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РЕФОРМИ НА БЕЗБЕДНОСНИОТ СИСТЕМ КАКО ПРЕДУСЛОВ ЗА ЕВРО - АТЛАНТСКИ ИНТЕГРАЦИИ

INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE

SECURITY SYSTEM REFORMS AS PRECONDITION FOR EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATIONS

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проф. д-р Никола Дујовски, декан на Факултетот за безбедност – Скопје

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PREFACE

The mission of the international scientific conference is to encourage the academic community and practitioners in the security sector to share knowledge based on the application of subject specific research scientific methods and upgrade the practical experience with a scientific – research dimension. The idea for organizing this Conference coincides with the need for essential reforms of the security sector in the Republic of Macedonia.

The papers received by means of a public announcement offer solutions for the future establishment and renaming of the security system in order to respond efficiently to the contemporary security risks and threats, that is, the destabilizing factors that create conflicts.

On that note and in correlation with the Conference title, the rational assumption for full application of the required reforms in the security sector presented in the papers that treat security issues in a number of sub-disciplines of the science of security, confirms the existing and encourages the creation of new solutions within the security system, based on a holistic approach in view of efficient and timely dealing with security risks and threats and accelerating the Euro – Atlantic integration process.

Hence, the mission of the conference is to stimulate scientific workers to exchange views and knowledge of the science that should identify the security needs and determine the security reforms and opt for an appropriate security concept, as one of the prerequisites for Euro – Atlantic integration of the country.

The practical goal of the topic of Conference Compendium is multifaceted, primarily due to the scarce number of papers and analyses on this topic in scientific and expert literature and the partial scientific approach in those that exist, which implies imposing effects in practice. The Conference and the Compendium aim to produce valid results and scientifically verified knowledge that will enable the implementation of a rational and acceptable solution for the security sector reforms. Argumentative substantiation and presentation of the derived results and the overall situation are used to consider the systemic and institutional solutions and to initiate a new phase of qualitative development of the security system and its institutions.

Security sector reforms aim to provide an efficient security system with appropriate security capacities to deal with potential threats. Hence, security sector reforms contribute not only to a more efficient security apparatus, but also to a more responsible one.

The overall goal of the "security sector reform" is directed toward transformation of the security institutions so that they acquire an efficient, legitimate and democratically responsible role in ensuring the external and internal security of its citizens. The work invested in these reforms is expected to yield certain positive effects that will be felt primarily by the state itself, and then by its citizens. In terms of the effects or the implications that may arise in the process, they should be grouped in two segments; positive and negative effects.

Positive effects mean increased internal and external security, greater and increased investment process, higher level of employment, greater mobility of population and capital, offering more possibilities to the citizens and a wider choice of living conditions, receiving assistance from European development funds, assistance in the defence sector, modernization, development and all other areas on which the progress of the security sector is dependent.

The positive effects also concern the citizens directly, in terms of respect of human rights, the rule of law, equitable and ethnic representation in the security structures, improved living and working conditions, participation in different peace missions, requesting certain competences for executing the assigned tasks, control over the work – external and internal, assessment, ensuring a quality system, increasing the services for the citizens and their quality, more stringent criteria for non-legal conduct, etc. What is more important, considerable progress has been made in increasing the communication of the security structures regionally and internationally and developing their cooperation within international security organizations, which has resulted in positive effects in conducting major actions against international crime covering trafficking in drugs, weapons, people, radio-active materials, etc.

On the opposite side, there are also negative effects of the reforms: downsizing of employees, losing some privileges, decreasing competences, jurisdictions and the possibilities for fight against crime.

It is evident that there is a global process of continuous changes of the security threats worldwide, which calls for transcending the local needs of the security structures and stimulating them to think and act globally.

The papers in the Compendium and the Conference cover the following topics:

- The relation between external threats and internal weaknesses as the basis for security reforms
- Civilian and democratic control of the security system
- Transformation of the secret (intelligence and counterintelligence) services
- The role of the police and the Army in the crisis management and protection and rescue system
- Restructuring of the security system to enable dealing with contemporary threats, terrorism and organized crime
- Coordination and reorganization of the security institutions
- Regional security cooperation as an imperative for Euro – Atlantic integration
- Prevention against internal risks and asymmetric threats
- The role of non-state actors (private security, civic organizations, the media) in the security system and its reshaping;

The Faculty of Security – Skopje has a key role in promoting the security system. Moreover, it aims to increase the security and stability in the Republic of Macedonia by learning, creating professional personnel, conducting research and implementing the best practices in the security sector reform process in the country.

Thus, the Faculty of Security – Skopje continues its orientation toward organizing international conferences in the security field in order to contribute to the development of scientific thought, and help policy creators (political level) and decision makers (senior practitioners) on the regional, national and local level to overcome the practical problems they are facing in a faster, simpler and timely fashion with the acquired knowledge and research results.

I believe that the next 10th jubilee will crown the successful joint project of the Faculty of Security – Skopje that is a combination of experience and youth of this higher educational institution, stimulating its greater development in future into one of the most important security academic fora of South Eastern Europe.

Chairman of the Organizational Board
of the International Scientific Conference and Vice Dean for Science and
Development at the Faculty of Security – Skopje
Assistant Professor Marjan Gjurovski, Ph.D

Country	Original scientific paper	Review scientific paper	Professional paper	Total work papers
Bulgaria		2		2
Bosnia and Hercegovina		5	1	6
Croatia		2		2
Dubai		1		1
Kosovo		1		1
Macedonia	8	30	14	52
Serbia		13	1	14
Slovenia		1		1
Turkey	1	1	1	3
United Kingdom		1		1
Total work papers	9	57	17	83

SECURITY SCIENCES

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WHY IS IT NECESSARY TO HAVE A REFORM OF THE SECURITY SYSTEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA?

Tome Batkovski, Dr.Sc
Faculty of Security- Skopje, Republic of Macedonia
e-mail: tomebat52@gmail.com

The starting point in this paper is to elaborate the term 'system' and the necessity of its installment in the modern state as an answer to the endangerment directed to its fundamental values. It elaborates the features, principles and characteristics of a modern national security system. The threats and risks to the security of the Republic of Macedonia are in the focus, as well the necessity for a reform of its security system based on the drawbacks which have been identified over the past 26 years since Macedonia gained its independence. The author presents his own proposal for a reform of the current security system in the Republic of Macedonia, elaborating its structure and function.

Key words: state, system, security, risk, structure, function, security efficiency.

One of the most important questions imposed to the states which entered the serious and turbulent period of transition, among which was and is still the Republic of Macedonia, is 'How to provide stability and security when the risks and threats are increasing in quality and quantity?' The establishment of a new society characterized by political pluralism and a new market dominated by private property necessarily led to introducing of the new security system in the state. The changes provoked redefinition of the closer and wider surrounding of the Republic of Macedonia, which influenced its international position and it was logical to introduce a reform of its security system. When declaring its independence, the Republic of Macedonia revived or defrosted some aggressive aspirations of the nationalistic circles in the neighbouring countries directed towards Macedonian independence, the national entity of the Macedonians, the Macedonian language and the autocephaly of the Macedonian Orthodox Church. These are and, have been very serious attacks to the security, i.e. the vital national interests of the Republic of Macedonia which cannot be pushed back or stopped without an establishment of a new security system (relevant to the threats and attacks). I will explain shortly the term 'system' and the characteristics of the modern security system of the national states in addition to my paper, but the core of it elaborates the necessity of establishing of a new security system in the Republic of Macedonia with a specific proposal.

1. The term 'system' originates from the old Greek word 'systema' which means 'a set of elements and their relations'[1], i.e. from the Greek words 'syn'='together' and 'histani'='to insert'.[2] The system is a relatively independent unity which consists of interrelated parts. There are physical, chemical, biological, technical and social systems. Furthermore, there is another division of open/close; simple/complex and determined/scholastic systems. The components that make

[1]Политичка енциклопедија (1975), Савремена администрација: Београд
[2]Bakreski.O. & Milosevikj,M. (2010). *Соврмени безбедносни ситеми* .Skopje:Autoprint T.A p.23

one system are the structure, made of interrelated elements, and the function, performed by each element on their own and in the unity.[3]

The system exists in one surrounding, which on the one hand, influences the surrounding, and on the other hand, is affected by it. In other words, each system is in a communication with other systems which make its surrounding. Coordination and synchronization among the parts are important, and their vertical and horizontal connection is crucial for proper functioning of the systems. At the same time, the established hierarchy within the system from the highest to the lowest level is very important.

2. The security system of one state or the system of the national security is a part of the social systems and is a subsystem within a modern state. The system of national security is a unity of institutions from the public and civil sector responsible for protection from dangers, threats and risks to the fundamental state and social values.[4] It should be emphasized that security is one of the most important areas for one state both internally and externaly. The components of the security function of one state are:
   - Political foundation (doctrine, concept);
   - Legal foundation (constitution, laws, legal acts, international contracts);
   - State bodies (entities) responsible for the security in particular areas;
   - Working methods of the bodies responsible for the security;
   - Management, organization, coordination and synchronization of the work of the bodies responsible for the security, and
   - Immediate targets for the entities responsible for the security.

Every system of national security consists of these basic components:

- Structure
- Function
- Organization and management
- Hierarchy, and
- Self-defence readiness.

It should be emphasized that the security system as every other system has its own structure which consists of many elements (entities) which are interrelated. These elements are in fact, subsystems which are structured by more microsystems. The relations among the subsystems within the security system of one state and the microsystems within the particular subsystems are regulated by laws and legal acts. The work of the entities within the security system should be in harmony and convergence- in order to protect the fundamental values, which is the common aim of the system as a whole.

- Each security entity should act in order to perform its tasks in its own area and within its own competence;
- Each security entity tends to cooperate and act mutually with other entities in the system in order to accomplish the mutual values and interests of the system as a whole;

[3]Maslesha,R. (2001) *Teorije i sistemi sigurnosti.* Sarajevo:Magistrat

[4] Compare Mijalkovic, S. (2009) *Nacionalna bezbednost* .Beograd: Kriminalisticko-policijska akademija. p.299

- All security entities act together as a subsystem within a wider system – the state, inside and outside, to provide security relevant to the real dangers, threats and risks;
- The system of national security, as a whole, influences the other neighbouring systems, and at the same time is influenced by them;
- The system of national security as a whole and each entity in particular builds defence mechanisms against potential risks internally and externally.[5]

A condition for the national security system to act as a harmonious unity is to have a quality doctrine and adequate legal acts which define precisely the competence, scope and mutual cooperation of the security entities within the system.[6]

The institutions are connected vertically and horizontally in the national security system. The vertical line means that the principle of subordination is respected, i.e. subordination of the lower institutions to the higher ones, or in other words respecting the hierarchical principle. This principle is necessary in the security systems, because of the need to act quickly, efficiently and timely in case of revealing, preventing and removing the dangers, threats and risks. The horizontal line of connection means that there is cooperation of the entities which are at the same level within the security system, e.g. respecting the principles of equality, cooperation, operation and synchronization among the subsystems.

It is worth mentioning that the entities of the security system are divided in three groups: conventional, unconventional and additional (supplementary) ones.

The conventional entities perform the security function directly in their own scope. All the security bodies from one state, which are authorized to manage and coordinate the security entities belong here (e.g. the Council of National Security) on the one hand, and the professional entities (institutions) as the Intelligence Agency, the Security Service, the Army, the Diplomacy, the Customs and others, on the other hand.

The unconventional entities create the political, doctrinal and legal basis for the conventional entities to work in the security scope. They are the President of the State, the Government and the Parliament, which, in fact, operate with the national security, submit requirements to the conventional entities, control and supervise their work (e.g. the Parliament controls and supervises the security and intelligence institutions through its commissions.)

The additional entities in the security system do not work professionally with security, but they contribute to it with a wider social activity locally (local communities), in the NGO sector, in the education and everything connected to society.

The national security system joins with all its resources to perform its tasks internationally in the military and civil sphere. Accordingly, one national security system can be in cooperation with another national security system nearby or worldwide, it can have passive relations or be in a conflict. Security worldwide is characterized with an exceptional dynamics, so that national security must be ready and flexible to quickly and efficiently work out quality answers to all challenges.

3. The Republic of Macedonia faced a lot of problems in politics and security after 1991, which influenced directly its internal and external stability. Gaining its independence from the SFRY and declaring its sovereignty led to reactivating the negative attitude of some nationalistic circles in the neighboring countries towards the name of the state, the

[5]Tatalovic,S.(2006). *Nacionalna i medjunarodna sigurnost.* Zagreb: Politicka kultura p.151
[6]Stajic,Lj. (2004). *Osnovi bezbednosti.* Beograd: Policijska akademija. pp 9-17

Macedonian nation and the language, the right to autocephaly of the Macedonian church, and the right to sovereignty on the whole territory of the state.[7] It was clear that the Republic of Macedonia entered a very complex period which required quality and timely decisions and their efficient realization in politics and security. It was necessary to completely reform the existing security system which was relevant to the former social and political establishment characterized with one-party system, socialistic planned production, and domination of the social property. It was a must to pass a new Law on National Security, which would define the security institutions, their responsibilities and fundamentals of coordination and cooperation among them, with a precise definition of the principle of hierarchy.[8] However, it was not done. The law from the former SFRY was used until 1995. Then the Law on Internal Affairs and the Law on the Intelligence Agency of the Republic of Macedonia were declared (this Law was in use from the end of 1997/ the beginning of 1998 when the new Agency was established). However, this act was not suitable for the new security challenges, because it lacked the necessary pyramid in the security system. The Republic of Macedonia faced a huge pressure in politics and intelligence with subversive elements by Greece[9], as well as an economic blockade, while within the country, it faced organized forms of illegal activities (armed and unarmed) by the Albanian separatism, which lasted until the armed conflict in 2001.[10] During this period (1995), there was an assassination attempt on the President Kiro Gligorov which has not been solved so far neither from aspect of security nor from the aspect of criminal law. This act discredits the work of the security system and institutions of that time. After the armed conflict in 2001, new entities were introduced in the national security system of the state- the Crisis Management Centre, the Management Committee and the Assessment Group. However, their work does not give the required results in the security sector, especially in performing their essential duty- prevention of the threats and risks towards the Republic of Macedonia.[11] I will present the flaws in the current security system of the Republic of Macedonia in these aspects:

- There is no National Security Law in which the security entities and their responsibilities are defined;

[7]Batkovski,T. (1992). Possible Security implications from surroundings of Macedonia. *Security: Ministry of Defence of RM 1*

[8]The Commission for control and Supervision of the former security service and I, personally, recommended a new Law on National Security, but it was not forwarded in a parliamentary procedure.

[9] The consequences are known- accepting the insulting reference for the state, FYROM, and changing the state flag. Moreover, there was an attempt to corrupt the former President of Republic of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov by the former Minister of Interior, Ljubomir Frchkovski, via intelligence channels of the Republic of Greece. It is surprising and unexplainable (from the point of security) how and why this criminal act (according to the Criminal Law of Republic of Macedonia) by the former Minister of Interior and some representatives of the Intelligence department from the Security Service at the Ministry of Interior was not sanctioned in a proper way- politically, legally, and from the aspect of security by the former President, Kiro Gligorov, and the former Prime Minister, Branko Crvenkovski. See: Андов, С. (2017). *Успеси и заговори 1993-обидите на Данаилов Фрчковски.* Скопје: Матица Македонска

[10] The end of the armed conflict in 2001 resulted in Ohrid Framework Agreement, which in fact, which did not respect the decisions of ASNOM (1944), and the Macedonian nation was 'ranked' as an ethnic entity.

[11] For example, there is no security assessment on state level in order to find out all relevant aspects of the event known as 'Divo Naselje', in which an armed group was infiltrated in Kumanovo.

- There is no security pyramid in the state, which disables the implementation of the hierarchy principle; this is necessary in every security system of modern states, including the Republic of Macedonia;
- There is no leading state security body in which both the Prime Minister and the President take part, and which would give a security assessment and make relevant and obligatory decisions and directions for the work of the security entities in the system in accordance with the security targets and interests inside the state and beyond;
- There is a lack of necessary coordination and synchronization among the security entities in the system vertically and horizontally (e.g. between the Ministry of Interior and the Army of the Republic of Macedonia, or between the President and the Government of the Republic of Macedonia.[12])
- There is no coordinated planning and recommendation for the budget of the security entities of the system;
- There is no professional control and supervision of the security entities in vertical line, which enables them to make assessment of their work by themselves, and as a consequence, their mistakes, flows and misuses are not discovered, corrected or sanctioned;
- There is no joint planning of the work of the security entities, including their employment, training, according to the level of the risk for the security of the state;
- There is no joint and coordinated access to the installation, use and protection of the IT system in the security entities;
- There is no joint, coordinated and planned work and its implementation by the internal security entities with the security, military and intelligence security institutions of foreign countries;
- There is no civil control of the Directorate of Security and Counter Intelligence and the Army apart from the Parliamentarian;
- There is no quality and efficient parliamentary control and supervision of the Directorate of Security and Counter Intelligence and the Army. In fact, the control has formally existed in the last 27 years, but in reality it was far from the standards of the parliamentary states.

4. Having in mind the above mentioned flaws in the current security system of the Republic of Macedonia, I think that it is high time to start a reform, or more precisely to install a new system. A new Law on National Security or a Law on Security and Intelligence ought to be introduced, which would define the entities in the system and their

[12] I would like to give two examples for this: First, 'Divo Naselje' - when an armed group from Kosovo was infiltrated and illegally positioned in Kumanovo in 2015. It is a clear indicator of the weak coordination between the Ministry of Interior and the Army of Republic of Macedonia on the one hand and Military Security and Intelligence services at the Ministry of Defence on the other hand, as well complete absence of the state authorities from this event.
Second, the state authorities of the Republic of Macedonia, the Ministry of Interior and the Army were provided with quality security data for preparing of the conflict three years before the armed conflict happened in 2001. However, they did not react efficiently and timely to prevent this act inside the country and abroad. See:
Batkovski,T. (2011).*Strategic-Intelligence Component of the Republic of Macedonia before the Armed Conflict in 2001*. International Scientific Conference: Security in the Post-Conflict (Western) Balkans: Transition and Challenges Faced by the Republic of Macedonia: Skopje. pp 457-466

responsibilities[13]. The crucial change refers to the part of management of the system and strengthening of the vertical interrelation of the entities on the one hand, and establishing a better coordination and cooperation among the security entities on the horizontal line, on the other hand. This would enable the necessary unity of the system and an ability to timely and efficiently manage the threats and risks to the security of the Republic of Macedonia.

For the needs of this paper, I will present the following structure of the system.

It is necessary to form a National Security Council which would be on the top of the security pyramid. The Council would have supplementary bodies like a Bureau for Coordination of Security and Intelligence Services and Office for Professional and Administrative Affairs. Furthermore, the Intelligence Agency, the Security Agency (outside the Ministry of Interior), the Military- Security Agency, Military-Intelligence Agency; the Office for Protection of IT Systems and the Operational-Technical Centre for Communications[14] (outside the Ministry of Interior) would be the bodies for immediate execution of the tasks.

The control and supervision of the security entities would be performed on several levels: parliamentary- through the commissions already formed within the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia; civilian- through a newly formed commission, in which representatives of the civil sector would take part; professional-internal, and professional-external control and supervision on vertical lines.

In a diagram, the system would be like this:



[13]In my opinion, the Law on Security-Intelligence System from Croatia, from 2006 should be taken as an example, because it is the most suitable for the real social and political state and the internal social and political structure of the country.

[14]In the meantime, the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia passed the Law on Operational-Technical Agency (OTA) on 12 April, 2018.

In addition, I would like to explain the fundamental elements connected to the National Security Council and its bodies- Bureau for Coordination of the Security and Intelligence Services and the Office for Professional and Administrative Affairs, as well as the Office for Protection of IT systems. As I mentioned before in the footnote '14' the Parliament of the Republic of Macedonia passed a Law on Operational-Technical Centre for following communications named 'Operational-Technical Agency OTA' (12 April, 2018)

4.1. The National Security Council would give a security assessment at the state level and would define the security priorities internally and externally. At the same time, it would make decisions which would be obligatory for the security entities and ask for concrete actions for vital state interests abroad. Moreover, the Council would take measures against the security entities based on the reports of the responsible control and supervision bodies. The Council would also propose a draft budget for the activities of the security entities in the country and internationally to the Government of the Republic of Macedonia.

The National Security Council consists of the President of the state, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Interior, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Justice, the Chief of General Staff of the Army, the Director of the Security Agency, the Director of the Intelligence Agency, the National Security Advisor to the President, the National Security Advisor to the Prime Minister, and some other authorities upon request.
A very important point for the National Security Council is convening and managing meetings. In order to implement the unity principle, the meetings would be convened and chaired by both the President and the Prime Minister, and the decisions would be signed by both of them.

4.2. The Bureau for Coordination of the Security and Intelligence entities would work on implementation of the decisions of the National Security Council and on coherence and coordination of the security entities according to the defined security priorities and would analyze the work of the security entities by giving adequate suggestions in order to improve the quality of their work.



The Bureau for Coordination of Security and Intelligence entities consists of Advisor of the President of the state for National security, the Advisor of the Prime Minister for National security, the Directors of the Security and Intelligence Agencies (civil and military), the Director of the Operational Technical Agency, the Director of the Office for Protection of State IT Systems and other managers upon request.
Meetings may be convened by both the Advisor of the Prime Minister for National Security and the Advisor of the President for National Security and they would both sign the decisions. Chairing the meetings would also be mutual.

4.3 The Office for Professional and Administrative Affairs would deal with these tasks: performing professional and administrative affairs of the Council, consolidating the reports on the work of the security entities, preparing and giving periodical reports to the Council and Bureau, taking part in the preparation of documents related to strategy and security, and, supervising and controlling the security entities.

As for the structure of the Office at National Security Council, there would be a manager, representatives from all security entities and appropriate administrative staff.

4.4 I think that the establishment of the Office for Protection of State IT Systems is obligatory, having in mind the level of technical data transfer nowadays and storing of information related to security entities and the security system as a whole, as well as the high risks by unauthorized access to them. Thus, the main duty of this office would be to protect and modernize the state IT systems, to accredit the state IT systems and to protect the communications.
The structure of this office consists of a director, professional and administrative staff.



CONCLUSION

The current security system of the Republic of Macedonia has shown a lot of weaknesses in the period of almost thirty years since it declared its independence. The weaknesses have been and are still vivid because the principles of unity, hierarchy, coordination, operation and synchronization have not been implemented in a proper manner. These principles should characterize every solidly established security system. Therefore, there is a need for a deeper reform of the state security system, a reform which asks for passing a Law on National Security. It would define the security entities and their responsibilities. At the same time, the foundations for establishing hierarchy, coordination, cooperation and synchronization in their mutual work would be set. On the top of the security structure would be National Security Council which would be convened and headed by the President of the State and the President of the Government. The Council would have a duty to make a security assessment of the state, define the security priorities and direct the work of the security entities and, at the same time, control and supervise them. The Council would have two supplementary bodies –Bureau for Security Coordination and Intelligence entities and Office for Professional and Administrative Affairs. The immediate bodies which would carry out the security duties are: Security Agency, Intelligence Agency, Operational-Technical Centre (agency) and Office for Protection of State IT systems. The control of the security entities would be performed on parliamentary, professionally (external and internal) and civilian level.

The security system like this would certainly be more efficient in discovering, studying and preventing the security challenges - dangers, threats and risks in a timely manner.

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RECONCEPTUALIZING SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Snezana Nikodinovska - Stefanovska, Dr.Sc
Faculty of Security - Skopje, Republic of Macedonia
e-mail: snikodinovska@gmail.com

Abstract

When conditions in the world change, the accepted definitions of some terms can become insufficient, or even confusing if they retain their traditional meaning. In such cases, the attempt to apply these old definitions to the changed character of the world reveals their limitations. The term "security" seems to be such a case. On the one hand, it is basic to human relations, but on the other hand the meaning of this word has changed so significantly over the centuries, and especially since the end of the cold war, that there is a need to redefine not only security, but many terms related to security, and to introduce some new terms.

