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СОВРЕМЕНА МАКЕДОНСКА ОДБРАНА

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Original scientific article

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THE WAR IN UKRAINE THROUGH THE PRISM OF CLASSICAL GEOPOLITICS

Nano RUZHIN[1]

Abstract: *The word "Ukraine" in Russian means "internal territory, border territory". Does this mean that Russia's invasion of Ukraine, from the Kremlin point of view, can also be interpreted as aggression on its "internal territory". On the morning of February 24, 2022, President Putin announced on state television that a "special military operation" to defend the Russians in Ukraine and its "demilitarization and denationalization" had just begun. Eurasia and the world entered a new era, which threatened world peace, and announced the establishment of a new world order that would be completely different from that of 1945 and 1989. The geostrategic dynamics in this part of the world are reminiscent of geopolitical theories about Eurasia developed by the classics Sir Harfold Mackinder, Nicholas Spikemann, and in more recent times by Brzezinski's doctrine. In their work, Eurasia occupies a central place in the geopolitical structure just as it occupies a primary place in President Putin's ideology. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has threatened the world with nuclear war, and the consequences of Russia's invasion of Ukraine are far-reaching and multidimensional. They range from geopolitical, trade and economic, to energy, cultural, technical-technological. Russia and Ukraine on whose territory the conflict is taking place are two important links of the world economy, major exporters of oil, natural gas, steel, iron, palladium, wheat, flour, sunflower ... which caused a decline in the planned economic development, rising inflation, shortage of basic products, rising energy prices. When it comes to large-scale military conflicts, the primary question is: when will peace be established between the warring parties? There is no doubt that history has once again confirmed Clemenceau's maxim that "it is easier to wage war than to establish peace." Why Putin broke Machiavelli's postulate that "a bad peace is better than a good war." But how did such degradation occur between Ukraine and Russia? According to Russian mythology, "Ukraine is in the DNA of every Russian." Ever since he created the USSR, Lenin has said, "If we lose Ukraine, it is as if we have lost our heads." When the first misunderstandings between the Russians and the Ukrainians began after the declaration of independence (1991), Solzhenitsyn predicted that any misunderstandings with Ukraine would be like an avalanche. Russia has launched an invasion that has met with a huge backlash around the world. The international community led by the United States, NATO and the EU is fully committed to supporting Ukraine. How did the Russian intervention in Ukraine come about? What were President Putin's main motives? Could invasion have been avoided? What will be the epilogue of this conflict? Maybe Europe made a mistake and pushed Russia into China's arms? Will the world go through a new cataclysm? Did small countries like North Macedonia do the right thing by supporting the policies of the developed West?*

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There is no doubt that the security of NATO's security umbrella has somewhat calmed the population, but the threat of global nuclear war is becoming a reality that is restructuring the world's leading powers and increasing the population's fears. The planet is about to create a new international order with many strangers.

Keywords: *Ukraine, Russian invasion, Putin, Zelensky, Geopolitics, NATO*

The political history of Ukrainian identity

Ukrainians, Russians and Belarusians have numerous cultural and historical roots dating back to the creation of their joint Russian state of Kyiv in the late ninth century. It was strongly decentralized and was inhabited by Slavic peoples who combined a common culture, language with regional dialects, Orthodox religion, customs and traditions. Regardless of the common past, the history of Russians and Ukrainians was filled with conflicts, divisions, tragic events that acted as catalysts for the formation of their special identity. The Kievan Rus' kingdom lasted two hundred years and was the first Slavic state in the history of the Slavic peoples. The Old Slavic language, spoken by the Slavic peoples between the 10th and 15th centuries, fragmented into Russian, Ukrainian, and Belarusian.[2] In the era of Russian Tsar Alexander I, the Ukrainian language was banned in schools (1804). During the reign of Alexander II, Ukrainian was considered a "rural language", and was treated as a "minority dialect". Tsar Alexander III (1881-1894) continued to Russify Ukraine, arguing that "the multiethnic Russian Empire must be Orthodox and speak Russian." During the reign of Tsar Nicholas II (1894-1917), Ukrainians were officially called "Little Russians" and the emperor's famous phrase was: "there is no Ukrainian language, only illiterate villagers who speak less Russian."[3]

During World War I, after the Bolshevik Revolution (1917), Ukraine proclaimed independence. In 1922 the two self-proclaimed states of the People's Western Republic of Ukraine and the Soviet Republic of Ukraine merged into the Socialist Soviet Republic of Ukraine within the Soviet Union. In the new creation, the Ukrainian language was reintroduced in schools. About 100,000 Jews, Roma, Poles, and Ukrainians were executed in Nazi concentration camps during World War II. After the death of Stalin in 1953, at the XXII Congress of the KP of the Soviet Union, among other decisions, Khrushchev decided to promote the concept of a "second language" for all Soviet non-Russian citizens. Despite the proclamation, until the collapse of the USSR, Russian remained the first language in Ukraine and Ukrainian the "second official language". In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev, the last president of the USSR, began reforms, through the "perestroika" and "loudness" that inaugurated the "definitive defeat of communism" that Russia had never acknowledged, and the Soviet Union implosion. On July 16, 1990, the Supreme Council of Ukraine (Rada) adopted the Declaration of Independence of the country. One year later, the Parliament of Ukraine (Rada) adopted the Declaration of the Rights of Nationalities, which guaranteed political, economic, cultural and social equality and justice to all ethnic groups. Independent Ukraine inherited borders from 1922 that were constantly changed until 2014 when the country lost Crimea and split between the Russophone and Uyghur parts.[4]

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[2] *В.П. Потемкин- Историја дипломатије , Том I, Београд: Државни издавачки завод Југославије, 1945, стр.112*

[3] *Jean Lévesque Professeur d'histoire, Université du Québec à Montréal (UQAM) Ukraine-Russie : une histoire commune et conflictuelle, des avenirs incertains Published: March 9, 2022 2.15pm GMT – The Conversations*

[4] *Pierre VERLUISE, le 27 février 2022, Dossier géopolitique : Russie et Ukraine, quelles relations ? Paris: Diploweb, 2022*

Ukrainian border territories were seized by Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Moldova. Transistria was confiscated from Moldova and handed over to Ukraine, which later became a Russian self-proclaimed enclave in Moldova. Such an evolution of tailoring territories according to historical victories or defeats has resulted in the constitution of the Ukrainian multinational mosaic of various peoples who today speak about 40 languages. After a successful 1991 referendum and the proclamation of independence, the Ukrainian Velvet Revolution ended with the proclamation of Ukrainian Communist apparatchik Leonid Kravchuk as the first President of the country (1991-1994). In the 1994 elections, the people elected the Russophone Leonid D. Kuchma for the new president of Ukraine, a position he held until 2005. During his three-year term, Leonid Kravchuk, a representative of the old Soviet bureaucracy, already in his inaugural speech announced the de-Russification, the decommunization of Ukraine, but without much success. The Ukrainian intellectual elite has withdrawn and is still heavily influenced by Russia. The only resistance to Kravchuk was shown by the Russophones of the Kharkiv (Kharkov) and Donetsk districts. Despite Kravchuk's ambitions, his voters were dissatisfied with the outdated methods of governing of this corrupt oligarch, which resulted in a high rate of corruption and a 60% drop in gross national product.[5]

In 1993/4 Leonid Kuchma won the presidential election. For the first time since independence, the rivalry between Ukrainian-speakers in the west and Russophones in the north and south-east of the country manifested itself. President Kuchma's term has been marked by major economic failures, nepotism and corruption. Externally, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan as nuclear powers, under the influence of the United States, signed the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, which handed over weapons of mass destruction to Russia. The agreement was signed by Leonid Kuchma, Boris Yeltsin, Bill Clinton and John Major.[6]

In 1994, Kuchma applied for a $ 360 million IMF loan. He also announced the beginning of economic reform. He proposed reducing subsidies and taxes, price control, privatization of industry and agriculture. He was re-elected president in 1999, despite strong media control that resulted in the assassination of opposition journalist Gongadze in 2000. From 2002 to 2005, he named Viktor Yanukovych Prime Minister. In foreign policy, Kuchma signed a cooperation and partnership agreement with Russia, and participated in the founding of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CEI) (Sodroujestvo Nezavissimykh Gossoudarstv). Kuchma declared Russian "one of the official languages" of Ukraine, and signed the Agreement on the Special Status of Ukraine in the NATO PPF with the possibility of membership in the Alliance. His popularity declined after numerous scandals, excessive pro-Russian orientation, and authoritarian attitude towards the media. Ahead of the 2004 elections, Ukrainian oligarchs raised $ 150 million for the opposition parties. According to US Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul, the United States intervened with $ 18 million to "promote democracy".[7]

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[5]   *Olga Rudenko, « Kharkiv settles down, while pro-Russian separatists still hold buildings in Luhansk, Donetsk » sur kyivpost.com, 8 avril 2014*

[6]   *Mattieu Lasserre - Guerre en Ukraine : qu'est-ce que le mémorandum de Budapest, censé garantir l'intégrité de l'Ukraine, Paris : L echo, 14.03.2022)*

[7]   *Michael McFaul-From Cold War to Hot Peace: The Inside Story of Russia and America, Stanford University 2018, Introduction, p.6*

The Orange Revolution

In November 2004, Russian President Viktor Yanukovych and Ukrainian Viktor Yushchenko faced each other in the November 2004 presidential election. After summarizing the results of the second round, it was clear that this was a major election fraud by Yanukovych's staff. Ukrainians took to the streets, and Ukrainian oligarchs Poroshenko, Zhvania, Chervonenko, Chernovetsky reacted, as well as several Western NGOs specializing in the "velvet revolutions" such as the Freedom House, Open National Institute, NDI) International Republican Institute (IRI). Why orange? In Ukraine, according to tradition, if a young woman wants to let a young man know that she does not love him, she puts an orange in front of her door. On November 23, 2004, in central Kyiv, some 200,000 protesters waved orange flags and said "No" to rigged election results. The Orange Revolution divided Ukrainian society. Students and pupils from Kyiv, the middle class, petty traders from the West supported the "Orange Revolution". Miners and workers from the east, as well as pensioners and the poorest Slavs in Kyiv, supported Yanukovych. The rivalry manifested itself in the rivalry and relationship between the churches. The orthodox Ukrainian Church of the Moscow Patriarchate supported Yanukovych, while the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Patriarchate of Kyiv and the Greek Catholic Church supported the Orange Revolution.

Moscow's favorite Leonid Yanukovych, in order to calm the crowd, proposed holding new elections in December of that year. This time Viktor Yushchenko was not alone. He was openly supported by the charismatic Yulia Tymoshenko, nicknamed "Jovanka Orleanska of Ukraine" or "Princess Lane of the Orange Revolution" - respectively the local "La Passionaria". She fascinated the Ukrainians, pupils and students of the Pora organization with her determination and sharp speeches, which played a significant role in the success of the revolution. Some Russian experts have described the organization as a Ukrainian clone of the Serbian Otpor movement, or the Georgian NGO Kmara.[8] According to Vyacheslav Aviutsky, the Orange Revolution resulted in a series of rivalries at various levels. At the global level, it was the result of a confrontation between Russia and the United States, at the national level, a conflict between eastern and western Ukraine, and at the transnational level, new actors such as youth organizations against authoritarianism emerged. In the by-elections, Viktor Yushchenko was elected President of Ukraine in the first round and a euphoric crowd shouted "Muscovites out of Ukraine!" However, the main issue of resolving the language dispute remained open. As a member of the Council of Europe (1995) and as a multilingual state, since the time of L. Kuchma, attempts were made to regulate the language issue with the 1996 Constitution. However, the law was very fluid, vague and contradictory.[9]

According to Article 10, "Ukrainian was declared the sole official language of the state". At the same time, the law "guaranteed the free development, use and protection of Russian and other languages of national minorities". Due to the inaccuracy of the Constitution, absurd situations occurred in which the Russian language was reduced to a "foreign language". Dostoevsky and Pushkin studied in Ukrainian and with the "Ukrainianization" a number of toponyms in the Ukrainian language were changed. Under Article 11 of the Constitution, the Ukrainian leadership agreed to respect the linguistic rights of national minorities. However, the doctrine of upgrading the Ukrainian nation on the basis of the single national language resulted

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[8]   *Viatcheslav Avioutskii, La Révolution orange en tant que phénomène géopolitique Dans Hérodote 2008/2 (n° 129), cmp. 69 – 99*

[9]   *Viatcheslav Avioutskii, La Révolution orange en tant que phénomène géopolitique Dans Hérodote 2008/2 (n° 129), cmp. 9*

in great dissatisfaction of the other minorities, especially the Russophones.[10]

On the day of literacy, January 23, 2005, Yushchenko spoke in Ukrainian. "Today, the Ukrainian language has the status of an official language, plays a decisive role in the national consolidation of the only Ukrainian nation and unites the entire Ukrainian world." This message was liked by Ukrainians but not by Russophiles.[11] The international animosity of the two largest language groups was constantly deepening. Yushchenko's beautiful speeches and promises remained just rhetoric, a list of unfulfilled wishes. He failed to implement any significant project, both for objective reasons and due to subjective weaknesses. Yushchenko proved to be an incompetent and weak unifier. He failed to resolve the linguistic dispute or to find an appropriate political consensus, but on the contrary, reversed linguistic bilingualism. Reactions in the Russian-speaking areas were sharp, with some mayors and regions deciding to make Russian their second official language.[12]

Hundreds of statues of Lenin, Russian heroes and historical figures were torn down as a result of the "de-Russification". After a split with Yulia Tymoshenko and a huge drop in popularity in 2006, Yushchenko nominated former rival Yanukovych for prime minister. Such an unmarried duo experienced severe cohabitation, and serious jokes began between the Russophones and the Ukrainians between the "bad orange" and the "good blue" or between the "good orange and bad blue", depending on whether such selections were made by one or the other. Yushchenko's second major defeat was the country's catastrophic economic situation and lack of political lucidity to face major challenges. However, the Yushchenko regime experienced a real economic collapse with the 2010 presidential election known in advance that the same Viktor Yanukovych who was dethroned in 2004 by the "Orange Revolution" would be the new president of Ukraine.[13]

"Multi-vector politics" of Viktor Yanukovych's regime

In Kyiv in 2010, instead of 2004 orange, yellow-blue, the symbol of pro-Russian regions and Yanukovych's Party of Regions, dominated. Like any totalitarian leader, President Yanukovych sought to increase his political power by amending the Constitution and establishing a favorable "equilibrium" relationship between Europe and Russia. Aware of the geopolitical and economic importance of the European Union and Russia, Yanukovych promoted a balanced "multi-vector policy" similar to that of his former mentor Kuchma (1994-2005). He lucidly stated that he wanted to maintain a strategic balance between the East and the West by inclining towards Russia in the interest of the Ukrainian people. Russia is undoubtedly significant for Kyiv, but it is still the second largest export market with 10.7 billion euros in 2010, compared to the EU market with 13.1 billion euros.[14]

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[10] *La Constitution d'Ukraine de 28.06.1996, Digitheque, point 1 and 2. Art.10.*

[11] *Ukraine – Russie: vers une vrais guerre - Pierre Hasner et Thoma Gomart , realise par Aurelie Julia- Revue des Deux Mondes (June 2014), pp. 45-57 (13 pages) Published By: Revue des Deux Mondes ,https://www. jstor. org/stable/ 44435492*

[12] A*ccording to the 2001 Census (results of the 2010 Census were not published) 77.8% declared themselves as members of the Ukrainian nation, 17.3% as members of the Russian nation and 4.9% as others. In terms of mother tongue, 68.5% of the Ukrainian population considered Ukrainian as their mother tongue, while 29.6% said that their mother tongue was Russian.*

[13] *Nikita Toranko Acosta, -La Langue otage du nationalism, » Uktainisation a marche forcee, may 2019*

[14] *Direction générale du Commerce de la Commission européenne, statistiques sur le commerce bilatéral de l'UE : Ukraine, 2009, disponibles sur Trade.ec.europa.eu .*

Yanukovych was forced to maintain good relations with both partners because Moscow's domestic and energy policies depended on Ukraine, while loans from the International Monetary Fund and trade cooperation depended on the West. The relations with Russia were improved by the April 2010 Compromise Agreement on the price of natural gas, and the Rada passed a Law on the stationing of the Russian fleet in Crimea until 2042. The law passed without amendments and remarks by the opposition and the Constitutional Court astonished both international observers and analysts with its dubious "independence of the Ukrainian judiciary."[15] Russia became a priority in Yanukovych's foreign policy. After his first visits to Brussels and then Moscow, in March 2010 his Chief of Staff Anna Guerman specified that "the general negotiations were held in Brussels, but the agreements that will improve the economic situation of Ukraine will be signed in Moscow ".[16] In addition to the Stabilization Agreement with the Russian Navy, President Putin's proposal also signed an energy agreement to merge Ukraine's Naftogaz and Russia's Gazprom.[17]

Yanukovych also tried to find a compromise with the new Law on Languages, according to which "in any region where at least 10% of the population speaks a language other than Ukrainian, the other language would be considered a second official language." However, the adoption of this law in 2012 caused huge debates and fights in the Parliament not only because of the necessary large financial expenses, but also because of the animosity between the Russophones and the Ukrainians. Finally, the Law was repealed in 2014 and definitely annulled in 2018. In 2012, the Free Trade and Association Agreement was signed between Ukraine and the EU. However, as Yanukovych sued 15 Ukrainian officials, including Yushchenko and Tymoshenko (sentenced to seven years in prison), the EU conditioned the ratification of the agreement on "democratization and the rule of law". Influenced by Russia and the $ 15 billion offered for economic development, Viktor Yanukovych refused to sign association agreements with the EU, which led to an intensification of civil disobedience. The memory of the "Orange Revolution" hopes for a better life had faded, but the 2014 revolt manifested itself as a revolt of "lost illusions". Yanukovych's rejection of the "European path" was interpreted by Ukrainians as a "strategic choice" for rapprochement with Russia.[18]

The revolt of the masses was so great that on February 22, 2014, Yanukovych was ousted from power. In that crisis, the event known as the Euromaïdan (Ukrainian: Євромай-дан, Yevromaïdan; in Russian: Евромайдан, Yevromaïdan) was the common name for several months of "pro-European demonstrations" against the Ukrainian government's decision not to sign the EU Agreement. Between 250,000 and 500,000 protesters took part in the protests from November 21, 2013, to February 22, 2014, when Yanukovych finally resigned.[19]

It is evident that the Ukrainian speakers tried to provoke the Russophones and with the annulment of the Law on Languages (2012-2014) the country entered a new political crisis.[20] Russophone parties, especially those in Crimea, staged large-scale protests. In 2014,

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[15] *Inside Ukraine , n 7, avril 2010 ; BBC Monitoring, « Top Court Refuses to Consider Legality of Basing Foreign Troops in Ukraine », 22 avril 2010*

[16] *Yanukovych Heads West but Looks East", Kyiv Post , 28 février 2010*

[17] *Poutine propose de marier le Russe Gazprom à l'Ukrainien Naftogaz, France-24, 30.04.2010*

[18] *Benoît Vitkine, « Des centaines de milliers d'Ukrainiens réclament le départ du président », Le Monde, декември 2013*

[19] *Sébastien Gobert, « L'Ukraine se dérobe à l'orbite européenne », Le Monde diplomatique, 1 December 2013*

[20] *Lionel Jean - L'aménagement linguistique dans le monde http://www.axl.cefan.ulaval.ca › monde › Lionel_Jean, http://www.axl.cefan.ulaval.ca/europe/ukraine-2histoire.htm)*

Russia, under the pretext of "protecting the Russian-speaking population," instrumentalized the crisis and annexed Crimea. According to Moscow, the coup against Yanukovych was an act of "dangerous fascist groups" marching through the streets of Kyiv with Kalashnikovs and threatening Ukraine's Russophones. All strategic points in the Autonomous Region of Crimea, such as the Parliament and the airports of Sebastopol and Simferopol, were occupied by Russo-Russian "self-defense groups" aided by Russia. The average Ukrainian became nostalgic for the days of communism when he had health and social security and a modest regular salary. The average citizen was powerless to watch the turmoil of Ukrainian society, far removed from the splendor of the Ukrainian oligarchs. In 1995, the Ukrainians were not as rich as the Poles and Russians. In 2014, the average income of Ukrainians was $ 4,000 (2,900 euros), but the Poles reached $ 13,000 (9,500 euros) and the Russians $ 14,000 (10,200 euros) per capita. The Ukrainian economy became anemic and completely dependent on Russian economy.[21]

Who was responsible for the economic cataclysm? Certainly the ruling elites and their totalitarian leaders. Starting with Leonid Kuchma (1994-2005), through Yulia Tymoshenko and Petro Poroshenko to Viktor Yanukovych, they were all billionaires and oligarchs who made money from trade with Russia. With the deterioration of the relations between Ukraine and Russia, geopolitics had taken up more space in the relations between the two neighboring countries. On several occasions, President Putin and a number of Russian historians have argued that "the Ukrainian cities of Odessa, the cities of the southeast, the Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Nikolaev, Kherson-Kirovograd regions, as well as the Kuban and Transnistrian regions of Moldova, have always been Russian territories." "New Russia." On one occasion, Putin told Sputnik, "These territories were ceded to our neighbors for unexplained reasons." Following the ouster of Viktor Yanukovych on February 23, 2014, the Ukrainian Parliament (Grand Rada) nominated Alexander Turchinov, a close ally of Yulia Tymoshenko, as the interim President of Ukraine. The same day, a new government was elected, headed by Arseniy Yatsenyuk, which ousted Yulia Tymoshenko and repealed the Law on Linguistic Policy of Ukraine, which provided for minorities to use their mother tongue with a 10% share. The Charter of the Council of Europe concerning regional and minority rights was annulled. In accordance with the European law, with the Charter several regional and minority languages had been previously recognized.[22] Early presidential elections were held on May 25, with Petro Poroshenko winning in the first round. The election took place in an extremely tense political and military crisis due to anti-Maidan demonstrations that escalated into a military conflict between pro-Russian forces in Donbas and the Ukrainian army. This hybrid war started with the anti-Maidan demonstrations in Kharkiv (Kharkov) on February 23, 2014 and spread to Donetsk and Luhansk regions. In early April, insurgents from Donetsk declared the People's Republic of Donetsk and those from Luhansk the People's Republic of Luhansk (May 11). Since May 2, 2014, separatists in these areas have clashed with the Ukrainian army. Between 2014 and 2020, according to UN figures, 13,000 people were killed, including 3,350 civilians and 4,100 Ukrainians, as well as 5,650 pro-Russian rebels. On the other side of Ukraine, in late February, Russian forces annexed Crimea, where a

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[21] *Iterview-Valeria Gontareva, la gouverneure de la Banque centrale ukrainienne à Kiev, le 30 décembre 2014, RFI- Ukraine / Economie –« 2014, une année noire pour l'économie ukrainienne'', France/Paris*

[22] *According to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages Charte européenne des langues régionales ou minoritaires-, the following languages were used in Ukraine: Russian, Belarusian, Bulgarian, Armenian, Gagauz, Hebrew, Tatar, Moldavian, Russian, German, Polish, German, Polish, Slovak, Hungarian, Ruthenian, Karaite and Transians.*

referendum was held to join Russia. Crimea's independence was declared by the region's Prime Minister ten days before the referendum. In Donbas, the Russophone revolt intensified. In 2014, Ukraine held presidential elections in which the oligarch Petro Poroshenko won with 55% of the turnout, without the participation of voters from Donetsk and Luhansk.[23]

The Minsk Agreement

The Minsk Agreement, otherwise known as the "Minsk Protocol", is a convention signed on September 5, 2014 in the Belarusian capital by representatives of Ukraine, Russia, and the unrecognized Donetsk and Luhansk regions to end the war in eastern Ukraine. Following the preparatory meetings, the Tripartite Contact Group composed of representatives of Ukraine, Russia, and the OSCE managed to agree on the basic measures: 1. Instant ceasefire. 2. Ensure monitoring and verification of the ceasefire by the OSCE. 3. Organize the decentralization of power, through the application of Ukrainian law (Law on Special Status), temporarily granted to local autonomies in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. 4. Guarantee constant surveillance of the Russian-Ukrainian border by the OSCE and establish a border security zone. 5. Immediate release of all hostages and persons illegally detained. 6. Adopt a Ukrainian law to ban the prosecution and punishment of all those involved in the Donbas war. 7. Maintain the national dialogue between the parties. 8. Implement appropriate measures to improve the humanitarian situation in Donbas. 9. Hold early elections in Donetsk and Luhansk regions. 10. Demilitarize the conflict zone, withdraw the military equipment, armed forces and foreign fighters from Ukrainian territory. 11. Establish an economic program for promotion and continuation of activities and local economy in Donbas. 12. Provide personal protection to the participants in the consultations. The agreement provided for respect for Ukraine's territorial integrity, including Donetsk and Luhansk, which were to gain greater autonomy. The decentralization of these regions meant autonomy in the use of the Russian language and the local police. At the same time, the control of the eastern border was planned to begin after the elections of 2015. Despite the efforts, this agreement failed to stop the hostilities between the warring parties. The Ukrainian side avoided implementing them, believing that this would create the phenomenon of "Finnladization" of Ukraine. On the other hand, Putin justified the invasion of Ukraine with its failure to implement the Minsk agreements.

Decommunization and derusification

On April 9, 2015, the Ukrainian Parliament passed four laws called "decommunization" (dekommunizatsia), which banned any propaganda against totalitarian and Nazi regimes in Ukraine. These laws forbade the propaganda of the symbols of totalitarianism and Nazism, the flags and anthem of the USSR, provided for a change in the names of toponyms, settlements, factories, but also of Soviet heroes of World War II, a change of textbooks and their contents.[24] The process of decommunization and de-Russification was transformed into a "war with the past", a "cleansing of the communist remnants" and a "battle against monuments" and the

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[23] *A Kharkiv, pro et anti-Maïdan se font face », Le Temps, 24 février 2014*
[24] *Law no. 317-VIII "Condemnation of the Communist and National Socialist (Nazi) Totalitarian Regimes in Ukraine and Prohibition of Propaganda of Their Symbols"; - Law no. 314-VIII "On the legal status and commemoration of the fighters for independence of Ukraine in the 20th century"; - Law no. 316-VIII "On access to the archives of the repressive bodies of the communist totalitarian regime from 1917-1991"; - Law no. 315-VIII "On the continuation of the commemoration of the victory over Nazism in the Second World War 1939 - 1945"*

iconographic features of the Soviet period. Petro Poroshenko's term was filled with failed reforms, scandals, corruption, conflicts of interest and about 15 criminal charges. During his tenure he increased his own wealth by 20%, traveled under a false name to the Maldives, became involved in Panama papers and offshore companies in the Virgin Islands, and in January 2022 his passport was confiscated by the Ukrainian police.

Zelensky - from showman to president and possible Nobel laureate

On April 22, 2019, tired frustrated Ukrainians, disappointed by the selfishness of the oligarchs, and the inability to strengthen the state economy, voted for 41-year-old showman Volodymyr Zelensky. He was a Russophone and a Jew who did not speak Ukrainian fluently.

In contrast to the Ukrainian speakers, he opposed the nationalist linguistic positions that, in turn, reduced the place of the Russian language in the country. He also opposed the 2019 Law on Language, which strengthened the use of the Ukrainian language, irritating thus the Russophones. Zelensky considered it desirable that Ukrainian remains, in accordance with the Constitution, the official language without stifling the Russian language. At the same time, he generously assisted the arming of the Ukrainian army engaged in battle against the Russophones in Donbas. The beginning of Volodymyr Zelinsky's term coincides with the deterioration of the relations between Russia and Ukraine due to the annexation of Crimea and the military clashes in the Donbas region and also due to the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. But despite Putin's tough stance, the Ukrainian leadership has made contradictory moves. On the one hand, Kyiv fought to preserve its territorial integrity in Donbas, on the other hand, the Ukrainian Parliament voted on a bill that virtually rejected Donbas by Ukraine. Such a dual policy of attracting "honey flies" has intensified the discontent and frustration of Russian-speaking separatists. At the time, Ukrainian nationalists criticized Zelensky for plotting a "capitulation" against Russian-speaking separatists. It is a fact that the Minsk Agreements signed in 2014/5 reduced the violence, but the political part of the peace package was never implemented. Russia's military invasion has created a major star of President Zelensky in the the media war. Who could have guessed that Volodymyr Zelensky, who in 2016 played the piano with "his attributes" wearing sexy leather pants, the man who was considered a "servant of the Ukrainian oligarchs", an actor in the suspicious transactions of the Pandora Papers, would grow into an incarnation of the Ukrainian David against the totalitarian Russian Goliath. In Europe, he is compared to Che Guevara of the 21st century, in Paris according to Bernard-Levy, Zelensky is the new Gavrosh, and at the same time the Ukrainian Allende and Churchill, who are worshiped by US congressmen and MPs and leaders. He showed that he took over the command of the attacked state and proudly declared "I am here with you Ukrainians and we will not lay down our arms, and I will die with you." He equates the fate of Ukraine with the fate of Europe, reminiscent of Hitler's territorial Anschluss, staging the dialectic between Good and Evil. "If Ukraine does not endure, Europe will not endure either. "Defend our freedom, because that victory is not only against the Russian soldiers, but it will be a victory of Good over Evil." "There is no doubt that Zelensky is playing his best role, the role of his life and destiny," writes Pierre Atret from the Parisian Boulevard Voltaire portal. Although Zelensky sometimes exaggerates, seeking to close the skies over Ukraine or declare Russia a terrorist state, knowing it would provoke World War III, officials say "there is no other choice." The reactions of the German MPs were also great when in his speech before the Bundestag, he reminded them of the Holocaust of the Third Reich, which caused open criticism of Zelensky. In history, Zelensky will remain a symbol of the courage of

the Ukrainian people against the far more powerful enemy Putin.

Putin's personal war

Under the pretext that "Russia is defending itself against the security threat of NATO infrastructure", but also with the slogan "stop the genocide against Russophones in the Donbas region ..." Russian President Putin first recognized the independence of the two Ukrainian separatist territories of Donetsk and Luhansk, and two days later began the military invasion of Ukraine. The official motives for the military aggression were "demilitarization and neutralization" of Ukraine from the pro-Atlantic project and "denationalization of the state by Nazi hordes." Already after the recognition of the two phantom territories, it was clear that Putin's moves were unpredictable.

The day before the invasion, he pompously bowed before the monument to the "Unknown Hero" with the entire military-protocol retinue and then, less than 24 hours later, ordered a general invasion of Ukraine. It became clear that the UN warnings and mediation attempts by the leaders of France and Germany were in vain. Vladimir Putin, in a long statement in front of the Russian audience, supported by numerous arguments, historical reminders and justifications, announced his intention to recognize the two separatist territories by decree. For historians, the events in Donbas are associated with the territorial dispute between Nazi Germany and Czechoslovakia over the status of the Sudetenland inhabited by Sudeten Germans (1938). The then German dictator of the Third Reich, Hitler, advocated the secession of the Sudetenland and its annexation to Germany in the name of the alleged "oppression" of the German minority by the Czech authorities. In this way, Hitler gradually began to "bite" Central and Eastern Europe, which would lead to World War II.

The date February 22, 2022, "Imperial Tuesday" gained magical dimensions in the two separatist republics and especially in Russia. That's the day Russia's two parliamentary houses - the Federation Council and the Duma - officially recognized the two self-proclaimed breakaway republics of Donbas, a region that has been at war with Kyiv for eight years. On the Russian electronic media, numerous state journalists, analysts, futurologists, ideologists, fortune tellers, Russian "grandmother Vangja and Cleopatra", tried to interpret this historical act through the arrangement of stars, zodiac signs, planetary alignment and numerology and Pushkin to qualify the mystical dimension of Putin's policy. The Western world knew of Putin's intentions and feared recognition of the separatist states of Donetsk (DNR) and Luhansk (LNR). The act of recognition paved the way for a worse scenario: the Russian occupation of Donbas and the total invasion of Ukraine, which the Kremlin leader had previously said he considered a "US colony" and a "fruit of US brutal intervention." "We had no other choice because I knew they would impose sanctions," Putin said after the invasion, which he called a "special operation."[25]

There is no doubt that the Russian president is extremely good at using the opportunities of strategic gaps, but the numerous media interventions and diplomatic activities give the impression that he is cut off from reality. There is no brave analyst near him who would be able to advise him, to give him a signal, to critically analyze his moves. In 2014, after the annexation of Crimea, when Angela Merkel sought to find a common language with Putin, after lengthy negotiations, she noted that the "man has lost his sense of reality." Recently, Macron came to a similar conclusion, because "he came across a completely different character from that of Putin

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[25] *"Vladimir Putin's war was premeditated and unprovoked. He rejected diplomatic efforts. He thought the West and NATO would not respond. He thought he could divide us, here at home, he was wrong. President Biden's speech to the US Congress.Deutche Welle, 23.02.2022*

three years ago." His speech on Donbas's independence on February 21 by Elise Matignon was described as "paranoid." This is a "Putin war" stated by Macron and Schulz in one voice. US President Joe Biden also did not show high opinion of the "strong man from the Kremlin" and undiplomatically called him "a criminal, a war criminal, a butcher ... who will be responsible for the damage and the killed soldiers and civilians."

Vladimir Putin, confident in his own omnipotence, is filled with passionate anger against Ukrainians who have advocated democracy and Euro-Atlantic values. He dreamed of great revenge against the West and of correcting Gorbachev's great mistakes and injustices. He dreams of a great Russia and wants to be compared to Peter the Great in the 21st century. For those who still had illusions about his intentions, the move to recognize and invade Ukraine is a great lesson!

With this series of events, Putin has shattered all confidence in his "empty promises that he has no intention of using military force." He insulted both Western countries and the Ukrainians and formulated "ideological-historical" interpretations to justify his military moves. It reserves the monopoly on the use of force in Ukraine, as a personal right to activate at any time and in any place in Ukraine. This country has grown into a private investment of Vladimir Putin. He himself said that Ukraine was "his obsession, inspired by a common history" but unfortunately, "the country was taken over by corrupt oligarchs" and "Ukrainians have been betrayed by the Ukrainians themselves," as well as "the homeland of Ukraine by the bad Ukrainians and Nazis."

