biologically given, interact with external influences including culture, in shaping the skills, habits, tastes, and values which construct the characteristic adaptation of the individual. Beside IPIP NEO, two dimensions of

the Laponce questionnaire (concerning minority effect), one on the significance of the social role of the students, and the second on their treatment by the state were applied.

The findings of this research pointed that dimensions: agreeableness (A) as the tendency to be compassionate and cooperative rather than suspicious and antagonistic toward others, and conscientiousness (C), the tendency to show self-discipline, act dutifully, are relevant dimensions which influenced students participative behavior in some aspects and affect citizenship participative behavior, but only if the social role of student is important.

Keywords: participative behavior, personality dimensions, agreeableness, conscientiousness, social roles

Introduction

The project “Perspectives of Higher Education Development in the Republic of Macedonia”, carried out by the Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research, in its first phase analyzed the perception of students at the “St. Cyril and Methodius” University about their organization and representation in the university student organization.

The purpose of the research was to determine the level of students’ information on the student organization; their involvement in the activities of the organization; satisfaction with the organization’s work; the impact of students in the decision-making processes on issues of interest to them within the university they belong to; what is the perception of the social role “student”; the expression of the motive for social justice, as well as the connection of the dimensions of personality with the participatory behavior within and outside the student organization of the University.

This paper is focused on two aspects, the first is exploration of the integration of the social role “student” in the society, which is described with intersection of two dimensions: the significance of the role of the students, and their treatment by the state, regarding Laponce (2004), and the second is the role of personality dimension in explaining student activism in student organisation.

Psychological and social characteristics of youth/students

The term youth determines the life cycle phase that is placed between childhood and adulthood (i.e. between adolescence and adulthood), which, actually, as all age groups, is a social construct. The youth category contains a consensus on the existence of some biological determinants (e.g. universality of ontogenesis, bio-psychological maturation as a key feature of youth) and awareness of their socially conditioned articulation. According to the findings of numerous modern researches, the period of youth in today's societies lasts longer, that is, begins earlier, and ends later. The duration of youth is different and in its basis is socially, not biologically determined.

The participants of this survey included the young, students, aged mainly 18 to 25 (undergraduate students). They, according to the theoretical and empirical knowledge of developmental psychology, belong to the life period designated as "early maturity". Early maturity covers the period from 18 to 40 years. This period begins with the transition from adolescence to early maturity and has two sub-stages, one from 18 to 25, and the second from 25 to 39 years. At the age from 18 to 25, young people strive for independence from their parents and build a vision of achievements in life related to the profession and intimate relationships (Gormly, Brodzinski, 1990).

In early maturity, the basic development tasks are in the domain of maturation in a psychological sense: the establishment of identity, intimacy, emotional stability, responsibility for oneself and others, starting a professional career, establishing a marital union, deciding on parenting, establishing a network of friends and taking civic responsibility. The main development task in this period is the stabilization of the ego identity. After the stabilization of the ego identity occurs, a new type of intimacy becomes possible – the intimacy of an adult based on mutual exchange (Gormly, Brodzinski, 1990).

Sociologists studying the phenomenon of youth distinguish synchronized and non-synchronized youth (Nikolic, 2004). Synchronized youth is characterized by temporal and content coordination of achieving economic independence, permanent employment and family formation. Non-synchronized youth is determined by temporally and content-wise uncoordinated attainment of certain adult roles. Research has shown that the extent to which

an individual experiences a synchronized, i.e. a non-synchronized youth strongly influences the lifestyle, attitudes and attitude of the individual towards reality. In Western countries, youth is more or less a matter of choice. In transition countries, of which Macedonia has been a part for a long time, youth is subject to coercion. We are dominated by extorted, prolonged youth, that is, unsynchronized youth.

The transformation of youth depends on the degree of freedom in a society, reflected in the possibility of choosing values according to the existence of pluralistic offers, existing culture, quality of education, and conflicts in society. Social transition hinders the transformation that occurs in youth, especially when the transition does not appear alone, but along with various forms of armed conflict.

The question "What are young people like?" is often posed. This general question also results in the following two basic questions that are most frequently asked: "Are young people progressive?" and "Do young people introduce new values in society?" According to Šiber (1998) both questions should be answered negatively. According to him, the progressiveness of young people is the result of their focus on the future, which is a result of the interaction of the overall development of society and biological change. According to Šiber (1998), the main characteristic of young people is to choose the extreme solutions, and the content of those solutions is usually the result of existing conflicts in society. In a political and broader social context, young people choose the nuclei of the new (which may also be old) social functioning.

Respondents belong to the millennial generation, a generation that from its birth to the present day has been a witness to a series of social events that generate a sense of insecurity and unsafely. When all the events that took place in the period of growth and development of this generation are put together, it can be concluded that they refer to living in a society that is continuously at high risk from a security, economic and social aspect. In the "Study on Young People in the Republic of Macedonia" (Latkovikj et al., 2016), the following are the events that young people perceive as socially negative: the 2001 armed ethnic conflict in the country, the natural disasters in the country, the assassination of President Kiro Gligorov, the wars of the former Yugoslavia.

The survey on the expectations of the young people in the Republic of Macedonia, carried out in 2006 (Taleski et al. 2006) aims to give an overview of the perceptions of young people regarding the vital socio-economic, internal and external political issues, as well as issues in the spheres of education, migration, human rights. The general perception of the situation in the state, as well as the perception of the internal political situation, clearly demonstrates the state of lethargy among the youth, accompanied by mistrust towards the state institutions. These data are also confirmed in the more recent surveys conducted by the Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research (Cvetanova et al, Student Population Identities in the Republic of Macedonia, 2016; Topuzovska-Latkovikj et al, Study on Young People in the Republic of Macedonia, 2016; both of which were carried out in 2014). Research has shown that young people are usually not socially active, and those young people who are, members of political parties, a lesser number are members of non-governmental and sports organizations and the smallest number are members of professional organizations. Studies have shown that the percentage of students who answered that they are politically active have cited pragmatic reasons: employment, a better standard, protection, etc. The absence of political participation of young people is a current topic even for western democracies where there is a decline in the interest of young people, especially in being part of formal modes of political participation. Political scientist interprets this situation as a result of the disappointment and distrust towards political representatives and parties. Research in post-communist countries shows that young people are not satisfied with the institutions, and do not feel that their needs and demands are represented in the policies of their governments (Cvetanova et al, 2016).

However, it should be noted here that during the course of 2015, students in an informal way of organizing demonstrated social dissatisfaction through student protests and social networks activism. Nevertheless, apathy in students' behaviour can occur again if they lose trust again in the institutions of the Government that changed in 2017.

Regarding the education system, young people display dissatisfaction with the practical skills offered by the education system. There is scepticism about finding a job with the knowledge acquired from the existing education system. Young people do not believe that with

the continuation of the educational process they would find a better position in the Macedonian labour market. The educational system is perceived as an obsolete system that changes slowly.

Regarding political ideology, it transpired that among the student youth, born and raised in independent Macedonia and that broke away with socialist ideology inherent in the communist countries it is still dominated by socialist ideology characterized by collective responsibility, equal distribution of funds, non-conformism and expectation for the responsibility to be taken over by Government institutions. Namely, the results of applying the test that determines political morality based on morality (Morality Based Political Test,) indicated that 71% of students have socialist ideology (Markovikj, 2010).

It was noted that students adopt values needed and necessary for adaptive behaviour in conditions of liberalization of society (independence, resourcefulness, ambition), while at the same time values inherent in socialist society are still existent. The relative absence of the need for competition speaks of preference for collective responsibility and reduced civic initiative (Markovikj, 2010).

The established passiveness of young people regarding topics which concern them as citizens have reflected on shaping of the average personality profile.¹ The reflection of the existing culture in general, but of the political culture in particular, on a person's personality, can be seen through the representation of the average person profile obtained according to the five-factor personality model. This profile indicates that there is an absence of the need for inclusion in social action, and the reasons for their own dissatisfaction are projected to the outside (i.e. they are attributed to others, to institutions). There is a weaker expression of the personality trait of "Honesty", which points to sincerity and honesty, and yet the trait referring to the need to help others – "Altruism" is sufficiently pronounced. There is a reduced expression of the personality trait "Trust" (the belief that others are honest and well-intentioned is weaker). Low scores on the personality dimension of "Agreeableness" speak of the absence

¹ The average personality profile is obtained by calculating the arithmetic mean for each trait and dimension of NEO-PI-R, the person's inventory containing questions for each of the six personality traits determining a single (Terracino, 2005).

of civic initiative, the absence of the need for association and the achievement of common goals. The personality trait “Dutifulness” from the “Consciousness” dimension is also very pronounced, and it refers to behaviour guided by a sense of duty and consistency in accepting ethical principles. The high expression of the “Anxiety” trait (from the “Neuroticism” dimension) refers to a certain emotional instability which, in turn, finds its reflection in the low trust in others (low “Agreeableness”). Such an expression of the average personality profile² of the student is certainly not an indicator of established civic awareness in the young population in the Republic of Macedonia (Markovikj,2010).

² *Dimensions and facets of the Five Factor model of personality*

Dimensions/and facets		Main characteristics of the aspects of the dimensions
NEUROTICISM	H	
Anxiety	N1	fear, worry, tenseness
Hostility	N2	feeling of anger, frustration, irritation and bitterness
Depression	N3	feeling of guilt, despondency, helplessness and loneliness
Self-consciousness	N4	shyness, anxiousness, not feeling well when in contact with people, sensitiveness to gossip, tendency to feel inferior
Impulsiveness	N5	cannot control impulses and urges
Vulnerability	N6	susceptibility to stress, weak capacity
EXTRAVERSION	E	
Warmth	E1	emotional, friendly, easily forms emotional relationships
Gregariousness	E2	social, preference for the company of other people
Assertiveness	E3	dominating, powerful, social ascendancy
Activity	E4	fast pace of living, energetic movements, a tendency to constantly do something
Excitement seeking	E5	passion for excitement and stimulation
Positive emotions	E6	tendency to experience positive emotions, such as: happiness, love and excitement
OPENNESS TO EXPERIENCE	O	
Fantasy	O1	lively imagination, regular daydreaming as a way of creating an interesting inner world
Aesthetics	O2	appreciation of beauty and art
Feelings	O3	receptiveness towards own emotions, valuing and deeply reliving the experience

Five-factor Personality Model/The Big Five and Political Behaviour

The five-factor personality model (the Big Five) distinguishes itself from the rest because it is not based on any personality theory, but is based on language analysis, the natural system in which people communicate in order to understand one another (McCrae, Costa 1992). The five-factor model assumes the existence of five basic dimensions that lie in the basis of the personality traits, and are obtained by analysing the language, that is, the attributes used in everyday speech for naming personality traits, as well as data obtained through the application of psychological measuring instruments. The model starts from the

Actions	O4	openness to trying out different activities, a preference to experience something new
Ideas	O5	intellectual curiosity, open-mindedness, looks forward to new unconventional ideas
Values	O6	openness to new opportunities/values
AGREEABLENESS	A	
Trust	A1	belief in the sincerity and good intentions of other people
Straightforwardness	A2	sincerity, honesty, chastity
Altruism	A3	constant concern for the welfare of others, unselfishness, willingness to help others
Compliance	A4	inhibition of aggression, respect for others, tendency to forgive and forget
Modesty	A5	modesty, reservation
Tender-mindedness	A6	attitude of sympathy and concern for other people, emphasizing the humane aspects in social policy
CONSCIENTIOUSNESS	C	
Competence	C1	belief in own self efficacy, strength, ability, self confidence
Order	C2	cleanliness, orderliness, good personal organization
Dutifulness	C3	behavior driven by sense of responsibility, acceptance of the ethical principles
Achievement Striving	C4	high level of ambition, readiness to work hard to achieve a particular goal
Self-Discipline	C5	capacity to begin tasks and follow through to their completion
Deliberation	C6	tendency to carefully think things through before taking any kind of action

concept of hierarchical structure of personality traits. The basic five factors are named as domains and behavioural dimensions that can be grouped in different ways.

- Neuroticism is the dimension that distinguishes the adaptability and emotional stability from inadequacy and emotional instability;
- Extraversion is second dimension that refers to social relations, to social life;
- Openness is third dimension referring to aesthetic sensitivity, intellectual curiosity, intraceptiveness, need for change, independent thinking, preferences of diversity, i.e. inclination to non-dogmatic attitudes;
- Agreeableness is a dimension of interpersonal relations. It involves trust, compassion, the need to help others versus cynicism, selfishness and antagonism. The narrower aspects are trust, sincerity, altruism, modesty;
- Conscientiousness is the ability of self-control as disciplined direction for the realization of set goals, as well as adherence to one's own principles. It manifests itself through the processes of planning, organization, execution of duties and obligations.

Mondak and Halperin (2008) point out that the change in research in the domain of political science occurs owing to the research in the field of personality psychology where several factor models appear. Of these, the five-factor model is best known. The series of research in the field of political science has resulted in data indicating that all five personality dimensions (according to the five-factor model) have a certain connection with certain aspects of political behaviour. The relationship between personality and political behaviour, according to the authors, should be considered in two respects. The first aspect is that differences in personality can directly affect different forms of political behaviour, for example: manner of voting, political attitudes, strength of identification with certain political parties, etc. The second aspect is that differences in personality can lead to indirect, situational effects on political behaviour. Recent research in psychology suggests that situational factors, such as the threat to society's security, influence the way of political reasoning.

Data from the surveys in the domain of studying political behaviour through the connection with personality dimensions have shown that the basic political predispositions are deeply rooted in the personality. The data has shown that the personality dimensions 'Openness to new experiences' and 'Consciousness' are related to important political predispositions and attitudes. It has been demonstrated that 'Openness' is negatively linked to identification with conservatism as an ideology, and a positive connection has been made between the indicated ideology and the personality trait –“Consciousness”. Persons with high expressiveness of the 'Consciousness' dimension have a sense of obligation to be good citizens and thus to participate in society.

“Conscientiousness” is the personality dimension that includes disposition to be safe, organized and accurate, as well as to work hard and be diligent. People with a high level of conscientiousness usually excel in school and at the workplace. It has been shown that the dimension pointing to emotional stability (Neuroticism) influences the attitude towards political rights. Namely, the persons who are calm and secure are advocates of the politics of equality. “Agreeableness” has proven to be positively related to interpersonal trust and trust in politics.

Relation of the personality dimensions Agreeableness and Conscientiousness to the participation in the student organization of UKIM students

Institute for sociological, political and juridical research (ISPJR)- Skopje in May 2017 conducted research on 669 students from State University Ss. Cyril and Methodius (UKIM). The topic of this research was: “Perception of student participation in student organization at the University of “Ss. Cyril and Methodius” (SPUKIM)”. The research was conducted with quota sample in first phase and convenience sampling in second. Male students were 33,2% and female 61,8%. Respondents were students from 1 till 4 year from almost all faculties which constitute UKIM. Used measuring instruments were Questionnaire with 25 questions designed for the purpose of the research to examine the student's attitude toward their organization, Subscale for Social Justice Motive

part of Moralism Scale (Sheikh, 2014), IPIP NEO (Goldberg, 1992) and Two scales of Laponce questionnaire (importance and satisfaction) which measure minority effect, only for the role of student (2004).

For the purpose of this research, two scales were used that measure two personality dimensions Conscientiousness and Agreeableness from the version of IPIP NEO personality test containing 50 items, which represents a brief measure of the Big Five Personality Dimensions (Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Neuroticism and Openness). In this form of the test, each dimension is defined with 10 items. This test uses the “Big Five Factor markers” contained in the International Personality Item Pool, developed and constructed by Goldberg (1992). This test is taken from the “Possible Questionnaire Format for Administering the 50-Item Set of IPIP Big-Five Factor Markers” (International Personality Item Pool.<http://ipip.ori.org/New_IPIP-50-item-scale.htm). The test contains 50 items ranked on a five-step scale where “1” is “very inaccurate”, “3” is neutral “neither true nor false” and “5” is “very inaccurate”.

The items were translated into Macedonian and the basic metrical features of the two scales were checked (Agreeableness and Conscientiousness).

The items were translated into Macedonian and the basic metrical features (Agreeableness and Conscientiousness) of the two scales were checked.

The Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient indicating the internal reliability of scales for the scale measuring the Agreeableness dimension is 0.79, and for the Conscientiousness scale it is 0.82. These coefficients indicate high reliability on both scales.

In order to determine, whether the items have the capacity to differentiate the respondents with regard to the degree of possessing the quality being measured, the Pearson correlation coefficient statistic was applied, and the items scores were correlated to the summary score on the scale for both scales: Agreeableness and Conscientiousness.

Table 1. Values of the Pearson correlation coefficient of the item scores and the summary score of the scales: Agreeableness and Conscientiousness

Scale Agreeableness										
Items	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
r	0,59**	0,62**	0,45**	0,72**	0,56**	0,51**	0,66**	0,67**	0,63**	0,51**
Scale Conscientiousness										
Items	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
r	0,50**	0,69**	0,47**	0,69**	0,64**	0,70**	0,69**	0,64**	0,60**	0,60**

**p < 0.01

These data show that there is a correlation between the score of each item with the summary score of a scale on level 0.01, confirming the discrimination of items. It turned out that both scales (Agreeableness and Conscientiousness) correlate at level of 0.01 ($p = 0.310$).

By using the Principal Component Analysis, which determines how many factors the scale consists of, it has been found that each of the scales determines or satiates one dominant factor.

Table 2. Component/factor values obtained when applying the Principal Component Analysis statistics.

Collaboration(items)	Component	Conscientiousness(items)	Component
1	,574	1	,492
2	,629	2	,678
3	,421	3	,437
4	,731	4	,690
5	,533	5	,657
6	,476	6	,694
7	,666	7	,706
8	,696	8	,601
9	,657	9	,617
10	,525	10	,612

Given the obtained data, it can be said that the two scales have solid metric characteristics that allows their use in further research.

The minimum score that can be obtained on the Conscientiousness scale and the Agreeableness scale is 10, and the maximum is 50. The minimum obtained score on the Agreeableness scale is 16 and the maximum is 50. On the Conscientiousness scale the minimum score is 19 and the maximum is 50. The arithmetic mean for the Agreeableness scale is 38.07, and on the Conscientiousness scale it is 37.6. Both arithmetic means are above the 50th percentile, which would indicate average expression of both dimensions in the sample respondents.

Students are noticed to have a less pronounced degree in the Conscientiousness that manifests itself through a lower degree of self-organization, insufficient perseverance and motivation to achieve a goal, as well as weaker ambition and self-control.

As an illustration, the following image is a demonstration of how generally students are familiar with the work of SPUKIM.




Figure 1. Familiarization with the work of SPUKIM

The high 60% and the low 11.3% speak of the significantly low level of familiarization with the operation of SPUKIM, in which, in fact, undergraduate students enrolled at UKIM are members.

This weak expression of information about the work of SPUKIM speaks about the relative absence of a built attitude towards SPUKIM. Precisely such a situation where there is a grouping of the largest number of respondents in one category makes it impossible to further analyse the relationship of personality dimensions with the degree and valence of

the attitudes that students have with respect to SPUKIM, which has also been shown when applying locking statistics.

The research data have shown that one can notice a significant change in the expression of the Agreeableness dimension among students depending on the year of studies. As the number of years of study increases, the expression of the dimension also increases, which indicates that in the course of sharing common experiences students have intensified feeling of confidence in colleagues and readiness to assist ($r = 0.102$, $p < 0.05$).

The respondents demonstrated a weak, yet indicative connection between the Conscientiousness dimension and the answer to the question "How well are you familiar with the Law on Higher Education?" ($r = 0.131$, $p < 0.05$) and the answers to the question "Would you like to be better informed about the work of student representatives?" ($r = 0.105$, $p < 0.05$). This direction of answering corresponds to the manifestation of the Conscientiousness dimension. Persons with a more intense expression of the Conscientiousness dimension need to be more fully informed about the areas of action for which they need to communicate their opinion. It is interesting that there was higher information on the Law on Higher Education than on the documents of the UKIM student organization. This issue raises the question of availability of SPUKIM documents to its membership.

The relation of the Conscientiousness dimension is noted only in the answers to the two issues mentioned above.

Concerning the Agreeableness dimension, the relation is determined in connection to the answers to the question "Have you participated in an informal association of students until now?" Students with more pronounced co-operation show greater readiness and participation in informal association of students ($r=0.114$, $p < 0.01$). This connection is to be expected, since those with the more pronounced Agreeableness dimension tend to show solidarity with the people who experience empathy.

The general conclusion from this research points to the weak connection between the personality dimensions of "Conscientiousness" and "Agreeableness" and the students' attitudes about their belonging to the UKIM student organization. In a further in-depth study, it might be possible to continue the study of the relationship between the

other three personality dimensions (Openness, Neuroticism and Extroversion) and the attitudes on student organization.

On this occasion it should be noted that the students are very poorly informed about the existence and operation of SPUKIM, as well as that there is poorly expressed initiative for suggesting, initiating or participating in organized activities supported by SPUKIM.