Radical transformation of security ambient, complete reconfiguration of the system of global relations of power and force at the end of the Cold War and emergence of entirely new security challenges, risks, and threats, only added to intensification of the debate on redefinition of the concept of security.

Keywords: security, Copenhagen school, broadening and deepening of security.

1. INTRODUCTION

The term "security" bears deep controversy with regard to its meaning and scope. Moreover, the concept of security has always been a contested domain. This is significantly because of the reason that security, both in terms of theory and practice, is an evolving concept.[15]

Security is an elastic and diverse concept that can be understood in different forms, depending on its objects: the perception of threats, the protected values, and the

[15] For a good analysis of the concept of security following literature can be viewed: Arnold Wolfers, "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol", Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 67, No.4, December 1952; Lester Brown, "Redefining National Security", Worldwatch Paper No. 14, Washington, DC, 19n; Jessica Tuchman Matthews, "Redefining Security", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 68, 1989, pp. 162-n; Richard H. Ullman, "Redefining Security", International Security, Vol. 8, 1983, pp. 129 - 53; Joseph J. Romm, Defining National Security (New York, 1993); J. Ann Tickner, "Re-visioning Security", in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.), International Relations Theory Today (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 175 - 97; Ole Waever, Concepts of Security (Copenhagen Institute for Political Science: University of Copenhagen, 1997); Michael C. Williams, "The Institutions of Security: Elements of a Theory of Security Organizations", Cooperation and Conflict, Vol.32, No.3, 1997; M. McDonald, "Securitization and the Construction of Security", European Journal of International Relations, Vol.14, 2008, pp. 563 - 587; Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, The Evolution of the International Security Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

means through which these values can be protected.[16] The changing perception of security threats that already emerged in the 1980's[17] and the ways in which these threats are addressed, has led to comprehensive and scientific studies of the security concept.[18] The end of the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar balance of power in Europe and in the world made the concept of security one of the most disputed concepts in the international relations.

During the Cold War we have been looking at the traditional security. However, in the 1970's and the 1980's the concern over the economic and environmental problems, in the 1990's the concern over the "identity" and "transnational crimes", and in the 2000's the concern over the energy, cyber, and social security as well as terrorism have broadened the meaning of security. Already, in the 1980's Buzan has mentioned about new security domains beside military such as social, economic, political and environmental. Thus, discussion on the broadening of security has started towards other domains even before the end of the Cold War era, indicating that we cannot only focus on military issues, which is also well noted by the Copenhagen School.

Buzan and the Copenhagen school, viewed security as a much more multifaceted concept which was not necessarily linked to territory. According to this approach, security could be measured on a variety of levels, both above and below the state and it could be assessed in relation to political, economic and societal values.

2. SECURITY – CONTESTED TERM

The term "security" is one of the most broadly defined words known to human beings. "Security" means different things to different people, and it may even mean different things to the same person, depending on the context.

Etymologically, according to Hans Gunter Brauch, "Security (Lat.: 'securus', 'securitas', 'secura'; It.: 'sicurezza'; Fr.: 'securite'; Sp.: 'seguridad'; Port.: 'seguran~a'; Ger.: 'Sicherheit') was introduced by Cicero and Lucretius referring to a philosophical and psychological state of mind, or the subjective feeling of freedom from sorrow."[19] It was used as a political concept in the context of "Pax Romana" by referring to political stability in the era of Augustus.[20] In the classical sense, "security refers to tranquility and freedom of care, or what Cicero termed the absence of anxiety upon which the fulfilled life depends."[21]

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[16] See: D.A. Baldwin, 'The Concept of Security', Review of International Studies 1997-23, pp. 5-26. Cf B. Buzan, People, States and Fear: The National Security Problems in International Relations, Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1983, p.6. (stating that security is an 'essentially contested concept').

[17] See, e.g., J.T. Mathews, 'Redefining Security', Foreign Affairs 1989-68(2), pp. 162-177; R.H. Ullman, 'Redefining Security', International Security 1983-8, pp. 129 - 153

[18] See: B. Buzan and L. Hansen, Evolution of International Security Studies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

[19] Hans Gunter Brauch, "Threats, Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Risks in Environmental and Human Security", United Nations University-Institute for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS), Bonn(Germany), Publication Series of UNU-EHS, No 1/2005, 2005, p. 7.

[20] Ibid.

[21] R P. H. Liotta, "Boomerang Effect: The Convergence of National and Human Security', *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 33, No. 4, 2002, p. 477.

The term “security” by most dictionaries and encyclopedias is defined as freedom - from danger, fear, deprivation, care, even from doubt. It is also defined as a condition, quality, value, or state. The English word "security" has a wide range of meanings including "to feel safe" and "to be protected" and is used to describe a situation without any risks or worries.

In his seminal work on Realism, Hans Morgenthau thus hardly bothered to define *security*. The closest he came to a definition was: “National security must be defined as integrity of the national territory and its institutions”.[22] A more comprehensive definition of security was proposed by Arnold Wolfers.[23] This definition has become a “standard” in IR theory. Wolfers pointed out to two sides of the security concept: "Security, in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, and in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked". Thus, in its double meaning, security refers to an absence of objective dangers, i.e. of threats, challenges, vulnerabilities and risks, and of subjective fears, and subjectively to the perception thereof. Objective security is achieved if the dangers posed by manifold threats, challenges, vulnerabilities and risks are avoided, prevented, managed, coped with, mitigated, and adapted to by individuals, societal groups, the state or regional or global international organizations.

For Arnold Wolfers, the term security covers a range of goals so wide that highly divergent policies can be interpreted as policies of security. Therefore, he refers specifically to national security, although in a broader sense than only military force. He closely relates national security to national interest, and those policies designed to promote the demands which are ascribed to the nation rather than to individuals, subnational groups, or mankind as a whole, arguing that national security designates an objective of policy distinguishable from others. Finally, he states that security is “a value, of which a nation can have more or less and which it can aspire to have in greater or lesser measure.” Again writing more than a half century ago, Wolfers referred to national security as an “ambiguous symbol.” What would he say now, when so many “security” paradigms have emerged that are much broader than his concept of national security and its political aspects?

3. SECURITY: THE MULTI-FACETED CONCEPT IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

As one of the main concepts used in the international relation, security was and still is one of the most contested ones. Even before the demise of the Cold War, traditional state-centric and military-focused approaches to security studies were being questioned by a growing number of scholars and practitioners. At the end of the “short twentieth century”, the environment dramatically changed in Europe and the old approaches to security had to be replaced by others that fit better to the multidimensional characteristics of the European Security landscape today.

As an international relations concept, the term security is ambiguous in content as in format. Thus Helga Haftendorn asks whether security is a goal, an issue-area, a

[22] Morgenthau, H. J., 1960. Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace, 3rd edition, Alfred A. Knopf: New York.

[23] Wolfers, A, 1962. National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol, in: Discord and Collaboration. Essays on International Politics John Hopkins University Press: Baltimore, pp. 147 - 165

concept, a research program, or a discipline. In the end, she defines security as "a value and / or system maintenance over time, and the absence of threats to it."[24] This is a good definition that gives us the essence of the real nature of security.

There is no concept of security. Security refers to different sets of issues and has their origins in different historical and philosophical contexts. All these difficulties in understanding security and the concepts related to it increased in the last more than twenty years. The end of the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the end of the bipolar balance of power in Europe and in the world made the concept of security one of the most disputed concepts in the international relations.

A more differentiated concept of security began to emerge with the end of the Cold War. At the beginning of the new millennium, the meaning of the term "security" has become vague and expansive to the degree that everything could be considered as a security issue. The twentieth century, particularly the last decade, brought enormous changes to both the world political order and technological development, which have changed overall perceptions of security. Namely, radical transformation of security ambient, complete reconfiguration of the system of global relations of power and force at the end of the Cold War and emergence of entirely new security challenges, risks and threats, only added to intensification of the debate on redefinition of the concept of security.

An enormous contribution to the contemporary security studies / concept of security was made by the so-called Copenhagen School of Security Studies, which offered a quite innovative, original perspective on a broad spectrum of security issues, perceiving clearly that security dynamics could no longer be reduced only to the military-political relations of the two super powers, however important they might be.

Drawing on the work of Buzan and the Copenhagen school, security was viewed as a much more multifaceted concept which was not necessarily linked to territory. According to this approach, security could be measured on a variety of levels, both above and below the state and it could be assessed in relation to political, economic and societal values.

4. THE EXPANDED CONCEPTION OF SECURITY - AN ALTERNATIVE SECURITY DISCURSE

The traditional view of security is defined in military terms, with the primary focus on state protection from threats to national interests. However, such a traditional notion of security, as defined by reference to national survival, physical protection of state territory, and military power, has expanded its scope in the second half of the 20th century, particularly since the end of the Cold War.

With the end of the Cold War in 1990, the study of international security added a new dimension. New conceptions of security e.g. human security considered that the traditional notion of state-centric security, typically defined by military aspects, was insufficient to explain emerging threats. As an alternative to the conventional understanding of security affairs, human security discourse incorporated poverty,

[24] Helga Haftendorn, The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International Security ,*International Studies Quarterly* ,Vol. 35, No. 1 (Mar., 1991), pp. 3 - 17

environment, and intra-state conflict as threats to an individual's life.[25] Thus, the security discourse experienced a shift from traditional to nontraditional security. The traditionalists, backed by political realism, define security in terms of power.[26] In realism, meaning is closely linked to the military capability of a state. This state-centric and conventional concept of security has been challenged by the post-realist security scholarship. This is the reason why redefining the concept of national security has been a prime target of numerous research agendas since the 1980's. Nontraditional security is a significant shift from the conventional idea of security to a new paradigm of security that includes poverty, environment, health, and social instability as threat factors.[27] There are two subcategories of followers of the nontraditional security approach: wideners and the deepeners. Wideners reflect the new scope of the security studies and have included diverse issues e.g. environment, internal conflict, and economic crisis as part of security affairs. On the other hand, deepeners discuss the focus of security, i.e., whose security is being threatened.[28] Apart from these two categories of nontraditional aspects, there are security concerns that are not limited by borders. These transnational security concerns include ethnic conflict, weapons of mass destruction, political instability, and international organized crime e.g. drug and human trafficking.

5. BROADENING AND DEEPENING OF SECURITY

Radical transformation of security ambient, complete reconfiguration of the system of global relations of power and force at the end of the Cold War and emergence of entirely new security challenges, risks and threats, only added to intensification of the debate on redefinition of the concept of security.

With re-conceptualization of security, there are two dimensions: broadening, i.e., consideration of nonmilitary security threats such as environmental scarcity and degradation, spread of disease, overpopulation, refugee movements, terrorism; and deepening, i.e., consideration of the security of individuals and groups rather than focusing narrowly on external threats to states such as ethnic conflict, civil war, environmental threats, and survival of individuals. While broadening can be attributed predominantly to attempts made by representatives of neorealist approach, then parallel broadening and deepening of the concept of security has been proposed by the constructivist approach associated with the works of the Copenhagen School.

The central point of the debate was a question on whether and how to broaden and deepen the security concept without bringing its logical coherence into the dispute, how to widen the focus of the research onto the other, nonmilitary sectors, and keep the sole concept meaningful and to analysts a useful tool.

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[25] United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Human Development Report 1994, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 23.

[26] Colin Elman, "Realism", in Paul D. Williams, ed. *Security Studies - An Introduction*, (New York: Routledge, 2008), 16.

[27] The definition of the nontraditional security is used by the Consortium of Non-traditional Security Studies in Asia (NTS-Asia). For more details see NTS-Asia website, www.rsis-ntsasia.org.

[28] For a better understanding of the concepts of "wideners" and "deepeners" one can read: Sarah Terry, Definition Security: Normative Assumption and Methodological Shortcomings, (Canada: University of Calgary, 1998), 1.

The reconceptualization of security has not only been provoked by the global contextual change but also by fundamental changes in the approaches of the social sciences from positivism to constructivism (ideas matter, reality and knowledge are socially constructed) in political science and international relations to a "reflexive modernity" in sociology.[29] The combination of the impact of the change of international order on the object of security analysis, and of the new theoretical approaches in the social sciences have amalgamated in manifold new concepts and theoretical approaches on security threats, challenges, vulnerabilities, and risks that has resulted in a new scientific diversity.

6. CONCLUSION

The concept of security has expanded, particularly after the end of the Cold War, in terms of both security objects and security threats. In the present debate on theory of international relations attention is paid to the concept of broadening and deepening of security. Broadening of the neorealist concept of security means inclusion of a wider range of potential threats, beginning from economic and environmental issues, and ending with human rights and migration. Deepening the agenda of security studies means moving either down to the level of individual or human security or up to the level of international or global security, with regional and societal security as possible intermediate points.

However, the moment one leaves the idea to tie the concept of security only to certain referent objects (such as the state) and to certain kind of security threats (such as military), a question "what quality makes something a security issue" arrives at the very centre of controversy. Without distinctive criteria which separate a security issue from non-security issue, the concept of security is trivial and leaves only confusion behind.

While many theories of international relations / security are fiercely contested, it is usually inappropriate to see them as rivals over some universal truth about world politics. Rather, each rests on certain assumptions and epistemologies, is constrained within certain specified conditions, and pursues its own analytic goal. While various theories may lead to more or less compelling conclusions about international relations, none is definitively 'right' or 'wrong'. Rather, each possesses some tools that can be of use in examining and analyzing rich, multi-causal phenomena in international politics such as security.

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SECURITY INSTITUTIONS OF THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Nikola Dujovski, Dr.Sc
Faculty of Security – Skopje, Republic of Macedonia
e-mail: ndujovski@fb.uklo.edu.mk
Marjan Arsovski, Dr.Sc
Faculty of Security – Skopje, Republic of Macedonia
e-mail: arsovskim@yahoo.com

Abstract

The member-states of the European Union have always recognized the need for acting together in the foreign policy, but this proved as a difficult challenge to be achieved. The principle of the common foreign and security policy for the first time was formalized in 1992 with the Contract from Maastricht, but there was the need for formation of formal secondary instruments for diplomacy and intervention inspired by the regional conflicts in 1990. Such a decisive action is the European Union. With the adoption of the Lisbon treaty, for implementation of its provisions the treaty determines the existence of the European Foreign Service with the task to work in collaboration with the diplomatic service of the member-states in order to ensure consistency and coordination of the external action of the Union. During their mandate, the High representative is assisted by the Institutions which are responsible for foreign and security policy such as administration of the Council and the Commission. In this context, the purpose of the research paper is to explore the development of the institutions responsible for the Common foreign policy of the European Union.

Key words: *European Union, Institutions of the Common foreign and security policy*

INTRODUCTION

At the summit in Thessaloniki on June 20, 2003, the European Council adopted a conclusion on the establishment of the competent bodies of the Council with the purpose to overtake all necessary actions in direction of creation of an intergovernmental agency from the field of defense development, research, and supply of weapons during 2004. As a result, the European security strategy adopted by the European Council determined the formation of the Defense Agency as an important element for the development of more flexible and efficient military resources, which is also provided in the Agreement for the adoption of the constitution of Europe[30]. The constitution came into force but it was not ratified by all member states; its norms were later accepted with the Lisbon treaty and then they became effective[31].

[30] European constitution – Subject and documents in rule of EU and on the member-states, Amato Julijano, Jack Ziler, Skopje 2009 – IX p. 306

[31] Agreement of the establishment of a constitution in Europe adopted by the heads of state and government of the European Council in Brussels on July 17 and 18 and signed in Rome on October, 29, 2004

EUROPEAN DEFENSE AGENCY

In the general provisions for foreign and security policy of the Lisbon Treaty and further in the section of security and defense policy in Article 28d, the existence of the Agency responsible for development of defense opportunities, research, procurement, and armament was established. This Agency identifies operative needs, promotes measures in order to satisfy the needs, contributes for identifying and where there is a need for implementation of the measures necessary for strengthening of the industrial and technologic base of the defense sector, and participates in the defining of the European capacities and the policy of armament assisting the Council in assessing progress of the military capacities[32]. De facto, the Agency started its work in the second half of 2004, when for better coordination of the existing institutions the European Union started with the creation of the European Defense Agency in which all groups were integrated.

The purposes and the organization of the Agency are determined by the Common action 2004/551/CFSP of the Council from July 12, 2004 for establishment of the European defense agency. According to the same determination, the purpose of the European Defense Agency is to develop defense capacities in the field of crisis management and to promote European collaboration in armament. Also, the Agency tends to achieve strengthening of the European industrial and technologic base in order to create a competitive market of the defense equipment and to promote research in the field of defense. The Agency was founded in Brussels and all members participated in it, except for Denmark. According to Article 6 from the Protocol for the position of Denmark added to the Agreement of the European Union, Denmark does not participate in the formulation and implementation of decisions and activities of the European Union which have implications for the defense. Denmark acts on authorization and political surveillance of the Council to which it delivers regular reports for its activities. Every year, the Council gives instructions for the way of working and adopts a program for the work of the Agency, while every three years it adopts a financial framework for the Agency.

The mission of the European Defense Agency is to give support to the Council and the member states in order to improve the defense capacities of the European Union in the field of crisis management and ensure development of the European security and defense policy.

With the Lisbon treaty, in Article 28d it is determined in details that the European defense agency under the jurisdiction of the Council has the basic tasks and areas to:

1. contribute in identification of the purposes of the member states in their military capacities, such as evaluation of the obligations of the member states which they have in relation to their military capacities;
2. to develop defense capacities in the field of crisis management through determining the future defense needs of the EU, coordinate implementation of the Action plan for European opportunities and harmony of the military needs, suggest common activities in performing operations, and give its opinion about the financial priorities;
3. promotion of harmony of the operative needs and making effective and appropriate methods for procurement;

[32] Decision of the Council 2007/643/CFSP from September 18 2007 for financial rules of the European defense agency and the rules for public procurement and Rulebook for providing financial support from the operating budget of the European defense agency (L 269 from 12. 10 .2007)

4. suggestion of military projects with the purposes determined for military capacities such as providing coordination of the programs implemented by the member states and management of specific coordination programs; by this it improves the European collaboration in armament through suggestion of new projects for multilateral cooperation and it coordinates and manages the existence and specific programs;
5. contribute to identification and if there is a need, to implementation of measures for strengthening of the industrial and technological base of the sector for defense and improvement of the efficiency in a military issue for creation of the competitive European market for defense equipment for which purpose the Agency, in consultation with the Commission and the industry develops appropriate politics and strategies, and it develops and adjusts the rules in that field;
6. support the research in defensive technology, coordinate the common research activities and studies for technical solutions for future operative needs; improve the effectiveness of the defensive research and technology in cooperation with the Commission through promotion and coordination of the researches in order to meet the potential needs for the defense capacities.

The European Defense Agency is opened for every member state which is willing to be a part of it. Deciding with qualified majority, the Council adopts a statute of the Agency by which the places and rules for work are determined; in this decision it takes the level of an effective participant in the activities of the Agency. Within the Agency, special groups are formed to connect the member states participating in common projects. If there is a need, the Agency will realize its obligations in communication with the Committee.

Organization and financial rules

The Agency has the status of a legal entity. Its basic organs are the Head of the Agency, the Management board and the Executive Director:

1. the Head of the Agency is the General Secretary – the High representative for common foreign and security policy who is responsible for the whole functioning and organization of the Agency and gives directions issued by the Council and the decisions of the Management board implemented by the Executive Director ,who directly responds to him;
2. the Management board of the Agency is an organ which makes decisions. It consists of one representative from every member state and one representative from the Committee. The Management board meets at least twice a year at ministerial level for defense or its representatives who convene and preside the Head of the Agency;
3. the Executive Director of the Agency is appointed by the Management board on suggestion of the Head of the Agency for a mandate of three years which can be further continued for a period of another two years. The Executive Director manages and is responsible for the staff, and performs control and coordination of the organizational units – departments.

The Committee is a member of the Management board without the right to vote and it is connected to the work of the Agency. Also, in the name of the Union, the Committee can participate in projects and programs of the Agency.

Financial provisions which are related to the general budget of the Agency are adopted unanimously apart from the Council. According to them, the revenues consist of

the other revenues and the contributions are paid by the member states which participate in the Agency. The contributions are determined according to the gross national product scale as it is determined in Article 28(3) in the Agreement of the European Union according to the decision of the Council 2000/597/EC, Euroatom from September 29, 2000. Such ad hoc projects and programs and their special budgets are predicted in two categories such as:

1. when one or more member states participants or the Executive Director submit to the Management board an ad hoc project or programs which are in the competence of the Agency, for the same they inform the appropriate bodies responsible for the ad hoc budget. In principle, the member states are called to join and they contribute to it. The board of directions approves the formation of ad hoc project or program.
2. One or more member states can inform the Management board that they have the intention to form ad hoc projects or programs and they have determined appropriate budget. In order to maximize the opportunities of cooperation, every member state participating in it is timely informed for an ad hoc project or program so that any member state can express its interest for connection.

At the proposal of the Executive director or a member state, the Management board can decide based on the Agency Treaty to be entrusted administrative and financial management of some activities in the framework of its competence. The Management board can allow the Agency to conclude contracts in the name of some member states.

In order to carry out its mission, the Agency can enter into administrative arrangements with other countries, organizations, or other subjects. This kind of arrangements covers areas such as:

- the principle of the relations between the Agency and a third person;
- provisions for consulting on themes related to the work of the Agency;
- security questions.

COMMITTEE FOR POLITICAL AND SECURITY AFFAIRS

On the Summit in Helsinki on December 11, 1999, the European Council agreed to form the Committee for political and security issues. For that purpose, by decision 2000/143/CSFP apart from the Council it was formed a Temporary Committee, while on the Summit in Nice in 2001 at the meeting of the Heads of the states and governments (Council of the European Union), an agreement was achieved on the establishment of a Committee for political and security issues. With the Treaty from Nice, the Committee for political questions turns into Political and Security Committee which besides politics, comes competent also for questions in the field of security. The idea for security questions existed even earlier but it could not be accomplished with the Treaty from Amsterdam because of the Turkish - Greek disputes for which through the rule of veto, Greece conditioned the existence of security policy of the European Union with prior resolution of the Cyprus issue in their benefit.

According to Article 25 from the Contract for Operation of the European Union, by signing the agreement of Lisbon the formation of the Committee for political and security issues was defined as a permanent structure interested in following the international situation in secret field apart from the Common foreign and security policy and the European security and defense policy which plays the key role in defining and following reactions of the European Union to some crisis. According to this Article, the

Committee for political and security affairs follows the international events in the field of Common foreign and security policy and participates in the defining of the policy of the Union through giving its opinion to the Council. On a suggestion of the Council or in his / her incentive, the High representative of the Union for foreign affairs and security policy tends to abide by Article 207 from the Agreement. Also, the Committee takes care of the implementation of agreed policies, respecting the position of the High representative.

Tasks of Politics and Security

The mission of the concept for political and security tasks, is to follow the international situations in the fields of Common foreign and security policy, so the Committee will:

- give opinion to the Council, in order to help about defining of politics;
- looking for draft-conclusions of the Council for general things;
- coordinate different work groups in the field of Common foreign and security policy.

The Political and Security Committee leads a political dialogue through keeping privileged relations with the General secretary, the High representative, and special representatives such as leading some privileged forum for a dialogue on European security and defense politics (for example the forum leaded with NATO). The Political and Security Committee sends instructions to the Military Committee for which it later receives some opinions and recommendations.

The President of the Military Committee also participates at the meetings of the Political and Security Committee and where there is a need gets in touch with the Military headquarter of the European Union.

It contains high officers / ambassadors in the permanent representatives of the member states which meet several times a week on the level of permanent representatives in Brussels and it performs the central function of an intermediary on political and administration level.

The Political and Security Committee and the Committee of Permanent Representatives have the support by the work groups of regional experts or experts of ministries for foreign affairs which regularly session in Brussels on the part of the advisers to ambassadors from the permanent representatives for Common foreign and security policy.

