Marija Todorovska

2-537:59
Preliminary communication/Прелиминарно соопштение

THE SCAPEGOAT: RITUAL, MECHANISM, SIGNIFICANCE

Key words: scapegoat, ritual, expiation, mimetic, sacrifice

We need a safe, ordered, familiar world in which to live and prosper; we try to keep chaos at bay. We make up rules, we establish values, and we try to function as well as possible within the parameters of our reality. When our world is threatened, we respond. The question is, who do we sacrifice in order to (re)achieve order and serenity? The scapegoat serves to be blamed for the sins, guilt, malice, misfortune of the collective, to take all that evil onto itself and away from the others, and is a concept that has persisted and transformed through the ages. The scapegoat is a sin-eater, a fall-person, victim of the harshness of the ideal of the greatest happiness for the greatest number at any cost. In Utopian ideas explored in literary fiction and other forms of art, a victim, a scapegoat, is needed 'to feed' the future bliss of the community.[1]

In the Old Testament, two goats are given from the community to the priest as a purification sacrifice.[2] The priest throws lots over the goats, determining one for God, and destining one for Azazel (the demon from the desert),[3] the former is sacrificed in a

[1] This also brings to mind situations of exploitation and forms of mistreatment of certain groups whose sole purpose in life is said to be to keep the more fortunate well and happy. While this is a serious issue of justice and morality, the scapegoats are victims chosen and greatly outnumbered, so scenarios of unjust class stratification and crimes against human rights and dignities do not apply.
This is an article resulting from a conference on the Bible and literature (MASA, Skopje, April 2017), so the example from the *Pentateuch* and the points of sacrifice in René Girard's mimetic theory will be used to illustrate the significance of the scapegoat, with only a hint of the concept in literature (Fyodor Dostoevsky and Ursula Le Guin).

[2] The verse is from Lev 16:8 - And Aaron shall cast lots upon the two goats: one lot for the Lord, and the other lot for Azazel.

[3] Nobody knows who Azazel is, and evidently this is utterly unimportant, mentions Walter Burkert (Burkert, 1979: 64). This is true, and the most associated "character" is Azael/Asa(s)el from the *Ethiopic* (or *First*) *Book of Enoch*. In one account of the story, the Watcher (Watchers being identified with 'fallen angels') Asael (or Azazel) teaches men how to create weapons (which facilitates war-waging), and gives women make-up (artificial beautifying and the use of adornment enhances lust).

normal, yet intricate purifying blood ritual, the latter is placed alive in front of the temple/altar, where the priest transfers, through touch and utterance, the confessions of sins of Israel (the sins of the collective) on the goat's head, which is then lead to the desert and left there.[4] Several features of the scapegoat distinguish it from other sacrificial victims. The goat chosen for this purpose was not to be sacrificed (made holy) on the altar to God, but was to be delivered, still alive, to the demon Azazel. Because of the weight of collective guilt, the scapegoat was considered accursed or unholy, which meant that sacrifice on the altar was too good for it. Except, its significance, and with that, its ambivalence, are to be found exactly in the expiatory function of taking away sins and guilt, the role it plays in re-establishing order, and the fact that it becomes the saviour of the group's world as they know it. The ritual of the scapegoat, especially the sacrificing of one goat that is fit to be blessed, made holy, and presented to (a merciful?) God, and one that is "cursed", and to be banished and abandoned in the hostile and unknown realm of the demon, shows levels of ambivalence and transition. Both God and Azazel have a sense a duality about them – God is believed to exhibit some traces of primal (almost demonic) anger, while the demon, as ungodly as he is, still has to be appeased with sacrificial offerings, which are usually presented to God.

In *The Golden Bough*, James Frazer gives an impressive collection of examples of variations of the scapegoat, analysing the transference of evil to inanimate objects, to animals, to men, under the assumption that 'primitive men' misapprehended the distinction between actual actions in the physical world and cognitive processes and facts of the psyche, thus believing that concepts of loading physical burdens/impurities can be transposed to the mental

[(4QEnoch *b Col.* II **(**= 1 *Enoch* 5 : 9 - 6 : 4 + 6 : 7 - 8 : 1), 26-29)] (Garcia Martinez, 1996). On Azazel in *Leviticus* see Carmichael, 2006: 49-51.

[4] The *Book of Leviticus* (16: 5-10, 20-22) describes the ceremonies of choosing the scapegoat by lot, of discharging "all the sins of the Children of Israel" upon its head and of escorting it amid shouts and curses into the desert. Some traditions (Mishna, for example) involve a crimson thread around the goat's horns, and hurling the goat down a precipice. For an earlier version of the ritual see, for example, "The Origin of the Biblical Scapegoat Ritual: The Evidence of Two Eblaite Texts" by Ida Zatelli. P. D. Wright thinks, as Calum Carmichael lists, that Azazel does not appear to be an angry deity who needs to be appeased, nor a desert demon who is the custodian of evil, it is virtually without a function, though it must originally have enjoyed one comparable to the role assigned to Near Eastern deities and demons (Carmichael, 2000: 167-168). According to Carmichael, it is the Levitical lawgiver who, to concentrate on the origin of the scapegoat ritual, was responsible for its construction. Bringing to bear on these issues his own ethical and legal thinking, the anonymous lawgiver proceeded to invent his nation's ancient laws (Carmichael, 2000:168-169). The Assyro-babylonian scapegoat can be found in unilingual inscriptions K. 138 and K. 3232 that contained allusions to a ceremony similar to that of the Hebrew scapegoat mentioned in Lev. 16, which John Dyneley Prince finds plausible, while Fossey does not, claiming that the animal which is taken to be a scapegoat in these inscriptions was not an animal at all - see the dispute in Prince, 1903: 135-156.

Not all expiatory sacrifices are examples of the scapegoat ritual, as it shall be illustrated later, nor all human sacrifices are examples of expiation. The much-explored story of the "sacrifice" of Isaac (Gen 22: 13) is not a scapegoat example. However, on more general terms, in the part when the providential appearance of the ram averted the slaughter of the son by Abraham, Roger De Verteuil finds an eloquent testimony to the transition in human history from human to animal sacrifice (De Verteuil, 1966: 211).