In his obsession with Ukraine, which he treats as his own hunting ground, Putin also threatened Ukraine's allies in the EU and NATO. "If any of Ukraine's allies tries to interfere or threaten our people, they must know that Russia's response will be immediate and will bring about effects that they have not experienced in their history." "Fanaticism and cynicism, the fruit of his intimate fantasy or manipulation, because no one in the world threatens Russia and the Russian people," said Western analysts. If a military power wants to attack Moscow, it does not need to deploy its missiles to Russia's borders, but anywhere in the world. The Russian parliament unanimously supported President Putin's carefully executed strategy. He ignited a spiral that paved the way for Russia - as the "military and financial godfather of the war" and the separatists to take full control of Donbas. With a massive military invasion, probably planned for months, Putin wants to trample Ukraine militarily and politically and return it to the "neutral and demilitarized status" of Yanukovych's time.[26]

The invasion and its effects

The move by the "peacekeeping force", as Putin called Russian troops entering Ukraine, is essentially a military-political response to the sanctions. The recognition of the two separatist territories was only an introduction to the escalation, as they were recognized as entities whose territories exceed those controlled by the Russian separatists. That is why the Russian invasion is a gesture to expand the power of the two newly proclaimed states over the whole territory of Donbas. Theoretically, there was a possibility that after their recognition, these territories would remain a kind of "frozen conflict", around whose fate the diplomatic spears of the West and Russia would clash. With the invasion, Putin did not give diplomacy a chance. He also annulled the Minsk Agreements and the possibility of maintaining the further status quo of the separatist territories. The Russian military operation during the occupation of Ukraine took place from the territory of Belarus and Crimea in order to protect the sensitive facade Odessa-Mariupol-Karkif (Kharkov), which is important for the control of the Crimean Peninsula. Russian armored troops

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[26]   *L'obsession ukrainienne de Vladimir Putin, AFP, L'Express, 24.02.2022*

entered Ukraine from the northern regions of Chernihiv to Belarus, northeast of Sumy bordering Russia, and from Luhansk and Kharkov on the eastern border with Russia. The international community's condemnation of Putin's invasion was enormous. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres of New York said it was "a dangerous moment for the whole world and the saddest day of his tenure." "In the name of humanity, Vladimir Putin, I ask you to send your troops back to Russia." He described the military invasion as "an act that threatens human coexistence". The other world statesmen reacted similarly. President Macron condemned Russia's decision and called for a halt to military operations. "France is with Ukraine and will act with its allies and partners to stop the war," said Joe Biden, condemning "Russia's unjustified attack on Ukraine" and saying "Russia is solely responsible for the death toll and the destruction of the war." He added that "the United States will not stop there" and announced the largest sanctions against Russia to date.[27]

On behalf of the Alliance and Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg, he condemned "Russia's unjustified attack on Ukraine, which could result in heavy casualties." EU Commissioner Ursula von der Leyen reminded that "in these dark moments all thoughts are focused on Ukraine" and announced massive sanctions against Russia, recommending that "Russian leaders should be completely isolated" through "massive and painful sanctions".

The War in Ukraine: Can World War III be considered?

Any war waged on the territory of the former Soviet Union, such as the case between Russia and Western-backed Ukraine, is reminiscent of John Mackinder Halford's geopolitical doctrine. His theory of Heartland is a geopolitical analysis of world history proposed by this British geographer in 1904 in The Geographical Pivot of History.[28] According to Mackinder, the world is comparable to the world's oceans, which are home to the world island of Asia, Europe, and Africa. It is surrounded by large islands ("outlying island"): America, Australia, Japan and Great Britain. He who controls the global center ("heart-heartland") controls the global island, says Mackinder. He who holds the world island holds the world. The heart of the world is represented by Eurasia dominated by Russia and China.[29] Their solidarity is the greatest geopolitical challenge for the West, just as trying to oust Ukraine is the biggest geostrategic challenge for Russia. In recent history, Napoleon and Hitler have sought to capture the heart of the Earth, while during the Cold War, the entire NATO, ASEAN, and other security forces were strategically positioned toward Eurasia. Finally, with the collapse of communism and the implosion of the Soviet Union, it was thought that the concept of the "Great West" would be realized, uniting the transatlantic alliance of America and Europe from "Lisbon to Vladivostok". But the winners of the Cold War did not even dream of such integration. "Russia did not accept the inferior position and sought to maintain its image as a world power, so it did not concede defeat in the Cold War." Thirty years later, the Russian military operation in Ukraine has drawn a line under the entire era that began with the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the USSR. In the 1990s, Fukuyama announced the synthesis of "the end of history when a stable bipolar world order was replaced by a victorious liberal world order. President George W. Bush (father) has

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[27] *David Rich, « Crise ukrainienne : la stratégie des sanctions américaines pour contrer Moscou", « 24 France »31.01.2022*

[28] *Mackinder, H.J., "The Geographical Pivot of History", The Geographical Journal, Vol. 23, No.4, (April 1904), 421–437*

[29] *Mackinder, H.J., Democratic Ideals and Reality. A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction, National Defense University Press, 1996, pp. 175–193*

declared the United States and the West winners of the Cold War. But does such an epilogue still apply today?

The beginning of a new military-political and ideological cold war

What we are witnessing now is another, armed version of the end of the Cold War by other means and consequences. Thirty years ago, Boris Yeltsin's Russia was cuddled under the lap of the West. Today, Russia has shown Putin a completely different and very dangerous face. Then Russia opened up to the world, but today its tsar intoxicated by his own war power has turned the country into an armed fortress. Putin has made very high demands on Western powers. Isolated in the White Court, he calculated that he must do something strong and visible in front of the international community, to show power, determination and defiance. For a long time, the idea was spread that Ukraine would not join NATO, but it failed to get formal guarantees from the West. He intimidated those who expressed desires for political emancipation, as was the case with Armenia and Belarus, and proved that in that part of the world "everything must go through the Kremlin." He gradually got rid of unpleasant topics, such as the problem of Navalny or the annexation of Crimea, and therefore unhesitatingly decided to punish Ukraine with the sole purpose of preventing the development of its alternative political model. No one expected such a move, although for weeks the United States reported on the accumulation of Russian forces on the border with Ukraine. With the aggression against Ukraine, analysts have agreed that a new era is beginning in the international order of Europe similar to the stresses of 1989. "It is the beginning of a real political, military and ideological Cold War," the analyst said. It is clear that the ultimate goal of Putin's intervention was political in nature, regardless of the fact that Putin initially announced that it would be for purely "military" purposes. He will seek to "behead Zelensky's government in Ukraine" and change Ukraine's political regime.

What is striking to speech analysts is the fact that Putin is systematically exploiting the belligerent language used by Western powers in Kosovo and Iraq. Putin underlines that there is a "genocide" against the Russophones in Donbas, a reference to Kosovo (1999), and focuses on the "regime" in Kyiv that must be overthrown because it "can produce nuclear weapons" referring to Iraq (2003). Vladimir Putin has recognized the independence of the separatist territories of Donetsk and Luhansk, without defining the borders of these territories. Will they extend to the current front line, which intersects the Donbas administrative regions, or will the Kremlin insist on expanding the maximum borders reached in 2014, which fully covered the two administrative regions of Donetsk and Luhansk? According to Duma Foreign Minister Leonid Kalashnikov, the territories that the Russian president has recognized as independent cover entire administrative regions. "In this configuration, Ukraine has illegally occupied two-thirds of its territory, which it must return to Donetsk and Luhansk."

"Sanctions or World War III"

As the Russian army is bombing Ukrainian cities, Western leaders are preoccupied with the security of their countries. "Can we think of World War III?" - asks Le Monde's Parisian editorialist. In Moscow, the founder of the Russian NGO Memorial, 80-year-old Lev Ponomarev, a historical anti-Putin dissident in La Republika, describes Putin's character traits. "The Kremlin chief is burdened with a paranoid mentality. "He is able to drag us into World War III, into a nuclear conflict." World War III as an alternative is mentioned by US President Biden, who in an interview with influencer Brian Tyler Cohen said that between the two options, "sanctions or war", he chose sanctions and not World War III. "We are convinced that the sanctions will weaken Russia's position and it will pay for the gross violations of international law." Is Putin's

"special military operation" for "demilitarization and denationalization" starting to stall? After land, air and sea attacks, Russian forces intensified their attacks with thermobaric missiles. The invasion enters the third phase. The Russian offensive is no longer marching in front of the gates of Kyiv, but is either "reorganizing or preparing for a dignified withdrawal, as the Russian leadership has stated that" the objectives of the operation have been met. " In this asymmetric war, the Russian army, which is ten times larger than the Ukrainian one, won more strategic points, but also lost a large number of soldiers. Many wonder: How far will Putin go? For now, the Russian president is focused on Ukraine. He is practically already absorbing Belarus, which has served as a base for an attack on Ukraine from the northern borders. It is unknown at this time what he will do after leaving the post.

The breadth of his imperial dreams is likely to depend on the opposition and resistance of the international community, especially the EU, the United States and NATO. Romania, a member of the Alliance since 2004, was particularly concerned about the Moldovan enclave of Russophones. The "no-man's land" that Russia appropriated manu militari in 1992 has since been classified as a "frozen" conflict under the Kremlin's indirect control. The first day of the Russian aggression, Moldova knows how many times it felt the weight of the Russian army stationed in Transnistria.[30] Moldovan and Romanian media have shown footage of two rockets fired from the enclave at Ukraine. This incident was silenced by the Minister of Defense of Moldova in order not to escalate the situation with the powerful Russophones. Unlike Romania, Moldova is not a member of the Alliance and therefore public opinion justifiably fears Putin's aggression. Is it possible for NATO to go to war? Following the start of the aggression, President Putin openly threatened all countries "not to try to interfere in the conflict, as the retaliation it would inflict on them would be the largest in history," referring to its nuclear capabilities. Only French Foreign Minister Le Drian responded that "the West also has significant nuclear potential." But does it make sense to think this way. Both the United States and Russia are known to possess thousands of missiles with destructive nuclear warheads. In the United States, despite Donald Trump's decision to keep secrets about the number of US nuclear warheads, the administration of Joe Biden informs that the United States has 3750 nuclear warheads. This figure is a reduction of the arsenal from 1967 by 88%. The United States then had 31,255 operational and usable nuclear warheads. According to the International Peace Research Institute, which has data on "withdrawn nuclear warheads", in 2021 Russia had 6,255 versus the United States - 5,500 and China - 350 warheads. In such a context, would either of the two superpowers be prepared to go to war with catastrophic consequences for the entire planet? A priori NATO will not declare war on Russia because Ukraine is not a NATO member and cannot activate Article 5 of the Washington Agreement. The United States and most of the relevant members of the Alliance have announced for several weeks since the beginning of the crisis with Ukraine that they do not intend to send troops to Ukraine. However, for the first time, NATO has begun to use elements of its reaction forces in order to strengthen its own defense disposition, and to be ready for any eventuality and rapid reaction. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg informed that "the Alliance has activated defense plans and the deployment of elements of the reaction force." This force numbers 40,000 elite soldiers with the highest level of defense.

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[30]   *Maurine Mercier/V.Cherpillod- "Acquise à la cause russe, la Transnistrie ne veut pas la guerre pour autant" MA RTS, 17.03.2022*

Heartland, however, is not in solidarity

Chinese President Xi Jinping, during a recent meeting with Putin, expressed peaceful views on Russia's intervention. "China supports Russia in resolving [the conflict] through negotiations with Ukraine," state television CCTV reported. Without using the term war or invasion, Xi Jinping speaks of "upheavals in eastern Ukraine that are of concern to the international community." But Chinese diplomacy has not mentioned any call for a ceasefire or a ceasefire by Moscow.[31]

As a strategic partner of Russia, and an integral part of Mackinder's doctrine of the "earthly heart", China is not always its blind ally. Beijing showed this on Friday, February 25, when it abstained from voting in the UN Security Council on a resolution "expressing regret over Russia's aggression against Ukraine." The first version of the text, which "condemns" the aggression and calls for the imposition of sanctions, was rejected by Beijing. The United States softened its stance, but China did not back it. Hours earlier, Chinese President Xi Jinping had spoken by telephone with Vladimir Putin and said he was committed to "resolving the dispute peacefully but also respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries." The tone of this press release differs significantly from that issued a day earlier by Beijing. In a telephone conversation with Sergei Lavrov and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, he noted that China "has always respected the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries." "Russia's legitimate security concerns." China still refuses to use the term "invasion" and speaks of a "military operation". China appears to be torn between its strategic partnership with Moscow - spectacularly strengthened in February 2022 during a meeting between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin in Beijing - and its commitment to the notion of territorial integrity. Beijing seeks to maintain good relations with Russia. At the same time, China unreservedly blames the United States for the crisis because they are constantly adding fuel to the fire. "When the United States seeks to expand NATO eastward, five times more than its previous positions, and reaches the threshold of Russia, it is a great threat to this country." Despite all the sanctions, casualties and threats, Russia continues its hostilities. Zelensky and Putin do not rule out negotiations to find a diplomatic way out of the crisis, but as Mikhail Poljak points out, "the conditions for discussion imposed by Russia are unrealistic." Are there any real prospects for peace? Of course there are, but the wheel of events is very difficult to turn on the starting point. Russia's position is nothing more than an attempt to disintegrate Ukraine and force it to accept categorically unacceptable terms. "War must stop, because as time goes on, the dangers of expanding the war increase. Yet despite the threats, no one in the West believes in World War III.[32]

Between Huntington and Fukuyama

Two studies by American professors Francis Fukuyama's The End of History and the Last Man (1992) and Samuel Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations (1996) marked the end of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. Fukuyama promotes "liberal democracy" as the absolute winner of human evolution and the end of history. Did she really conquer the world? Did Huntington's eight "civilizational spaces" identify potential conflict fractures on planet Earth, and can Russia's invasion of Ukraine be viewed from such perspectives? Experts are divided. Could this intervention be a strategic mistake, just like the one Russia made with the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan? Of course, but not for the foreseen reasons such as the risk of stalemate

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[31] *Greg Naker- « Guerre en Chine : A quoi joue la Chine? » AFP, Paris, France-Interne, 22.03.2022*
[32] *Gerlandine Mosna Sovoye-La 3e guerre mondiale est elle possible ?, Paris, France Interne*

and isolation, the severity of the sanctions or again the economic cost of the occupation. The invasion called into question a new geostrategic configuration that had benefited Russia since Putin's arrival in 2000. The binary vision was based on Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations." Gradually, Western public opinion shifted in favor of Putin's Russia. The Christian right, along with the majority of populists and numerous conservative circles, began to flirt. This wave started at the time of the conflicts in Serbia and Kosovo.[33]

Numerous senior officers and intellectuals wondered if we had chosen the wrong enemy, if it would not be more logical for the West to support Serbia instead of the Bosnians and Kosovars. Such suspicion was called the "Islamic threat." The events of 9/11 worsened this vision, especially as populist movements intensified their rejection of Islam. Local conflicts have been interpreted through the prism of the struggle between the Christian West and Islam, from Sudan to Syria, reaching the Balkans and the Caucasus. In Syria, Bashar al-Assad was backed by Russia, as well as those posing as protectors of Oriental Christians. Riots in the French "suburbs" in 2005 prompted analysts and novelists such as Houellebecq to herald the start of a civil war between "Europeans" and "Muslims" in global jihad. Putin's Russia was seen by many conservative Christians as a bulwark against traditional values, anti-LGBT and anti-abortion, while the Orthodox Church emerged as the champion of the reconquest of souls, in conjunction with political power. This explains the satisfaction of many American evangelicals and conservative Catholics with Putin. The Polish and Hungarian leaders, although skeptical of eternal Russia, were on this front, along with advisers to Donald Trump (Steve Bannon) or Marine Le Pen in France. Many European politicians have turned into lobbyists in love with President Putin in the world of political science, everyone who has studied Samuel Huntington's theory and the Clash of Civilizations (1996), who interprets new conflicts in the world as a clash of civilizations. Since the beginning of the crisis in Ukraine in 2014, has Huntington's theory of this conflict begun to evoke? Huntington thought that there would be two kinds of conflicts in the new post-Soviet world: a) micro-conflicts or conflicts of territory, and b) macro-conflicts or conflicts of ideology and control. The situation in Ukraine today is represented by both types of conflicts. In terms of micro-conflict, there was a fight for Crimea and Donbas between Russia (where Crimea was located during the Soviet period) and Ukraine (where it found itself after the Cold War).[34]These regions are very important for both countries, in terms of industrial and energy dimensions. More important on the other side of this micro-conflict is the macro-conflict that started with the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. This macro-conflict is primarily a conflict of ideology following Ukraine's request to join the EU and NATO. Even though the Cold War is over, there is still a difference in ideologies between Russia and the EU, NATO or the United States. If Ukraine manages to join the EU, Russia will lose an old ally in its ideology. Russia invaded Crimea to protect its interests: its ideology and its Russian-speaking population. Samuel Huntington, the theorist of The Clash of Civilizations, explained his doctrine in Foreign Affairs magazine back in 1993: "If (the concept of) civilization is the key, then the likelihood of violence between Russians and Ukrainians should be small. "The moral of the story is that with this Russian military intervention in Ukraine, we have definitive proof that the theory of the 'Clash of Civilizations' does not work, although it inspires many thinkers in geostrategy. There is an idea that the collapse of the Soviet Union is irreversible and that we are now moving." "Christianity against Islam" is collapsing, and we can see that

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[33] *Le Nouvel Observateur, Olivier Roy- "Ukraine and the Clash of Civilisation theory, an interview with Olivier Roy", 10.03.2022*

[34] *Aziliz le Corne – Interview with Max Erwann Gastineau, Le Figaro, Paris, 25.02.2022*

it has never been in line with Putin's vision. From Catherine II, Russia has always integrated Muslims into the Empire.

Conclusions

-For the first time since the 17th century, Russia is self-aware that it has been deprived of a part of the empire conquered by the Russian tsars increased by the Soviet regime. President Bush (father) reassured Gorbachev that "NATO will not extend to Russia's borders. This verbal promise was not kept. Putin comes to power at the beginning of the new millennium and with it the prospects for change emerge. He does not accept that Russia has lost its "greatness" and observes Russia throughout history. -Three factors determine his vision. First, Russia paid a high price during Nazism, and its revival, even in a symbolic sense, reinforced the Russian people's sense of injustice. Second, if the Baltic peoples have their own identity, the Ukrainians have been close brothers since the ninth-century Kievan Rus. Third, Ukraine is a vast country that lacks Russian power, and has had a hard time becoming enemies. - The drunken Russian tsar, aware of his own power, shocked the world with the invasion and announced the creation of a new world order. Europe will never look like 2022 again. The relations between Ukraine and Russia will never be the same as before the war. - The West also has a historic responsibility, which has been consistently rejected by Russia since the early 2000s, and has not influenced Ukrainian leaders to implement the Minsk Agreements. In this way, they influenced Russia to seek a single way out of the alliance with China - This war is the beginning of a new international order that may be characterized by a cold, political, militaristic and ideological war. Russia will turn to China and the "world heart" - heartland according to Mackinder's definition will become a very strong factor in the international community. Russia and China stand for multilateralism as a principle of the international community, as opposed to American "unilateralism", even though the invasion of Ukraine was a "unilateral act." - The new international order will not be able to function if Russia remains isolated from the rest of the world. Russia can only be the big loser because of the sanctions, but the sanctions will have a negative effect on both Europe and the rest of the world. - Analyzed from a theoretical point of view and through the prism of Huntington, the war in Ukraine partially showed that Huntington's doctrine was not confirmed in this conflict because different religions (Muslims and Christians) do not fight. However, in Croatia, too, different religions did not fight, but different religions (Catholics and Orthodox). There is another dimension to the conflict in Ukraine between Slavic and Western culture and civilization. In this case, Huntington's still relevant.

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WOMEN'S POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND THEIR INTEREST IN POLITICS: CASE STUDY OF NORTH MACEDONIA 2020/21

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Abstract: *Due to the fact that women's political participation is an essential element of democratic progress, good governance and a condition sine equa non of liberal democracy, in this research we are examining the North Macedonia case in point via analysing women's political participation and their interest in politics, particularly. Consequently, we present reflecting conclusive remarks, as well as, certain recommendations.*

Keywords: *political participation, interest in politics, women, North Macedonia*

Introduction

Nowadays, one can say that it is common sense that women's political participation is essential to the democratic progress of modern societies and must therefore be continuously prioritized; exercised not only at the level of active and passive suffrage, but at all levels (i.e., women as stakeholders in public decision making, policymaking, political activism, etc.). Given that the status of women in contemporary societies is considered one of the key indicators of good governance and a condition sine equa non of liberal democracy (Dahlerup 1978; Dahlerup & Leyenaar 2013; UNDP 2000), the world and national research methods for obvious reason are becoming increasingly interested and sophisticated to provide the relevant data on the way how and how often women do engage in politics : globally, nationally or at the local level. In that specific manner, we are examining here the North Macedonia case in point via analysing the political participation and interest of women in politics. To be more concrete, in 2021 the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in North Macedonia conducted an important research : Women's Study - The Republic of North Macedonia 2020/2021 [3] as an interdisciplinary study that gives a comprehensive overview of the position of women in NM. Here, we as researchers present the related findings, but most importantly, we place special attention to women's political participation and women's interest in politics.

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[3]   http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/skopje/17556-20210318.pdf

The Study is based on a combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods and techniques, with an analysis of primary and secondary data. More specifically, the following research techniques were used for data collection: [4]

The interview consists of 10 open-ended questions (with sub-questions) for the same thematic chapters as in the questionnaire, with a section dedicated to demographic data. For the needs of the survey research, a stratified-quota sample was designed. For this purpose, official data on population estimates were used, published on the website of the State Statistical Office of the Republic of North Macedonia. Also, the female population (aged 18 to 67) was first segmented into mutually exclusive subgroups, according to the country's eight statistical regions and municipalities and age groups. Then, the cases in each segment / stratum were calculated and selected based on the specific ratio of quotas according to: ethnicity and place of residence (urban / rural). The sample size is calculated according to a formula (with a marginal error of 3% and a confidence level of 95%). The size of the research target population – the total number of girls / women aged 18 to 65 in the country is 710 2879, hence the size of the projected research sample is N = 1066. Even more, for the interview, the sample consisted of 12 female respondents, selected on the principle of maximum variation, i.e. heterogeneous according to demographic characteristics (such as age, ethnicity, level of education, place of residence, employment and marital status). Twelve in-depth semi-structured e-interviews were successfully conducted in the same time period.

The Macedonian national political context in which this research was conducted took into consideration the fact that Macedonian democracy is relatively young, still not fully consolidated, and has already faced an episode of democratic setback (2006-2017). This political episode led to the country being labelled a captive state, a hybrid regime, a liberal democracy, and exhibited an authoritarian populism (among other terms) (FH Report 2015; 2016). It also served to highlight the pitfalls of a transitioning political culture (Klicperova-Baker, 1999; Bernik, 2000; Pendarovski, 2015, 2016), wherein political participation is largely absent and thus citizens, particularly women, are non-responsive.

(Dis)interest and political (non)participation among women

Our study shows worrying data regarding the general (dis)interest and political (non) participation among women. There is a clear and unequivocal indication that women are not interested enough in politics on a more general level. Proportionally, however, they are more interested in women's equality policies (25.5%) and only then in local (17.9%) and national (16.4%) politics, followed by an interest in regional politics. Policies of the EU, Russia, and the United States are of the least interest to the respondents. These data are helpful in terms of assessing the level of civic responsiveness, inclusion, and civic virtue.

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[4]   *Literature preview; Documentation analysis; Face-to-face CAPI survey, on a representative / national sample; Semi-structured e-interviews. The survey questionnaire is composed of the following thematic units: demographic data values, trust and religion; family and social life; education and employment; politics and participation; safety and security; women's health*

How interested are you in political issues?

(cumulative % for "interested", "very interested")

14.8%	10.2%	16.4%	17.9%	11.7%	7.0%	5.8%	25.5%
General politics	EU politics	National politics	Local politics	Regional politics	US politics	Russian politics	Gender Equality politics

Respondents with higher education showed greater interest in the listed aspects and all other monitored aspects (r > 0.25, p <0.01). Respondents who consider themselves to have (higher) income, i.e., income that meets their needs, tend to be more interested in general, national, US, and gender equality politics. Moreover, the lack of interest in political topics is reflected in the data regarding the discussion of political topics and the expression of views. Namely, a large percentage of women in the Republic of North Macedonia stated that they never express political views. Those who say they express their political views do so mostly within the family, and rarely within the party or to traditional media.

Where do you most often express your political views?

(cumulative % of answers for „often", „very often")

Via a political party	5.80%
At work	8.20%
Locally (in the neighborhood, with friends/acquaintances)	11.50%
Via traditional media (TV, radio, call-in shows)	3.00%
On social media	8.20%
Within my family	32.80%

This lack of interest is likely due to the fact that only 20% of women in the country believe that their expression of political views can effectively influence politics in the country. These data indicate the perception that the political opinion and attitudes of individuals are considered completely irrelevant in policymaking and decision making.

Do you think that by expressing your political views publicly, you could influence political decision-making?

Yes 20%

No 48%

I do not know 32%

Civic unresponsiveness, in a wider social setting, is confirmed by the finding that women do not show interest in becoming members of organized socio-political groups. However, it is interesting to note that despite the low level of membership, women are more present in political parties, hobby groups, and women's organizations than in other groups: 13% of the respondents reported membership in a party or hobby group, and 12% in a women's organization, which were all higher than membership rates to NGOs, agricultural cooperatives, volunteer organizations, trade unions or interest groups. The reason for this civic unresponsiveness is probably the absence of participatory political culture, given the immaturity of democracy in the country, but also points to the traditional view that a woman's primary focus is within the home. One of the more visible democratic setbacks promoted by the then authoritarian government, was the reminding, stimulating, and propagating of the traditional role of women, which played out not so long ago.

Which organization/s are you a member of?

Organization	Percentage
Labor union	9.60%
Agricultural Cooperative / Association	2.10%
Hobby group	13%
Women organization	11.70%
Volunteer organization	8.60%
Business association	8.60%
Interest group (with a common interest, goal)	8.70%
Non-government organization	10.80%
Political party	12.60%

Women in the Republic of North Macedonia show an extremely low level of motivation for political participation reflected in the findings that as many as 47% "do not bother with politics at all" and 28% are very rarely active. Only 5% show a high level of participation and 20% have a self-perception of moderate participatory performance. The "do not bother with politics" qualification is probably due to a combination of the absence of participatory political culture often seen in young democracies and feelings of political alienation on a global scale, but also

at the country level, which must be interpreted in light of citizens' experience of authoritarianism, fear-mongering, and political labeling, discrimination, and dishonesty.

What is your level of political participation (self-assessment)?

High (I use every opportunity to be politically active)
5%

Moderate (I am active only when the situation demands it)
20%

I do not bother with political issues at all
47%

Low (only sometimes/or very rarely)
28%

Other than that, at the sample level, the model, although statistically significant, has little explanatory value. Only the level of completed education proves to be a determining factor in the political self-assessment among the respondents, a rise in education level coincides with a rise in self-perception of political participation.

Age and financial status did not prove to be significant determinants in the level of self-perception in the respondents.

Place of living and ethnicity do not (statistically) significantly affect self-perception ($p> 0.05$).

Respondents with higher levels of self-perceived political activity showed a significantly higher tendency to take interest in general political issues (e.g., national/local politics, regional politics, US politics, Russian politics), to express their political opinion more often (in the family, on the social media, through the traditional media, in the local community, at work, within the party), to believe that expressing their political views can influence politics in the country, to join organizations within which they can express their political opinion (e.g., political parties, non-governmental organizations, women's organizations).

Despite the tendencies in the expressing of one's political views, the determination towards taking concrete action to advocate for these issues does not statistically explain the level of self-perception of political engagement. Only some of the views can be considered as explanatory: attitudes towards the general interest in political issues; attitudes towards the interest in national and local politics, and US politics; expressing political opinions on social networks and in the local environment; membership to a political party; interest in monitoring the global situation with women's equality; and familiarity with the legally mandatory quotas for women's participation in politics. Even with these explanatory variables, the model explains the level of self-assessed political engagement by only 56%.

It can be concluded that politically active women (political party members) have a higher level of political self-perception, but that said, the possibility of endogeneity between these variables is not excluded, i.e., that a higher level of self-perception is the woman's motivation to join a political party. This relationship would need to be verified through a longitudinal or further study.

Regarding the question about protest participation to express political disagreement, the interest was low, reaffirming that respondents do not 'bother' with politics (50%), while 23%

explicitly claim that they do not want to express their dissatisfaction through protest. Only 27% of respondents said they had no problem expressing their political dissatisfaction in this way. Alternatively, as previously suggested, non-responsiveness and non-partisanship may underpin these responses, as one of the dominant challenges arising from this research.

Would you participate in a protest to show your disagreement with a certain political decision/policy?

Yes, I have no problem expressing my political dissatisfaction in that way
27%

No, I do not want to express my dissatisfaction in that way
23%

I do not bother with politics
50%

Similarly, the initiative to become a member of a political party is also low, namely, only 14% of respondents confirmed that they would join a political party, compared to 59% who would not join. Of those respondents who would join a political party, 21% would do so because of the need to improve the situation in society, as opposed to 5.5% who would do so for employment reasons and 4.5% who would join to gain personal material benefit. Here, we see there is still some room for participatory initiative for those who still believe that society can improve.

Would you become member of a political party?

Yes
14%

Unsure
27%

No
59%

If you were to become a member of a political party, you would do it...:

expressed in %

Other reasons	9.1
To gain employment or to help family members to gain employment	5.5
To help better society	21.9
For personal (material) gain	4.5

0 20 40 60 80 100

Concerning the different forms of political opinion expression or socio-political engagement, the respondents again show extremely low levels of activity. Namely, 62% have never signed any list of political demands or online petition, nor do they intend to. Similarly, 64% did not and do not intend to participate in demonstrations or protests to express their political opinion, and 59% show no interest in participating in volunteer or civil society organization activities. Furthermore, 66% have not boycotted a company by refusing to buy their products for political or environmental reasons, nor do they intend to. Notably, the greatest resistance is seen with activities connected to a political party (72% show no interest) and participating in political activities online or on social networks (71.4% have not tried nor want to). These findings and those above that relate to reasons for non-participation suggest that the (un)democratic experience and resulting political culture have greatly influenced political engagement.

HOW DO YOU EXPRESS YOUR POLITICAL VIEWS OR POLITICALLY ENGAGE?

(EXPRESSED IN %)

■ No ■ Not yet, but I would ■ I have already done this

	No	Not yet, but I would	I have already done this
PARTICIPATION IN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES ONLINE / ON SOCIAL NETWORKS	71.4	18.5	10
STOP BUYING THINGS/ PRODUCTS FOR POLITICAL OR ENVIRONMENTAL REASONS	65.5	25.5	8.9
WORK IN A POLITICAL PARTY OR POLITICAL GROUP	71.4	19.4	9.1
PARTICIPATION IN ACTIVITIES OF VOLUNTEER OR CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS	58.6	25.6	15.7
PARTICIPATION IN DEMONSTRATIONS / PROTESTS	63.8	19.1	19.1
SIGNING A LIST OF POLICY DEMANDS / SUPPORT AN ONLINE PETITION	62.4	19.8	17.7

Although the interest in politics and political participation of women in the country is at a very low level, and the electoral model is a commonly debated topic, the proportion of women voting in elections in the Republic of North Macedonia is extremely large. In the last elections, 75% of the respondents voted, while 25% did not exercise their right to vote.

Did you vote in the last parliamentary elections?

No
25%

Yes
75%

This contradiction in attitudes is especially interesting when we take into account that the largest percentage of respondents (60%) who exercise their right to vote, do so according to personal conviction. Although it is known that political parties in the country are seen as guarantors of employment and utilitarian agents, still only 11% answered that they vote in a way that will provide them with personal benefits, such as employment or similar. This data indicates that the female population does not vote in the elections in anticipation of reaping future rewards from the parties. Meanwhile, of those respondents who did not exercise their right to vote, the majority (63%) indicated a total disinterest in politics, a third (27%) are disillusioned and believe that no political offer will meet their expectations or needs, and 10% consider their vote irrelevant and unable to change anything.

Reasons for not using the right to vote

I refuse to vote because no political offer meets my expectations and criteria
27%

I have a feeling that my vote is irrelevant and that it won't change anything
10%

I do not want to bother with politics
63%

Only 34% of the respondents in the Republic of North Macedonia recognize the right to vote as an extremely important instrument of political influence. A third (33%) consider it simply a formality, 20% see it as having only a minor influence on politics, and 13% view the most fundamental civil right of a democratic society (i.e., to vote) as completely ineffectual.

What is your view on the right to vote?

It is a small opportunity to express a political position
20%

It is an extremely important tool for political influence
34%

It is irrelevant
13%

It is a formal procedure
33%

When asked if they would accept a political position, 65% of women answered negatively. Only 7% would gladly take on a political position, while 18% would be hesitant to, and 1% answered that they are already in such a position.

Would you accept a political position?

I am not sure
9%

I hold such a position
1%

With pleasure
7%

Maybe
18%

Definitely not
42%

Probably not
23%

The level of education is a significant indicator of the determination of the respondents to accept a political position (out of the whole sample, 39% answered, "completely agree" to the question of whether they would accept a political position), and show the respondents with higher levels of education as 20% more willing to accept a political position. By age, the ratio is negative or inversely proportional, showing a 2% drop in willingness for every year gained in age.

Predominantly, the responses from the qualitative part of the research also suggest similar attitudes of political non-participation and disinterest.

"I am not politically active, because I do not see the quality in any political party, I do not believe in political ideology, I think it is [self-]interest and I do not want to belong to a group where the only criterion for progress is a membership card. (…) I do not want injustice, and there is a lot of it in politics." (B., 44)

"No, I do not want to be a politician and I honestly do not see any benefit in that." (V., 26)

"No. I do not like the parties or the way they work. They are groups of people who care about their personal well-being, not the common good." (W., 56)

"No, because I do not believe I can change anything." (W., 30)

"I am not because I do not want to be marked and I do not justify the actions of any of them." (V., 53)

"No. Because I am politically unaffiliated." (W., 26)

Conclusive remarks and recommendations

The study showed worrying data regarding female (dis)interest in any kind of politics, with many taking the stance "I do not bother with politics". In line with these results, the interest and participation or membership in other organized social activities and clubs are low among the surveyed female population. The cause for women's low political participation could potentially be the result of combination factors such as the fact that Macedonian democracy is still unconsolidated, and consequently- the absence of internalized substantive democratic standards in the population, but also the absence of participatory political culture (hence non-participation). A specific national contextual factor is the regressive democratic setback (2006-2016) in recent Macedonian political history, which consequently took its toll on citizens and women's willingness to be active actors in the democratic progress. That, in addition to the logic of conservative authoritarian populism, has greatly encouraged the traditional role of women (i.e., discouraged their participation in the political sphere). The question of the "main reason / factor" remains an open question that has to be further explored.

Conclusively to our findings, we can suggest some elemental recommendations. Namely, to the political parties to include more women in leadership positions, which will increase women's trust in politics and motivate them to participate in political processes. It is important, also, to raise awareness among decision-makers about the benefits of empowering women and their involvement in decision-making processes. Civil society and the media have to initiate a campaign that empowers women to engage actively and continuously in political debates and in political processes. The government and local municipalities have to continue to secure systemic incentives for greater participation of women and make policies to be more inclusive and gender-sensitive. Institutions and international organizations, too, have to consider providing special financial support to those women's organizations that can raise political awareness among women to stimulate their proactive involvement in decision-making processes. The strengthened international and regional networking among women's organizations, civil society, political parties, and public institutions and bodies is of great importance, as well.