Effective crisis management

In the frame of the obligations determined by the chapter for Common foreign and security policy, the Political and Security Committee is under the responsibility of the Council and High representative which carries out political control and strategic direction of missions for crisis management in member 43 (28b). About these missions, the Council can entrust it to the Committee to make independent decisions in the framework of the purpose and duration of operation for crisis management. As an organ of the Council, the Political and Security Committee is interested in crisis situations and examines the options which can be counted as a response and action on the EU. For that purpose, the Political and Security Committee recommends to the Council which political purposes can be proceed, and options for resolving the crisis.

The Political and Security Committee can make opinion and recommend to the Council to take joint action. Without entering into the Committee competencies, it can oversee implementation of the measures and their effects and the Committee and the member states inform it about the measures which were overtaken.

In the frame of their competencies and according to procedures determined by agreements, the Council and the Commission have the opportunity to make legal decisions. But, according to Article 25 from the Agreement of EU, the Council can delegate to the Political and Security Committee on the duration of the crisis management to make decisions of political control and strategy work. It means that the Committee can be called in emergency in case of crisis and on the part of the Council to receive authorization for deciding with the operation of crisis management in case the actions for crisis management have a special authorization for control of the lower instances of the Common foreign and security policy.

In the case of military response, the Political and Security Committee takes political control and gives strategy instructions. Based on the opinions and recommendations of the Military Committee of the European Union, the Political and Security Committee rated the strategy of military options, the concept of the operation and together with the operative plan delivered it to the Council. In order to complete the operation, the Political and Security Committee delivers recommendations to the Council from the recommendation before and opinion of the Military Committee of the European Union.

Based on this, the Council makes decision to start the operation in the frame of a joint action when it is needed to proceed the role of the General Secretary – High representative in implementing the measures. During the operation, the General Secretary - High representative may preside with the Committee for political and security and deliver reports to the Council. On the base of procedures of the work of the Political and Security Committee, the General secretary – High representative directs the activities to the Centre of situations, who supports the Political and Security Committee with providing information for crisis management.

MILITARY COMMITTEE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

On the regular session, on December 11, 1999, in Helsinki, the European Council approved the formation of new existing political and military organs in the frame of the Council of EU. Such is the Military Committee of the European Union.

The Military Committee of the European Union is a supreme military organ in the composition of the Council of EU. This is a forum for military consultations and collaboration among the member states of the European Union in the field of prevention of conflicts and crisis management. The Military Committee is an organ consisted of military representatives, Heads of Governments of member-states whose primary function is to give advices to the Political and Security Committee.

The Military Committee of the European Union was established with the decision of the Council from January 22, 2001, for creation of the Military Committee of the European Union which establishes its mandate and it is the highest military organ of the Council of EU.

Content of the Military Committee

The Military Committee of the European Union is consisted of Heads for defense apart from the military representatives. The meeting are organized on a level of Heads or their representatives.

The chairman of the Committee must be an officer with four stars and he or she is appointed on the part of the Council of recommendation prior to the Heads for defense,

with a mandate of three years if the Council does not decide differently. The President chairs the meetings at the level of Heads for defense or the level of representatives and represents the Military Committee in the Council and the Political and Security Committee

The Military Committee is a forum for collaboration and military consultations among the member states of the European Union in the field of prevention of conflicts and crisis management. It provides the Political and Security Committee with advices and recommendations for military questions which adopts them with consensus.

The Military Committee of the European Union may give advice and recommendations for:

- Military aspects for the whole concept of crisis management;
- Military aspects for political control and strategy direction of operations;
- Risk assessment from crisis;
- Military dimension and implications for crisis situation;
- Evaluation, elaboration, and reassessment for purposes;
- Financial assessment for operation and exercises;
- Military relations with countries candidates, other countries or international organizations;

In the case of crisis, the Military Committee of the European Union will perform exercises for giving military instructions to the Military headquarter of the EU. The Military Committee has to:

- At the request of the Political and Security Committee to suggest instructions to the General director of the Military headquarter of EU, to prepare and present strategic military options;
- To evaluate and assess strategic military options developed from the Military headquarter of the EU and deliver these military assessments and evaluations to the Political and Security Committee;
- To approve the beginning and planning of instructions for operation based on the military option apart from the Council;
- At the base of the assessment of the Military headquarter of the European Union to give advice and instructions to the Political and Security Committee for an operative concept and an operative plan from the commandant of the operation;
- To give advices to the Committee for political and military questions about an option for stopping the operation.

The Military Committee of the European Union follows the correct execution of the military operations for duration while they are implemented under the responsibility of the operative commandant.

MILITARY HEADQUARTER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

With the decision of the Council from January 22, 2001, the Military headquarter was created. For the EU it is a resource of military expertise who prepare assessment, warning, and strategic plans of Petersburg jobs (human missions, piece, and crisis management) and for every operation apart from the EU. The Military headquarter is an organ consisted of military experts nominated by the member states which work in the area of the Council of advice with the purpose of warning from crisis hot spots. It dominates with 200 officers who are directly responsible to the General secretary of the Council and to the Military Committee. Their basic function is to plan, assess and give instructions for the concept of crisis management and the general military strategy responsible for generic and strategic planning of actions in situation of crisis.

Functions and mission of the Military Headquarter of the EU

The Military Headquarter of the European Union is a unit within the Council of advice under the military jurisdiction of the Military Committee of the European Union. It implements decisions and instructions of the Military Committee and it helps them in assessment and military aspects of strategic plan. This applies to the entire spectrum of Petersburg jobs as well as the European security strategy and operation led by the EU.

The General Secretary is directly associated with the High-representative, so the Military Committee provides support on the request of the General Secretary – High representative or the Committee for political and security for temporary missions with other countries or international organizations.

The Military headquarter provides a relation between the Military Committee of the European Union and military resources. It is responsible for following, assessment, and giving instructions in terms of the strengths and capacities available on the part of the member states of the European Union and in coordination with NATO identifies the national European multinational forces for operations of the European Union. The Military headquarter is responsible for :

- Following potential crisis;
- Implementation of military aspects for strategy planning;
- Organization and coordination of procedures with national and multinational General Headquarters and those who have made them available of the European Union;
- Programming, planning, implementation, and assessment of the military aspect to the procedures of the European Union for crisis management;
- Establishing permanent relations with NATO;
- It is a host of the NATO team for relations and creation of the team of the European Union in the NATO Supreme headquarter of the allied forces in Europe;
- Contributes for military aspects for unique security and defense policy and fight against terrorism;

The Military Headquarter will implement all of these tasks with respect to contribute to the planning and defense of NATO and the process of planning and review of the Partnership for peace. It also has a close collaboration with the European Agency for defense.

Current management with crisis and operations

Management with crisis and operations on the part of the Military headquarter occurs as its additional functions for which it can requires and proceeds specific information from organizations and other available resources. For that, it gives military advice and strategic instructions for military operations of the Military Committee and the Political and Security Committee.

In managing and observation of the whole military aspects of the operations, the Military headquarter works under the leadership of the Military Committee and it implements strategyic analysis in the permanent communication with the operative commandant. In terms of political and operative events, the Headquarter informs the Military Committee on the new military options which further involve in base for its advices apart from the Political and Security Committee.

Since 2004, the Military headquarter is helped by the civil and military cells which exist in its frame implementing tasks of strategic planning in case of crisis for common civil and military operations. About the EU Civil Military Cell, the Military headquarter is responsible for implementing capacity needed for the planning and management of military operations of the EU. According to recommendations from the Military Committee in case where there is a need for civil and military purposes, the Headquarter has the opportunity to form the operative centre in case where there are not assigned General headquarters on the part of the Council. The Civil Military Cell is a permanent organ in the operative centre of the European Union which helps in coordination of the civil operations.

STANDING COMMITTEE FOR OPERATIONAL COOPERATION OF INTERNAL SECURITY

With the decision of the Council, a Standing Committee for promotion and strengthening of the operational collaboration of internal security was formed in the frame of the European Union. Here, detailed responsibilities of the Committee were implemented. The creation of this Committee is with the purpose to facilitate, promote, and strengthen operative cooperation of the relevant state organs of the member states of the European Union in the field of internal security. The Committee implements effective collaboration in the areas of the police and the customs and all organs which are concerned in border control. It will also cover court cooperation in criminal tasks where there is a need for operative cooperation in the field of internal security. The Permanent Committee makes an assessment of the effective operational cooperation, identifies oversights and failures and recommends some measures for solving disadvantages. The Permanent Committee will not be involved in the implementation of operations or in preparing legal acts.

In relation to the emergence of terroristic attacks or natural and human disasters on the territory of the EU, the Permanent Committee will help the Council in the application of the solidarity clause according to Article 222 from the Treaty of functioning of the European Union. The Permanent Committee helps in the implementation of consistency for actions from the Europol, the Eurojust European Agency for external borders, and the other organs. If there is a need, all of them will be summoned as observatories to be present at the meetings of the Permanent Committee.

MILITARY EXERTION AND CIVIL COMMITTEE - CIVCOM

Since March 2000, additionally was made an immediate military expertise in the form of a Military Committee (WUUE) and a military headquarters in the General Secretariat of the Council with more than 100 people. In the following years they were supplemented, inter alia, with a military and civil planning cell and the European Defense Agency (EAO).

It is important to emphasize that the Common Foreign and Security Policy has also civilian aspects of the rule of law, since the General Committee (CIVKOM), which is a formal level, is the same as the Committee on the Interior, that is subordinate to the Secretary General of the Council, and has an advisory character.

This committee, among other things, is in charge of coordinating the policies of the political forces, the officials of the European Security and Defense Policy and the judiciary and other experts in the field, with the main intention to promote the European Union in the fields of human rights and democracy, the rule of law and the restoration of the public order, which covers about three quarters of all previous engagements on the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy.

POLICY UNITS AND AMBASSADORS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN NON-MEMBER COUNTRIES

The trend of the growing presence of the CFSP bodies in Brussels since the late 1990s is additionally responsible for the "Policy Unit", which represents a small group (of about 20 employees) subordinate to the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, composed of experts and placed in the General Secretariat of the Council, which, contrary to the initial task as a planning cell, increasingly participates in the determination of the daily work of foreign and security policy.

An additional important element of the fourth level in the hierarchy of the Common Foreign and Security Policy are the monthly meetings of the ambassadors of the European Union states in non-member countries and international organizations and conferences. The more recent reports (2007: 257) are an important source of information for decision-making in the Common Foreign and Security Policy bodies in Brussels.

PERMANENT COMMITTEE ON OPERATIONAL COOPERATION OF INTERNAL SECURITY

The Council's decision created the Standing Committee for the Promotion and Enhancement of Operational Cooperation on Internal Security within the European Union, setting out the detailed responsibilities of the Committee.

The establishment of the Standing Committee is aimed at facilitating, promoting and strengthening the operational co-operation of the relevant state authorities of the Member States of the European Union in the field of internal security.

More specifically, the Committee provides effective cooperation and coordination in areas covered by police and customs cooperation, as well as for border control authorities. Where necessary, it will also cover judicial cooperation in criminal matters for operational cooperation in the field of internal security. The Permanent Commission assesses the effectiveness of operational co-operation, identifies all omissions and

recommends appropriate measures to address the shortcomings. The Standing Committee will not be involved in conducting operations or in drafting legal acts.

In relation to the occurrence of a terrorist attack or a natural and man-made disaster on the territory of the EU, the Standing Committee will adequately assist the Council in the carrying out of the solidarity clause laid down in Article 222 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

The Standing Committee has helped to ensure consistency in the actions undertaken by Eurojust, Europol, the European Agency for External Borders, and other relevant bodies. If necessary, these bodies are invited as observers to attend meetings of the Standing Committee.

COLLEGE FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE

On 19 and 20 June 2003, a meeting of the European Council in Thessaloniki was proposed to develop a coordinated policy for the European Union for training in the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).

The European Security and Defense College was established on 18 July 2005 by the Joint Action 2008/550 / CFSP of the Council of 23 June 2008 establishing the College of European Security and Defense (ESDC), abolishing Joint Action 2005/575 / CFSP and a network of educational institutions responsible for providing training for civilian and military personnel in the field of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Its main purpose is to promote common understanding of that policy and to disseminate best practices in the field of security and defense.

Pursuant to Article 13 of the joint action on 21 December 2007, the Board of Directors presented a report on the activities and perspectives of the ESDC. On March 18, 2008, the Committee on Politics and Security requests the Council to change the joint action in the direction of its improvement, which should be properly reviewed and revised no later than December 31, 2007.

The College is an organized network that brings together institutes, faculties, academies, and universities dealing with security and defense policy issues, including the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS).

The high level of training in the field of the European Security and Defense Policy is a strategic commitment in order to promote a mutual understanding of the European Security and Defense Policy between civilian and military personnel, and to disseminate the best practices in this area equally.

The college training consists of three types of activities: the high level course, the orientation course and courses for a specialized audience or a specific topic. All civilian or military persons, nationals of member states of the Union, accession countries, candidate countries and, where appropriate, third countries, dealing with strategic aspects in the field of the European Security and Defense Policy, have the right to training. Participants in ESDC training activities may also be invited to NGOs, academia, media and representatives of the business community. Participants who have completed all ESDC courses will receive a certificate signed by the Secretary General and the High Representative for the European Security and Defense Policy who will be recognized by the member states and the institutions of the European Union. ESDC goals are:

- Improving the European security culture within the framework of the European Security and Defense Policy;
- Promotion of a better understanding of the European security and defense policy;

- Providing the institutions of the European Union and the Member States with personnel and administration qualified in the field of the European Security and Defense Policy;
- Assistance in the promotion of contacts and professional relations among the participants in the trainings.

ORGANIZATION AND FINANCING

The Joint Action of the Council constitutes three network management bodies, such as:

- The Steering Committee responsible for the overall coordination and guidance of ESDC training activities;
- The Executive Board which guarantees the quality and coherence of training activities;
- A permanent secretariat responsible for the assistance of the other two bodies;

The costs related to its participation in the ESDC, including salaries, fees, travel and expenses associated with the organization and administrative support of ESDC training activities for its members are settled by the member states, institutions and agencies of the European Union as well as each institute representing a part of the ESDC network.

CONCLUSION

Since the creation of the European Union to the present moment, the development of the Union's foreign policy has been advancing from intergovernmental cooperation to become a complex "service" because nationalism and supranationalism is confusing in the EU Security Institutions. Since 2009, the Lisbon Treaty has strengthened the formal intergovernmental decision-making approach, adding supranational dimensions to the CFSP (as foreign policy) and the EU's CSDP (as defense).

The EU's security institutions are institutionally designed in times of rapid change and need to find their voice and role. The relationship between the EU's security institutions and the national foreign and defense ministries is a complex matter due to the EU's foreign policy densities. This is deeply relevant in light of the global and domestic forces that affect the EU and the member states.

In addition, incorporating intergovernmentalism and supranationalism into one of the complexities is for fostering a common European position on many controversial foreign policy issues. The EU security institutions represent hybridity that makes foreign policy exposed to the strengths and weaknesses of uncertainty. The conceptualization of the EU foreign policy is a disputed subject, reflecting the juicy generics of the EU's nature as an international actor and does not rely on a single interpretive approach. There should be an overall research question, where so many altered volumes failed to do so and offer a roadmap for understanding European foreign policy. EU security institutions have an important contribution to the under-studied topic. The methodology used to review the positions of the EU Security Institutions allows for the development of a serious argument and confirms the expectations of the European experts. It is a strong case in the justification of their qualitative methodology by claiming that the explanatory power of normative and ideational variables is central in order to explain changes, adaptation and reforms.

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THE ROLE OF THE CORPORATE SECURITY WITHIN THE NATIONAL SECURITY REPRESENTED THROUGH THE SECURITY OF THE CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES

Marjan Gjurovski, Dr.Sc
Faculty of Security – Skopje, Republic of Macedonia
e-mail: mar.gjurovski@gmail.com
Gjorgji Alceski, Dr.Sc
Dep. Airport Manager
TAV Macedonia Airport St. Paul The Apostle Ohrid, Republic of Macedonia
e-mail: Gjorgi.Alceski@tav.aero

ABSTRAKT

One of the main features of corporate security is the protection of the interests of the company from all types and forms of endangerment. However, many of the corporations have a part of determining the objects that are of vital interest to the state, i.e. belonging to the category of critical infrastructures. There is the need for a different approach that is shaped according to changed security conditions. The field of competencies, based on the national interest, is changing and it is different from the standard measures i.e. ways of security, this is so the measures that are already in place should be focused on both, the corporate needs and the national security system.

The constant terrorist attacks on the corporations of vital interest show that terrorism does not recognize state borders nor the political systems or areas on which it is directed to. The tragic past events directed at corporations are defined as critical infrastructures and represent a clear indicator to continuous improvement of security, extending the corporate security interest both, to the state and even to the global security interest.

The increase development of the national security through corporations with a clearly defined security policy and co-operation is grounded over subjects that have a precise task in dealing with security challenges that arise from the complex sources of endangerment, and give a new impulse to the transformation of security awareness of both, the security and the other qualified staff. For those reasons, this paper has the purpose to raise the awareness into achieve a standardized level of security in all corporations that have the status of critical infrastructures with direct cooperation and coordination between the state security sector and the private security sector, which this key factor in the overall security system.

Keywords: *security corporate security, national security, critical infrastructures, coordination*

The importance of National Critical Infrastructure as an Essential State Interest

The need to keep track with contemporary security trends, especially in the segment of "critical infrastructures", or the so-called "vital facilities", "facilities of special interest to the state and security", etc., as terms used in our country, is the foundation of security in modern societies. The complexity of contemporary threats, reflected through the corporations that operate the critical infrastructures, implies that they have a direct impact on national security and the efficient functioning of the state systems.

The determination of the need for security, as an essential interest of the state, is expanded with concepts of reference facilities whose security must be guaranteed. Hence, the infrastructures that bear such importance for society, where their non-functioning or limited functioning may create serious consequences and problems, are defined as "critical infrastructures" and need to be treated both on national and international level.[33] As critical infrastructure has become an important segment of national security, critical infrastructure protection has started to develop as well and it is listed among the top priorities of every state. In the context of contemporary global security threats, critical infrastructure protection is a priority issue of the national security of every state.[34]

The complexity of the issue of critical infrastructure security is directly linked with the national security strategies of a number of states, where it acquires a broader vital dimension that includes economic, business, political and environmental issues. National security no longer refers solely to military strategies, but rather tries to eliminate non-military threats by detecting the real threats and efficiently eliminating them. It often presupposes the creation of national security strategies through the corporations that are considered critical infrastructures, as a delicate and comprehensive process which constitutes an integral part of the security concept of each state.

Generally, there are a number of definitions of critical infrastructure. The generally accepted definition of critical infrastructure across the European Union is presented in Directive 114/2008. Here, the European Commission defines critical infrastructure' as a system or part thereof located in Member States which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact in a Member State as a result of the failure to maintain those functions[35]. The analysis of the term critical infrastructure perceived through the need for its adequate protection, indicates that there are minor differences in the national definitions of the states, which highlight systems, assets, properties, products, etc. as crucial for normal functioning of the state in terms of its economic, social, health and security needs. Based on the overall analyses of the notion of "critical infrastructure", viewed through the prism of security and the offered Western indicative lists of critical infrastructures, and guided by the European Union, we may formulate the following definition: *Critical infrastructures refer to facilities, assets, installations, products, services and all systems that are directly or indirectly linked with the normal functioning of the state and whose disruption would cause serious*

[33] http://zastita.info/hr/clanak/2013/2/denis-caleta-(ics)-slovenska-iskustva,311,10204.html,Преземено 14.03.2014

[34]О. Бакревски, Т. Милошевска, Ѓ. Алчески - Заштита на критична инфраструктура Скопје 2017год. Стр.84

[35] EU Directive 2008/114/23.12.2008 EN Official Journal of the European Union L 345/75"

consequences to national security, economy, health, state functionality, social and other consequences.

In that context, we would fully accept the areas identified by the European Commission, inter alia, energy, information and communications technologies, water, food, finances, public and legal protection, public administration, transport, chemical industry, research[36], with all their capacities and activities, products or services. On the other hand, viewing national security as a state of continuing accomplishments, development, welfare and optimal protection of national and state values and interests, the companies that operate critical infrastructures are assigned an exceptional place within the national security system. National security is necessary, inter alia, to accomplish, maintain and promote the security of the citizens, the national security system and the supranational security mechanism, as well as the absence (individual, group and collective) of fear of being threatened, and the collective feeling of peace, certainty and control of the development of future occurrences and events important to societal life and the state.[37]

Non-Military Risks and Threats to National Security Reflected Through the Corporations designated as Critical Infrastructures

Non-military risks and threats to national security, which are ever more present in everyday life, asymmetric threats focusing on the new forms of action and the examples of the past imply that critical information infrastructures, electrical energy infrastructures, oil and natural gas transportation, civilian aviation, water resources and other critical infrastructures have been the target of terrorist attacks. The attacks on critical infrastructures, regardless of whether they are triggered by political, religious, separatist or other types of organizations or they involve terrorism, industrial espionage, hacker attacks are real threats that are directly linked to national security. The omissions of the security services and the preparedness of the terrorists to manipulate, or break into the security protection systems of the corporations determined as critical infrastructures, increase the danger of future illegal acts.

It is evident that national security should be considered on three levels through several areas of human activity. The levels of consideration are individual, state (national) and international, whereas the spheres of human activity include at least the military, political, economic, social and environmental areas. State level is the most important since it determines the other two levels: in contemporary world, the standard unit of security is the sovereign territorial state. The areas important for national security are military, including the offensive and defensive capabilities of the state; economic, that is, the access to natural resources, the market and the finances that determine the acceptable level of welfare; the social, that determines the existence and evolution of traditions, culture, language, national identity and customs and environmental protection that includes the care for the biosphere on which all human activities are dependent. [38] Critical

[36]Green paper on a European Programme for critical infrastructure protection Brussels, 17.11.2005 COM(2005) 576 final Annex II

[37] Саша В. Мијалковић- НАЦИОНАЛНА БЕЗБЕДНОСТ - треће, измењено и допуњено издање КРИМИНАЛИСТИЧКО-ПОЛИЦИЈСКА АКАДЕМИЈА Београд, 2015 стр.82

[38]https://kupdf.com/download/nacionalna-bezbednost-knjiga_58ac2d4b6454a70654b1e90d_pdf 96 Buzan, B.:
People, States & Fear – An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era

infrastructure is the backbone of every nation as it is linked with national security, economy, industry and health[39].

With respect to the threats to the critical infrastructures, they may be man-made, as a result of terrorism or other criminal activities, or natural, as a consequence of weather conditions, such as storms, volcanic eruptions, floods and other environmental disasters. Furthermore, critical infrastructures may be jeopardized by diseases or pandemics that affect large numbers of critical personnel.[40]

Corporate security as a Security factor of National Security

Considering the fact that in many Western countries the largest portion of critical infrastructures is privately owned, there is a need for active involvement of the state in this type of security. In Germany, four fifths of the critical infrastructures are in private hands. In the USA, about 85% of the critical infrastructures are privately owned, but reality shows that market powers are not sufficient by themselves to incite the required investment in protection. The complexity of this security concept arises from the need to implement a number of measures and activities that extend throughout different areas of expertise and activities, all united under national security. Critical infrastructure consisting of numerous sectors is a system of elements that are most often on the territory of one state and crucial to the maintenance of the vital functions, health, security, safety, economic and social welfare of the population and its disruption or destruction would significant consequences in a given state as a result of its inability to preserve these functions. [41]

If we draw a parallel between the basic principles of corporate security for protection of the company's interests against all types and forms of threats and making profit on the one hand, and the need for national security, in terms of critical infrastructures that permeate all pores of national security, on the other hand, it is evident that their roots are stemming from the national values and their ensuing state interests. Many scientists view National security on three levels (individual, state/national and international), including important areas of human activity, *inter alia*, the level of technical – technological development, the educational and age structure of the population, the influence of the state on the decisions made by the international organizations, the power and potential of the states, etc.[42]

All offered definitions or considerations of the term national security refer to the connection between critical infrastructures and national security. Therefore, the complexity of this security concept stems from the need for implementation of plethora of measures and activities that encompass various areas of expertise and activities, all united under the area of security.