and psychological realm of delivering from sins and evils by loading them onto a chosen victim. Frazer shows this through the public expulsion of evils; the idea of the omnipresence of demons, and the mechanisms of occasional and periodic expulsion of evils; the concepts of public scapegoats through the expulsion of embodied evils; the occasional and periodic expulsion of evils in a material vehicle; and human scapegoats in classical antiquity (Frazer, 2009: 1260-1371). Apart from an animal, Frazer carefully lists examples, the scapegoat upon whom the sins of the people are periodically laid, may be a human being (1331), a divine animal (1334), or it even may be a divine man (1335). The overview of the custom of publicly expelling the accumulated evils of a community suggests a few general observations, summarises Frazer. He remarks that what he has split into categories of the immediate and the mediate expulsions of evil are identical in intention; that whether the evils are conceived as invisible or as embodied in a material form, it is a circumstance entirely subordinate to the main object of the ceremony, which is simply to effect a total clearance of all the ills that have been infesting a collective.[5] A second important point is that in periodical expulsions of evil, the time of the year when the ceremony is played out usually coincides with some well-marked change of season (beginning or end of winter in the arctic and temperate zones, beginning or end of the rains in the tropics), which causes the increased mortality in people susceptible to the discrepancies in temperature, and which is by them seen as the result of the agency of demons, who must be expelled; but, whatever season of the year it is, the general expulsion of (d)evils commonly marks the beginning of the new year, unburdened by the past troubles, and solemnly liberated of evil spirits and nefarious agents and guilt (1344). A third point is that the public and periodic expulsion of devils is commonly preceded or followed by a period of general license, during which the ordinary restraints of society are cast aside, and all offences, short of the gravest, are allowed to pass unpunished.[6] Finally, consistent with his adherence to the ritualistic theory of the sacrifice of the sacred king, he places special notice on the employment of a divine man or animal as a scapegoat – a custom of banishing evils only in so far as these evils are believed to be transferred to a god who is afterwards slain. The custom may be much more widely diffused than what is apparent from the examples Frazer has given, he remarks, for the custom of killing a god (what many ritualists consider as the proto or urritual) dates from so early a period of human history, that in later ages, even when it continues to be practised, it is liable to misinterpretation: in time, the divine character of the animal or man is forgotten, and he comes to be regarded merely as an ordinary vic-

[5] If any link were wanting to connect the two kinds of expulsion, he explains, it would be furnished by the practice of sending the evils away in a litter or a boat - invisible and intangible evils on a visible and tangible vehicle to convey them away. A scapegoat is nothing more than such a vehicle (1343).

[6] This extraordinary relaxation of all ordinary rules of conduct on such occasions is to be explained by the general clearance of evils which precedes or follows it, which makes sense, as men feel more free to pursue their passions when a general riddance of evil and absolution from all sin is in immediate prospect, trusting that the coming ceremony will remedy any consequences of bad behaviour, and also because when the ceremony has just taken place, men's minds are freed from the oppressive atmosphere filled with (d)evils (1345).

tim (1346).[7] The goat serves to transfer the 'plague' from one's own side to the other. Azazel stands for this 'other' side in opposition to God and his people, as the desert is the opposite of man's fertile fields, *érga anthropon*, as the Greeks say, explains Burkert.[8] The evil transferred in *Leviticus* is sin, instead of the more concrete dangers of battle or actual contagion in the other instances. The Greek equivalent of the scapegoat, as it is widely known, is the *pharmakôs*. In sixth century Colophon, an especially repugnant person was chosen as pharmakôs, fed a meal, and whipped and chased away from the town.[9] It is important that this was undoubtedly a process of purification – of katharsis, the scapegoat called 'offscourings', peripsema, katharma. *Pharmakos*, though obviously related to pharmakon (medicine, drug), is more complex to grasp, especially since pharmakon has an ambivalent meaning of a healing drug and of poison, but this just enhances the meaning of ambivalence, the pharmakos ritual being equivalent to a king's tragedy (a theme explored in both Girard and Burkert). In the chapter on the transformations of the scapegoat in *Structure and History in Greek Mythology and Ritual*, Burkert offers an attempt at tracing variations of self-sacrifice in situations of hostility (battle or strategic planning), in Hittite, Greek and Roman rituals and myths, finding that the common pattern is a familiar one – that of the scapegoat, an Old Testament ritual, one of Yom Kippur, the Day of

[7] Some scholars, notices Burkert, have believed that the practice of eliminating evils through the banishment of a scapegoat has more to it than just purifying ends. Wilhelm Mannhardt, for example, put forward the thesis that the scapegoat is 'originally' the vegetation spirit, which must be beaten and chased away, killed even, in order to be reborn. This, takes issue Burkert, is an impressive myth, but more "in the sense of a tale pattern transferred to furnish an explanation without being analyzed in itself"; without admitting it, it exploits the mystery of sacrifice, the Christian idea of death and resurrection (Burkert, 1979: 68). Frazer advanced the more realistic suggestion that 'originally' it was the king with his magical powers to control fertility or, more specifically, a king installed yearly to impersonate the vegetation spirit, who had to be chased or killed lest his strength should wane (this is, again, the ritualist conjecture), he believes. However, Burkert finds that it is more difficult to account for the situation of war and enemies on the Frazerian model, apart from the problem of how old and wide-spread the institution of 'magical kingship' really was; and in more than one instance there seemed to be a choice as to who the victim was supposed to be. Burkert thinks that the authentic Babylonian and Hittite evidence for a 'substitute king' definitely ruins the Mannhardt-Frazer hypothesis: it is not a seasonal New Year festival to which this ritual belongs, but rather a special procedure, seldom performed, to save the king from evil portended by omens, who retired for a while, having his fate taken by a substitute (68-69). Gradually, the meaning of these rituals is becoming clearer, is hopeful Jan Bremmer: where earlier generations, still influenced by Mannhardt, often detected traces of a fertility ritual in the scapegoat complex, Burkert has rightly pointed out, he believes, that in these rituals the community sacrifices one of its members to save its own skin. (Bremmer, 1983: 300). For the status (someone from the margins of the society), the ambivalence (both a foe and a saviour) and the significance of the scapegoat in ancient Greek ritual see 303-307.

[8] Elaborating on concepts by Karl Meuli (who noticed similarities between Greek sacrificial practices and customs of some hunting and herding societies, Burkert 1983: 12-13 and onward) and Konrad Lorenz (see the links between ritual as essentially religious and ritual in animal behaviour in biology, 23-29), Burkert links ritual killing to the origins of the hunt, suggesting that it is an exteriorisation of tension through the collective process, released and symbolised in the subsequent religious sacrifice. Religion is the product of the killing, which is then transformed into life through the ritual consummation of the victim (juxtaposed are the chaos of the killing and the meticulous order of the feast).

[9] See variations of the ritual in Burkert, 1979: 64-66.