On the basis of the obtained data, an impression is created of separation of the person from the events in the environment in which it exists, and for students this means inclusion in higher education, or expressed in other terms, students do not perceive themselves as citizens, members of the academic environment, even though they are such according to their social role.

These data are in favour of the previously presented findings from other studies that point to the absence of a participatory political culture among students.

Degree of integration of the social role student in society

Laponce (2004) constructed an instrument by which he identified the relationship of individuals to the social roles they have in society, and in doing so, he sees this relationship as multidimensional, including the following:

=> solidarity with the members of the various social roles

=> mutual interests with the members of the various social roles

=> difficulties in changing different social roles

=> significance of the members of the social roles for the individual

=> opinion on the degree of satisfaction of individuals belonging to specific social roles on how they are treated in a society.

Laponce connects (intersects) the last two dimensions (the significance of the social role and the degree of satisfaction of the individual having a defined social role with the treatment by the state) and talks about the degree of integration of these social roles in society. Namely, he

places the significance of the social roles for the individual and the opinion on the degree of satisfaction of individuals belonging to certain social roles in a coordinate system with satisfaction as abscissa and significance as ordinate. The four squares are separated by a middle zone of relative neutrality covering the middle scores from the Likert scale (in this study the Likert scale is determined by 5 degrees). The four squares obtained with the coordinate system Laponce names as Square I – integration zone, Square S – stress zone, Square M – peaceful zone, and Square P – potential problemszone.




Figure 4. Graphical presentation of the zones defined by the dimensions “significance of the social role” and “satisfaction with the treatment by the state”

Square “I” includes individuals who consider that social role as important and perceives the members of that group as generally satisfied with the way they are treated in society. “S” includes those individuals who perceive that social role as important, but at the same time, the individual believes that the members of that group are generally dissatisfied with the way they are treated within the state. Such positioning of roles can be stressful for the individuals who belong to that social role. Square “M” includes individuals who consider that social role as not important to them, although the members are satisfied with their treatment in society. In square “P”

are those individuals for whom that social role is not important, but the members of those groups are assessed as dissatisfied with the treatment by society.

In this research, students were asked two questions that correspond to the two dimensions of Laponce. The first (significance of social role) refers to the importance of students, members of the UKIM student organization (the question was: “How important are to you personally the students from the UKIM student organization?”), and the second (the degree of satisfaction with the treatment of a social role in society) refers to how much they were satisfied with the manner the state treats the student, members of the UKIM student organization (the question in the questionnaire was “How much do you think students from the UKIM student’s organization are satisfied with how they are treated in this country?”).




Figure 5. Graphical presentation of the zones defined by the dimensions “importance of social role” and “satisfaction with the treatment by the state”

As can be seen from the graph shown: 19% of the students are in the P zone, which is a zone of unimportance for the role of being a student belonging to the UKIM student organization (they answer the first question that students from the UKIM organization are not personally significant) combined with the opinion that students from the UKIM organization are dissatisfied with the way this social role is treated by

the state. 13% of students perceive this social role as important and are dissatisfied with its treatment by the state, which places them in Square S, that is, in the zone of stress. Almost the same percentage represents those who have the experience that they are satisfied with the role and that the treatment by the state (zone I) and those to whom the role is of no significance, and consider the treatment by the state appropriate for this social role (zone M). The remaining 58.8% of the surveyed students are in the middle zone, the zone of relative neutrality.

Conclusion

These data point to the conclusion that certain student activism can occur in cases when those students who are in Zone P will become aware of the importance of the student role (meaning that students from the UKIM student organization will begin to be personally important to them, and they will remain dissatisfied with the treatment by the state). The very important finding is that only 4,3% of respondents have expressed that they are satisfied with the treatment of the social role student in student organisation (SPUKIM) and for whom the role student in student organisation is important. Only these 4.3% of respondents perceive their role as a student of SPUKIM as a well integrated role in society.

The main important finding from this research is the weak expression of information about the work of SPUKIM (61.6% are not familiar with SPUKIM). Such a situation where there is a grouping of the largest number of respondents in one category makes further analysis impossible regarding the relationship of personality dimensions with the degree and valence of the attitudes that students have with respect to SPUKIM, which has also been identified when person coefficient of correlation was applied. There is direct weak connection between the personality dimensions of Conscientiousness and Agreeableness and the students' attitudes about their belonging to the UKIM student organization.

There is no connection between the personality dimensions and the four categories of grouping according to the significance and satisfaction of the social treatment of the role "student-member of student organization".

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HUMAN RESOURCES TRENDS AND CHALLENGES¹

Abstract

The significance and role of human resources management has evidently increased in the last decades of the 20th century, and this trend has continued in the 21st century. Human resources management has been put in the same plane with finance and technology. In this area, a major change occurred when the role and the importance of the human resources department changed from a purely administrative-analytical role to the role of the department that became a consultant and partner at the same time to other departments in the company. The next challenge was to put all these specifics into an international framework and adapt to new managerial and marketing orientations. This made investment in human capital very important.

In recent years, the trend of major changes in the global economy has been brought by many new elements and changes in human resources management. Companies are forced to focus on better organization, governance, development and the importance of human resources. Due to the rapid advancement of technology that changes the “rules of business”, individuals are forced to adapt more quickly, but organizations do not change so quickly. For these reasons, it has become important to highlight several new elements, such as

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the speed of adaptation to computing, the focus on work experience and employee knowledge, performance management, a new model of leadership, digitization of work and equity at work. For these reasons, human resource management has become significant for all managers in the context of the strategic leading of the organization. In addition to these microeconomic factors, other factors such as globalization, migration and demographic change are very important. All this requires an approach to human resource management that implies “smart work”.

Keywords: human resources, trends, challenges, digitalization, globalization, talent, leadership

Introduction

Today, in business operations, human resources management appears as one of the most important issues. The most developed countries of the world have built their own human resource management models at the end of the eighth decade of the 20th century. In this respect, the quality of each employee, such as knowledge and skills, motivation, persistence are placed in the forefront. The experience of European, Japanese and American multinational companies has greatly enhanced knowledge and deepened research, which clearly indicates that the human factor is an irreplaceable element of every organizational system. Since companies are competitors in the international market, it is clear that multinational companies are most interested in selecting and retaining high-quality human resources, increasing knowledge and talents in organizing, supporting and improving the performance of tasks at all levels. The initial change in the domain of human rights management occurred when the significance and role of the human resources management department changed, from a purely administrative-analytic role to the role of the department that became an advisor and partner at the same time to other departments in the company. In fact, then, strategic management of human resources was transferred. Within the Human Resources Department, the position of employees falls into one of two categories, both generalist

and specialist. Generalists provide support to employees directly by providing answers to their questions, complaints and projects. They can deal with all aspects of HR work, but they must have a wide range of knowledge. Experts, on the other hand, work on a specific task and are on a specific function of human resources (Obedgiu, 2017).

The next challenge was to put these specifics into an international framework and adapt to new managerial and marketing orientations. This has made investment in human capital very important. Terms such as ethnocentric, polycentric, geocentric and regiocentric type of employees appeared (Maksimović 2004, p. 38-41). This complex area became even more complex.

Globalization and human resources management

Globalization is an old term that has survived in the time of the “new economy”. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the constitution of the Washington Consensus, the last phase of globalization begins, the third phase of internationalization. This last stage of internationalization also includes the notion of regionalization and broad expansion. In this context, globalization is inevitable, it is a reality, and it is only a matter of how to deal with it. It is justifiable to ask, is it possible and how to manage it intelligently and rationally? In any case, today almost all societies in the world are moving towards a commercial mode of business and based on these principles their economic development. Globalization is a process that involves the expansion, intensification, and overall enhancement of political and economic activities. The most famous term in the context of globalization is economic (trade) liberalization, a term with which one should be cautious, as it often leads researchers to misinterpretation of globalization (Maksimović, Petrović, 2017). However, for globalization, the most important are multinational companies that transfer knowledge, capital, goods, but in recent times and cultural influences, and in this respect, respecting the cultures of the countries they come in. Organizational form in literature and practice is characterized as a network of “specialization confederations”, characterized by flexibility, pronounced specialty and management relationships that deliver quick responses to changes in technology, competition and consumer demand. There are several other names such as “network organization”, “strategic network”,

“network management”, all of which are mostly characterized by an informal social system (which is contrary to bureaucratic strategic structures) within the enterprise and responsible relationships between them (De Cieri, Fenwick, 1998, Maksimović, 2004, pp. 4-5) Thus, strategic human resource management should be integrated into the company’s strategy, but also the strategic needs of people who converge together into strategic activities of multinational companies (MNEs) and thus affect global interests and the goals of these enterprises (Schuler 1996). In the strategic management of HRM, task division is carried out among cross-functional, fully responsible teams. Thus tasks will be executable, because even the best-conceived corporate strategies fail when the organization lacks the capability to execute those strategies.

In the literature there are different definitions of human resources management and international human resources management. Thus, the definition of human resources management includes human resources management, policies and practices that the company uses to achieve greater competitiveness on the market; but also all the changing forces (among others, new competitors, new technologies, business restructuring, legal and social factors) that the organization must recognize and respond to their challenges in order to ensure their own position and competitiveness over a longer period of time (Schuler, 2000). The second definition relates to international human resources management and includes the first dimension - which makes “people’s procurement”, allocation and use (which can include planning, selection of assessments, training development, compensation and labor relations); the second dimension - made up of the type of country from which the employee originates (the home country of the company headquarters, the host country where one of the branches and other countries can be the source of work or financing) and the third dimension - which includes types of employees (employed nationality of the home country, employees the nationality of the host country where the branch is located and the employed nationality of a third country) (Dowling, Welch, Schuler, 1999). More and more global businesses can not underestimate these specificities that make up complex international business operations.

The intensification of linking human resources globally has been prompted by low labor costs that have become available, lack of talent

in individual countries, consumer growth in developing countries, technological advances that have led to a diversity of workforce around the world. The global human resources departments must form global data bases that will contain all the necessary information about employees (salaries, benefits, benefits, ethnic, cultural, full membership). Thus, human resources professionals can have a reliable insight on the basis of which they can track changes and make decisions at strategic levels. By analyzing data, business analysts get professional insights and make fact-based decisions. Different components, mutually dependent, can be classified into main subsystems: data warehousing, data analysis, data obtained and information delivery system, which will be further forwarded to users who will make business decisions based on the insight of the results. Globalization has led to diversity in the workplace, because many cultures and ethnic groups come together, so that they have diverse identities, and this can bring benefits and benefits to the organization. Different cultural groups can think differently and with a more convincing alternative, they can foster the development of language skills, and, therefore, allow the organization to define new processes for coping with challenges (Kapoor, Sherif, 2012, Sparrow, & Brewster, 2006).

The scope of labor and labor relations has become increasingly demanding and uncertain. The literature outlines some of the major challenges facing organizations, such as globalization, consumer demand, revenue growth and cost savings, constant change and transformation, technology deployment and the attraction and development of human capital. While technology, production processes and products can be copied, human resource management can not be copied, and it makes a unique competitive advantage. The HRM practice influences employees' skills by leading to the development of human capital, influencing training, motivation and the design of work, as highly motivated and qualified employees can use what they know in their work. Thus organizational peculiarity is crucial, difficult for imitation, and in the long term profitable (Burke, Cooper, 2006, p. 3-4).

Trends and challenges in human resources management

In recent years, the trends of major changes in the global economy have led to a multitude of news in human resource management. Companies are forced to focus on better organization, governance, development and the importance of human resources. Due to the rapid advancement of technology that changes “business rules”, individuals are forced to adapt quickly, but organizations do not change so quickly. For these reasons it has become important to highlight several new elements, such as:

- *Information technology development* - intensified use of the Internet and digitization of work, business operations take place in a different way than in the previous decades. This increases the burden and responsibility of employees, develops new skills of employees and companies that lead to work flexibility. In addition, there is a claim that organizations and employees need to increase their efforts in understanding how to use the IT sector to provide comprehensive information on better employment. From this, organizations and employees would benefit, such as innovation and more efficient decision-making. People are also very exposed to IT technologies in everyday life, and should use this information as much as possible in their organizations (Limburg, Diana, 2014). Globalization is intensified by the development of cheap and easily usable technologies, thanks to which people can co-operate, compete, share knowledge, share work and ideas. This global platform also works as an incentive because it develops global thinking. Multinational companies must learn to integrate diverse value systems and support common global work values in order to enable workers to communicate and coordinate their activities so that they achieve common goals. However, there are still a small number of people who are willing or able to move and work abroad. (Kapoor, Sherif, 2012).

The use of robotics and robots in businesses is a major challenge that businesses will need to face. Still robots have not entered the mass use because they are very expensive, but when their value is reduced, their wider application is expected. What was in the United States at the beginning of the nineteenth century, that workers were worried that machines would replace their work, in a way is similar to robots at the

beginning of the 21st century, where they fear that they will endanger jobs. When robots are accessible to wider masses, when their mode of use is easily justified, only then can waves of workers who are out of work, and it may also be shown that the institutions are not ready for such challenges. Exemptions from the market are happening much faster than in the past, and displaced and discouraged workers will be more than before (Joerres, 2016).

- *Work flexibility* - was created due to de-industrialization and virtualization that affected both the field of work. Deindustrialization implies a reduction in the number of employees in industries in many countries, and a certain percentage of employees have flexible working hours, and the number of part-time workers has increased. Virtualization of work implies that work can be done via electronic media, without taking into account the place where it takes place, but it also involves working in virtual teams. At the center of this approach are activities, in the other plan is the choice of tools, environment, time and place for work (De Leede, Kraijenbrink, 2014). Engaged in certain activities are paid “by work” and this represents a kind of mobility and decentralization of work.


- *Talent Management* - beginning of the 21st century, talent management is in the focus of human resource research. In short, identification, retention and further work on the potentials of talented employees means identification. Strategic talent management can be defined as activities and processes that involve the systematic identification of key positions that differently contribute to the sustainable competitive advantage of the organization, the development of a database of highly talented potential and highly successful executives in order to facilitate the filling of these positions with competent fusers and to ensure their continued commitment to the organization. In addition to education, performance is influenced by the abilities, motivation and capabilities of employees, which indicates a higher level of individual performance (Collings, 2014, Collings, Mellahi, 2009). Talented employees are mainly referenced to key positions in an enterprise in the country, and in the case of MNEs, they refer to such positions abroad.

- *Global mobility* - is part of many global talent management systems for many MNEs, and until recently these two areas have been separated. In the last decade, they are viewed as merged due to the

global management of human talents in focus and its impact on the achievements of strategic MNEs. For example, the eviction of a citizen from the place where the parent company's head office is located, in a branch to improve the productivity of employees in the branch, which is culturally remote from the company's headquarters. Therefore, global mobility has been put into the center of global talent management strategy in MNEs. For example, permanent transfers of employees to rotational tasks: long-term tasks (3-5 years) and short-term tasks (business tasks less than a year) are carried out in order to accomplish some organizational goal. MNEs set a human capital requirement depending on the business scope of the organization in the geographic area. For many economies that expand their business, such as BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and MIST (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey), there is a need for human capital that is able to function effectively in the cultural and geographical remote markets (Collings, 2014). In addition, employees face a changed local culture, a culture under whose influence employees live and work, which has an impact on how employees will behave. It is exactly the influence on cultural factors that makes multinational companies easier or harder to adapt to working together. In addition, the programs of continuous training and education programs contribute to the increase in the educational level of employees.

- *A new model of leadership* - implies a focus on work experience and employee knowledge, performance management, and equal treatment of employees with respect to individual differences. However, the role of the leader is to demonstrate the ability to diagnose business challenges and turn them into opportunities. Leadership is a significant ability of an organization that has employees, customers, investors as it will gain more value for the company. Then, leadership is based on results, on how the results are identified and how they are delivered (Leadership code). This identification of leadership is a task of the human resources department. Within the leader code, five rules have been developed: Rule 1 - shaping the future as a stratagem, Rule 2 - making things happen as an executor's work, rule 3. - engaging today's talented talent managers, Rule 4 - building or creating the next generation, which is the task of human resources managers and rule 5. investing in yourself as part of personal expertise (Ulrich, Smallwood, 2011). These rules are shown in Scheme 1.

Scheme 1. Leadership Code - Five Rules for Leading



Source: According to Ulrich, Smallwood, 2011, Ulrich, Smallwood, Sweetman (2008) p.14.

Selected employees for leadership positions usually have predispositions, but there are those who, through training, education and experience, reach those positions. For these reasons, Ulrich proposes a formula for developing leaders, a 50% rigorous and careful learning through work assignments, 30% innovative application-based training based on results, and 20% learning from life experience. In addition, the physical and emotional stability of the leader (self-awareness, dealing with difficult decisions, humor, continuous learning) can affect other employees to feel that way (Ulrich, 2008). Leaders should behave like parents in the best sense. Simply, today it is not possible to say: "Here are my rules and follow them." You need to have a role model that constantly shows responsibility, and this kind of leadership is a very exhausting job. It must constantly be in front, said in the language of the technique, "the flyer goes faster, and you need to go even faster" (Joerres, 2016, p.79).

- Physical and mental health - many literature and official acts of the International Labor Organization and similar institutions

are considering this issue. However, translated into the language of the company today, this indicates that physical and mental health is needed so that employees can engage in rapid changes and show adaptability. Namely, by analyzing the mode of operation today, the great dynamics of the changes are evident, and hence the ability to quickly respond to changes (for example, locations) which in fact is a kind of competitive advantage. Communication is then part of the strategy of motivation, but it is much more significant and more difficult than before. Because of this, emotionality is important because employees can feel like they are constantly repressed, so the leader should communicate in a consistent and authentic way to make that feeling appear (Joerres, 2016).

- *Sustainability of human resources* - rapid industrial growth in the second half of the 20th century has resulted in degradation of the environment and the natural environment. Linking the concept of human resources and environmental management has led to sustainability that has become a new paradigm. Environmental management through human resources has become a popular activity for various industrial enterprises. Sustainable environmental development is a development that ensures that current and future generations meet their needs and therefore must be a priority. This includes three types of sustainability, i.e. (1) ecological sustainability - the ability of the environment to maintain a certain level of environmental quality; (2) economic sustainability - the ability of the economy to support a certain level of economic production; and (3) social sustainability - the ability of the social system to function at the level of social well-being and harmony. Sustainable Human Resource Management helps the organization achieve sustainability through the development of human resources policy, strategies and practices that support the economic, social and environmental perspective. Despite the available models for sustainable human resources management, companies have yet to make their contribution, and human resources specialists can take part in adopting and establishing green policies that can have positive results and effects on perception (Pavitra, 2013). For these reasons, human resources management has become significant for all managers in the context of strategic leadership of the organization. In addition to these microeconomic factors, there are other factors, such as demographic changes and migratory

movements. Demographic changes include increasing aging of the population, increased employment of women, but also an evident problem of youth unemployment. The aging of the population and the workforce is the phenomenon that developed countries face. Europe and Japan have the oldest population, while Africa has the youngest. Fertility in most of the most developed economies is below the replacement rate, and the smallest population is in India, while China is the most populated country. From such a structure it is necessary to identify employees who are ready to deal with work tasks, which today require an increased level of specific knowledge. Migration, however, involves changing the place of residence of a certain number of people, in the short or longer term, in search of better living and working conditions. Two types of knowledge are transmitted with migration: explicit and taciturn. Explicit knowledge is systematic and can be easily communicated and shared with others in the form of a product specification, a scientific formula, or a computer program. Tacitly knowing, however, he resides in people, is the result of experience and represents informal skills that can be reduced to the term “knowhow” (Tung, 2016, p.147).

The main features of today’s work are flexibility, adaptability and organizational efficiency. For these reasons, a strict hierarchy and centralization of operations is lost, because the command and control do not encourage innovation and agility. Today’s adaptation has become a key issue for businesses, although it is not easily achievable. In addition, the adequacy of the institutions to respond to unemployment needs to be innovated, the models of social insurance have changed (they are different than after the Second World War). Sometimes it worked differently, it took longer to hire people in one company, find it easier to find a new job, wait a little longer for employment. It is also necessary to transform Universities in order to give an adequate response to new models of labor and labor relations in general (Joerres, 2016).

These trends are characterized by today’s human resources management at the global level and represent a challenge for most companies operating in the international business arena. They point out that the field of human resources management has developed most rapidly at the end of the XX and the beginning of the 21st century, that it has completely new demands and expectations from

the employees. The organization of the enterprise and corporate culture evolved and thus gained a completely new meaning and form that became the imperative of competitiveness.

Conclusion

Globalization has become a reality that can not be avoided, but like every process has its own positive and negative sides. Multinational assumptions play an important role in it, but only those that are able to adapt to change, adapt to the uncertain conditions of the global labor market. Such companies can attract, develop and retain high-quality employees and are highly likely to survive and succeed at the global level of competition. These companies need their human resources to prepare for diversity, collaborative assessment of opportunities, learning, in order to contribute to the success of their companies. Management of employees from culturally diverse backgrounds, geographically dispersed, is a key goal of global human resources. The demand for talented employees is growing in developed and developing countries, and openness to cultural diversity is very important. The global workforce is networked, which has facilitated the development of information technology, which has supported the work of multicultural and virtual teams. Global mobility and flexible modes appeared at the very end of the 20th century in response to changes in the organization of the company. Cultural and religious traditions, level of commitment, repatriation issues, talent management, motivation issues, change the context of work, and lead to a review of current HR policies and practices. The issue of virtualization and talent management has led to a new form of leadership based on knowledge and competencies. Physical and mental health, as well as the sustainability of human resources today have become non-oblique topics in the study of human resources. Each individual has become responsible for conserving nature and in charge of protecting his environment, because the survival of the planet of the country depends on this.