, стр. 19–20. Саша Мијалковиќ : Национална безбедност 2017год. стр. 37

[39]http://www.dhs.gov/what-critical-infrastructure Accessed on 26.03.2015г.

[40]Critical Infrastructure Security and Protection: The Public-Private Opportunity White Paper by CoESS – Confederation of European Security Services © December 2010.

[41]О. Бакревски, Т. Милошевска, Ѓ. Алчески - Заштита на критична инфраструктура Скопје 2017год. Стр.35

[42]More details in: Art J. Robert "The Fungibility of Force" in Art J. Robert, Waltz N. Kenneth (eds), The use of Force – Military Power and International Politics, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., Oxford 2004., pp.8-15 . – Корпорациски Безбедносен Систем О. Бакрески, Д. Триван, С. Митевски Скопје 2012

National Concepts in Function of the Security of CI Through the Corporations of Vital Interests

If we consider the need to protect critical infrastructure in the US by managing risks it is evident that it is wide-ranging, composed of partnerships among owners and operators; Federal, State, local, and territorial governments; regional entities; non-profit organizations; the academia, etc.

Managing the risks from significant threat and hazards to physical and cyber critical infrastructure requires an integrated approach to:

- Identify, deter, detect, disrupt, and prepare for threats and hazards to the Nation's critical infrastructure;
- Reduce vulnerabilities of critical assets, systems, and networks; and
- Mitigate the potential consequences to critical infrastructure of incidents or adverse events that do occur[43].

The success of this integrated approach depends on the overall spectrum of capabilities, expertise and experiences in infrastructures and their concerned parties.[44]

Although the US and the EU differ in their positions on the risks and threats to general national security and the critical national goods, they recently established a common determination on two levels that define:

- The resources that constitute critical infrastructure, and
- The measures required for their protection[45].

If we make an overview of the security concepts through a legislative framework, we will see that many contemporary countries regulate this area by directives, strategies, laws, etc., in line with their national interests, designed to enhance the security and persistence of their critical infrastructures in the face of today's threats. The CIP concept, viewed through the prism of providing a framework for a consistent national approach to protection of the state, government and business, designs security concepts that will enable the corporations, that is, the owners – operators of critical infrastructures to deal with the potential risks to the infrastructure or the relevant sector.

CI protection is largely decentralized in the EU member states. In each state, a significant part of the infrastructure is in private ownership and therefore, there must be cooperation with the state institutions. The level and degree of participation of privately-owned corporations in the protection of critical infrastructures are different. In certain countries, the representatives of the private sector are actively or systematically involved in the policy creation process, whereas in others, the private sector is involved only if necessary and mostly for the purpose of implementing the minimum protection standards set up by the state sector. There are many efforts in the EU to consider CIP for each sector separately.[46] As a result, experts describe the EU work on protecting CI as assisting the

[43] NIPP 2013 Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience Homeland Security - USA

[44]Ibid, p. 7

[45] Zastita kriticne infrastructure I osnovni elementi uskladivanja sa direktivom saveta Evrope 2008/114/ES Mirko Škero Bezbedno-informativna agencija Vladimir Ateljević Vlada Republike Srbije, Kancelarija za evropske integracije - Visoke studije bezbednosti i odbrane стр.197

[46]Eriksson, P., Barck-Holst S., Critical Infrastructure Protection policy in the EU and in Sweden – Comparative analysis, FOI, Stockholm, 2005.

states in clearly defined sectors in conditions of relevant sectoral coordination.[47] The problem of the cooperation between the EU and member states for CIP may lie in some states' position that certain data must be kept within national frames only.[48]

In Norway, the concept of "a vulnerable society" has become a major part of both public and political debates, following a report by a government commission headed by former Prime Minister Kåre Willoch.[49] The Willoch commission listed several new challenges regarding societal vulnerability and proposed a set of measures in its Report, which constituted the foundation of Norways's White Paper. These included technological changes, increased complexity in society, increased cost- and efficiency pressure, reduced manning in public services and outsourcing of public services to commercial enterprises.[50]

These challenges, together with the emergence of "new" threats like terrorism, organized crime and climatic changes, represent a fundamentally changed context for the organizations responsible for the maintenance and protection of critical infrastructures. France follows the doctrine for defense and national security and its approach focusing on "operators of vital importance" means that the inaccessibility of those operators will strongly undermine the economic or military potential and nation's security and resilience. Each operator identifies the critical components in its production system and is obligated to offer them as points of vital interest that require special protection.[51]

In the legal code of the Czech Republic, the CI issues ensue from the legal regulations and fall under four steps:

1. Selection of CI within individual sectors.
2. Applying the definition of critical infrastructure.
3. Applying the definition of European critical infrastructure (ECI).
4. Applying the cross-cutting criteria.[52]

With respect to the legal regulation for CI protection, the Republic of Croatia has advanced in comparison with the other states of former Yugoslavia, by regulating CI protection, or more specifically, the management and protection of CI is regulated by the Law on Critical Infrastructures, adopted in 2013,[53] which is based on EU Directive 114 of 2008. In addition to adopting this law, the Republic of Croatia has passed two additional bylaws: the Decision designating the sectors in which the central state administration bodies identify

[47] Larsson, R., *Tackling Dependency: The EU and its Security Challenges*, Swedish Defense Research Agency, 2007, стр. 9-24.

[48]Jarlsvik, H., Castenfors, K., *Security and Preparedness in the EU*, Stockholm, 2004, стр.64.

[49] Project description: Critical infrastructures, public sector reorganization and societal safety (CISS) https://www.sintef.no/globalassets/project/samrisk/ciss/critical-infrastructures-and-societal-safety.pdf посетена 03/12/2016.О. Бакревски, Т. Милошевска, Ѓ. Алчески - Заштита на критична инфраструктура Скопје 2017год.

[50] Report on Safety and Security of Society. Report no. 17 to the Storting (2001-2002). Government Norway: https://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumenter/Statement-on-Safety-and-Security-of-Soci/id420173/посетена на 6/12/2016.О. Бакревски, Т. Милошевска, Ѓ. Алчески - Заштита на критична инфраструктура Скопје 2017год.

[51]Secrétariat GénéraldelaDéfenseetdelaSécurité Nationale: http://www.sgdsn.gouv.fr/site_rubrique70.html, посетена 06.12.2016.

[52] International jurnal of mathematical models and methods in applied sciences - Measures for critical infrastructure protection – Ludek Lucas, Lubos Necesal – Issue 7, Volume 5, 2011.

[53]Zakon o kritičnim infrastrukturama, (Narodne novine 56/2013).

national critical infrastructures, [54] and the List determining the order of critical infrastructures sectors and the Rulebook on the risk analysis methodology in managing critical infrastructures.[55] With the Law on Critical Infrastructures, the Republic of Croatia regulates national and European critical infrastructures, the sectors of national critical infrastructures, the management of critical infrastructures, the risk analysis development, the security plan of the owners, the security coordinator of critical infrastructures, the procedures for handling sensitive and classified information and the mechanism for supervising the implementation of the law.[56]

The Federation and local governments are required jointly to enhance and implement critical infrastructure protection in their respective areas of responsibility. This purpose is served by a structured implementation. This procedure comprises the following work packages, which are implemented in parallel, and is based on the co-operative approach adopted by the Federal Administration with the involvement of the other major players, i.e. operators and the relevant associations:

1. definition of general protection targets;
2. analysis of threats, vulnerabilities, and management capabilities;
3. assessment of the threats involved;
4. specification of protection targets, taking account of existing protective measures; analysis of existing regulations and, where applicable, identification of additional measures contributing to goal attainment.

For the implementation of the protection strategy, an extensive set of instruments is available in the form of

- programmes and plans (e.g. the National Plan for information infrastructure protection and the related implementation plans as a strategic concept for IT infrastructure protection;

- specific recommendations for action (e.g. the national Baseline Protection Concept as a basic guidance to physical critical infrastructure protection; the Risk and Crisis Management Guide for Critical Infrastructure Operators, or the national special protection concepts as detailed recommendations for action for the protection of individual CI sectors;

- standards, norms and regulations (e.g. the BSI Information Security Standards as a basic recommendation for action addressed to critical infrastructure operators; or the regulations of the German Gas and Water Supply Association on risk management in the field of drinking water supply.[57]

On account of the chosen co-operative approach that must be given priority, suitably institutionalized platforms involving the state and public authorities, companies and associations are required in view of the procedural steps and instruments that serve to implement the politico-strategic framework.

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[54]Odluku o određivanju sektora iz kojih središnja tijela državne uprave identificiraju nacionalne kritične infrastrukture te liste redoslijeda sektora kritičnih infrastruktura, (Narodne novine 108/2013).

[55] Pravilnik o metodologiji za izradu analize rizika poslovanja kritičnih infrastruktura, (Narodne novine 128/2013).

[56]Закон о критичним инфраструктурама NN56 13, http://www.zakon.hr/z/591/Zakon-o-kriti%C4%8Dnim-infrastrukturama, посетена на 14/11/2016.

[57]National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP Strategy) Federal Republic of Germany
Federal Ministry of the Interior Berlin, 17th June 2009

These security partnership platforms may be organized as: round tables; on federal level; on federal states level; on local government level; joint round tables of the afore-stated entities[58].

CI security, viewed through the prism of national guidelines for protection of CI from terrorism, adopted by the Committee for fight against terrorism of Australia and New Zealand, provides a framework for a national, consistent approach on the protection of CI for the state, the government and the businesses. The Strategy is designed to aid the owners and operators of CI in their dicussions with their jurisdictions (including the Government) about protecting the CI from terrorism. It defines that the treatment of individual CI assets will depend on an assessment of the criticality of the asset in question, the nature of the security environment and the risk profles for that asset or relevant sector[59].

The term critical infrastructure has not yet been adopted in the framework of the National legislation of the Republic of Macedonia, however, it does not mean that the objects of special significance or the vital facilities in the Republic of Macedonia have not been determined or defined. The Republic of Macedonia has continuity in defining these facilities, in terms of foreseen security measures and delegated duties and responsibilities, however, they are not harmonized in accordance with the guidelines of the European Union. In this regard, the terms are not clearly specified, that is, critical infrastructures are not covered in accordance with the recommendations of the Union. One of the more important steps in this direction was made with the adoption of the Decision on determining the legal entities that are obligated to have private security. This Decision was adopted by the Government of the Republic of Macedonia in 2013, and pursuant to Article 44 of the Law on Private Security ("Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia" No. 166/12) and the Law on Amending the Law on Private Security ("Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia" No. 164/13), which stipulates the time of their entry into force. According to Article 44 of this Law, the Government of the Republic of Macedonia determines which legal entities are obligated to have private security, if the performance of their activity is related to handling radioactive substances or other hazardous substances for people and the environment, objects of particular cultural and historical significance, as well as in other cases when it is in the interest of security, that is, defense of the Republic of Macedonia.

It must be noted that the regulations treating critical infrastructures include the legal regulations on protection and rescue, as well as crisis management.

[58] Ibid.

[59] https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Media-and-publications/Publications/Documents/national-guidelines-protection-critical-infrastructure-from-terrorism.pdf Превземено 11.11.2015година

CONCLUSION

Corporate security may be defined as one of the most important processes in the organizations as it has a significant role in the functioning of the systems. The strategic planning and operational measures stemming from corporate security must provide answers to the numerous threats and risks the companies face, especially in the segment of critical infrastructure. This process requires much more attention and awareness at the highest level of company management[60].

The key personnel in corporate security must take dominant positions, primarily due to the dependence of the state on these companies determined as critical infrastructures. It is the the responsibility of the state to protect the public and ensure a certain level of social functionality and secutity. However, the fact that part of CI is state-owned, whereas part is in orivate ownership (domestic or foreign companies) and that some owners do not share the same values and positions with respect to the protection of the CI system calls for a multifaceted approach of the state and the operators.

Each critical infrastructure sector has unique characteristics, operating models, and risk profiles that have institutional knowledge and specialized expertise about the sector.[61] Therefore, security policy, which is a complex and interdependent set of measures, plans, activities and programs, should be directed towards upgrading the existing regulations and practices in view of seeking and defining the possibilities and conditions for applying advanced practices, procedures and systems and implementing them in the development of security. The practical application of certain standards and procedures that ensue from the final operationalization of the offered solutions should be the priority of each state, which requires a new approach to security by activating advanced security systems that follow the technological achievements non-stop, 24 hours a day. There is no dilemma that equipping the security services in accordance with the latest sophisticated achievements in this area will ensure unobstructed execution of the assigned tasks, adequate to contemporary risks and threats.

Corporations, defined as CI, should develop legislation-based security programs or plans that will be approved, accepted and coordinated with all national security stakeholders, especially with the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Defense and other relevant members of the national security system. On the other hand, the national security bodies should develop guidelines for the critical infrastructures to adapt their security systems in terms of personnel and technical equipment, so as to guarantee the implementation of standard measures and activities within their scope of work.

[60] http://www.asadria.com/index.php/teme/kolumne/276-kriticna-infrastruktura-i-znacaj-osiguravanja-njenog-neprekidnog-djelovanja - Denis Caleta - Kritična infrastruktura i značaj osiguravanja njenog neprekidnog djelovanja, Превземено на 17.09.2015г.

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THE CIVIL SECTOR AS A CONSTITUTIVE ELEMENT OF THE SECURITY SYSTEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Marjan Nikolovski, Dr.Sc
Faculty of Security-Skopje, Republic of Macedonia
e-mail: mnikolovski66@gmail.com

Abstract

Every society in continuity is susceptible to certain potential threats, which could jeopardize the security of institutions and citizens. Such potential risks evolve and adapt to the emerging conditions of social living. The dangers of conventional wars are diminishing, but new dangers arise from emerging social, political, economic and security situations in the global society. The risks and threats to national security are defined in most strategic documents of the Republic of Macedonia, where possible manifestations of extreme nationalism and religious intolerance are identified as a potential danger with the highest risk, followed by other dangers such as: terrorism, organized crime, illegal migration, illegal trafficking in drugs, weapons, people, etc.

The security institutions are tasked to successfully pursue their legal authority and eliminate any potential risks and threats to the security of citizens. To that end, the members of these institutions must enjoy the reputation and trust of the citizens. In the absence of mutual trust and support, one cannot speak of efficiency and early detection of potential security threats. From this perspective, we see the role of civil society as a combination of the institutions and citizens or monitoring of the functioning of the security institutions on the one hand, and respect for the fundamental human rights and freedoms in the Constitution, on the other.

The security system cannot function fully and the security institutions cannot carry out their responsibilities, and thus respond successfully to new challenges and threats if they do not put an emphasis on prevention and cooperation with the civil sector. It is a successful model of the functioning of modern security systems in dealing with the new challenges and threats to security.

Keywords: security system, security institutions, civil society, threats, risks, prevention

Introduction

One of the very important constitutive elements of the security system of a democratic-parliamentary state is the civil sector. It works with democratic activities and funds, separate from the state organization, in order to accomplish human rights in the area of freedom, democracy and security. The civil sector mediates between the interests of individuals and social groups, on the one hand, and the interests of the state on the other. The Greek sector in modern democratic societies is the most important corrective of power. Consisting of non-governmental institutions, it represents an important part of society in which the citizens' activity is carried out, and their interests are fulfilled by using democratic methods and means, sometimes in the form of expressing dissatisfaction and peaceful protests through various forms of free association in organizations or associations.

The civil sector increasingly finds its place in the interaction between the state institutions, while respecting basic human rights and freedoms. The state institutions, exercising their legal competences, need to be in function of the citizens, to have mutual trust and cooperation as a successful model of functioning. However, this trust in the security institutions will not be achieved if they act exclusively with repressive measures, if the citizens, the non-governmental sector are not asked for anything, if the citizens do not feel the security institutions as their own to protect their safety, their rights, etc. Hence, in order to effectively restrain the potential risks, above all, extreme nationalism, radicalism and religious intolerance within a certain tolerant level, in order to successfully address all security issues, the security institutions should work together with the citizens, not against their interests, rights and freedoms. What is also important is that security institutions must act preventively! What does that mean? Security institutions must constantly have information, keep track of all events, make assessments of the situation in order to detect and prevent timely any destructive and criminal activities that jeopardize security. Only in this way will the citizens trust the security institutions and be ready to help, contribute to building a community that is safe to live in and where there is cooperation between the security institutions and themselves.

In the text below, I will elaborate the existing security system, analyzing the place and role of the civil sector in the functioning of the total security system.

Security system

Society and the state as macro-social environments have been created to function harmoniously within the process of creating favorable conditions to meet the general and individual interests and needs. But it is a well-known fact that in the processes of their functioning, they are exposed to numerous destructions and threats from natural, technical and technological processes, individuals and groups from their own social environment and from destructions originating abroad. Such a reality determines the need of the society and the state to build and establish a security system that will take care of security.

The security system in the world, in each country, is organized differently depending on the social order and many other specifics of the state, but they are almost all similar to each other in terms of the basic goal.

To talk about the role of the civil sector as one of the constituent elements of the security system, we will first explain the notion of a bureaucratic system.

The security system is a whole that consists of several interconnected parts that function harmoniously. Constitutive elements of the security system are:

1. **The Law on Security** that regulates the security relations and conditions in the society and the state;
2. **Institutions** and bodies that perform security functions (public sector bodies, private sector bodies, human and civil society NGOs);
3. **Measures** to resolve security issues (preventive and repressive)[62].

The Law on Security regulates the overall security situation in the country. It covers both preventive and repressive security rights. The Preventive security law regulates the relations in the state in the field of prevention, while the repressive security law regulates

[62] Spaseski J., Nikolovski M., Gerasimoski S., 2010, Security Systems, Faculty of Security - Skopje, 2010, p. 18,19

the relations in the area of repression, that is, the modern valuation of the crime and state violence as a necessity for respecting the penalties and legal restrictions.

The second constituent element of the Security system includes the institutions. They are:

- institutions that perform security functions as public sector bodies (Ministry of Interior, Police, Inspection Bodies, Judiciary Bodies, State Administration, etc.),
- private sector agencies (private agencies for property and persons and detectives), the human being (as the pillar of the overall security in the country because only the human being can endanger security and contribute to its stabilization and maintenance), and
- non-governmental organizations from the civil sector (various Citizens Advisory Groups, as well as Local Prevention Councils, as well as other non-governmental organizations working in the field of security).

The last element of the definition of the Security System refers to the measures undertaken to resolve security issues, which may be: repressive (measures taken after the occurrence of a particular security problem such as imprisonment, fines, etc.) and preventive measures (i.e. those that are taken before a problem arises in order to eliminate it or prevent it, such as advice, warning, etc.).

In this context, further in this paper, I will elaborate in this paper only the part that is related to the civil sector.

The civil sector as an integral part of the security system

In the creation of security systems in parliamentary-democratic societies, a very important place is dedicated to the civil sector, which is one of the three pillars of the security system institutions in addition to the public (state) and non-state (private) sector.

Among the institutions that perform security functions are non-governmental organizations from the civil sector, as well as man himself. The civil sector is composed of non-governmental institutions and represents an important segment of the society in which the citizens' activity is performed in order to accomplish their interests, sometimes by expressing dissatisfaction and peaceful protests through various forms of free association in organizations and associations.[63]

Through these organizations and associations, people actively participate in building security in the country and in exercising their rights. Also, such associations are separate from the state government, and represent its very important corrective. People's stability must be mentioned here. It is known that citizens are interested in creating a favorable security situation, which means that they are interested in creating a certain degree of security and stability, which we can call people's stability, which manifests itself as developing good relations between people, as well as their anti-delicate and moral behavior. Under certain conditions this people's stability can play a very important role in the creation and maintenance of the security situation in the state.

The civil sector performs functions and activities that are organized and managed by the citizens independently of the state: associations and non-governmental organizations which the citizens join in order to solve issues and problems of their interest and in the interest of a democratic society independent of the state and its institutions. They can and should be a corrective to the country's omissions or mistakes. Otherwise, the

[63] Ibid 15

state without democratic control over its institutions can easily encroach on the rights, freedoms, democracies and security of the citizens. There are various forms of free, non-state organization of citizens for the exercise of certain rights, such as religious freedom, freedom of expression, right to peaceful protests and so on.

The basic pillar of the civil sector is the **man (citizen)** as an individual associated in non-governmental organizations that perform activities in the sphere of protection and promotion of human rights and freedoms, protection of the natural environment, protection of children's rights, protection of cultural heritage and similar.

In the theory of systems, the question is analyzed separately: how is system unity provided when there is a social system at the same time and there are other systems, such as: economic, health, financial, educational, etc.? Most often, the answer to this question is related to whether the system is capable of surviving and whether it can perform the function for which it is constituted, while being a part of the system of society.

The citizen in the security system

A citizen as a free man has his inherent right to take care of his life, his property and his safety.

Throughout his entire life, from his birth to his death, he is constantly exposed to risks and threats from natural, technical and technological processes, from the society and from other individuals. At the same time, he constantly strives to be protected in what he himself does or what other people, that is, the social environment - the society and the country in which he lives - are doing to him.

How much a person is safe in a certain time and in a certain living space always depends on how much that moment and that area are endangered and how protected they are. If we start from this assumption, which is realistic, we can conclude that the scope and quality of human security are always dependent on the scope and quality of the threat and protection. Accordingly, the other conclusion would be that the three phenomena of endangerment, protection and security are mutually connected. When the human being is not threatened, there is no immediate need for protection because he is feels safe. Thus, man's vulnerability is an objective and natural state, and security is a consequence of such a state.

As it is known, each state establishes its own firm system and it tends to build and promote the safety of man and the community as a whole. In this sense, the position of man in the social environment, and especially in the relations with the security system, is a very complex phenomenon. Man as an individual is the creator of the collective life in the social environment, but at the same time it is also a threatening factor. He as a subject may at different times have different interests and views on his personal and general security. They can be expressed in the following way:

- having interest in the existence of general security;
- having an interest in achieving and promoting security, and
- having an interest in jeopardizing security.

If a man-citizen of a state cannot meet his needs, starting from respecting the basic civil rights and freedoms, determined by international law, the free expression of ethnic, religious, national security, does not feel the state institutions as his own, which have the role of his protection and therefore cannot establish harmony, then he will find himself in a position of disharmony which, without exception, produces conflicts and destructions. Such systems come to dissatisfaction with certain social groups who express their

discontent with some requests, ranging from peaceful protests to violence, calling for disrespect of the institutions, without excluding the possibility of resorting to terrorist acts for achieving certain goals that cannot accomplished in another way.

Risks and threats to the national security of the Republic of Macedonia

Under national security, we refer not only to the functioning of the security forces, but also to the political, economic, military, social, environmental and information stability, international reputation and integrity in international structures.[64]

Strategic documents, such as the National Security and Defense Concept, define the vital interests of the state. The priority vital interests include the protection and promotion of peace, security, life, health, property and personal security of citizens, the development of a multiethnic society based on mutual trust, joint efforts and aspiration of all ethnic communities to live in stability and versatile development in the state.

Great attention in creating a security policy is paid to the potential risks of possible manifestations of extreme nationalism and religious intolerance, which are foreseen as priority risks in the Security and Defense Strategy. The assessment of threats, risks and dangers is made on the basis of the degree of intensity. Intensity is considered at the current moment, in the medium and in the long run, and hence it can be very low, medium and high. According to the estimates, the dangers of possible manifestations of extreme nationalism, racial and religious intolerance, the terrorist threats are considered as one of the quicker ways of accomplishing certain requests that cannot be achieved in any other way.

Citizens are interested in creating a stable security situation because we know that security is one of man's basic needs. Due to this fact, citizens very often form various organizations and associations, by means of which they realize their interests and goals. Among them, I will focus on the newly formed associations that have certain competences in relation to citizens' security:

- Advisory groups of citizens, and
- Local prevention advice.