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HORIZONTAL INEQUALITIES AND CONFLICT

Vlora ELSHANI[1]

Abstract: *Does horizontal inequality feed violation and cause conflict? The Balkan societies are diverse in terms of ethnicities which is an opportunity, but also a great challenge when it comes to building sustainable peace and tolerance, and strong democratic institutions. Observing the ethnic relations is a serious issue focused on various levels of the modern societies - impacting the attitude between people and different communities and escalating into armed conflicts; thus, it is of high im-portance to analyze the disparities effecting this violation. In this context, in most of the scholarly articles, in the theories describing ethnic group relations (ethnic group inequalities and categorical inequalities), but also in the fragile relations re-vealed between different communities in a post conflict and former Yugoslav countries, the misbalance between the groups can be attributed mostly to the hori-zontal intercommunity inequalities. In contrast to the studies that alleviate the relation between vertical inequalities, in this paper the focus will be in the form of ine-qualities between the ethnic groups, which enlightens the aspects of disparities in between by potential cause of violation and conflict escalation. To analyze the communities' in-between horizontal inequalities is a challenge, as it entails analy-sis on the groups' situation for a longer period; subsequently, the intercommunity horizontal inequalities of the two post-Yugoslav countries (North Macedonia and Kosovo), are presented through "conflict analysis tools", relying on crucial facts of the past by suggesting few avenues for a future conflict prevention and further analysis as necessary as a result of horizontal inequalities.*

Keywords: *Horizontal inequalities, intercommunity relations, violation, conflict*

Introduction

Considering that inequalities between ethnicities are a source of instability and escalation of violation, there are studies conducted and theories developed aim-ing to describe from where they primarily originate. Witnessing the disparity trend in the rise of the inequality curve between different communities in the world, late-ly, the horizontal inequalities, which were left apart and almost lost their attention in contrast to the vertical ones or individual inequalities, were brought into atten-tion and additionally examined. It must be underlined that the theoretical approach-es of horizontal inequalities reveal the prominence of the community and group relations in societies and alert their impactful control in the way forward of coun-tries towards integration processes, in particular those with fragile community rela-tions like the Western Balkan countries for instance. As a new concept, horizontal inequalities generate "synergies

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between this and other approaches to understand-ing multidimensional inequalities and the dynamics of violent group mobilization in ethnically heterogeneous countries".[2]

Just two decades ago, "in civil war literature, shifting the focus of under-standing inequalities among groups with the lens of horizontal inequalities, had been recognized as an innovative approach that of beyond vertical inequalities or inequalities between individuals. The idea of inequalities between groups as an explanation for political violence was floating around for some time under the guise of several alternative terminologies: ethnic group inequality (Barrows 1976), ranked ethnic groups (Horowitz 1985); relatively deprived groups (Gurr 1993a, Gurr 1993b, 2000); categorical inequalities (Tilly 1998); and cross-cutting cleavag-es (Gubler and Selway 2012, Selway 2011, Siroky and Hechter 2016)".[3] "Gurr's (1970) work on relative deprivation as a source of political violence remains a clas-sic today, since at the core of his theory is the notion that when people get less then they originally expected, frustration will arise and their willingness to participate in political violence to rectify the perceived injustice will increase".[4]

At a later stage, inequalities have been transformed in line with the Frances Stewart (2002, 2008) theory of horizontal inequalities. Based on this actual theory "defining horizontal inequalities as inequalities in economic, social or political di-mensions or cultural status between culturally defined groups, argues that group inequality matters more than individual inequality, and that inequality becomes an important source of conflict when it overlaps with salient group identities".[5]

In a general sense it is closer in perspective that "inequality triggers viola-tion and con-flict. Initially the literature focused primarily on vertical inequality, but due to the inability of explaining how and why inequality mobilizes certain groups for violence, it has overwhelmed the existing literature. Therefore, the the-ories of horizontal inequality are better placed to address this question and show an increase of convergence around the conclusion that hori-zontal inequality is as-sociated with armed conflict. It is also noted that there are several gaps evident in the literature. First, while the evidence is strong of a positive relationship between horizontal inequality and violent armed conflict, and that political context plays an important role in this relationship, the conditions under which certain group iden-tities become relevant for mobilizing people for violence is still unclear. Second, any interaction between different types of horizontal inequality, as well as interac-tions between within-group and between group inequalities are under-studied".[6]

Having said this, the examples analyzed through conflict analysis tools, would be of interest to brighten up some facts for the interethnic or intercommuni-ty relations and the momentums in which the violence has escalated to conflict, in apprehension of circumstances that led to violent situation wedged by internal and external political, economic and cultural

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[2]   *Gudrun Østby, 'Inequality and Political Violence: A Review of The Literature' (2013) 16 International Area Studies Review, 16 (2), p. 214.*

[3]   *Bagdad, K. and others, 2017. Inequality and Armed Conflict: Evidence and Data. Peace Research Institute Oslo, p.4.*

[4]   *Elise Must, 'When and How Does Inequality Cause Conflict? Group Dynamics, Percep-tions and Natural Resources' (PhD, The London School of Economics and Political Science 2016), p.55.*

[5]   *Ibid.*

[6]   *Bagdad, K. and others, 2017. Inequality and Armed Conflict: Evidence and Data. Peace Research Institute Oslo, p.4.*

influences. It must be outlined that the two cases of post-conflict communities with potential for violation, analyzed through conflict analysis tools do not yield the best model in generalizing the con-nection between horizontal inequalities and violent conflict, but they confirm that in specific social circumstances of heterogeneous societies, the horizontal inequal-ities feed violation and they cause conflict. Moreover, the fragile relations and the lack of democratic participatory process afterwards in building of state and con-solidation of institutions may easily replicate the aggressive steps and generate conflict.

North Macedonia Case

North Macedonia is a small and landlocked country, but with a great geo-strategic im-portance, with "around 2.02 million inhabitants according to the Census of 2002. The majority of the residents are ethnic Macedonians with 64.17%, Alba-nians with 25.17%, Turks with 3.5%, Roma with 2.66%, Vlachs with 0.48%, Serbs with 1.78%, Bosniaks with 0.84% and 1.04% belong to other ethnic groups".[7] It is the only one that reached independence in 1991 from former Yugoslavia in a non-violent way. The new-born state continued surviving with a number of weaknesses, underdeveloped institutions and limited capacities for a full control of the territory. The large minority (Albanians) from another culture is concentrated in the border areas in the north-west. Being a relatively poor country (compared to other repub-lics in the past), it started its independence on a stagnant economy. The situation was further worsened by the UN sanctions to former Yugoslavia (1992 – 1996), and the Greek embargo imposed on Macedonia's name as a punishment for that.[8]

The dynamics of inter-community disappointment became visible initially from the mistrust of the Albanian community in the public institutions and the ina-bility to use the Al-banian language as an official language, as well as have the right to higher education in their language – in this way being unequal with the Macedo-nian majority in the country followed with expression of revolt for being consid-ered second-class citizens and unequal. Although, the usage of language for other ethnic communities has been defined under the constitution of North Macedonia (Article 7) specifying that "in the units of local self-government where there is a considerable number of inhabitants belonging to a certain nationality, their lan-guage and alphabet are also in official use, in addition to the Macedonian language and Cyrillic alphabet, under conditions and in a manner determined by law"[9], in practice this didn't appear satisfactory for the Albanians and was considered insuf-ficient, thus it deepened the misbalance of dissatis-faction between these two main communities. As a consequence, the exasperation reached the level of segregation and creation of their own system (i.e. boycott of referendum, establishing their uni-versity, NLA (National Liberation Army actions and escalation of armed conflict); the misbalance diverged the two core communities in North Macedonia so high, that the Ohrid Peace Agreement had to be reached (August 2001), and indicated the future landmark. The agreement

[7] *'Population: Demographic Situation, Languages and Religions - Eurydice - European Com-mission' (Eurydice - European Commission, 2021), https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/national-policies/eurydice/ republic-north-macedonia/population-demographic-situation-languages-and-religions_en accessed 13 January 2021.*

[8] *Lars Jerker Lock, 'A Conflict Analysis Macedonia' (Publikationer.sida.se, 2003), https://pub-likationer.sida.se/contentassets/a4319f99cc124339800aecd53db36bfa/macedonia-a-conflict-analysis_936. pdf accessed 16 January 2021.*

[9] *Legislationline.org, 2019, https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/8221/file/North_Mace-donia_Constitution_1991_am2019_en.pdf accessed 23 January 2021.*

recognized formally the rights of ethnic Albani-ans, turned the society of North Macedonia into a society with multi-ethnic and multicultural character, consequently a multicultural state.

The education and the language are in the focus of the Ohrid Framework Agreement dated 13 August 2001 in items 6. and 6.1. respectively, thus outlining the primary and secondary education and the support required stating that "with respect to primary and secondary educa-tion, instruction will be provided in the stu-dents' native languages, while at the same time uniform standards for academic programs will be applied throughout Macedonia"[10] then item 6.2. elaborating the funding from the state in relation to the largest minority group, decisively saying that "state funding will be provided for university level education in languages spoken by at least 20 percent of the population of Macedonia, on the basis of spe-cific agreements"[11] and item 6.3. referring to positive discrimination of enrolment to state universities, citing "the principle of positive discrimination will be applied in the enrolment in state universities of candidates belonging to communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia, until the enrolment equitably reflects the composition of the population of Macedonia".[12]

It is crystal clear that in North Macedonia the transformation to multi-ethnic society was awkward and the Ohrid Framework Agreement was primarily focused in the relations between the two communities in the conflict without con-sidering soberly the rights of other communities, at the same time omitting the analyses on the causes of the conflict as well. Yet, after the parties signed the Ohrid Framework Agreement, still Annex A did not find complete implementation relat-ed to Article 7 in items 2 and 3 for the official usage of Albanian language and is-suance of personal official documents of citizens speaking that language. Two dec-ades now the progress measures that "the inter-ethnic relations remain calm over-all, and an agency is created, along with an inspectorate to oversee the overall im-plementation of the Law on the Use of Languages".[13]

In regard to education "there are a number of encouraging and equitable in-itiatives implemented across ethnic groups; at the school level, the Ministry of Ed-ucation and Science formally accepted the Concept for Intercultural Education in 2016 - a normative document promoting diversity in education and has partnered with USAID (2017-2022) to strengthen inter-ethnic integration, by upgrading cur-ricula and textbooks and renovating schools. Within efforts of improving minori-ties' access to higher education is the quota ethnic minorities in 2003, (amounting to 23% of total enrolment), and in 2004, recognizing the State University of Te-tovo, an Albanian-language university".[14] As part of public universities, further-more in 2016, the Mother Teresa University was been established in Skopje with 5 faculties.

Being at this point, to brighten up the clashes and link moments of situa-tion, the follow-ing conflict analysis tools will provide illustration and inputs to streamline how and by when the gaps were present at horizontal level with inequal-ities. Additionally, through the tools it will be easier to capture and simplify the moments of causes in conflict, as well as the main issues diverging ethnicities and understand the interaction feeding the violation that can further

[10] *UN DPPA, Peacemaker.un.org, 2001, https://peacemaker.un.org/fyrom-ohridagreement2001 accessed 25 January 2021.*

[11] *Ibid*

[12] *Ibid*

[13] *Ec.europa.eu, 2020, 'North Macedonia 2020 Report', https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/north_macedonia_report_2020.pdf accessed 25 January 2021.*

[14] *Hannah Kitchen and others, OECD Reviews of Evaluation and Assessment in Education: North Macedonia, OECD Reviews of Evaluation and Assessment in Education (OECD 2019), https://doi. org/10.1787/079fe34c-en accessed 25 January 2021, p.75.*

predict possible circumstances of interethnic relations that may disrupt and escalate to potential conflict situations for the community relations.

The **Conflict Mapping** used to demonstrate the conflict between two main ethnicities coming from different cultures in North Macedonia between Macedoni-ans and Albanians, is given through positioning of each actor with influence and power in the following scheme including the conflict main issues, the relationships between actors, as well as specific conflict situations as a result of horizontal dis-parities.

The indications from the disparities have originated back in the past as a result of the conflicts and polarization in the Balkan societies during World War II and lately in the former Yugoslav system, when the Albanian ethnic community was considered a minority population in the federation system, including in the Repub-lic of North Macedonia. The transition from one to another situation influenced by political, cultural and economic factors in neighboring countries, created another momentum in which the manifestation of dissatisfaction in regard to unequal ac-cess for all ethnic communities in particular those with higher representation, had been raised.

Figure 1: Visualization of community relations in North Macedonia

Considering that the focus was mainly in the recuperation and consolida-tion of the state that reached independence in a non-violent way, the issue that the internal inequalities between the main majority community and the second largest minority community group with higher representation would increase and become violent was not considered a priority from the government point of view, which derived from a communist system and monoethnic state mind-set.

The non-treatment of issues (i.e. education, official language), non-dialogue combined with the poor economic situation and the impact from the war in neighboring Kosovo, further worsened the situation and diverged the groups to the level of deep separation, violation and escalation to the armed conflict. The re-spect for culture was transformed into the difference between communities, and it spread up fast to further separate the groups and differentiate them.

One important element is that the conservative approach of all religious in-stitutions during the social crises further worsened the relations between all com-munities and amplified the level of inequalities and the religious social teaching towards respect of diversity in culture, was left aside from religious representa-tives. In such circumstances, when horizontal inequali-ties are profound, the only visible and detrimental action is the violation and conflict between communities, because the convergent lines do not affiliate with each other at all.

The **Conflict Perspective Analysis (CPA)** is selected aiming to illustrate the macro view of the situations explaining what happened in the case of horizontal inequalities causing conflict between Macedonians and Albanians, and which parts were missing that could help to overcome it/in between the vacuum zone, that usu-ally is not used by communities involved in the conflict. It is proven that the wind of violation is by nature unstoppable and with no other explanation North Macedo-nia had to go through struggles to be transformed into a multi-ethnic society. The conflict is presented based on the different perspectives from the involved parties (Albanians and Macedonians).

While the perspective of each ethnic community during the conflict is pre-sented with facts, interests, motivation and options, the reality box in the end con-firms the presence of conflict escalation as a result of the existing elements as visu-alized below. In all similar circumstances, the different ethnic communities are mo-tivated by actions prioritizing differences rather than similarities.

The process in which the communities in North Macedonia were triggered with inequali-ties did not just cause the interethnic conflict, but it also shaped a pes-simistic future image for the residents internally and beyond in Western Balkan countries. Considering that multi-ethnic societies carry the potential for conflict, the relations between communities represent the sub-stantial aspect for their future that can never be neglected.

To reiterate, the root causes of inequalities back in the history happen dur-ing complex situations, associated with crises and tensions between different ethnic communities. The de-struction of former Yugoslavia that started in Slovenia, Croa-tia and in North Macedonia during 1991, reached culmination with Bosnia & Her-zegovina during 1994/95, ending the conflict in Kosovo during 1998/99 and at last with the interethnic conflict in North Macedonia during 2001, between Albanian NLA and the Macedonian National Army.

Even though a lot has been studied to analyze the conflicts and inequali-ties, and that is understandable, it is the miscommunication that creates a vacuum situation, there is yet no single theory that describes specifically all the causes for the appearance of the conflict. Hence, it is important to understand what is in be-tween/vacuum situations that are missing during violent situations which can help to prevent it and reduce inter-ethnic horizontal inequalities. Additionally, the will-ingness of conflicting parties and their reasonable judgment is missing in all violent and conflict situations and the nationalism increases beyond normal values, where-as the participatory democratic approaches are hidden somewhere in the darkness of conflict.

| Actors	Albanian Community		Macedonian Community
Facts	Prejudice, mistrust, boycott, threatened by state anti-actions and attacks, violation, attacks with Macedonians, armed conflict.	Interest to be convergent and work in state building, EU agenda and integration process, ceasefire, international agreement, mutual trust and respect, respect for diversity.	Disrespect of other community rights, implementation of old mono-ethnic system, attacks and armed conflict with NLA (Albanian Guerrilla).
Interests and motivation	Need good livelihood, income generation, higher education in their language, having their official language/equal rights and integration in leadership structures and EU structures, sustainable economic development.	Religious representatives and local structures bridging dialogue between communities and promote democratic processes.	Need to have local representation of Macedonians in local governance with majority Albanians, good livelihood, income generation, mutual respect and trust, integration in EU, sustainable economic development.
Options	Dialogue, decent life stable economic situation, equal access in education, use of official language, income generation and employment opportunities.	Academia, youth and adults undertaking joint initiatives with the support from government officials and parliamentarians of both communities to promote a multi-ethnic state with respect of each other's culture and education in their language	Dialogue and constructive discussion to define the advantages and disadvantages, gaps and agreed intervention logic as a joint effort.
		Coordination and Reconciliation between Macedonians and Albanians; Implementation of Framework Ohrid Agreement.	
Reality Check	National Army/Military & Security Forces and State Police fail to control the situation, curfew in place, unpredicted escalation of violation and shootings.		

Figure 2. The macro view of intercommunity disparities in North Macedonia through the CPA tool

The horizontal misbalance between the ethnic communities affiliates with the expression of dissatisfaction that usually escalates in violence since all of the issues that represent a real concern from the ethnic communities from the horizon-tal perspective aren't discussed between them to define possible solutions for the joint way forward, but instead, they are taken as unchanged and with no construc-tive approach, hence deviating the idea of state building and common development where diversity would be considered a value instead of an obstacle. As already mentioned, the horizontal inequalities are still under studied, but in this particular case, they are impacted also with other elements, such as: the conflict from the neighboring countries in Kosovo and the destructions from former Yugoslavia, as-sociated with the high devotion of the government to the country's name dispute and the low interest to the ethnic relations, unfortunately.

The opened negotiations of North Macedonia with the EU are an optimistic and promis-ing path under the motto of which the country is buffering the inter-community inequalities and thinking beyond in a long-term perspective. However, the issues generating fragile community relations, the polarization of the political arena and non-implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement in its entirety, are always the future determinates and impact the country's future and may very easily affect the horizontal misbalance between communities in North Macedo-nia. Additionally, the right to education and language for the Roma minority in particu-lar, is another critical step for the rehabilitation of horizontal inequalities between all ethnic groups.

Kosovo Case

Small and landlocked, situated in the Balkan Peninsula, Kosovo is a place in which the roots of the interethnic inequalities and conflict go back deep in the history. According to the population census data conducted in 2011 "Kosovo has in total, 1,739,825 residents excluding municipalities of Leposaviq, Zubin Potok, Zveçan and Mitrovica North which the Serb popula-tion boycotted".[15] "The largest ethnic group are Albanians, amounting to 1,616,869 or 92.9% of the total popula-tion. The second and third largest ethnic groups are, respectively, Bosniaks, with 27,533 inhabitants (1.6%), and Serbs with 25,532 inhabitants (1.5%). They are fol-lowed by Turks (18,738 or 1.1%), Ashkali (15,436 or 0.9%) and Egyptians (11,524 or 0.7%). Finally, Roma and Gorani, with 8,824 and 10,265 inhabitants, amount to 0.5% and 0.6% of the total population. A remaining 0.1% defined them as pertain-ing to other groups".[16]

Back in the former Tito's Yugoslav system "for the first time, ethnic Alba-nians were recognized as a distinct national group in which they were allowed to use their language and also gained the right to have education in their language as well as constitution of the autonomous Province in 1974".[17] The student' demon-strations afterwards during 1981 with the "'main demand for Kosovo to be made a full republic, were put down by Serbian police forces with many killed or arrested and the ethnic Albanians' rights were systematically eroded".[18]

The last country's history chapter underlines the revoking of Kosovo's au-tonomy in 1989 (Milosevic's power), allied with protests and violence that impact-ed ethnic relations, and since

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[15] *Kosovo Agency of Statistics, 'ESTIMATION of Kosovo Population 2011' (KAS 2013), p.12.*

[16] *Erasmus+: Higher Education - International Capacity Building (CBHE), 'Overview of The Higher Education System' (European Commission 2017), https://eacea.ec.europa.eu/sites/eacea-site/files/countryfiche_kosovo_2017.pdf accessed 27 January 2021, p.1.*

[17] *Minority Rights Group International, 'Minority Rights in Yugoslavia' (2000), https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/469cbfe40.pdf accessed 27 January 2021, p.12.*

[18] *Ibid.*

then the interethnic inequality challenges between Albanians and Serbs still exist. The relations between Albanians and Serbs in Ko-sovo were progressively worsened and finally escalated into the armed conflict in 1999 between the Yugoslav/Serbian army and KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) followed by the NATO interventions. This period is known for its flagrant viola-tion of human rights of ethnic Albanians and repression from the regime which "suspended the legally formed Parliament and government, closed Albanian lan-guage schools, and sacked Albanian workers in state institutions and state-owned enterprises".[19] The education parallel system of Albanians was created, which served since 1992 until the appearance of the conflict.

The prolonged definition of the status produced another misbalance and dissatisfaction in society in the interethnic relations that blew up in the spring of 2004 and again attacked the fragile relations between the main ethnicities with the attacks towards minorities, in specific the Serbs. After 4 years of progress, in close coordination with international community, in 2008, Kosovo declared independ-ence and became a multi-ethnic state, but the interethnic relations between the Serbs and the Albanians continued to be fragile and tense. The newly created state started its independence with stagnant and very poor economy as well, a high un-employment rate and tensions among these two communities. Two decades after the armed conflict, Kosovo's independence still remains an unacceptable fact from the perspective of the Serbian community, particularly those living on the border with Serbia (i.e. Mitrovica North).

Due to the history of the conflict in Kosovo, the transition from one to an-other status for the Serbian community destroyed the interethnic relations with the local Albanians in the post-independence period. When associated with the impact from neighboring Serbia with the imposed parallel governing structures among Serb majority municipalities, as well as the lack of mature political actions of the Kosovo's Government, the relations can easily be abolished - provoking violence and may cause boycott in local municipal structures with a Serbian majority com-munity. As a consequence, the actual horizontal inequalities between the two main com-munities with history in conflict can collapse the development and slow down the integration processes of Kosovo in the European Union.

To capture the real moments which affected the inter-community relations the below **conflict mapping** is used to provide basic evidence for the parties in-volved in the conflict, including their local misbalanced power and relations with and between the Governments in Kosovo and Serbia.

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[19] *Ibid. 13*

Figure 3. Conflict mapping of intercommunity relations and inequalities in Kosovo

The map aims to simplify the appearance of conflict, its dimension, the is-sues from the history of conflict, the actual issues, as well as the relationship with and between each other as a majority and non-majority community, and the third parties' impact in the overall process. It is worth mentioning that misinterpretation of social values and disrespect for each-other's culture and religion by religious institutions as well as prolonged issues between communities at horizontal level, usually become a cause for immediate conflict.

The presented horizontal inequalities within the main communities and in their close relations associated with the number of unresolved issues impacted by various factors, highlights the need for transparent discussion that marks the future steps towards sustainable development for the heterogeneous societies. The fact that several actors are implicated in the misbalanced situation within the communities, articulates the lack of empathy in the moments of conflict escalation and directly feeds the appetites of specific political agendas and opens space for prejudice and nationalism. The lack of synchronized approaches and the dictated actions from the neighboring Serbia and its government in relation to the Kosovo Serbs are a factor of desta-bilization and interference in the already misbalanced relations between the Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo and in the new state-building efforts. Allied with the factors impacting the western Balkan countries as well, such as: lack of decent jobs for Kosovo youth & migration, poverty and low economic development, it becomes much complicated and may easily pledge destruction.

Going back to some interesting and drastic facts, for instance the constitu-tion of the Republic of Serbia still considers Kosovo as a province and a constitu-ent part of Serbia[20] and Albanians are not mentioned as a minority. In contrast to this, the Constitution of Kosovo is designed based on the best advanced constitu-tional democratic practices for minority protec-tion. Compared to other minorities in Kosovo, the Serb minority is advantaged in Kosovo, and they are clearly speci-fied in the constitution with the official languages in use (Albanian and Serbian), whereas "Turkish, Bosnian and Roma languages have the status of official lan-guages at the municipal level or will be in official use at all levels as provided by law".[21] Furthermore, the Serb Community as mentioned, has the "total number of seats won through the open election, with a minimum ten (10) seats guaranteed if the number of seats won is less than ten (10)".[22]Other communities in Kosovo specified with the name of communities (i.e. Roma, Ashkali, Egyptians, Turkish, Gorani and Bosnians), also have their guaranteed minimum number of seats.[23] Kosovo is an example of how democratic constitutions should look like since it cap-tures the best democratic constitutional parts from the developed countries, and it is written from the best practices worldwide.

However, from another perspective, there is a misbalance between com-munities includ-ing minorities in Kosovo, and by being a favored minority commu-nity in one state and also an acknowledged a citizen in another state, which is the case with Kosovo Serbs, may create dissatisfaction between the Serbs and the Al-banians in particular and with other communities in Kosovo and it might raise un-predicted expectations that can be attributed mainly to horizontal inequalities. This type of disparities originated as a result of various appetites with political, econom-ic and cultural background become a source of instability and destruction of inter-community relations within the countries and do not lead anywhere but to the man-ifestation of dissatisfaction in different forms.

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[20]   *Constitution of the Republic of Serbia 2006, Article 114.*
[21]   *Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo 2008, Article 5 (Languages).*
[22]   *Ibid. Article 64 (Structure of Assembly), point 1.*
[23]   *Ibid. point 2.*

In the case of Kosovo the Needs-Fear Mapping is used to echo the specifics relat-ed to inequalities between communities that can nowadays potentially aggravate to conflict if they are not addressed accordingly. The analysis given for each actor involved, describes what each actor has in terms of issues, inter-est/expectations/needs, fears, means and options. In our case, this is used to obtain an understanding about the role of actors involved, their perceptions for each other including prejudice, the impact of their action for their future relations, their con-nection with governments and the way forward with stimulated discussion for the situation. The analysis shows that there are cross-cutting interests that may be used as a connection point and that contribute to the peace-building and reconciliation process. The mismatch between the needs and the interests between communities may become a cause for their stagnant future and generate escalated violation.

So, from the elaborated parts under this tool, it becomes clear that the ethnic com-munities impacted by horizontal disparities, have also interests and needs, they also have fears, but for each issue they have an option of how to overcome them. In that sense, while for a considerable percentage of Kosovo Serbs it is crucial to have dominance of a parallel system, and they have a fear to accept the new reality cre-ated, similarly for them it is also important to define a safer and a more promising future, to ensure decent jobs with improved livelihood, to have access to improved public services and better infrastructure – consequently, a better quality of life.

Similarly, for the Kosovo Albanians it is very important to live in harmony and peace-fully in their newly created state, to ensure prosperity for the younger genera-tions, to create a better living and working environment, to have state sovereignty and sustainable economic development and decent jobs.

It must be outlined that the inter-community disparities between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo which are generated mainly by political influences from neighbor ing Serbia are toxic elements that impact the future of the Serb minority popula-tion, especially of the younger generations, as they do not yield long-term sustaina-ble de-velopment, but instead create dependency and harm multi-ethnic social de-velopments. These approaches cannot survive endlessly and aren't the right ones during integration processes of Kosovo towards the European Union and with re-spect to the membership in the International Organizations.

The below given elaboration with disparities at horizontal level between Al-banians and Serbs influenced by various factors as it is, describes how complex the situation is, thus it requires multidimensional and always interactive and constructive approach.

Parties	Issues	Interests/Needs	Fears	Means	Options
Kosovo Serbs	Return to 'status quo ante bellum', imposed parallel system in municipalities with Serb majority (i.e. health system, education, double payment), privileged minority communi-ty inside Kosovo	Security, Survival, Income generation, improved liveli-hood, access to improved public local services, better infrastructure	Destructed relations with Serbia if accepting Kosovo reality, potential violation, conflict appearance and damaged relations with lo-cal Albanians	Insufficient political, eco-nomic and cultural integrat-ing approaches from local Serbs (promoted by Lista Srpska), promotion of paral-lel system during election process and governing	Interact in the meaningful intercommu-nity dialogue, reflect in the dialogue with Serbia as local Serbs with their future in Kosovo, undertake joint de-velopment efforts with common inter-est, join local integration process for the benefit of all communities
Kosovo Albanians	Limited access to municipal local services with Serb ma-jority and lack of employment and integration processes for other communities including Albanians in those areas	Security, Survival, Income generation, decent jobs, im-proved livelihood, access to improved public local ser-vices, development, func-tional state, responsive gov-ernment	Losing patience, appearance of violation, conflict ap-pearance and damaged rela-tions already established with local Serb community	Lack of political, economic and cultural actions to con-tribute to integration pro-cesses, no realistic promises during election process and governing	Join the local dialogue and local integra-tion process, implement integration in-ter-community agenda for joint commu-nity development, promote projects with local initiatives
Kosovo Government	Limited access in municipali-ties with Serb majority, paral-lel system of Serbia, lack of feedback and cooperation from local structures and no implementation of Kosovo agenda towards EU integration process	Recognition of Kosovo's independence, further inte-gration to UN and EU structures, visa liberalization, equal parties in dialog with Serbia, implementation of agreements reached, eradi-cated parallel system in mu-nicipality and elimination of propaganda against Kosovo integration	Losing state sovereignty, no cooperation with Serb resi-dents in Municipalities with Serb majority, the increase of parallel system, potential for violation and anarchy	Lobbying from Central level government and main polit-ical parties in Kosovo (in-cluding Serb ones) for im-plementation of integration and unrealistic measures for eradication of parallel struc-tures	Have realistic action plan for integration of Kosovo Serbs, join EU dialogue with concrete actions, minimize impact of parallel structures within Kosovo, be-come equal party in the dialogue, ensure implementation of agreements, under-take well-thought steps that do no harm to democracy and relations with interna-tional community and in particular with other minorities in Kosovo
Serbia Government	Partial control in Serb inhabit-ed municipalities, propaganda and anti-Kosovo integration agenda and international recognition	egaining the control of Kosovo, protection and manipulation of Serbs in majority commu-nities, protection and control of cultural heritage in Serb Municipalities, creating As-sociation of Serb Communi-ties	Losing control over Serb inhabited areas, implemen-tation of Kosovo govern-ment agenda in municipality	Lobbying from Central level government in Serbia in-cluding Serb political par-ties in Kosovo, irrelevant approach towards Serbs	Minimize impact into Kosovo Serbs, accept Kosovo as independent state, consider Serbs as their community living in another neighboring country, ensure their equal rights, start integration and dialogue for EU, stop propaganda for Kosovo

Figure 4. The needs-fear mapping with inequalities in Kosovo case

Conclusions

The interethnic relations of post-conflict societies are fragile with intention to break up and their horizontal inequalities feed violation at various levels and cir-cumstances. Horizontal inequalities matter in post-conflict and former Yugoslav countries and in a way they represent the transition from one to another level in so-ciety (monoethnic to multi-ethnic society). In addition to the fact that inequalities between different communities have the root causes back in their history, the current political, economic and cultural factors in Kosovo and North Macedonia may easily destruct these relations and provoke violation, specifically in the areas with mixed communities which were in conflict in the past (i.e. Kosovo – Albanians and Serbs; North Macedonia - Macedonians and Albanians). While inequalities exist among communities, the spread of conflict from neighboring countries has a tendency to accelerate the impact into fragile community relations. On the other hand, the im-mediate transition from one to another status in various communities is seen as a challenge too. Thus, when combined with the fear, mistrust, and other divergent el-ements, they deepen the level of dissatisfaction among communities and provoke violation and represent a threat for conflict. This is usually justified by the confront-ed communities as being done in the name of protection for their national values and territory. Considering that the concept of horizontal inequalities worldwide is still new, the synergy with other dynamics of violation in multi-ethnic countries is pre-sent, but understudied. The conflict analysis tools are a good way to visualize the disparities and moments pertaining to when and how the conflict appears within dif-ferent ethnic communities and represents a simple roadmap for easy interpretation of relations, actors, issues, and inequalities in ethnically heterogeneous societies. From the examples of Kosovo and North Macedonia, by reducing the inequalities at the horizontal level the potential for any future violation and conflict appearance among communities is prevented. Consequently, horizontal inequalities are a poten-tial source for violation that can escalate in conflict too. The Ohrid Agreement alt-hough not a perfect one in practice, was a framework that helped to overcome the issue between Macedonians and Albanians in North Macedonia, however, there are parts that require implementation (i.e. the usage of the Albanian official language), that may become a reason for potential destruction and an obstacle for North Mace-donia in the EU integration process. Additionally, neglecting the language and edu-cation rights of the Roma Minority living in North Macedonia, just because these issues were not treated in this agreement, represents a threat for future appearance of horizontal inequalities. In the Kosovo case, the grand focus in the relations between the Albanians and the Serbs, by neglecting in practice the rights of the marginalized groups such as of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians, may incite tension and repetition of horizontal inequalities among all communities, even if the constitution is based on the best models for respect of their rights.

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CROSS BORDER COOPERATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES: THE REPUBLIC OF KOSOVO AND NORTH MACEDONIA

Kaltrina SALIHU[1]

Abstract: *Border as a concept and practice has been central to vast political, social and economic research over the last two decades. Because of the big number of cross border cooperation initiatives stimulated in Europe and beyond, the discussion is focused on the impact of these initiatives in re-bordering and de-bordering processes for the countries, establishing cross border mechanisms and cooperation. The EU IPA programme and funds have been supporting the cross border cooperation of the Republic of Kosovo and the Republic of North Macedonia since 2007. This paper elaborates on the connection of the administrative borders between the two countries and the cross border initiatives endorsed under the IPA CBC programme.*

To understand the common forms of cooperation among the citizens of both countries, citizens were asked how often they cross the border, for what purpose, and what would help to ease cross border cooperation. Official data and information were also analysed to help in understanding the cross border initiatives developed by the two countries with the IPA programme support. The research methodology consists of literature review and implementation of a questionnaire. The results of this research inform on the common cross cooperation practices among the citizens of both countries and recommends that more effective cross border cooperation is ensured through enhanced administrative border procedures.

Keywords: *Border, Cooperation, Cross border, Citizens, Institutions*

The Republic of Kosovo and the Republic of North Macedonia

Cooperation between countries is indispensable for thriving in the modern world due to its potential for using common resources and tackling common challenges along the path of prosperity. This also applies to the Republic of Kosovo and the Republic of North Macedonia, two countries of the Balkan region in Southeast Europe sharing their border. They also share similar development opportunities and challenges inherited from historical and political processes.

Both the Republic of Kosovo and the Republic of North Macedonia were part of Yugoslavia, from which they declared their independence in 1991[2] and 2008, respectively.

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[2] *North Macedonia declared independence in September 1991 under the name Republic of Macedonia; The country became a member of the United Nations in April 1993, but as a result of a dispute with Greece over the name "Macedonia", it was admitted under the provisional description the former*

In addition to economic relations, the two countries also have family, social and cultural ties considering that a quarter of the North Macedonia population is Albanian, living precisely in the vicinity of the border with the Republic of Kosovo, which has a majority Albanian population.

Currently, they have another thing in common - their state building and functioning are guided by EU standards as they are both striving to become members of the EU. Thus, North Macedonia has the status of candidate country granted by the European Commission in 2005, while Kosovo has had the status of a potential candidate since 2015. Furthermore, they are both part of the EU enlargement strategy for the six Western Balkan Countries.

In the last two decades, the political, economic, and social developments in these countries have been aligned to reach EU standards at all sectors to advance in their accession process, each with its specificities, and get the merit-based reward of accession. Rule of law, administration reform, inclusive rural and economic development, gender equality, environmental efficiency, and enhanced quality of education are some of the common areas where these countries have mandatorily engaged in and are also supported by different funding mechanisms, including the ones from the European Union.

The EU-Kosovo Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) has been in force since April 2016. The European Reform Agenda (ERA), launched by the EU and the Republic of Kosovo in November 2016, has continued to serve as a useful tool to guide the implementation of EU-related reforms in the SAA context. While the SAA between the EU and North Macedonia entered into force in April 2004, following ratifications by all the EU Member States. After a long journey, in March 2020 – the Council of the European Union and the European Council gave the green light to the opening of accession negotiations with North Macedonia[3].

Border Crossing Points

Parallel to the other processes of alignment with the EU standards and operations, both countries have committed to establish and apply border management systems based on EU principles, for creating an efficient and effective border management system that provides open but well controlled and secure borders, which requires application of border control and surveillance measures and standards.

As presented in the Kosovo National Strategy for Integrated Border Management[4], the two countries share four official border points of A and B categories. The length of the border between the two countries is 170.772 km. Under the coordination of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the three main institutions managing the borders are the Police, the Customs and the Food and Veterinary Agency.