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**NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
LEGISLATIVE ARCHITECTURE:
LOSERS OF SLOW ADAPTERS IN THE EU INTEGRATION
PROCESS?**

Abstract

The role of national parliaments as key institutions in the system of representative democracy has been seriously questioned with the creation of the European community that lead to re-allocation of decision-making processes to new supra-national arenas of collective decision-making. National parliaments, being traditionally political and democratic institutions, started losing their competences, keeping at the same time their electoral function on domestic levels, thus being fairly depicted as representation without real power and competence. EU Membership imposed sever boundaries on the political autonomy on national parliaments. Gradually increased regulatory powers on European policies placed the power in the hands of Brussels bureaucrats at the detriment of the democratically elected representatives in the national states. The monopolization of legislation in the European affairs by the executive made national parliaments plain verifiers of a legislation that was created elsewhere and submitted to them for approval. The complexity of EU decision-making and the increasing number of actors involved in the centralized power in the executive has shadowed the golden era of parliamentarism among in the national parliaments of EU Member States de-parliamentarizing national parliaments. With the Lisbon Treaty, national parliaments have been practically moved from the margins of decision-making

and placed in the EU policy creation process, although its entering into force has not fully repositioned them as key actors in the EU decision-making triangle. Re-parliamentarisation process emerged as inevitable phenomenon that helped national parliaments, to some extent, to return part of their competences as means to restore the link demos-parliament. This paper analyses the transformation phases of national parliaments and their participation models, their reaction and adaptation to the new EU institutional set-up after the Lisbon Treaty.

Keywords: de-parliamentarisation, re-parliamentarisation, national parliaments, EU decision-making.

De-parliamentarisation process

The role of national parliaments as key institutions in the system of representative democracy has been seriously put into questions with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community. The reconciliation process to go beyond the socio-cultural “engine” of promotion of Westphalian state from the 18-20th century and the cultural identification of the individual with the state, the nation and shaping of the concept of nationality (Ristova-Asterud 2013: 140) caused re-allocation of politics to supra-national arenas on European soil lacking formal electoral authorization and electoral accountability, created a system of power without appropriate representation in terms of democratic legitimacy (Hupe and Edwards 2012: 185). The competences of the European Union have been gradually increased in the past decades, to the detriment of the prerogatives of national parliaments that have been proportionally decreased until the beginning of the 1990-ties (Cygan, 2011: 480).

This has de facto marked the start of the era of de-parliamentarisation and undoubtedly labeled national parliaments as losers or real victims of integration (O’Brennan and Raunio, 2007: 8). The decreased legitimacy from the 50-ties until the 90-ties in the previous century, has led to lower electoral turnout, diminished the identification of parties and their recognizing features of appropriate participation in the EU-related processes. The fact that national parliaments, as traditionally political and democratic institutions lost competences

in the decision-making, and at the same time struggled to maintain their electoral representative function on domestic level, thus creating the image of representation without proper power and competence. In such conditions, the sensitive and pragmatic decision-making processes became unpopular and almost impossible. Lamenting over the loss of legislative competences occurred when comparing golden parliamentarism era in Britain and France, the fall of legislative powers one noticed in the growing power of parties, and the limited power of parliamentarians (Christopher, 2013). The balance of power shifted from Honourables (Manin, 1997) to the executive. Legislation in the EU affairs got monopolized by the executive and parliaments became mere rubber-stumpers of legislation created elsewhere.

Europeanization and de-parliamentarisation

According to the de-parliamentarisation thesis, the development of European integration was the main precursor for the diminution of parliamentary oversight over the executive on constitutional basis, with the legally enabled jurisdiction of part of national legislation to a European level. Practically speaking, the centralized technical expertise in the EU decision-making processes made Brussels bureaucrats and private interests on all levels of government to become winners of the European integration. The research made on national policies and the influence on the EU go in favor of the de-parliamentarisation thesis and being a mere result of the so-called Europeanisation, which shifted the direction and policy creation to the level that political and economic dynamic of EC has become part of the organizational logic of national policies (Berman and Damgaard, 2000); (Kassim, Peters and Wright, 2000); (Wessels, Maurer, Mittag, 2003).

The process of European integration imposed authorization to some national institutions to the detriment of decreased ones of others, i.e. the European integration has strengthened national governments and the main users of this Europeanized portfolio fell in the hands of prime-ministers, ministers and civil servants dealing with EU affairs in the line ministries. National authorities used the European institutions to strengthen their autonomy versus other national actors (parliaments). The dominant position of national governments within the frames of domestic and European politics has been one of the key reasons for

decreased influence of parliaments in all phases of decision-making regarding EU affairs, and turned on the de-parliamentarisation process. Another aspect of Europeanization and in favor of de-parliamentarisation is the creation of lobby groups on national level, which “by-passed” national governments and parliaments to accomplish their own interests on European level that came out of the frames of control of national governments in policy-making.

Limited influence in the EU affairs

The EU membership imposed soft, but rather severe boundaries on the political autonomy of member states and their national parliaments. The houses of the democratically elected representatives turned into voting machines of EU legislation that very often was not well considered or no real interest was shown by parliamentarians. The increase of regulatory and administrative competences on European policies has simply increased the power of Brussels over parliaments in the member states (Thatcher, Sweet, 2002). The question to be raised here is to what extent the de-parliamentarisation is a result of the European integration, since analyses from the 60-ties and the 70-ties in the last century indicate that European legislation has relatively modest influence over the decision-making process in member states and in most cases parliaments have been depicted as re-active rather than being really active in the amending and adopting of initiatives coming from the executive (Mezey, 1979). The continuous deficit of parliamentary capacities in the multi-level game has crippled national parliaments and their possibilities to make better oversight of government EU-related drafts (Maurer, Wessels, 2001).

The problem to define de-parliamentarisation is that often the focus is on the loss of national competences in national parliaments, not taking into account the fact that this pulls also loss of their representative image of the citizens as fundamental feature of state organization. All in all, European integration at the beginning has shown to be a bad thing for national parliaments and for national legitimacy, and a symbol of a de-democratization of society (Reimund, 1995).

Some scholars (Auel, Benz, 2005); Barret (2008); (O’ Brennan, Raunio, 2007) try to dilute the de-parliamentarisation thesis and label national parliaments not as losers, but as late adapters in the reorientation as

national to multi-level players. In order to be able to respond to the challenges of the complex manner of the functioning of the EU, national parliaments had to strengthen their institutional capacities, a multi-faceted process especially due to the fact that their competences were limited in the decision-making process, on ratification of agreements (Norton, 1995) and monitoring the government in the adoption of the EU legislation (Maurer, Wessels, 2001). The European integration has been a challenge by itself for national parliaments, especially in terms of their elective, informative and legislative competence (Bagehot, 1967). Those elected by the people to represent their interests have been legitimately “undermined” by the executive and Brussels, risking to lose their voters legitimacy within the political system spectrum (Norton, 1998), especially in terms of their publicity and transparency, the possibility of voicing different positions, also including those of the opposition. This has contributed to a lower interest among nationally elected representatives and national parliaments to get involved more actively with the European agenda and to transmit it to the voters. That was one of the main reasons that the EU affairs agenda was not much present in the parliamentary related press, since it was dominated by government representatives (De Wilde, 2012).

Parliaments realized that they have to find ways to compensate the loss of parliamentary participation and their rights of joint action in the adoption of legislative solutions and to avoid perceiving EU affairs as foreign policy and pure prerogative of the executive, but instead as their home work same as other national issues, and to provide the necessary preconditions for functional models of parliamentary oversight on the executive in both in the pre-accession process and after the EU membership.

Promotion of parliamentary rights and their influence on EU affairs did not imply that it will solve the problem of representation without proper return of previously deprived parliamentary competences. This is even more significant since even before the establishment of the Community, national parliaments have been characterized as institutions that weakly correspond to the legislative perception of a national parliament. Thus said, return the role of national parliaments in the decision-making, encompassed legislative and communication competences, as well as the control over the executive.

Response to the challenge of de-parliamentarisation

Parliamentary representation, unlike in the 70-ties (Nibloc, 1971) and the 80-ties in the past century significantly changed with the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and the rule of the German Federal Court (BVerfGE 1993), which confirmed that the democratic legitimacy in the European Union lies in the national parliaments as main institutions that represent the European citizens. It was a logical consequence of the debates that started regarding the democratic legitimacy of the EU, the victimization of national parliaments and the negative effects of integration, i.e. the de-democratization (Reimund, 1995) и and de-parliamentarisation that put into question their definition as pillar institutions in the systems of representative democracy (Auel, 2013). The new competences of national parliaments have been assigned to them to improve their active involvement in the EU decision-making matters, and to fill in the gaps that occurred between the European citizens and the EU institutions. There is a widespread opinion that national parliaments being the base of each constitutional democracy can provide effective and convincing modus to decrease these existing legitimacy gaps in the current EU order (House of Lords, 2014).

As result of such policy reallocation to new supra-national decision –making arenas, an authority has been created without proper representation of democratic legitimacy. The process of European integration with the transfer of competences to the EU level, including legislative creation and adoption competences to a supra-national level, has directly contributed to loss of direct control over European policies and delegitimized national parliaments. The European Parliament has not helped over the years in compensating the democratic legitimacy of national parliaments, and the European Council has been acting like a collective actor deciding on behalf of the citizens of the European Union. The evolution of the embryonic Community has taken the influence in the EU political system (Maurer, 2005). The trend of de-parliamentarisation was most obvious in the 80-ties when the executive took over the advantage for direct contact with EU institutions. Marginalization of legislatures opened series of discussions for the end of parliamentary democracy and for post-parliamentary democracy (Maurer, Wessels, 2001).

The European Commission, the European Parliament and the government of member states have placed themselves in a position of legislators of the EU *acquis*, leaving national parliaments for embedding European Directives in their national legal systems. The biggest evidence of loss of parliamentarism was seen among candidate countries, which were turned into a formal institution for transposition of the *acquis communautaire* (Agh,1999). Legislatures, as other institutions, tried to respond to the challenges in their environment by making reforms of their rules of procedure and defining the manner of communication and cooperation with other state institutions. Adaptation to the challenges brought with the European integration among national parliaments went into phases, during which the national parliaments gradually changed their role from passive to more active players in the EU multi-level game.

The accession of Denmark and the United Kingdom in the Community in 1973, as countries with traditionally strong parliaments that introduced novelties by establishing European Affairs Committees, demonstrating interest for European affairs. The Danish Parliament has been the first national parliament in Europe that established the negotiating mandate system, by which it imposes the national government to obtain a negotiating mandate from the parliamentary committee before it decides in the Council. This model was an inspiration of other member states in the Community, which followed the example and made changes in their internal procedures and organization of work. The British Parliament has introduced in the 1980-ties the so-called scrutiny reserve, by which British ministers are not given consent for a position in Brussels, before the end of this procedure in Parliament. This has practically started the phase of gradual decrease of de-parliamentarisation and initiated the middle phase of development of national parliaments: start of institutional and changes for greater involvement in the EU decision-making. This included:

- extended expertise by parliaments regarding areas under European competence and the functioning of the national parliament within the European legislative architecture,
- increased activity of parliamentarians in the parliamentary committees as result of these changes, and

- deeper specialization of parliamentary committees for EU affairs and maintenance of the link between the public, the civil sector and the government.

With the adoption of the European Single Act, that came into force in 1987, the jurisdiction of the Community has been expanded to new areas, and qualified majority voting has been introduced in the Council, strengthening even more the legislative role of the European Parliament and the European Commission, by which national parliaments lost the exclusive right to a veto in certain areas and the full control in the EU decision-making. The increased competences of these institutions and the deprived right to a veto for some areas, has turned on the red alarm among national parliaments to return their real legislative role in these processes.

The period has been marked with establishment of Committees on European Affairs in the national parliaments of member states. The debates about whether national parliaments are the right place for communication on EU affairs or whether they should be more in competence of the European Parliament, have been defeated with the creation of the *Conférence des organes spécialisés dans les affaires communautaires* (COSAC) in 1989 at the conference of presidents of parliaments of EU member states in Madrid, to strengthen the role national parliaments through the European Affairs Committees regarding community related issues. In this way, national parliaments have echoed their plea to return their oversight role on the work of the government making it responsible to explain European affairs as well as to clarify negotiating positions before leaving for Brussels in these committees, which in turn has contributed to improved transparency of the process and greater availability of information to the public.

The re-parliamentarisation process

The trend of de-parliamentarisation and post-parliamentary democracy (Maurer, 2005) has gradually returned the link between the demos and the parliament (Bellamy, Castiglione, 2011). National parliaments started to perform their roles in accordance with the constitutional and political context of the state. This enabled them to build their own opinion and positions regarding the EU affairs,

as well as to systematically face with the executive in order to avoid mere confirmation of generated information, the legislation and the resolutions submitted by the government.

The adoption of the Maastricht Treaty that came into force in 1993 started the phase of return of the role of national parliaments in the decision-making process, the so-called re-parliamentarisation, and strengthening of the national legitimacy of EU member states to overcome the exiting democratic deficit. This has not passed unnoticed, since this permissive consensus that has previously existed among the public and the parliaments on EU affairs on a supra-national level for deeper integration and the concept of the European Community, did not exist in such extent. Maastricht Treaty referred to the democratic deficit and decreased the cavity between the national and European institutions. National parliaments realized that the implementation of the Treaty will cause changes in the European political landscape and appropriately amended their constitutions/legal acts to enable greater role of their parliaments in the shaping of national policies related to EU acquis. In this period, part of national parliaments demanded greater access to information from the government regarding EU issues. The Maastricht Treaty included two Declarations for the national parliaments: No.13 which encouraged greater inclusion of national parliaments in the European Union activities, and increase exchange of information between national parliaments and the European Parliament, and timely submission by the national governments of European Commission draft-laws; and Declaration No. 14 where Conference of Parliaments has called the European Parliament and the national parliaments to hold regular meetings, without prejudice to the competences of the European Parliament and the national parliaments, with regular addresses by the President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission on each consecutive session.

The Treaty of Amsterdam that came into force in 1999 went a step further and included a Protocol for the role of national parliaments in the European Union, which unlike the previous declarations had obligating clauses. The Protocol obliged the European Commission to send all documents (green and white papers and communication, as well as commission draft-laws in accordance with Article 151, paragraph 3 from the Treaty) on time to the national parliaments as

well as through their governments of member states, giving them 6 weeks deadline for consideration. The protocol also recognizes COSAC that may give contribution to the European institutions regarding EU draft-legislation or initiatives in the area of freedom, security and justice, and may have direct influence on the individual rights and freedoms. Also, COSAC was given the possibility to address European institutions regarding the principle of subsidiarity. However, the contribution of COSAC did not have an obliging character for national parliaments and was without prejudice to their positions.

The Declaration 23 in the Nice Treaty that entered into force in 2003, demanded deeper integration in the Union and wider consultations with national parliaments, especially regarding their role in the EU law –making system.

The entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, made a colossal step forward in the role and the significance of national parliaments, putting them again in the “spotlight” and returning to some extent their role that has been taken away from them in the past. There is no doubt that with the adoption of this treaty, the greatest political reforms have been made in the history of the EU. Protocol 1 on the national parliaments, states that it is the duty of the European Commission, and not the national governments, to be directly responsible for sending simultaneously all documents as well as their annual program to the national governments, national parliaments, the European Parliament and the European Council. This has practically placed national parliaments on the same level in the information process with other European Institutions.

The early-warning mechanism

With the introduction of the early warning mechanism, the monitoring of subsidiarity by the national parliaments contained in Protocol No 2 of the Treaty, national parliaments are enabled a pre-legislative intervention as a tool for safeguarding the subsidiarity in the Union, as a kind of ex-ante oversight on the work of European institutions. The draft-legislative acts arriving from the Commission should be justified regarding the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, accompanied with a detailed statement for harmonization with these principles and the reasons for achieving a greater objective on the level

of the union, which should be accomplished once they are adopted on European level, also with a possibility for quantitative indicators. This provision limits the possibility for the European Commission to write and prepare draft-laws without sound preparation and justification why the draft could not have the same effect if adopted on a lower, national level. National parliaments can within the 8 weeks deadline send a reasoned opinion if they consider that the draft is not in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. Also, if 1/3 (or 1/4 if the proposed measure is related to the area of freedom, justice and security) from national parliaments consider that the draft is not in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, the European Commission must review the proposed measure (yellow card). If it decided to go on with the proposal, the Commission must give reasoned opinion to the Union legislators (the Council and the Parliament) why it considers that the measure is in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity. If a simple majority of parliaments from member states are against the draft-proposal, it must be re-considered by the European Commission (orange card). If the Commission still decides to move on with the proposal, then it must submit its opinion to the legislators, together with the opinions of national parliaments. The legislators may decide with majority of 55% of the Council members, or with majority votes from the European Parliament, that the proposal will not be further considered.

There is no doubt that the oversight of subsidiarity represents a significant task for institutions showing interest for its implementation. The early-warning mechanism enabled national parliaments to be more involved in the European affairs, and the control of subsidiarity helped them to prioritize the EU areas within the frames of the national political debates (Cygan, 2011). However, the complexity of the model provides each national parliament two votes, and in order to the mechanism to be implemented at least 1/3 of this votes must be initiated for breach of the principle of subsidiarity, which does not give enough manoeuvre for national parliaments to initiate easily revision of the proposed legislation, and to resume their proper role in the EU decision-making process.

On the other hand, there is no direct involvement of national parliaments in creation of the proposed act and their role in the process is more of an advisory nature at the time being. National parliaments can only

use their role before the Court of Justice by filing a complaint against the final act, as a kind of ex-post oversight of the legislation process in the European institutions. The current mechanism lacks legally-binding provisions that will introduce real change and participation of national parliaments in the EU decision-making process.

Strengthened rights for obtaining information

The Lisbon Treaty has also promoted the rights for obtaining information by national parliaments, with the fact that Protocol 1 contains a catalogue of wider range of all documents that national parliaments will receive by the European Commission, defining their privilege for obtaining timely information.

Strengthening the resources and the oversight function

National Parliaments invested more resources for European affairs, since with the expansion of competences of European institutions, instead of being external, they became rather domestic issues and became subject of constant preoccupation and discussion in everyday parliamentary business. As EU was becoming more significant with the reforms for a deeper integration, domestic legislatures had to pay more attention and time for what was going on in Brussels. The current level of development of scrutiny depends to a large extent on the constitutional and parliamentary traditions and cultures in different member states. The reforms include democratization of legislative practices, undertaking internal reforms for adoption of new Rules of Procedure, establishing a platform for internal institutional re-organization, including the work with the public, i.e. sensibilizing the citizens for the new manner of functioning of European processes both on national and supra-national level.

Conclusion

There is no doubt that national parliaments, more or less, have learned to play better the European legislative game, but the questions to be asked in future should be what is the role of parliament in the domestic political system, as well as public opinion regarding deeper

Europeanization of the EU itself, meaning whether the parliament makes oversight for the EU legislation to the government to the same extent as for the domestic legislation, and whether European integrations increase considerably the divisions among political parties and the public with such oversight mechanisms. Having in mind that parliaments delegated the EU affairs decision-making to the executive, it is obvious that national MPs will not dedicate more time on these issues than to the domestic issues in future. Regarding parliamentary elections, EU affairs despite being important for the voters in terms of cutting the cake of structural funds and other regional funds in member states, yet the voters are primarily interested in solving home-burning issues such as taxation, health care, education etc., so promotion of EU affairs before elections seems not much profitable for being re-elected.

The future of national parliaments is in their hands, since after the Lisbon Treaty they have been removed from the margins and placed in the middle of legislation–shaping. Although this has not repositioned them fully as key actors within the EU legislative triangle, now it is up to them to fight for a better position in the future. This can only be seen as a start-up process that will incrementally expand the rights of national parliament in the decision-making process in the long-run.

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**THE WESTERN BALKAN'S PROCESS:
NEW DIPLOMATIC TOOL OF THE GERMAN AND EU SOFT
POWER FOR REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND
STABILITY**

Abstract

The six Western Balkan countries – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro and Serbia – are united by the common goal of joining the EU. However, they still face divisions, both infrastructural and political, and are confronted, among other things, by a dire economic situation and bilateral disputes and instability. In 2014, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker announced a five-year halt on enlargement. This distancing of the membership prospects, coupled with the realisation that achieving long-term stability and transforming the region could best be secured through economic growth and increased regional cooperation, led to the so-called 'Berlin process'. Consisting of yearly high-level meetings between the six Western Balkan governments and several EU Member States between 2014 and 2018, this process aims to reaffirm the region's EU perspective by improving cooperation and economic stability within it. Connectivity is an important aspect of this process, with investment in infrastructure being seen as a means for creating jobs, business opportunities and other benefits. Creating high-level political connections, reconciling societies by stimulating youth exchange and education projects, and resolving outstanding bilateral disputes, while ensuring civil society participation in the whole process, are other significant aspects of this initiative.