Citizen Advisory Groups "CAGs"

Citizens' Advisory Groups or abbreviated "CAGs" represent a union between the police and the citizens, which allows citizens to ask questions that are of their interest and concern security and to communicate with representatives of institutions that can give them answers to these questions.[65]

These advisory groups allow the police and citizens to work together, as partners, and find solutions to the problems they are facing and are concerned with. In fact, this is a model that is an integral part of the police cooperation program with the citizens, a so-called project. "

Community policing refers to the work of the police based on cooperation with the citizens of the community. Through these CAGs, the citizens will have access to the local police, they will be able to keep up with the events that surround them, including those

[64] Spaseski J., Nikolovski M., Gerasimoski S., 2010, Security Systems, Faculty of Security - Skopje, 2010, p.204-210

[65] OSCE Prevention Inspector, Module 3, 5

they are concerned with. In this way, the trust between the police and all citizens should be increased, establishing at the same time positive relations and positive communication.
We can say that in order to have an effective concept of cooperation between the police and the local population, it is necessary to have the following two elements:

- Partnership between the police and the local population, and
- A common approach in addressing the problems identified by the partnership. [66]

With respect to a survey conducted by the OSCE in the MOI on the work of the police, the results indicate insufficient knowledge of the citizens about the work of the Citizens Advisory Groups and the Local Prevention Councils. The level of awareness moves in the interval from 34.4% with CAGs to 37.2% with LPCs. Police officers are far more familiar with these forums and their purpose (68.4% with CAGs and 73.4% with LSP). Those who are familiar with the functioning of these forums are also familiar with 12 and with the purpose of their formation.[67]

Similar to the previous is the research conducted by the Faculty of Security - Skopje on the citizens' opinion concerning the police. On the basis of the obtained data, according to Professor Cane Mojanoski, the general conclusion is that "there are differentiated views on the work and the actions of the police". This means that citizens have positive attitudes with respect to their willingness to assist a policeman in carrying out a specific task and to participate in certain preventive programs. But, there is a high percentage of citizens who are not familiar with the existence and functioning of the LPCs (80.02%), and with certain community-based activities for addressing local problems. It follows that the joint activities between the police and the community are not sufficiently understood and supported by the citizens.[68]

The afore-stated leads to the conclusion that in order to have successful Citizens Advisory Groups, we need to have a partnership between the citizens and the police, and there is a need for a link between them. Accordingly, a partnership is a group of two or more members who share the risks and benefits, and this may be of a short or long-term character, while linking is a link of opinions or knowledge, the condition of belonging to the same family and the connections are always long-term. These are also the components needed for a successful Citizens Advisory Group.[69]

We may ask ourselves what are the benefits of such cooperation between the police and the citizens. But the answer is unique, where there is cooperation between the police and the citizens, and where this cooperation works, the police acts as a catalyst and facilitator of change, where crime is kept within the limits of the norm, and the citizens are more satisfied with the work of the police, as their security is improved, and that justifies and supports the formation and functioning of "CAGs".
In other words, the benefits of building a partnership are as follows:

- Increasing the potential for crime suppression and reducing the fear of crime;
- Coordination and positive impact on the resources of all elements of community;
- Increasing trust and understanding;
- Strengthening of the organizational support;

[66] OSCE Prevention Inspector, Module 3, 5
[67] Narrative Report, Community Policing Survey, October, 2010, OSCE in cooperation with MV
[68] Mojanoski, C. (2010). The work of the police through the prism of the citizens, Annual of the Faculty of Security, Skopje, 2010, p. 297-310, p. 308
[69] OSCE Prevention Inspector, Module 3, 6

- Creating a network for helping, referring and technical support for problem solving;
- Using a more strategic approach with the part of the impact that will get to be long-term.[70]

These Citizens Advisory Groups, together with representatives of the local police, call meetings at which they review and identify problems that concern the citizens and approach their joint resolution and prevention. These problems do not necessarily mean that they must always be connected with crime, but rather penetrate deeply into those social problems that concern the citizens and whose resolution would contribute to a better and safer life in the community itself., all those interested in participating in the partnership and cooperation for solving the problems of the community where they live can be invited to join the CAGs. This means that all citizens, who are interested in being engaged in preventing the endangerment of their safety and the safety of their loved ones, and thus the safety of all citizens and the state community, can participate in the CAGs meetings.

The cooperation and joint performances of CAGs and the police in the past period had particularly noticeable results in the area of education. Specific projects have been implemented to promote sports among young people, organize sports clubs fairs, where well-known athletes take part in attracting young people to positional values, thus diverting them from the delinquent activities that are increasingly present among young people. Such and similar activities include CAGs, the Department for Prevention in the Ministry of Interior, as well as the educational institutions with their teachers, pedagogues and psychologists.

The formation and operation of CAGs gives initial results in a very short period of time and fully justifies the expectations for greater engagement of the civil society sector in the area of security, as well as one of the measures for reforming the Macedonian police, which will enable approximation of the manner of acting of the Macedonian police towards the actions of the police of the EU member states, in line with the foreign and security policy of the Republic of Macedonia.

CONCLUSION

If we make a comparison of how the police worked in the past with a symbolic participation of the civic sector in the security issues, and how it works today with all of the above stated concerning the significance and role of the civil sector, we derive the following results:

Traditional way	Community policing
For the citizens	With the citizens
Solving Incident Response	Schematic resolution
Passive citizens	Active participation
Police against the citizens	Partnership
The police react reactively	The police act preventively

[70] OSCE Prevention Inspector, Module 3, 8

The table of comparison indicates that in the traditional way, the police work disrespected the human rights and freedoms of the citizens, acted repressively, took action after an incident, and the citizens felt a certain fear and distrust on the part of the police, they felt like an alienated part, they were passive and reluctant to help the police.

The reforms in the Ministry of Interior, and primarily the uniformed police reforms enabled a closer relationship and cooperation between the police and the citizens. The police are actively involved in building partnerships with the citizens, act preventively, address the problems schematically and take care of the citizens. The citizens are willing to help the police, because they themselves have confidence in the police, they want to actively participate in creating the security in the community in which they live, and therefore they start to organize themselves in various groups and councils, such as Citizens Advisory Groups, local councils for prevention, etc. Through these groups, citizens receive an answer to their questions, have the opportunity to present their ideas and opinions, give specific remarks regarding the actions of the security institutions, perform a certain kind of monitoring of their work. They represent in fact a successful formula in the actions of the security institutions in a democratic society and fulfillment of the legally foreseen obligations of the security institutions, on the one hand, and on the other hand, protection and respect of the citizens' human rights and freedoms and right solutions, which is one of the fundamental values of the Republic of Macedonia provided for by the Constitution of the country.

By applying this model to the functioning of the civil sector and the police, the entire community will be able to combat successfully crime and other occurrences that endanger the overall security. Only with the trust of the citizens in the police and their mutual cooperation, can the whole community successfully deal with all the challenges and threats it faces including the military and all its citizens.

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PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OVER THE OPERATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION FOR SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Ice Ilijevski, Dr.Sc
Faculty of security – Skopje, Republic of Macedonia
e-mail: iilijevski@fb.uklo.edu.mk
Zlate Dimovski, Dr.Sc
Faculty of Security – Skopje, Republic of Macedonia
e-mail: zdimovski@fb.uklo.edu.mk
Kire Babanoski, Dr.Sc
Faculty of Security Sciences – Skopje, MIT University, Republic of Macedonia
e-mail: kire.babanoski@mit.edu.mk

Abstract

The main subject of this paper is the determination of the need for an effective system of measures and activities for proper parliamentary control and oversight of the operation of the Administration for Security and Counterintelligence in the Republic of Macedonia which have to be in accordance with the democratic principles by fulfilling publicity, transparency and accountability.

The goal of this paper is to present the current situations and the future perspectives of the parliamentary control and oversight of the Administration for Security and Counterintelligence of the Republic of Macedonia and the need of reforms in this important segment of the security system. Furthermore, the formal legal obstacles of the members of the Parliament will be analyzed based on their goals and tasks at hand. An emphasis will be placed on the increase of the cooperation of the parliamentary committees for control and oversight with the community of professionals, academics and scientific experts, as well the need to establish other mechanisms for control and oversight. A comparative analysis of the parliamentary oversight of the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bulgaria will be made separately. Their positive experiences from the work of the parliamentary bodies, commissions and committees for the control of the intelligence services will be analyzed as well.

Key words: *parliamentary control, oversight, Administration for Security and Counterintelligence, security system*.

1. INTRODUCTION

The control and the oversight of the security system in whole is a backbone of the democracy and they should be implemented in all institutions of the security system without exceptions and should not be subjected to any party-political influences and certain pressures. We can say that the control and the oversight as a function of the security management are constant, never completed, never perfect, and constantly current. The

same applies to the control and oversight of the security system in the Republic of Macedonia which makes this problem complex. Establishing an effective system of measures and activities for a proper control and oversight of the security system in the country should be in accordance with the policy and principles of democracy, through public awareness, transparency and accountability.

The system of control and oversight over the operation of the security system largely depends on the situation in which the country is located. The degree of politicization, independence and honesty of the judiciary, as well as the public's attitude towards corruption play a major role. On the other hand, the effectiveness of control depends largely on the resources available for its implementation, the skills of the one who controls, and the willingness of the authorities and management to apply the results.

The purpose of the control of the security system (as part of the state administration bodies) essentially is two-sided [Bakreski, 2008:47]. On one hand, it ensures legality and expediency in the work and realization of the public interests within the legal order. This can be achieved by removing certain unlawful activities that may occur in the security system, correcting and directing certain stages in the legal procedure, and through an effective process of building and improving the security system. On the other hand, the control over the security system provides protection of citizens and their organizations from illegal actions on certain segments of the security system.

Due to the threats and risks of the internal security, the countries in the world have given the Security-Intelligence and Counterintelligence Agencies and Services huge powers to fight terrorism, espionage, more serious forms of organized crime, or other activities aimed at endangering or demolishing democratic institutions. The nature of the work of such services is usually of a high degree of secrecy, and the imperative of secrecy can be abused and lead to unlawful and illicit actions, inefficiency, abuse of power or use for political purposes. In order not to be abused the legally given authorizations, duties, obligations, and thus the encroachment on human freedoms and rights, it is necessary to implement appropriate control and supervision.

2. PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OVER THE OPERATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION FOR SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

The Parliament has an obligation to provide that the institutions of the executive power work for the benefit of the citizens. It performs several functions [Bryden & Fluri, 2003:66] but in particular fulfills three basic functions: the legislative function, the control function, and the representative function.

In a democratic country, no area of the government's work should be a restricted area for the Parliament, including the security system [Born & Leigh, 2005:83]. The involvement of the Parliament carries legitimacy and democratic accountability. This would help in ensuring that the security and intelligence authorities serve the country as a whole and that they protect the Constitution, and not that they serve only to the narrower political or individual interests. The appropriate control guarantees a stable, political, two-party approach to security, which is good for the country and the country institutions themselves. The involvement of parliamentarians can help in ensuring that the use of citizens' money in security is properly authorized and justified.

Regarding the parliamentary control and oversight, we must point out that Parliament is obliged to ensure that the institutions of the executive power work for the benefit of the citizens, and this is done most often through the working bodies of the

parliament, such as parliamentary committees. They are necessary due to the fact that they allow discussing security issues on a multi party basis. For this purpose, the work of the Commission for Supervision of the Operation of the Administration for Security and Counterintelligence and the Intelligence Agency and the Commission for Supervision of the Implementation of the Special Investigative Measure for Interception of Communications by the Ministry of Interior, the Administration for the Financial Police, the Customs Administration and the Ministry of Defense is the most important.

In terms of duration, permanent and temporary or ad hock parliamentary committees are formed. The oversight function of these commissions acts in a reactive manner, that is, once the problems arise. It is necessary for the supervisory function to be proactive in order there will not be improper action of the institutions of the security system.

2.1. Commission for Supervision of Operation of the Administration for Security and Counterintelligence and the Intelligence Agency

In the parliamentary practice, the **Commission for supervising the operation of the Administration for Security and Counterintelligence and the Intelligence Agency** require an annual report from the Intelligence Agency and Administration for Security and Counterintelligence, and such a report is jointly reviewed. The Intelligence Agency delivers a summary of its report, while the Administration for Security and Counterintelligence delivers it as a whole. Considering that the reports are of confidential nature, they are only considered by the members of the Commission, and the other Members of the Parliament do not receive the mentioned reports. The Parliament, then, conveys the conclusions that arise from the report of this Commission to the President and the Government of the Republic of Macedonia.

The work of this Commission is not fully regulated by the primary legislation. The provisions regulating oversight can be found in a number of laws, such as: Intelligence Agency Law (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, no. 19/95), Law on Internal Affairs (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, no. 42/14, 116/14, 33/15, 05/16), Law on Interception of Communications (Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, no. 121/06, 110/08 и 116/12), but they do not contain sufficient information on the competence of the Commission and the mechanisms that are available for performing such activity. In the past period, the Commission has been characterized by ineffective visits to Administration for Security and Counterintelligence and Intelligence Agency, unsuccessful referral and provision of presence of directors of Administration for Security and Counterintelligence and Intelligence Agency to sessions of the Commission for direct and original informing of the Commissioners, non-maintenance of sessions for a longer period of time, untimely provision of security certificates and the like. From this it can be concluded that this Commission is poorly functioning and insufficiently controls the intelligence community in the Republic of Macedonia.

2.2. Commission for Supervision of the Implementation of the Special Investigative Measure for Interception of Communication by the Ministry of Interior, the Administration for Financial Police, the Customs Administration and the Ministry of Defense

This Commission has clear elements in its competencies that should be addressed for the protection of human rights. It has the authority to request to visit the Ministry of Interior, the Financial Police, the Customs Administration and the Ministry of Defense, and to inspect the available documentation regarding the application of the measure for interception of communications for certain cases, and its aim is to obtain relevant information in order to build an attitude if it has not been handled according to the law. The Commission also cooperates with the civil sector by calling external experts on their hearings, and also announces the need for external expert support and cooperation with foreign parliamentary bodies.

The disadvantages of this Commission are reflected in the need to direct the work to the supervision of the conditions under which the monitoring of communications is conducted, the duration of communications monitoring, the procedure for data storage and their proper cancellation, as well as the oversight of the costs that are caused by monitoring communications that are paid from the budget. Also, this Commission can not collect statistical data for monitoring communications due to the lack of technical skills and incompetence of the members of the control over the equipment of the Administration for Security and Counterintelligence.

3. PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OVER THE OPERATION OF THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA

The parliamentary control in the Republic of Croatia is conducted by the Croatian Parliament, which directly and through the National Security Committees can request from the security intelligence agencies and the President of the Supreme Court to report on the work and measures taken by the security-intelligence agencies in general as well as towards certain individuals. The Parliamentary Committee on Internal Affairs and National Security carries out oversight of the security and intelligence bodies in accordance with the law, especially in regard to the protection of the established human rights and fundamental freedoms of the Republic of Croatia and gives an opinion on the appointment of the head of the security services in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia.

The expert supervision of the agencies and the Operational Technical Centre is carried out by the Department of the National Security Council, which, among other things, conducts supervision and application of these measures.

The civil control over the work of the security intelligence agencies is performed by the Civil Monitoring Council according to which Republic of Croatia is recognizable.

The Council performs the following tasks: examining the legality of the work of the intelligence services and monitoring and overseeing the application of measures for the secret collection of data that limit constitutional human rights and freedoms. The Council acts on complaints from citizens and after the conducted supervision, it informs the applicant [http://www.sabor.hr/Default.aspx?art=19962&sec=2398]. The work of this Council is proving to be successful because in cases where the Council has made conclusions they dealt with the illegal operation of the agency and harassment in human

rights and freedoms. The shortcomings of the Civil Monitoring Council are recognized in the limitations of their work, that is, they do not have the possibility to perform direct supervision over the Operational Technical Center, they have broad criteria for election of Council members, and they have no opportunity to act on their own initiative and communicate freely with the public [Bosanac, 2015:10].

4. PARLIAMENTARY CONTROL OVER THE OPERATION OF THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA

The parliamentary control over the intelligence services is especially developed in the Republic of Bulgaria. Many of the functions of the National Assembly are practiced through the Committees that they select directly. The Committees according to the Constitution have the power to exercise parliamentary control on behalf of the Parliament.

The most important in this area is the Committee for Control over Security Services, Implementation and Use of Special Investigative Measures and Access to Data under the Law on Electronic Communications. This Committee exercises parliamentary control over the security services of legality, as well as over the adequacy of their activities based on the applicable strategic national security documents of the Republic of Bulgaria and concluded international agreements. It has the right to issue opinions on the annual reports and budgets of security services, regularly requesting thematic reports on the work of the security services and on the state of the individual components of national security, organizing hearings of current and former security personnel, reviewing and makes recommendations for all internal regulations of security services, including those containing classified information, reviews complaints from citizens and organizations related to violations of injures the employees of the security services and makes suggestions for improving their work, inform the public about the results of its control activity through written opinions or statements before the media [http://www.parliament.bg/bg/parliamentarycommittees/members/2596/info].

Apart from parliamentary control in the Republic of Macedonia, Bulgaria has a National Bureau for the Control of Special Intelligence Instruments [http://www.nbksrs.bg]. This Bureau is an independent state body that oversees the procedures for the authorization, implementation and use of special intelligence means, compliance with the principle of financial obligation, the preservation and destruction of information obtained through special intelligence and to protect the rights and freedoms and citizens from illegal use of special intelligence.

The National Bureau is a collective body and consists of 5 members, including a president and a vice-president elected by the National Assembly for a term of five years. The members of the National Bureau have the right to access: all documents related to the use and application of special intelligence means; all documents related to the storage and destruction of information obtained through special research facilities and all premises in which such documents are stored. This National Bureau also acts upon complaints from citizens, which after the conducted investigation it is obliged to inform them if illegal special intelligence assets were used against them.

5. PROPOSED CONTROL MECHANISM OVER THE OPERATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION FOR SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

The problem of control and supervision over the Administration for Security and Counterintelligence in the Republic of Macedonia is complex and should be considered from a higher instance through an efficient and effective system of control and oversight of the security system as a whole. For that purpose, we can provide a constructive proposal that offers the establishment of a specially independent body that would have the authority to exercise control and to oversee the work of the members of the security system, including the operation of the Administration for Security and Counterintelligence. The Agency for Control and Supervision of the Security System in the Republic of Macedonia will be formed by the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia in a regular procedure with a separate Law and the Assembly will be the only body in front of which the Agency would be responsible for its work. Even though it will be formed by the Assembly, it will not be a parliamentary, nor a governmental body, which means it will not be placed under the institutional control of any ministry, government or the president of the state. It will have the capacity of a legal entity, it will be independent in the performance of its authorities, and financial resources will be provided from the budget of the Republic of Macedonia. In addition to the other Commissions, there will be a Commission for control and oversight of the work of the Administration for Security and Counterintelligence.

This Commission would exercise control and oversight on the work of the persons from the Administration for Security and Counterintelligence in charge of undertaking security and counterintelligence activities in order to fulfill the national interests and goals of the state.

Each of the Committees within the Agency will be composed of 5 members elected by the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia after previously announced public call for election the members. The Agency will be managed by a director who will be proposed and elected by the Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia with a mandate of 5 years. The members of the Committees would have professional status of employees in the Agency. Each of the Committees shall be headed by a Head, elected from among the members. The highest body of the Agency will be the Council, composed of the Heads of Committees and the Director, who will also manage the Council.

6. CONCLUSION

The control and the oversight of the security system are important elements of the legal order of any modern democratic state, especially in the area of protection of human freedoms and rights. The efficient and effective functioning of the control and oversight bodies in the country is one of the key preconditions for reducing overstepping of powers and abuse of the official position by the members of the security system.

In the Republic of Macedonia there are conditions for implementing parliamentary control and oversight over the security system, but there are also a number of shortcomings, omissions and weaknesses in the area of practical application of control and oversight mechanisms.

The objective of the proposed changes in the area of control and oversight over the intelligence agencies is to strengthen the effectiveness of the control and oversight mechanisms in the Republic of Macedonia, especially regarding the abuse of the official

position and overstepping the powers of the members of the security system. The past inefficiency in the work of the institutions and bodies that conduct control and supervision can be removed by introducing a new body (the Agency), which would represent a higher instance of the control and oversight mechanism, and at the same time a body that will perform parallel control and supervision and will not to allow infringement in human freedoms and rights of citizens guaranteed by the Constitution and ratified international agreements. With the establishment and operation of the Agency, the rule of law would be ensured and the professional capacity and public confidence in the institutions and bodies of the security system and their members would be strengthened.

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CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION APPROACH TOWARDS MAINTAINING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Ana Fritzhand, Dr.Sc
Faculty of Philosophy – Skopje, Republic of Masedonia
e-mail: anaf@fzf.ukim.edu.mk
Marjan Gjurovski, Dr.Sc
Faculty of Security - Skopje, Republic of Masedonia
e-mail: mar.gjurovski@gmail.com

Abstract

The world is rapidly transforming and continuously facing changes in every aspect of people's existence. Each new change, whether local or global, introduces a new challenge to deal with. Unfortunately, some current changes are not positive at all. Such are the threats towards the international security and stability. Therefore, many people would argue that the world we all live in is a dangerous place and they would not be far from the truth. Each day, through the media we witness new conflicts, terrorist attacks, killings, and suffering. We also witness a new security concern for the states in the form of transnational terrorism. Extremist groups can reach every corner of the globe in just a few days. Some of them remain focused on local or national political dynamics, but others seek to affect global change. Another particularly important challenge for the Balkans and Europe in recent years is the migration crisis. Macedonia is one of those countries that was and still is on the main route for migrants from Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, etc. This opens new issues towards how we maintain safety and stability, nationally and internationally. More particular, what conflict resolution approaches should be used in dealing with terrorists, for example? Or, what changes should be made in the security system of our country, in order to be tuned in with the Euro-Atlantic standards and thus become more effective and reliable in dealing with the new forms of security challenges the whole Europe is facing? Relevant literature highlights negotiation, mediation, and dialogue as most important conflict resolution strategies. Therefore, in the following pages we will review the possibilities and limitations of the mentioned strategies in dealing with new international security challenges.

Keywords: *conflict resolution, international security, negotiation, mediation, dialogue*

1. INTRODUCTION

During this last decade intensive and rapid changes related to increased instability and insecurity occurred in many parts of the world. Starting from the Arab Spring which erupted into deadly conflicts in some Arab countries, through militarized clashes in Ukraine, as well as worsened relations between China and Japan, the ongoing crises in North Korea, the ominous consequences from the American withdrawal from Afghanistan and ongoing terrorist attacks in Europe, altogether contributed to the growth

of feelings of unsafety and insecurity among people worldwide. Although some authors would argue that conflicts are universal features of human societies (e.g. Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, Miall, 2016), still today international security is facing serious challenges which lead to the impression that there is no safe country in the world. According to Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, Miall (2016), conflict resolution theory tries to respond to such a challenging context by highlighting the contemporary cosmopolitan conflict resolution approach that focuses on "*…adequate hybrid local-global responses to tackle the new reality – the hybrid mix of local, regional and global conflicts…called transnational conflict*" (p. 5).

In theory, conflict resolution is usually defined as a complex set of approaches and techniques for resolution of conflicts by a third party. It is tightly related to the process of peacekeeping. A new form of practice of the international conflict resolution, called *interactive problem solving*, is based on social-psychological principles. These principles form a particular framework for analyses of international conflicts in particular, i.e. of international relations in general terms (Kelman, 1997). When it comes to conflict resolution and the study of constructive responses to the problems caused by violent ethnic conflicts, many authors make a distinction between the conflict management and the conflict resolution approaches. Sometimes, these two approaches are defined as incompatible with each other. For example, Cohen and Arnone (1988), distinguish between *conflict management* and *conflict resolution*, by defining the first one as typically short-ranged in which governments must engage and the later as the long-term processes, which must include the involvement of entire societies and the replacement of adversarial relations with cooperative ones.