Atonement. Burkert identifies a clear pattern to the ritual: although the occasions which set it off differ (like hunger, pestilence, or war, or regular cleansing at yearly or greater intervals), what they have in common is a situation of anxiety. The sequence of actions goes as follows. First there is a selection on account of some quite ambivalent distinction (a most repulsive individual, a king, a woman as an object of desire, but still less valuable than a man, or an animal); then there are the rites of communication, especially offering food, and adornment or investiture; followed by the solemn rites of contact and separation to establish the polar opposition between those who are active and safe on the one side, and the passive victim on the other. The scapegoat is chased across the frontiers of the dwelling of the community, and the unquestioned effect of the procedure is salvation from evil and anxiety, which disappear with the doomed victim (67).[10]

Girard lists three meanings to be carefully distinguished in discussing the scapegoat concept, a biblical, an anthropological and a psychosocial (Girard, 1987: 73-74). In the biblical meaning, in the Mosaic ritual of the Day of Atonement (from Lev 16) the scapegoat is the goat sent alive into the wilderness, with the sins of the people symbolically laid upon it (the other being sacrificed to God). The word, reminds us Girard, was first invented by William Tindale to render the *caper emissarius* of the *Vulgate*, itself a mistranslation of the original Hebrew specifying that the goat is "destined to Azazel", who is the demon of the wilderness, an error that Girard dismisses as relatively unimportant for the interpretation of the ritual, since "Scapegoat" is as good a term as any other to designate, in the Leviticus ritual, the first of the two goats and the function it is called on to perform. Before and in the eighteenth century analogies were perceived between the Leviticus ritual and others, and in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Frazer and others freely utilized the term "scapegoat" in connection with a large number of rituals, which, they felt, were based on the belief that "guilt" or "sufferings" could be transferred from some community to a ritually designated victim, often an animal but sometimes a human being (like the Greek pharmakos).[11]

[10] It is interesting how Burkert applies, what he calls, a nearly perfect Lévi-Straussian formula, the scapegoat being the mediator who brings about the reversal from common danger to common salvation: the situation 'community endangered' versus 'individual distinguished' is turned into 'individual doomed' versus 'community saved', illustrated by fx(a):fy(b)->fx2(b):fx-1(a), with the caveat that he still does not find such a representation particularly illuminating, as the relations of the terms do not throw light on the basic mystery, the force which brings the change, the reversal from anxiety to anxiety dispelled. In legend, this is explained by an oracular prediction, or as the wrath of gods to be appeased, but these are not acceptable explanations as to how the mechanism really works, he adds, especially since the common answer is that the procedure is magical, which could mean irrational and thus, unexplainable (Burkert, 1979: 67-68). He then tries to set up some principle of archaic mentality to deduce the custom, one of transfer, and one of elimination, but the confusing element here is the use of an animal for ritual 'carrying away' of evil, instead of a sponge or washrag and water for cleansing, in which case no animals would be harmed. For the use of an animal or a man one would have to introduce at least a third 'principle', one about the importance of 'soul' or 'life', suggests Burkert, a principle of sacrifice; which is neither practical nor 'primitive'.

[11] For many years, remarks Girard, the notion of scapegoat remained popular with a number of anthropologists who took for granted the existence of a distinctive category or subcategory of rituals they treated as scapegoat rituals, but later, most

For Girard violence is at the heart of the sacred. People, he takes as the core of his mimetic theory, are lead by a desire for something either possessed by someone else, or coveted by someone else, a mimetic desire. The triangluarity of this desire creates conflict, breeds violence. A central focus of his mimetic theory is the idea that desire is imitation-based: we desire the object others desire, but we also desire *how* they do it. Desires are distinct from basic physiological needs and appetites, which, when met (or even just before) open the path for desires to appear. Man desires that which someone else possess, he desires being. The desires of others mediate and form ours, and vice-versa, they are contagious. The triangularity of desire as mimetic means that it is not a straightforward subject-object relation, but a triangle between subject and object through a mediator

researchers have felt that no such category can be isolated and defined with any accuracy, which is why most anthropologists avoid the systematic use of the term, and the word has suffered disrepute. The psychosocial meaning is evident in novels, conversations, newspaper articles, and so on, where the victim(s) of unjust violence or discrimination are called scapegoats, especially when they are blamed or punished not merely for the "sins" of others, but also for various tensions, conflicts, and difficulties (hence the "to scapegoat" and "scapegoating" in the English language). Scapegoating enables persecutors to elude problems that seem intractable, expands Girard, but it must not be regarded as a conscious activity, based on a conscious choice; it is not effective unless an element of delusion enters into it. The social dimension is always present, and the persecutors always outnumber the victims (Girard, 1983: 74-75). Scapegoating in this sense implies a process of displacement or transference that is reminiscent of Freud, and Girard reminds us that Frazer used the term in connection with scapegoating decades before Freud. Unfortunately, however, he defined it in a completely misguided fashion, feels Girard, one that empties it of its universal significance, even though (or perhaps because) it is curiously prophetic of the method advocated by linguistic structuralism: the notion that we can transfer our guilt and sufferings to some other being who will bear them for us arises from a very obvious confusion between the physical and the mental, between the material and the immaterial. The scapegoat illusion of Frazer is predicated on a simplistic confusion between word and thing. The "rude savages", according to Frazer, would wrongfully extend to the spiritual realm the physical significance of such words as 'carry', 'load', 'burden'. The implication, however, is that a correct understanding of these words is enough to rid us of the scapegoat practices, so, if we accept Frazer's definition, continues Girard, we will assume, as he does, in a conclusion of his linguistic suppositions, that modern men are immune to scapegoating in any form. Frazer's simplistic interpretation of scapegoat rituals merely confirmed his cultural prejudices against primitive societies and his concomitant belief in the absolute superiority of modern civilization, underlines Girard. *The Golden Bough* offers no real understanding of "scapegoating" in the modern and popular usage, even though that usage antedates Frazer by several centuries, which could lead us to believe that Frazer was either unaware of any propensities to psychosocial scapegoating around him, or that he was aware, but firmly believed in his linguistic-confusion theory of the scapegoat, which protected him from all subversive speculation concerning the possible similarities between "savage" scapegoating and "civilised" scapegoating.