The summit hosted by Italy in Trieste this year was the fourth in the series, after Berlin in 2014, Vienna in 2015 and Paris in 2016.

This paper will analyze the Berlin Process as a new tool of the German soft power, the developments so far and the results and outcomes of the agreements and explain the motives and ideas behind the process. Additionally it will try to give an overview of the possible developments and perspectives of this process as an examples of new successful application of soft power in foreign policy.

Keywords: soft power, EU enlargement, regional stability, connectivity.

Introduction

The challenge facing all countries nowadays is the effort to achieve a successful foreign policy in a very complex and interdependent world today. Challenges and opportunities are decreasingly moving within the national borders. Power has never been more diffused, moving not only from the West to the East but also from the governments themselves towards non-governmental actors. The digital revolution accelerates the diffusion of power and allows citizens to unite inside and outside borders in a way that they have not been able to date.

In this new world, it becomes clear to states that with the help of militaristic and economic power, the traditional so-called “hard power”, they can no longer achieve their goals. What appears to be more effective in the new complex world is the ability to co-operate and network, i.e., the ability to attract and persuade rather than compel. As Professor Joseph Nye, who, for the first time, introduces the term “soft power” in the early nineties of the last century, stresses that “power with others can be much more effective than power over others”. (Nye, 2011)

For years, Germany has been ranked in the top five countries of all relevant world rankings for the impact of “soft power”. According to the latest global ranking of the “soft power” of Portland Communications, Germany ranks third in the world list, just behind the United States and Britain, one place below compared to 2015, when it was ranked

second in the world on the same list. And according to the Elcano Global Presence Report whose index measures the global presence of countries in the world, Germany is ranked third with no change in the past three years. Interesting about this research is that it shows the European Union as the world leader in the presence of soft power, if Member States are excluded and we see the European Union as a whole.

The newest mechanism of European Union's soft power, introduced by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2014 is the so-called Berlin Process - a new tool of German soft power that covers Macedonia as well. This paper will explain the ideas behind the Berlin Process and at the same time will summarize the achievements and recommendations of the process in order to prove that this process will serve as a new example of successful application of soft power in the foreign policy.

Theoretical Background

The term "soft power" was introduced in the 1990s by the Harvard University professor, Joseph Nye, to describe the ability to get the desired by attracting and co-opting, not through coercion and money as a means of persuasion and forcing (Nye, 2004). Soft power is defined as the ability to shape the attitudes of others through appearance and attraction. What defines soft power is its unpredictability, and its main features are culture, political values and foreign policy (Nye, 2004). Lately, the term is also used to change and influence public opinion through relatively less transparent channels and lobbying through political and non-political organizations.

The development of the definition of "soft power" is closely linked to the evolution of the concept of power, which began in the early 1960s with the exploration of various aspects of power by scientists. Dahl (Dahl, 1961) focuses on the forced influence of power, but in response to his approach other researchers dedicate themselves to finding other complementary sides of power. Bachrach and Baratz and Steven Lukes identify the other face of power, setting the agenda (Bachrach, Baratz, 1962). Stephen Lukes distinguishes the third person of power, the setting of demands and the influence of the formation of beliefs (Lukes, 2005). After Bachrach and Baratz discovered the influential

side of national power in certain societies, they begin to concentrate on immeasurable variables, which have until then been ignored by literature on power.

As the literature on power develops, Nye's initial definition also experiences its own transformations. The early version of its definition implies "the ability to get the desired by attracting, not by coercion and money" and encompassing "culture, values and foreign policy" (Nye, 2004). Later, the same definition is extended to "the ability to influence others through co-opting ways of framing the agenda, persuading, and creating a positive attraction in order to achieve the desired results." (Nye, 2011). By further developing its definition, Nye focuses on the results of soft power.

Despite the rich history, soft power has drawn attention to international relations since the end of the Cold War. By then, most international interactions are based on military and economic assistance. The United States and the Soviet Union use precisely such incentives to attract allies in search of desired economic systems and governance systems. Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, both economic and military losses on both sides, the United States has strengthened its soft-power strategy.

As a viable approach to foreign policy, soft power is experiencing rapid progress over the past two decades, mainly for three reasons. First, "soft power" strategies are an adequate response to the changing nature of foreign policy, driven by the diffusion of power and the digital revolution. Secondly, the use of soft-power resources is more cost-effective and worthwhile than the hard power tactics. And third, cooperation becomes the most effective approach in creating the main global results. Otherwise, unilateral performances are with increased costs and open to challenges. Despite the increased progress, in reality soft power is difficult to deploy effectively and the ability to use it, is really hard.

In international relations, soft power is generated only where governments act through their policies and public diplomacy. The generation of soft power is also influenced in a positive (but also negative) way by non-state players inside and outside the country. These players influence both the public and the government elites in other countries, and thus create a favorable or inconvenient disposition for government policies.

On the other hand, the success of the use of soft power mechanisms depends, above all, on the reputation that the player enjoys in the international community, as well as the flow of information among stakeholders. In addition, soft power is often identified with the onset of globalization and the neoliberal theory of international relations. Popular culture and mass media are regularly identified as a source of soft power, such as the spread of language or a set of normative structures. International news is considered crucial in creating the image and reputation of certain foreign countries. Positive media reporting is associated with positive international attitudes and views, while negative media reporting with negative views (Segev, 2016).

The skeptics of the soft power concept argue that hard power is the only effective foreign policy tool. Gray claims that hard power must remain an essential policy instrument, since soft power is inadequate to run a control policy because it relies heavily on perceptions of other countries. The rest, like Ferguson, conclude that there is nothing new in soft power, once called imperialism. He also believes that soft power has a limited reach and that the real engine of cultural imperialism is still hard power, and calls soft power “velvet glove for an iron hand” (Ferguson, 2004).

Soft power is more descriptive than a normative concept. Like all other types of power, it can be used with good or bad intentions. Whether soft power can be used with bad intentions and cause terrible consequences depends on the ways of its interpretation. Henceforth, it is possible to construct a normative preference for greater use of soft power.

Regarding the conduct of foreign policy, the characteristics of the world order weaken the effectiveness of the strategy of hard power. An example of an unsuccessful foreign policy based on hard power is the US attack on Iraq in 2003. However, the concept of soft power has its own weaknesses. Cooper cites three points of weakness - the question of culture as a resource of soft power, bearing in mind that cultural influence can not be compared to political power, then the dependence of the results of a soft power strategy from certain states that do not depend on the countries themselves and lastly, the benefit of setting an agenda, bearing in mind that the results of this practice are visible much later (Cooper, 2004).

However, unsuccessful soft power strategies are an exception, while there are many examples of the successful application of soft power. First of all, the most successful example is the European Union and its ability to attract new members, which on the one hand provides peace and security among member states, and on the other hand, the enlargement process strengthens its position on a global level, achieving therefore dual benefit - both for the member states and for the Union itself.

The Berlin Process

In August 2014, German Chancellor Angela Merkel decided to present the initiative and at the same time host the first Western Balkan Conference as part of the so-called Berlin Process - a step that was warmly welcome by the countries of the Western Balkans. This initiative came a month after the announcement by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, who stressed that in the next five-year mandate of the Commission, there will be no new enlargements in the European Union, and on time to calm down the reactions in the Western Balkan countries caused by such a statement. Although technically correct, the statement itself allowed interpretations that were seen as playing down to the commitment of the European Union towards the efforts to join the countries of the region (Fouere, 2014).

So far, four summits have been held within the Berlin Process, the first in Berlin in 2014, then the second in Vienna in 2015, followed by the Paris summit in 2016 and this years summit in Trieste, 2017. The Berlin process includes 12 countries: six Western Balkan countries that are at different stages of the accession process to the European Union (Albania, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo) and six countries of the European Union (Austria, Croatia, France, Germany, Italy and Slovenia), two of which are from the region (Croatia and Slovenia).

It is important to note that this process is being upgraded to two existing and complementary processes involving the countries of the Western Balkans and the European Union. The first is Brdo-Brijuni, a process initiated by Slovenia and Croatia in order to provide space for informal co-operation and political dialogue to strengthen relations

among the countries of the region in the enlargement process. The second process is the Western Balkans 6 (WB6), officially announced in 2013 by Montenegro as the country's leading country in the accession process, with the support of the EU Enlargement Commissioner at that time, Stefan Fuhle. Through this process, participating countries demonstrate their commitment and commitment to regional co-operation.¹

The Berlin process is considered to be an entirely new tool of soft power, primarily to Germany, but also to the European Union. Finance plays a major role in the implementation of such soft power mechanisms, given that the European Union allocates a budget of 11.7 billion euros for the period 2015-2020 in the pre-accession funds for the Western Balkan countries aspiring to adhere to the European Union. Funds that should primarily serve to maintain stability in the region, but also as a leverage for dealing with regional and national leaders. While taking place outside the regular institutional decision-making processes in the European Union and with the presence of only seven EU member states, the Berlin Process and the summits keep the focus on the region and manage to gather all the leaders of the Western Balkans in one place.

At the same time, additional events with representatives of the business community and the civil sector are organized, which is of great importance for the inclusiveness of the process, bearing in mind that the goal, among other things, is to strengthen the economic ties between the countries of the EU and the Western Balkans, but also among the countries of the Western Balkans themselves.

However, this strategy has its own challenges and tensions in the region do not diminish, especially due to the large number of unresolved neighborly relations, Serbia recognizing Kosovo as a prerequisite for integration, persistent threats by Republika Srpska within Bosnia and Herzegovina with a referendum on independence, political and ethnic tensions in Macedonia and the name dispute with Greece. On the other hand, the European Union after the economic crisis is facing now new political and economic problems, as well as increased nationalist

¹ The Berlin Process: Crystallization point for the Western Balkans. (PDF). Dosije Studio, Belgrade, 2016

factions. Therefore, in the coming years, the main threat to the stability of the Western Balkans will be the possible perception that access to the European Union is not a realistic prospect for the countries of the region. If the idea of accession weakens, national and regional governments will be less motivated for economic and political reforms or for building political dialogue with their neighbors.²

This is one of the additional reasons why Germany has initiated the Berlin process - the danger that the weakening of influence and of aspirations to join the EU will allow access to other external forces that play an active role in the region, such as Russia, a country having cultural, economic and political relations with Serbia. It is known that Moscow often uses infrastructure projects as a way to spread its influence and is negotiating with Bulgaria, Serbia and Hungary to renew the gas pipeline project that was stalled in 2013 under the pressure of the European Union. In general, the prolongation of the integration of Western Balkan countries into the EU would make them seek alternative options outside the EU, something Germany doesn't want.

On the other hand, the benefit of this process for the Western Balkan countries is to maintain the momentum of integration, and a different type of intergovernmental co-operation in order to strengthen ties between the Western Balkans and EU members, as well as to improve regional co-operation on infrastructure and economic development.

In the framework of the research "Key actors of the German soft power in Republic of Macedonia", few Macedonian key politicians from the two biggest parties (SDSM and VMRO) were asked during the in-depth unstructured interviews in June 2017 about their perceptions of the Berlin Process. The main conclusions were that the Berlin process considers political will to be a necessity in a long-running process such as the EU enlargement in order to keep the will to reform and the will for accession. At the same time, they stated that the process itself brings back the attention to the Balkans and as such is good. Particularly interesting is the view that this process expresses Germany's invaluable role that gives the tone to the EU enlargement

² http://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2017/07/12/the_eu_woos_the_balkans_with_soft_power_112435.html

processes, since other members either do not have the strength or have no interest in assuming that role. For Macedonian politicians, it is of particular benefit that summits within the process offer the opportunity to meet with influential political leaders in one place, while a regional approach can be useful if practical common topics are found, especially for economic development or crisis management.

Regarding the EU Integration of Macedonia and the region, it was mentioned that the longer the candidate countries are left waiting, the bigger will be the influence of other players outside the EU, who do not share the same interest with Germany and have conflicting views on many issues. Some of the interviewed politicians thought that Germany should make a strategic decision, and in this way, the growing frustrations will be solved. Otherwise as frustration grow, the skepticism towards EU will grow, which can seriously affect the political scene. Fortunately, in Macedonia EU skeptical radical parties have not appeared yet.

It is important to conclude, that macedonian political scene regardless their ideological background defines the Berlin process as beneficial, but it must not be seen as compensation for the enlargement, which proves that that the goals of the Berlin process are mostly met in Macedonia and the process itself is seen as a successful and beneficial for the country and the region.

Achievements and Recommendation for future development

There is a good definition of the achievements of the Berlin Process so far in the paper “The European Union and the Western Balkans after the Berlin Process. Reflecting on the EU enlargement in times of uncertainty” saying that “Berlin process was instrumental in keeping on the radar key issues marring progress made by Western Balkan states on their way towards the European Union: their infrastructure gap and economic vulnerability; the lack of perspective perceived by WB6 youth; their democratic backsliding into stabilitocratic regimes; the persistence of ethno-nationalism under the surface of reconciliation; the destabilizing potential of bilateral disputes and

the growing engagement of Russia, China and Turkey throughout the region.” (Marciacq, 2017)

A major achievement of the Berlin process has been its contribution to boost up the interest of WB6 and EU stakeholders for regional cooperation, whether through its contribution to the Connectivity Agenda, RYCO, the establishment of the Western Balkan Chambers Investment Forum or its support for the Civil Society Forum or pan-European Expert Reflection Forum. But this achievement will lose its meaning if it ends up after the last summit in London 2018 and if the EU's approach as it has been practiced for two decades takes over, without dialectal change. In fact, returning to the EU's “business as usual” approach would be barely justifiable and at best illusory. The Berlin Process needs to identify new priorities and to plan the process beyond London 2018.

On 31 May 2017 the German Minister of Foreign Affairs announced a “Berlin Plus” addition to the Berlin Process in order to be better equipped to answer to the needs of the region. This opportunity should be used so as to provide more prominent roles to regional organizations and European companies, especially those involved in the connectivity agenda-related issues, in pushing the WB countries to engage more directly and decisively towards the European single market benchmarks. Siegmur Gabriel proposed to set up a fund for infrastructure and technology to which EU member states, EFTA and the European Economic Area members could contribute as donors. Such funds should also help to accelerate symbolic projects like transport links between the least-connected countries in the region. While these initiatives are of course most welcome, the question remains of how much difference they can make in the short term.³

It is more than obvious, that the responsibility for the potential success of the Berlin Process rests with the respective regional governments. However, the Berlin Process should be used as an opportunity to increase pressure on the governments of the Western Balkans to do their job better by strengthening the role of the civil society and by assuring that it is a more precise role.

³<http://www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/biepag/node/247>

The side events organized within the Berlin Process, The Civil Society and Business Forums played an important role and increased the bottom-up pressure on the governments of the Western Balkans to do their job better by strengthening civil society and giving the organizations a more precise role. In the future it is recommended for the side events to be integrated into the formal program of the future summits.

As it is described in the discussion paper of BiEPAG “The Future of the Berlin process”, the process should remain stable in terms of the number of actors involved, as an increase in size bears risk of spoiling the dynamics and hijacking the agenda for self-driven interest. In terms of content, however, the process has been fluid as thus far it included issues of regional cooperation, bilateral issues, and other issues related to youth, migration, connectivity, ecology and most recently rule of law. In the future, as it says, it is important to limit and prioritize the number of issues addressed within the Berlin Process so as to avoid the dilution of concrete tasks. Also, it is crucial to avoid duplexing of the accession process, as this makes the European Commission reluctant to substantially engage. (Nechev, Bieber, Kmezic, 2017)

Finally, all the efforts made within the framework of the Berlin Process should be primarily focused on fulfilling the Copenhagen Accession Criteria, for example increase

the candidate countries’ ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. This being said, it is important to use this forum to boost the transformative effect of enlargement by insisting on the independence of key state institutions and empowering democratic forces in the WB6 countries. (Nechev, Bieber, Kmezic; 2017)

Conclusions

Berlin Process seems to be clear, complementary and strategically developed mechanism of soft power. Despite having many weaknesses, it offers various channels for consolidating the Western Balkan countries in their efforts to join the EU.

It is clear that the process is not a substitute for the enlargement process. But it plays an important role in the WB integration, because it initiated a cooperation as a starting point for solving many burning issues in the future.

One of the most important benefit of the Berlin Process is bringing the governments from the region, business sector, civil society, regional and international organizations, the EU and its member states working together. The Berlin Process is an important format that has developed this cooperation and provides a specific framework for initiating and addressing many difficult issues.

As Marciacq states in the conclusion of the policy paper issued by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, although it is too early to draw conclusions on eventual success of the Berlin Process, preliminary observations, one year before its programmed end, are rather positive. Against the backdrop of the Juncker Declaration, Brexit and growing geopolitical challenges, the Berlin process signals that the EU remains a strategic player in the region, and that interest in enlargement has not completely faded away. (Marciacq, 2017)

It can be concluded that the Berlin Process as a new soft power mechanism so far has proved that application of soft power leads to successful foreign policy. It has the capacity to become an example of successful implementation of soft power with dual benefit – both for EU and the Western Balkan countries. And that is why this process should have its future.

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**THE GENDER GAP IN CHARITABLE GIVING FOR
EDUCATION:
A CASE STUDY FROM BULGARIA IN THE PERIOD FROM
1878 TO 2015**

Abstract

In 2015, within the project „Culture of giving in Education: social, institutional and personal dimensions”, funded by the Scientific Research Fund at the Ministry of Education, records of donations in the sphere of Education for the period from 1878 to 1944 in Bulgaria were examined and a nationally representative sociological survey on „Attitudes towards donating for Education” was conducted.

Based on the collected archive documents, the data from the representative survey and additional literature and investigations, the donation activity in the sphere of Education in Bulgaria is traced through the following three historical periods: from the Liberation of Bulgaria (1878) until 1944; in the period from 1944 to 1989; after the „Velvet revolution” of 1989 to 2015. The donation activity for educational causes is different in the studied historical periods of the development of Bulgaria. The philanthropy depends on the political situation and regulations.

The giving is a value for a lot of Bulgarians in the period from the Liberation to 1944. There have been made a lot of donations for different causes, but mostly for education, followed by social causes

- helping orphans and poor children during this period. Results show that about 25 percent of the donors are women.

After 1944 the donation activity has been practically interrupted. The situation has changed dramatically in comparison to the previous examined period. Donor funds have been closed. Donation has been destroyed and the consequences have been extremely negative.

The donation gradually returned to the Bulgarians' public life after 1989, but overall it has not been mainly oriented towards education. Approximately two-thirds of the all donors for education are women. The most motivated Bulgarian donor in Education is a woman with a high educational degree (minimum secondary education), living in a big city (capital and district town), employed, married or live in cohabitation.

Keywords: donation, donor, education, Bulgaria

Introduction

The philanthropy is characterized by a different activity in the studied historical periods of the development of Bulgaria - from the Liberation of Bulgaria (1878) until 1944; in the period from 1944 to 1989; after the „Velvet revolution” of 1989 to 2015. The distribution of charitable events in the society depends to a large extent on the transformations in the society, the political structure and the regulation.

Compared to the period from 1878 to 1944, the donor activity in education has a certain decrease in the contemporary Bulgarian society. There are differences in the main motives for donation among different groups of the contemporary donors. Furthermore the social profile of the private donor is changing.

The term charitable giving is defined as a positive action, gratuitous help (beyond personal interest) to other/s or dedicated to a cause by donation of funds, tangible property, voluntary work (Кабакчиева (съст.), 2011: 11).

Methodology

Based on the collected archive documents (within the project „Culture of giving in Education: social, institutional and personal dimensions” (in 2015)) and additional literature, the donation activity in the sphere of Education in Bulgaria is traced through the two historical periods: from the Liberation of Bulgaria (1878) until 1944 and in the period from 1944 to 1989;

The gender gap in charitable giving for Education is analyzed in detail after the „Velvet revolution” of 1989 to 2015 (through the third studied period). The conclusions are based on the following three surveys:

- In 2011, the first study was conducted by order of the Bulgarian Donor Forum;
- The second study was conducted by Alfa Research Ltd. in July 2015;
- In 2015, within the project „Culture of giving in Education: social, institutional and personal dimensions”, funded by the Scientific Research Fund at the Ministry of Education a nationally representative sociological survey on „Attitudes towards donating for Education” was conducted.

Civil activity and philanthropy of Bulgarian women in the period from the Liberation of Bulgaria (1878) until 1944

In the period from the Liberation in 1878 until 1944 donation is a value for a lot of Bulgarians. As a whole, they are committed in the care of the sick persons, orphans, widows and communities in need. In addition, they are actively involved with their own means, land and labor in the construction of monasteries, churches, chapels and schools.