However, it seems that the assumption of a basic incompatibility between conflict management and conflict resolution is not justified because it is generally unhelpful in promoting conflict resolution. Therefore, some authors (e.g. Ryan, 1990) suggest how the two approaches can be combined, by introducing the concept of peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding. According to Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall (2005), appropriate conflict resolution strategies as today's answers to the international terrorism, are one of the most serious tests of the principles and the approaches used in the general philosophy of conflict resolution. Judging from the position of cosmopolitan conflict resolution in 21st century, terrorism is defined as a complex, multifaceted global-local phenomenon. These authors state that conflict resolution approaches towards international terrorism should include two things. First, they have to cover all levels (from local to global). Second, they have to obtain appropriate answer based on relevant security strategies in order to rebut terrorism and to be applied in a wider political frame which consists of three strategies: preventive (in order to accept that there is a potential base for bursting deadly conflicts and terrorism), persuasive (in order to persuade relevant political groups) and coordinative (in order to combine all mentioned efforts under the umbrella of contingency and complementarity principles).

2. SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS

There are several propositions about the nature of international conflicts coming from the social-psychological perspective. One proposition is that international conflicts are processes driven from collective needs and fears. The other propositions claimed that these conflicts are intersocietal processes, multifaceted processes of mutual influence, and

interactive processes with an escalatory, self-perpetuating dynamics (Kelman, 1997). In sum, the shared feature of the international conflicts is that they are *processes* which affect international relations. When discussing the first proposition regarding the needs and fears, it should be underlined that unfulfilled basic human needs (such are those for physical safety, food and shelter, health, identity, security, autonomy, sense of justice and many more), are among the most influential causal factors in any kind of conflict (international, inter-ethnic, inter-racial, etc.). This is particularly highlighted in the theory of basic human needs (Staub, 2003). In the situation of direct violence between individuals or nations, the needs for security and identity are becoming most important. When people live in structural violence where the economic needs or the needs for freedom of speech and self-determination are not met, the path to violence is clearly open.

The fear of denial of the basic needs (especially the perceived threat to *identity* and *security*) is closely related to eruption of intergroup conflicts. When protracted conflicts between identity groups are present, those fears could become existential in their nature, thus turning the conflict into a struggle over group survival. As theory and practice show, the causes of conflict usually combine both objective and subjective factors which are interconnected. However, when subjective factors linked to collective basic needs and existential fears take on the lead, they have a significant impact on the escalation and perpetuation of the conflict. The latter is true, because such needs and fears create resistance to change even when all parties in the conflict are well aware that it is in their best interest to end it. Moreover, collective needs and fears are often linked to individual needs and fears, so in the international conflicts they can be relatively easily manipulated by the leaders, causing high levels of rage and violence (Kelman, 1997). Therefore, as Christie puts out (as cited in Murdzeva - Shkaric, 2007), the resolution of a conflicts can be achieved only by satisfying the basic human needs (or at least those for identity, security, well-being, and self-determination), diminishing fear and reaching social justice.

International conflict, as an intersocietal phenomenon, pervades the whole society, both when violence is explicit, or muted. Therefore, when analyzing conflicts, we need to account not only for its strategic, military, and diplomatic dimensions, but also for its economic, psychological, cultural, and social-structural dimensions. All these dimensions interact with each other and define both intrasocietal and intersocietal processes that drive the conflict. Since each party involved in the conflict protects its own positions and interests, the conflict arises when those interests clash. Therefore, the parties engage in mutual influence targeted towards advancing their interests and blocking the opposite ones. However, the conflict is a process in which all parties change over time and react in relation to each other. When the conflict is highly intensive, the interaction is becoming more tensed and violent, by reinforcing and deepening the conflict. Such interaction is driven by certain norms and principles that lead to creation of an escalating, self-perpetuating dynamic (Kelman, 1997).

Since international conflicts are complex processes, approaches that are used for resolving or transcending of these conflicts have to be systematic and holistic. As Galtung explains (as cited in Murdzeva - Shkaric, 2007), a conflict, which can be symmetric or asymmetric, is a triangle consisted of attitude, contradiction, and behavior. These three components are constantly changing and influencing one another, because conflict is a dynamic process. Thus, resolving a conflict must include simultaneous interventions in all three components. This includes de-escalation of the conflict behavior, changing of the attitudes, and transformation of the relationships, personalities and interests of all sides in the conflict. Relating this model to the forms of structural, cultural, and direct violence

brings to the conclusion that changing conflict behavior will end direct violence, removing structural contradictions and injustices will resolve structural violence, while changing attitudes will help ending cultural violence (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, Miall, 2016). Main tools for conceiving of these outcomes are the dialogue, negotiation, and mediation.

3. TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM AS A MOST SERIOUS THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Today's terrorism is transnational in cause, operation, and effect. Its essential features ensure its importance within international relations because it represents a whole new security concern for the states: the risk of attack does not just come from other states (war) but from mobile criminal groups that move between nations and are dispersed globally (transnational terrorism). According to the Global Terrorism Index (2016), the dynamics of global terrorism is rapidly changing and those fluctuations are very complex. The modern terrorist activity has a fluid nature which can be recognized in the continued intensification of terrorism in some countries. Referring to data reported in GTI 2016, there is strong evidence that terrorism is a highly concentrated form of violence. It is mostly committed in certain countries by a small number of groups. Among the analyzed countries, there are five which are suffering the highest impact from terrorism. Those are: Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Syria, accounted for 72% of all deaths from terrorism in 2015. The same Report highlights that ISIL, Boko Haram, the Taliban, and al-Qa'ida were responsible for 74% of all those deaths.

Transnational terrorism has diverted the attention of global institutions from supporting basic developmental issues. Economic and social issues have been combined with the counter-terrorist activities. The consequences of terrorism operating transnationally are that states have been presented with a number of decision points about when and how to intervene. The first set of decisions governments must make, is where to intervene. Western nations have been tempted to intervene internationally in order to prevent the emergence of terrorist groups or minimize the efficacy. Relevant evidence indicates that the most common actions as a response to terrorism are the military ones. It also reveals that those types of actions are not effective enough to resolve terroristic behaviors. By contrast, many times they end up with negative contra-effects by provoking even more destructive and violent actions from terrorists. One probable reason for this is the nature of terrorism itself since it represents a mosaic of different types of behaviors (Kendall Hope, 2014). Therefore, if counter-terrorist strategy is to be effective with long-term benefits for all parties, the conflict resolution approaches aimed towards resolving complex terroristic behavior should be considered as well. By acting simultaneously on different levels and domains, it is essential for regions and countries that face a long history of deadly conflicts.

Although there is a large body of research on terrorism, studies about the role of conflict resolution approaches towards countering terrorism are still scarce. There are various reasons. Namely, there is an intensive debate whether such approaches should be considered at all in dealing with terrorists. Often, many believe that this is not the right way to fight terrorism since negotiating with terrorists is a sign of weakness. Furthermore, it will strengthen their positions and it will only provide false legitimacy to their actions. Nevertheless, experienced negotiators provide evidence against such notions, explaining it is usually the case when the situation is evaluated incorrectly and / or the negotiation process is conducted unprofessionally. According to Weiss (2003), in crisis or during

conflicts more communication is essential to resolve these conditions successfully. Conducting proper negotiation means being focused on reaching the best possible solution to the conflict, without undermining one's own positions. Furthermore, it is considered that the scope of terroristic actions is too wide; identifying and reaching leaders within radical groups has been determined impossible to negotiate with.

When considering appropriate conflict resolution approaches towards countering terrorism, the psychology of individuals who become involved in terrorism needs to be taken into account as well. Relevant literature indicates that there is a longstanding interest among behavioral scientists to describe and explain what is mutual to all those individuals and their behavior (Borum, 2011). According to Victoroff (2005), there is a significant body of evidence which suggests that the genesis of the terrorist mindset is contributed by modifiable social and psychological factors. Understanding the causes, motivations, and determinants of terrorist behavior poses an enormous challenge, but it is also an inextricable part of every counter-terrorism strategy. Thus, pursuing this knowledge is vital to countering violent extremism's threat to global security.

Transnational terrorism is a complex international issue which needs to be addressed by fully understanding of the nature and scope of the need of the global world to counter terrorism. Different professional and social groups have a definite role to play in the counter international terrorism. Diplomacy also plays a crucial role in developing this international approach. In order to implement the policies against terrorism, the state needs well-articulated mechanisms and procedures. International security across borders of countries needs to be upgraded so as to promote international security and reduce movement of terrorists across counties thus reducing the impact of terrorism worldwide.

However, if a counter-terrorist strategy is to be effective and with long-term benefits, more should be added into it. Specifically, conflict resolution approaches aimed towards resolving complex and fluid terroristic behavior have to be considered as part of wider intervention. However, not all authors agree on the later. A key objection raised by those who are against engaging in negotiations with terrorists is that it legitimizes terrorist groups, their goals, and their means. A dialogue with them would serve only to incite more violence and weaken the democracy. Furthermore, it is that the complex transnational structure of some terrorist organizations brings confusions and suspicion about who the officials should start a negotiation with. Faced with a multifaceted, horizontal organization such as a terrorist, the dilemma is how officials should engage in the negotiation process. Nevertheless, the truth is that conflict resolution approaches can lead to a better understanding and peace, even with terrorists. It is viewed as an alternative approach to the question of legitimacy and complexity in engaging with terrorism. Drawing from research in peace and conflict studies, it becomes obvious that there are strategies which may, in fact, be conducive to a nonviolent resolution of conflicts, involving terrorist violence. In that sense, legitimation of terrorist groups through talks can transform a conflict away from violence and complexity and it may open up new possibilities for engagement (Toros, 2008).

4. COSMOPOLITAN CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A NEW WAY OF ADDRESSING TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM

The effects of globalization in the 21st century forced societies to open their borders, accept new ideas and new ways of communication, different cultural values, belief systems and ways of living, etc. However, this also resulted in local conflicts to be manifested globally and vice-versa, so their effects are felt much further away than the place they in which originally appear. Therefore, conflicts are not only experienced on an intrastate or interstate level, but also globally, which makes them transnational. According to Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, and Miall (2016), transnational conflict is a hybrid mixture of local, regional, and global conflicts. This requires new doctrines of intervention, but also a new understanding of peace and security. Here, cosmopolitan conflict resolution probably has most to offer.

Cosmopolitan conflict resolution is both reactive and proactive. Its activity is viewed in promotion of the global agenda based on certain values, as well as in its overarching strategy to stimulate further transformation. Authors use this term to highlight the need for an approach that promotes constructive ways of dealing with conflicts on all levels (from local to global), all in the best interest of humanity. In its essence, cosmopolitan conflict transformation is devoted to prevention, alleviation, and termination of the damaging aspects of transnational conflict thus protecting those who suffer the most from such a conflict (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2016). As it was mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the most serious threat to the international security today is transnational terrorism. Therefore, the question of whether the cosmopolitan conflict resolution approach could provide a new and more effective strategy for dealing with terrorism occurs naturally. Some people doubt this, saying that conflict resolution has nothing to offer in the area of deadly security threats from fanatical ideologies. Thankfully, this is far from the truth.

In terms of addressing terrorism, the cosmopolitan conflict resolution approach gives a framework consisted of four dimensions: *prevention*, *persuasion*, *denial*, and *coordination*. *Prevention* implies to reduce proneness to terrorism which is in the core of a conflict resolution antiterrorism strategy. This further means to address what drives international terrorism globally, and what the regional systems and the issue of state legitimacy and capacity are. *Persuasion*, as the second dimension, provides three main elements of its strategy: to challenge ideologies of terror; to persuade conflict parties to use non-terrorist means; and to reduce the appeal of terrorism within wider actual or potential support constituencies (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2016; p.340). The third dimension – *denial* – is focused on reducing vulnerability and defeating hardliners. *Promotion of international cooperation and legitimacy* is the last, fourth dimension in the suggested framework. It includes coordination of regional and local incentives in widest coalition of possible international actors. Application of the principles of contingency, complementarity and comparative advantage is also part of this dimension. In the same time, it is very important to ensure that terrorist action is sanctioned internationally and that it complies with the international law.

A review of the relevant literature reveals five generations of conflict resolution approaches. Cosmopolitan conflict resolution is listed in the latest generation that emerged in 2005. It is focused on developing new tools and approaches appropriate for the rapidly changing world and the impact of global information communications technology. The frequent use of the internet by many different parties opens global space for achieving

negative goals (such as organizing a terrorist attack or spreading hatred and fear) but also for achieving positive goals (such are the interventions targeted towards prevention of conflicts, education of young generations, and increasing awareness of the importance of a dialogue and the implementation of non-violent problem-solving strategies). There is also a focus on human solidarity in this fifth generation as well as the efforts to ensure that conflict resolution is going to be truly international. The latter implies that the central goal of "transforming potential violence into non-violent change" (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2016; p. 503) has to be shared cross-culturally in order to be cosmopolitan. Finally, the awareness of shared *humanity* that lies in the essence of cosmopolitan conflict resolution needs to be recognized and ultimately respected, because it is the deepest identity of all – individuals, ethnic groups, nations, states, religions, and cultures – and the core characteristic that defines the human species.

5. STRENGHTS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE CONFLICT RESOLUTION APPROACH TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

It was already mentioned at the beginning that terrorism is probably the most serious threat to the international security these days. Regarding the possibility of applying negotiation, mediation, and dialogue in countering terrorism, some authors believe that it will be just a waist of energy, since it will be a reward for them, and not punishment for their behavior. However, the conflict resolution approach offers an innovative path toward understanding terrorism by engaging with terrorism as a form of violence that is part of a broader conflict. Terrorism thus becomes a strategy used in conflicts by actors who believe it is the best strategy to adopt at a given time. Thus, from a conflict resolution perspective, terrorism cannot be understood outside of the conflict of which is it part and can only be analyzed by scholars and engaged with by policymakers within this broader context (Toros, 2016).

Nevertheless, the conflict resolution approach is not omnipotent, so one has to know its full potentials and limits before applying any conflict resolution approach or strategy. Analysis of potentials and limits of conflict resolution strategies towards international terrorism presented in the relevant literature highlights several main conclusions. For example, in some cases, negotiation, mediation, and dialogue with terrorists are viewed as a weakness and many prefer to use military approaches. Some terrorist groups are structured in such a way that makes the negotiators or mediators to contact with them physically and transmit messages to them. The lack of open channels for communication increases isolation and mistrust and often makes the conflict resolution approach appear unsuccessful. Rigidity and stubborn mentality of religious extremists often makes it difficult for policymakers to resolve the conflicts with them peacefully and hence, they are compelled to use coercive counterterrorism measures (Amin, 2017). Regarding *conflict prevention*, Toros (2016) points out that one must not overestimate the potential for this approach in conflicts marked by terrorist violence, which may be particularly resistant to conflict prevention. In some cases, maintaining the group intact can become the ultimate goal of the group (Crenshaw, 2005, Weinberg and Davis, 1989, Wilkinson, 2001; as cited in Toros, 2016). Still, the analysis also provides theoretical arguments and empirical evidence that conflict prevention can have an impact on the rationale for groups engaging in violence, on their relationship with their constituency, and on halting a potential escalation of violence. It also highlights the important link between

conflict prevention and counterterrorism and how the latter has to be thought of as part of a broader response that understands terrorism as part of a broader conflict.

Peacemaking also has its potential and limits when applied to conflicts marked by terrorist violence. It is well known that violence can have a profound impact on negotiations. Armed groups have in the past miscalculated their capacity to impact on negotiations by pursuing strategies of violence to increase their leverage (for example, IRA). There is usually an inherent asymmetry in conflicts marked by terrorist violence, which makes it difficult for the state leaders and officials to accept that they are unable to defeat a small group of what they often consider to be criminals and terrorists. Another challenge for peacemaking is that in the contexts of terrorist violence lies the potential need for secrecy at the start of the negotiation process. As practice shows, many cases of negotiations between states and non-state armed groups began in secret. *Negotiations*, as one aspect of peacemaking, could often fail, as was the case in many conflicts involving terrorist violence such as the conflict opposing the Colombian government and the FARC or in the Basque conflict. However, understanding terrorism as a strategy used within a broader conflict opens the question of whether ending terrorism necessarily means a resolution of the conflict (Toros, 2016).

The *dialogue*, as another aspect of peacemaking, also differs in its role according to the type of the conflict, its duration and outcome. Although dialogue can be very effective in resolving conflicts nonviolently, it is also true that in some cases sustained effects other than precondition for the application of other policy tools are not registered. Hence, the dialogue is important as a diplomatic tool, but the necessary conditions for an integrative approach to succeed are seldom present in deep-rooted conflicts such is the one in Ukraine, or as were those in Georgia, Libya and Iran, for example (Rieker & Thune, 2017). The achieved stability could also easily be undermined, so there is a need of a long-term and systematic approach to conflict resolution in these cases. On the other side, a less formal dialogue process undertaken by non-diplomats (like in Afghanistan, or Sudan) was justified despite the massive costs of the war and the fairly modest achievements. According to Rieker and Thune (2017), some analyses of dialogue potentials and limits indicate that behavior and positions tend to change as a result of changing international and domestic circumstances and not exclusively because of the dialogue. It is also shown that diplomatic dialogues does not necessarily transform values and identities of the actors which is especially obvious in deep-rooted conflicts, but could affect both the timing of events and the nature of the measures that are adopted. Furthermore, if enforcement mechanisms are lacking, any negotiated agreement could be fragile. This applies also on the agreements based on the dialogue. The character of the dialogue differs depending on whether the negotiation is facilitated by a neutral third party or not. It also depends on the level of secrecy and confidentiality. Practicing the top-down approach usually makes a genuine dialogue more difficult to be established. Finally, practice shows that dialogue is more effective in preventing conflicts than in resolving them.

As Toros (2016) points out, *peacebuilding* usually undertakes disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of armed combatants as one of its first policies. Yet, the actors involved in terrorist violence are not reintegrated into the society, because the focus of this policy is placed more on disengagement from terrorism. This has potentially dangerous repercussions for the resolution of the conflict and the overall levels of violence in post-agreement societies. Also, the asymmetrical power relations in the conflict may lead to the conclusion that compromise is not necessary to end the conflict with terrorists. Nevertheless, it is precisely the asymmetrical nature of conflicts marked by terrorist

violence which may make peacebuilding and reconciliation in particular more difficult. One of the biggest concern related to peacebuilding as carried out by international organizations is that a one-size-fits-all model is imposed on regions throughout the world with little concern for local specificities or for the social costs of widespread reforms. Peacebuilding can therefore be a source of renewed conflict if it follows a top-down model. Thus, conflicts marked by terrorist violence must be understood as conflicts when peacebuilding is undertaken but states and other actors have to account for the extreme asymmetrical nature of the conflict and its impact on peacebuilding strategies (Toros, 2016, p. 15).

6. CONCLUSION

As announced at the beginning, the present paper is focused on a brief analysis of the contemporary challenges of the conflict resolution approach, i.e. its strengths and weaknesses in maintaining international security. International conflicts as an intersocietal phenomenon pervade the whole society, both when violence is explicit, or muted. Thus, conflict resolution approaches can lead to a better understanding and peace. The latter is true even when dealing with terrorism. Although many would say that negotiations legitimize terrorist groups, their goals, and their means and serve only to incite more violence and weaken the democracy, conflict resolution approaches offer an innovative path toward understanding terrorism by engaging with terrorism as a form of violence that is part of a broader conflict. Terrorism thus becomes a strategy used in conflicts by actors who believe it is the best strategy to adopt at a given time. In this since, several effective political strategies are possible. One of them is inclusiveness of people and issues. This strategy is important because it has the potential to reduce the frustration from unmet basic human needs which is a high motivator for people to support terrorists and terrorism and / or to resort to violence.

Persuasion aimed towards reducing the motivation of the conflicting parties to resort to violence and minimizing support for terrorists should also be applied as a potential strategy. This process includes challenging ideologies of terrorism, persuading the conflict parties to use non-violent and non-coercive tactics and reducing the existence of terrorism. Demonstrating greater humanity and efficacy of non-terrorist alternatives and persuading the parties that non-violent measures can best meet their strategic goals can go a long way in dealing effectively with terrorists and their support groups. Reducing vulnerability and defeating hardliners can as well be used to respond to terrorism. Coordination and maximization of the international efforts is also required to respond effectively to terrorism. Here, diplomacy also plays a crucial role in developing this international approach. Last, but not least, the nature of terrorism itself needs to be accounted for, since it represents a mosaic of different types of behaviors. Thus, knowing the psychology of terrorism and of terrorists is another very important part of every effective counter-terrorist strategy.

Finally, in order to make structural changes it is necessary to transform the conflict into another reality, i.e. to transcend. Transformation introduces systemic changes and it is a process which leads to greater equity and equality in the social system as a whole. When transforming deep rooted conflicts, it is necessary to apply the strategy “operate locally, think globally” by working on local solutions that will make a change in the global social structure as well. Here, the psychological plan requires dealing with hatred and traumas in order to move from a vengeance culture - an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth – towards a

culture of reconciliation. In this sense, building a culture of peace is the model for transforming social structures into peaceful places in the world.

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COORDINATION AND REORGANIZATION OF SECURITY INSTITUTIONS

Oliver Bakreski, Dr.Sc
Institute of Security, Defence and Peace-Skopje, Republic of Macedonia
e-mail:oliverbakreski@yahoo.com
Tanja Miloševska, Dr.Sc
Institute of Security, Defence and Peace-Skopje, Republic of Macedonia
Leta Bargieva, Ma
Institute of Security, Defence and Peace-Skopje, Republic of Macedonia

Abstract

The coordination of the security sector is exeptionally important because it enables the necessary synchronization of the security institutions, which leads to overall adjustment of the activities in order to maintain a balanced system of relations and proper transformation of the security institutions. The issues which merit to be analyzed in the context of foreseeing whether and how the coordination of the security community in the country, and in general between the institutions in charge of maintaining the security of the country is achieved, point out to: the existence or the nonexistence of coordination. Hence, this paper has a dual relevance. First, it designates the existence or the nonexistence of security sector coordination in the Republic of Macedonia. Here, as referent and starting contexts are taken the practical solutions in the segment of coordination provided by the country, synthetized and generalized in the security system of the Republic of Macedonia. Second, locating the problem and giving recommendations for coordination improvement.

Key words: coordination, transformation, subjectivism, security sector, re-organization.

1. Introduction

Coordination emanates from the need for cooperation between the institutions and it is tasked to connect the separate components of the security institutions in order to ensure the integration itself. Analyzing the security sector coordination is a complex and difficult task, because it is featured with great intricacy and specifics. Therefore, the eximantion of the internal mechanism of the security system should be primarily based on its complete comprehension and distinction from the other management functions in order to avoid any improvisation and partiality, especially if we are aware that the high level of coordination is beneficial for the work of the security sector which is not simple and is unpredictable.

The segment of issues which are on this occasion analyzed in this paper is in the context of foreseeing the questions: “Is the necessary level of coordination between the security institutions provided?”, “How are the necessary activities coordinated for the key security actors in the country?” “Are certain activities undertaken in order to improve the coordination on a national level?”, “Are the problems in the part of providing coordination

located well?", "Which are the methods for permanent improvement of the way the coordination itself is achieved and which steps should be undertaken in order to improve that perspective?"

2. The need for coordination

Coordination differs from institution to institution, from person to person. In a given organization there are multiple message receptors, and fewer emissaries (sources) of communication processes. When communications are spread irregularly through various segments of the organization there is a need for their coordination.[71]

Hence, coordination is more than necessary, because it is a fundamental presumption for the existence of a certain institution and it is achieved and implemented in all of the institutions regardless of their size and authority.

Managers accomplish coordination in two ways: first, they facilitate coordination through adequate organizational structure and by selecting capable and trained individuals, through elaboration of the integral plans and programs which the subordinates will perform, as well as by establishing means for ascertaining whether the plans and programs are executed adequately.