On a side-note, it is important to keep in mind, warns Wolfgang Palaver, that although Girard makes use of concepts central to psychoanalysis, his insistence on the unconscious nature of the victimage mechanism is not a concession to any psychology of "the unconscious". He strictly rejects any notion that unconscious incestuous or patricidal drives influence human behavior, as well as the conception of any self-contained individual or collective unconscious. The unconscious processes to which Girard refers concern, on the individual level, the misapprehension of the mimetic nature of desire and, on the collective level, the religious disguising of these interpersonal processes. His concepts of misapprehension, ignorance, and unconsciousness must, therefore, not be understood in connection with psychoanalysis; they find their earliest expression in the New Testament, where Jesus asks that his persecutors be forgiven "for they know not what they do" (Luke 23:24), Palaver, 2013: 152-153.

which renders the object desirable. The concept of the scapegoat serves to appease the built-up violence, to reconcile the parties involved. The removal of this creature from the community solves the problems, before the cycle begins again. The scapegoat, in many forms present in different communities and cultures, serves for psychological appeasement; it brings relief to the group riddled by conflict. The mimetic conflict, which develops because of the desire to possess certain things is contagious and escalates to full-blown violence. The desire to possess that which is desired by another develops not because of the thing (object, quality), but because of the threat by the other.[12] This object is, therefore, neglected, and the mimetic conflict turns into general antagonism. The mechanism gets complicated: the antagonists do not mimic the desires of the other, but the antagonism – from the wish to own the same thing we arrive to the wish to destroy a common enemy. The idea is that a surge of violence would focus on a (random) victim, a 'culprit', towards which a mimetically intensifying antipathy is felt by the concerned parties. The elimination of this victim diminishes the desire for violence, and in the group which suffered conflict, now appeasement appears. The victim is to blame for the conflict, and to praise for the restored peace. The ambivalence and the significance of the victim render it sacred. Beginning with the books *Deceit, Desire, and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure* and *Resurrection from the Underground: Feodor Dostoevsky* Girard developed a theory of desire based around the idea of "mimesis" (imitation).[13] The function of sacrifice, insists Girard, is to appease violence and prevent the escalation of conflicts (Girard, 1972: 30). In *Deceit, Desire, and the Novel*, Girard explains that the origins of his theory of mimetic desire can be located in a number of novels (he analyses Stendhal, Cervantes, Flaubert, Proust and Dostoevsky), in the imitative nature of desire (Don Quixote desires to perfectly imitate the legendary knight Amadis de Gaul, while Sancho Panza, the side-kick, is prompted by it to govern his own island, which is a case of externally mediated desire - the mediator is distanced from the subject in an ontological and chronological way in the sense that rivalry between the subject and the mediator is not an option), as opposed to an internal mediation, which is a case of coincidence of desire, creating conflict (Monsieur de Renal in *The Red and the Black* decides to hire the tutor Julien Sorel on the basis that he believes that his rival, Monsieur Valenod, is planning to do the same, which proves to be false, until the latter learns of the

[12] A prohibition that is absurd in appearance, practiced in numerous societies, is the prohibition of imitative conduct: one must abstain from copying the gestures of a member of the group, or repeating their words. The imitation reduplicates the imitated object, it engenders a simulacrum that could bring it magical powers (this is why imitative, or mimetic magic is something to be protected against in such cultures), Girard, 1978: 19.

[13] *Des* choses cachées depuis la fondation du monde (*Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World)* has Aristotle's stance on human imitation for a motto – man differs from animals in that he is very apt at imitation (from *Poetics* 1448b, 4–10). Girard goes with "mimesis" instead, because imitation implies an intentional conscious effort, rather than something just below the point of awareness, and because 'mimesis' has conflictual valences that the word "imitation" does not bear out (Fleming, 2014: 11). Humans learn through imitation (see the many examples supporting this from medical sciences in Fleming) and thus form their cultures. If they were to stop imitating, believes Girard, all forms of culture would vanish (Girard, 1978: 15).

former plans and decides to actually act on the idea). The internally mediated desire means that rivalry ensures a way to obsession and increased imitation of the other – the antagonists transform into doubles of each-other and become more interested in the characteristics and actions they are imitating than in the object of desire. The vain attempts at distinguishing oneself in order to acquire the object of desire lead to a further elimination of differences. The intensifying conflict of the rivalry is a sacrificial crisis, a potential avalanche of cultural disorder. In the sacrificial crisis, desire does not have an object other than desire, so in one way or another, violence is always mixed with desire (see Girard, 1972: 202-203). It is a crisis of distinctions, which obliterates the lines between subjects and social constructs (hierarchies). Since society cannot persist in a spiral of destructive violence and disorder, the peak of conflict brings a point where violence itself is the group's answer to the escalating conflict – an ordered act of violence serves to resolve violence on a general level. When the attentions of the conflicted collective focus on some chosen figure which stands as cause for the trouble, the violence is directed towards the blame of this scapegoat, and the group is united in expressing this violence. The scapegoat mechanism[14] means that internal conflict originated and induced in conflictual (antagonistic) desire is resolved through the elimination of the chosen victim. This surrogate victim,[15] surrogate sin-eater, absorbs the blows of violence, it is the centre of blame and hostility – when banished, peace is restored. Rivalry is purely mimetic, with the sacrificial crisis which uniforms the participants in the same conflictual desire, it transforms everyone into twins of their own violence (see the story of Romulus and Remus taken as exemplary in Girard, 1982: 78).[16] The scapegoat mechanism legitimises, sacralises a certain social or cultural configuration. Through the sacrificial repetition of the scapegoating ritual, peace is ensured within religious practices. When discussing Gregory Bateson's double-bind concept, in connection to his

[14] It is generally acknowledged that literary theorist Kenneth Burke first coined and described the expression "scapegoat mechanism" in his books *Permanence and Change* (1935) and *A Grammar of Motives* (1945).

[15] Fleming finds that it is not too self-evident why and in what sense the phrase 'surrogate victimage' should be called 'mechanism' in Girard's hypotheses. It is properly described as a mechanism insofar as the mob's polarisation against the victim operates in a non-volitional, automatic way. So surrogate victimage is not part of any explicit or tacit 'social contract' (however amoral), consciously entered into by social actors for the purposes of group cohesion. The fact that surrogate victimage operates unbeknown to its participants is not 'accidental' (in the Aristotelian sense of that term) – in the Girardian purview, its very operation requires miscomprehension, claims Fleming. To this clarification of surrogate victimage as a 'mechanism' a further specification of the latter term should perhaps be added, one that is integral to capturing one of the key epistemological features of Girard's theory itself: the notion of 'mechanism' well encapsulates the intended morphogenetic scope of the proposed explanation. Girard's hypothesis is morphogenetic in that it attempts to furnish a hypothetical account of the origin of cultural forms. This means that surrogate victimage is not an 'institution' (political, economic, or cultural) in any sociological or anthropological sense, but rather, according to Girard, concludes Fleming, it is temporally antecedent to these: it is a mechanism that functions first to dissolve institutions and then to generate them (Fleming, 2004: 53). On how it structures ritual and prohibition see 54-67.