Pepka Boyadjieva (2012) summarized that the giving for educational causes is concentrated on the activity and energy of a number of Bulgarians (public figures and intellectuals, as well as ordinary citizens) and organizations for a long time during the Renaissance (the Bulgarian Renaissance includes the processes in the society in the 18th and 19th centuries) and after the restoration of the Bulgarian state in 1878. She adds that donor initiatives do not only have a clear

priority in the sphere of education, but also become a manifestation of genuine civic awareness and commitment to the development of Bulgarian nationality and national identity (Бояджијева, 2012: 28). As a result, the donated funds and land for building of schools is increased. Supporting Funds which help talented students are created. During this period, Bulgarians are distinguished by high donor activity and donation is performed to various causes, but mostly for education; followed by social causes – helping of orphans and poor children (Кабакчиева (съст.), 2011: 13).

The donations in education are related to a variety of objectives. They cover a wide range – it can start with a donation for training and to pass through the supporting of poor, but talented students and in order to finish with donations for dining, clothes, books, and so on. A lot of the funding for education purposes comes from donations and wills, although the cost of education is state-regulated (Стойкова, П., Първанов, П., 2017: 1061-1067).

Information on the more famous donors in the period 1878-1951 can be found in the three volumes of the Encyclopedia „Donation” (Николова, В., Стоянова, Р. (съст.), 2012). About 75% of the named donors are male. Female names are much less. Although these data does not concern the donations for education, we can assume that women’s donor activity is also lower than men’s donor activity in this sphere.

In fact, during the research period, the Bulgarian woman is limited to show her own empathy and willingness to work for the welfare of the society. She is not allowed to the public space and she cannot develop her potential. This concerns both her ability to participate more actively in the church life and her participation in the development of Bulgarian public education.

Data from a scientific study related to the female donors of the Bulgarian Orthodox temples during the Renaissance show that „a number of restrictions on women in the public space of the Orthodox Church are regulated in Byzantium” (Пенчева, 2015: 5). Pencheva (2015) notes that this is a reflection of the religious worldview and the understanding of the woman as a source of temptation for the male half of the population. She adds that in a number of monastic statutes (rules) the basic requirement is the prohibition of the female presence

(female wards are detached in the churches and they are located on the second floor). Gradually, the Bulgarian woman changed the church attitude towards her. Many male monasteries are being transformed and have allowed the women presence during the temple holiday and the great Christian feasts (Пенчева, 2015: 5).

Exactly the charity is one of the forms of modification when the woman enters in the sacred space of the temple. Pencheva (2015) divides the women's donations to the Orthodox churches during the Renaissance on the basis of the donation object: donations to the construction of temples, donations to the interior decoration, donations to church plate and liturgical literature, and donations to temple support. The Bulgarian woman demonstrates a high civic activity and a national consciousness (Пенчева, 2015: 7).

The Bulgarian woman gradually has become a part of the social activity during the Renaissance. The church has been opened to her, as well as the school system. Until the beginning of 1930, the woman was devoid of education, and even the shared opinion in the society is that for the girl it is „a shame to learn” (Андонова, 2015: 36-37). The place and the role of the Bulgarian woman are very well presented by V. Paskaleva – „The monastery schools have been visited only by young men for ages. The Bulgarian girls remain illiterate. Only a minority of them receive some kind of education, usually the girls who are preparing to become nuns. They learn in the „Read Letter” in Girls' monasteries. But the women's monastery education is developed much slower than the male. It is hampered by the backward Christians' view that the woman is made up of the man's rib and that she should not be self-sufficient, as the Oriental attitude towards the woman as a slave, which is deeper routed in our nation” (Паскалева, 1964: 18). However, women charity organizations were set up in the last years of the Renaissance. Their main objectives are „the development of the girls education and social activity” (Пенчева, 2015: 16).

According to Georgeta Nazarska (2017), the available data from the archival documentation shows that the private donation funds support the education of Bulgarian students during a long historical period - from the end of the 19 century to the mid-1940. The share of women in the total number of the fund beneficiaries is 30,8%. It varies for the individual funds. The reasons can be different - women's interest in

subsidized specialities, their social status and others (Назърска, 2017: 262-263). Although the educational chances of women increase, they rarely had the opportunity to acquire higher education. Moreover, „female educational elites do not acquire the necessary social influence - in the research period their group is not empowered in the private or public sphere, including in the professional field“ (Назърска, 2017: 271).

The restricted access to education is a prerequisite for women to become rarely donors for Bulgarian education. However, the Bulgarian woman is awake and engaged in the public work. This conclusion is a consequence of the many female organizations in the Renaissance, which are the forerunners of an organized women's movement (Стоянова, 2015: 19). According to Pencheva, the female rebellion against the patriarchal worldview and manners of the society changes the Bulgarian woman activity. She gradually leaves the religious space and focuses on secular public spaces. The social and professional status of the active Bulgarian woman was changed - by a nun at the beginning of the Renaissance, at the end of the period she was a teacher and activist of the women charity organization. Exactly through the donation the Bulgarian woman manages to acquire a number of spheres from the public space (Пенчева, 2015: 16).

However, the donor activity of the woman can not be fully deployed and actually reflects the female fighting spirit. As a result of some legislative changes after 1944 donor practices are ceased and the donation is no longer a leading value in Bulgarian society. The donation was revived after 1989. It was only then a new beginning of the female charity was established.

Limitation of donor practices in the period from 1944 to 1989

After 1944, the donor activity in Bulgaria practically disappeared. Between 1945 and 1951, with a series of legislative changes, the donations made in the previous period were gradually transferred to the state. As a result, the charity activity ceased to exist and the education is fully governed by the state policy and the training of „socialist ideals“ (Стойкова, П., Първанов, П., 2017: 1061-1067).

The giving has been destroyed, and the consequences after that are extremely negative. According to Petya Kabakchieva, on the one hand, the names of thousands of donors sink into oblivion, their will is neglected; on the other hand, the very idea of donation and charity was losing value because the state had to be the only „benefactor” (Кабакчиева (съст.), 2011: 13).

The donation practices have been re-established in 1980. This was related with the creation of Fund „13 centuries Bulgaria“. But in this case, donation is again subordinated to the state policy and it is carried out in a „socialist spirit”. In other words the donations did not have this economic significance for education and they are essentially material, especially for books and works of art, as well as for free work (Стойкова, П., Първанов, П., 2017: 1061-1067).

Women donors in Education after 1989

After 1989, the charitable giving gradually returned to the public life of the Bulgarians, but in general it is oriented towards non-educational spheres (Бояджиева, 2012: 28). This conclusion is based on two surveys on donor attitudes among Bulgarians held in 2011 and 2015 respectively.

The first study was conducted by order of the Bulgarian Donor Forum and it was conducted by the Open Society Institute - Sofia. The results from this survey show that the respondents most often donated for „social causes – for disadvantaged people - the needy people, adults, disabled persons, orphans” (48,6%) and „Health causes - treatment of children, purchase of equipment, treatment of adults” (43,4%). Only 2,6% of them have donated for education („educational causes - scholarships, for the schools”), and for „culture and art” the share of donors is even lower -1,7% (data are received from the answers to the question „What causes do you donate for?”).

The results from the second study (it is conducted by Alfa Research Ltd. in July 2015) that is related to the attitudes towards charitable giving also show that the donations for education are insignificant. The interviewees have guessed that the individuals donate mainly for health and social causes. More than half of the respondents gave the answer „health causes” (54%), followed by the donations for „social

causes” (45%). According to the respondents only 5% of the people donated for educational causes (data are received from the answers to the question „What causes do persons donate for?“).

These data are also confirmed by a third study - the representative sociological survey on „Attitudes towards giving in Education“, conducted in 2015 within the project „Culture of giving in Education: social, institutional and personal dimensions“. This is the most thorough research of contemporary Bulgarian culture in this sphere. The analyzed donor activity of the private donors in this paper below is based on it. The social profile of the contemporary Bulgarian donor of Education is also presented.

Donation activities from private individuals

There are different criteria for classifying of the donors. Most often, they are based on the fundamental subjects of the law (for all legal systems) - physical persons, legal entities, the state and the international organizations. From this point of view, the physical persons and the legal entities can be considered as donors. The researched social profile of the contemporary Bulgarian donor in Education refers to a physical person.


The representative sociological survey (the third study mentioned above), that is entitled „Attitudes towards giving in Education“ and conducted among 1283 Bulgarian citizens, confirms the results of the two surveys quoted above (they held in 2011 and 2015 by order of the Bulgarian Donor Forum).

The contemporary Bulgarians donate most often in the following three causes – 1. in causes of social occasions; 2. for health reasons and 3. for overcoming the impact of natural disasters. There is less giving activity in education, culture and art, for religious purposes, as well as for animal care, ecology and sports initiatives. This conclusion is based on the answers to the question „Which of the following causes have you donated for?“. The question was raised to the physical persons that donated in the last five years (Table 1).

Table 1. Donor activity for different causes

Which of the following causes have you donated for?	Yes	No	Total
Social causes (for disadvantaged people, the needy people, adults, orphans)	81,1 %	18,9 %	100 %
Health causes (for treatment of children, purchase of equipment)	63,4 %	36,6 %	100 %
For overcoming the impact of natural disasters	59,5 %	40,5 %	100 %
Education	25,9 %	74,1 %	100 %
Culture and art	24,7 %	75,3 %	100 %
Religious purposes	24,1 %	75,9 %	100 %
Animal care	18,9 %	81,1 %	100 %
Ecology	16,3 %	83,7 %	100 %
Sports initiatives	16,1 %	83,9 %	100 %

However, the most of Bulgarians have positive attitudes towards giving for educational purposes. To the question „What is your attitude towards giving for education?“, total 64,7% of the respondents have chosen the following two answers - „entirely positive“ and „rather positive“. 16,7% of the interviewees indicated the option „both positive and negative“, and with „rather negative“ and „entirely negative“ answered 5,3% and 6% of them (Graph 1).



Graph 1. Attitude towards charitable giving for education

The data from the research revealed some prerequisites for the development of culture of giving in education.


The Gender Gap in Charitable Giving for Education

Donation activity in Education by gender

Are the men or the women more motivated to charitable giving for educational purposes? What is the social profile of the contemporary Bulgarian donor in Education? The answer to these questions was sought on the basis of data from the study.

The applied Chi square analysis shows that there is no correlation between gender and attitudes towards giving in education.

Total about 61% of the men have „entirely positive” (34,5%) and „rather positive” (26,4%) attitudes, while the women with positive attitudes are over 68% (Graph 2).



Graph 2. Attitude towards giving for education by gender

The correlation between the gender and charitable giving for education is very little – the Cramér's V is 0,131. 19,3% of the men have donated for educational purposes, and 30,9% of the women (Table 2).

Table 2. Gender gap in giving for education

		Sex		Total
		Man	Woman	
Did you donate for educational causes?	Yes	80,7%	30,9%	25,9%
	No	19,3%	69,1%	74,1%
Total		100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

There is a tendency for women to donate more in Education. This conclusion is based on the answers to the question „In the next 6 months, would YOU PERSONALLY make a donation for education, regardless of its form and size?“. Certainly, 4,3% of men and 9,8% of women are going to make a donation. 19,4% of men and 24,4% of women (Table 3) are likely to donate in Education.

Table 3. Donation for education, regardless of its form and size in the next 6 months by gender

		Sex		Total
		Man	Woman	
In the next 6 months, would YOU PERSONALLY make a donation for education, regardless of its form and size?	I will do it	4,3%	9,8%	7,2%
	I will rather do it	19,4%	24,4%	22,0%
	I will not rather do it	24,0%	20,1%	21,9%
	I will not do it	33,3%	23,8%	28,3%
	I don know/ I can not answer	19,0%	21,9%	20,5%
Total		100,0%	100,0%	100,0%

Social profile of the contemporary Bulgarian woman – donor in Education


Of all interviewees, about two-thirds are the persons donated for education are women (68%). Women are more involved with educational problems than men (Table 4).

Table 4 Donation for education by gender

		Sex		Total
		Man	Woman	
Did you donate for educational causes?	Yes	32,0%	68,0%	100,0%
	No	46,8%	53,2%	100,0%
Total		42,9%	57,1%	100,0%


The group of women who have donated in education was selected. The purpose was to reveal the socio-demographic profile of the female donors. The distribution of this group by ***degree of their education, their family status, the type of settlement where they live in, their employment and the professional groups to which they belong*** is presented as follows:

Concerning the educational degree, the largest share of women-donors (41,7%) graduated higher and upper secondary education, 40,9% of them have a secondary education and 17,4% have primary and lower of primary education (Graph №3).



Graph 3. Women who have donated for education by their educational degree


Approximately three quarters (72,5%) of the women in this group are married or live in cohabitation. The divorced or widows (16,5%) are ranked as second, and the lowest group is the one of the unmarried women - 11% (Graph №4).




Graph 4 Women who have donated for education by their marital status

Most of the women-donors - a total of about two-thirds - live in the capital Sofia and the district towns. The donors from the smaller settlements are significantly less. In smaller town live 11,3% and the villages' residents are 22,6% of them (Graph 5).

Regarding the impact of employment on the giving in education we can point out, that our expectations are for greater activity by the permanently employed. The hypothesis that the largest share of the donations in education are made by the employed persons has been confirmed. Unemployed ones, permanently not-working because of sickness, pensioners, and students are giving rarely than those with permanent and/or higher income. To the group of the employed women belong over 70% (Graph 6).




Graph 5. Women who have donated for education by settlement



Graph 6. Women who have donated for education by employment

A comparatively small share of contemporary Bulgarian women – donors for education are among the low-skilled and unskilled workers (a totally 20%). Significantly more are women – donors who have graduated a higher education and respective have good professions (Graph 7).



Graph 7. Women who have donated for education by the social groups to which they are added

The presented data show that the most Bulgarian woman motivated to charitable giving for educational purposes have a high education degrees (minimum secondary education), are married or live in cohabitation, they come from a city (capital and district town), are permanently employed and possess a higher professional qualification.

Conclusion

There is not a gender inequality in the contemporary Bulgarian society. Women are allowed to enter in all educational levels. Their chances of professional realization, leadership and higher socialstatus are increased. The preferred type of settlement is determined by their

employment. The largest share of female teachers is an additional prerequisite for the active inclusion of Bulgarian woman in educational causes. The old Bulgarian national revival woman have come to live again. The contemporary woman in the act in conditions of freedom and greater gender equality, where charity giving is not an abstract concept but a real quality.

In the three historical periods, the Bulgarian woman manifested a clear national consciousness and a high civic activity. Gender equality in the conditions of democracy creates some prerequisites for the full development of her potential related to the welfare of society.

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MYANMAR: BUDDHISM AND POLITICAL POWER

Abstract

Since 1962, Myanmar has been under one of the most inscrutable dictatorships in the world: the Military Junta in its various forms. After different attempts of democratization throughout the 80's, 90's 00's, all of which were carried out by civil society and the National League for Democracy (NLD), Myanmar is set on the path to democracy. The general elections of 2015, won by the NLD, were the starting point of a new political system crammed with challenges. Within this context, this article pretends to investigate which was the role of Buddhism and the Sangha from 1948 until now and how it is related with the nationalistic discourse. Buddhism in Myanmar has been one of the main defining tools for collective and cultural identity and it has worked in Myanmar as an agglutinative tool of the collective identity of the main ethnic group, the Bamar. However, in the last decade Buddhism has become the main tool of an ethnic nationalistic discourse that promotes segregation, division and exclusion. The return of this ethnic and religious nationalism has its maximum expression in the persecution of the ethnic group Rohingya, who are Muslims.

Buddhism has shaped the political arena in Myanmar since the twenties, when several monks started the independence and nationalistic movement. After 1948, year of its independence Buddhism had a significant role in politics: it had the power, and still has, to lead changes in the political arena and modify the behaviour Myanmar's citizens,

dictators and politicians. This paper explores which is the relationship between Buddhism and political power in Myanmar through recent history and how it has modified the country's political development.

Keywords: Buddhism, ethnic nationalism, Myanmar, dictatorship, identity.

Context

In 1948, Myanmar got the independence from Great Britain. From 1948 and until 1962 U Nu, and after general Aung San, the father of independence was assassinated, ruled the country as a constitutional democracy. It was characterized by important internal divisions and ethnic tensions (Steinberg, 2010). The democracy ended in 1962, when General Ne Win and the Tatmadaw, the Burmese military, organized a coup d'état and abolished the Constitution. The dictatorship period, led by the Military Junta in different forms, would last until 2015. During the eighties, Myanmar was included in the Least Developed Countries by the United Nations. The government tried to make some economic reforms and to open the country to international businesses and investments, but it was not enough. In 1988, students in Rangoon started a series of protest and claimed for democracy. Even if there is a little data about how many people died during the protests, it is said that around 3.000 demonstrators lost their lives (Oxford Burma Alliance, s.f.) and more than 10.000 were incarcerated. The protests were brutally crushed and "(...) in its aftermath the new junta was formed, maintaining an iron grip on power (...) General Ne Win, in charge since 1962, quietly faded into the background. A new leader, General Than Shwe began consolidating his hold. (Myunt-U, 2011:21).

After the protests the government suffered international isolation and Ne Win resigned and the Burmese Way to Socialism ended (Taylor, 2001). The Burmese Socialist Programme Party disappeared and the State Law and Order Restoration (SLORC) took power. Later, the party would change again its name and would become the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC).

The international community did not back the SLORC and after the protests, both the United States and the European Union blocked the country and established a series of economic sanctions.

The first democratic elections in the country were celebrated in 1991, and the National League for Democracy, led by Aung San Suu Kyi won the elections. (Oxford Burma Alliance, s.f.). However, the Military Junta did not accept the results and Aung San Suu Kyi was put under house arrest (Casa Asia; Fundación CIDOB; Real Instituto Elcano, 2010). Some members of the NLD and pro-democracy activists were incarcerated, too. Than Shwe took power until 2010.

In November 2010, after the protests and a Constitutional reform in 2008, the Military Junta convoked general elections, but the NLD did not participate. The Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) won 77% of the parliamentary seats, followed by the National Democratic Force (NDF) (Crisis Group Asia; International Crisis Group, 2011).

The international community did not accept the results because the elections were not transparent. The 2010 elections meant a big step towards democracy, but the military was still in power. (Crisis Group Asia; International Crisis Group, 2011). The Asian countries celebrated those elections, but the European Union and the United States did not see it that way. However, the 2010 elections meant an inflection point. The goals of the Burmese government were clear: they wanted a lift on the sanctions and the reestablishment of bilateral relations with other Asian countries.

In 2011 Thein Sein took power and there were by-elections in 2012. The NLD won 43 of the 46 available seats. A process of reforms started: the European Union and the United States lifted some of the sanctions.


2015 Elections

On 8th November 2015, Myanmar celebrated general elections. The European Union and the Carter Centre were invited to the elections, (Reuters, 2015). It was the first time that the European Union had the chance to observe the general elections in Myanmar (European Union External Action, 2015). In 2010, the government did not allow the entrance to international observers and in 2012, only observers from Asian countries visited the country (Reuters, 2015). After the elections, the European Union assured that there was a well-run polling process,

overthought the process of advance voting lacked transparency (European Union Election Observation Mission, 2015). The Carter Centre was also positive about the general elections and considered that the elections were held in an orderly and peaceful manner. (The Carter Center, 2015).

Table 1 Results of the 2015 elections

Myanmar election results 2015



Source: Myanmar election commission

BBC

Reference: FISHER J (2015). Myanmar's 2015 landmark elections explained. BBC, 3 December 2015. Available at: <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33547036> (accessed 3 December 2015).

Table 2 Composition of the Parliament after the 2015 elections

House of Representatives elections, 2015						
Party	Seats	Net Gain/Loss	Seats %	Votes %	Votes	+/-
NLD	255	▲218	57.95			
USDP	29	▼183	6.59			
ANP	12	▲4	2.73			
SNLD	12	▲12	2.73			
PNO	3	—	0.68			
Ta'Ang National Party	3	▲1	0.68			
ZCD	2	▲2	0.45			
KSDP	1	—	0.23			
KDUP	1	—	0.23			
LNDP	1	▲1	0.23			
WDP	1	▼1	0.23			
Independent	1	▲1	0.23			
Cancelled due to insurgency ^[20]	7		1.59			
To be declared	2		0.45			
Military appointees	110	—	25.00	—	—	0
Total	440		100	100		

Reference: Political Party Forum Asia (2015) Myanmar's NLD: much needed grace period after landslide election. Available at: <https://partyforumseasia.org/tag/myanmar-election-2015/> (accessed 18 November 2015).

30 million people voted, however, more than 4 million people were not allowed to vote. Some Burmese citizens outside the country could not vote and there were problems for voting in some rural areas (Tan, 2015).

Human Rights Watch stated that the Rohingya minority had not been able to vote, too: "But hundreds of thousands of Rohingya and other Muslims have been dropped from the voter list and effectively disenfranchised. Candidates have been excluded because of discriminatory citizenship laws that are being applied in a harsher way than in previous elections" (Human Rights Watch, 2015).

Despite the claims of some human rights organizations, the elections in Myanmar were considered a success by most of the international community. The NLD won the elections, but the 25% of the parliamentary seats were still reserved for the military, who has the power of veto.