Second, they need to be assured that their subordinates comprehend the coordination principles and the importance of action according to them.[72]

The need for coordination arises from the difference in the standpoints among the members of the organization itself. These days, we mostly discuss four sources of differences in the outlook between the associates in a certain organization.[73] First, differences regarding the goals. These contrasts are a result of the insistence of various sections of the organization, or individuals in the organization to impose goals in their own organizational unit or their branches as the dominant organizational goal. For instance, in the security sector priority is always given to the security matters over the other segments of work. Second, differences which occur by the different approach toward timing. Some managers in the organization pawn for immediate problem solutions, while others insist on long term decisions. Such differences are a consequence of the nature of matters. For example, when the leading structures in the security sector decide on concrete problems they need to have the solution at the same moment, because on the contrary the situation can escalate. Third, differences which are the result of interpersonal relations. For instance, during the execution of certain security tasks, especially in the army and the police, the communication demands a rapid exchange of information and automatic decision making process and execution. Fourth, differences which emanate from the level of formalism. Every organizational unit has different standards in assessing the level of achieved goals. The differences are often a consequence of various activities which are performed in various organizational units. Some organizational units are dealing with easily measureable matters for which it is not hard to establish quality standards, based on which it is possible to objectivize control, while others deal with fluid matters where objectivity is often

[71] Gustzkow, H. *Communication in Organization*, Handbook of Organization, ed. March J., Rand Mc Nally Company, Chicago, 1965, pp.537-538.

[72] Petit, T., *Fundamentals of Management Coordination*, New York, 1975, p.52.

[73] These differences in standpoints and such gradation are advocated by several authors. (J. Todorovic, Lawrence, Lorch, etc.), see in: Dragišić Z., *Bezbednosni menadžment*, Službeni glasnik i Univerzitet u Beogradu-Fakultet bezbednosti, Beograd, 2007, str. 101-103.

impossible. In the field of security management, objective control is often impossible because the matters which are performed by some segments of the organization responsible for security cannot be measured immediately, like the other sectors of the country.[74]

Coordination is also necessary because it more or less eliminates various conflicts which occur in the organization on different levels. From the numerous conflicts, naturally present in the complex organization structure, three are especially related to the coordination process: conflict of personal interests and the organization's interests, or a part of the organization, second, conflict of interests of various segments of the structure and third, conflict of interests in the entire organization. Coordination cannot solve conflict situations which have a deeper social background, it rather moderates and succesfuly absolves to a certain level the ones which arise from the complexity of the organizational activity.[75]

Coordination is achieved through standardization, which enables routine and rules which every organizational unit and every individual in it is obliged to act upon on and function in the identical and constant manner.[76]

It means that for the achievement of better coordination, it is necessary for the individuals in the institution to be able to complement each other in the realization of the commonly designated goals. Some of the generalizations can be summed up as follows:

1. High realization more often and much more depends on the unity of the majority, rather than on small interpersonal interactions.
2. Small groups tend to be superior over major ones, when the matter is consecrated on the formation of the opinion, while larger groups tend to be beneficial when it is necessary to quickly reject incorrect proposals.
3. Tendency, unlike agreement, is decreasing on the account of the increase of its dimensions.
4. Better and freer discussion leads to better results. Every remark of the members should be considered according to their own measures and everyone should feel free to publicly express their opinion in front of all group members, even if it is a personal reference, and be respectful if it is part of their privacy.
5. The examination of the differences should be prolific unlike the agreement as an encircled end of the discussion.[77]

Practice shows that the coordinative function is more successful where contemporary experienced subjects exist, where the activities are unfolding according to plan, by previously designated order; on the other hand, in subjects which lack experience, the coordinative function is unfolding with difficulties, inconsistently and without any special results. Hence, without the existence of permanent efforts in direction of coordination, overlapping and duplicating of the activities and the endeavors of crossed goals is certain.[78]

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[74] Ibid, p. 102-103.
[75] Chokreski, T. *Организационо општество,* НИО Студентски збор, Скопје, 1995, стр.109-110.
[76] Thomson, J. *Organization in Action*, McGraw Hill, New York, 1967, p.5.
[77] Cohen, J. *Humanistic Psychology*, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., London, 1958, pp.141-154.
[78] Dale, E. *Management: Theory and Practice*, Mc Graw - Hill Book Company, 1965, p.301.

3. The need for coordination in the security sector in the Republic of Macedonia

In order to offer a coherent explanation which will be adapted for examination of the complex structural, institutional, social and other changes that burden our country, our standpoint is that the best basis for analysis is the examination of the security sector coordination in the Republic of Macedonia.

Basically, the security system is a segment of the broader social system and its task is to guarantee an optimal degree of national security, and through the necessary causality of the elements it is directed toward the protection of the fundamental values of the country.

The security system of the Republic of Macedonia has a chain of hierarchically established sub systems and clear and precise functions by means of which the security activity is performed. The efficient enforcement of the security activity is impossible if there is no proper organization presented as a sum of institutions which focus on achieving this subtle activity.

In order to accomplish its task, the security system has to function in all of its elements, and subsystems respectively in accordance with the expressed required flexibility, sustainability, temperateness, capability, etc., and all the elements of the system are focused toward the achievement of a single purpose which is timely, authoritative and efficient reaction in complex security situations. Also, it should be emphasized that the efficient functioning of the security system is preconditioned by the achievement of the necessary level of coordination and management.

Regarding the management of the security sector, it should be emphasized that it demands a new model which in complex and opened social relations, with a well devised security policy and strategy will enable for the overall action to be based on scientific, expert and experience premises. However, in order to efficiently implement all the activities, a complete engagement of the human factor is necessary. Also, these assumptions have to be adopted and they are necessary for successful completion of the specific tasks. Especially the superiors in the security structures have to carefully and efficiently follow all social shifts, in order to be able to create a climate for adoption and organization of the new circumstances timely and on all hierarchical levels. On that note, standpoints and assurance need to be developed, and especially a security behavior culture and action in complex security situations, which will be a guarantee for a humane approach in the realization of the tasks. Once that correlative relation is established between the comprehension and the significance of the security system in the society, subsequently the acceptance of all its organizational, operative and other characteristics, as well as readiness for operationalization of the previously adopted security policy and strategy, it could be then said that the demands, efforts and necessities of the whole society have been met.[79] However, in order for the security system to be able to efficiently fulfil its tasks, there has to be a certain degree of activity coordination. Coordination has a great significance for the survival and the successful functioning of every institution and the country as a whole. The success of the coordinated activities depends on the capability, skills and experience of the superiors, the type of activity and complexity of the tasks which are performed, the cooperation among subjects, the time in which the coordination is made etc. but, regardless

[79] Sarkesian, S. C., U.S. *National Security - Policymakers, Processes and Politics*, Second edition. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995.

of its successfulness or unsuccessfulness, coordination remains the main link and a strong need in all institutions, organs and organizations.[80]

4. The subjective factor in coordination

In contemporary societal development, there is a contradictive tendency expressed through human subjectivity. Here, a question is raised whether the institution imposes its objective needs as rational in the achievement of social goals or, the issue is actualized whether the individuals are naturally subjected to many things, and whether there is room for human subjectivity. Seeking the answer to such designated goal has proved to be a very difficult task. Above all, the institution itself counterpoises a very complex creation in which many social relations cross, but on the other hand the roots to some of them are in the executors of the managerial roles which are connected and well established in the broader social community.

Subjectivity is a characteristic mainly found in countries which undergo a transition period. The belief that transitional processes will occur in a certain "institutional vacuum" and complete freedom in the building of the new institutions more or less seems to encounter huge difficulties. Subjectivity is mostly manifested in the part of opinions. Some individuals can adjust certain standpoints (opinions and attitudes) harder in a concrete situation,[81] and it is due to the undeveloped legal and other regulation in accordance with democratic standards, in which the interpretation and the foreseeing of how a certain field should be developed – in this case security, emanates arbitrarily.

Subjectivity in its broadest notion starts from a different truth propagated by the individual and it is not based on a written construction disseminated by the country. With respect to behavior, it is a situation based on subjective estimations of the occasions, situations and procedures.

The individual needs to acknowledge by himself and be aware of those interactions, whereof the awareness gains crucial significance for the future of man, and the interactions thereby get a different aspect, because they become recognized by their lawfulness. The awareness of lawfulness makes the activity of the person successful and liberating.[82]

The systematic violation of principles or their neglecting in altered circumstances often leads to decrease in legitimacy. The vertical and horizontal legitimacy is consisted of emotions and habits which are based on different institutions, rules and norms.

Basically, the vertical and horizontal legitimacy is the arrangement between all sectors of society for the fundamental rules of the political game, which Buzan calls institutional expression of the country.[83]

Subjectivity exists on the professional level, throughout to the executive level of government, including the competent ministers, especially with respect to the inter-ministerial coordination. This is especially important because security has interfaces with

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[80] Bakreski, O. *Drzavnite organi i odbranata*, Makedonska riznica, Kumanovo, 2002, str. 9.

[81] The society we live in will further remain trapped in what socialism left in the awareness, values and behavior of people.

[82] Синадиновски, Ј., *Опитеството и личноста*, Македонска книга, Скопје, 1988, стр.114-115.

[83] Buzan, B. *People, States and Fear*: *An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991, p. 65.

other ministries (Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Education etc.). Part of this ministerial incoordination stems from the lack of legal instrument when there are coalitions and ministers from various parties. The emerging result is a lack of cooperation, nonexistence of proper communication, low level of activity planning, absence of joint actions, etc.

The second dimension is the ignorance of the matter of the people who are assigned to certain positions (in the case of the Republic of Macedonia, regardless of whether they are capable to carry out a certain position or not, they accept such frontal and very sensitive managerial functions). For some of them it takes time to adjust to the new situations. This presupposes adaptation on the new values which are different than their previous ones.

The following dimension is in relation with the needs. In one moment the individual can satisfy only one of his needs, although the temptations can get bigger. But, in the satisfaction of this single need, the individual can be completely lost.[84] Contrary to this, it should be known that there are no separate interests and for the sake of responsibility, it is necessary for the common benefit to prevail. The notion "common benefit" is a false formulation which needs to prove that the country is taking care of the general content of all people, counterpoises a return of the "personal" basis, because "the common benefit" is above all "morally right". But, the "common benefit" is not a sum of the individual benefits, it is rather a benefit of "the integrity comprised by individuals", it is even an instrument for the achievement of the highest goal of every individual separately.[85] In the Republic of Macedonia the vital notion of general responsibility is seemingly non-existent, since certain superiors in charge promote a different life style known only to them, and their ambitions grow excessive and unrestrained, and rather selfish.

In any case, subjectivity is not inevitable, and it could be overcome solely by focusing on the goal which needs to be achieved, especially in terms of what must be the connecting tissue. In that regard, many clear and mandatory regulations are of course needed, as to the organizational and functional work arrangement, which narrows the space for the subjective aspect of development in a certain realm.

Considering the phase we are currently into, subjectivity will further be present. It will decrease as the number of prescribed norms and rules for a certain realm increases. Also, in order to overcome it, we should work on narrowing the space and reducing the possibilities for interpretations by one's own will. Consequently, if the realm is clear enough, there is no possibility for it to be violated, and that presupposes that one cannot refer to something if there is no appropriate regulation prescribed. In particular, one reason that can be pointed out for the occurrence of subjectivity in the Ministry of Defence is the lack of a rulebook on the creation of strategic documents, which goes in favor to the previously enunciated statement. Subjectivism exists among the ministers as well, especially in bringing certain decisions, solutions and instructions. Furthermore, another reason is the lack of criteria based on which the minister can bring such acts.

Hence, the absence of clear and concise criteria creates an assumption for the matters to be built somewhere in between, and that opens a gap for subjective behavior.

[84] Čupić, Č. *Politika i zlo*, ČIGOJA ŠTAMPA, Fakultet političkih nauka, Beograd, 1997, str.149.
[85] Maritain, J., *Humanisme intègr*al, Paris, 1936, p. 145.

Conclusion

The Republic of Macedonia belongs among those countries in the world which are in general ruled by a multiple-year continuity of statehood, and multiyear devising and organizing of the security sector thereon. The specifics of this sector are a result of the deep embeddedness of security in Macedonian tradition and culture, ethics and the Macedonian lifestyle in general.

Today's security sector of the Republic of Macedonia is a result of the process of reorganization, adjustment and building of the security community which is organized for performing a broad spectrum of security related tasks. Previously, it has to be pointed out that similarly as in other post socialist countries, after the collapse of socialism, massive social reforms were initiated in the Republic of Macedonia as well, which had the purpose to establish democratic standards in the country.

The most essential part of these reforms was in the transformation of the security sector with the sole purpose of demystifying its role and putting it under civilian control, and ensuring its activities are in accordance with the law. Under the influence of the past, the security sector reform was far more sensitive than in the rest of the social segments, but it has also brought certain dilemmas whether the best solutions were made, especially in the part of the coordination of the security institutions in order to respond to the demands of the citizens and the country.

Nevertheless, beside the numerous efforts, coordination remains an ongoing challenge for the Republic of Macedonia and it is considered that the answer to this question is one of the most difficult, because it is connected with the efficient functioning of the security system. It does not mean, however, that the existence of coordination will also mean creation of a system which will enable the necessary functionality by itself.

The next steps should be right in this direction, and coordination needs to provide the necessary functional connection of all security actors and enable the anticipated tasks to be accomplished without problems.

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MIGRATION: A SECURITY THREAT OR SECURITISATION PROCESS?

Ivica Simonovski, Dr.Sc
Cyber Security, Corporate Security, and Crisis Management Initiative
Republic of Macedonia
e-mail: ivica.simonovski@c3initiative.com
Zeynep Ece Unsal, Dr.Sc
Co-Founder and Chair Person of CSRC-Global
Istanbul, Republic of Turkey
e-mail: zeynepece@csrc.global

Abstract

Migration is as old concept as human history. When we look at the history of humanity, there had been a migration movement in the establishment story of almost every nation-state. These migratory movements had occurred either to ensure the safety of the nation or to achieve better living conditions. At that time, the concept of migration, which is perceived as a natural result of the needs of the societies, is now placed in many different forms. After the two World Wars and the Cold War security threat, a more peaceful international society was expected, but the world has begun to meet new security threats. The concept of migration and terrorism and especially the direct or indirect relations between these concepts have begun to be considered as new security threats. The attacks of September 11th were a milestone in the consolidation of this perception. With similar attacks taking place in Europe, immigrants have directly become percept as a security threat by the nation states. Today, there are many different flows of migration due to the different reasons. In this paper, the relationship between migration and terrorism will be examined and an analysis of the EU's approach to the refugee crises resulting from the Syrian civil war will be conducted. Is there a direct relationship between immigration and terrorism? Who are the perpetrators of terrorist attacks that occurred in Europe after 2001? Should every migrant be considered a possible criminal? How can we explain the foreign fighters or lone wolfs in Europe in such a pre-acceptance way? Is migration a threat to the security of nation states or is it part of the process of securitisation migration by the policy makers? What are the possible predictions for the next EU immigration policy?

Key Words: *Security, migration, migrants, terrorism, EU policies.*

1. FOR INTRODUCTION: WHAT IS SECURITISATION?

In simplest was the term "security" can be understood as being far away from all threats. However, in all periods of history the term security has been used for defining many different situations. The concept of security is historically based on the emergence of human society. However, for International Relations discipline the concept of security can be described as a very controversial concept. On one hand, discussions about defining and specifying of the scope of the concept continue. On the other hand, we frequently come across the debate about “how to provide” “of what security” “against what” in the

literature. In all times of International Relations discipline, it has not been possible to make a single definition of security for responding all the needs because of the concepts of security have always been affected by changes in time and space (Williams, 2008). The definition of security, which aimed to explain the international system of the first half of the 20th century focused on military issues and was defined as the absence of military threat for the protection of the nation from foreign attacks (Dedeoğlu, 2003). Security, by itself, means freedom from war, and it brings with it a strong expectation that there will be no defeat in the event of this war (Bellany, 1981). This is also called "traditional security approach" in the discipline and as it can be seen, these and similar definitions include "military" threats that can be detected predominantly towards the nation state, because the "state" that we are dealing with here is the Weberian state which has a means of domination, a force based on its authority when it comes to its place, having the capacity to obey its laws and punish those who violate it, and to have a legitimate use of violence (Heywood, 2007).

In the period of Cold War the dominant idea of security is related to the national security in military sense, but after the Cold War period, because of the new world order, the concept of security was also changed and started to be criticized. The Post-Cold War internationalization reminds us of the recent expansion of the individual security rights of the Liberal thinker of the Enlightenment and the old political debate on human rights. As a consequence of the internationalization of political, economic and social life, the appearance of individual security in international politics occurred in the 1990s. According to Buzan (1991, 432); "security is taken to be about to pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against the forces of the change which they see as hostile." (Buzan, New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century, 1991). In this context, security is at least related to survival, while at the same time it depends on the conditions (worries and anxieties) in which the existence can be realized. On the other hand, when this condition becomes part of the uncertainty of everyday life and is included in the account of the urgency of the security concept, the difficulties of the concept arise, because the concerns that arise in that case are perceived as a security threat and require different urgent actions and measures, including the use of force (Buzan, New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century, 1991).

According to Buzan and Waever, two of the leading theorists of the Copenhagen School, "the traditional military-political approach……. international security is established as existential" and serves as a vehicle for "power of politics". In other words, security in the traditional sense is built on the basis that the dominant actors of the state in the built-in system define both the source and the measure of the threat with an existential content and close it against any external questioning. Such a conceptualisation of the term security is "a moving that takes places beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics." Thus, any phenomenon considered and accepted as a security issue which can be assessed in a wide range of perceived and presented threats, from another state to a phenomenon of a different culture or a different religious organization - will be grounded for dealing with the "normal limits of the political procedure", with the determination and acknowledgment that "urgent measures" require. Here, "acceptance" refers to the social acceptance of such detection. However, this acceptation in society is largely related to the presentation of the concept as a threat, rather than the conscious recognition of the threat presented. To open it, when a case / concept presented as a security issue, -source of threat, agent of threat, target of

threat-listeners (public opinion) need to evaluate this issue in such a way that the built in dominant actors of the state can provide a crossing of the normal limits of the political procedure. In this way, however, issues that have not previously been linked to security can become the objects of security-related policies; in other words, they can be "securitized". According to Buzan and et al. securitisation in international level means presenting an issue as an important urgent and existential issue that should not be left to normal political bargaining and decisively addressed by top-ranking leaders before other issues (Buzan, Waever, & Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 1998). Securitisation is achieved through discourse or "speech act". Ole Waeverstate determines the rule of the language game explained the importance of language in the securitisation process as:

> ... What then is security? With the help of language theory, we can regard 'security'' as a speech act. In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering "security" a state representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it (Weaver, 1995:55)...

As it can be seen, the discourse dimension of the securitisation approach is the most important element. The more effectively the political message sent as a speech act is used, the easier it is to secure it on the agenda of politics. People can demonstrate that there is a problem, and that it is of critical importance, with the rhetoric and attitude that they put on the axis of information. Indeed, the authority and legitimacy created by the concept of security on society makes even impossible things into possible. Securitisation is a conscious choice that is made by the state elites and community-oriented opinion leaders actors. In other words, securitization approach as a speech act is carried out in order to impose political policies of political actors who are pursuing in order to achieve specific goals, to maintain and legitimize their own ideologies. Media, education, political parties, non-governmental organizations, ideologies, doctrines, and religion are used as a securitisation issue by actors who want to give direction to community as means of security because they are both communicative and inclusive tools.

In this context, the main base of this paper is analysing the securitisation of migration in Europe or is it a real security issue for Europe. However, this is a very broad subject for a paper. Especially following the attacks of September 11, attacks by Al Qaeda in Madrid and London have caused Europe to be approached to a migration concept much more sensitive and more security-relevant aspect. So, this paper focuses on the Syrian civil war, the IS problem and the wave of migration that Europe has to face from 2011 onwards. Our aim here is to define whether the concept of migration is one of the root causes of terrorism as the main security problem which is Europe facing in present times. The final point is to assess whether the main security problem is the immigrants in the society or the problems about the integration of immigrants to the society.

2. MIGRATION AND SECURITISATION OF MIGRATION IN EUROPE

The concept of migration is as old as human history, like the concept of security. Migration, which is basically related with the feeling of anxiety about survival and

livelihood, refers to the relocation of people from one place to another. There are religious, economic, political and social reasons for immigration and also the consequences of immigration can bring enough seriousness to involve all of us. The increasing population at the place of migration brings problems such as accommodation, work, environmental pollution, insufficient social services. According to IOM, migration could be defined as:

> ... the movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification (IOM, 2017)...

The period of the Second World War is a transitional period for Europe in terms of migration. In the pre-war period, Europe was an emigration area. Many Europeans went to the countries of the so-called New World. In the post-war period, especially the period from 1960 to 1990, Western Europe was converted in an immigration area. The main reasons can be divided into three different categories: job search, decolonization, and refugees. In the early 1960s, Western Europe was hit by the first migration wave. Migrants from South Europe (Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal) have left their own countries in search of a better economic and social life. Later on, Western Europe was hit by a second wave of migrants from Mediterranean basin, North Africa, Turkey and Middle East (in a similar situation, we are witnesses even in present times) (Bonifazi, Evolution of regional patterns of international migration in Europe, 2010). At the same time, the decolonization process took place. With the Treaty of Evian in 1962, the eight-year war on Algeria's independence from the colonial rule of France was terminated. That was the reason why a million Algerian Frenchmen moved to France. France was hit by a new wave of returnees from the colonial states, of which 260000 were of Moroccan origin, 180000 of Tunisian origin, about 16,000 from sub-Saharan Africa and about 45,000 from Indochina. (Euroactiv. RS, 2015) It was an additional problem for France. In 1975, Portugal was hit by a similar situation. After the declared independence of the former Portuguese colonies Mozambique, Angola, and the Cape Verde, together with Sao Tom and Princip, Portugal received half a million migrants from these countries. The same year, France was hit by another wave created after the end of the Vietnam War and the entrance of the Red Kimer in Phnom Penh. The fall of communism also caused waves of migration. After the collapse of the USSR in 1990/91, about 2.5 million Germans left the former Soviet Union's territory in order to return to the countries of their origin. And after the collapse of the communist regime in Albania, 400,000 Albanians left the country in order to move to Greece and Italy. Also, the activation of the Yugoslav volcano expelled more than 1 million refugees. Most of them went to the countries of Western Europe. (Euroactiv. RS, 2015)

However, immigration movements towards Europe did not end with that either. By the year 2000, Europe was faced with a new migration flow from the Middle East. The September 11 attacks were shocking for both the USA and Europe. Afghanistan and Iraq interventions, which were started in the period just after the September 11 attacks, led to the new migration flow at the gate of Europe, which had never been desirable. With the attacks of Al-Qaeda in 2004 Madrid and 2007 London caused a new and different perspective for Muslim peoples and immigrants among European peoples and governments. This new situation caused two mainstream thinking styles in Europe. The

first is xenophobia on social level and the second is the concept of securitization of the migration especially on political level.

The colonial exploitation of Africa and Asia as well as air strike of live targets in the name of a struggle for democracy left behind deep wounds. Fleeing from the bombs, leaving its centuries-old hearths, the course of the migrant route has turned to Western Europe, especially towards its former colonial powers. Some of them were looking for economic and social components, but the intention of the other part is to collect a blood tax. These are members of a terrorist organization that were infiltrated among migrant groups. Many European cities, including Paris, Madrid, London, Brussels, Istanbul and others, have already smelled gunpowder.

Until 1970s, Western European countries faced a shortage of low-skilled workers (the situation is similar today). It was a driver for adopting liberal legislations in many European countries. But the oil crisis in 1973 contributed to the introducing of restrictive politics that halted or restricted migrations. These policy changes have been kept alive by imposing a thesis on the security, economic and social implications that would be created in societies. Accordingly, law-skilled workers will significantly affect the labor marker, increasing inexpensive inequality and non-occupancy. This will cause a decreasing in the price of labor, raising the revolt among the domestic population. It will cause social tension that can turn into extremism and even terrorism movements. From an economic and business perspective, the cheap labor will have a positive effect. Many of the big corporations have opened production facilities in countries that offered favorable tax incentives and cheap labor. Under such conditions, the transport cost for the products have increased. Today, the situation is the opposite.

The ability of large corporations now is to make more profits by utilizing the cheap labour offered by migrants. But, in order to achieve this, the cheap labor must be concentrated in one place. From that point of view, Germany has opened the doors for migrants by channeling their path. The biggest benefit of this concentration of migrants (cheap labor) will have large corporations that are crave for cheap labor in their production facilities.