[16] If acquisitive mimesis divides by leading two or more individuals to converge on the same object with a view of appropriating it, conflictual (antagonistic) mimesis will inevitably unify by leading two or more individuals to converge on one and the same adversary that all wish to strike down (Girard, 1978: 35).

views on the tragic in *Oedipus the King*, Girard agrees that if desire is allowed to follow its own bent, its mimetic nature will almost always lead it into a double bind. The non-channelled mimetic impulse throws itself blindly against the obstacle of a conflicting desire; it beckons its own rebuffs, which will then strengthen the mimetic inclination. This makes for a self-perpetuating process, constantly increasing in simplicity and in fervour. Whenever the subject (the disciple, as he calls it) borrows from his model what he believes to be the 'true" object, he tries to possess that truth by desiring precisely what this model desires; whenever closest to the supreme goal, a violent conflict with a rival ensues, and through a mental shortcut that is both eminently logical and self-defeating, he convinces himself that the violence itself is the most distinctive characteristic of the goal, which is why violence and desire will remain connected, and why the presence of violence will ineluctably provoke desire.[17] Violent opposition, expands Girard, is the signifier of ultimate desire, of divine self-sufficiency, of that 'beautiful totality' whose beauty depends on its being both inaccessible and impenetrable. The victim of this violence is ambivalent - both adores and detests it, striving to master it by means of a mimetic counter-violence and measuring his own stature in proportion to his failure. If by chance, however, he actually succeeds in asserting his mastery over the model, the latter's prestige is eliminated. However, it does not end here: he must turn to an even greater violence to search for an obstacle which promises to be truly insurmountable (Girard 1972: 206-208).

Girard tries to show, through a five-part typology, that a number of motifs appear in myths,[18] thus giving textual evidence as to the sacrificial crisis and surrogate victimage: disorder or undifferentiation; some transgression by an individual, who is thereby responsible for the situation of undifferentiation; stigmata or 'victimary signs' on the individual responsible for the disorder; description of the banishment or killing of the culprit; and the appeasement of conflict and the regeneration or return of order (Girard, 1978: 128). Girard suggests that the beginnings of myths often depict states of undifferentiation, along with the violence perpetrated against an innocent victim, which is consistent with his insistence on

[17] Desire, he reiterates, is attracted to violence triumphant and strives desperately to incarnate this 'irresistible' force. Desire clings to violence and stalks it like a shadow because violence is the signifier of the cherished being, the signifier of divinity (Girard, 1972: 211).

[18] Myths represent persecutions difficult to decode, as victims are depicted as monstrous, capable of exhibiting fantastic power; they are important because after sowing disorder, they re-establish order (often they are shown to become holy predecessors or fathers of gods). This, however, Girard believes, does not prevent from comparing persecutions in myths with actual historical examples of persecution. Due to the mechanisms in place, the victim is the cause of disorder, but at the same time the one to whom peace and order are ascribed, which makes it sacred. It also transforms the persecution into a point of religious and cultural departure. Girard identifies that the whole process serves as a model for mythology, in which it is saved and venerated as religious epiphany, and as a mode for ritual, forced to reproduce it on the principle that the experiences and actions of the victim, in that they were beneficial, should be repeated, as well as a counter-model for the forbidden, on the principle that if they were harmful, the actions of the same victim should never be repeated. Girard notes that there is nothing in mythico-ritual religions that does not unfold logically from the fact that the scapegoat mechanism functions on an order higher than in history (Girard, 1982: 50).

the mimetic antagonism and the sacrificial crisis that deletes significant cultural differentiations (Girard, 1982: 47). The presence of certain stigmata or 'victimary signs' on the 'culprit' is depicted through the mythical exploration of types of extraordinariness, be it physical afflictions, monstrosity, the absence of a single flaw in human heroic characters, or cases of god-like exceptionality (Girard, 1982: 49). The exceptionality of the depicted victims (often shown as amalgams of god, human and animal) goes along the lines of the obliteration of distinctions, and the distortions caused by the escalation of antagonist reciprocity (Girard, 1978: 130-132), which leads to a perceived identical conduct in the antagonists, and is confusing (Girard, 1982: 51). Myths give description of the victim banished or killed by the entire community acting as a whole, or one person acting as the whole community, which shows, according to Girard, that the act of scapegoating is the fruit of the mimetic polarisation triggered by the mimetic crisis (Girard, 1996: 119). Order is re-established thanks to the banishment of the culprit, and peace returns in the community, which renders the victims sacred; they are sacralised or venerated as saviours (Girard 1972: 375).[19]

In order for all the persecutors to be inspired by the same faith in the evil power of their victim, it should successfully polarise all the suspicions, tensions, and retaliations that poisoned the relationships. The community, as Girard puts it, must effectively be emptied of its poisons, it must feel liberated and reconciled within itself, return to a new order in the religious union of a community brought to life by its experience (Girard, 1982: 40) The scapegoat is the one person labelled responsible for everything, absolutely responsible. Because he is already responsible for the sickness, he is responsible for the cure. This seems as a paradox only for someone with a dualistic vision, too removed from the experience of a victim to feel the unity and too determined to differentiate precisely between good and evil, remarks Girard. Of course, the scapegoat cannot cure external and real misfortunes, like epidemics, droughts or floods, but the main dimension of every crisis is the way in which it affects human relations. A process of bad reciprocity initiates itself, it nourishes itself, has no need of external causes to sustain it, so as long as external causes exist (contagions, for example), scapegoats will have no efficacy. However, when no such causes are present, the first appeared scapegoat will bring an end to the crisis, serving as the one victim into which all evildoing, interpersonal repercussions and tensions are focused.[20]

In *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World*, Girard claims that characteristic for the Judeo-Christian scriptures, culminating in the crucifixion of Jesus, is the mechanism of scapegoating as itself progressively unveiled: the kingdom of God is about reconciliation of battling brothers, or ending the mimetic crisis by an universal renunciation of violence (Girard, 1978: 197). According to Girard,

[19] Fleming notes that by drawing links between ritual sacrifice, kingship, and surrogate victimage, Girard supplies an interesting solution to questions of the paradoxical nature of primitive divinities, simultaneously malevolent and benevolent (Fleming, 2004: 81).

[20] The scapegoat is only effective when human relations have broken down in crisis, but gives the impression of influencing external objective calamities, Girard, 1982: 41; see Girard 1978: 139-147 on the issue of persecution).