Criteria for categorization and standardization of the Border Crossing Points have been developed taking into account the assessment of internal and external factors, as well as based on interstate agreements. This categorization is based on the current situation as well as on meeting EU standards, such as: movement of people and goods; level of cross-border crime;

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; a term that was also used by some other international organizations. In June 2018, Macedonia and Greece resolved the conflict with an agreement that the country should rename itself Republic of North Macedonia; this renaming came into effect in February 2019.

[3] *European Council, Council of the European Union. "Council Conclusions on Enlargement and Stabilization and Association Process". 18 June 2019. Accessed on 15.03.2022 https://www.consilium. europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/06/18/council-conclusions-on-enlargement-and-stabilisation-and-association-process/#*

[4] *National Strategy of the Republic of Kosovo for integrated border management, 2019-2023. Republic of Kosova, Government. P. 18*

migration and asylum; presence of authorized integrated management authorities and control of the national border and the number of staff.

Out of four Border Crossing Points (BCPs) between Kosovo and North Macedonia, three fall under the A category and one under the B category. A category BCPs are open 24 hours and serve for movement of people, means and goods. In these BCPs, Police, Customs, and Food and Veterinary Agency are constantly present.

B Category BCPs are open 24 hours and serve for movement of people, means and non-commercial goods. In these BCPs, Police is present 24 hours, while Customs and the Food and Veterinary Agency only during the time intervals determined by bilateral agreement with neighbouring states.

The Border Crossing Points of A category are at the following locations: Hani i Elezit (road); Stanqiq-Bellanovc (road) and Hani i Elezit (railroad). The fourth Border Crossing Points of B category is located at Glloboqica.

EU Cross Border Cooperation Programme between the two countries

Both countries are in the process of EU accession and parallel to their individual efforts in achieving the required reforms and improvements, they are also engaged in joint activities to ensure development and integration of the border regions and communities.

An important EU instrument implemented in the region including both in Kosovo and North Macedonia is the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) as part of the EU enlargement strategy[5]. The Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) is the means by which the EU supports reforms in the 'enlargement countries' with financial and technical assistance[6].

The aim of the CBC Programme between the two countries is to support the improved livelihood for the communities in the cross-border area, which is linked to the economic development of the regions and their integration in the national market affairs. It contributes to the social cohesion through cultural and exchange activities as well as support in addressing joint environmental challenges.

Cross border initiatives result from joint needs of the communities in the cross-border region to address problems or challenges, which are then planned and implemented through a bottom-up approach, or they can be proposed at the regional and central level policies as strategic and required interventions to foster development and good relations at the local level.

The level of the harmonization of priority development needs and potentials at the national levels and the border region with the programme strategies, thematic areas and goals, impact the success and the effectiveness of the CBC interventions[7].

Authorities of both countries have committed to establishing good cooperation linked to the functions and needs of the communities in the border area, responding to the programme area needs, as well as maintaining good partnership with the European Commission.

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[5] *European Commission. "Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A Credible Enlargement Perspective for and Enhanced EU Engagement with the Western Balkans." COM/2018/065 final. Strasbourg, 2018. Accessed on 13.03.2022. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52018DC0065*

[6] *Cross Border Cooperation Programme, Official Webpage, https://www.cbc-kosovo-northmacedonia.eu/programmes*

[7] *Jan van der Molen. Ietswaart, H. (2012), Crossing Borders, Creating and Managing Cross-Border Regional Alliances - Practical handbook to the Crossing Borders theory. (Retrieved from www.cb-academy.org)*

The eligible bordering area for the IPA Cross-Border Programme between the Republic of Kosovo and the Republic of North Macedonia includes five regions – the East and South Economic Regions in the Republic of Kosovo, and Skopje, Polog and the Northeast Region in the Republic of North Macedonia. The cross-border area is relatively homogeneous in terms of geographical features and social and economic development characteristics. The population growth tendency is declining. The young population composes a large group of the population ranging from 25–30%. Migration has been one of the most concerning issues of the last decade, which has affected the labour force (mainly in rural areas).

The proposed strategy of the Cross Border Cooperation programme is centered around three main priority directions: 1. Enhancing competitiveness, business and SMEs development, trade and investment; 2. Encouraging tourism and cultural and natural heritage; and 3. Protecting the environment, promoting climate change adaptation and mitigation, risk prevention and management[8]. The strategy strives to foster the cooperation among institutions and organizations in the cross-border region, to support sustainable economic growth and strengthen social cohesion.

The cross-border area is becoming more and more attractive for foreign investors, whose direct investments play a vital role in the border area's economic development. Trade relations between both IPA II beneficiaries have shown an increasing trend over the years. The SMEs dominate the economic activities in almost all sectors, while large enterprises constitute a small number of financial entities. The business sector is developing, but it suffers from various problems, such as low labour productivity, lack of labour market skills to cope with new technologies, and lack of innovation capacities. Although there is a wide range of higher education institutions in the area, the research and development activity level is minimal. Knowledge transfer should take place both locally and across the border, as well as between different sectors.

Under IPA I call of 2013[9], seven projects were financed and implemented. Two of them included joint activities in the education sector, two other included cooperation in culture and tourism, one promoted gender empowerment, and one had an activity to support SMEs in the partnering implementing municipalities. The implementation of these actions started in 2014 and was completed in 2016.

Under the first call of IPA II in 2017[10], nine projects were financed and implemented by the cross-border partners. Out of these projects, seven fall under the thematic area of tourism, culture, and natural heritage. Simultaneously, two of them included implementing actions aimed at enhancing competitiveness, business and SMEs development, trade, and investments.

The majority of the actions supported under the calls of IPA I and II CBC programme fall under the second thematic priority of the programme, i.e. encouraging tourism and cultural and natural heritage, with few steps that fall under the first thematic priority, i.e. enhancing competitiveness, business, and SME development, trade and investment. While in the groups of

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[8] *European Commission. "Overview – Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance." Accessed on 01.04.2022, https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/instruments/overview_en.*

[9] *Programme Document IPA I CBC programme 2007–2013. Accessed at https://www.cbc-kosovo-northmacedonia.eu/programmes.*

[10] *Programme Document (2014), IPA II CBC programme 2014-2020 ANNEX 2 INSTRUMENT FOR PRE-ACCESSION ASSISTANCE 2014-2020. IPA CBC PROGRAMME KOSOVO* – THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA. Page 6. Accessed on 25 March 2022. http://cbc-ks-mk.com/ programmes*

initiatives under these two calls, no action was noted under the third thematic priority protecting the environment, promoting climate change adaptation and mitigation, risk prevention, and management.

Citizens' perspective on the border crossing procedure

As part of this research, a short questionnaire consisting of five questions was designed and implemented with seventy respondents. The main purpose of the questionnaire was to get the feedback of the citizens from both countries on the frequency of their traveling, the purpose of traveling from one country to the other, and their border crossing experience.

On the question of how often do you travel from the Republic of Kosovo to North Macedonia and/or vice versa, 78.6% of the participants responded they travel once or twice per year, 12.9%, 1.4% travel one to five times per week, 1.4% travel more than 10 times per month, while 5.7% do not travel at all from one country to the other.

1. How often do you travel from the Republic of Kosovo to North Macedonia and/or vice versa?

|	N	%
0	4	5.7%
1 to 2 times per year	55	78.6%
1 to 5 times per week	1	1.4%
5 to 10 times per month	9	12.9%
More than 10 times	1	1.4%

Table 1. Frequency of traveling

Chart 1. Frequency of traveling

Highest percentage of respondents (45.7%) visit the two countries for tourism, 21.4% travel for work related purposes, 12.9 % travel to visit family members and relatives, 12.9% for other reasons, indicating mainly the travel to access medical services, 5.7% cross the border for study purposes, and 1.4% for business.

|	N	%
Business	1	1.4%
Family visits	9	12.9%
Other	9	12.9%
Study	4	5.7%
Tourism	32	45.7%
Work	15	21.4%

Table 2. Reason of traveling

Chart 2. Reason of traveling

Crossing the border point for the citizens of both countries requires the verification of personal documents of travelers, documents for the transportation vehicles, and declaration of goods at the customs if included. Usually this procedure takes 15-20 minutes, depending also on the flux of people crossing the border points at the same time.

The respondents of the questionnaire also confirmed this. 48.6% of them said that the border crossing procedure takes ten to fifteen minutes, 30% of them said that the procedure lasts fifteen to thirty minutes, for 14.3% of them the procedure takes thirty minutes to one hour, while 7.1% experienced longer border crossing procedures, which lasted more than one hour.

3.How long do you wait at the border crossing point?

	N	%
10-15 min	34	48.6%
15-30 min	21	30.0%
30 min to 1 hour	10	14.3%
More than 1 hour	5	7.1%

**Table 3. Border crossing time**

3.How long do you wait at the border crossing point?

Table 3. Border crossing time

To enable faster and easier border crossing procedures 28.6% of the respondents declared that the removal of physical checks and controls by replacing them with digital border crossing tracking practices would be an appropriate solution. 27.1% of them also supported the proposal of digitization of all services including the digitization of vehicle control and customs declaration, which was the response of 15.7%. On the other hand, 25.7% of the respondents think that stronger border integrated management would be the solution for a more effective border crossing procedure in terms of quality and length.

4. What do you think would facilitate the border crossing procedure?

	N	%
Border integration and addition of control cabins	18	25.7%
Digitalization of services	19	27.1%
Digitization of vehicle control	11	15.7%
Other	2	2.9%
Removal of controls	20	28.6%

**Table 4. Improve the border crossing procedure**

4. What do you think would facilitate the border crossing procedure?

Chart 4. Improve the border crossing procedure

The last question of the questionnaire aimed at getting insight on how informed the citizens of both countries are on the responsible institution for managing the borders.

Thus, 75.7% of the respondents said that the main responsible institutions for border crossing points are the Ministries of Internal Affairs of the two countries, 11.4% said they did not know, 7.1% declared that responsible institutions for the border management are the National Centers for Border Management, and 5.7% think that this task is a responsibility of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs.

5. Who manages the administration of the border crossing points?

|	N	%
I don't know	8	11.4%
Ministries of Foreign Affairs	4	5.7%
Ministries of Internal Affairs	53	75.7%
National Centers for Border Management	5	7.1%

Table 5. Border management institutions

Chart 5. Border management institutions

The overall citizens' perspective on the border crossing procedure gathered through the implementation of the questionnaire confirms the mainstreaming of the Cross Border Cooperation programme between the two countries, which is oriented towards three thematic areas: 1. Enhancing competitiveness, business and SMEs development, trade and investment; 2. Encouraging tourism and cultural and natural heritage; and 3. Protecting the environment, promoting climate change adaptation and mitigation, risk prevention and management. However the frequency and the reason of traveling mostly concentrated around tourism, and the reason behind the fact that very few include business purposes can be related to the border crossing procedures, which may create difficulties for producers and traders. In this regard, the need for improving border-crossing procedures in making them more effective, which was also confirmed by the respondents, remains a challenge for both the citizens and the responsible institutions managing the borders. The coexistence of the administrative borders and the efforts of enabling cross borders cooperation should be coordinated, in order to enable real exchange of cultural and tourist offers and products, and more importantly to support the economic exchange and cooperation between the two countries. For this, the commitment of both governments in pursuing integrated border management strategies and agreements is necessary, not only to comply with the EU standards, but also to build better and sustainable relations and cooperation.

Conclusion

The Republic of Kosovo and the Republic of North Macedonia as neighbouring countries in the Western Balkan region share similar development challenges as well as development opportunities.

Being partners under the IPA Cross Border Cooperation Programme since 2007, they have had the chance to align their development priorities and work on development of a partnership at the national and local level. The efforts for improving cooperation and exchanging activities

are ongoing. In parallel, both governments are also committed to improving the border management strategies and practices, aligning them with the EU standards at the same time, but more importantly making the border crossing experience more effective for their citizens. While there are challenges in these processes, which are also confirmed by the citizens of both countries, the efforts of both governments, with the support of the EU, either through IPA programmes or through other regional activities, should be further tailored to the communities' needs and opportunities.

The results of the survey show that citizens of both countries travel from the Republic of Kosovo to the Republic of North Macedonia (and vice-versa) once or twice a year on average, mainly for tourism. The border crossing procedures usually take ten to thirteen minutes, and in certain exceptional cases over thirteen minutes. According to the respondents, these procedures would improve and become more efficient through digitization of the services. This includes the digitalization of document control, vehicles control and other procedures. Reforms and actions in this regard are to be led and implemented by the responsible border managing institutions, in particular the Ministries of Internal Affairs.

More practical and effective border crossing procedures would also create bigger possibilities for economic cross border cooperation among the businesses of both countries, joint environmental related actions, and at the same time would foster more frequent travels for tourism for the citizens of both countries. In particular, considering that IPA CBC programme is already supporting the two countries in identifying and implementing cross border actions in the three related areas, the improved border management practices would add to these efforts to the benefit of the citizens of the two countries.

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Scientific article

PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES AS A TOOL IN PROXY WARS: THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN FOCUS

Mile KOSTOSKI[1]

Abstract:*The purpose of this paper is to elaborate on the phenomenon of the privatization of warfare through the use and participation of private military companies as a means of accomplishing security tasks in the contemporary international context. In this case, the focus is on the effects of their engagement in the so-called proxy wars (wars with intermediaries) in the conditions of a growing multipolar international system. The analysis of the case of the Russian Federation starts from the premise that this country, among other things, relies on the indirect approach to warfare, but also that private military companies serve as a tool in the proxy wars they wage, in order to achieve their geopolitical goals and interests.*

Keywords: *privatization of war, private military companies, proxy wars, Wagner Group, Russia*

Introduction

The analysis in this paper starts from the mapping of the world in which proxy wars (proxy wars, wars with proxies) are part of the modern security context. For example, points of potential conflict between the Russian Federation and the Western powers extend worldwide, starting from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Belarus, Ukraine, Syria, Kazakhstan, and sub-Saharan Africa all the way to Venezuela. These are territories in which Russia is skillfully spreading its influence, which the Western powers consider as important points of their collective and national interests. China is recognized as the third pillar of the multi-polar international system. Although for the moment it is based mainly on the so-called soft power, however, it intensively strengthens its military potential and is becoming an important factor in the geopolitical security games. So far, the scientific literature has been much more interested in the privatization of security and war in Western countries, as well as in the so-called Third World countries, but strong tendencies in other parts of the world have been ignored. Hence, this paper analyzes the privatization of warfare in the Russian Federation, that is, the Russian indirect strategy implemented by private military companies (PMCs) as a means of achieving foreign policy objectives. Most research on proxy warfare and PMC originates from Western science centers and/or is published in English, so the non-western linguistic/scientific space remains in the shadows. The research used primary and secondary sources as well as a large

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part of journalistic research references. Confidentiality and classification of documents are also factors that affect the difficulties in the implementation of a comprehensive approach to uncovering all the pieces of the global security industry puzzle that goes beyond the classic state framework. PMCs represent a significant scientific challenge to study, i.e. a subject for analysis, which then raises many additional research questions. One of them is the use of PMCs for so-called proxy wars. This is one of the key objectives of this paper, which should inform their growing application in this type of warfare.

In this article, we focus first on the theoretical framework of PMCs and proxy wars, beginning with and based on empirical evidence of the changing nature of war. The second part of the paper addresses some aspects that have not been sufficiently researched so far, namely the Russian PMCs, as well as Russia's approach to their use. In this context, two key arguments are offered: firstly, Russia can be expected to undergo strong international pressure in order to eliminate the shortcomings in the regulation of the activity and the legal vacuum in which they operate. Secondly, the tendency to increase the number of Russian PMCs and their use as a strategic tool can be expected to increase. The first hypothesis underlying this statement is that PMCs are an inevitable part of the modern global security context and that Russia is no exception, and the second is that Russia already has a positive experience of using them in capacity development and achieving its goals. The financial scale of this sector supports the first hypothesis. Namely, Russia's private security sector in 2011 weighed US$7 billion annually (Galeotti, 2013: 54). Their expeditionary and market facilities for hire, diverse terms, and services, make them competitive on the force market. Their spread is greatly facilitated in a globalized world within the existing "flexible" international legal framework.

In addition to the second hypothesis is the positive history experience that Russia has in the use of irregular forces, PMCs, or mercenaries, which will be explained below. Here, it is important to note an important difference, that in one case, we're talking about mercenaries involved on an individual basis, for their economic reasons, profitable where Russia has no role. These are mostly African countries. In the other case, there is a political background and support for the PMCs, as in the case of Syria and the annexation of Crimea. Specifically, the fact that the Wagner Group is designated as a private military company in Syria does not necessarily mean that it will play the same role in Sudan. This builds on the general classification proposed by Deborah Avant, who says that private military and security companies (PMSCs) have a designation and an epithet in a situation, and another in a different context, according to the contract, which catalogues the activities over time and location (Avant, 2015: 16–22). The contracts of state or non-state security actors are the best way to determine the relative independence of the company at any point.

Finally, in terms of available literature, it can be seen that there is a growing interest in the topic of Russian PMCs. Until recently, the privatization of the war was a phenomenon missing from the official Russian texts on defense and security. Until the last Russian military doctrine of 2014 ("The military doctrine of the Russian Federation", 2015), The PMCs were mentioned for the first time, not as a possible instrument in the service of Moscow, but as a new kind of threat against Russia and its interests. One of the reasons is Russia's non-intervention or passivity due to the military hegemony and proactivity of the United States worldwide as the largest consumer of private security services.

Private military companies – theoretical framework

The need for a definition stems from a lack of consensus on how to defend private companies specializing in military and security services. For the purposes of this paper, PMSCs will first be defined as the common denominator of the PMCs and PSCs. Emphasis will then be placed on defining PMCs (in Russian: частная военная компания) because the Russian military doctrine first categorized them as non-state actors in 2014 (Westerlund & Norberg, 2016: 8).

Accordingly, in terms of defining PMSCs, there are two international mechanisms. The first is the Montreux Document adopted in 2008 and the second is the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers (ICoC) adopted in 2010. Based on the provisions of the two documents, it can be concluded that: they are entities that provide military and/or security services, independently or on behalf of other actors, regardless of how they describe themselves. Military and security services, in particular, include the armed guarding and protection of persons and objects, such as convoys, buildings, and other places, maintenance and operation of weapons systems, detention of detainees, advice and training of local forces, and security personnel... or any other activity for which company personnel is required to bear arms while performing their duties (ICoC, 2010: 5-6; The Montreux Document, 2008: 9).

Furthermore, the term PMSCs covers a variety of terms used to refer to private military contractors, private security companies, private security providers, military service providers, and military service companies. "All PMSC studies and reports begin with the problem of a simple definition: they are ambiguous or polymorphic entities" (Carmola, 2010: 9).

To differentiate PMC and PSC, the classical classification of private actors is twofold. PMCs are registered corporate bodies with legal personalities that offer military and security services of various natures and for purposes other than those of mercenaries. Services include combat operations and operational support, military counseling and training, procurement of weapons, logistical support, intelligence gathering, etc. On the other hand, PSCs have the same features and command structures as PMCs, and the main difference lies in the services they provide. Their primary focus is crime prevention, and public order and peace. They also provide security services for prisons, airports, infrastructure facilities and private individuals. Avant rightly proposes unique terminology, so she names these actors by the generic name of private security companies (Ванковска, 2011: 101-102).

Regarding the definition of PMCs, the most specific definition is given by Sean McFate who says that PMCs are "expeditionary conflict entrepreneurs" who "kill or train others to kill" in foreign environments (McFate, 2014: 1).

Another definition is that PMCs are defined as "companies providing services that previously belonged to the state military domain and include military training, intelligence, logistics, offensive warfare, and security in conflict zones for-profit" (Schreier & Caparini, 2005: 18).

Furthermore, one of the most widely accepted definitions is that PMCs are commercial entities operating on a contractual basis, both concerning their clients and their employees, and providing security services in the broadest sense of the term (training, advice, securing facilities, or protecting the convoy) in support of combat forces; and their use of armed force is foreseen only in cases of defense or self-defense. (Dreyfus, 2018: 2).

Proxy wars – conceptualization

There is a narrative in academic production that says proxy warfare is already deeply shaping conflicts. Proxy wars are nothing new. Only the roles and actors have changed. In the available literature, there is a multitude of debates and different approaches to conceptualization

and understanding, but strict definitions of proxy warfare are rare. The question of mercenaries that have existed throughout history is deliberately not tackled so as not to lose sight of the work.

The concept of proxy wars emphasizes a two-way relationship. That connection is between the so-called Principal (external actor) and the Client (proxy actor). However, in the competition of the great powers, more attention should be paid to all the actors who are involved. In general, this involves a four-way connection between the two main external actors and their respective proxies or target countries. To understand the context, one must appreciate all the actors and have a systematic vision of the political and proxy relations in play (Hoffman & Orner, 2021a). Therefore, it is difficult to give a strict definition of the question of what proxy wars are.

By definition, however, proxy wars involve sponsoring foreign actors to influence the outcome of a violent conflict for the foreign state's own strategic purposes. The definition encompasses the desire of the foreign State (the "principal") to avoid direct action while supporting clients on the ground (state governments, or local militias, or contractors), as well as the use of force, in order to achieve the desired political goals (Hoffman & Orner, 2021b). According to Peek, the term proxy war is used to refer to a non-state paramilitary group receiving assistance from a sponsor to achieve strategic goals. The definition includes three parts: the group itself, an actor in an interstate conflict; the assistance ratio; and the sponsor, a more powerful entity than the proxy that intends to achieve strategic goals. Proxy forces can include actors like private military companies, which is one of the fastest-growing areas in the study of warfare (Peek, 2021: 37). In the context of the paper, the term proxy forces will refer to PMCs.

Furthermore, a proxy war is an armed conflict between two States or non-state actors acting at the instigation or on behalf of other parties not directly involved in hostilities (Osmańczyk & Mango, 2002: 1869). According to Mumford, a traditional proxy war is a war that involves foreign intervention: "conflicts in which a third party intervenes indirectly in order to influence the strategic outcome in favor of its preferred faction" (Mumford, 2013: 2). In brief, proxy warfare is the sponsorship of indirect forces by different actors who successfully circumvent state law. Geraint Hughes provides a specific military definition, which most closely mirrors the paper, namely: "(armed conflicts)... in which the warring parties use third parties or as an additional means of waging war or as a substitute for the direct use of their armies" (Wither, 2020: 19).

Historically, as well as practically speaking, for the needs of the paper through examples, proxy warfare during the Cold War was an indirect form of confrontation in which client states were armed and used offensively to expand their spheres of influence. (Schmid, 2011: 702). By comparison, proxy Cold War wars and military conflicts in which the United States and the Soviet Union never became directly involved, rather, they supported opposing parties to smaller conflicts to gain influence around the world (Grieco, Ikenberry & Mastanduno, 2018: 60); (Kaufman, 2010: 78). However, the use of proxies by either side is simply the result of an analysis of the costs and benefits of modern conflict - countries adapting to changes in warfare - and the bipolar struggle during the Cold War (Peek, 2021: 36). Consequently, it can be concluded that in a bipolar order in which there were two superpowers with nuclear potential, the only way to fight was to get involved in other conflicts in other parts of the world where the parties to the conflict were secretly assisted depending on their geopolitical agenda.

It can be concluded that the term "proxy war" refers to the Russian method of predicting conflict. Even though these conflicts take place in very different contexts, their paradigm is similar. The use of mercenaries and PMCs is one of the many tools of these "proxy wars" carried out by Russia since the beginning of the 1990s. The hybrid nature they possess, namely their developed relationships with different sponsors, network structure and connectivity, the support

of the states contributed to the achievement of victories on the battlefield, not of a tactical nature, but more in a geostrategic and geopolitical sense.

Legal framework and regulation of Russian PMCs

Private security companies in Russia have been registered and legal since 1992. In that period it is about guard security in the country or abroad (Østensen & Bukkvoll, 2018: 22).

In contrast, Russian PMCs (founded by Russian citizens and executors of Russian interests), have their headquarters abroad, which makes them international. Russia denies any involvement in any mercenary activity abroad and casualties among Russian citizens involved in these groups. There are scholars in the Russian academic community who talk about the erosion of sovereignty due to the increased permeability of borders and the weakening of the traditional functions of the state (Nebolsina, 2019: 20), as well as due to the growing influence of new actors while weakening the power of the state itself and its inability to function without the support of institutions for international cooperation (Nebolsina, 2019: 20).

Regarding the regulation of PMCs, they are subject to the sponsorship of forces not covered by Russian laws. According to the Constitution of Russia, Article 13, paragraph 5, clearly states that the creation and activity of public associations whose goals and activities are aimed at forcibly changing the basis of the constitutional order and violating the integrity of the Russian Federation, undermining its security, creating armed units and inciting social, racial, national and religious conflicts will be prohibited ("The Constitution of the Russian Federation", 1993). However, such provisions exist in almost all constitutions, and this is not a barrier for PMCs because they are not prohibited and are not organized against their state, but as western science argues, they are in a public-private partnership with the structures of the state.

In addition, in the Criminal Code of Russian Federation, Article 208 states that the participation in an armed formation that is not provided by federal law, as well as participation on the territory of a foreign state in an armed formation not provided for by the legislation of that state shall be punishable by deprivation of liberty for a term of eight to fifteen years, with restraint of liberty for a term of one to two years. The note states that a person who has committed a crime under this article for the first time, who has voluntarily ceased participation in an illegal armed formation and who has surrendered their weapon, shall be released from criminal liability, unless their actions contain a different corpus delicti. Furthermore, Article 359 stipulates the sanctions for mercenaries, namely the prohibition of participation in armed conflicts as mercenaries for material reward ("Уголовный кодекс Российской Федерации" (УК РФ) от 13.06.1996 N 63-ФЗ (последняя редакция)).

At the international level, the Montreux Document affirms state obligations under applicable international law and sets non-binding standards and practices for business entities providing military or security services. Fifty-eight states (58) are signatories to the Montreux Document. Also, the European Union, the OSCE, and NATO as international organizations. Russia is not a signatory to the Montreux document, nor does it want to make a more serious commitment. This prevents the international system from exercising control over the actions of Russian PMSCs that may be involved in illegal activities ("Participating States of the Montreux Document," 2022).

PMCs are not yet explicitly regulated in Russian legislation. At the moment, under Russian law, PMCs cannot be established in Russia. It should be noted that their illegal status is not coincidental. Non-regulation, the legal void, and the status of PMCs are tools that allow Russia to use them to pursue foreign policies. The classification and unavailability of documents

on the status of Russian forces participating abroad mean that PMCs are characterized as proxy assets, proxies, and mediators.

The development and status of Russian PMCs as a factor in proxy warfare

Russia has extensive operational experience with indirect access and irregular forces support.[2]

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, several Russian PMCs entered the private market, most of which functioned exclusively as private security companies. Founded by former KGB officers and military officers, these individuals sought to leverage their past experiences and business connections created during the secret and open missions of the Cold War (Singer, 2008: 12); (Lock, 1998: 27). The major reasons, around the world, and also reflected in Russia, for the development of PMCs, were the reduction of military personnel, the increase in the sale of military equipment and arms, and the processes associated with the privatization of states. As a result, security has been privatized. The former Russian soldiers took advantage of the opportunity they were given by the private sector.

Despite official rhetoric about the need for a state monopoly on the use of force, and resistance to the legalization of PMCs in Russia, the country has experienced in outsourcing (the transfer of hostilities or the recruitment of temporary executioners by state structures) of violence against private entrepreneurs (Østensen & Bukkvoll, 2018: 41).

No official statistics exist on the existence of PMCs. That is because of the mysterious nature of the industry, their illegality in Russian legislation, and because of their transnational nature. The well-known private military companies in the Russian world are RSB-Group, Antiterror, MAP, MSGroup, Centre R, ATKgroup, SlavCorps, PMC Wagner, E.N.O.T., Cossacks. They had fought in Syria, Ukraine, and other parts of the world (Bryjka, 2019: 5). If we follow the map on which meridians the Russian PMCs are located, it can be noticed that from 2014 to 2020, is slowly increasing, i.e. African countries and parts of Ukraine dominate after the 2014 conflict. With suspicious or proven operations in no less than 30 countries on 4 continents and an increasingly sophisticated and adaptable business model, PMCs are likely to play a significant role in Russia's strategic competition in the foreseeable future (Katz, Jones, Doxsee, & Harrington, 2020).

According to Russian experts Ivan Konovalov and Oleg Valetsky, there are about 20,000 "private security services" in Russia, about 4,000 private security companies, and between 10 and 20 PMSCs (Østensen & Bukkvoll, 2018: 22).

Russian PMCs played a role in the development of the concept of non-linear warfare, but they also have the geopolitical and geoeconomic advantages that Russia enjoys today (Sukhankin, 2018: 13).

Key examples of Russian PMSCs that support regimes for securing and protecting economic concessions for the Kremlin are Syria (oil and gas), Sudan (gold), the Central African Republic (gold, uranium, and diamonds), and Venezuela (oil, gold, and weapons deals). According to Arnold, the evolution of PMSCs as a Russian geoeconomic tool remains an open research project (Arnold, 2019: 12).

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[2] *For more details, see: (Sukhankin & Hurska, 2020: 3); (Jones, 2018); (Turbiville, 2005: 12); (Matthews, 2018); (Dreyfus, 2018: 3); (Sukhankin, April 2018). Historical examples refer to volunteers and mercenaries and deviate from the modern definition of PMCs as corporate entities that operate and provide services in exchange for profit, regardless of who the client is.*

Wagner Group on the horizon

Among Russian PMCs, the Wagner Group is the most prominent, largest, and most controversial. There is also a large amount of relatively credible and publicly available information about her at the time of writing. Wagner is the subject of interest by several independent Russian investigative journalists, who have provided documentaries, photographs, and evidence-based interviews about the activities as well as the groups that created the company (Marten, 2019: 182). According to those analyses, its appearance was not accidental. The General Staff of the Russian Army first saw the need to organize PMCs for "delicate missions abroad" from 2010. Its commander is Dmitry Utkin, who was also decorated with the Order of Courage during a gala in the Kremlin (Sukhankin & Hurska, 2020: 5).

According to experts, it is not a classical PMC but rather a mercenary movement offering combat services. Wagner Group has no formal legal existence. Without an existing website, it is not registered in the Russian tax administration's offshore database. Media reports suggest Wagner had access to a Russian military base near eastern Ukraine (Laurence, 2018). According to some sources, Wagner also has offices in St. Petersburg and a commando training camp in southern Russia (Galeotti, 2017). Wagner's military units at different times and, according to various sources, numbered from 1350 to 2000 people. According to sources in the German newspaper "Bild" in the Bundeswehr, the total number reaches 2,500 people (Bushuev & Baranovskaya, 2020).

Ukraine served as one of the first fields to prove PMCs. The Ukrainian crisis, in particular in its violent phase, which followed in April 2014, played a key role in the emergence and rise of the Wagner Group.[3] Although some (future) members of the group participated in the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, the real phenomenon dates from May 2014 and the beginning of the armed conflict in southeastern Ukraine, where the group will take part in all major engagements (the battle at Lugansk airport, the battle at Debaltsevo), subversive/terrorist operations (downing of Il-76; provocations in the rear of the Ukrainian armed forces; intelligence gathering) and "suffocation" of (pseudo) Cossacks and local powers acting as "cleaners" (Sukhankin & Hurska, 2020: 6). According to the Ukrainian Security Service, more than 200 Wagner contractors took part in the battle for Debaltsevo, where the group lost more than 50 members during the period January-February 2015 (Dahlqvist, 2019).

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[3]   *In late November 2013, Ukrainians took to the streets to protest the non-signing of an agreement by then-President Viktor Yanukovych that would bring the country closer to integrating into the European Union. As protests in Kyiv's Independence Square, or Maidan, continued in 2014, the government began dispersing protesters. On February 27 and 28, pro-Russian gunmen seized key buildings in Crimea and seized control of the ethnic Russian-majority Crimean Peninsula. The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, describes it as an attempt to protect Russian citizens and military means in Crimea. On March 16, in a referendum, 97% of the population of Crimea chose to secede from Ukraine. On March 18, Russian and Crimean leaders signed an agreement in Moscow to join the region to Russia. On March 21, after the ratification of the annexation agreement by Russia's parliament, Putin signed a law on the formal integration of Crimea into Russia. In April 2014, pro-Russian separatist activities expanded to other eastern Ukrainian cities, like Donetsk and Lugansk in the Donbas region. It escalated into an armed conflict between the Ukrainian government and the separatist forces of the self-proclaimed Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics, whose demands range from self-government to unification with Russia. The UN estimates that between mid-April 2014 and January 2015, at least 5,244 people were killed and 11,862 were injured in the conflict.*

For more details, see: https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/explainers/understanding-ukraines-euromaidan-protests <https://www.britannica.com/place/Ukraine/The-Maidan-protest-movement>

Unlike Ukraine, in Syria, the Russians perfected the model because those private mercenaries were working with the local forces. Wagner succeeded, perhaps because his main client was the Russian state and its Syrian ally (Galeotti, 2017). On the Russian side, PMCs serve as "unofficial boots on the ground" in support of the Syrian regime, President Bashar al-Assad, while the official Russian presence relied heavily on the state-provided air force (Sparks, 2016).

Among other things, Wagner played a significant role in the Islamic State's efforts to capture Palmyra. During the first two years of the campaign in Syria, Wagner received significant support from the Russian Ministry of Defense. In 2016, Wagner had equipment and manpower equivalent to an infantry regiment, with access to tanks, missile artillery, howitzers, and air support from the Russian Ministry of Defense (Dahlqvist, 2019). As a former Wagner fighter told the Estonian TV channel ETV in July 2017, "Wagner is no ordinary private military company. It is a miniature army". (Giles, Akimenko, 2019: 5).

Along with the successes, the Wagner Group also has its losses. By the way, one of those missions led to a debacle near Deir Ez-Zor, where the group suffered the heaviest casualties following an airstrike by US forces. The exact number of dead is unknown, but the most realistic number of Russian mercenaries killed was about 20 (Reuters, 2018). According to another source, about 100 to 200 Russian combatants were killed (Spearin, 2018: 39). The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a denial on February 20, 2018, stating that the dead men were Russians who acted "of their own free will and for various reasons" (in other words, volunteers). Subsequent reports link the deaths to the Wagner Group, noting the growing tendency of Russian PMCs to fight alongside the Russian armed forces (Barham-Marsh, 2018).

Another instance of their use is the civil war in Libya in 2014. Wagner, with about 200 fighters, supports former Libyan colonel Khalifa Haftar, funded by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (Fabricius, 2019). It was just an indicator of expanding control over oil plants, revealing an interest in Libya's energy resources. It was used by President Omar al-Bashir in Sudan and support of the Central African Republic (CAR) government, amongst others (Marten, 2019: 197).

However, state officials deny the existence of the PMC. Asked about the existence of PMCs in Russia, a spokesman for the Russian Duma, Dmitry Peskov, states: "By law, there are no private military companies in our country. Everyone is talking about a private military company, something called Wagner, but the fact is that there is no provision in our legislation (for private military companies)" (TASS, 2022). However, their existence suits them, primarily due to the absence of legalization, they exist at the mercy of the state authorities, who will use them as long as they meet the strategic goals. President Vladimir Putin has confirmed the PMC's involvement in Mali (Teslova, 2021) which is an indicator of how it reaches the scope and maneuver of its foreign policies through PMCs while dissociating itself from their existence.

The Wagner Group can be considered as a hybrid entity: in its "essence" accepts the mercenary methods employed by Moscow since the early 1990s, and because of their "form", PMCs that appeared in public in the wake of Western interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, especially in the early 2000s (Dreyfus, 2018: 7).