In March 2016, the new president, Htin Kyaw, took power. Aung San Suu Kyi could not take power as a president because of the article 59f of the 2008 Constitution:

Qualifications of the President and Vice-Presidents are as follows (...) (f) shall he himself, one of the parents, the spouse, one of the legitimate children or their spouses not owe allegiance to a foreign power, not be subject of a foreign power or citizen of a foreign country. They shall not be persons entitled to enjoy the rights and privileges of a subject of a foreign government or citizen of a foreign country. (British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2008).

Aung San Suu Kyi married to Michael Aris, a British scholar and she has two sons who hold a British passport. This article was added to the 2008 Constitution, so she could never become the president. However, Jonah Fisher, the BBC correspondent in Myanmar, stated: "By installing Htin Kyaw, a trusted friend in the top job, and creating the new position of State Counsellor for herself Ms Suu Kyi is now more powerful than if she had simply been president" (Fisher, 2016).

Aung San Suu Kyi is the State Counsellor and the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Presidency. “It doesn’t matter how many ministries she takes as she will run the whole government anyway” (Zaw & McLaughlin, 2016).

The challenge: to stop the raising of Buddhist ethnic nationalism

The raising of a Buddhist ethnic nationalism discourse against some minorities is one of the main obstacles in Myanmar’s democratic transition. There will be no democracy if there is no national reconciliation between ethnic groups. Frydenlund states:

Buddhism’s close relations with the state have made Buddhism an ally with modern ethno-nationalism. Buddhism is identified with the majority ethnic group to the extent that religious minority identities are often represented as non-national. Thus, the dark side of Buddhist political paradigms is the potential exclusion of ethnic and religious minorities, and hence the possibility of increased insecurity. The escalating religious intolerance constitutes a serious threat to local communities, which in turn may represent a threat to the states themselves. Radical Buddhist groups today present a narrative of an inherent Buddhist-Muslim conflict, which excludes narratives of co-existence, tolerance, and inclusion. (Frydenlund, 2015:2).

The hate speech, led by the movement 969 and the Ma Ba Tha, is an obstacle to democracy and it benefits the military. The violence generated by the hate speech has been an excuse for the military to intervene in rural areas where minority groups live. Religion is the key to ethnic nationalism in Myanmar. Historically, religion has been used to justify violence against other ethnic minorities in the country. Promoting national reconciliation should be a priority in the democratic transition. The European Parliament Think Tank considers that signing a final peace accord is crucial for the country’s democratic transition (European Parliament Think Tank, 2015).

Buddhism and power in Myanmar

Buddhism has been intimately linked to the political history of Myanmar and since the 11th century, it predominates in Burma. It

is the religion of most of the population. There has always been a dependency between the monarchies that reigned before the arrival of the British and Buddhism.

To understand the resurgence of the ethno-nationalism in Myanmar, one must see how the Sangha relates to political power. In Myanmar, Buddhism has had a huge influence on the political life and has designed the country's recent history. There are five key moments in which Buddhism has modified Burmese politics.

Twenties and thirties

Nationalism reached Southeast Asia during the 1920s and settled in the cultural elites of the colonies. The emergence of modern nationalism was due to the development of capitalism, the disappearance of the great empires and the adoption of a colonial education that promoted democracy and freedom (Tuoung Vu, 2010). The elites of the countries of Southeast Asia were educated in the empire schools with the ideals of freedom, democracy and socialism.

Under the British colonial rule, the first Burmese and anticolonial movement appeared. It was led by monks who observed how the Buddhist moral was backing down in the country. With the country under the British rule there was a deterioration of morals and religious practices. Nationalism in Burma was born as a Buddhist reaffirmation, rather than a need to reaffirm Burmese national identity.

Before dying in prison in 1939, the monk U Ottama wrote: "When Lord Buddha was alive, a man had a predilection for Nirvana. There is nothing left now. The reason why it is so is because of the government is English" (Smith D. E., 1965: 96). Or U Thilasarara: "Though the attainment of political and personal freedom, they may be more favourably and firmly placed on the road to Nirvana" (Walton, 2016: 109). At this time the Young Men's Buddhist Association (YMBA) was created to promote national spirit, national language and literature, and Buddhism.

In the thirties, the nationalist movement was led by the Thakins, a group that promoted self-determination of Burma. It was a secular movement and it was led by Aung San, who promoted the separation of religion and power. He stated: "Religion is a matter of individual conscience, while politics is a social science. (...) We must draw a

clear line between politics and religion because the two are not the same thing. If we mix religion with politics, then we offend the spirit of religion itself. Politics is pure secular science (Houtman, 1999: 244).

The appearance of the first nationalist discourses, led by the monastic community, solidified the anticolonial nationalist movement that led the country to independence.

Democratic period: 1948-1962

On July 19, 1947, Aung San, six ministers, the transport secretary and a bodyguard were killed. Few months later, it was discovered that some British officers had sold weapons to Burmese officers but there was never any evidence of a possible conspiracy. On January 4, 1948 U Nu declared the independence.

The use of religion by political parties in Burma began in the fifties. The governing party, the Antifascist League for the Freedom of the People, (LAFLP) was the driving force behind this way of doing politics to avoid losing power. U Nu provoked a social division and a dangerous precedent.

In 1951 the Buddha Sasana Council was created to articulate the development of Buddhism in the country. It was a turning point in the relations between politics and religion. In 1958, U Nu ceded power to the Tatmadaw and called for elections. With the intention of securing his victory, U Nu promised to make Buddhism the state religion. After winning the elections, in 1961, the State and Religion Act was drafted as an amendment to the 1947 Constitution. Buddhism became the state religion. To avoid conflicts with other ethnic groups of the country, another amendment was drafted to guarantee the liberty of cult. These measures did not please either the Tatmadaw or the minorities, which began to organize themselves to defend their culture and interests. Gomà considers that the Tatmadaw knew that the enthronement of Buddhism was counterproductive to national interest (Gomà Pinilla, 2012).

To stop secessionist movements, the Tatmadaw took power in 1962 after a coup d'état. The pressure of the Sangha in 1960 and the constitutional amendment that had given Buddhism the title of official religion provoked an irreversible situation in Myanmar. It worked as a

catalyst for the Tatmadaw to take power in 1962. The interference of the monastic community in politics would result in the establishment of an authoritarian military regime that would remain in power until 2015.

Buddhism during the Military Junta: 1962-2007

In 1963, the military limited the political power of Buddhism. In 1965 the Buddha Sasana Council and the State Religion Promotion Act were abolished. In 1980 the Supreme Sangha Council was created in order to control the Buddhist leadership of the country.

When the protests took place in 1988, the monks lined up with the students, who asked for democracy. The 1988 protests put the focus on Burma and the international community took great interest in the country. Due to these protests, the Military Junta decided to hold general elections in 1991. The NLD won by majority, but the elections were annulled by the military and the leader of the NLD, Aung San Suu Kyi, was placed under house arrest.

Throughout the 1990s, the Sangha supported the NLD and the democratic cause. During this period, the Military Junta did everything to stop the monks, who were getting more and more involved in politics:

The monks should stay away from forming, joining or supporting any illegal organization that does not accept the supervision and the administration of sangha organizations at different levels. Party politics is concerned only with lay persons. [...] All in all, the members of the sangha residing in Myanmar are directed to avoid getting involved in party politics of instigation [83.6] (Directive No. 83 of 13th July 1991).

The support of the Sangha to the democratic cause had an important weight in Myanmar. The 1988 protest resulted in the 1991 elections.

The Saffron protests of 2007

In 2007 there was a turning point that changed the direction of the dictatorship. After a rise in prices due to the global economic crisis, the monastic community started a protest. The images of the Tatmadaw firing at the monks went viral and the international community pressured the regime. The government drafted a new Constitution in

2008 and there were elections in 2011. Sylwia Gil considers that the monks became aware of their responsibility for the country and realized that their role in society was not limited to the preservation of religion (Gil 2008). These protests, known as the Saffron Revolution, marked the way for a new political regime.

Current context: Movement 969 and Ma Ba Tha

Since 2012, an ethno-nationalist discourse has been spreading in Myanmar. It has its maximum expression in the Rohingya Crisis. The Rohingya is the Muslim minority who lives in Rakhine State, in the north of the country. The hate speech against this minority is led by the 969 movement and the Ma Ba Tha. These groups claim to protect the Sasana, the guideline of the monastic vocation. Buddhist nationalists frame their actions as an obligation to defend the country from any supposed religious threat.

This resurgence of the ethno-nationalism has led to an important split in the Burmese Sangha. The forced displacements and the brutality of the Tatmadaw against the Rohingya have caused Amnesty International and the United Nations to have described the situation as an ethnic cleansing. (Amnesty International, 2016) (UNHCR, 2017).

The construction of the Burmese identity

Religion has worked in Burma as a unifying element of the collective identity of the Bamar and it is the main element of national cohesion. In the words of Anthony D. Smith (1997): “A historical territory, a legal political community, the legal political equality of its members and a collective ideology and culture, these are the components of the western standard model of national identity” (Smith AD, 1997: 10). In Burma, Buddhism has functioned as that ideology and collective culture mentioned by Smith and it has always woven the national identity of the country. It is a religious nationalism. Barker (2009), quoted by Emily Biver (2014), defines it as follows:

(...) as a sentiment occurring when a specific faith is “central ... to conceptions of what is meant to belong to the given nation”, which is accurate in the case of Myanmar’s Buddhist nationalists, who identify their nation in terms of ethnicity and religion (Biver, 2014: 21).

Jurgensmeyer (2012) clarifies that Buddhism leads the new nationalism. Theravada Buddhism and nationalism have allied in Myanmar with clearly political intentions.

The resurgence of nationalism in Southeast Asia

In recent years, Southeast Asia has witnessed a resurgence of nationalism. This, according to Tuong Vu (2010), is due to the end of the cold war, the wave of liberalization and democratization in the region, the appearance of an intellectual class and finally, the resurgence of China as a regional power, which has created a widespread anti-Chinese feeling in the region as the southeast Asian countries see China as a threat. However, nationalism has not sprouted in all the countries of the region and has not done so in the same way (Vu, 2010).

The new nationalism aims to reaffirm the national identity in a globalized world. Kinnvall (2004) assures that individuals who face globalization tend to feel insecure and seek the reaffirmation of their own identity. They find that reaffirmation in religion and nationalism. Holliday, (2010), mentioned by Biver (2014) argues that “nation building (...) has been particularly strong in ancient colonial regions, (...), where cultural and linguistic differences have been repressed in order to build single national frameworks inherited from imperial rulers” (Biver, 2014: 25).

One of the risks of the reappearance of nationalism is the resurgence of old resentments and diplomatic conflicts, since the mission of nationalism nowadays is to assert national identity and to defend national territories, rather than liberating the country (Vu, 2010: 9). In this context, it seems clear that the resurgence of Buddhist nationalism in Myanmar not only comes from internal situation: there are many regional factors to be considered.

Conclusions

In Myanmar, Buddhism has always been used for political purposes. Understood as a cultural institution, it has taken advantage of its moral authority to promote or slow down political changes: it has played a fundamental role in Burmese political life and has modified it on

several occasions during recent history. While it is true that Buddhism did not consolidate the dictatorship, it did not oppose it frontally.

Buddhism has functioned as a factor of national cohesion, but it has also been and is one of the main elements of distortion of political harmony. At some point, it has functioned as a tool that has fostered an exclusive nationalist discourse and segregation in the country. This nationalism, at the same time, constitutes one of the greatest obstacles to national reconciliation and the peace process. Considering the fragility of the democratic stability at this moment in Myanmar due to several crises, it would be important that religion stepped back from the political arena in order to help consolidate democracy.

TABLES

Table 1 Results of the 2015 elections.

Table 2 Composition of the Parliament after the 2015 elections.

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THE LEGAL REFORM OF HEALTH CARE SYSTEM IN THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA¹

Abstract

Serbian law joined the active reforms in the health care sector. The procedure for the adoption of several laws in the area of health care is undergoing, aiming at improving health care services. The main reason for the adoption of new legislation is need for harmonization in the area of health care and health insurance system taking into account modern developments in the region countries and in the EU. Increasing the scope of mandatory health insurance is projected due to the growing needs of population for health care. It covered the new categories of the population, providing greater scope of health care to vulnerable social groups. Furthermore, the obligation of the individual to respond to a call for targeted preventive examination or screening under appropriate national programs is introduced. As a part of health care reform, Serbian government adopted Biomedical assisted fertilization Law creating preconditions for the promotion of donations in order to increase the number of successful treatments.

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It is likely to enhance the quality of health care taking into account modern standards of medical science and practice, complying with the EU legislation as well. There is also an initiative for adoption of new Pharmacy Law aiming to regulate pharmaceutical industry based on demographic, geographic and technical criteria.

Keywords: health care, compulsory health insurance, voluntary health insurance, transplantation of cells, tissues and organs, biomedical assisted fertilization

Introduction

The period behind us was marked by active legislative reform in the field of health care. There are several health-related laws in the parliamentary procedure, which should be adopted by the end of the year, while some of them have already been adopted, such as the Law on Biomedical Assisted Fertilization² and the Transfusion Medicine Act.³ The main goal of the reforms envisaged is the improvement of health care, and health services. Another important reason for the adoption of new laws is the need for harmonization of the Health Care System and Health Insurance with modern achievements both in the region countries and in the EU.

The Draft Laws are based on the principles of solidarity, reciprocity, and social justice, so that the scope of the mandatory health insurance coverage could be extended to as many citizens as possible. There is also a possibility of contracting a larger scope of rights by introducing a voluntary health insurance package in the context of the specialization of additional services. Extension of the scope of rights in mandatory health insurance is taking place due to the constantly increasing population needs for health services. Comparative analysis shows the trend that more and more funds for health care have been allocated in recent years.⁴ One of the reasons is a demographic factor, i.e. the

² Law on Biomedical Assisted Fertilization, *Službeni glasnik RS*, No. 40/2017

³ Law on Transfusion Medicine, *Službeni glasnik RS*, No. 40/2017

⁴ Institut za uporedno pravo (2014) *Sistemi zdravstvene zaštite i zdravstvenog osiguranja, Uporednopravna analiza u evropskim zemljama*. Sindikat lekara i farmaceuta Srbije – Gradska organizacija Beograda, Beograd.

population aging trend. This is why a domestic legislation endeavors to introduce the mandatory targeted preventive screening program within the framework of social responsibility for an individual's health. The plan is also justified regarding the aspect of protecting the general interest in the field of public health, reducing the costs of health care in terms of the prevention of serious diseases, and the preservation and improvement of the health of individuals.

Health Care Protection Issues – Proposed Novelty

At the end of 2016, the Ministry of Health of the Republic of Serbia proposed the Draft Law on Health Care.⁵ Bearing in mind the current Law on Health Care it can be observed that the draft has systematically improved both the systematization of the provisions, and the terminological compliance of the institute. The impression is that the Draft has a better logical structure and harmonization of the regulatory issue and it is terminologically well-balanced. Addressing the general social interest and concern for the health of the population, the Draft provides the extension of health care to foreign nationalities and stateless people with permanent and temporary residence in the Republic of Serbia, as well as internally displaced people from the former Yugoslavia. Also, displaced unemployed persons with a low monthly income with a place of residence in the territory of Serbia are protected by the Draft Law.⁶

For the first time in the Health System of the Republic of Serbia, the Draft Law has foreseen the introduction of mandatory targeted preventive screening or screening for an individual.⁷ The introduction of a mandatory citizen response to targeted screening is considered justified from the aspect of protecting the general interest in the field of public health, reducing the costs of health protection in the context of the prevention of serious diseases and condition, preserving and

⁵ Ministry of Health of the Republic of Serbia. *Draft Law on Health Care*. Available at: http://www.zdravlje.gov.rs/downloads/2016/Decembar/Nacrt_zakona_o_zdravstveno_j_zastiti_1.pdf (accessed 10 September 2017).

⁶ Draft Law on Health Care, Art. 3, 11.

⁷ Draft Law on Health Care, Art. 15.

improving health, and reducing mortality from cancer, cardiovascular diseases, diabetes and other chronic diseases. Screening programs should be implemented relying on the principle of usefulness for the Health Care System and harmonized with the principle of privacy and confidentiality of personality data of the participants in screening programs. Given that the Draft provides mandatory screening, a more thorough regulation of the procedure for its implementation is needed, as it is the case with in comparative law, requiring mandatory full information on the purpose and importance of the screening.

Reform of the Health Care System foresees reintroduction to the Health System clinic and the Health Center. In the provisions governing the activity of the health center the provision of emergency medical assistance is omitted, and this activity is transferred to the regional Emergency Medicine Units, which, in addition to the existing 4 institutes, will be established for the territory of one or more local self-government units. This solution completely changes the system that has functioned well in practice and calls for the formation of new units, which will undoubtedly cause new additional costs. It would be more useful to improve the existing system than to introduce a new one without an adequate reason based on good experience. Also, it is planned to establish new types of the institute: Institute for Palliative Care, Institute for Laboratory Diagnosis and Institute for Radiological Diagnostics.⁸

On the other hand, the reason for the adoption of the new Law on the Application of Human Cells and Tissues is the need for the field of human tissue applications to be based on the highest standards of medical science and practice, given that the field of medicine is intensively developed and offers great opportunities for treatment.⁹

The current Law has created confusion in practice because it has not clearly defined an institution that could be a tissue bank. This was the reason why the bank has never been established. With the clear

⁸ Draft Law on Health Care, Art. 28, 74, 80-89

⁹ Ministry of Health of the Republic of Serbia. *Draft Law on the Application of Human Cells and Tissues*. Available at: http://www.zdravlje.gov.rs/downloads/2016/Decembar/NACRT_ZAKONA_o_primeni_celija_i_tkiva.pdf (accessed 25 September 2017).

defining of conditions regarding the performance of activities, space, equipment and personnel issues, health institutions will be able to obtain a license for performing these activities. In order to set out the modern medical standards in the field of transplantation of human cells and tissues, it is necessary to define the Register of donors of hematopoietic stem cells, which allows finding unrelated donors and providing cells for transplantation. The Draft simplified the procedure in terms of licensing the Health Care institutions for performing human organ transplantation activities and established a single Information System. The Draft Law proposes the presumed consent of the deceased provider, i.e. the opt-out solution.¹⁰

The development of science and a wider use of human body substances have led to their commercialization without the consent of the authorities. The case of John Moore is well known, whose spleen cells, as unique, used to produce proteins important for the immune system, and later, to a large extent, are commercially exploited. The market value of this drug (which would not have developed without these unique cells) was about \$ 3 billion. John Moore who has not been informed and has not given the consent claimed to be a stakeholder in the proceeds of the sale of a drug, which was recognized by the California Supreme Court ruling. Data on the taking and sale of parts of the corpse to pharmaceutical companies without the consent of the authorized persons are published in the media, primarily abroad (Sjenčić, 2003).

The intention of the legislator is to systematically regulate the area of transplantation of human organs for the purpose of a treatment. Also, the legislator's intent is to establish and ensure the conditions for achieving quality and safety standards in transplantation of human organs, as well as to set up working conditions and organization of the health system aimed at ensuring the optimal viability of transplant organs and a high level of protection of human health. The Draft Law on transplantation of human organs for the purpose of treatment emphasizes the perseverance of the priority interests in order to protect life and health of individuals and ensures exercising the basic human rights and dignity of both the donor and the recipient.¹¹

¹⁰ Draft Law on the Application of Human Cells and Tissues, Art. 28.

¹¹ Ministry of Health of the Republic of Serbia. Draft Law on transplantation of human

As one of the main reasons for adopting a new law is increasing the number of successful organ transplants, and reducing the waiting list for organ transplants. It presupposes establishing effective procedures for donation in accordance with professional standards and ethical principles. In the preamble of some international documents, it is noted that the number of organ transplants from deceased persons indicates the level of development of society. Despite all achievements of this medical procedure, transplantation is still accompanied by numerous controversial issues and dilemmas, which show that it has not been yet fully defined by legal and ethical norms (Mujović-Zornić, 2013:1).

The need for organs is on the rise all over the world and the waiting lists are long. It is estimated that in the EU about 61,000 people are waiting for organ donations, and approximately 12 people die every day while waiting for a transplant. Therefore, scientific attempts has examined the possibilities of the so-called xenotransplantation, i.e. the process of transplanting organs or tissues between members of different species (for instance, between animals and humans).

In order to promote donation, the state creates the possibility of opt-in for a donor card. Progress in organizational terms has not been accompanied by an increased number of transplants since Serbia took the last place in Europe by the number of transplants. The main reason is the lack of voluntary donors. On the other hand, there have been cases in which individuals offered the sale of their own bodies, most often through advertisements in the press. The occurrence of trafficking in human organs was noticed in 1980s in the countries of Southeast Asia and since the year 2000 trafficking in organs has started to spread globally. Over time it has also evolved as one way of health tourism between developed and poor countries (Mujović-Zornić, 2013; Nedić, 2016). Organ transplantation is also a form of organized crime.

The draft law provides the presumed consent of the deceased donor.¹²

organs for the purpose of treatment. Available at: http://www.zdravlje.gov.rs/downloads/2016/Decembar/Nacrtna_Zakona_o_presadivanju_organu_u_svrhu_licenja.pdf (accessed 25 September 2017).