Scripture is unique in its disclosure of the victimage mechanism by virtue of its identification of God with the victim. Girard argues that the biblical representation reflects the outsider perspective of a victim.[21] The role of Jesus' sacrifice in achieving social cohesion explicitly outlined in certain statements shows that the Bible works as a textual force to reveal this mechanism "hidden since the foundation of the world" (Lk. 11.50), so that this knowledge can bring about freedom (Girard is aware of Nietzsche's input in the problem of victimisation and empathy-invoking in the Gospels). The resurrection of Jesus further shows him as an innocent victim, and illuminates humanity's violent tendencies and the need to break the circle of violence.[22]

However, there is nothing in the Gospels to suggest that Jesus' death was, in fact, a sacrifice, whatever definition we give to this sacrifice, expiation, substitution, etc., it is never defined like such in the Gospels, claims Girard in *Things Hidden*. The passages referred to in order to justify the sacrificial conception of the passion should be interpreted outside of the realm of sacrifice, as passion is presented as an act which brings about healing for the community, but not as a sacrifice (Girard, 1978: 203-204).[23] The postulate of sacrifice was fully formulated by medieval theology, and it has a sacrificial exigency on the part of the Father, so efforts to explain the sacrificial pact seem absurd; God needs to avenge his honour compromised by the sins of humanity. Not only does God claim a new victim, but it is the most precious victim possible, his own son (this is a postulate which has greatly discredited Christianity in the modern world, once tolerable for the medieval mentality, it has become intolerable for ours). The pas-

[21] For example, the outcries by the lone victim motif in the *Psalms*, the shunning of Job by his neighbours, the prophetic story of the Servant of the Lord, scapegoated by his people and compliant in being the lamb led to slaughter in Isa. 52.13–53.12, and Jesus, who inaugurates a social environment of abandoning all violence (Matt. 5.38–40, pass in the Gospels).

[22] Fleming remarks that, in suggesting, as the Gospels do, that those involved in Jesus' crucifixion were on the side of "Satan" is simply to render tangible, through personification, the power of rivalrous desire to engender accusation and violence. The New Testament, he claims, is continually at pains to indicate that evil has power only in so far as it is embodied in a particular person or group, which is why the personification of Satan as rivalrous nemesis—as that which engenders accusation and violence—is necessitated by the way in which this power attaches itself to a victim at the epicentre of the scapegoat mechanism: they are viewed as a demon or devil (Fleming, 2014: 2, 9).

[23] By surveying the Gospel of Matthew through a narrative critical perspective, and by bringing a typological approach to the Yom Kippur rite of Leviticus 16, Debra Anstis offers an argument based on Girard's theory of mimetic desire (Anstis 2012: 50-67). The seemingly rigid and uniform construction of the Levitical text opens to creative reading and imagination when read as a literary work in its own right (especially given the rather obvious point which Anstis makes - that, when outside the actual ritual milieu, the reading/telling of a once sacred story/set of actions is the ritual). Anstis proposes that Jesus and Judas function as a pair in the events leading up to the crucifixion, just as the two appointed goats of Yom Kippur are a necessary pair. The figure of the typological scapegoat has often been ascribed to Jesus in a sacrificial role, but she tries to shift this metaphor and ascribe the scapegoat type to both Jesus and Judas in an intertextual scapegoat mechanism that connects Yom Kippur to the passion narrative. The passion narrative of Matthew and the Yom Kippur ritual are tackled textually around the anthropological model set out by Girard. Anstis remarks that any meaning or purpose of the Levitical rite is constrained by textual limits and not discussed in terms of possible historical occurrence or anthropological significance, so she approaches the *Gospel of Matthew* with a narrative critical view, by engaging with Girard's mimetic theory as a hermeneutical lens.

sages that apply directly to the Father offer nothing to allow even a modicum of violence to be attributed to the divinity, on the contrary, it is a god who is a stranger to violence that is present among humans (Girard, 1978: 205).[24] We do not have a relationship with an indifferent God in the *Gospels*, but a God who wants to be made known to men, but cannot be known by men unless he acquires from them what Jesus has to propose, which constitutes the essential topic of his predication, reiterated a thousand times – a reconciliation without some ulterior motive, without a sacrificial intermediary, a reconciliation which would allow God to reveal himself as he is for the first time in human history. The harmony in the relations between men would not need blood sacrifices anymore, nor absurd tales of a violent divinity (Girard, 1978: 207).[25]

In *Brothers Karamazov*, in a powerful outcry about God and the existence of evil Ivan Karamazov wonders about the atrocities and unforgivable offences towards the innocent, taking the case of suf-

[24] It should be noted that the *Gospels* take away from divinity the most essential of functions in the primordial religions, its aptitude to polarise anything that men cannot govern in their relations with the world and in their inter-personal relations (Girard, 1978: 207).

[25] Eugene Webb asks whether Girard's take on the death of Jesus would be to see that the true, fully effective sacrifice is the crucifixion, and that its function is the appeasement of God (Webb 2005). If not Jesus' death on the cross, Webb asks, what *was* his sacrifice, for he insists that *Hebrews* does represent Jesus as sacrificial offering ("he has appeared once for all at the end of the age to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself", 9:26), a covenant inaugurated in blood (9:11-12). He asks whether this is physical blood, like that of goats, or metaphorical blood: if it is physical, then, he agrees with Girard that the author of the epistle can see only continuity with previous sacrifices, but if it is metaphorical, and it is obvious that he leans in that direction (Jesus' death as perfect fulfilment of God's will), the picture is different. The central idea of *Hebrews,* goes on to explain Webb, is that Jesus, fulfilling the calling of Israel to divine sonship, raised humanity itself into sonship in his own person by conquering sin and breaking the power of Satan over all human beings. Satan's power in Biblical tradition includes the power of death, and *Hebrews* is quite explicit in linking the tendency of humans to sin (that is, to fail to fulfil their calling to sonship) to their fear of death. Men have been enslaved by the fear of death, and Jesus' death has delivered them from that slavery, so that they are now free to respond to the calling to sonship as he did. How did he do that, though, Webb muses, as *Hebrews* does not give an explicit answer, perhaps because the author thought the answer would be obvious, which, even if it once were true, no longer is. To a contemporary western reader, there is the answer that Jesus did it by dying as propitiatory sacrifice, by offering his blood to appease the wrath of God who inflicts death as form of punishment. However, this is obvious now, due to a tradition from Augusine and Anselm of Canterbury, who developed ideas of primordial sin and inherited guilt, but would have been perhaps far from obvious to the first century audience. Besides, the one having the power of death (2:14-15) is not an affronted God, but the devil, while God is repeatedly described as not wanting sacrifice of killed offerings. To Girard's remark about the efforts to explain this sacrificial pact that only result in absurdities, Webb offers the possibility that the western medieval reading of Hebrews would have seemed just as absurd to its author and first century audience as it does to Girard. Of course, he adds, to an early Christian, there would have been another obvious way of understanding the idea that Jesus' death freed humans from enslavement by the fear of death, and that is his subsequent resurrection (Webb 2005).
The idea of appeasement through sacrifice goes along the transitional image of God, for it repeatedly evokes the transition from wrath to love and forgiveness, thinks De Vereuil. In the *Book of Consolation* (Isaiah 40) we find what is probably the clearest image in the Old Testament of a God synonymous with love, suggests De Verteuil, and there are allusions to the scapegoat - but his destiny is altogether different, his innocence and saving function are recognised, and he is honoured as the Servant of God: transition from an angry to a loving God is thereby completed (De Verteuil, 1966: 218-219).