Regarding the above-mentioned PMCs, only one Russian company from 2019, RSB Group, qualifies as a relatively independent PMC managed by profit, which has existed for more than a decade (Dahlqvist, 2019). RSB, for example, is registered at home to work in Russia and registered in the British Virgin Islands for international operations. In 2016-2017, RSB employees worked in eastern Libya, supposedly to remove landmines (Spearin, 2018: 43).

Conclusion

The private security industry is an important component of the Russian state. The use of PMCs has exploded in recent years, reflecting lessons learned from previous deployments, a growing expansionary mindset, and a desire for economic, geopolitical, and military gains.

With the changing nature of warfare, today's conflicts are more complicated. The term proxy and the use of proxy forces as PMCs have gained momentum in international relations. We conclude that the use of PMCs is due to the incomplete international legal framework, as well as to the Russian legislation where there is a legal vacuum. There is no binding system for their liability, due to their private status and the confidential nature of their contracts. There is now considerable empirical finding and evidence to suggest that Russia has repeatedly hired PMCs over the past eight years to pursue national interests beyond its borders. PMCs enable Russia to increase its geopolitical influence in the world. They are an important tool in the conduct of operations that include cyber operations, military assistance, and combat operations. Public pressure subsides, as citizens do not react in the same way to the death of a PMC contractor as to the death of a soldier. At the same time, the state distances itself from its existence when the operations are not successful.

Finally, we see that there are two arguments for which Russia uses PMCs. The first is that they are used in ways that other countries do (using Western precedents), and the second is that they are involved in foreign policy and strategic goals.

We also found that the PMCs, in addition to the combat operations and the military consulting and support they provide, do not have to use military force to do their job and achieve their goals. They can also be used to incite civil unrest and demonstrations, wage cyber wars, conduct intelligence, tasks, and missions that were not covered in the paper, but are an integral part of PMCs missions, but also factors in proxy wars.

Understanding Russia's strategy and using PMCs as a tool is an important part of understanding Russia's indirect approach to warfare, as well as an important part of understanding future activities.

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Scientific article

COLONIAL RULE IN AFRICA AND NEW STRATEGIES FOR RENEWED INTEREST IN THE CONTINENT - THE EXAMPLE OF GREAT BRITAIN

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Abstract: *After many years of low growth, are opportunities for fast-tracked development opening up for Africa? Will the large increase in population be used as an opportunity for development or will it still keep some African countries in the poverty zone? For years, public opinion has been created that the "black continent" is the poorest region in the world, a place of the hungry and the poor, of diseases, misery and suffering. Yes, of course there is poverty in Africa, but not all countries in Africa are poor, and based on a number of parameters, many countries in Asia are poorer than many African countries. Centuries of exploitation of Africa by colonial powers have certainly left their mark, but the African continent has enormous potential and resources that have not been fully utilized. Africa's opportunities are in their economy, social development and population, agriculture, education, health, infrastructure and mineral exploitation, but it all requires investment. This is well known by the former colonial powers and China, which all return to the African continent with different intensities, strategies and interests.*
Key words: colonial powers, colonies, Africa, Great Britain, exploitation, investment, new strategies and partnership

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Introduction

Africa, the oldest inhabited continent on the Earth, is again attracting the geopolitical interests of the most influential countries in the world. What causes this renewed interest?

For the centuries of colonial rule on the African continent there are a number of analyzes, texts, papers and researches which elaborate on the actors, motives for colonial rule, ways, goals and interests of the colonial powers, as well as the negative effects and consequences for the colonized African peoples and states. In the paper we do not intend to elaborate on these phenomena, but by stating the basic data and facts about colonial rule, to reflect the imposed continuity and enter into an analysis of the existence of a new policy, a new approach and a new renewed interest of the great powers towards the continent. It is well known that for centuries and with different intensity, the developed European countries Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium and Portugal, have pursued their own interest in Africa. At the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century, China, Russia and United States also strengthened

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their economic, political and security influence on the African continent. There is not enough available research and analysis for the existence and confirmation of policies for a renewed interest of the former colonial powers towards the African countries, which was one of the motives for doing this paper. Of course, as countless times in the past, the greatest initiative in that direction has been demonstrated by Great Britain.

In order to explain this thesis, the paper will explain in more detail the imperial rule of Great Britain in Africa, with particular reference to the new energetic and renewed strategic approach or, as Great Britain calls it -"the new partnership for Africa's development".

Basic data on the potential and significance of Africa

Before we start talking about Africa, we first need to provide some general data that will capture the significance, potential and size of this continent in the world. The oldest inhabited continent spans over 4 time zones and covers the climatic zones from the north to the south temperate zone with an area of 30,224,550 km2, which is 20% of the total land area in the world and the second largest continent in the world in terms of size and population, after Asia. More than 1.3 billion people, representing 15% of the world population[2] live in 54 countries (46 land and 8 island countries) and one non-sovereign state (Western Sahara). Africa's energy potential is also significant. Africa holds 8% of world oil reserves, 7% of world gas reserves, 4% of world coal reserves, 10% of world hydrographic potential, 17% of uranium reserves, 15% of geothermal potentials, 38% of wind energy sources, there are 300 sunny days a year, etc.[3] The geographical size of the African continent, compared to other continents, can be seen through the "Gall-Peters projection of the world" [4] or the so-called "real and accurate map".


Scheme No. 1 - Gall - Peters projection of the world

[2]   *Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Dynamics. World Population Prospects 2019. https://population.un.org/wpp/. Accessed on 19.05.2020*

[3]   *World Energy Council: "2015 World Energy Trilemma. Priority actions on climate change and how to balance the trilemma". www.worldenergy.org and @WECouncil. Accessed on 12.01.2021.*

[4]   *The projection was created by Scottish scientist James Gall in 1855. Introduced to a wider audience by the German historian Arno Peters in 1970, as a "Peters Map of the World". Named "Goal-Peters Projection" after Arthur H. Robinson in 1986.This projection has been promoted for wider use by UNESCO and has recently been widely used in schools in UK. In some US universities, this projection has been widely used since 2017.*

But we know that the world population had or has built a different picture of the shape and size of the continents and countries because of the famous "Map of the World", made in 1569 by the geographer and cartographer Gerardus Mercator, which was widely used (and still is).

Scheme No. 2 – Mercator's projection of the World

In Mercator's projection, the territories of North America and Europe are shown larger than they actually are, while the territories of Africa and South America are smaller. Europe is shown in the center of the world map which is incorrect, because it should be Africa instead. Mercator's map does not realistically show the territories of third world countries (poor and underdeveloped countries), while the territories of the imperial powers are shown in an enlarged form. As a confirmation of this, we will state that in reality, the territories of the United States, India and China together, are almost as large as the territory of Africa, but the Mercator's map does not actually present this. You can also see the overstretched increase in Greenland territory, which is shown to be the same size as Africa, while in reality Greenland is 14 times smaller than Africa. It is clear that in this way the imperial and colonial powers also wanted to show their supremacy and domination, in relation to the continents and countries of the "Third World", especially Africa.

In order to be able to give some insight into the renewed interest of the former colonial powers in Africa, we will first give a brief overview of colonial rule in Africa, as it is a continuous process of influences and established ties between the colonial and colonized countries.

Beginnings of imperial presence on the African continent

Colonialism can be briefly defined as the political and economic control and domination of one country over another. Colonialism in its original form was certainly the most widespread on the African continent. The beginnings of colonialism date back to the late 1400s, when European sailors occupied mainly ports in Africa and did not show much interest in exploring inland. From 1700 to 1880, Europe increased its interest, primarily due to the expansion of the slave trade, economic exploitation, the spread of Christianity among the indigenous peoples, and the imposition of Western culture. The main interest of Europe certainly was the economic, i.e. exploitation of strategic natural resources from the colonized countries. The pressure on

the indigenous population was widespread and intense. For these reasons, in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, part of the African population, especially those living along the coast, began to accept more elements of European civilization. Christian missionaries were among the first to explore the interior of the continent and establish settlements. The rapid penetration of merchants, colonizers, and missionaries on the African mainland was also made possible by the great division among African tribes. Their leaders could not build a common response against the expansion of the colonizers. Many of the coastal peoples were already subjugated and dependent on trade with European colonizers. On the other hand, Christian missionaries dealt with the indigenous people and their leaders very skillfully and deceitfully. In those areas where Christianity was more difficult to spread, they used military repression and often employed a policy of dividing African peoples and tribes in order to confront each other, weaken, and subjugate them.

At the beginning of the 19th century, some European countries (Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, Portugal, Spain and Italy), started to compete intensely over who would dominate a particular region and a larger number of peoples. To avoid major conflicts, in late 1884 these countries tried to find a peaceful way to divide the zones of influence and responsibility on the African continent. At a conference in Berlin[5], that began in late 1884 and ended in early 1885, European powers established rules for the annexation of parts of the territories and for signing treaties which regulated the division of Africa into colonies with defined administrative boundaries. The decisions reached at the conference in Berlin actually accelerated the colonial process in Africa, which reached its zenith with the end of the First World War and continued after the Second World War. This means that in the period from 1881 to 1914, also known as the "New Imperialism"[6], almost 90% of African territory was placed under European colonial control, with only Ethiopia and Liberia remaining independent.

Types of colonial rule

Leading European colonial powers established colonial order in African countries through colonial governments, colonial economic power and exploitation. Colonial rule in most cases was established in such a way that the central government was governed by colonial representatives and they were responsible for passing laws, regulations and the judiciary. On the other hand, local government was given to local African leaders, who had little real power or authority to make decisions. In principle, such a system was maintained until the beginning of World War II, when in some colonial countries African officials were allowed to have greater influence in their countries.

Economic colonization was certainly the main motive and reason for colonial rule. In this way, the colonizers controlled the trade and exploitation of Africa's natural resources. In many colonies, white farmers received privileged treatment unlike the indigenous farmers. The best and most fertile land was given to white farmers, while African farmers were forced to cultivate less fertile land. Some of the colonial authorities introduced and imposed taxes on African farmers, which they could not pay regularly, forcing them to sell their land under

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[5]   *Henige, D. (1979). History in Africa. African Studies Association.*

[6]   *Forms of Imperial Government: Colony - when a country or a territory is ruled by an external power; Protectorate - a country or a territory with its own internal management, but under the control of an external power; Sphere of influence - an area in which an external power demonstrates the privilege of exclusive investment and trade benefits; Economic imperialism - independent but underdeveloped countries which are controlled primarily by private commercial interests rather than by other governments. Source: www.oxfordhandbooks.com. (c) Oxford University Press, 2015. Accessed on 10.01.2021*

unfavorable terms and later to work for and be paid by new land or mine owners.

Colonial authorities also created certain benefits for colonized countries, such as building roads, railways, ports, building factories, improving infrastructure, and more. This colonial economy fundamentally changed the traditional economy and changed especially the ownership of land, natural resources and trade. However, despite the fact that the colonial economy and government created opportunities for employment, new markets and education, large parts of the African population remained impoverished and without basic means and living conditions. Due to the constant export and exploitation of raw materials and products, the mutual trade between the African countries and colonies was hardly developed at all.

Map of colonial rule in Africa

We will present some basic data in order to easily understand the map of colonial rule in Africa, that is, which colonial country established power in which African countries. The British Empire has existed during the past 3 centuries. The main motives for the establishment of the imperial system were economic, political and military interests, as well as migration processes. Imperialism was made possible by British domination of the seas and oceans, with developed international trade and adaptable and flexible British regulations. The British Empire was developed in stages.[7] The creation of the First Empire began in the late 16th century in India. Due to the growing demand for sugar and tobacco in Europe, in the 17th century the empire spread to the Caribbean and Northeast North America. The developments in the late 17th and early 18th centuries were characterized by weakening of the imperial status of Spain and the Netherlands, which allowed Great Britain to take over many of their colonies. In addition, everything started after a pronounced rivalry between Great Britain and France on the territory of India, Canada and Africa. The second phase of British imperialism began with the voyage of Captain James Cook to Australia and New Zealand in 1770 and with the new conquests in India. After the victory in the Napoleonic Wars, the empire spread to Mauritania, Sri Lanka, Trinidad and Tobago, St. Lucia, British Guana, Malta, Africa (Nigeria, Ghana, Zambia, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Egypt). In Asia, the empire spread to Burma and Mali. The British Empire reached its greatest power and prosperity after the end of the First World War. It established control of much of the former German colonies in Africa and Asia, and spread to Palestine, Jordan, and Iraq. However, the resistance by the population in the colonized countries and territories and the desire to get rid of the colonial system reached its peak and became more and more manifested. National movements against economic inequality and exploitation and against racial discrimination by British immigrants were particularly strong in India and parts of Africa. This process of struggle against colonialism and the struggle for independence intensified and continued especially after the end of World War II. The British Empire at its zenith (late 19th and early 20th centuries) included territories on all continents, which made up a quarter of the world and the world population in those days. During its imperial rule, Great Britain had the following colonies in Africa[8]: in West Africa there were Sierra Leone (gained independence in 1961), Nigeria (gained independence in 1960), Ghana (gained independence in 1957) and Gambia (gained independence in 1965); in East Africa there were Uganda (gained independence in 1962), Kenya (gained independence in 1963), Zanzibar (formerly a colony of Oman until 1800, independent since 1963), Tanzanica (former German colony known as German East

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[7] *Williamson, A (1967). A Short History of British Expansion. Accessed on 26.12.2020*

[8] *Imperialism and socialism in the context of Africa. https://www.sahistory.org.za/article/. Accessed on 26.12.2020*

Africa, independent since 1961; since 1964, Zanzibar and Tanzanica have been united into one state - Tanzania), Somalia (independent since 1960), Mauritius (an island, placed under British control since 1814 with the Treaty of Paris, after the end of the wars against Napoleon, gained independence in 1968), and Seychelles (with the same Treaty of Paris, Great Britain acquired the island of Seychelles which gained independence in 1960). In Central and South Africa there were Southern Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe, gained (independent since 1964); Botswana (independent since 1966), and Swaziland (independent since 1968). In North Africa there were Sudan (gained independence in 1956) and Egypt, a British colony since 1800. With the outbreak of World War I, Egypt became a British protectorate. In 1922, Egypt gained limited autonomy, and in 1953 it was declared a Republic.

To analyze the colonial and postcolonial role of Great Britain on the African continent, as well as the connectedness of interests of more western countries, we will briefly provide some data of the African countries which were under the colonial rule of France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Spain.[9]

A second country that can match Great Britain with the number of colonies in Africa is certainly **France**. The following African countries were under French colonial rule. In North Africa (colonization began in 1830) there were Algeria (gained independence in 1962), Tunisia (gained independence in 1956), and Morocco (colonization began in 1900, but gained independence in 1956). All countries in West and Central Africa gained independence in 1960: Senegal, Ivory Coast, Togo (a German colony until the end of World War I), Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Gabon, Congo, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, Mauritania and the Upper Volta. In East Africa, French colonies were: Madagascar (colonized by Britain and France until 1884-85, when Great Britain withdrew and only France remained, gained independence in 1960), Djibouti (independent since 1977), Reunion Island (French overseas territory and one of four Comoros Islands), and Somalia (independent since 1960).

Germany established colonies in the period from 1848 to 1914, in the following countries: Rwanda (Urundi), in the period from 1899 to 1917, and then became a Belgian colony (gained independence in 1962); Burundi (gained independence from Belgium in 1962); Tanzania, until the end of World War I (gained independence from Great Britain in 1961); Togo was a German colony until the end of World War I, then a French colony (gained independence in 1960); Cameroon was a German colony until the end of World War II, then a French one (gaining independence in 1960); and Namibia, which was a German colony until 1918 and then fell under the occupation of South Africa (gaining independence in 1990).

The following African countries were colonized by Italy: Eritrea (under Italian colonial rule until 1941, when it fell under British occupation. Since 1950, Eritrea has formed a federation with Ethiopia. However, after a successful independence movement, Eritrea finally gained independence in 1991); part of Somalia; Ethiopia (until the end of WWII); and Libya (gained independence in 1951. After the end of WWII, Italy loses control of Libya, colonized by Great Britain and France).

Portugal was the first country to start exploring sub-Saharan Africa as early as 1400. During the colonial rule, Portugal had influence in the following states and territories: Cape Verde Island in 1440, Guinea-Bissau (gained independence in 1973), the island state of Sao Tome and Principe, colonized since 1400 (gained independence in 1975), Angola (a colony since 1600, gained independence in 1975) and Mozambique, colonized since 1400 (gained

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[9]   *Boston University Pardee School of Global Studies. African Studies Center. Colonialism and Resistance. www.bu.edu. Accessed on 15.01.2021*

independence in 1975).

Belgium had a colonial status over the following African countries: Congo (gained independence in 1960), Rwanda (Urundi, a colony from 1917 to 1962, when it gained independence), and Burundi (gained independence in 1962).

Spain was a major colonial power in Africa from 1400 to 1800. It had the following countries and territories under colonial rule: Western Sahara (Spain withdrew from Western Sahara in 1976), Equatorial Guinea (independent since 1968), and North coast of Morocco (Ifni, Ceuta and Melilla counties. Ifni was returned under Moroccan control in 1968, but Ceuta and

Melilla are still under Spanish control). What the colonial rule in Africa looked like in 1913 is shown on the following map.

3 - Map of Colonial Africa in 1913[10]

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[10] *Henige, D (1979). History in Africa. African Studies Association.*

The color map shows which African countries were under colonial rule of Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Belgium and Spain in 1913.

Strategy for renewed interest by Great Britain for African countries

Many opportunities and challenges have opened for Great Britain with its decision to leave the European Union in terms of its independent positioning in international relations and politics, i.e. for its affirmation as a great power since it has always had a key role and influence in world trends. Certainly, it is therefore important that Great Britain establishes and develops economic cooperation, especially with the Commonwealth countries, i.e. the countries that were part of the British Empire. In fact, Great Britain has not completely stopped its relations with the Commonwealth, but now, outside the EU, it again has the freedom to decide in which direction, with what intensity and with what priorities it will develop its national economic, political, diplomatic and security interests. The redefinition of state policies also refers to the re-examination of its position towards African countries which includes much more than the cooperation with its former colonies. In this regard, it can be seen that the government of Great Britain has a refreshed and new perspective on the continent, developing a long-term approach that should be based on partnership and mutual interest. This approach was announced by the British Secretary of State for Africa, Harriett Baldwin[11], who in 2019 presented the following five key priorities of Great Britain for future cooperation with African countries: Prosperity and economic development; Long-term security and stability; Demographics and climate change in the Sahel Region[12] and Natural resources management.

Great Britain, as an EU member, also maintained its cooperation with African countries. It has trade links established, such as with Kenya, whose flower exports to the EU accounted for 17% in Great Britain, as well as 50% of Botswana's flower exports. Also, Great Britain has already contributed to the EU development assistance to Africa, primarily through the European Development Fund, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the Council of Europe. In 2015, the trade between the EU and Africa amounted to $305 billion, of which $36 billion related to the trade with Great Britain. A total of 23 billion euros were invested in Africa through the EU's Official Development Assistance (ODA) program in 2016. In this program, Great Britain contributed with over 1.5 billion pounds in aid to Africa, while through European Development Fund (EDF) projects Britain has implemented programs in Nigeria, Malawi and Niger.

A confirmation of the new strategic approach for partnership between Great Britain and the African countries, as well as for the plans for future trade cooperation is the visit of the British Prime Minister in 2018. During a visit to South Africa, Nigeria and Kenya, the then Prime Minister Theresa May signed a declaration with the South African Customs Union reaffirming its readiness for economic cooperation and partnership, and a similar agreement was signed with Mozambique.[13] During her visit to Cape Town in 2018, the British Prime Minister

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[11] *Suess,J.(2019). The UK's policy towards Africa post–Brexit. RUSI. https://www.policycenter. ma/publications/uk. Accessed on 25.08.2021*

[12] *A region called Sahel covers: part of Senegal, part of Mauritania, Mali, part of Burkina Faso, part of Algeria, Niger, part of Nigeria, part of Cameroon and the Central African Republic, Chad, part of Sudan, Eritrea and part of Ethiopia.*

[13] *Great Britain signed the Eastern and Southern Africa - European Union Economic Partnership Agreement (ESA-EU EPA), which covers Madagascar, Zimbabwe, Mauritius and the Seychelles. For example, Germany, as an EU member, also signed a memorandum of understanding to build production facilities in Ghana and Nigeria, in addition to Volkswagen's existing plants in Rwanda, South Africa and*

stressed in her speech the determination of Great Britain for intensive support of development programs in Africa, emphasizing that Great Britain aims to become the largest investor in Africa by the end of 2022. The specific projects concern renewable energy, for the purpose of which, for example, 22 million pounds has been approved for Zambia, and similar projects have been approved for the Ivory Coast and Senegal. In the area of trade, the British government has expressed readiness to use its greatest advantages, such as the world financial center "The City of London" with its legal and financial opportunities and services. This means offering "skills sharing programs and projects" from the British legal services and financial sector in the area of financial crime detection, technology innovation partnerships and growth increase in African countries.[14]

With future investments in the countries that were previously under French colonial rule, Great Britain intends to develop economic cooperation with several countries in Africa. For these reasons, in 2019 the British Minister of Foreign Affairs visited Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Senegal, initiating cooperation in security, military training and English language learning. A confirmation of this new government initiative and policy were the approved projects in Congo and the increased presence of Great Britain in West Africa and the Sahel countries through the opening of new embassies in Chad and Niger.

The announced partnership of Great Britain with Africa, through the five defined areas: open inclusive economic growth in Africa; security and stability as a foundation for people and prosperity; climate change and sustainable management of natural resources; investment in people (education, health and work) and greater involvement of Great Britain and a presence in the Sahel region, received its confirmation at the Investment Summit between Great Britain and Africa, held on 20 January, 2020 in London.[15] The British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, as the host of the Investment Summit, welcomed more than a thousand participants, including the presidents and prime ministers of African countries, their ministers, senior representatives of the business community in Africa and Great Britain, investors, international organizations, financial institutions and civil society representatives. Businessmen highlighted the great potential of Africa. It is projected that 8 out of 15 growing economies in the world will be from Africa, and by 2050, 1 in 4 global consumers will be from Africa. Great Britain has made clear its ambitions to increase trade and investments in Africa in the areas of infrastructure, energy and retail technology and to spend 6.5 trillion pounds. In addition, on the day of the summit, businesses worth a billion pounds were agreed. The British government has also approved more than 1.5 trillion in financial stimulus assistance, which is expected to create thousands of new jobs and mobilize additional 2.4 trillion pounds by private investors to invest in Africa. Great Britain plans to be a key trading partner to African countries. According to the information from the summit, last year's trade between Great Britain and Africa increased by 7.5%, or by 36 trillion pounds. After Great Britain left the EU, it ensured that companies from 46 African countries can continue to export goods to Great Britain and pay a reduced zero tariff rate. For this convenience, 11 countries have already signed agreements, while for the other 35 coun-

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tries, legal provisions have been adopted for trade preferential schemes. Business connections between Great Britain and Africa plan to seize Africa's potential as a continental free trade area with a population of 1.3 billion.

According to the British government, the Investment Summit between Great Britain and Africa has laid the foundations for a new, renewed strategic partnership. Partnership, based on trade, investment, shared values and common interests. The ambition of Great Britain is to be a partner of choice for investing in Africa, creating thousands of jobs and ensuring shared prosperity for all nations involved. We mentioned that one of the five strategic determinations of Great Britain is long-term security and stability in the countries of African continent. We know from the past that Great Britain maintains a continuous military presence on the African continent. At the beginning of this century, such was the involvement in the civil war in Sierra Leone in 2000, the intervention in Libya in 2011, and the deployment of its forces in Sudan, as part of the United Nations (UN) forces. The British Army is involved in the training programs of the armies of Nigeria and Kenya, in the reform of the security system in Somalia and in the anti-terrorist operation "Barkhane", against ISIS forces operating in the countries in the Sahel region. The military cooperation between Great Britain and France in the Sahel region indicates that this region is a priority for Great Britain, in which their long-term strategic presence is expected. The realization of national interests is their main motive, but also the military presence is provided to control and suppress a large number of armed conflicts. We are witnessing wars and armed conflicts on the African continent in 11 countries at the moment (Nigeria, Central African Republic, Burundi, Congo, Libya, South Sudan, Congo, Mali, Somalia, Ethiopia and Western Sahara), while in general, wars were fought in 48 countries.[16] As a member of the EU, as part of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU, Great Britain had limited participation in joint missions and operations, amounting to 2.3% of all forces, with the exception of the EU training mission in Somalia (EUTM) and the EU maritime counter piracy operation ATALANTA. After the Brexit process began, the command of ATALANTA was moved from Northwood, Great Britain to Spain and Belgium, and the British mission commander was replaced by a Spanish admiral. It is clear that Great Britain, after leaving the EU, will pursue an independent security and defence policy, but it will certainly continue to work with the EU, at least where their interests intersect.

Conclusion

The interests of the great powers are rapidly shifting to Africa. It is clear that Great Britain has never completely broken ties with its colonies or the Commonwealth. In the case of African countries, it maintained its presence only with different intensity, which after a period of relative stagnation in the last 3-4 decades (after African countries gained independence), in recent years has gained new intensity and renewed strategic approach. The British new long-

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[16] *There have been wars and armed conflicts in Africa in the following 48 countries. In the African Great Lakes region: Burundi, Rwanda, Kenya; South Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda. In Central Africa: Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Republic of the Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sao Tome and Principe. In the Horn of Africa: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia. In the island states of the Indian Ocean: Comoros, Madagascar and Mauritius. In North Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia. In South Africa: Angola, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and Zambia. In West Africa: Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea - Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Western Sahara. Source: https://eeas.europa.eu u United Nations Peacekeeping. Accessed on 12.01.2021.*

term global strategy towards Africa was created before its formal exit from the EU, i.e. after the referendum on the termination of its membership in the EU in June 2016, and got its verification with the Investment Summit G. Britain - Africa, in January 2020. Great Britain is committed to expanding its presence on the oldest continent, pursuing trade and economic cooperation, and developing and investing in projects that will enable it to strengthen its influence. This strategy is not only limited to the former British colonies, but also to new states and regions in Africa, such as the Sahel region. We note the use of a new British narrative that calls for cooperation on an equal basis, mutual respect, common interest and a new partnership with African countries. It is a policy that aims to give Africa a new perspective which is different from previous colonial exploitation by many Western countries. However, the realization of the new British strategy towards Africa will depend on the actions of other developed European countries (France, Spain, Germany, Italy), as well as the United States and China. The realization of the new British economic strategy will also depend on the situation in the African countries, on their stability, desire for development and acceptance of new ways of economic connection with the Western countries. It will also depend on the democratic capacity of their leaders and elected governments and their determination to fight authoritarianism and corruption. Africa, as one of the continents with the youngest and fastest growing population, is changing rapidly. Let us hope that by the end of this century, the future will belong to the African continent, because according to projections, by 2050 Africa should have a population of over 3 billion, and thus become one of the most populated regions in the world.

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THEORY OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS AND COMMUNICATION, CREATING CONFLICT VERSIONS OF SOCIAL REALITY

Tamara JOVANOVIKJ[1]

Abstract: *From the very beginning of consciousness and rationality, each person is placed in a complicated system of external factors which, if there are no appropriate defense mechanisms and patterns to simplify things, would cause cognitive dissonance and distortion of the already established order. In order to protect oneself from this position of the outside world and to avoid a state of complete anarchy, one creates mental and social constructions that help them to perceive their surroundings in a simpler way and gives one a certain framework through which the path of what is socially acceptable behavior, which is not, is defined. One such mechanism is the Theory of Social Representations, which is in fact an established system of certain values, beliefs and practices that serve to preserve the social order and to open space for intergroup communication. The purpose of this paper is to review the Theory of Social Representations, but also to show how blindly following such systems can lead to the creation of conflicting versions of social reality.*

Keywords*: Theory of Social Representations, social reality, conflict, multiethnic societies, communication*

Introduction

Human rationality allows the creation of mental constructions to simplify everything that happens around us. It is a way of self-help that contributes to the creation of defense mechanisms that are responsible for eliminating potential threats from cognitive dissonance and the loss of one's self, which would mean entering a labyrinth of chaotic social representations that would show a distorted reality which is not in touch with the social framework of the arrangement of things.

Every single person, even countries as well, as creative units of social order, exist within a complicated system of intra, internal and external processes and factors that can often be perceived as too intense and to create different experiences and emotions in each individual. To avoid resorting to social illusion, one finds ways to simplify all the happenings around them and to chart the path of desirable behavior. Such systems of simplification of internal and external experiences become mental habits that are part of everyday functioning. They turn into repetitive behavioral practices that we do not need to think about, but accept them as they are under the influence of society and the environment in which we find ourselves. Thus, they help us to create a distinction that will celebrate the uniqueness of an individual who is part of a particular group, they help us to distinguish between multiple groups, and to simplify the way we can understand the functioning of those who are outside our parent group.

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Theoretical representation of social representations

This is where social psychology comes into play, which studies the social reality that deals with the explanations that we humans automatically resort to in order to explain and understand the world around us, that is, how we simplify our environment in order to understand and master it, how we reconstruct it in our own way to make it more predictable and recognizable (Rateau, et all. 2012, p.477).

Following the logic of deduction, we come to the Theory of Social Representations, which received its central term - social representation - by the Romanian social psychologist Serge Moscovici in 1961[2]. If we try to define social representations in the simplest way, then we get a definition according to which social representations are a system of values, ideas, metaphors, beliefs and practices that serve to establish social order, orient individuals and enable communication between members of groups and communities (Sammut, Howarth, 2014, pp. 1799-1802). Hence, Moskovici says that "Social representations are a system of values, ideas and practices with a dual function: first, to establish an order that will allow individuals to orient themselves in their material and social world and to overcome it; and second, to enable communication between community members by providing a social exchange and naming code and an unambiguous classification of various aspects of their world and their individual group history" (Moscovici, 1973, p.xiii). In principle, social representations and their theory tell us who we are, what environment we are in, and explain what connects us to that environment and its individuals. It explains to us the way in which mutual intertwining is created, how the connections of constant interconnection are built and how different perceptions find their position. Social representations also appear as cognitive elements in relation to a particular social object, so in this way social representation has four characteristics:

1. The first characteristic refers to the organization of the set, i.e. it is understood that it is not just a simple set of cognitive elements but that the elements that make up the social representation are in constant interaction with each other,

2. The second characteristic refers to the fact that the social representation is common to different individuals from the same social group,

3. The third characteristic refers to the method of constructing the social representation, i.e. that the social representation is produced through a global communication process,

4. The fourth characteristic of social representation refers to its purpose, i.e. that social representation is socially useful (Rateau, et all. 2012, p.479).

As stated by the second characteristic of the social representation, for a set of cognitive elements to be classified as a social representation, it is necessary that the same set be common to a certain group, i.e. it should be a collectively shared thought. To measure how much a set should be collectively shared in order to be classified as a social team, Moscovici distinguishes between hegemonic representations, emancipated representations, and polemical representations.

1. Hegemonic representations are shared by members of a political party, nation or other structured macro unit. They are uniform and "prevail in all symbolic or affective practices",

2. Emancipated representations refer to subgroups that create their own versions with "a degree of autonomy in relation to the segments of society that operate",

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[2]   *Serge Moscovici first used the term "social representation" in 1961 in his study of the reception and circulation of psychoanalysis in France. More in Moscovici, S., La psychanalyse, son image et son public, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1961*

3. Polemical representations are associated with social conflicts, group struggles, and controversies in a society. They are defined by "antagonistic relations" and "intended to be mutually exclusive" (Moscovici, 1988, p. 211).

According to Birgitta Höijer, there are four explanations for the cognitive elements that are an integral part of social representations:

1. Social representations refer to knowledge that signifies the collective thinking of society. Of particular interest are the phenomena that in different ways move away from traditional views, create tensions in society and challenge the daily lives of citizens, groups and institutions. Such phenomena are particularly well-suited to the study of how old ideas are modified and transformed and new social representations are created through public debate. Höijer, as changes in this section, cites the changes related to the new communication technology, terrorism, biotechnology.

2. Social representations, according to Höijer, participate in the global vision that society establishes for itself and functions at various levels, including large communities, such as the nation and small subgroups of people. According to her, here we can see a connection with the concept of ideology, especially current theories that concentrate on ideologies in the plural form and as practices of society and everyday life.

3. Höijer states that social representations are complex and holistic. They can be seen as "theories", "networks of ideas", metaphors and images that include emotions, attitudes and judgments. They are further embedded in communicative practices such as dialogues, debates, media discourses and scientific discourses.

4. Social representations refer to knowledge in communication and the importance of the role of the media in the growth of new social representations, with an emphasis on dialogic communication in groups and between individuals (Höijer, 2011, p.6).

Bauer and Gaskell represent social representations as links between three important elements. These elements are: subjects, or bearers of representation (S); an object that is represented, which can be a concrete entity or an abstract idea (O); and a project, or pragmatic context in which representation is significant (P). The objects, the subjects and the project form a system of mutual constitution. This makes it possible to understand how "the object represents the project of the subjects; or how the object appears in the objects in relation to a project; or how the project connects the subjects and the object" (Bauer and Gaskell, 1999, p. 168). If we look deeper into their theory, we can come to the conclusion that Dean Bauer and Gaskell argue that social representations differ from mental representations in the sense that mental representations need only one individual to occur, while social representations require a minimum triad of two people (subject 1 and subject 2) dealing with object (O), which forms a mediation triangle (S1-O-S2).

Within the theoretical representation of social representations and the Theory of Social Representation, there is also a model called the "Nested model of social behavior".

Picture 1.
Schematic representation of the Nested model of social behavior[3]

Gordon Sammut states that the model is classified as nested due to the fact that the basic concepts overlap and are necessary for the overall functioning of the model, i.e., attitudes are necessarily involved in the views (in terms of personality traits), and views are necessarily involved in social representations (in terms of social positioning). According to him, if attitudes, views and characteristics are considered individually, they alone would not provide an explanation of the social behavior of individuals and groups on an individual level. The theory of social representations provides an explanation at the societal level. It describes social recipes that influence the way people interpret events and what they consider to be legitimate ways of acting. Attitudes, on the other hand, provide an explanation of social behavior on a personal level, describing the individual's assessment of the object of the attitude that affects their propensity to act in a certain way (Sammut 2015, p.109).

Theory of social representation and communication
The theory of social representation states that social representations are a product of the different groups that make up society. In this process of particular importance is the communication itself, which is a way through which social representations are created, and a way through which they are further shared among members of the same group, and then shared with other groups in society. Although all species on this planet communicate with each other in different ways, human rationality has contributed to the creation of direct communication with words. It is this kind of communication that has the power to create, share and transform. Thus, communication acquires a central position in the Theory of Social Representation as a medium through which an idea or object is first visualized and embodied within the individual. That idea and that object are then shared with the group, shared with other groups, but also in the meantime there is an opportunity to transform the original ideas and accept them as a

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[3] *Available through https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/cambridge-handbook-of-social-representations/attitudes-social-representations-and-points-of-view/B426FAA38F-90BB748BBD64A64D587119*

consensus for tolerance.

Birgitta Höijer lists two basic socio-cognitive communication mechanisms that generate social representations: anchoring and objectifying.

The first mechanism, anchoring, is part of the transformation of the unknown to known, because it makes the unknown - known through its transfer to an already known sphere of previous social representations, and thus opens the possibility of comparing and interpreting the unknown, which reduces its uncertainty and is transformed into a new acquaintance in the already existing sphere of known social representations. The second mechanism, objectifying, also aims to transform the unknown into the known, but this time through a system of transformation of the unknown into something concrete that can be perceived and touched, which reduces its uncertainty and is subject to of the power of control (Höijer, 2011, p. 7).