¹² The organs of the deceased can be taken for transplantation, if the adult donor with legal capacity, before death is not verbally or in writing for life, or if the parent,

If we consider the existing models of legally accepted organs from the diseased donors, the two different systems can be identified in the comparative law:

1) An opt-in system or explicit consent: parts of the deceased body cannot be taken unless explicit consent is given in the manner prescribed by the law (Denmark, Germany, The Netherlands, Switzerland, Australia and the United States). This significantly reduces the circle of potential organ donors. Therefore, the legislators of these countries extended the possibility of consent to the relatives of the deceased. The family has the right to the subsidiary decision if the deceased hadn't declared it.

2) An opt-out system or a system of the presumed consent: the deceased is allowed to take organs if he hadn't objected to life. In this regard, the consent is assumed. Taking is allowed even when there is a doubt about the will of the deceased. This means that taking organs from dead people is not prohibited in principle. This increases the number of potential donors, because they also include those who haven't even made a statement at all. Laws on the transplantation of most EU countries accept this model (Italy, France, Spain, Belgium, Poland, Austria, Sweden, Norway, Croatia, and Slovenia) (Mujović-Zornić, 2013:5).

Biomedical assisted fertilization is an area of medicine that has been intensively developed over years, offering great opportunities for the treatment of various forms of infertility and sterility (Mujović, 2017:440). So far, the field of biomedical assisted fertilization has been regulated by the Law on the treatment of infertility by procedures of biomedicine-assisted fertilization.¹³ The current law regulating the field of infertility treatment by the methods of biomedical assisted fertilization has not recognized the importance of defining and regulating the activities of biomedical assisted fertilization and the conditions under which this activity can be performed. These conditions include testing, obtaining, processing, freezing, defrosting, conservation, storage and

spouse, extra-marital partner or adult child died at the time of death did not expressly object. Draft law on transplantation of human organs for the purpose of treatment, Art. 23.

¹³ Law on the Treatment of Infertility by Procedures of Biomedicine-Assisted Fertilization, *Službeni glasnik RS*, No. 72/2009.

distribution reproductive cells, zygotes and embryos, as well as the import or export of reproductive cells. It caused long-standing practice that biomedical fertilization procedures are being carried out in health institutions without defining the conditions at the national level under which they will be performed (Mujović, 2017:442).

The Law brings novelty in the area of private practice, where private health care institutions could provide health services if it meets the requirements prescribed by the law¹⁴. The increase of incidence of infertility in our country in recent years has indicated the necessity of involving as many couples as possible in the procedures of biomedical assisted fertilization. This means the reorganization of health care institutions, where private health care institutions could participate under the same conditions as public institutions.¹⁵

The Law has expanded the definition of biomedical assisted fertilization to the case regarding the preserving of fertility, while the previous law was concerned only with the cases of infertility. This solution increases the chance for the successful procedure of biomedical assisted fertilization for those persons who, for medical reasons, are not able to be in the process at the time of its implementation.

It is stipulated that the right to biomedical assisted fertilization has an adult, a capable woman and a man who needs the help of biomedical assisted fertilization in the treatment of infertility, leading a joint life in accordance with the law governing family relations i.e. spouses or extramarital partners.¹⁶ Also, the right entitles a woman with legal capacity living alone and is capable of performing parental duty taking into account her psychosocial condition and interest of a child to undergo the procedure of biomedical assisted fertilization.¹⁷ Furthermore, the

¹⁴ Law on Biomedical Assisted Fertilization, Službeni glasnik RS, No. 40/2017, Art. 14.

¹⁵ We believe that this solution is justified, since it allows access to most couples. In recent years, couples have often gone to other countries to access biomedical assisted fertilization. It is impossible to tell how many people travel in order to access fertility services. In 2010, Shenfield et al. estimated that there were about 24–30,000 cycles of cross border fertility treatment within Europe each year, involving 11–14,000 patients (Jackson, Millbank, Karpin, Stuhmcke, 2016).

¹⁶ It is also regulated in other countries in the region. To see (Alinčić, 2006; Žnidaršić-Skubic, 2008).

¹⁷ The law does not envisage the age limit to which the procedure of biomedical as-

Law stipulates that the right to biomedical assisted fertilization has also a legally capable woman or a man who has postponed the use of their reproductive cells because of the possibility of reducing or losing reproductive function that meets the requirements prescribed by this law. The existence of medical indications would be determined by the competent specialist.¹⁸

The donated reproductive cells could be used in the biomedical assisted fertilization in two cases: 1) when it is not possible to use reproductive cells of one of the spouses or extra-marital partners and 2) when the conception could not occur for medical reasons or when other medical assisted procedures were unsuccessful. Also, this could be applied when it is necessary to prevent a severe hereditary disease of a child. The above procedures show that the use of donated reproductive cells is allowed only for one spouse, or extra-marital partner (Georgijević, 2009). In the biomedical assisted fertilization, donated embryos of spouses/extra-marital partners in the homologous method of fertilization can be used, only when spouses or extra-marital partners who do not want to use their embryos for their own fertilization provide their explicit written consent.¹⁹

By enacting a new law, conditions will be created for the promotion of donation and awareness raising on the importance of donation, as well as the organization of the health service for the implementation of the process of biomedical assisted fertilization, which will increase the number of successful treatment and improve the quality of the provided health care according to the regulation of the EU in this field.

sisted fertilization can be undertaken, but has taken a more flexible approach using standards that spouses or extra-marital partners are in such a psychosocial condition that they can be expected to be able to perform parental duties. This leaves enough space for assessing in each case the suitability for biomedical assisted fertilization without strictly binding years of life. In comparative law, the trend of determining the upper age limit for women, for example, is evident: 45 years old in France, 47 in Belgium, 50 in Greece (Cvejić-Jančić, 2010:7) Although the law does not specify the boundary, this is done by the Rulebook, which raises the age limit for women entering the process of biomedical assisted fertilization from 40 to 42 years. Rulebook on the content and scope of the right to health care from compulsory health insurance and participation for 2017. *Službeni glasnik RS*, No. 8/2017, Art. 10

¹⁸ Law on Biomedical Assisted Fertilization, Art. 25.

¹⁹ Law on Biomedical Assisted Fertilization, Art. 30.

Health Insurance Issues – Proposed Novelty

The introduction of the Draft Law on Health Care was followed by the Draft Law on Health Insurance.²⁰ The need for adoption of the new Law is explained by importance of harmonization the health insurance system with modern achievements in the region and in the EU, although the current Health Insurance Law regulated the same matter, with minor differences.

The draft has extended the circle of insured persons on several grounds: it introduced two basic insurance schemes for farmers; it presented insurance scheme based on the performance of the notary's affairs; it also presented two insurance schemes for both persons receiving a pension or invalidity allowance exclusively from the foreign insurance holder and those with a permanent or temporary residence in Serbia.²¹

The Draft Law on Health Insurance creates a possibility of denying mandatory health insurance to insured persons in particular situations. Thus, healthcare services are not offered to the insured person who unjustifiably refuses to respond on call for a particular screening survey.²² Although it is repressive and discriminatory, this provision aims at stimulating certain categories of population in terms of taking preventive examinations for the early detection of the disease. It caused much controversy among the scientific and professional public. To sum up, the mandatory screening of certain diseases has been introduced by the draft, whereby failure to respond to the call is sanctioned by the denial of health care funding. It favors the principle of economic utility rather than the principle of the individual's autonomy. The proposed solution is unconstitutional, since the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia guarantees that everyone has the right to the protection of his physical and mental health.²³ Furthermore, the introduction of

²⁰ Ministry of Health of the Republic of Serbia. *Draft Law on Health Insurance*. Available at: http://www.zdravlje.gov.rs/downloads/2016/Decembar/Nacrt_zakona_o_zdravstvenom_osiguranju.pdf (accessed 10 September 2017).

²¹ Draft Law on Health Insurance, Art. 11.

²² Draft Law on Health Insurance, Art. 110.

²³ Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, *Službeni glasnik RS*, No. 98/2006, Art. 68.

penal provisions against insured persons could be criticized regarding the targeted population respond scarcely to screening programs. Conversely, if the state introduces a sufficiently functional call system, the appropriate level of citizen education and screening promotion penal provisions will not be necessary. It is also more important to work on further promotion and motivation of targeted population than on the penal policy and repression.

Medical examinations is not included into Health Care funding regarding enrollment in secondary schools, faculties, and courses obtaining a Health Care certificate for employees. Moreover, Health Care does not include medical examinations and treatments for professional and amateur athletes older than 14 years. Thus, the Law is harmonized with the Law on Sports which stipulates that mandatory health insurance provides funds for determination of general and special medical ability of children between 6 to 14 years in sports activities. Out of those cases in which insured persons do not provide Health Care, the legislator excludes women who have performed a mastectomy of one or both breasts and they can perform aesthetic reconstruction after the performed mastectomy on the basis of mandatory health insurance.²⁴ It is concluded that proposed solution is justified, since it contributes to improving the physical condition of the woman after the performed mastectomy.

The Draft Law on Health Insurance brings novelty in the area of voluntary Health Insurance, which has been regulated by the Regulation on Voluntary Health Insurance (by-law document).²⁵ The legislator seeks to precisely regulate this type of Health Insurance by proposing several models of voluntary Health Insurance. Furthermore, it sets up the implementation procedure, as well as the mechanism of financing. In this regard, voluntary Health Insurance is a long-term insurance, where contract period could not be shorter than 12 months. We consider that it is justified to regulate voluntary health insurance at the same level, since the current Health Insurance Law²⁶

²⁴ Draft Law on Health Insurance, Art. 110.

²⁵ Regulation on Voluntary Health Insurance, *Službeni glasnik RS*, No. 108/08, 49/09.

²⁶ Health Insurance Law, *Službeni glasnik RS*, No. 107/2005, 109/2005, 57/2011, 110/2012 – decision US, 119/2012, 99/2014, 123/2014, 126/2014 – decision US,

only regulated in principle. It was regulated more detail by by-law document - Regulation on Voluntary Health Insurance, which makes these two insurance systems not the same way regulation of the same rank regulated. The draft proposes that the insurer could not conduct voluntary Health Insurance for an identical type, content, scope, standard, method, and procedure, as it is the case with the mandatory Health Insurance System. Taking into account International and Comparative Law, a prohibition of discrimination of insured persons based on age, sex or health status in terms of entering into a relationship of insurance has been provided. The considerable sensitivity of genetic data in the context of insurance has been considered, whereby the Draft prohibited the insurer to request genetic data, i.e. the results of genetic testing for hereditary diseases as a condition for establishing the insurance relationship. We suggest a new provision by adding the following “on the basis of the results of genetic testing, the premiums or sums of insurance could not be determined and limited.” This statement represents a standard in Comparative Law, for instance, in the US law.

Discussion

The Draft Law on the Application of Human Cells and Tissues proposes the presumed consent of the deceased provider, i.e. the opt-out solution. This solution was not unanimously accepted in domestic and foreign public as well as in foreign legislation. For instance, German, Swiss and Polish regulations accept an opt-in solution (the necessity of the explicit consent of the provider/donor). The Serbian legislator accepted the opt-out solution in order to increase the availability of cells and tissues for transplantation. Moreover, the law itself does not provide enough guarantee that the cells and tissues in the opt-out system will not be abused. Finally, given that the opt-out solution has been criticized, our legislator need to consider the experience of other opt-in countries, instead of forcing the presumed consent to promote the donation throughout various health-systemic mechanisms.

The opt-out solution is not adequate since the existence of a presumed

consent may be a result of the lack of information. Therefore, the institutions of the Health Care System need to create the mechanisms of donation promotion, rather than impose an opt-out solution as a way of transferring responsibilities from system to providers/donors. The opt-out solution is difficult to apply in practice since there is no register of persons who have opted not to be providers/donors. The reason for doing so was reducing the costs of keeping the register. However, the non-donor register needs to be established. Otherwise, it will remain unknown who explicitly denied becoming a donor. The lack of such register suggests that there is no serious intention of the legislator to actually record non-donors. Also, taking into account EU regulation, mainly Directive 2004/23/EC setting out quality and safety standards for donated human tissues and cells, Serbian legislator need to comply with those standards in a harmonization process. It means compliance with the provision of the voluntary donation and with the principle of mandatory and informed consent. Furthermore, the Directive encourages system registration of any serious adverse effects or reactions.

As Draft Law on the Application of Human Cells and Tissues, The Draft Law on transplantation of human organs for the purpose of treatment also provides the presumed consent of the deceased donor. If we proceed from the assumption of the presumed consent, there is a legal gap, since the draft does not state where the person who rejected being a donor could make a statement, although this possibility is envisioned by the Draft Law. The question that arises is where these persons will give the statement: with the general practitioners, the Biomedicine Administration, or there will be established a special register of these persons. In this regard, it could be said that there is a lack of a serious intention of the legislator to keep a register of these persons.

The new provision regarding the presumed consent of the deceased donor should be considered in the light of the prevention of possible abuse, the existing tradition and its established cultural and social norms. Thus, the active promotion of voluntary donation is a far better solution taking into account the current stage of development of Serbian society and Law.

On the other hand, the Draft Law on Health Insurance provides the

legal basis for the subsequent introduction of health insurance packages, which implies basic guaranteed rights within the framework of the right to Health Care provided by a universal mandatory health insurance. This can be interpreted as the basis for the subsequent introduction of health services packages, where only the basic package of services would be financed from the funds of mandatory health insurance, with the possibility of extending the scope of rights. The proposed solution is in line with the adopted solutions in the EU Member States, where primary public health insurance remains, but with the possibility of contracting a larger scope of rights in the context of the specialization of needs and services. Introduction of the concept of specialization of needs and services presupposes the regulation of the voluntary health insurance according to the EU standards. The voluntary health insurance is regulated as a financial service in the most EU countries where in the Third non-life Insurance Directive stands that voluntary health insurance represents a partial or complete alternative to publicly financed coverage taking into account the principle of freedom to provide services (Sagan, Thomson, 2016:86-89). Until now, in Serbia as in the most EU countries voluntary health insurance was regulated in the same way as any other financial services and special provisions regarding voluntary health insurance are not included in the text of the law. However in order to improve affordable access to voluntary health insurance special regulation of this area that goes beyond general insurance provisions must be encouraged taking into account recent trends in the most EU countries (Germany, France, Belgium, Croatia, Slovenia).

Conclusion

As a principled comment, the question of justification of the adoption of the new Law on Health Care can be raised, when the current Law regulates the matter in the same way, taking into account that there are no significant changes related to the institutes themselves or different regulation of important health care issues.

When it comes to the Draft Law on Health Insurance, it should be emphasized that it is based on the principles of solidarity and reciprocity, and the principle of social justice. The draft introduces the possibility of additional, supplementary and private insurance as

a form of voluntary health insurance, which is a trend that has existed for several years in European countries, while the accession of Serbia to the EU requires the harmonization of domestic legislation in this direction. In this context, the justification for the adoption of a new law could be sought, since the existing Health Insurance Act regulates matter in the same way.

Finally, we conclude that the proposed and adopted solutions represent a significant improvement of the domestic Health Care System. There remains an open question of the application of particular institutes, such as the proposed transplantation solutions and biomedical assisted fertilization, taking into account the division of scientific and professional public. In addition, the inconsistency of certain solutions, inadequate conditions and mechanisms for their implementation should be added, which can lead to potential abuses and even more pronounced disagreement of the general public.

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**THE ISLAMOPHOBIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE MUSLIM
COMMUNITY IN BLAGOEVGRAD REGION**

Abstract

The terrorist attacks in Europe and refugee crisis and immigration due to the war in the Middle East shaped the public debate on Islam in Bulgaria at the present day.

The Muslim community in Bulgaria is the largest religious minority group in the country. It remained within the boundaries of the Bulgarian state after the country's liberation in the second half of the 19th century.

The Bulgarian Muslims living in the region of Blagoevgrad are strongly religious and have preserved the Muslim name system, customs and clothing. They can be characterized as honest, loyal, peace-loving citizens; they have never been involved in collective crimes or public provocations. Despite their loyalty and propriety to the statutory order of the country, the problems are not few.

The problems that underline Islamophobia in the region like in the whole country are mainly political. These problems have sometimes taken on a legal form in order to impose restrictions on the country's Muslim community.

The present paper experiencing Islamophobic attitudes in Blagoevgrad region, Southern Bulgaria and provides information about the main issues relating to Islamophobia now a day. It gives answers to the

main question is there an anti-Muslim hate crime and religious discrimination against Muslims in the Region of Blagoevgrad.

Keywords: Muslim community, anti-Islamic attitudes, politics, Islam, Blagoevgrad region

The Republic of Bulgaria is a parliamentary democracy. In the period from 1900 till now there were 13 official censuses of the population in Bulgaria. According to the 2011 Census, the population of Bulgaria is 7,364,570. The people who responded and identified themselves as Eastern Orthodox are 4,374,135 or 76%. The Catholic religion was chosen by 48,945 persons and the Protestant faith by 64,476 persons - or 0.8% and 1.1% of the respondents respectively. There are 577,139 Muslims or 10% of the population, of which 546,004 identified as Muslim Sunni and 27,407 as Muslim Alevi - 3,727 people identified simply as "Muslim". The question of religious denomination was the one with the largest percentage of people who did not respond (21.8%).

Population by confession by 01.02.2011

Total for the country	5,758,301
Eastern Orthodox	4,374,135
Catholics	48,945
Protestants	64,476
<i>Muslims</i>	
Muslims Sunits	546,004
Muslims Shiits	27,407
Muslims	3,728
Armeno-Gregorians	1,715
Judaism	706
Other	9,023
I profess no religion	272,264
not self identified	409,898

The statistical review demonstrates the differentiation on the grounds of national and ethnic origin, language and religion. In addition, it could be adding also cultural differences, historical traditions, etc. This complex picture needs to be legally regulated in order to meet the needs of the democratic society, the rule of the law, human rights, international obligations and the domestic social relations.

Muslim community in Bulgaria

The data of the last census shows that the Muslim community in Bulgaria consists of different “sub-groups”. The Muslim community in Bulgaria is the largest religious minority group in the country; it remained within the boundaries of the Bulgarian state after the country’s liberation in the second half of 19th century. The Muslim community in Bulgaria can be characterized as honest, loyal, peace-loving citizens; they have never been involved in collective crimes or public provocations. Despite their loyalty and propriety to the statutory order of the country, the problems are not few. The problems that underline Islamophobia in the country are mainly political. These problems have sometimes taken on a legal form in order to impose restrictions on the country’s Muslim community. Amongst those who declared themselves as belonging to the Bulgarian ethnic group 67,350 are Muslims; while from those who declared themselves as Roma, 42,201 are Muslims¹. Bulgarian Muslims are native-born and consist of different ethnicities such as Turks, Pomaks, Roma, Tatars, Cherkess, and Bulgarians. A small percentage of Muslims are immigrants (about 15,000 people) from other Muslim countries (Middle-East and Asia diasporas) and are mainly based in the capital Sofia and Plovdiv.

The terrorist attacks in Europe and refugee crisis and immigration due to the war in the Middle East shaped the public debate on Islam in Bulgaria at the present day. Anti-Muslim hate, vandalism against mosques and discrimination have persisted in 2016; many religious sites and symbols were subjected to various forms of violations including damage to property. Anti-Muslim rhetoric is very common in the nationalistic parties’ public discourse and is used to intimidate society and present Islam and Muslims as a threat to Bulgaria. According to the Office of the Grand Mufti, not with standing the progress made since the advent of democracy in Bulgaria in 1990, discrimination, ethnically and religiously motivated offensive acts and prejudice against the Turkish-Muslim minority and its institutions persist. The politicians and decision-makers usually ignore, or flatly

¹ National Statistical Institute of the Republic of Bulgaria, “Population and housing census 2011,” available at http://www.nsi.bg/census2011/PDOCS2/Census2011final_en.pdf (accessed 20 September 2017)

deny, the problem of Islamophobia. The problems of anti-Muslim hate speech and negative attitudes as a result of religious affiliation are underestimated by the public, the media and at an institutional level. The present paper seeks to provide information about the main issues relating to Islamophobia in contemporary Bulgarian society, anti-Muslim hate crime and religious discrimination against Muslims in the Blagoevgrad region. **Methodology:** the lack of official data on the ethnic and religious structure of the population in the Blagoevgrad region entails the search for informal sources of information. In order to specify the attitudes of Bulgarian-speaking Muslims (Pomaks) in the Blagoevgrad region and the presence of Islamophobia and since the object of the mission in this paper is the Muslim community in the region, twenty random in-depth interviews have been conducted, through Bulgarian-speaking Muslims (Pomaks).

Definition of Islamophobia

The term 'Islamophobia' was relatively uncommon till 9/11, 'anti-Muslim prejudice had grown so considerably and so rapidly in recent years that a new item in the vocabulary is needed.