fering children to make his point clearer. The world is filled with suffering, he says, though he cannot understand why the world is arranged as it is. In a free world, men are to blame for what they have brought on to themselves: they were given paradise, but wanted freedom, paired with the unhappiness it brings. With a logical, Euclidian understanding, he confesses that all he knows is that there is suffering, and there are none guilty, but a simple direct cause-effect relation. This brings no peace, however, it does absolutely no good to know that this is how it is, this is not justice, and Ivan wants justice on earth, not in some remote infinite time and space; he has believed in justice, and he wants to see it. His life cannot have served just for the future harmony of others; he wants to see the torturer and his victim embrace. Religions are built on the longing that at some point everyone will suddenly understand what it has all been for, and Ivan proclaims to be a believer in this dream. But, then there are the suffering children, and he has no answer as to what to do about them. If this eternal harmony is achieved through suffering, what have innocent children got to do with it? It is beyond all comprehension why they should have to suffer and pay for this harmony. Solidarity in sin among men, he understands, and solidarity in retribution, but how can there be such solidarity with children, he asks. If it is true that they should pay for their fathers' crimes, such a truth is not of this world, and is beyond his comprehension, he continues. He excitedly denies to Alyosha that what he says is blasphemy, for he understands what an upheaval of the universe will happen when everything in heaven and earth blends in one hymn of praise of the Lord, when a mother of a child tortured to death and the child himself embrace his murderer. All knowledge will be attained then, and all made clear. However, Ivan cannot accept that harmony. He renounces this higher harmony altogether, for it is not worth the unatoned tears of that one tortured child. Those tears must be atoned for, or there can be no harmony, he claims. He then asks whether and how this would be possible – by avenging them, perhaps? Why, though, why would he care for a hell for the torturers, what would it do for the child already tortured to death? And if there is hell, what becomes of harmony? Ivan does want to forgive, to embrace, to see the end of suffering. If all the suffering of children just adds up to the sum of sufferings necessary to pay for the truth, however, he protests that this truth is not worth the price. It cannot be right, he explains – he does not want the mother to embrace her child's torturer, he does not want her to forgive him, she dare not. She can forgive for her own grief, but she has no place forgiving for the sufferings of her child tortured to death, even if the child ever does.[26] But if they dare not forgive, what happens with the harmony, then? Is there in the world a being who would have the right to forgive and could forgive? Ivan rejects harmony, if this is what it takes, because of his love for humanity. He would rather live with unavenged suffering and unsatisfied indignation, even if he were wrong.

[26] V. Jankélévitch makes a similar point in "Should We Pardon Them?", when he discusses forgiveness by survivors for both their torturers and those who did nothing to prevent it. He asks what qualifies a survivor to pardon in the place of the victims, or their loved ones. It is not the place of the survivor to pardon on behalf of the "little children whom the brutes tortured to amuse themselves". The children must pardon the torturers themselves, while the survivors turn to the brutes and their friends and tell them to ask themselves the children for pardon (Jankélévitch, 1996: 569).

This harmony built on the tears of the tortured innocent has too high a price; it is beyond our means to pay so much to achieve it (Достоевский, 2006: 345-347).

When Ursula Le Guin wrote "Those Who Walk Away from Omelas", she had completely forgotten about having read this passage, and instead got inspired by William James' "The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life" (Le Guin, 1975: 275-276).[27] The people of Omelas are mature, intelligent, passionate adults whose lives were not wretched. Omelas sounds like a city in a fairy tale once upon a time and far, far away. There is a boundless and generous contentment among the people of Omelas, a magnanimous triumph felt not against some outer enemy but in communion with the finest and fairest in the souls of all men everywhere; the victory they celebrate is that of life. However, in that perfect setting of art, and beauty, and serenity, and self-actualisation, in a basement under one of the beautiful buildings of Omelas, there is a room, and in that room there is a sad, tortured child. The door is always locked; and only rarely someone comes over to peer at it with frightened, disgusted eyes (Le Guin even uses 'it' for the child, making it even more dehumanised).[28] All the people of Omelas know the child is there, malnourished and feeble-minded, scared, and in pain. Some of them have come to see it, others are content merely to know it is there. They also all know that it has to be there, writes Le Guin - some of them understand why, and some do not, "but they all understand that their happiness, the beauty of their city, the tenderness of their friendships, the health of their children, the wisdom of their scholars, the skill of their makers, even the abundance of their harvest and the kindly weathers of their skies, depend wholly on this child's abominable misery". When explained to the young spectators, this provokes shock and sickening feelings, disgust, which they had thought themselves superior to. They would like to do something for the child, but there is nothing they can do, for the moment the child is saved and nicely treated, all the prosperity and beauty and delight of Omelas would wither and be destroyed. Everyone knows that those are the non-negotiable terms. When they begin

[27] James discusses three questions in ethics he believes must be kept apart, the psychological, the metaphysical and the casuistic. In one part of the exposition, he wonders about a Utopian world on the shoulders of a tortured victim: "Or if the hypothesis were offered us, of a world in which Messrs. Fourier's and Bellamy's and Morris's Utopias should all be outdone, and millions kept permanently happy on the one simple condition that a certain lost soul on the far-off edge of things should lead a life of lonely torture, what except a specifical and independent sort of emotion can it be which would make us immediately feel, even though an impulse arose within us to clutch at the happiness so offered, how hideous a thing would be its enjoyment when deliberately accepted as the fruit of such a bargain?" (James, 1912: 97-98).
Shoshana Knapp allows that we are entitled to be sceptical about Le Guin's supposed lapse of memory, however, and as D. H. Lawrence suggests, to trust the tale instead of the teller (Knapp, 1985: 75).

[28] When Knapp analyses the similarities, she notices that the evil in the story begins with its creator, a figure who is absent from James's formulation, and it is this emphasis that leads her to remember Dostoevsky's take, whom Le Guin has forgotten. She lists other reminders, too - Le Guin has replaced James's "certain lost soul" a being of in-determinate age, with the young child of Ivan Karamazov's conversation with his brother; Le Guin also expands James' abstract "lonely torture" into a painfully concrete picture, similar to Ivan's. Both artists, Knapp adds, in fact, give us not only a philosophical formulation, but (raw) flesh and (clotted) blood (Knapp, 1985: 78). For another take on suffering children in literature, see Langbauer, 2008.

to perceive the terrible justice of reality, they somehow accept it. The people of Omelas have no vapid, irresponsible happiness, because their tears and anger, the trying of their generosity and the awareness of their own helplessness are perhaps the true source of the splendour of their lives. They know that, just like the child, they are not free. It is the existence of the child, but also their knowledge of its existence, that makes possible the nobility of their architecture, the poignancy of their music, the profundity of their science, all that allows them to dwell in bliss. However, sometimes, one of the adolescent girls or boys who go see the child does not go home to weep or rage, does not, in fact, go home at all. Sometimes also a grown man or a woman falls silent for a day or two, then leaves home.[29] They keep walking, and walk straight out of the city of Omelas, ahead into the darkness, and they do not come back. Le Guin is at a loss as to the kind of place they walk towards, perhaps even less imaginable than Omelas, it might even not exist. But, she concludes, they seem to know where they are going, the ones who walk away from Omelas.