1. Anchoring

With communication, social representations are anchored in other, already known social representations, i.e. the new social representations are incorporated in the already known ones, and the new ideas are connected with an already known context. Within the anchoring mechanism there are other sub-mechanisms that facilitate the process of transformation from the unknown to the known, such as: naming, emotional anchoring, thematic anchoring, metaphoric anchoring and anchoring via basic antinomies. Naming is a mechanism that is very often used, which in itself implies that the uncertainty of the unknown is eliminated by naming the new idea, and thus it fits into the already established framework of social order. Emotional capture as a mechanism implies a mechanism of attachment and includes certain emotions. In other words, in a simpler way, emotional anchoring means a communication process that helps transform the unknown into the known, through which the new phenomenon is attached to already well-known emotions, and thus placed in the matrix of already known social representations. Emotional anchoring is often conveyed through language or illustrations, and is particularly common in the mass media, which Furedi says has "an increasing number of media intimidation stories and is even transforming Western culture into a culture of fear in which [fear] it feeds on itself and creates a tendency to speculate about other dangers lurking around the corner" (Furedi, 2006, p.xiii). Themes can be imagined in ways that approach the concept of ideology which is considered as common sense thinking or they can be imagined as ideas that exist within a group, between groups or within a society and in this case the themes can exist as an everyday occurrence that is not given too much attention, but is simply accepted as such. Anchoring through basic antinomies implies that the unknown becomes known through the ability to make distinctions, to think in oppositions, polarities or antinomies. Thus, the analysis of opposition differences or antinomies shifts the focus to internal tensions, which may be particularly pronounced in periods when new social representations are developing. Metaphorical anchoring helps to turn the unknown into the known by imagining the unknown as something known. Anchoring social phenomena in metaphors can serve ideological and legitimate functions. (Höijer, 2011, pp. 7-12).

2. Objectifying

The objectifying of new ideas and phenomena represents their materialization in the already known system of social representations. Humans as beings are not only able to carry out mental processes in their consciousness, but people also orient themselves in their external environment through the use of tactics, i.e. through the use of their senses people try to position themselves in their environment and on that a way to turn the unknown into the known.

Objectification turns the unknown into the known by transforming it into something concrete that we can perceive and experience with our senses. This would mean that objectifying, in principle, refers to the way in which a new phenomenon, through communication about it, will be quickly simplified, illustrated and diagrammed. Within objectification there are two sub-mechanisms - emotional objectification and personification. Emotional objectification exists where there is a strong emotional component. On the other hand, personification implies the connection of the unknown with certain persons. To attribute something to famous public figures is a common discursive mechanism in the media in order to attract attention and popularize the course of events (Höijer, 2011, p. 13).

Communication is the central point around which the existence, expansion and compromise of social representations orbit. Communication as such, exists in all known species and can be implemented in a variety of ways. But, communication as a language is characteristic of man as a unit of their existence and perhaps one of their main attributes that contributed to man being at the top of the biodiversity pyramid scheme. There are a myriad of theories and views concerning language, but two of them are particularly important in deepening the understanding of the Theory of Social Representations. Alasautari cites one of the theories that says that in everyday life, the tacit notion of language is treated as a phenomenon that is separate and set against reality. It is used in describing or discussing reality and in that role, it is conceived as a transparent lens that in itself does not interfere with its role as an instrument that provides us with a view of reality (Alasautari, 2004, p.56). Within this view of language, testing the truthfulness of different views of reality is sometimes seen as a comparison of those views with reality. This implies that the reality of objects exists independently of our connection to the world and that every single individual has a direct connection to one and only objective reality. The second important view of language from the point of view of the Theory of Social Representation is that proposed by Ferdinand de Saussure who says that language is a system in itself and that there are no references that are in contact with external reality. According to him, language should be a system that would be composed exclusively of signs and the connections that are formed between those signs. According to de Saussure, "The sign consists of two analytically distinct elements, the signifier and the signified. The signifier refers to the sound image that constitutes the word, while the signified refers to the concept, the meaning of

the said sound image" (Saussure, 1966, p.10).

Picture 2. Graphic representation of Ferdinand de Saussure's theory[4]

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[4] *Available through https://writingfortherestofus.wordpress.com/2012/03/25/looking-at-narra-*

The theory of social representation and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in 2022

The emergence of new social representations always coincides with the emergence of a new situation that has no precedent, that it is an unknown phenomenon or an unusual event. This new nature of the object implies that information about it is limited, incomplete or widespread across the various social groups that are affected by the appearance of the new object. This new object awakens care and vigilance or disrupts the normal flow of things. Thus, the object motivates intense cognitive activity in people to understand, control or even defend themselves and provokes a multitude of debates and interpersonal and media communication. As a result, information, beliefs, hypotheses or speculations are shared, leading to the emergence of majority positions in different social groups. The gradual emergence of social representation occurs spontaneously and is based on three types of phenomena: information dispersion, focalization, and pressure to draw conclusions (Rateau, et al. 2012, p.482).

The Theory of Social Representation can be of great help in explaining the creation of social representations that are related to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, but due to the extensive analysis that would result from this topic and the limited space for reflection, I will reflect my opinions in short. If we take all this into account, then we will be able to present the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine through the prism of the Theory of Social Representations, communication and dissemination of information through the mass media. As it is already known, Russia and Ukraine have an intertwined common history which in one way or another keeps the two countries in a state of constant readiness. More recently, however, the growing animosity between the two countries became more obvious when the Ukrainians replaced the then-pro-Russian inclined President Viktor Yanukovych with Oleksandr Turchynov. Russian authorities took advantage of the 2014 period and the political turmoil in Ukraine to impose military control over Crimea. Russian authorities have also tried to provoke insurgents in pro-Russian areas, and this has succeeded in Donbas, which has become a battleground between Russian separatists and the Ukrainian military. The situation escalated when the positioning of Russian troops was noted and when Russia asked for a halt to the NATO expansion.

In a time of democratic order, such military action and invasion of a sovereign state is unacceptable, so Russia had to find a way to communicate its reasons for the invasion of Ukraine and to justify its actions through distorting the image of its opponent. In this case, new social representations appear as a consequence of an unexpected event (the invasion of Ukraine) for which there is not enough clear information, so media communication is used as a means of disseminating them, creating two polarized groups - pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian. If we go back to the anchoring and its naming mechanism, we can see that in order for Russia to justify its actions, it is trying to anchor the new social representation in the already known historical context of these two countries and call it "denazification" of Ukraine, i.e. the liberation of Ukraine from the Nazis in that country. Putin uses the naming mechanism as a system to justify his attack and to place the new social representation within familiar contexts, because Nazism as a term and phenomenon evokes a great deal of emotion within Russia because of its role in the fight against Nazism in the past. This naming is constantly communicated through the media. Here, too, it is particularly important to note that one of the first targets of the Russian attacks were the Ukrainian media outlets in order to create only a one-sided social representation that would correspond to the views of only one group, and then to communicate and convey it to other groups, and to the society as a whole. Furthermore, in Putin's speech we can see the thematic

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tive-saussure-and-semiotics/

anchoring whose themes can be imagined in ways that approach the concept of ideology, such as democracy or equality. In this mechanism, the use of words as a medium for revealing a certain glorification is interesting. In his speech, Putin said, "We defended the integrity of our country, we saved Russia, and in 2014 we supported the people of Crimea and Sevastopol."[5] In this way, Putin glorifies Russia, and thus his decisions, and consequently tries to gain acceptance and support for the creation of a new social representation. As for the anchoring of antinomies, in the whole undesirable situation between Russia and Ukraine, opposing terms are used such as Nazification-denazification, defense-attack, occupation-liberation, militarization-demilitarization. In his address, Putin said that Ukraine was home to the Nazis, which meant immediate Russian intervention to ensure the country's denazification, and thus to defend the integrity and security of Russia, which was allegedly threatened by such a set-up. He goes on to describe the attack on Ukraine as a defense of Russia and its citizens, and the occupation of the country as a liberation from the genocide of Ukrainians by the Kyiv regime. Lastly, he uses the term demilitarization against the alleged militarization of Ukraine in an attempt to justify the bombing of Ukrainian military bases. As for anchoring through metaphors, Putin uses the metaphor of "... the sacrifices our people made on the altar of the victory of Nazism are sacred ..."[6] in an attempt to increase support for his actions through the use of metaphor and a reminder of Russia's contributions to the fight against Nazism. As for objectification and its mechanisms, Putin uses emotional objectification by communicating emotions related to fear and uncertainty, that is, an emotion of concern about Russia's survival as NATO moves closer to its borders, and links the mechanism of personification to the cult of his own personality, in which he is portrayed as a supporter of human rights and a fighter trying to liberate Ukraine from an undemocratic regime.

On the other side of the social representation, we have Ukraine, a country with about 44 million inhabitants, far from the pedestal of a world power, on which its opponent Russia, which has 100 million more inhabitants than Ukraine, has climbed. In the address of the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky from February 24, one can also notice the different mechanisms for turning the unknown into the known. If we start with naming as a mechanism, we can notice that the word "enemy" is constantly repeated. In this way, Zelensky names the emerging phenomenon, i.e. he names the Russian government as an enemy. Furthermore, in this speech we have the emotional anchoring. Zelensky tries to present an emotion of pride, disobedience, national unity, victory. He says: "The Ukrainian army, our border guards, the police and the special services have stopped the attacks of the enemy. In Donbas, our armed forces are doing a great job. A secure defense has been built in the Zhytomyr region".[7] The emotional anchoring in Zelensky's speech is of particular importance because the emotion he is trying to convey and its psychological impact help to interpret the new situation which by its nature arouses fear and uncertainty. Zelensky validates these negative emotions, but also offers a range of positive emotions that would replace the desperation of the Ukrainian people with a desire for a better tomorrow. "No one will be able to persuade or force us, the Ukrainians, to give up our freedom, our independence, our sovereignty… Glory to the Armed Forces of

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[5] *Transcription of the speech available through https://www.smh.com.au/world/europe/full-transcript-of-vladimir-putin-s-speech-announcing-a-special-military-operation-20220224-p59zhq.html*

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] *Transcription of the speech available through https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/zvernen-nya-prezidenta-ukrayini-73137*

Ukraine! Glory to Ukraine!"[8] in these few sentences we can see the thematic anchoring through which the glorification of Ukraine and the importance of the patriotic feeling are shown. As for the anchoring of antinomies, it is interesting that Zelensky represents the Russian government and the Russian people - as two opposite polarities. In his speech, he called on Russians to take to the streets and squares of their country and show their government that they do not support Russia's aggression. Another important antinomy is the general opposition of Ukraine, and other world powers, to what Zelensky calls an enemy (Russia). Zelensky also uses anchoring through metaphors, i.e. he uses metaphors to make this new phenomenon understandable through its presentation as something else. "It is the sound of the new Iron Curtain that lowers and closes Russia away from the civilized world,"[9] Zelensky said. With this sentence Zelensky uses anchoring through metaphors using transferable knowledge. He turns the sounds of the bombing into the sound of a new Iron Curtain, which would mean secession from everything Russia has achieved so far and isolation of the country from democratic values. In this way, Russia is portrayed as an aggressor who decides its own future. As for emotional objectifying, in my opinion, Zelensky is trying to eliminate negative emotions from the invasion process, which would reduce the fear of the Ukrainians and increase their willingness to liberate their homeland and expel the enemy from its borders. Objectifying through personification allows the new phenomenon to be related to a person. Thus, Zelensky links aggression to Putin as the main character of the invasion, and Zelensky represents the personification of the fighting spirit of the Ukrainian people, and thus becomes the main character of the Ukrainian defense.

Conclusion

The Theory of Social Representations talks about how certain values, beliefs and metaphors affect the social order and how communication is central to creating, preserving and promoting it, and how social representations actually explain the relationships that are formed between certain actors on the social scene. What should worry us is that in the 21st century we are facing a military invasion of a democratic country and that we can use the Theory of Social Representation as a matrix through which we could explain the behavior of the leader of one of the largest world powers in the world.

The Theory of Social Representations and communication as its focus, can be used as a theoretical and even empirical basis for considering the importance of language and the wording used in the transmission of information by the media for mass communication and the manner in which Theory of Social Representations can be used by political leaders to justify certain actions and to win the favor of public opinion.

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[8] *Ibid.*
[9] *Ibid.*

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HISTORICAL RETROSPECTIVE OF MOGADISHU BATTLE FROM 1993

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Abstract: *The Battle of Mogadishu, on October 3rd, 1993, is one of the most notable events in recent history after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The battle would later be seen as a tactical achievement in which, despite impossible odds and unequal forces, an army of 100 Americans held more than 1,000 enemies equipped with small-caliber weapons and rocket-propelled grenades in a well-organized ambush. But strategically, this battle will be the key reason for the then President of the United States to decide to renounce his forces from Somalia, six months after the battle. The paper observes the events and operations that occurred before the battle, as well as the possible reasons and prospects for such a reaction by the Somali insurgents.*
The main thesis calls into question the use of the undeviating tactics of the U.S. command which, as the principal carrier of tactical operations, forces the helicopter infiltration/exfiltration scheme. The analysis is performed by comparing all previous tactical operations, taking into consideration all possible factors that could contribute to the learning of the model of action by Somalis. Although technologically superior, U.S. forces cannot face and defeat the Somalis, through the narrow streets and hellish climate of Mogadishu, who for the first time unify the modern urban war and proclaim a new concept of warfare that to this day is an unfathomable enigma for even the largest military forces.

Keywords: *Urban warfare, raid, task force, civil war, UNOSOM*

Introduction

Somali political unity above the clan level is recent and was not very relevant on the world stage until the end of the 19th century when Somalia became the subject matter of European colonialism. Following the defeat of Italy during the Second World War, Somalia fell under British rule until the United Nations came to power and was under its patronage for ten years, from 1950 to 1960. Meanwhile, the country was making significant progress in agricultural infrastructure and modernization, with the introduction of democratic policies. In 1960, British Somaliland merged with Italian Somaliland to make up the Republic of Somalia. Clan policy was eroding this new multi-party constitutional democracy, and Somalia was becoming dependent on foreign aid which served only to enrich government leaders while the masses have lived in poverty (Arnold, 2017).

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In 1969, Major General Siad Barre took control of the government by a military coup and established a socialist military dictatorship that aggressively and oppressively dismantled social institutions and marginalized many clans. Over the next two decades, the rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union for influence in the region resulted in a large arms flow to the Somali army, making it the best-equipped army in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite its apparent armament advantage, Somalia lost the 1979 Ethiopian war and plunged into civil war during the 1980s (Lewis, 2019). Decades of oppression, foreign war and violent civil war have brought violence into Somali society. When the Barre government was forced to withdraw in 1991, the people of Mogadishu, while fighting with each other, also learned how to effectively fight the more technologically advanced United States.

Operation Eastern Exit (1991)

Intending to evacuate people from the U.S. Embassy due to the escalating violence and threat to U.S. citizens in Mogadishu, Operation Eastern Exit was conducted by the United States on January 5, 1991. What happened before and during the operation is noteworthy because it illustrates the type of weapons, technology and communication equipment used by the two opposing parties, as well as the Somali command and control capabilities at the time of the escalation of violence.

At the end of 1990, General Barre was surrounded in Mogadishu by three opposition groups who had come into the city. Predicting that the bloody civil war would escalate as fighting shifted to the city, Egypt and Italy offered to hold peace talks, but the rebel forces already established throughout the city refused.

The fighting broke out deeply in the city in December, with approximately 1,500 Somalis killed in violent clashes during the first month (Sturdivant, 2006). The largest rebel faction was the SNA, under the leadership of General Aidid. While they had limited artillery capacity, they had neither air force nor armored units. More modern weapons were available to the government forces, but in limited quantities. Both parties were equipped with a wide range of weapons including pistols, 7.62 mm AK-47 assault rifles, grenade launchers, 12.7 mm heavy machine guns, mortars, and rocket launchers (Siegel, 1991). In January, the city's telephone network was down, but the government radio station was still operating, as evidenced by several broadcasts announcing a ceasefire. However, both parties did not have an effective command and control structure, because none of them respected the ceasefire agreement negotiated by their leadership. In addition, a senior Somali official arrived at the U.S. Embassy drunk seeking asylum or would otherwise kill families on the streets (Sullivan, 1995).

On January 3, Russians, Germans, and Italians attempted to evacuate their citizens by sending a plane to the airport, but these attempts were interrupted due to the violent and inaccessible environment. The French tried to use the port's access to the sea to evacuate their citizens by boat, but they also interrupted the mission when a Somali navy commander threatened to attack them with a fighter jet for violating the sovereignty of Somali territorial waters (Ohls, 2009). On 5 January, the U.S. Marine Corps managed to clear the U.S. Embassy by helicopter. The CH-53 helicopter squad immediately infiltrated 60 Marines and naval specialists, and in about an hour they departed with the evacuees.

Figure 1. Evacuation plan for diplomats and civilians in Operation Eastern Exit 1991.
Source: Ohls, 2009: 134

Conditions throughout the city deteriorated during the day, and a surprise 12.7 mm machine gun and RPG opened fire on the Embassy, with some intended for the Embassy and some stray missiles from the street fighting. The remaining evacuation support did not arrive until sunset when five CH-46 helicopters successively landed at the Embassy complex. While landing, they detected an active air defense battery radar with Soviet-made SA-2 missiles. This sophisticated air defense system forced the AC-130 fighter aircraft to remain close to the sea, preventing them from providing fire support.

Major Siad, a member of the Somali police, arrived near the Embassy shortly after the first wave landed (Joseph, 2018). With a radio link in his hand, he threatened to shoot down the next helicopter to take off because his government had not authorized U.S. air operations in Somalia. (Dee, 2014)

A payment by U.S. Ambassador Bishop changed the mind of the Major, who allowed the Ambassador to receive his radio. Within minutes, all the remaining evacuees boarded the helicopters and left.

Operation Restoring Hope (1992-1993)

The intervention in Somalia began in 1992, after the Somali civil war and later with the spread of the famine crisis. The United Nations deployed a battalion-sized unit for the United Nations Operation UNOSOM in Mogadishu to provide security for organizations assisting the local population whose activities had been hampered by Somali military organizations vying for supremacy; namely Aidid's Somali National Alliance (SNA) and Ali Mahdi Mohammed's United Somali Congress (USC). By April 1991, Barre's regime had been overthrown and he had fled into exile (Shaw, 2012: 122 - 143). However, the victory by the rebel factions did not bring peace to Somalia, on the contrary, it made the two dominant factions led by Ali Mahdi

Mohammed and General Mohamed Farah Aidid turn against each other in fights for control of the country.

For almost two years in fighting, not only Mogadishu, but Somalia was sinking into anarchy with daily killings, rapes, torture, destruction of crops and water resources. The ensuing famine added another 300,000 deaths by the end of 1992. The approach employed by most of the belligerent clans was to deny their rivals access to food brought into the country by humanitarian organizations. Their weapons consisted largely of what was common and used in the streets in 1991, but they were also given access to the remaining weapons of the Barre's regime. The chaos that reigned made the maintenance of armored vehicles and aircraft left over from the Barre's regime difficult, so the militants removed all usable fire systems and mounted them on pickup trucks, called technicals.

Telephone links in the city continued to be dysfunctional from the urban conflict which started two years earlier. However, the radio continued to operate under the command of General Aidid and the SNA. In 1992, the United Nations passed three resolutions authorizing peacekeepers to enter Somalia and ensure the security of humanitarian agencies.

The first, known as UNOSOM, failed because the UN approved only 550 and 3500 troops, which proved insufficient in number and capability. With its relatively small size, restrictive rules of engagement and use of force, and surrounded by heavily armed Somali groups, UNOSOM was incapable of ensuring stability in Mogadishu (Security Council, 1992). Consequently, from December 1992 to May 1993, the United States conducted a large-scale multinational military mission in Somalia, authorized by the United Nations, to provide a safe environment for the delivery of humanitarian aid and strong enough to intimidate Somali factions from acting.

By the end of the year, the UN authorized UNITAF, which had 39,000 soldiers and was fully capable of conducting a full spectrum of military operations. Operation Restore Hope, also known as the United Task Force (UNITAF), stabilized the environment, allowing the next UN operation, UNOSOM II, to continue its mandate of political reconstruction and nation-building beginning in May 1993 (Katz,1993). While Mogadishu kept quiet, UNITAF forces began to settle in the countryside. To assist with co-ordination, the southern part of the country, the area most marked by drought and famine, was divided into 9 areas of humanitarian relief sectors (HRS). U.S. Marine Forces (MARFOR) concentrated on Baardheere (Bardera) and parts of Mogadishu, while the U.S. Army Forces (ARFOR) of UNITAF focused on providing security, often in conjunction with allied forces, in 4 sectors: HRS Baidoa, HRS Balli Doogle (Baledogle), HRS Merca (Marka), and HRS Kismaayo, as shown in Figure 2. (Stewart, 2003: 11).

On 12 December, UNITAF forces faced their first hostile attack when three vehicles equipped with mounted machine guns attempted to shoot down an AH-1 Cobra helicopter. UNITAF quickly launched an operation to seize weapons in the streets and, on 11 January, 60 to 70 patrols were conducted daily in the city.

In the day-to-day battles involving more than 900 Marines and tanks, artillery, and combat aviation, UNITAF quickly brought the opposition forces under control.

During the battles and patrols, large quantities of tanks, artillery ammunition, unarmored vehicles, mortars, armored personnel carriers, and five-ton trucks with light weapons and ammunition were seized monthly. The large military capability with which UNITAF operated brought the necessary peace to the city and allowed humanitarian aid to flow freely to the people in need.

The change took place with great speed and Somali leaders met and engaged in a process of peace and reconciliation. Despite the construction of the peace movement, there was still a lot of danger on the streets. Somali attacks against UNITAF forces always occurred while staff were away from their bases and in the depths of the city while patrolling unprotected.

Figure 2. UNITAF – Area of operations during February 1993
Source: Stewart, 2003: 12

Further measures reduced the ability of the Somalis to carry weapons, so the violence evolved into the use of hand grenades. During the street protests, as was sometimes the case, the demonstrators used blocks composed of burning tires and bribed crowds. It was clear that the Somali factions were clearly avoiding direct confrontation with the head of UNITAF and using more guerrilla methods.

In the spring of 1993, it was clear that UNITAF had provided a certain level of stability and peace which gave rise to the hope of building a nation.

Operation UNOSOM II (1993 - 1994)

When UNOSOM II began operations in May 1993, the United States deployed the so-called A brigade-sized quick reaction force (QRF) consisting of a light infantry battalion, a logistics battalion, and a helicopter attack battalion to assist UN forces (Baxter, 2013). The clash between the SNA and UNOSOM II took place on June 5th 1993, when 26 Pakistani peacekeepers were killed in Mogadishu as they were inspecting Aidid's arms depots. The UN claimed responsibility for the events of June 5 and issued a Security Council resolution calling for his arrest.

After June 5th, UNOSOM II intensively used combat helicopters from the SNA quick reaction units in five major engagements between June 6 and the arrival of the Ranger Task

Force on August 29. Two commitments were valuable in bringing to light the destructive use of the US Air Force in Somalia against the SNA on June 30 and July 12.

On June 30, six Cobra AH-1 combat helicopters fired 23 missiles and 2,000 chain gun bullets during an attack on the garage of Osman Ato, Aidid's chief financier and logistical supporter. Quick reaction units also began operations to capture Aidid with Black Hawk helicopters. The search for Aidid was no secret. The UN special envoy, the Secretary-General of Somalia, retired U.S. Admiral Jonathan Howe, announced in June that Aidid was wanted by UNOSOM II, adding a $ 25,000 reward for information leading to his capture. Several capture missions were planned, but "intelligence was not accurate enough or higher headquarters interrupted the mission (Evans, 2000)." However, another mission was planned to behead the SNA leadership on July 12. The attack on Abdi's house was controversial. Major-General Thomas Montgomery, the U.S. Force Commander in Somalia and UNOSOM II Deputy Commander, declared that the attack was "a very specific and decisive operation... the intention was to kill the bad guys, and to behead part of the command staff ... " who is currently deciding to attack the United States and the United Nations (frontline. PBS, n.d.)"

However, the survivors affirmed that it was a clan meeting to discuss peace proposals with the UN, not a military council (Drysdale,2002: 134 - 139). Amongst those killed was Sheikh Aden Mohammed, the spiritual leader of the SNA (Baumann et al. 2004). The death toll varied considerably, with the Quick Response Force announcing 20 Somali deaths, UN 27. Aidid claimed 73 people were dead and presented the news about the bodies to the press. The highest estimate came from the Red Cross; 54 killed and 161 wounded (Megas,2019).

The attack on Abdi's house is crucial to understanding Mogadishu's operational environment as it openly demonstrates the destructive use of anti-SNA helicopters several months before the arrival of the Ranger Task Force. The attack on Abdi's house had a different effect. Capt. Haad, a SNA officer who fought with Operation Ranger on October 3, said the subsequent pulling of U.S. troops through the streets of Mogadishu was out of anger over the attack on Abdi's house.

He states, "73 of our older men, of our religious leaders, of our most prominent men, whose bodies were mutilated ... we collected parts of their bodies from the building in which they were attacked ... to be the son of one of those killed on that day, what would be your situation, how would you feel? (frontline. PBS, n.d.)"

Although the Ranger Task Force was not responsible for the attack on Abdi's house, Haad's testimony illustrates that the activities of the QRF infuriated the Somalis and further suggests that from a Somali perspective, there was no difference between conventional U.S. forces in Mogadishu (QRF) and Special Operations Forces (Task Force Ranger); they were all the same enemies.

Following the attack on Abdi's home, General Montgomery called for the deployment of special forces to complete the mission to capture Aidid (DeLong et al. (1994). As a result, the Ranger Task Force was ordered to deploy to Somalia because of the Battle of Mogadishu.

The Battle of Mogadishu (1993)

On October 3, 1993, 16 Ranger helicopters carrying members of the U.S. Ranger Unit and members of the Delta Force landed in central Mogadishu. They were tasked with capturing Omar Salad Elmi and Abdi Hassan Awale, two key members of the Somali National Alliance (SNA) at a high-level SNA meeting near the Olympic Hotel. The task force planned to attack by helicopter, followed by a retreat with vehicles to their nearest base near Mogadishu airport (Bowden,1999).

**Figure 3. Graphic representation of the battle of Mogadishu
Source: Bou, et al. 2019**

The raid started at 3:42 p.m. By 3:58 p.m., the Ranger Task Force arrested several prisoners, including Elmi and Avale, while UH-60 Black Hawk and MH-6 Little Bird helicopters from the 160th Special Air Operations Regiment were monitoring the situation from the air.

At 4:20 p.m., at the very end of the mission, one of the helicopters flying over nearby announced that the Super Six-One helicopter had been hit and shot down by a rocket-propelled grenade launcher (RPG-7). Eight minutes later, another Black Hawk helicopter, a Super Six-Eight, was attacked by several RPGs as it flew over the crash site of the Six-One to land an evacuation team that somehow managed to reach Mogadishu airport. 13 minutes later, the second Black Hawk helicopter, the Super Six - Four, that was to replace the Super Six - One in the air perimeter, crashed.Within 20 minutes, two Black Hawks crashed and one of them was severely damaged (Perino,1994). The Ranger Task Force, despite increasing the SNA's opposing forces, began to secure the sites where the helicopters crashed to rescue the survivors and retrieve the bodies.

Two more helicopters were attacked because of that attempt. Super Six - Two were attacked by the RPG at 17:27 during the landing of two Delta Force snipers to secure Super Six – Four crash site. The two Super Six snipers, Gary Gordon, and Randall Shughart reached the site of the Six-Four crash and fought until they were taken over by Somali military groups. Gordon and Shughart were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor, the first awarded after the Vietnam War.

During the Battle of Mogadishu, 18 American troops were killed and 84 wounded. 312 Somali victims were estimated to have been killed and 814 wounded (Atkinson,1994).

Only days after the battle, President Clinton announced that the American army would withdraw from Somalia in six months.

Helicopter attack - "Already used" tactics

Following the Battle of Mogadishu (1993), there was a dispute as to what caused the catastrophe during the attack. The Senate Armed Services Committee concluded that "the uniform use of the Joint Task Force Ranger in a series of attacks, which allows Aidid's forces to assess the tactics of the task force and to develop countermeasures, is questionable (Senate Armed Services Committee,1995)."

The Senate claimed that Task Force Ranger consistently used the same tactics during its seven operations in Somalia, allowing the SNA to identify helicopters as critical to U.S. offensive capabilities, and to use lessons learned in the seven operations, focusing on downing helicopters from land with rocket-propelled grenade launchers. Task Force Ranger was deployed on 29 August 1993 as a Joint Special Operations Task Force led by Major-General William F. Garrison. Their mission was named Operation Gothic Serpent; the capture of Mohamed Farah Aidid, or, if unsuccessful, the disruption of the SNA leadership to destabilize it.

For the capture of Aidid, two scenarios were envisaged by the task force; trapping Aidid while moving in a convoy of vehicles, or during an attack while in a building (Eversmann, et al. 2006). However, while conceptually limited to both scenarios, the tactics employed in the seven Ranger Operations varied considerably. Their first operation on the night of August 30 was aimed at a suspicious area for SNA mortars to carry out attacks on Mogadishu airport, where Ranger operatives were stationed, and all US and UN aircraft. The bomber struck shortly after noon in front of a Black Hawk helicopter and retreated in the same manner as the helicopters, and the approach was repeated on September 6 and 14 in two attacks on locations in Mogadishu where Aidid was based, according to intelligence. The September 14 attack mistakenly captured former Somali police chief and UN ally General Ahmed Jialow, who "looked similar to Aidid (Perino, 1994)." Following three overnight operations, General Garrison believed that Aidid had fled to underground shelters, which resulted in a shift to targeting senior management and parts of the SNA's critical infrastructure. There were changes in tactics. The Ranger Task Force is trying to dismantle the anti-UN anti-propaganda from the Radio Mogadishu station with an overnight ground attack, but the radio station was not at the target location (Perino, 1994). Despite the task group's plans to capture Aidid in a convoy or while in a building, using ground forces against SNA infrastructure rather than an individual, it caused significant variation in tactics, indicating a lack of consistency in the Ranger Task Force operations. The working group then attempted to capture Osman Ato, Aidid's chief financier and logistician. Ato was previously the target of a quick reaction force. Although they let Ato go for a few minutes, making a significant tactical change, the task force operated in daylight, inserting the helicopter attack group, and using ground vehicles before retreating. Ato was caught 3 days later while moving in a convoy of vehicles. His vehicle was disabled from the air, armed members of the operative group landed by helicopters, apprehended him, and pulled him out by helicopter.

The capture of Ato is of particular importance since, during the operation, for the first time, the helicopters of the task group were targeted with grenade launchers (Faust, 1999). A Ranger Task Force officer stated: "The Somalis have fired at least 15 grenades (RPGs) on our helicopters and a number of smaller caliber weapons (Cap. James O. Lechner, 1994)." General Garrison sought to ensure that the actions of the Ranger Operations Group were perceived as unpredictable to prevent uniformity of operations (Bowden, 1999). All six Ranger Task Force operations by October 3rd clearly demonstrate a variation in tactics.The attacks were conducted

in various ways, night and day, the soldiers were alternately infiltrated and recovered by heli-copters or ground vehicles.

Date of operation	30 August	6 September	14 September	17 September	18 September	21 September	3 October
infiltration	helicopter	helicopter	helicopter	vehicles	helicopter	helicopter	helicopter
exfiltration	helicopter	helicopter	helicopter	vehicles	vehicles	helicopter	vehicles
day/night	night	night	night	night	day	day	day
Using a land convoy	On standby / no	On standby / no	On standby / no	no	yes	no	yes

Table 1. Overview of operations methods before October 3 attack
Source: Carroll, 2021: 10

As shown in Table 1, the Ranger Task Force altered its operational schedule and infil-tration and extraction methods during its deployment to Somalia. To suggest that the repeat tactics or predictable operational scheme of the Ranger Task Force was a major contributor to Aidid's arrest on October 3 or that it led to the escalation of the Battle of Mogadishu is debat-able. As evident, the Ranger Task Force modified its tactical approach by using helicopters as an operational landmark. The main problem with the "already used tactics" argument is that it sought to isolate the case, which would include only the SNA and Operation Ranger, where Garrison's helicopters were the only threat to Aidid, allowing Somalis to focus only on opposing specifically this force. That would clearly identify the cause and effect.

However, this was not the case in Mogadishu. The helicopter operations against the SNA, which was mentioned earlier, started months before the arrival of the Ranger Task Force in Somalia, and no U.S. helicopters were shot down (Bowden, 1999). Importantly, despite the arrival of the Ranger Task Force, it was still not the only American air force in Mogadishu, nor was it the only force actively fighting Aidid and the SNA.

Conclusion

For information gathering, firefighting and maneuvering, General Aidid and the SNA used relatively rudimentary and outdated tools and techniques. They quickly realized that facing large American military formations was ineffective and that they would only succeed if they could isolate smaller patrols entering the depths of the city. The SNA quickly learned that U.S. forces in urban operations were based on their combat helicopters, which could generate speed and combat power in a very short time.

To prevent this force, they had to find a way to land the Americans and trap them on the narrow streets of the city. The SNA achieved this when it managed to shoot down two heli-copters, forcing the U.S. military to fight in the streets, a case that left striking images of U.S. troops powerless and killed by Somali factions, and those images diminished the political will of the United States to fight.

Eventually, by listing smaller U.S. military units in the city and isolating them, the SNA developed a powerful counterinsurgency tool that would influence the complete withdrawal

of the entire U.S. military from their country. Somalians had no control over aircraft flying over Mogadishu or the ability to collect satellite images of hostile formations. What they had, however, was an underdeveloped network of outdated systems that depended on the existing infrastructure to collect intelligence, engage, and conduct information operations.

They used the smoke from burning tires to mark checkpoints and gathering points, the local radio station that mobilized the city against the United Nations, simple radio links that quickly transmitted command and control information to key leaders, and their existing media infrastructure.

They did not have combat helicopters, coordinated artillery or high-trained infantry units that could serve in combined operations against foreign troops in Mogadishu. Their concept of shooting and maneuvering, however, evolved during the three years of American military presence in Mogadishu with the weapons they possessed. In 1991, the Somalis fought recklessly in the streets without any coordination effort, in fact they had no real concept of maneuver. At the time of the 3rd of October incident, the SNA was finding a means of controlling fire from various weapon systems and directing them to specific targets.

Additionally, they learned to maneuver on the battlefield, and instead of fighting randomly around the city, they created a space where UNOSOM II forces would be listed and maneuvered to surround their opponent, attacking with concentrated fire. The future concepts, to be used by actors like Aidid and factions like the SNA, were based on conducting intelligence, intelligence operations and mobilizing forces that relied heavily on the use of smart devices, mobile networks, and the Internet. In 1992, the Marine Corps launched a mobile network in Mogadishu for their own use during Operation Restoring Hope. The result was a practical, commercially available communications network that provided commanders with a means of communication without the need for tactical radio networks (Joseph, 2018). The future rebel factions could also easily adapt to the same concept, especially considering the rapid growth and availability of such technologies in places like Mogadishu. In Somalia, wireless and Internet access is on the increase. In 2013, as many as 7 out of 10 Somalis reportedly owned a mobile phone, and some polls show that almost 50 percent of Somalis had access to the internet each week (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2015).