Public and policy debate in Bulgaria now addresses Islamophobia more directly, but not always in a productive or coherent way. In the intervening 20 years much has changed. Three particular changes are worth highlighting: the first change is that the context – domestically and, perhaps more importantly, globally – has transformed fundamentally. After 9/11, Muslims became a greater focus of policymakers in Bulgaria, the EU and around the world, but framed largely in terms of terrorism or as a civilizational threat. This framing of Muslims is, of course, centuries old, but has re-emerged in new ways. Of course, the terrorist threat is indeed real. A frequency attacks in EU in 2017 inevitably increases public concern and fear, as well as requiring long-term support for the victims of these terrible attacks. For the most part the government, police, mayors, other officials and indeed victims' families have responded sensitively to these incidents. The issue of terrorism in EU and across the world of course deserves policy and public focus and is a significant challenge for our society.

This research/paper focuses on Islamophobia specifically, as a form of discrimination that affects Bulgarian speaking Muslims (Pomaks) and those who are perceived to be Muslim. It does not offer a comprehensive account of Bulgarian Muslims or Islam. Rather it offers an overview of the way in which Islamophobia affects individuals and communities in ways that are either structural or interpersonal.

Islamophobia in 2017 is complex and multifaceted. The focus in the paper is on the manifestations of Islamophobia that is described as anti-Muslim discrimination or racism. There is not sufficient public understanding of the ways in which Muslim individuals and communities experience discrimination, and this should also be the focus of policymakers and anyone else seeking to, or in a position to, improve the lives of Bulgarian Speaking Muslims.

The European Union and its Member States make significant efforts to promote, protect and preserve an open secular society with equal rights and opportunities. Thus, a distinction must be made between attitudes and actions against individuals or groups of individuals of Muslim faith, based on unjust stereotypes and generalisations on the one hand, and a critical stand towards religious manifestations in our society that do not respect fundamental rights on the other. The common fundamental principles of the European Union and its Member States under Community law, including the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the European Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, must be respected. These values include respect for the uniqueness and freedom of the individual, equal opportunities for men and women (including the equal right of women to make individual choices in all walks of life) and equal treatment and non-discrimination on a number of grounds, including, for example, sexual orientation. Efforts to protect those principles may at times clash with the perceptions of certain individuals or faith groups. However, Member States have a positive duty to ensure that a potential critical stance towards certain religious manifestations respects the principle of equal treatment.

The Bulgarian legislation of discrimination

In the years after the democratic changes, several laws have been adopted in Bulgaria and improvements have been made to existing legislature, mainly to fulfill the conditions for membership of the EU (January 2007). The Constitution² (adopted in 1991) and other laws and policies protect religious freedom and, in practice, the government has generally shown the required respect for religious freedom. The Constitution designates Eastern Orthodox Christianity as the “traditional” religion³, exempting it from having court registration, a requirement for all other religious groups. To receive national legal recognition, the law requires groups other than the Bulgarian Orthodox Church to apply for official registration at the Sofia City Court. The Law of Religions establishes the right to religion and its protection, guarantees the legal status of religious communities and institutions, and outlines their relations with the state⁴. By law, public schools are required to offer optional religious education courses that cover Christianity and Islam as part of the elective curriculum⁵ with explicit permission from the students’ parents. The law also allows religious groups to open religious schools and universities.⁶ With the permission of the Minister of Education and Science, religious institutions in the country may open religious schools for the ritual needs of children who have completed primary education.⁷ The state pays particular subsidies each year for traditional religious communities in the country on the basis of population percentage. In 2016, the subsidy intended for the Muslim religion was 360,000 levs⁸ (approx. 180,000 Euros).

² articles 6, 13 and 37, The Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria (1991).

³ article 13, The Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria.

⁴ article 1, The Law of the Religions (2002).

⁵ articles 48 and 76, The Law of Preschool and School Education (2015).

⁶ article 33, The Law of Religions(2002).

⁷ Law of National Education, art.30 (2013) and Law of Preschool and School Education, art.48, 324 (2016).

⁸ State gazette, No.96/9.12.2015, sec./National Assembly, The Law for State Budget 2016, decree No.259, <http://dv.parliament.bg/DVWeb/showMaterialDV.jsp?id-Mat=99252> (accessed September 2017)

The Muslim community received 150,000 levs of this subsidy (approx. 75,000 Euros) for reconstruction purposes. The sum is intended for the construction, repairing and maintenance of Muslim religious sites and mosques. The subsidy allocated to the Orthodox Church was over 3 million levs (1.5 million Euros); for the Catholic Church 50,000 levs; and for the Jewish community 50,000 levs. Bulgaria ratified an international convention for the abolition of all kinds of discrimination. It passed a special Act on Protection from Discrimination. The Law on Protection from Discrimination regulates the protection against all forms of discrimination and aims to contribute to its prevention. The Commission for Protection from Discrimination⁹ is an independent specialized state body for the prevention of discrimination and ensuring equal opportunities.¹⁰

Bulgaria's laws that apply to hate crimes are a combination of specific penalty enhancements and substantive offences. Over the years, changes and improvements have been made to the Penal Code in the parts referring to hate crimes, including hate crimes on religious grounds, crimes against religious denominations, and on racial grounds.¹¹ The Council for Electronic Media is an independent specialised body that regulates broadcasting activities in Bulgaria, the registering and issuing of licenses, and the supervising of activities of all broadcasters transmitting programmes in the country.¹² The Radio and Television Act regulates the media services of all radio and television stations in the jurisdiction of the Republic of Bulgaria.¹³ A large number of Bulgarian media have signed a national Code of Ethics.¹⁴ The institution of the independent Ombudsman established by law in 2003 serves as an advocate for citizens who believe their rights

⁹ Website of *The Commission for Protection Against Discrimination* available at <http://www.kzd-nondiscrimination.com/layout/> (accessed 25 November 2016)

¹⁰ Article 40, Law on Protection against Discrimination (2003).

¹¹ Penal Code, Articles 116, 131, 162, 164, 165, 172, 419a.

¹² Website of *Council for Electronic Media*, available at <http://www.cem.bg/> (accessed 18 January 2017)

¹³ Council for Electronic Media, "Radio and Television Act" available at <http://www.cem.bg/infobg/81> (accessed 18 January 2017)

¹⁴ Website of *National Council for Media Ethics* available at <http://mediaethicsbg> (accessed 18 January 2017)

and freedoms have been violated by the actions or inaction of public and municipal administrations, as well as by public service providers.¹⁵ Despite the existence of good institutional and legal framework, the practice shows that there is no tangibility on the effective functioning of the institutions and law enforcement practice.

On the other hand One of the most controversial legislative issues in 2016 was the adoption by the National Assembly of Bulgaria of the “Law Prohibiting the Wearing of Clothing Concealing One’s Face in Public Spaces”, the so-called “Burqa Law”.¹⁶

The role of the Media

Media also plays an important role in forging a negative public opinion towards Bulgarian Speaking Muslims. Some media outlets and journalists contribute to the establishment of Islamophobic attitudes. Programs with discriminatory content and offensive rhetoric are allowed to be broadcast on TV. Also in the country, especially migrants by a persistent defamation campaign through the media. They introduce hate speech to mainstream discourse, both in politics and media. And the latter ones influence a lot the speech of regular people. Hate speech is growing in Bulgaria. Recently the situation has become worsened, especially with the new global challenges such as refugee crisis, the war in the Middle East and fatal ideology of “DAISH”, which negatively impact on Muslim communities in Europe including Bulgaria.

However, lately the media reflected the news that some mosques and mesjeeds (prayer rooms) in the country, especially in Sofia are illegal and clandestine, as well as the worshipers preach radicalism. On this occasion we can see the example of cooperation between media and political party. Obviously the protests have organized by the politicians, as the members of VMRO (a Nationalistic Political Party in the National Assembly), as well as a Christian clergyman were seen among the protesters on 13 March, the date of first gathering.

¹⁵ Website of The Ombudsman of the Republic of Bulgaria, available at <http://www.ombudsman.bg/> (accessed 18 January 2017)

¹⁶ Adopted and passed on second reading in the National Assembly of the Republic of Bulgaria, available at <http://www.parliament.bg/bg/laws/ID/42106> (accessed 30 September 2017)

The public reactions against mosques rise, as the people congregate at the prayer room every Friday, as it causes the feeling of insecurity and social discomfort among the Muslims. Thus the media and politicians provoked reaction and protest of a group of people in Sofia against the prayer room in Lulin locality, as well as created tension and atmosphere of hate between people. Thus the distorted news of the media reporting about the Muslims in the country creates tension between Muslims and non-Muslims.

Religious structure of the population in the Blagoevgrad region

Official data on the ethnic and religious structure of the population in the Blagoevgrad region can not be find. This entails the search for informal sources of information. The below data on religious affiliation are submitted by father Nikolay Davidov, who is a longtime clergyman/employee in the “Nevrokopska” and a clergyman in the diocese at present the village of Banichan (Municipality of Gotse Delchev).¹⁷

Table № 2: Total number and religious structure of the population in the Municipalities with mixed population, Bansko and Gotse Delchev Municipalities.

Municipality	01.02.2011 Total	01.01.2007 Total	Religious structure to the month October, 2017
BANSKO	13125		
<i>THE TOWN OF BANSKO</i>	9019	8645	Mixed (predominate Christians)
<i>DOBRINISHTE</i>	2836	2801	Mixed
<i>village GOSTUN</i>	46	71	Christians
<i>village KREMEN</i>	205	281	Christians
<i>village MESTA</i>	242	260	Mixed (predominate Christians)
<i>village OBIDIM</i>	84	132	Christians
<i>village OSENOVO</i>	78	108	Christians
<i>village FILIPOVO</i>	615	597	Muslims
GOTSE DELCHEV	31236		
<i>THE TOWN OF GOTSE DELCHEV</i>	19219	20023	Mixed (predominate Christians)
<i>village BANICHAN</i>	611	645	Christians
<i>village BOROVO</i>	1138	1148	Christians
<i>village BREZNITSA</i>	3379	3247	Muslims (about 130 Christians)
<i>village BUKOVO</i>	917	879	Muslims
<i>village GOSPODINTSI</i>	508	447	Muslims (about 20 Christians)
<i>village DELCHEVO</i>	51	69	Christians
<i>village DOBROTINO</i>	38	39	Christians
<i>village KORNITSA</i>	1666	1636	Muslims (about 100 Christians)
<i>village LAZNITSA</i>	1602	1424	Muslims
<i>village MUSOMISHTA</i>	2107	2251	Christians

¹⁷ Stoykova, P. 2015. “Bqgstvo” ot seloto v oblast Blagoevgrad, available at http://www.omda.bg/uploaded_files/files/articles/SELA_za_PRODAN-2_1429175939.pdf (accessed 3 October 2017).

Table № 3: Total number and religious structure of the population in the Municipality of Garmen.

Municipality	01.02.2011 Total number	01.01.2007 Total number	Religious structure to the month October, 2017
GARMEN	14981		
village BALDEVO	188	201	Christians
village GORNO DRYANOVO	1009	1187	Muslims
village GARMEN	1998	1716	Christians (temporarily Muslims)
village DEBREN	2251	2251	Muslims
village DOLNO DRYANOVO	1216	1039	Muslims
village DABNITSA	1760	1669	Mixed (predominate Muslims)
village KOVACHEVITSA	42	41	Christians (1-2 families of Muslims)
village KRUSHEVO	258	277	Muslims
village LESHTEN	2	5	Christians (1 family Muslims)
village MARCHEVO	149	164	Christians (Roma neighbourhood – muslims and Evangelists)
village OGNYANOVO	1634	1611	Mixed (about 60% Muslims)
village ORESHE	198	332	Muslims
village OSIKOVO	524	553	Muslims (15-16 Christians)
village RIBNOVO	2745	2449	Muslims
village SKREBATNO	297	296	Muslims (15-16 Christians)
village HVOSTYANE	710	673	Muslims

Table № 4: Total number and religious structure of the population in the Municipality of Hadzidimovo.

Municipality	01.02.2011 Total numbers	01.01.2007 Total numbers	Religious structure to the month October, 2017
HADZIDIMOVO	10091		
THE ROWN OF HADZIDIMOVO	2730	2723	Mixed (predominate Christians)
village ABLANITSA	2629	2610	Muslims
village BESLEN	723	730	Muslims
village BLATSKA	618	617	Mixed (predominate Muslims)
village.GAITANINOVO	75	106	Christians
village ILINDEN	100	131	Christians
village KOPRIVLEN	1344	1411	Christians
village LAKI	52	72	Christians
village NOVA LOVCHA	68	84	Christians
village NOVO LESKI (LYASKI)	482	477	Christians
village PARIL	17	18	Christians
village PETRELIK	181	193	Christians
village SADOVO	419	452	Christians
village TEPLEN	466	443	Muslims
village TESHOVO	187	248	Christians

Table № 5: Total number and religious structure of the population in the Municipalities of Belitsa and Yakoruda.

Municipality	01.02.2011 Total numbers	01.01.2007 Total numbers	Religious structure to the month October, 2017}
BELITSA	9927		
TOWN BELITSA	3362	3149	Mixed (60% Christians)
village BABYAK	820	791	Muslims
village GORNO KRAISHTE	1191	1112	Muslims
village GALABOVO	58	78	Muslims
village DAGONOVO	742	703	Muslims
village ZLATARITSA	98	109	Muslims
village KRAISHTE	2483	2278	Muslims
village KUZYOVO	248	269	Muslims
village LYUTOVO	218	224	Muslims
village OTSEVO	175	211	Muslims
village PALATIK	255	286	Muslims
village CHERESHOVO	277	277	Muslims
YAKORUDA	10731		
TOWN YAKORUDA	5792	5747	Mixed (About 60% Muslims)
village AVRAMOVO	723	648	Muslims
village BEL KAMEN	563	573	Muslims
village BUNTSEVO	529	496	Muslims
village KONARSKO	968	957	Muslims
village SMOLEVO	552	521	Muslims
village CHERNA MESTA	417	372	Muslims
village YURUKOVO	1187	1127	Muslims

Table № 6: Total number and religious structure of the population in the Municipality of Satovcha

Municipality	01.02.2011 Total numbers	01.01.2007 Total numbers	Religious structure to the month October, 2017
SATOVCHA	15444	17318	
village BOGOLIN	418	467	Muslims
village VAKLINOVO	958	1144	Muslims
village VALKOSEL	2554	2507	Muslims
village GODESHEVO	844	926	Muslims
village DOLEN	370	422	Mixed (predominant Muslims)
village ZHIZHEVO	291	352	Muslims
village KOCHAN	2615	3058	Muslims
village KRIBUL	391	385	Muslims
village OSINA	468	597	Muslims
village PLETENA	1561	1938	Muslims
village SATOVCHA	1944	2252	Mixed (50% Muslims)
village SLASHTEN	1879	1985	Muslims
village TUHOVISHTA	735	830	Muslims
village FARGOVO	416	455	Muslims

The profile of the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims inhabited the Region of Blagoevgrad

The Bulgarian-speaking Muslims (Pomaks) economy is based on agriculture. Their major crops include rye, barley, corn, potatoes and tobacco. Raising animals such as cows, goats, and sheep is also very important. Pomak women are renowned for their excellent weaving abilities. Many Pomaks also earn their income as migrant workers. The Pomak diet primarily consists of bread, potatoes, and beans. They also enjoy yogurt, various cheeses, lamb, and goat meat.

The Pomak farmers live in rural villages that are surrounded by their fields and pastures. The houses were traditionally constructed of stone, wood, and clay, with sloping slate roofs. Recently, however, some Pomaks have begun to build homes out of brick or cinder block, with ceramic tile roofs.

Traditionally, Pomak marriages are arranged between the families of the prospective bride and groom. The wedding occurs when the couple reaches their mid to late teens. Before marriage, the bride prepares her own dowry, which consists of household items and clothing. Although Islamic law allows a man to have as many as four wives, polygamy was never frequent among the Pomaks and is currently prohibited by Greek law.

What Are Their Beliefs?

The Pomaks are virtually all Muslim, and their religion makes up an integral part of their ethnic identity. Yet, among most Pomaks there is an absence of traditional Islamic practices. Their language even lacks many religious words vital to the Islamic faith and traditions. Muslim saints are practically unknown to the Pomaks, while the feast days of various Christian saints continue to be observed. Weddings and other ceremonial occasions often combine Muslim and Christian traditions. Fasting during Ramadan (the ninth month of the Islamic year) and other Muslim rituals were once observed. However, today, these customs have largely disappeared. The relative isolation of the Pomaks from other Muslims has allowed the mixing of beliefs to continue unhindered for centuries.

What Are Their Needs?

The Pomak have an identity crisis. They have been rejected by both the Bulgarians (and their religion), and the Turks (and their language). Many cults have also infiltrated Bulgaria, trying to win the hearts and minds of the people. The Pomaks need the Gospel. They also need people who will begin to faithfully intercede for them, tearing down the strongholds that are keeping them in spiritual bondage. Only then will their hearts be prepared to receive the Good News as it is presented to them.

Data collection

In order to specify the attitudes of Bulgarian-speaking Muslims in the Blagoevgrad region and the presence of Islamofobia and since the object of the Mission in this paper is the Muslim community in the region, twenty in-depth interviews have been conducted, through Bulgarian-speaking Muslims (Pomaks).

Despite the high degree of integration, the Muslim community in the region of Blagoevgrad (mostly the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims, Pomaks) faces problems and challenges. According to the people interviewed, the main source of these problems is the ethnic and religious confrontation, the attempts for political isolation of the representatives of the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims and their non-admission in the managing structures of certain ministries.

My research proves that the problems of the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims (Pomaks) are clearly economical. The respondents refer to the poverty and the low incomes as one of the most serious motives for creating negative attitudes among the Bulgarian-speaking Muslims. Since they cannot find steady income sources, many of them turn to Turkey. And although they feel Bulgaria as their motherland, they prefer to work in Turkey or abroad so they can be better provided materially.

According to the respondents, in the last few years there is an increase of the islamophobic attitudes. The original talks are provided by "Ataka", which is the main propagator of anti-Islamic patterns of thinking.

The clash between the activists of “Ataka”¹⁸ and the Muslims in front of the Sofia mosque on the 2d of May 2011 raises serious concerns about the state of the reality of exercising religious rights in Bulgaria. A new “contribution” to confirming this rhetoric has the party “Order, Legality, Justice”, whose representatives are even more severe opponents of the ethnic peace in the country, according to the respondents. One of the direct results of such talks is the creation of increasingly stronger attitudes among the Bulgarians against people speaking different language than Bulgarian in public places.

The respondents/interviewed share that they are subject of rude comments and remarks, even aggression. The activities of different neo-fascist formations and youth groups (like skinheads, for example), who desecrate the religious symbols of the Muslims, become possible again for the above-mentioned reasons. “We have regional units, which report to us different cases of vandalism - drawing on the walls of the mosques, drawn swastikas, offensive words, etc. This shows that these things are not gone.” ... “There are many attacks against mosques, arsons included, and not one case has been solved.”¹⁹ According to the report of the chief mufti Mustafa Hadzhi in the period 1991-2009 59 cases of profanation of religious places of the Muslim confession were recorded.

Conclusions

As a general observation, the lack of adequate knowledge about Islam, the tendency to spread false and distorted information about Islam and Muslims in the public domain by pseudo-experts on Islam, and malevolent public figures seem to have created the space for an increasing number of Islamophobic utterances that remain uncontested in the country’s current political atmosphere.

¹⁸ The political party “Ataka” was created on April 2005 in Sofia and officially registered in the Sofia City Court in July 2005. It is self-identified as nationalist and patriotic. At the parliamentary elections in 2005 the party took 8,93 % of the votes and gained 21 places in Parliament. At the parliamentary elections in 2009 “Ataka” gained 9,36% and 21 places. See more at www.ataka.bg.

¹⁹ Otherwise different, p. 24.

On a positive note, civil society is conducting at a relatively good level in its efforts to combat racism and related discrimination. The interfaith dialogue is also at a very good height. Representatives of the major religious organizations, including the Muslim leaders in the country maintain a good dialogue and try to give good examples of the community, though sometimes not very successfully.

With regards to the amendments in the Penal Code, the Muslim denomination in Bulgaria is of the opinion that the state, with its legislation, justice and judiciary system, must maintain its neutrality in terms of intrinsic peculiarities and discussions, currents and degrees (“radical” - “moderate”) that follow given religious teachings. And if a citizen violates the law, for example, preaching religious hatred, incitement to a change in established public order, hatred for other believers or violence, then the state must take its role to penalize and punish according to the Penal Code currently in force, where the preaching of religious or other hatred is clearly regulated.

The state should not intervene directly in debates, taking a valuation position through definitions and concepts that are internal to a particular religious community. From the point of view of legislation, the acts constituting crimes should not be religiously justified in this case, but must be translated into a publicly accessible and clear legal language. The criterion should be whether it is an act that is punishable by the laws in force and undermines the constitutionally defined civil liberties and democratic values. This should not be done by engaging in these procedures of theological arguments or disputes over the “radical” nature of certain religious beliefs. Otherwise, secular law will have to declare religious principles. Regardless of one’s religious identity, any citizen, in violation of these laws should have punishment imposed in view of the act committed within terms of currents legislation, before which all citizens have equal rights and obligations, whilst refraining from measuring and assessing the how radical is one’s view and intrinsic peculiarities of ideas.

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