All three authors invite the reader to morally deliberate on the justifiability of the victimisation of one for the promised bliss of the majority.

While important for the origins of cultural conflict, managing mimetic violence and religious appeasement through the understanding of (some of the) mechanisms of sacrifice, scapegoating in the contemporary world remains a painful reality, always provoking a fresh moral reevaluation of concepts of culpability and condemnation, and of the justifiability of the principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest number.

[29] In Dostoevsky's presentation, Ivan shows both emotional and logical refusal of the harmony built upon the suffering of the innocent. In both James' and Le Guin's accounts, people are held accountable for their reaction to the scapegoat, because they are able to formulate it in full knowledge of the context and stakes. James thinks that our enjoyment of this happiness would be hideous because the bargain would be "deliberately accepted", and every child in Omelas is given the opportunity to see the scapegoat, at least once, and to understand that it has to suffer. In both these scenarios the decision to decline to follow the rules seems to be based on something other than rational deliberation: a specified and independent sort of emotion, and the refusal to go on like that by those who suddenly pick up and leave Omelas.

References

Anstis, D. 2012. "Sacred Men and Sacred Goats: Mimetic Theory in Levitical and Passion Intertext" in Scott Cowdell, Chris Fleming, and Joel Hodge, (eds.), *Violence, Desire and the Sacred – Girard's Mimetic Theory Across the Disciplines*, New York: Continuum, pp. 50-67.

Bremmer, J. 1983. "Scapegoat Rituals in Ancient Greece", *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, Vol. 87, pp. 299-320.

Burkert, W. 1979. *Structure and History in Greek Mythology and Ritual*, Los Angeles-London: University of California Press.

Burkert, W. 1983. *Homo Necans – The Anthropology of Ancient Greek Sacrificial Ritual and Myth*, Los Angeles-London: University of California Press.

Carmichael, C. 2000. „The Origin of the Scapegoat Ritual", *Vetus Testamentum*, Vol. 50, Fasc. 2, pp. 167-182.

Carmichael, C. 2006. *Illuminating Leviticus – a Study of its Laws and Institutions in the Light of Biblical Narrative*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

De Verteuil, R. 1966. "The Scapegoat Archetype", *Journal of Religion and Health*, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 209-225.

Достоевский, Ф. 2006. *Братья Карамазовы*, Москва: Эксмо.

Fleming, C. 2004. *René Girard - Violence and Mimesis*, Cambridge: Polity.

Fleming, C. 2014. "Mimesis, Violence, and the Sacred: An Overview of the Thought of Rene Girard" in Scott Cowdell, Chris Fleming, and Joel Hodge, (eds.), *Violence, Desire, and the Sacred (Vol. 2) - Rene Girard and Sacrifice in Life, Love, and Literature*, pp. 1-13.

Frazer, J., G. 2009. *The Golden Bough*, The Floating Press.

Garcia Martinez, F. (ed). 1996. *The Dead Sea Scrolls Translated – the Qumran Texts in English*, trans. Wilfred. G. E. Watson, Leiden: Brill.

Girard, R. 1961. *Deceit, Desire, and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure,* trans. Yvonne Freccero, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Girard, R. 1972. *Violence et le sacr*é, Paris: Grasset.

Girard, R. 1978. *Des* choses cachées depuis la fondation du monde, Paris: Grasset.

Girard, R. 1982. *Le bouc émissaire*, Paris: Grasset.

Girard, R. 1987. "Generative Scapegoating" in R. G. Hamerton-Kelly, (ed), *Violent Origins - Walter Burkert, René Girard, and Jonathan Z. Smith on Ritual Killing and Cultural Formation*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 73-145.

Girard, R. 1996. *The Girard Reader*, James G. Williams, (ed), New York: Crossroad Herder.

James, W. 1912. *The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy*, London: Longmans, Green, And Co.

Jankélévitch, V. 1996. 'Should We Pardon Them?, *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 552-572.

Knapp, S. 1985. "The Morality of Creation: Dostoevsky and William James in Le Guin's 'Omelas'", *The Journal of Narrative Technique*, Vol. 15, No. 1, pp. 75-81

Langbauer, L. 2008. "Ethics and Theory: Suffering Children in Dickens, Dostoevsky, and Le Guin", *ELH*, Vol. 75, No. 1, pp. 89-108.

Le Guin, U. 1973. "The Ones Who Walk Away From Omelas", *New Dimensions*, 3, pp. 275-276.

Palaver, W. 2013. *René Girard's Mimetic Theory*, trans. Gabriel Borrud. Michigan: Michigan State University
Prince, J. D. 1903. "Le bouc émissaire chez les Babyloniens", *Journal Asiatique*, pp. 135-156.
Webb, E. 2005. "René Girard and the Symbolism of Religious Sacrifice", *Anthropoetics*, XI, no. 1 Spring/Summer, http://anthropoetics.ucla.edu/ap1101/webb/ [September 2107].
Zatelli, I. 1998. "The Origin of the Biblical Scapegoat Ritual: The Evidence of Two Eblaite Texts", *Vetus Testamentum*, Vol. 48, Fasc. 2, pp. 254-263.

Марија Тодоровска

Жртвениот јарец: ритуал, механизам, значење
(Резиме)

Статијата го разгледува жртвениот јарец во ритуалот за искупување во функција на прочистување од гревови и зло, преку идејата за жртва одбрана да ги понесе гревовите на колективот, протерана надвор од безбедниот свет на групата, во кој, со ритуалното искупување, повторно се враќа период на спокојство. Жртвата е разгледана низ миметичката теорија на Рене Жирар, преку идеите за миметичката желба, секогаш придружена со нагон за насилство, и решавањето на ескалирачките конфликти токму преку наоѓањето на заеднички „виновник". Проблемот на одбран виновник кој е истовремено и фокусот на конфликтот и насилството, и спасител од нив, е пренесен на идејата за невина жртва врз чие страдање се гради среќата на колективот, во пламениот монолог на Иван Карамазов од *Браќа Карамазови* на Ф. Достоевски (хармонијата на човештвото е прескапа цена за солзите на едно измачено дете), и од расказот „Оние кои си заминуваат од Омелас" на У. Л'Гуин.

Клучни зборови: жртвен јарец, ритуал, искупување, миметичка, жртва