Over the past few years, totalitarian Islamists had increased the use of unmanned aircraft available on the market to monitor and direct fire. They soon demonstrated their ability to use such aircraft to deliver high-precision munitions, as well as to drop explosives onto armored vehicles and infantry formations (Speckhard, 2017). The use of improvised explosive devices to harass adversaries evolved to the point where ISIS in Iraq were using drones to deliver them. This technique tended to change and improve continuously. In 1993, the Somalis maneuvered most effectively when they led superior military forces to penetrate deep into the urban environment before surrounding them while using unarmed women and children as human shields. This tactic continued to exist and became increasingly difficult to counter as urban areas became denser, three-dimensional, and new ways of distributing information were being developed.

The future U.S. adversaries that fit the profile of the SNA and General Aidid will be non-state actors in conflict-affected areas and cities close to coastal areas that lack advanced systems or high-end military weapons. But, they will use discarded or stolen systems of armies that are more capable than they will be able to always maintain,

so they will adapt them to their full potential. This trend was observed in Mogadishu after General Barre's escape into exile - rival clans were unable to keep the tanks and other equipment operational, resulting in the use of highly lethal systems attached to civilian vehicles.

Although they do not have their own modern technology, the future opponents with this profile will not simply reject its use, but will actively monitor and evaluate what technology the United States uses and look for ways to use it and points that are critically vulnerable. At Mogadishu, the SNA noted that US forces depend on helicopters for speed and surprise. As a result, they developed an efficient method for fighting them. As the US military continues to build its military capabilities based on modern technology, they create an advantage only for a period until the enemy finds ways to deal with them.

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Professional paper

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LETHALITY OF CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN APFSDS ROUNDS AGAINST NATO'S MAIN BATTLE TANKS

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Elenior NIKOLOV[2]

Abstract: *Rising tensions in NATO - Russian relations challenge stability in Europe. A hypothetical conventional engagement between the two sides would see massive use of armor and main battle tanks (MBTs). So far, the only proven means to stop a large, armored force is by employing tanks of your own, with armor-piercing fin-stabilized discarding sabot (APFSDS) rounds as the ultimate kinetic energy (KE) tank-killing asset. While current guns and propellants are at the design limit for muzzle velocities, enhancements to this ammunition continue through modifications to the projectile's Length/diameter ratio. Recent development has focused on creating "long-rod" KE projectiles which have increased penetrating power due to their length and mass. Russian technological advances of this ammunition type have been substantial and aimed at out-guning their NATO counterparts. The Svinets 1 (3BM59) and 2 (3BM60) and the Vacuum 1 (3BM69) and 2 (3BM70) projectiles are the latest in this line of development and likely pose a threat to NATO armor. Based on currently available data, evaluating these projectiles against an RHA (rolled homogenous armor) plate at different ranges and angles of impact, simulating different thicknesses of NATO's MBTs armor will allow us to evaluate their lethality and answer which side will have a potential edge over their opponents in conventional warfare.*

Key words: Armor-piercing, penetration, capability, design, trends

Introduction

Rising tensions in NATO-Russian relations challenge stability in Europe. In a hypothetical military engagement between the two sides, as a precursor to conventional fighting, we might be looking at rising tensions and warnings, "hybrid warfare" that combines military power with covert efforts to undermine and discredit the enemy's government and cyber attacks at the opposing forces critical infrastructure. However, when it comes to conventional warfare, tanks are in many ways a fearsome deterrent, a symbol of power and a standard element of national armories. This holds truth for Russia more than any other country as their inventory of tanks encompasses 13 000 functioning MBTs. (GFP, 2021)

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Tanks pose a difficult obstacle for armed forces to overcome so that other strategically important objectives can be pursued, and so far, the only proven means to stop a large, armored force is by employing tanks of your own. Sources have made different claims over the tank's increasing vulnerability in the wake of the Russo-Ukrainian and the Nagorno-Karabakh War especially from aerial threats such as UAVs, but these have quickly been disputed or discredited as unfounded. (Bateman, 2020)

The arsenal of most Russian MBTs will include a number of general-purpose, high-explosive fragmentation (HE-frag) rounds for use against infantry, bunkers and light vehicles; then high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) rounds primarily used at shorter ranges (up to 2000 m) and against lighter targets, older MBTs and armored personnel carriers; and finally, Armor-Piercing Fin-Stabilized Discarding Sabot (APFSDS) rounds used against modern MBTs. Additionally, some tanks might be able to fire guided ammunitions carrying a HEAT warhead, at a maximum effective range between 4000 – 5000 m, for missiles fired with the 2A46 tank gun (T-72, T-90), and up to 12000 m, for missiles fired with the 2A82 gun, mounted on the T-14 Armata.

While the introduction of explosive reactive armor (ERA) and spaced armor has rendered most HEAT projectiles useless, since by the time the shaped charge reaches the tank's base armor, it has already lost any penetrating capacity, kinetic energy (KE) rounds such as the APFSDS round remain the ultimate tank killing asset, as they pack the largest blow at the longest distance.

As a result, Russian efforts to out-gun their NATO counterparts have resulted in more than 15 different APFSDS rounds developed for the 125mm gun (model 2A46 and newer 2A82) found in T-64, T-72, T-80, T-84, T-90, and T-14 MBTs. The Svinets 1 (3BM59) and 2 (3BM60) and the Vacuum 1 (3BM69) and 2 (3BM70) projectiles have been designed latest and therefore have the largest potential to pose a threat to NATO armor. That being said, the aim of this paper is to evaluate their lethality against an RHA plate at different ranges, simulating different thicknesses of NATO MBTs armor based on currently available data.

Materials & Methods
Development of the APFSDS Round
Sub-caliber armor-piercing ammunition was created to deal with the large number of tanks deployed on the WW2 battlefields. As armor thickness increased, KE rounds were designed by wrapping a rigid tungsten carbide core in a lighter metal alloy to reach the gun's caliber. Upon impact with the target, the casing deformed, but the core (the penetrator), concentrating all its kinetic energy on a small area, penetrated through the armor.

The smaller the diameter of the penetrator (increased length-to-caliber ratio - L/d) it retains a greater portion of its initial energy at the target. By abandoning the gyroscopic stabilization principles, and introducing aerodynamic fins, the projectile's L/d ratio rose from 5:1 to 30 or 40:1 therefore attaining higher penetration on impact. (Panda, et al., 2017) An additional design improvement was the introduction of a discardable segmented carrier (also known as sabot) of the KE penetrator instead of the early light metal casing. Other major design changes were using tungsten heavy alloy (WHA) instead of tungsten carbide, with WHA being more flexible and not as brittle, allowing the projectile to deform without losing its hardness and moreover improve performance against angled targets. The advantage increased with penetrators made from depleted uranium (DU) with a density of 18.6 g/cm3 (unlike WHA's density of: 14.3-16.3 g/cm3).

This ammunition came to be known as armor-piercing, fin-stabilized, discarding sabot – APFSDS, and from the 1980s until today it has been the primary anti-tank ammunition of the main battle tank (MBT).

Terminal Ballistics of APFSDS Rounds

The basic principle of any KE projectile is to have the highest possible impact velocity, to be long and thin. At extremely high speeds of about 3 km/s, upon impact, penetration is achieved by mutual erosion of the projectile and the target. Assuming that both the projectile and the target behave as non-compressive fluids and that the penetration takes place at a constant velocity, and invoking conservation of momentum, we can write that:

$$(1) \qquad P = L\sqrt{\frac{\rho_p}{\rho_t}}$$

where: P – target penetration depeth; L – KE penetrator (rod) length; p_p – KE penetrator (rod) density; and p_t – target material density.

However, based on equation (1) the amount of penetration is dependent only on the length of the penetrator and the densities of the target and penetrator and is independent of the striking velocity. The initial velocity, which is mostly retained during flight of modern APFSDS projectiles ranges from 1500 to 1800 m/s. Therefore, the effects caused by a projectile which travels at roughly this velocity, can be better represented by the semi-empirical Lanz-Odermatt equation:

$$(2) \qquad P = aL\sqrt{\frac{\rho_p}{\rho_t}}\,e^{-\left(2S/\rho_p v^2\right)}$$

where: a – function of the penetrator L/d ratio; S – measure of target ressistance; and v - impact velocity.

Equation (2) still proves that the penetration primarily depends on the length of the penetrator and the densities of the penetrator and the target, but less so on the increase of the impact velocity. (Andrews, 2003) Consequently, a penetrator will be incapable of penetrating much deeper than its own length, as the sheer stress of impact and perforation will ablate it. As a result, current guns and propellants are at the design limit for muzzle velocities, but to increase penetration, enhancements continue to the L/d ratio.

Contemporary Russian APFSDS Rounds

Russia inherited the ammunition development legacy of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, they were the first to adopt APFSDS technology by fielding the 115 mm 2A20 smoothbore gun on the T-62 MBT and continued with the larger 125 mm gun (2A46 and its variants), mounted on the T-64, T-72, T-80, T-84 and T-90 MBTs.

The development of the original Svinets ammunition started in 1985 and lasted until at least 1991 and uses a DU penetrator with a length of 546 mm and a diameter of 25 mm. The Svinets penetrator is reportedly able to penetrate an estimated 600-650 mm of RHAe at 2.000 m, at an angle of 90°. (BTTR, 2016) Although there is a factor of secrecy involved in the production of tank ammunition, so far it seems both possible (and probable), that Russia has been mass producing the improved Svinets ammunition (Svinets 1 or Svinets 2) for the best part of the last two decades as serial production is rumored to have started back in 2002 to 2005.

The Svinets 1 (3BM-59) uses a DU penetrator, while the Svinets 2 (3BM-60) is fitted with a WHA penetrator. They utilize an aluminium sabot with three points of contact which is rather unique, as most other APFSDS round sabots use only two points of contacts. This might

affect accuracy and barrel wear, but it is not likely that in any way enhances penetration. Still, the projectile length for the Svinets ammunition is an overall improvment over older Vant (3BM-32) - 380 mm, Mango (3BM-42) - 452 mm and Lekalo (3BM-44M) - 570 mm and could mean a major boost in the anti-armor capabilities for Russia's tank force. (Figure 1)

Figure 1. Russian APFSDS Projectiles Development
(A – Vant, B – Mango, C – Svinets, D – Lekalo)

The newer Russian 2A82 tank gun, which is now installed on the T-14 Armata MBT (Roblin, 2019) was conceived to modernize the numerous fleets of T-72 and T-80 MBTs, and to equip new modifications of the T-90. The 2A82 can employ new 3BM69 Vacuum 1 and 3BM70 Vacuum 2 APFSDS rounds with extra-long 900 mm penetrators (Pawlikowicz & Surowiec, 2019) fired at a muzzle velocity of 2 km/s, striking with 15-24 MJ of energy to penetrate 900 - 1000 mm of armor at a distance of 2000 m.

Designation	Dimensions	L/d Ratio	Material	Muzzle Velocity	Penetration RHAe at 2000 m	
					0°	60°
3BM48 "Svinets"	546 mm x 21 mm	26:1	Uranium	1700 m/s	650 mm	300 mm
3BM59 "Svinets 1"	740 mm	30:1	DU	1650 m/s	830 mm	410 mm
3BM60 "Svinets 2"	735 mm x 21 mm	35:1	WHA	1660 m/s	740 mm	350 mm
3BM69 "Vacuum 1"	900 mm	/	DU	1700 - 2050 m/s	1000 mm	460 – 490 mm
3BM70 "Vacuum 2"	900 mm	/	WHA	1700 - 2050 m/s	900 mm	410 – 440 mm

Table 1. Penetration of Russian APFSDS Rounds against RHAe at 2000 m (Сергей, 2020; Ezoteriker, 2021)

Layered armor protection & RHA equivalent

Due to the lethality of anti-tank weapons, crew survivability is one of the largest challenges of MBT design.

Rolled homogeneous armor (RHA) was a type of armor, made of hot-rolled steel which fell out of use on MBTs as new KE and chemical energy (CE) weapons (such as the HEAT round) were capable of penetrating even significantly thick RHA. Moreover, weight, mobility, and fuel consumption constraints did not allow engineers to improve protection by simply inserting more, heavy RHA between the crew and the projectile. As a result, RHA has largely been superseded by spaced and composite armor, which incorporates air spaces and materials such as ceramics or plastics in addition to steel.

Protection against KE projectiles is a matter of one or a combination of three things: slow down; turn; or break up the projectile. (Zahn, 2000) With spaced armor, the projectile's penetration capability is reduced by placing a thin sheet of armor a few inches from the base armor. As the round penetrates the spaced armor, it begins to turn and, by the time it hits the base armor, it may be nearly perpendicular to its flight path. Since most KE projectiles are brittle, another advantage of using spaced armor composed of high-hard steel and ceramics (also known as composite armor) is that it causes the penetrator to break up as it crosses the distance between the spaced and the base armor.

A very hopeful alternative to RHA is explosive reactive armor (ERA), which at its basics is a sandwich of two metal plates with explosive material between them. The plates are mounted on the tank body on the path of the penetrator so that, when attacked, the explosive reacts causing the two plates to fly apart. The movement of the plates breaks up the KE penetrator. These characteristics make ERA more efficient than homogenous armor and allow greater protection at a fraction of the weight.

For the testing and calibration of anti-tank guns and ammunition, the term RHAe (Rolled Homogeneous Armor equivalency) is used when giving an estimate of either the penetrative capability of a projectile or the protective capability of a type of layered armor which may or may not be steel. Today, the term is primarily used as a unit of measurement of the protection offered by layering armor on a vehicle in equivalent "millimeters of RHA", referring to the thickness of RHA that would provide the same protection. (US Army, 2000)

Composition of the NATO tank fleet

Out of 30 NATO member states, 8 do not operate MBTs, while the 22 member states that do have MBTs in their land forces operate 12 different models, reflecting diverse armor capabilities among NATO countries. Of the rough total of 13000 plus in-service platforms, the largest portion of 43 % fall under the US-made Abrams, represented with the M1A1 and M1A2 models which NATO wise are used exclusively with the US Army. 20 % are represented by the German - made Leopard family (Leopard 1 and 2 variants), while the third largest portion of MBTs is in the form of Russian export variants of the T-72 (9%). With a significantly smaller representation follow the French – Leclerc (3%), the Italian – Ariete (2%), and the British – Challenger 2 (2%). Finally, some 22 % include the Romanian TR-85 and its variants, some Soviet T-54/55s, as well as US made - M60 and M48 Patton variants. (Figure 2)

Looking at the operational status of MBTs in NATO, as well as some of the member states (such as the UK) defence budget cuts by 2025 there is a significant number of these platforms to be phased out. Nonetheless, based on Figure 2, as well as the defence policy of NATO, almost certainly both the Abrams and the Leopard 2 variants will stay in use for the foreseeable future. (ESD, 2021)

Figure 2 Percentage of MBTs (by manufacturer) in service with NATO countries (GFP, 2021; ESD 2021; Marrone and Sabatino, 2020)

MBT	Armor	RHAe for KE penetrators
Abrams	Modular Chobham composite armor, Spaced armor, and DU Paneling + Reactive armor kit (TUSK)	940-960 mm
Leopard	3rd generation composite armor, with reinforcement to the turret and externally mounted add-on armor modules	920-940 mm
T-72	High hardness steel with ceramic insertions + ERA	400 mm
Leclerc	Welded steel plates with a thickness of 30 - 50 mm + Semi-reactive armor modules and titanium, spaced armor	800 mm
Ariete	Steel and composite blends and spaced armor	490-500 mm
Challenger 2	2nd generation modular Chobham composite armor + Reactive armor kit	920-960 mm

Table 2. Armor thickness of NATO MBTs in RHAe

Results

A simple comparison of the data provided in Tables 1 and 2 allows us to reach a well-founded conclusion, that Russian 3BM69 Vacuum 1 and 3BM70 Vacuum 2 APFSDS rounds with their extra-long 900 mm KE penetrator pose a significant threat to most NATO MBTs as well as their armored forces in general. Seeing as the data provided in Table 2 presents the best frontal armor protection estimate (RHAe) regardless of the MBT model, we can safely say that this finally gives Russia a tank round that could reliably penetrate NATO MBTs at medium range (2000 m).

It is also worth mentioning that neither of the abovementioned MBTs will have the same protection on all points of their frontal arcs. In fact, even with the mighty Abrams M1A2 SEP or the Leopard 2A7+ (latest variant MBTs), some points will be weaker, especially say the upper front turret or the gun mount. With this in mind, even the Svinets 1 (3BM-59) and the Svinets 2 (3BM-60) rounds have a fighting chance of effectively engaging the representative NATO tanks.

However, MBTs irrespective of the type and make have a certain sloping to their armor, especially on the front glacis. Although each of these slope values are different for different MBTs, we can see that a hit on target under a 60-degree angle, significantly reduces penetration (by 45-50%). On that note, it is highly unlikely to achieve a perfect perpendicular frontal hit (at an angle of 90 degrees) which reduces the chances of successfully destroying a target.

Moreover, achieving a first-round hit ultimately comes down to the fire control system and its gun stabilization platform, sighting systems, ballistic computer, target acquisition system etc. as well as the element of surprise, and the opposing tank's active protection and warning measures. But, when it comes down to sending any of these projectiles down-range, they are a more than capable and lethal asset which will attain massive damage against any armored target, including NATO's MBTs.

Discussion

Today, T-72s remain Russia's primary MBT, supplemented by turbine-engine T-80s and some T-90s. All carry variants of the 125 mm 2A46 smoothbore gun, which loads its ammunition using an autoloader. Both the Svinets 1 and 2, as well as the Vacuum 1 and 2 have penetrators exceeding 640 mm, whereas T-72 and T-80s autoloaders could only accommodate a maximum ammunition size of 640 millimeters.

Supposedly the T-90A features an upgraded autoloader design capable of supporting longer parts, but the original production model of the T-90, which largely relied on the old T-72B chassis, might not have been fitted with the improved autoloader. This might result in the newer ammunition being only useful with a limited number of tanks, which would result in a lower production volume and higher per unit costs. The Armata with 10
its new 2A82 gun and autoloader is most likely capable of handling the Svinets 1 and 2 APFSDS rounds and larger ammunition.

The Svinets 1 and 2 rounds have been in development since the late-1990s or early-2000s, and development on the Vacuum 1 and 2 has started a lot sooner than that. While it has been known for quite a while that Russia has been working on the development of more advanced APFSDS ammunition for the T-72, T-80 and T-90 tanks - it is more likely that most of Russia's tanks are still supplied with older ammunition from the mid-1980s, likely taken from Soviet stocks.

Conclusion

MBTs are a major obstacle for armed forces to overcome and so far, the only proven means to stop a large, armored force is by employing tanks of your own. APFSDS rounds have proven themselves as the most formidable tank-killing asset, as they pack the largest blow at the longest distance. Consequently, Russia's efforts to out-gun their NATO counterparts have been aimed at developing more lethal APFSDS ammunition.

An analysis of their terminal ballistics shows that the basic principles of any KE projectile are to have the highest possible impact velocity, to be long and thin. Generally, a penetrator is incapable of penetrating deeper than its own length, as the sheer stress of impact and perforation ablates it. Also, while current guns and propellants are at their design limit for muzzle velocities, recent development has focused on creating "long-rod" penetrators, which have increased penetrating power due to their length and mass. The Svinets 1 (3BM59) and 2 (3BM60) and the Vacuum 1 (3BM69) and 2 (3BM70) projectiles are the latest in this line of development.

Based on currently available data for NATO armor and Russian contemporary ammunition penetration capacity, allowed us to conclude that Russian (3BM69) Vacuum 1 and (3BM70) Vacuum 2 APFSDS rounds with their 900 mm long KE penetrator pose a significant threat to most NATO tanks. Since neither of NATO's MBTs will have the same protection on all points of their frontal arcs and some points like the upper front turret or the sides of the hull will be less armored, even the Svinets 1 (3BM-59) and Svinets 2 (3BM-60) rounds have a fighting chance of effectively engaging the representative NATO tanks.

MBTs irrespective of the type and make also have a certain sloping to their armor, especially on the front glacis. A hit on target under a 60-degree angle reduces penetration by 45-50 % which reduces the chances of successfully destroying a target. Moreover, a first-round fatal hit would ultimately rely on the tank's fire control system, the element of surprise, and the opposing tank's active protection and warning measures.

When it comes down to sending any of these projectiles down-range, they are a more than capable and lethal asset which will attain massive damage against any armored target, including NATO's MBTs. Seeing as the data of armor thickness of NATO's MBTs presents the best frontal armor protection estimate (regardless of the MBT model), we could safely say that this gives Russia a tank round that could reliably penetrate all NATO main battle tanks at the medium range of 2000 m.

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Professional paper

THE IMPACT OF GEOPOLITICS ON THE UNITED NATIONS

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Abstract: *Geopolitical risks and challenges pose a huge challenge to all international actors, from countries, NGOs, to transnational corporations and international organizations. Geopolitics itself has a huge impact and significance on the formation of the world order, and thus inevitably on the hierarchy of the world and its constituent parts. The functioning of international organizations regardless of their character is conditioned by the great geopolitical leaders such as the USA, Russia, France, UK and China. This is especially obvious in the UN. These countries are trying to achieve their geopolitical goals with the assistance and help of the right and power of veto and therefore paralyzing the work of the UN and UN led operations. It should be emphasized in particular that the role of the United Nations is not to uphold or reject a particular order and hierarchy in the world, but to guarantee peace and security for all. The UN should not be an extended arm to achieve the goals of certain states, nor tool to gain geopolitical power. This is because some countries think that being the greatest contributors to the financing of international organizations allows them to have the greatest rights, benefits and advantages in the fields of security, economics, international relations over other countries.*

Key words: *security, relations, countries, organization*

Introduction

Centuries of global conflict and strife have taught us that the world is better when nations work together. (Garcés, 2019). Security is usually a matter of complex interlinkages among actors at a variety of scales, and how local arrangements are supported and enforced, or not, requires thinking about these larger geopolitics too. (Megoran & Dalby, 2018: 263)

The international community, through dialogue and concerted efforts, has made remarkable gains in peacekeeping, peacebuilding, human rights, women peace and security, youth peace and security, and climate action. (Garcés, 2019)

In the history of UN resolutions to allow intervention into conflicts between states, the euphemism "all necessary means" usually indicates that armed intervention may be sanctioned by the UN and therefore have a force of law. However, before that ultimate step is reached, a variety of other tools are available to the global community to defuse a violent conflict. (Braden & Shelley, 2000: 130)

The single best way to mitigate rising threats is to pursue dialogue and to strengthen multilateralism. The international community must be fully committed to the principles of engagement and cooperation, and that is what multilateralism stands for. Multilateralism, through dialogue, negotiation and international cooperation, provides the most suitable platform to

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discuss and reach agreements in search of a common understanding. (Garcés, 2019)

Tensions at the U.N. Security Council and other global and regional institutions can reduce the international community's ability to pressure local actors to prevent a conflict from escalating and support more accountability in countries. (Marc & Jones, 2021)

The United Nations

The institutions and systems that were born out of the ashes of World War II, including the United Nations, have allowed our societies to flourish. Through shared responsibility and accountability, shared burdens and costs, we have helped to reduce, if not abolish, inter-state war, and have seen significant reductions in famine and poverty coupled with massive gains in development and the protection of human rights. (Garcés, 2019)

The most important intergovernmental organization which seeks to promote international co-operation and peaceful exchange is the United Nations (UN). Under the 1945 Treaty of San Francisco, the international community created the UN in the hope that the anguish of the Second World War could be replaced by peace, dialogue and universal solidarity. The purpose of the UN was spelt out in the UN Charter (111 articles), which defined common goals for the world community, such as the implementation of particular moral values and standards for international relations. The signatories to the UN Charter had to commit themselves to peaceful resolution of disputes, sovereign equality of all members, the principle of collective security and a range of other social, political and cultural concerns. The UN sought to maintain order and codify certain forms of behavior as either acceptable or unacceptable. (Dodds, 2005: 41)

The United Nations is an international organization that is, in essence, state-led and state-run. Yet, states are far from the only actors present at UN forums and conferences. Rather than a narrow diplomatic corps consisting solely of traditional state diplomats, UN diplomacy is constituted of a 'larger and more complex diplomatic community' that includes an array of non-state actors. (McConnell, 2020: 1018)

The 'UN charter model' of world politics described a world in which: states co-existed with other social and political actors, co-operation was not limited between states, rules and regulations were used to eliminate unacceptable features of world politics such as genocide and war and where the territorial boundaries of states were blurred by transnational and supranational relationships. (Dodds, 2005: 39)

The United Nations, its difficulties and challenges

You can tell an international system is out of touch with reality when it risks repeating the grave mistake of previous international orders determined to uphold the status quo even in the face of inescapable change. (Klieman, 2015: 1)

For critics of liberal institutionalism, the performance of the UN is indicative of the difficulties inherent in this body of thought. During the Cold War, the role of the UN was effectively neutralized by a number of 'Great Powers' (China, France, the UK, the USA and the USSR) who made up the permanent members of the Security Council. Armed with the power of veto, these states habitually paralyzed the UN and its executive orders, often on the basis that particular UN operations or directives would interfere with their own strategic or political goals. The alleged sovereign equality of UN member states was frequently exposed as 'hollow' during the Cold War as and when the Great Powers either ignored UN resolutions or violated the sovereign rights of Third World states. (Dodds, 2005: 42)

One institutional manifestation of this resistance to change, or slowness in adapting to it: the five original veto-empowered members of the United Nations Security Council remain

immovably secure in their seats more than 70 years later. Neither replaced nor reinforced by new peer powers, this institutional rigidity denies—indeed, defies—more recent shifts in the real foci of global influence and responsibility. Today our shared future is in the hands of not one, nor two nor even five "Great Powers" but perhaps a dozen or more key regional actors who will doubtless answer the salient concerns of international politics: Amity, or enmity? Peace, or war? Order, or disorder? Stability, or instability? Cooperation, or conflict? Integration, or separatism? Growth, or stagnation? (Klieman, 2015: 1)

Turning to world politics, arguably the greatest challenge of our times lies in striking a proper balance between extremes: between order and disorder, between hegemony and anarchy, between collective norms and individual freedoms, between the international and the national, between permanency and change. (Klieman, 2015: 253)

The United Nations and Geopolitics

In a world where there is much to know, there are also many ways of knowing. Claims to one particular way of knowing have frequently been exposed as either misrepresenting or excluding a variety of histories, places and contemporary experiences. Explaining contemporary world politics is extremely complex, not only because the range of materials available is substantial, but also because the scope of interpretation is wide-ranging. (Dodds, 2005: 26-27). States are not the only influential force in international politics. The activities of multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations and firms are considered to be of importance. It is abundantly clear that states have to operate within a world economic system not only where flows of capital and technology transcend territorial boundaries, but where the activities of business corporations which operate in more than one country or region also influence this process. Multinational corporations often enjoy considerable independence from particular governments even if they are identified as 'American' or 'Japanese' firms. The presumption that states pursue so-called national interests often underestimates the importance of sectional interests, which may be represented as national interests for political reasons. Analyses of international politics often neglect patterns of economic relations to the detriment of the structure of the international political system. International relations are thus reduced to a concern for the interaction between states through diplomatic and political arenas rather than focusing on the reciprocal action between the world economy and the power of the state. (Dodds, 2005: 33)

Challenging conventional categories of international or global politics is part and parcel of a critical evaluation of the role of geographical knowledge and its influence on social and political practices. (Dodds, 2005: 30)

By focusing on the micro-political practices within the UN, it can emerge as a revealing site of geopolitics. This is underpinned by two particular spatial dynamics. First is the fact that, as a members club, the UN is an institution premised on practices of inclusion and exclusion, and the differentiation of actors as inside or outside the organization has implications for access to certain spaces and how particular individuals and groups behave within that space. Second, individuals with these prescribed identities as members and non-members are, at particular times and in particular places within

the UN buildings, in close proximity. They might encounter each other in corridors, sit next to each other in conference rooms and, in certain circumstances speak during the same session. (McConnell, 2020: 1018)

If geopolitical aid or the aid given to recipients with political leverage more generally is less effective than other aid, the literature using political connections as instruments would not provide evidence of the ineffectiveness of the overall aid, but rather of the aid given to politically important countries. Their estimates would represent a lower bound for the effects of overall aid. (Dreher et al., 2016: 5)

Geopolitics is becoming increasingly complex. In order to achieve a mutual benefit between regions, it is necessary to develop an analytical and strategic management perspective. (Presenza & Sheehan, 2018: 315)

The UN and geopolitical hierarchy

For those who believe that the UN has real influence on the world by setting rules and norms between nations, many feel that the country who pays the piper must name the tune, and this is not happening. For those who believe that despite all these apparent superpowers, the UN merely reflects the agendas of the states within it, they may take a more laissez-faire attitude to the UN budget. Either way, the national makeup of senior positions that run the UN can tell us a lot about which countries are actually calling the shots in world affairs. (Duffy, 2022: 1-9)

Whether in geo-politics or geo-economics, the idiom, "he who pays the piper calls the tune" is almost as old as humanity, and the idiom "who pays for the UN" is certainly as old as the UN. How we pay for the UN is a formula which dates to the end of WW2 and to the power-structures which prevailed at the time of the UN's gestation, the creation of the Bretton Woods institutions, and of course post-war geo-politics and geo-economics. Delicately, it was a formula which considered the mess left by global war and the power structures of a new world order, who would have to shoulder geo-political and geo-economic responsibilities for the post-war recovery. Normally in life, we would expect the biggest treasurer to have the most influence, but in the UN system the most powerful remain the permanent five members, their powers solidified on the cold cement holding up the first UN flagpole erected in 1947. Veto power in the Security Council lies firmly with those permanent five so the UN is not an organization recognizing the principle "pay to play." How about the UN charter, founded on Sovereign Equality and Big Power Politics? Should tiny Tonga with a mere 100 000 inhabitants continue to have the same voting power as the USA or China? Now the voting power in the UN system means many different things so we should not get carried away on a pipe dream of sovereign equality. It is more realistic to regard the UN as a global entity frozen in geo-political time and hamstrung by the delicate mechanisms of a 1945 clock which threatens at any time to send the whole planet back into upheaval. It is a bit like the plumber and the old plumbing. Tinker with the UN's governance at your peril. (Duffy, 2022:1-9)

There exists a geopolitical hierarchy among the leading states that is more directly responsive to relative power than is the formally established hierarchy of the UN. For instance, the United States as a hegemonic actor has exerted an influence on the manner in which the UN operates that extends far beyond its status as a permanent member of the Security Council. It not only possesses the benefits of its formal status, but it relies on its political and financial leverage to distort political reality in its favor. (Dallmayr et al., 2014: 6)

Either despite being a military and economic power, there are countries that have not yet been able to project soft power. Or you can take another view, that these countries are rejecting the global system. Either way, it is not clear that it is in the best interest of the world for these rising powers to take a back seat when it comes to solving international conflicts." (Duffy, 2022: 1-9)

Moreover, the geopolitical effect of the countries coincides with UNSC membership and disappears after the temporary member loses its extraordinary geopolitical importance. (Dreher et al., 2016: 15)

The United Nations and the Euro West centric world order

There are two negative implications of the Euro West centric world order, which are particularly ill adapted to the needs and aspirations of the early twenty-first century. First of all, there exists a persisting Euro/West centric denial of civilizational equality that no longer corresponds, even geopolitically, to the circumstances of a post-colonial world order in which sovereign states now formally represent the non-Western peoples of the world. At the same time, this formally anachronistic legacy of Euro/West centrism is embodied with distorting consequences in the structure of the United Nations. Four of the five permanent members of the Security Council must be considered to be primarily associated with the Euro West centric domain, with China being the fifth, and only non-Eurocentric political actor enjoying this status. It can be pointed out that the General Assembly gives each state the same status regardless of size or wealth, but needs also to be noticed that the General Assembly was deliberately subordinated to the hierarchical Security Council. Whereas the Security Council can make decisions, mandating even war on occasion, the most that the General Assembly can do is to make recommendations, and exhibit its support or opposition to proposed courses of action. (Dallmayr et al., 2014: 4-5)

The Charter accords dominant states an exceptional status, via the veto, which effectively confers an unrestricted right to exempt themselves (and their friends) from obligations under international law. This capacity to block decisions in the UN Security Council that are perceived as adverse to their strategic and ideological interests is a radical denial of the equality of states as an organizing principle of world order. It places the mantle of UN constitutionalism on the geopolitical governance of the planet. And behind this constitutional move lies the even more hierarchical character of power relations, giving the United States a degree of influence that far exceeds what derives from its status as one of five permanent members of the UNSC. (Dallmayr et al., 2014: 4-5)

Conclusion

The first is that, as a matter of law, we have formally moved beyond a world of empires and greater spaces to a world of states. The second is that, as a matter of practice, the international legal order is still vulnerable to the expansionist ambitions of hegemonic powers.

While the attempts at regional ordering engaged in by great powers may be a fact of international politics, such conduct is considered to operate outside international law. The state is the normative political subject of international law, and any move away from the 'geography of statehood' as the foundation of the international legal system is seen as novel and exceptional. (Orford, 2021: 149-194)

The UN appears as a sterile site of geopolitics: its status as a global power broker has seemingly diminished, and its day-to-day business is sluggish thanks to oppressive protocol. Moreover, as a space of ostensibly formal geopolitics conducted by elite actors, institutions such as the UN run counter to critical geopolitics' recent focus on the everyday, embodied and intimate practices of geopolitics. (McConnell, 2020: 1018)

Geographies of peace must attend to geopolitics: not instead of the fine-grained, local, thick descriptions of peace in specific places, but as well as this. This includes understanding and interrogating the multi-layered, nested geographies of geopolitical actors including states, regional blocs, global inter-and non-governmental organizations, Transnational Corporations (TNCs), the architectures of international finances, offshore territories. (Megoran & Dalby, 2018: 263)

It can be argued that this deference to geopolitical forces is a necessary acknowledgment of the actuality of inequality among the members of the United Nations that potentially allows the Organization to operate effectively because its affirmative decisions will necessarily enjoy support from the political actors with implementing capabilities. It is often argued that the League of Nations failed, in part, because of its refusal to accommodate geopolitics. (Dallmayr et al., 2014: 4-5)

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COMPUTER CRIME DURING THE COVID 19 PANDEMIC

Marija GJOSHEVA-KRSTESKI[1]

Abstract: *The COVID 19 pandemic has spurred significant changes and criminal innovations in cybercrime. In many cases, many types of crime have caused problems, especially with the fact that work from home has increased and everyone uses computer devices. Due to insufficient security measures of the information infrastructure and the use of the Internet, as well as insufficient awareness of users, we have seen an increase in cybercrime offenses such as: sexual exploitation of children via the Internet, misuse of personal data, computer attacks on critical infrastructure (malware, DDoS attacks), social engineering, phishing, etc. Cybercrime affects everyone, everywhere. The citizens in our country, but also the whole world. Cybercrime does not stand still.*

Key words: *COVID 19 Pandemic, cybercrime, investigations, dark pages, cryptocurrencies.*

Introduction

Cybercrime is changing with the same pace as the speed of the internet. Cyber criminals and their tactics evolve and change as information technology evolves, and cybercrime is integrated into all forms of traditional crime.

The COVID 19 pandemic has shown that cybercrime remains at its core. The difference with COVID 19 is that due to the physical constraints imposed to stop the spread of the virus, with the consequent increase in work from home and remote access to business, many individuals and businesses that may not have been so active on the Internet before the crisis now have a lucrative goal.

Criminals change their approach to respond to the social context. They quickly exploit social vulnerabilities and turn to traditional cybercrimes such as "cyber fraud" and "phishing".

Also during the pandemic, disinformation, various campaigns and activities were allowed to spread, and disinformation is often combined with conventional and unconventional activities, military and non-military activities, which can be used to achieve certain political goals. So-called hybrid campaigns also include cyber-attacks targeting critical information infrastructures of government institutions, undermining public confidence in government institutions. Various misinformation can affect elections, referendums in a particular country.

We are also witnessing an increasing number of websites offering misinformation about pandemic drugs, as well as the dark pages of the "Dark Web" where banned products, criminal activities, etc. are often offered.

However, the key and biggest threat during the pandemic remained "Social Engineering" and "Phishing", which became more and more sophisticated.

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Social engineering is a manipulation technique that exploits human error to obtain private information, access, or valuables. In cybercrime, these "human hacker" scams tend to entice unscrupulous users to expose data, spread malware infections, or gain access to restricted systems. Attacks can occur online, in person and through other interactions.[2]

Phishing attacks can be divided into three groups, i.e. fake attacks, in which the victim, through fake messages, is persuaded to give personal data, malicious attacks, where the attacker uses malicious software in order to obtain the desired information, as well as DNS-based attacks, in which the domain is modified, whereby the user is redirected to a fake website.

The biggest problem with phishing attacks is that it is not based solely on technical elements, but uses more complex and advanced techniques of social engineering, which exploits the inexperience and ignorance of internet users. By creating specially designed and falsified emails, it tries to instruct the user to voluntarily and unknowingly give their own confidential information to the unauthorized user.[3]

Phishing is becoming increasingly difficult to detect, many phishing sites are literally identical to the real ones, and the latest examples are that there are more and more phishing campaigns involving prize games, forcing victims to voluntarily leave their personal information, to send their own photo, to send personal data from bank accounts, payment cards, etc.

A key factor for success in preventing this type of threat is user awareness.

Cyber-dependent crime

Ransomware remains the most dominant threat, as criminals increasingly use this type of cybercrime to extort more money and data from victims, and threaten that if victims do not pay, that data will not be returned to them, that it is encrypted, or depending on the nature or sensitivity of the data, that it may be made public.

Most attacks with this type of virus are against large corporations. Entering their computer network that is infected with the virus, the virus can sit for a long time on servers, and through it criminals can conduct reconnaissance in their email communication, and at a convenient time when there is big sales, transaction interceptions, change data from the copper account IBAN, SWIFT and transfer the money into the account controlled by criminals.

Ransomware attacks can be multifaceted, making it easy for criminals to make money, and it is worrying that you do not need to have much knowledge of information technology to carry out a Ransomware attack. Instructions for this can also be purchased on the Dark Web dark pages.

Most large companies that are victims of this type of attack, choose to pay the required amount of money, usually in cryptocurrencies, in order not to suffer great damage to their work, while not reporting at all this crime that happened to them. All this hinders the investigators' investigation, especially in gathering the necessary evidence.

An image of a message sent after a Ransomware attack[4]

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[2] *https://www.kaspersky.com/resource-center/definitions/what-is-social-engineering*

[3] *Gjosheva M. (2017) The New Challenges and Threats of the High-tech Crime on National Security. Skopje: Faculty of Philosophy - Institute for Security, Defence and Peace*

[4] *https://www.google.com/search?q=messages+for+ransomware&source=lnms&tbm=isch&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwilmIj_0NzuAhVpzoUKHV1bDq8Q_AUoAXoECBsQAw&biw=1536&bih=754#imgrc=9xbfpHVPkmvOlM*

Picture 1

In addition to Ransomware, there are other malicious viruses that have a wide range of action, such as (Trojans and RAT) that allow criminals to remotely access infected computers. Targets of this type of malware attack are infrastructures of large organizations or institutions that play a key role in the overall system. All this poses a great risk, especially from leaks of confidential information that can be classified, state secrets and the like.

Emotet - this type of virus is increasingly prevalent due to its versatile use and is a modern malware.

Emotions is a Trojan that primarily spreads through spam. The infection can come either through a malicious script, macro-enabled document files, or a malicious link. Emotions emails may contain well-known branding designed to look like legitimate emails. Emotet may try to persuade users to click on malicious files using tempting language such as "Your Invoice", "Payment Details" or possibly an upcoming shipment from well-known package companies. Emotet went through several repetitions. The first versions arrived as a malicious JavaScript file.

Later versions evolved to use macro-documents to retrieve virus loads from attack and control (C&C) servers.

Everyone is a target for Emotet. To date, Emotet has cracked down on individuals, companies and government entities across the US and Europe, stealing bank details (user name, password), financial data and even Bitcoin wallets.[5]

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[5]   *https://www.malwarebytes.com/emotet/*

What should worry us in the future are malware on mobile phones, especially smartphones on which people have installed electronic banking applications and perform electronic transactions. But, this type of attack requires more knowledge in the field of information technology.

DDoS attacks are also a potential threat, and their impact is growing.

Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) is a malicious attempt to disrupt the normal traffic of a targeted server, service, or network by overstretching the target or its surrounding infrastructure with heavy Internet traffic. DDoS attacks achieve effectiveness by using more compromised computer systems as sources of traffic attack. Exploited machines may include computers and other network resources. From a high level, the DDoS attack is like an unexpected traffic jam that overwhelms the highway, preventing regular traffic from reaching its destination.[6]

DDoS attacks are becoming more adaptable, cyber criminals are becoming more protected, and it is very interesting that lately they have been reorienting to smaller first-timers who have weaker security protections in order to secure a financial payment that are difficult for investigators to detect. They use a large number of IP addresses when carrying out the attack and this makes it difficult to track down criminals, who often use special tools to hide the true place of origin of the attack, or use a Proxy server or VPN that falsifies the real IP addresses and gives the answer that you are logging in from a completely third place.

Sexual exploitation of children through the internet

What should worry us and what should be given the greatest emphasis and prevention in the future, is the sexual exploitation of children through the Internet. The development of information technology, the increased use of social networks by young people, especially now in a time of pandemic when a large percentage of the population is at home and doing work via computer, facilitates access to the children of this type of criminals, who succeed to hide behind a fake profile on a social network pretending to be children themselves, by using photos according to the age of the children.

The sexual exploitation of both girls and boys is happening globally, and it is alarming that most of these events remain shrouded in silence.

"Child sexual abuse is the involvement of a child in sexual activity that the child does not understand, is not able to consent to on the basis of prior information, or an activity for which the child is not properly prepared in terms of its development and cannot give consent, and which violates the laws and social taboos in a society. Child sexual abuse is demonstrated through such activity between a child and an adult and another child who, according to age or development, has established a relationship of responsibility, trust or power, and the activity is performed with the intention to meet or satisfy the needs of the other person. This may include, but is not limited to: inciting or forcing a child to engage in unlawful sexual activity; using the child for exploitation in prostitution or other illegal sexual practices; exploitation of children for pornographic performances and materials, etc."

Sexual exploitation of children via the Internet as a negative phenomenon has been present in criminal acts for a long time. With the advent of high technology and the global communication network, the way it is produced and distributed has become easier and it has become easily accessible to a larger group of people, thus turning it into an entire industry that ultimately violates basic moral norms and children's rights, which have become an instrument of profit in the hands of the international criminal network.

The sexual exploitation of children online is on the rise globally. Child abuse is a crime

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[6]   *https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/ddos/what-is-a-ddos-attack/*

that is intolerable by most people. Nevertheless, the number of these crimes is not so rare. In 2005 alone, it was estimated that more than one million child abuse photos and videos were available online. The number of these materials is estimated to increase by about 50,000 new photographs each year. About 70% of the photos found online are of children under 10 years old. It is a matter of concern that these photos often remain on the Internet forever.

Regarding the sexual exploitation of children through the Internet, abuse (displaying and publishing pornographic material) was noticed through the Social Network Facebook, video streaming (watching live on the Internet) through the Skype Service, etc. The reason for this trend is the easy access of children to the Internet and the insufficient control of parents over the persons with whom their children communicate through social networks.[7]

The COVID 19 Pandemic situation and the increasing use of the Internet imposed by the pandemic itself make it easier for criminals lurking on the Internet and seeking underage victims. This especially refers to children who spend more time online through online games, or who are susceptible to unwanted contact on social media, group chats through online applications, all this further increases the risk of children becoming victims of sexual exploitation on the Internet, and the distribution of generated unwanted material which was knowingly made by the child itself.

The uncertain future posed by the COVID Pandemic 19 will have a major impact on the development of events related to the sexual exploitation of children online.

Payment fraud

Due to insufficient computer security, payment fraud is on the rise. According to the analysis, the most common fraud currently happens with the interception of e-mail, where criminals enter the e-mail of an employee or director of a certain company, and at the moment when bank transfers need to be made, then criminals change the account, IBAN code, in some cases, they inform the person that the account is being changed for various reasons, and the person making the payment pays the money to an account controlled by the criminals, without being aware that they are the victims. In these cases, in order to act successfully, it is necessary for the injured party to inform the competent authorities as soon as possible, especially in the first 24 hours, in order to be able to react promptly and quickly through international institutions and bodies, in order to be informed about that fraud and to reverse these transactions and not allow cash to be withdrawn by criminals.

Also, at this time, investment frauds have been on the rise. These scams are intended to lure victims to invest or transfer money, in attractive schemes for quick money, by showing websites to the victims with false returns from these alleged investments.

Due to the pandemic, as mentioned before, a lot of time is spent on the Internet, and scams with fake "phishing" sites, which are identical to the original, increase, and victims unknowingly enter their personal data, bank account data, passwords, which go directly in the hands of criminals who run the fake side. The conditions imposed by the pandemic, resulted in an increase of online purchasing, i.e. many people do their everyday shopping via electronic payment, especially bills, as well as buying the most necessary products (food, medicine, etc.) and criminals create false phishing sites from well-known markets, pharmacies, even and from banks, in order to easily access your bank data and steal your cash.

Fake online gambling is also on the rise, with victims being asked to enter their details,

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[7] *Gjosheva M. (2017) The New Challenges and Threats of the High-tech Crime on National Security. Skopje: Faculty of Philosophy - Institute for Security, Defence and Peace*

payment card number and other personal information, or being asked to click on a page that redirects them directly to a fake phishing site.

There are also SMS frauds, which the victims receive as a text message on their mobile number, which requires alleged checks and updating of data, to give the PIN

code from their own payment card, or to click on the link that is sent in the message, which leads to a fake "phishing" page.

In these situations it is recommended that you never reply to messages that require a PIN code, payment card number, bank account password.

Dark web

The dark sites have worried the whole world because of the criminal activities offered on these sites.

To access the dark sites you need to have a TOR server installed that offers complete anonymity online, while browsing and using the internet you are anonymous, and are unlikely to be discovered by investigators. At the same time, publishers of dark pages are also anonymous thanks to encrypted data provided by the protocol.

Dark pages end with .onion instead of .com .org, .gov for example.

On the dark side you can buy various primarily prohibited products, and the payment is exclusively in cryptocurrencies. For example, it sells scripts and viruses used to carry out computer attacks, it sells stolen data from bank accounts, payment cards, illicit substances, drugs, drugs, weapons, child pornography, human trafficking, and you can even rent a killer for a fee. It is very important to know that by visiting a certain dark site, you can click on some content that is a virus in the background and infect your computer, causing huge damage by stealing your data and managing your remote computer. You can also click to redirect to material you do not want to see, material with criminal content (child pornography, etc.). Also, someone can access your camera on the computer device you are using, and criminals can see what suits them through your camera lens. It is therefore advisable, if you do not use the camera on your computer device, to cover it.[8]

Many people value the privacy of the Internet, and therefore choose to use the services of dark sites that offer total anonymity on the Internet.

The anonymity of the dark sites is a double-edged sword - and it depends on how it is used. When the dark site is used in a benevolent way, it can serve as a medium to ensure the privacy of the user. But with malicious intent, it can become a playground for criminals. Like any other invention, the dark sites have their advantages and disadvantages. It can prove to be very useful, or deadly depending on its application. The way it is used determines whether the dark site is a boon or an evil.[9]

On the dark site you can also join Tor on Facebook, which is identical to the original Facebook. Police officers are becoming increasingly successful in tackling this type of crime, and successfully closing dark sites, but many traffickers, after closing one dark site, migrate immediately to another.

Crypto currencies

Cryptocurrencies play an important role in facilitating payments that should be concealed, i.e. which are illegal, for all types of crimes in all areas of crime. Anonymity is a key factor in cryptocurrencies. It is used especially for payment on the dark pages of the Dark Web,

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[8] *https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-how-to-how-can-i-access-the-deep-web.html*
[9] *Encyclopedia of Criminal Activities and the Deep Web, pdf, (Mehdi Khosrow-Pour D.B.A).*

where various prohibited criminal services are offered (extortion, especially the purchase of malware that can enter a computer system, encrypt all data, and require recovery, payment in cryptocurrencies), then data theft, sexual extortion, and recently threats related to CODE 19. A larger percentage of the population is immune to these types of crime, but there are always victims, primarily because cybercrime quickly adapts to traditional forms of crime, and the very development of information technology facilitates, as well as the commission of criminal activities and crimes.

Of course, cryptocurrencies are also used for legal payments, but most often for criminal activities.

Cooperation with the private sector is very important for successful detection of illegal cryptocurrency transactions. Investigators are working hard to uncover the proceeds of crime.

The number of ATMs in the world that offer withdrawals and payments with cryptocurrencies is growing. There are already this type of ATMs in our neighboring countries.

The very fact that cryptocurrencies are not centralized is a big problem for investigators, especially to track the payment of cryptocurrencies. Most countries are already working on amendments to the law, in order to work with cryptocurrencies, do transactions with them, as well as control, and centralize them, and have a legal obligation to report them, and establish a protocol. Once that happens, it will be expected that cyber criminals and other criminals who practice cryptocurrency transactions will reorient to other markets that support decentralized transactions.

Challenges in future investigations

Cryptocurrency investigations are challenging and we can expect them to be more prominent in future investigations into all types of crime, not just cybercrime.

These investigations have become an essential tool for all investigators. In order to obtain the necessary information, police investigators need to exchange data and information with international institutions such as Interpol, Europol, because they have databases from several countries and can easily obtain useful data from them, such as establishing the identity of persons, as well as the new modes of perpetration of criminal offenses.

Cyber criminals will increasingly turn to markets that support decentralized transactions.

It is very important that crimes are reported, because the more data the investigators collect, the easier it is to identify the perpetrators and the possible links between different crimes, which gives a complete picture of the crime, and it can be determined whether it increases or decreases.

Many companies or individuals do not want to report for anti-advertising reasons or literally out of shame that it happened to them.

It is necessary to have information in the public, the media, on social media, to act preventively, to acquaint citizens with possible abuses, new ways of committing crimes, to encourage them to report crimes, to explain how and where they can do it the fastest.

Cybercrime, no matter how sophisticated, still has a human impact, and it depends on each individual how much they will improve their knowledge and raise their awareness, in order to successfully respond to computer threats.

The cooperation of the public and the private sector is also of great importance, to communicate regularly, to send information to the public together, to conduct joint surveys, to exchange information, and thus to strengthen the resistance to computer threats and to raise awareness, because people are encouraged to report crimes once certain information has been made public. It should be noted that it is necessary to involve the academic community, in order

to organize joint workshops, prepare the necessary instructions, manuals and the like.

Another recent challenge in investigations is the encrypted data that investigators face in conducting investigations. Use of certain tools by criminals offering encryption, encrypted telephone networks, encrypted messages. International legal requirements are required in those jurisdictions, which complicates the investigation. Cooperation with private companies offering these services is needed, cooperation between police officers at the international level is also necessary.

All this is relevant because organized criminal groups communicate with each other using the services of modern technology, bypassing all legal forms, which complicates the investigation of investigators.

National legislation in the Republic of North Macedonia

Cybercrime covers all those forms and shapes of criminal behavior related to the misuse of computers and information systems in general, and as such, i.e. socially dangerous, illegal behavior, with the intention of the perpetrator to obtain some benefit for themselves or for another or to cause harm to another, the legislator appropriately incriminates and prescribes them as criminal offenses with appropriate criminal sanctions. The following criminal acts are envisaged as criminal offenses in the field of cybercrime: „Display of pornographic material to a juvenile" Article 193, „Production and distribution of child pornography" Article 193-a, „Making and importing computer viruses" Article 251-a, „Computer Fraud" Art.251-b, „Making, obtaining or alienating funds for counterfeiting" Art.271, „Making and using a fake payment card" Art.274-b, „Computer forgery" Art.379-a, „Misuse of personal data" Art.149, „Damage and unauthorized entry into a computer system" Article 251, „Endangering the security" Article 144 paragraph 4 (through information system), „Spreading racist and xenophobic material through a computer system" Article 394-d.

Cybercrime convention

The Convention on Cybercrime was adopted on November 8, 2001, and signed the same year in Budapest on November 23, 2001, and the Republic of Macedonia adopted the Law on Ratification of the Convention on Cybercrime, which entered into force on July 2, 2004. It is the result of four years of work by an expert group from the Council of Europe assisted by experts from the United States, Canada, China and other non-Council of Europe countries. The Convention has been signed by 38 countries (among which are non-member states of the Council of Europe: Canada, Japan, South Africa and the USA), and ratified by 11 countries: Albania, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Denmark, Estonia, Croatia, Luxembourg, Hungary, Macedonia, Romania and Slovenia.[10]

It is obvious that there are no large technologically developed countries among the countries that have ratified the Convention, and in fact the success of the convention on a global level will depend on them. It is an indisputable fact that most of the countries that have ratified the Convention are new members of the European Union or candidate countries for accession to the European Union.

This Convention is part of the so-called Framework Conventions, its provisions are not directly applicable, and so each state should implement them in its legislation.

One of the reasons for its adoption is the belief that the effective fight against cybercrime requires increased, rapid, functional cooperation from a criminal point of view, and this must be borne in mind by the countries of our region if they want to have success in cybercrime.

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[10] *Svetlana Nikolovska, "Methodology of Computer Crime Research" Van Gogh, Skopje, 2014,*

Believing in the need to build as a matter of priority a common criminal policy aimed at protecting society from cybercrime, inter alia, through the adoption of appropriate legislation and fostering international cooperation, aware of the fundamental changes occurring with the digitalization, convergence and continuous globalization of computer networks, we are convinced that this Convention is necessary to deter acts against the secrecy, integrity and availability of computer systems and networks, and computer data, as well as against the misuse of such systems, networks and data by criminalizing the actions described in this Convention and by introducing powers necessary to effectively combat such crimes, by enabling their detection, investigation and prosecution at national and international level, and by providing arrangements for prompt and secure international co-operation.

The objectives of the Convention are the harmonization of domestic substantive provisions relating to cybercrime, the provision of domestic procedural law necessary for the investigation and prosecution of perpetrators of cybercrime, and crimes committed using computer technology.

Article 35 of the Convention on Cybercrime is the contact point 24/7, which requires each signatory to designate a place of contact that will be available 24 hours a day, seven days a week, in order to conduct investigative and other proceedings. Actions related to criminal offenses related to computer systems and data, or for the purpose of gathering evidence in electronic form for a specific criminal offense. The duty center 24/7 has been functioning in the Republic of Macedonia since 2008.

Additional protocol to the convention on computer crime for incrimination of racist and xenophobic actions by using IT systems

The Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime for the Incrimination of Racist and Xenophobic Offenses by means of an Information System was adopted by the Council of Europe on 28 January 2003.

The Republic of Macedonia has adopted a special Law on Ratification of the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Cybercrime for the Incrimination of Racist and Xenophobic Acts through an Information System which entered into force on 13 July 2005.

Considering that the aim of the Council of Europe is to achieve greater unity among its members, recalling that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights, convinced that acts of a racist and xenophobic nature constitute a violation of human rights and a threat to the rule of law state and democratic stability, believing that national and international law should provide an adequate legal response to racist and xenophobic propaganda spread through an information system, aware that information systems offer an unprecedented form of facilitating freedom of expression and communication in all over the world, and therefore this Additional Protocol has been adopted and ratified.

The purpose of this protocol is to complete the pages of the protocol, the provisions of the Convention on Cybercrime with regard to the incrimination of acts of a racist and xenophobic nature through information systems.

"Racist and xenophobic material" means any material in writing, any image, or other representation of ideas, or theories that recommend or encourage hatred, discrimination, or violence against a person or group of persons based on race; color, origin or national and ethnicity, or religion, if the latter serves as an excuse for one or another of these elements, or which incites such acts.

Of particular importance in the field of Cybercrime is the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime with Additional Protocols, Palermo 2000.

The Palermo Convention represents a significant step forward in defining global crime,

defining transnational organized crime, and determining the changes that states need to make in their criminal law in order to effectively combat organized crime.

The connection between transnational organized crime and cybercrime is the use of modern technology that is more modern with each passing day, in committing crimes, in hiring people capable of working with computers, especially money laundering, i.e. in the use of high technology to cover the tracks and money from illegal businesses (drugs, arms smuggling, etc.) to be converted into legal businesses and used in this respect.

This Convention requires States Parties to establish national bodies so as to oversee financial institutions subject to money laundering, and to provide anti-money laundering authorities with the opportunity to cooperate in the exchange of information both nationally and internationally.[11]

Conclusion

The risks of cybercrime are too real and too daunting to ignore. Every person or business owner must face their vulnerability and do something about it. Every company must conduct an analysis of their computer security, have a well-designed internet policy, including crisis management or a computer attack in the worst case scenario.

The Internet offers many opportunities for criminals, but information is the best method of protection. You need more than luck to succeed in affiliate business. It is necessary to know the specific measures that should be taken in case of a computer incident, in order to preserve electronic evidence that will help investigators to obtain the necessary information to shed light on a computer incident.

Successful fight against cybercrime requires effective cooperation between the public and private sectors. Given the fact that criminals use a coordinated approach and share information and have cross-border interaction, investigators need to cooperate at multiple levels internationally, and this will help to overcome the challenges arising from legal jurisdiction, various laws and the like.

Before taking the investigative actions and the information becomes available to the investigators, it is necessary for the investigators to exchange information with their colleagues through international institutions, because only in this way, with the rapid exchange of information that will certainly have a legal framework, can preventive action be taken to prevent or detect criminal acts, especially crimes in the field of cybercrime, for which we know that the collection of evidence is a great challenge, primarily because the evidence is usually in electronic form and in order not to be lost, this evidence is required to be frozen, until a formal request is made by the competent public prosecutor or a court in the country conducting the investigation.

The computer elements are becoming visible in every type of crime, and many criminal activities are facilitated by the information technology and the tools offered by technology, and that is why it is necessary to increase the capacity of investigators working on this issue, and to have constant development and advancement of their knowledge, following the novelties, all in order to be up to date with the new ways of committing crimes.

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PUBLIC AFFAIRS IN THE ARMED FORCES

Tomica RISTOSKI[1]

Abstract: *In the Information Age, assisted with the omnipresence of the media, an adversary will welcome any information about the daily issues and activities within the friendly force. Composition and disposition of units, equipment and materiel condition and availability, interpersonal relationships in units, and the general state of morale of the units is often highly-priced and sought-after information by the adversaries in the era of great-power competition. Keeping the information release authority at the strategic level will ensure separation and distinction between the public affairs and the Military Information Support Operations (MISO), while at the same time keeping them organizationally and physically separate.*
This paper will focus on the reservations of the role of the public affairs as an "operational function", stating that too much effort in that field by the military professionals will lead them astray and will defocus them from the conduct of the military operations.
The conclusion will demonstrate that the importance of the public affairs should not overshadow the sole purpose of the armed forces, which should be the completion of the policy's goals by military means.

Keywords: *public affairs, military professionals, armed forces, operation.*

Introduction

In a parliamentary debate in 1787, in the House of Commons of Great Britain, Edmund Burke, for the first time defined the fourth estate as represented by the press and news media both in explicit capacity of advocacy and implicit ability to frame political issues (Schultz, 1998: 49). As times are ever changing and because the information technology is ubiquitous and interconnected by the Internet, the rise of the fifth estate came about (Dutton, 2009: 1-15). In this day and age every military professional, especially those practicing their profession at operational or strategic level, must be aware of the circumstances in which they are operating and of the factors that are influencing the outcomes of their actions, or inactions. Military operations, across the world, are becoming increasingly joint and combined. The multilateral and the multinational character of the current operations require ever increasing sensitivity on the part of the operational commanders on handling the interconnected web of mass and mainframe-media and the Internet with the social media as a relatively new, but with developed and potent influence in the sphere of the related findings, but most importantly, we place special attention to women's political participation and women's interest in politics.

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strategic communication and public affairs. As the current United States Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, John Kirby says: "commander's objective may be distorted over the air waves, policy goals and public opinion may shift underneath him as a result of a single report, and an enemy behavior may take a turn for the worse" (Kirby, 2000-11). Therefore, it is becoming compulsory requirement for the public affairs, as a part of the strategic communications, to be applied as early as possible in the military operations' planning process. Those efforts should be aimed towards diminishing the negative effects of the media's growing power and its influence over the military operations, and in the same time, harnessing that same power and influence in order to reinforce and solidify the efforts conducted by military means. The armed forces, within multinational operations, need to communicate goals clearly and simply enough so that those goals will be received by each and every partner and across all echelons within their respective armed forces. The commanders should be able to identify and envision the ways and means that are to be used to achieve the set goals. Consequently, public affairs in the armed forces should maintain their supportive role, or be a supporting effort, an enabler for the armed forces to receive a clear and concise task to perform a military operation by using military means. The public affairs should be aggressively used during peacetime to be able to deter the hostilities, but as soon as the hostilities start they should be aimed towards communicating the commanders' intent and fostering domestic support.

Main Part

In the armed forces there is clear distinction between the public affairs and the rest of the operations in the information environment. The public affairs are concentrated on making news and information freely available to the media, the general public, and to the internal and external audiences. In the process of delivery of the information, the armed forces, by default, should retain the right to apply all legal requirements for exemption of sensitive and classified information from distribution. The obligation to communicate to the general public, through the media, should always be perceived through the lens of the inability to discern between the friend and foes with the audience.

Employing the armed forces to achieve a policy goal should be the nation's last and ultimate tool. The public affairs should support a military operation with a narrative, increasing the deterrence role of the armed forces. Today, the "limited conflicts" and the military operations other than war (MOOTW) are taking precedence over the conventional military operations. Subsequently, the role of the public affairs becomes increasingly important.

At the highest, strategical, political and military decision making level, there are several examples that are illustrating the influence of the public affairs on the concerned decision makers. In the mid-1990s, the media were covering the civil wars in Rwanda and in Bosnia and Herzegovina. With more persistent coverage of the events that were unfolding during the civil wars in the breakup of Yugoslavia, the media put enormous pressure on President Clinton's administration to engage and employ the US military, diplomatic and economic might in order to stop the suffering of the civilian population in the war-torn regions on the Balkan Peninsula. At the same time, a similar, if not bigger, disaster was enveloping in Rwanda, but the constant coverage of the Balkans, in a way, forced President Clinton's administration to act on the situation in Bosnia, but not to act on the situation in Rwanda (Livingston, 1997). If media coverage of crises and conflicts has had such a profound effect on U.S. military operations and foreign policy in the past, the potential for similar effects today, and in the future, can only increase.

The influence of the media over the military operations, at the operational level, can be illustrated by the experience General Herbert Norman Schwarzkopf, the commander of United

States Central Command, and the commander of the coalition forces in the Gulf War, had in 1991. General Schwarzkopf was surprised to hear the news reports of the 82nd Airborne Division massing some 200 miles west of Kuwait, clearly undermining his deception efforts to place the 82nd Airborne Division in Kuwait (Livingston, 1997). Fortunately for General Schwarzkopf, the Iraqi intelligence apparatus, at that time, was too weak to pick up and use that information. Even though nobody can claim that the media seemed to deliberately expose details on the operation, the inadvertent disclosure could have caused irreversible damage to the Desert Storm operation and the outcome of the first Gulf War in general.

Perhaps, the most recent failure of the military public affairs at the strategic level is the unintelligible tweet made by U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), which read ";l;;gmlxzssaw." (Thalen, 2021) The subsequent removal of the status did not stop the Twitter users joking about how the USSTRATCOM was overtaken, or that the status was an actual launching code for the US nuclear arsenal. That event alone, put a dent in the USSTRATCOM's credibility and professionalism.

The military operations in the former Yugoslavia showed certain adaptation in the cooperation between the media and the armed forces. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 1995, the term "embedded press" was first used to describe a style of press procedures similar to those used in the days of World War II and Vietnam, although far more formal and planned (Paul and Kim, 2014). The cooperation was handled in a way that the reporters were being assigned to a specific unit, they were deployed with the unit and were living within the unit for the period of their assignment, which typically lasted for a month at a time.

In 1999, NATO's Operation Allied Force in Kosovo also used embedded reporters, although the system resulted in less media access than in the operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Paul and Kim, 2014). The first reason for the limited access of the media to the operation was that Allied Force represented exclusively an air campaign, making the news coverage and the embedding of reporters far more difficult in comparison with the ground operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Additionally, operation Allied Power, being an exclusive air campaign, made the process of "embedding" reporters far less effective because the reporters riding in aircraft could have gotten an insight on how the operation was organized and conducted, but they could not report on the actual effect from the bombing on the targets, the enemy and the civilians. During operation Allied Power some major concerns were raised about the safety and security of the pilots and the operational security in general. Kenneth Bacon, who was then the Unites States Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, in an interview with the journalist Jim Lehrer on the show "The NewsHour" stated: "I think the thing the public deserves most is a set of conditions that allows its military, its men and women in uniform, to succeed at what they do, and as I said, we have different operational security restraints today than we used to have. I also think that a sophisticated government, such as the military in Yugoslavia, is very good at analyzing information -- at figuring out what sorts of weapons we use on what sorts of targets; whether we think the weapons performed well or badly - and they take that information and use it to recalibrate their defenses. We see that happening. So we've just decided to give them as little information as possible. That does mean being more tight with information we give to the press, but we've done this purely for operational reasons." (Bacon, 1999)

This case is a good illustration of adjusting the access of the media to a military operation and tailoring it so suit the needs of operational security and the safety and security of the military professionals involved in the operation. Unfortunately, the limitation on the media access to the allied military infrastructure generated interest from the media to look for information from the Yugoslav central command. Slobodan Milosevič, then the President of Yugoslavia, made sure

to conceal the cases of "ethnic cleansing" in Kosovo and to promote information on, and grant access to reporters to the places where collateral damage, resulting from the allied bombing campaign, was reported. The graphic reports on the allied bombing of a refugee column near Djakovica in Kosovo, in April 1999 resulted with a backfire and proved to be almost catastrophic to NATO's moral authority and the credibility of the operation Allied Power as a whole.

Operation Allied Power was a very complex operation mainly because of the complicated targeting approval system that was established by NATO. General Wesley Clark, then the Superior Allied Commander Europe in NATO, had to obtain political and military consent form the North Atlantic Council before firing on the identified targets. The disinclination to generate any collateral damage only increased the complexity of the conduct of military operation for the military professionals. The cases of collateral damages in Yugoslavia, caused by NATO, made ample of opportunities for the Yugoslavian regime to damage the operation's legitimacy and spread misinformation through the media (Hess, 1999). This is best illustrated by the words of the allied forces commander during the Allied Force operation, Admiral James Ellis: "The enemy was much better at this than we were… and far more nimble. The enemy deliberately and criminally killed innocents by the thousands, but no one saw it… We accidentally killed innocents, sometimes by the dozens, and the world watched it on the evening news… Unintended damage near the targets created sanctuaries and opportunities for the adversary which were successfully exploited" (Pounder, 2000).

NATO's experience in Kosovo showed the importance of limiting the media's access to sensitive and classified information in order to maintain the operational security. That limitation, on the other hand, provoked the media to look for information elsewhere thus compromising the quality of the gathered information and potentially causing an irreversible damage to the military operation.

Furthermore, the military professionals, which were conducting the operations, continued to carry the burden of determination on how to put in place a sufficient system for informing the public without compromising the operational security. At the same time, the military professionals had to bear in mind the damage the enemy could cause with the unopposed spread of misinformation.

The case study of the operation Allied Force portraits the pressure that a military professional, that has a leading role in a certain military operation, will have to bare while conducting the said operation. The added duties that given commanders should perform by giving briefings to the media, coupled with their personal profiles and presence on the Internet only put additional pressure on them and their subordinates in the performance of their main duties which is warfighting. In the armed forces there is a clear distinction and a physical barrier between the public affairs and the Military Information Support Operations (MISO). The public affairs are set up to inform the public, truthfully and willingly, on the activities of the armed forces. The MISO, on the other hand, are set up to influence the behavior of the opponent on the battlefield by using information which may, or may not be true (Porche et al., 2013: 57-64). The utter complexity of having those two different lines of effort separated indicates that those duties should be well thought off and planned before the start of a given operation.

The experience gained in armed conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan reveal that the failure to recognize the influence of public affairs introduces risks in failing to win wars. Even if one of the sides in a conflict has distinctive advantage in conventional technology, equipment and training and has defeated every known conventional enemy on the field of battle, it does not guarantee winning the war in the information environment. Public opinion, both at home and abroad, is developed by the proper use of the public affairs. During the course of planning a

military operation a careful consideration has to be given to the proper usage of the public affairs in developing the narrative to support the operations and to stop the spread of misinformation. Gaining supremacy in operations in the information environment is accomplished by maintaining the armed forces' credibility through being first with the truth, being as transparent with information as possible based on operational security and classifications, and being consistent and confident in one's own narrative (Boylan, 2015).

Conclusion

The expansion of the conventional warfare into the media-sphere represents a conceptual break with orthodox modes of conflict, but in vital respects there is continuity with the ancient logic of war (Knopf and Ziegelmeyer, 2016). In this media-based contest, the task involves control of the master narrative, convincing skeptical and often hostile audiences that military power will not be restrained but used judiciously for the greater good of increasing the consequences of the armed forces' interactions with industry and academia.

The following statement from General Colin Powell embodies the importance of public affairs in military operations: "Once you've got all the forces moving and everything's being taken care of by the commanders, turn your attention to television because you can win the battle or lose the war if you don't handle the story right." (Baker, 1991: 59-65) It clearly stresses the need for the strategic policymakers and military leaders to actively engage in public affairs to achieve the desired strategic end-state. But all of that engagement should be done after the force is set up and "everything's being taken care of." When engaging in public affairs, the focus should be placed on what the armed forces' (and its government) is doing, as opposed to what the media is propagating. As long as the armed forces are conducting itself professionally and within the strategic boundaries provided by its government's policies, the impact of the media and the public affairs on the operations and the armed forces will remain limited.

The public affairs should provide the narrative for a given operation because the military means to achieve a political goal should be the ultimate tool. The limitation and "exclusivity" of the military power should only add to the importance of its use as a national instrument of power. That will only increase the deterrence role of the armed forces. The terms such as "limited conflicts" and "wining the hearts and minds" of the enemies are more frequently used now than before. The armed forces should minimize its activities and presence in the field of public affairs, both on social media and in mainstream media. Those engagements should be centralized and strictly controlled to serve the purpose of informing the public. Military leaders should continue to use their prerogative to control the content of the information they release to prevent the spread of classified information and to protect the military leaders and the operations they lead from the influence of the media. At the same time, the public affairs should be coordinated at a strategic level to preserve the unity of effort and safeguard the reputation of the armed forces.

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LEFT	4 cm (inch)	LEFT	1.58"
RIGHT	4 cm	RIGHT	1.58"
		GUTTER	0"

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