Changes in the democratic structure caused by the migration are imposed as a significant issue (Bonifazi, Evolution of regional patterns of international migration in Europe, 2010). Most migrants are Muslim, and the fear of losing their own national identity is increasing in the countries where the Christian population is the most numerous. Looking for how to integrate into society, many of them made marriages with the local population. Later, when conditions were created, other members of the migrant's family are merged (Thomas, John, & Cristoph, 2005).

Instead of a win-win policy, xenophobia and hate are increasing on both sides. This restrictive policy places these people in the second-ranked group of citizens. It means that the state's approach to solving this problem is a major factor in the creation of further security implications. Even in the most developed democratic European countries, there is a legal inequality as to the migrants. Although many of them have citizenship, they are not real members of the nation state union, regardless of the fact that language and culture have been accepted. Migrants who are treated as second-class citizens cannot easily integrate into the new society. In such conditions, naturally, the solution is grouping and ghettoing in its surroundings or creating of separate settlements within the cities. Frustration to natives only increases confidence in a vicious circle. It forces these people to cluster and ghettoize into smaller communities (Dzoric, 2014).

On the political level, as it is mentioned in the theoretical explanation above, there is a situation about securitisation of migration. In today's world order, it is now apparent that only the military sense of security is not sufficient in terms of states. Now we go through a period that security is being discussed in relation to other actors beyond the state security. On the other hand, the threats against the state were also transformed, and became associated with the security of other actors. Issues such as migration or terrorism, which also affect the security of individuals, have become an important part of the state security and even the international security. It is because the notion of migration, which is a concept directly related to human needs, has begun to be shared in common field with the concepts of terrorism and security, especially by Western states as a result of negative experiences.

Especially after September 11 attacks, migration has been presented in the Western public space as a security threat which has to be handled. This is because in this case, there is a very significant effect of the "Muslim" perpetrators of September 11 and the subsequent 2004 Madrid and 2007 London attacks. As a consequence of these attacks, immigrants, who have been othered (viewed as strange) for a long time at a societal level, are become a security threat by the European states, which have some social problems with immigrants. Thus, very strict measures have been taken at the state level towards the concept of migration and migrants, which has become a security issue against the state survival. It was accepted that there was a link between migration / migrants and terrorism. First of all, the concept of migration has become a security issue, and urgent measures must have been taken by the discourses of policy makers. In this process, the concept of the "othering" of persons from the third world countries and the Muslim geography was corroborated. Within the society, xenophobia began to increase. As a result of all this, strict policies and measurements to prevent migration began to be demanded and implemented. And, at the end, migration became a critical security threat to the existence of the European states. The most critical consequences of these strict migration policies came on the agenda of the word with the Syrian civil war that was started in 2011. According to UNHCR (UNHCR, 2017) data nearly more than 5 million people have migrated from Syria to escape civil war. Some of these immigrants were able to reach safe areas, while others were exposed to a very bad treatment at borders of some European countries. Today, migration is now a security issue for the states. One of the most important reasons for this is the link between migration and terrorism.

3. TERRORISM IN EUROPE: WHO ARE THE PERPETRATORS?

Is the thesis that the process of migration and migrants are direct culprits for the growth of terrorism in Europe, especially the jihadist, correct? As a direct reason NO, as an indirect reason YES! Why? – If we take into account their main goal, the pursuit of a better economic and social life, then they do not have a radical component. In the newly created conditions, they focus their energy in the process of survival. But, if we take into account restrictive measures that are being introduced and applied to this group of people, placing them in the group of second–class citizenship, increasing frustration and distrust of the society, these people become a main target of terrorist organizations. Promising then better conditions, primarily material and spiritual, the youth population which is insufficiently experienced and matured becomes a main target of terrorist organizations. They are looking for their own idol or guru and very easily accept the offered ideology. In that

process, they do not check another source, whether the interpretation of that ideology is corrected or not.

If we analyse the terrorist attacks committed by jihadist cells in the last 20 years, we will come to the conclusion that the thesis of imported terrorism is true. Perhaps the perpetrators are domestic, but the foreign component exists at all stages of terrorism, starting from the radicalization process implemented by imams that are directly funded from outside or through cyberspace, to training that is also commonly realized abroad. The training is conducted in special camps by members of a terrorist organization. The financing of the activities of these people is not excluded, especially in the part of travel and training. Most often, terrorist organizations are the main sponsors of these activities (Institutt, 2015).

Common to the jihadist terrorist attacks that have been committed on European soil in the past period is their destructive power followed by many casualties and wounded civilians. The attacks were aimed at soft targets, towards the civilian population. It is another common denominator for these attacks. But who were the attackers?

Plot/cell	**Members**	**Ages**	**Religion**	**Origin**	**Link to Terrorist Organization**
The Swedish Cell (2010)	TaimourAbdulwahab Al Abdaly	28	Muslim	Swedish citizenship (Born in Iraq)	No
The Dusseldorf Cell (2011)	Abdelladin K. James S. Ahmed S	20 to 30	Muslims	Germans of Moroccan descent	Al-Qaida
Lone wolf (2012)	Mohammad Merah	24	Muslim	Born in France of Algerian descent	Member of Forsane Alliza organization, fight jihad in Afghanistan
Woowich attack (2013)	Michael Adbalajo Michaele Adebowale	22 and 28	Muslim	Born in France of Algerian Descent	Al-Shabab
Charlie Hebdo attack (2015)	Said Kouachi Cherif Kouachi	35 and 33	Muslim	Born in France to Algerian Immigrants	Al-Qaida
Paris attack (2015)	Salah Abdesalam Brahim Abdesalam Abdelhamid Abaaoud And others	from 20 to 31	Muslim	Belgian and French citizenships of Moroccan and Algerian immigrants + Infiltrated Syrians (ISIS members)	Islamic State
Brussels attack (2016)	Khalid el-Bakraoui, Osama K, Ibrahim el-	from 20 to 30	Muslim	Belgian citizenships of Moroccan descent	Islamic State

	Bakraoui. Najim Laachraoui Mohamed Abrini				
Nice attack (2016)	Mohamed Bouhiel	31	Muslim	Born in Tunisia with French residency permit	Islamic State
Manchester attack (2017)	Salman Abedi	22	Muslim	British citizenship of Libya descent	Islamic State
Barcelona attack (2017)	Youmes Abouyaaqoub Houssaine Abouyaaqoub Moussa Oukbir Said Aallaa Youssef Aallaa Omar Hychami	17-24	Muslim	Live in Spain, born in Morocco	Islamic State

Table 1: Jihadi terrorist attacks 2010-2017 (Desk, 2017)

Based on the above data, there is no single profile of Jihadist terrorists. But what can we conclude from the above table? According to their origins, a large percentage of terrorists were born, raised and radicalized in Europe, but from people who have direct links with jihadist terrorist organizations. Their origin is not European, but they are sons (second or third generation) of immigrants whose descent leads from Morocco, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia and Iraq. Most often, their origin is from Morocco and Algeria. The age frame of these individuals ranges from 17 to 35 years. By age, they are at a time when they need to integrate into society. It is usually a group which is not experienced and which can very easily be manipulated by being influenced by another's influence and thus radicalized. According to the research, part of the persons were with a criminal past (perpetrators of petty crime), and some of them were placed in prison where their radicalization began. Example of that we can find in Chalrie Hebdo attackers Kouachi and Couliibaly (Chrisafis, 2015). They found not only friendship but a mentor who radicalized them, Djamel Beghal who served a 10-year sentence for a plot to bombing the US embassy in Paris. Also, he had once been a regular worshipper at Finsbury Park mosque in London and a disciple of the radical preachers Abu Hamza and Abu Qatada. According to the UK and French intelligence services, Baghal was one of al-Qaida's leading recruiters in Europe. Another case which shows external connection is Salman Abedi, Manchester bombing terrorist who has had links to a network of jihadist on three continents. He had secret jihadist training after slipping into Syria during a family trip to Libya – a haven for ISIS fighters (Martin Evans, 2017). Also, the example of the terrorist attack in Brussels says that the perpetrators had an earlier criminal record and had a connection with members of ISIS. Ibrahim El Bakraoui had been involved in an attempting robbery at a currency exchange office and a subsequent shootout with police that left one officer injured. He was sentenced to 10 years in prison. Also, his brother Khalid was convicted of several cases of carjacking, the possession of a number of Kalashnikov rifles, and a bank robbery and kidnapping (AL-HLOU, 2016). Osama Krayem who participated in a Swedish documentary film about the

integration of migrants into the Swedish society, was one of Europe's most wanted fugitives because of his fight in Syria from 2014 (Dearden, 2016). Others, Najim Laachraoui and Mohamed Abrini were suspected of having fought for the Islamic State in Syria before the bombings (Bacchi, 2016).

4. AS FOR CONCLUSION: IS MIGRATION A REAL SECURITY PROBLEM IN THE CASE OF SYRIAN CIVIL WAR?

Today, the Islamic State terrorist organization, which sits on the world agenda together with the Syrian civil war, is based on the al-Qaida terrorist organization, which is also the perpetrator of the September 11 attacks. One of the main goals of the IS terrorist organisation is expanding its territory, leaving the present territory of Iraq and Syria as the centre of the state and the full fight against all infidels, including the countries of Western democracy and Shiite states. In that regard, maintaining its power and a condominium in the current territory is of particular importance for the Islamic state. It is the source of their power. The intention of the Islamic State is to expand the caliphate in three directions as follows: the first direction is within the Levant, the second one is expanding its territory to the Middle East and North Africa, and the third towards Europe, Asia and the USA (Weiss & Hassan, 2015). In the process of realization of the idea, all like-minded people were urged to move within its territory and to take part in its military in order to achieve their goals. However, the response of the grand coalition hampered this process and a lot of potential jihadists remained in their home countries. That changed the strategy of the Islamic state. It further urged all its associates to realization of smaller terrorist activities in their countries. The goal is single, weakening of the unity primarily in Europe and the European Union and their economic exploitation.

After this call, Europe began to live its "new normality" of the threat of terrorist attacks. Paris, Brussels, Ankara, Istanbul, Nice, and Munich are some of the cities in which supporters of the terrorist organization IS terrorist organisation conducted terrorism killing innocent people. Current power of the Islamic country does not allow its military comparison with military powerful countries like France, Germany, Turkey, and Brussels. For this purpose, its strategy envisages realization of smaller terrorist attacks in some European countries, for their political and economic exploitation.

In cases where the terrorists were Muslims, then they are linked to extremist religious ideology, while in those where terrorists were not Muslims, the investigation mostly focused on their mental health. Many of the people who carried out a terrorist attack are people who migrated in the previous period in those European countries or were born in the country in which they realized a terrorist attack. However, due to strict laws, they were unable to integrate into those societies, and their frustration was increasing continuously. Their profile was a soft target for the terrorist organization of the Islamic state. After these events, the fact is that Europe cannot live calmly that at least until tomorrow it would be safe. In Europe, nobody can be sure when and where a terrorist attack will happen.

On the basis of the foregoing, we can conclude that jihadist terrorism in Europe is imported from outside. Firstly, the call from the Jihadi terrorist organization IS is quite clear, and secondly, many of the people who committed the terrorist attacks are migrants (second or third generation) who have settled on the European soil in the past. Migration crisis and the crisis of refugees take place as a parallel process with terrorist attacks in Europe. In addition, it destroys the unity of the European Union and Europe as a whole. In the absence of a unitary rational action, which means the ability of the Union to speak with

one voice in international politics, ensuring internal cohesion, European countries have a different approach and policy for these threats (Maleski, 2001). On account of all these events, anti-Muslim feelings and fear of change in the demographic architecture in Europe is growing among the population (Swoboda, 2015).

On the other hand, the right-wing political parties seized the opportunity to strengthen nationalism through campaigns. Most European countries in defence of their territorial borders and national interests have built concrete walls in order to prevent the entry of migrants. On the other hand, leaders of the European Union seek to revise the Schengen agreement on stricter border control. In addition, it may slow economic trading and rapid flow of people across the Union. It will shake the basic tenets on which the functioning of the European Union is based, which are unity, freedom of movement and human rights. In addition, the implementation of the international law will be thwarted. Through this migrant policy, some countries of the European Union do not respect international signed agreements, such as the Convention on Refugees of the United Nations, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Convention on Refugees. Based on these documents, all signatories are obliged to accept all people who are fleeing from dangers that can threaten their lives.

In this context, it is clear that there is both a security and an immigration problem in Europe. However, it is not possible to say that this problem is directly related to immigrants. When we look back at the attacks, these attacks were carried out by people belonging to the Islamic religion. On the other hand, these people did not go to the European countries for carrying on an attack on the contrary, some criminals are European citizens or second- or third-generation immigrants who have been living in Europe. In this case, the European states need to carry out deep researches about why the second or third generation immigrants have entered such aggressive attitudes. Is it a question of the similarity between the integration politics applied by the European states and the assimilation politics?

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ROLE OF THE OFFICE OF THE HIGH REPRESENTATIVE (OHR) IN THE SECURITY SECTOR REFORMS (SSR) IN BOSNIA FOLLOWING THE DAYTON AGREEMENT – LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE ARMY AND POLICE REFORMS

Nikola Ambarkov
Ph.D. in Political Science, M.Sc. in European Studies
e-mail: ambarkov_nkl@yahoo.com, amvelbares@gmail.com

Abstract

The post-conflict Security Sector Reforms (SSR) became an integral part and a central element of the international intervention in societies that had experienced conflicts. Bosnia and Herzegovina, after 3.5-years of civil war (1992-1995), can undoubtedly be classified as such a society. For that same reason, it can also be noted that the reform on security institutions has been entangled in a wider statebuilding process, whereby the final architecture of the Bosnian state is still being defined. It is not a coincidence that Bosnia and Hercegovina, as a post-conflict country, is now considered one of the most prominent cases of the security sector policies sponsored from abroad, which are aimed at strengthening state-level institutions by eliminating parallel, ethnically-based security institutions. One of the sponsors of such policies in the country is the Office of the High Representative (OHR), an international institution set up under the Dayton Agreement (DA) for overseeing and implementing the civilian aspects of this agreement. Hence, the influence that the OHR had on the post-war development in Bosnia was not underestimated because under the auspices of the High Representative, Bosnia would not be in a position to reform some sectors of the security system; reforms which were key to the country's progress in the Euro-Atlantic integration. After the defence reform, where a single army was formed, Bosnia and Hercegovina became part of the NATO's Partnership for Peace, and the progress in police reforms was paramount to launching the Stabilization and Association Process with the EU. It is precisely the role played by the OHR, as a mediator and facilitator, in the defence and police reforms in Bosnia, the two important security lynchpins, to be a subject to a special explication in this paper, even more so, if we take into account the fact that the limited number of SSR provisions in the DA did not prevent the international community - led by the OHR - to push through its reform agenda. Another issue that will be addressed in this paper is the extent to which past lessons have been learned through the work of the OHR, a thing that is valuable and important for any future robust approaches of the international community in other post-conflict contexts, in order to achieve significant reforms in security, among other societal areas.

Key words: *OHR - Office of High Representative, DA – Dayton Agreement, SSR – Security Sector Reform, Euro-Atlantic integration;*

1. INTRODUCTION

Since 1995, Bosnia has become a laboratory for international state-builders, who sought to create a state structure that would manage ethnic relations in this multinational country, and will provide basic democratic standards of governance (Sebastian, 2014). These external actors in the post-conflict period insisted on "signing a formal peace agreement, whereby the major warring factions shall register their commitment to end hostilities and begin a process of reconstruction" (SSR in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, 2009: 1). The Dayton Peace Agreement is just that type of a peace treaty because it "was followed by massive international support for ethnic reconciliation and democratic development" (Blomberg, 2011: 15).

Dayton in Bosnia and Herzegovina introduced a complex consociational system[86] for sharing the weak central power by the three separate ethnicities, i.e. the Bosniaks, the Serbs, and the Croats. According to Hoddie and Hartzell (2003), power-sharing (also in B&H) should be considered in the context of a broader peace treaty that entails formal arrangements for the distribution of political positions (cabinet posts, legislative seats, etc.), as well as sharp deviations from the previously exclusionary system, through formal involvement of the most relevant groups in the respective post-conflict society. Hence the implementation of integration outside the context of the political solution is unlikely to function and integration should be promoted as a peace strategy only as part of the multidimensional approach to peace building.

Multidimensional post-conflict peace building can be defined as "a genuine political transformation process, emerging from a state of war or violent conflict, and becoming one of stability and peace" (Schnabelt and Ehrhart, 2005: 2). But, unfortunately, any attempts to build a state with international assistance, in terms of that state's goals, have often been problematic in practice, and the main reason for this is the state building methodology (Jackson, 2012: 256).

When it comes to the security system reform (SSR) it continues to be "understood as an integral part of the international community approach to conflict management" (Ibid, 260). In Bosnia and Herzegovina scpecifically, "the reform of security institutions had been entangled in a wider statebuilding process, whereby the final architecture of the Bosnian state is still being defined" (Perdan, 2008: 269). It is not by accident that Bosnia and Herzegovina is considered one of "the most prominent post-conflict cases of externally sponsored policies in the security sector" (Brzoska and Heinemann-Grüder, 2004: 122) aimed at strengthening state-level institutions through eliminating parallel, ethnically-based security institutions (Perdan, 2008: 263). The topic of interest in this paper is therefore the consideration of the role of these external factors, first of all the OHR, in the sponsoring of reforms in the domains of defense and police, as one of the most basic security sectors, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and their actual reach.

[86]"Amongst competing models of power-sharing, consociationalism has long been the dominant paradigm of political settlements in deeply divided societies" (Kocadal, 2012:25).

2. SSR – THE ORIGINS OF THE CONCEPT, THE OBJECTIVES, AND THE KEY NORMS AND PRINCIPLES

SSR is a relatively new and developing concept and "originally introduced by developed donors[87]" (Brzoska and Heinemann-Grüder, 2004: 123). In this sense SSR "generally refers to the politic framework through which a growing number of donors address security problems in post-conflict societies" (Schnabelt and Ehrhart, 2005:316). When we talk about the security sector itself, it should be emphasized that it covers all: "forces authorized to use force" (Hendrickson and Karkoszka, 2005:23); intelligence agencies and security services;[88] civil management and oversight bodies; judicial and public security structures; non-statutory security bodies and civil society actors (Sedra, 2010: 3). In other words, the security sector includes "all those state institutions that have a formal mandate to ensure the safety of the state and its citizens" (Tanner and Hänggi, 2005: 13).

A determined group of authors are of the opinion that the SSR, in order to be sustainable, should satisfy the following four dimensions: *political*, *institutional*, *economic,* and *societal* (Chanaa, 2002: 27 - 30). But in post-conflict societies, the SSR does not simply mean identifying sustainable policies "but also ensuring the political process through which the thing that strengthens democracy itself will be developed, implemented and sold to key stakeholders and the public" (Caparini, 2006: 50). By definition, the security sector in failed, unsuccessful, weak, and fragile, the state is fragmented, underdeveloped, overtly politicized, and divided along the dominant lines of division, primarily ethnic and religious. In addition, it is also "highly centralized in terms of decision-making and authority" (Keane, 2012: 3). From an international donor perspective such states should therefore not be ignored, because there is the justified risk of their further decline (Jackson, 2012: 251).

External actors who plead to restructure the security system in post-conflict states, in designing their intervention should, first of all, create preconditions for implementing the respective activities. Reconstruction and SSR cannot be imagined without a clear identification of the security issues that need to be addressed in short- and medium-term perspectives, but generally it is "supposed to deliver results on three fronts: Provision of security; Governance and Rule of Law; Effectiveness and efficiency (…) There is no general agreement in the literature on SSR about which of these clusters should become a priority and under what circumstances" (Brzoska and Heinemann-Grüder, 2004: 123 - 124). The same authors therefore note that the debate on SSR continues to be marked by "a mismatch between the long list of general recommendations of what could and should be done and the concrete suggestions based on a thorough analysis of the issues in a particular post-conflict situation" (Ibid.,125).

In this sense, it is equally important to integrate SSR into peace agreement. Although, according to Hadžović (2009: 19), it is a generally acknowledged fact that SSR has not been a priority in most peace agreements (including the DPA that is the subject of

[87] The role of the donors in SSR is "to develop a more coherent response to the security problems posed by state weakness or state failure" (Hendrickson and Karkoszka, 2005: 38).

[88] They are also known under the name of core security actors, and they include: the army; the police; the gendarmeries; the paramilitary forces; the presidential guard; the military and civilian security and intelligence and services; the customs and coastguard; the local security units (civil defense forces, national guard, and militias) (Schnabelt and Ehrhart, 2005: 6).

observation in this paper), due to the reason that many analysts locate in the "gap between what is desirable to include in a peace agreement - from a purely security perspective - and what is politically desirable and feasible" (Report for the World Bank and UNDP, 2007: 11).

The experience with SSR in various post-conflict countries also shows the importance "of local ownership – where local actors participate in reform programs with a view to continuing them on their own without the presence of international actors" (Yasutomi and Carmans, 2007: 5).The science for Security System Reform recognizes three general models of post-conflict peace implementation of SSR by involving certain external actors: 1.) the UN as lead agency; 2.) a regional organization as lead agency 3.); a state as lead nation (SSR in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding, 2009: 4). In particular, on the example of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the 1995 DPA, we had elements of a measured and functional combination of the first two listed approaches - the UN through the Office of the High Representative (OHR), proposed by the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council, and confirmed by the Security Council of the United Nations, along with the active role of NATO and the EU, which were crucial in the implementation of certain tasks in Bosnia and Herzegovina that are part of the SSR, such as the police restructuring and armed forces reform.

3. THE ROLE OF OHR IN REFORMING THE CORE SECURITY ACTORS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA – ARMED FORCES AND POLICE

3.1. Position of OHR in Dayton's Framework

More than two decades from the signing of the DPA "Bosnia and Herzegovina is still under extensive control of the Office of the High Representative (OHR), an international institution set up to support the country's peace implementation process" (Banning, 2014: 261). The OHR, according to the DPA, is responsible for overseeing the implementation of the civil aspects of this agreement. This institution has a unique role in Bosnia and Herzegovina because as an independent international body, it largely coordinated its activity with the EU and the United States, in the direction of supporting the DPA and encouraging reforms in the country (Deblauwe, 2014: 18-19). OHR is "an international organization *sui generis*" (Wilde, 2008: 68, 67) and according to Tim Bening is also "a political institution set up for the purpose of enhancing the quality of governance in post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina" (2014: 279).

Essentially, "under the OHR, Bosnia and Herzegovina is a protectorate, a state under partial or full international administration" (Deblauwe, 2014: 29). It is because of this position of the OHR in the overall political system of Bosnia and Herzegovina that the academic debates are focused more on the coherence and legitimacy of the OHR's public authority, as well as the legitimacy of its conduct under the international law (Banning, 2014: 262).

These questions about the international legitimacy and legality of the OHR are legitimate because the OHR has significant powers. One of the most important competences of the OHR is the so-called Bonn powers that leave room for the High Representative "to remove public officials who violate legal commitments and the Dayton Peace Agreement from office, and to impose laws as they see it, if Bosnia and Herzegovina's legislative bodies fail to do so" (see OHR General Information). According to Szewczyk (2010: 32), The Bonn Powers were innovated by the Peace Implementation Council in 1997, as a result of "the necessity to maintain the peace and enforce the human

rights guaranteed under the Dayton Agreement, in order to prevent a regression to the dark days of ethnic conflict and mass murder".

Hence, the OHR's influence in the political development of Bosnia and Herzegovina should not be underestimated, because under the auspices of the High Representative colossal breakthroughs were achieved in the country, including the sphere of SSR (Deblauwe, 2014: 19, 30). Therefore, the role played by the OHR, as mediator and facilitator, in the defense and police sector reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the two important security actors, is subject to a special explication in this chapter, even more so if we take into account the fact, as mentioned by Hadžović (2009: 23), that the limited number of SSR provisions in the DPA did not necessarily prevent the international community - headed by the OHR – to push its reform agenda forward.

3.1.1. The role of the OHR in reforming the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina

The defense system reform was one of the most sensitive topics in Bosnia following the Dayton Agreement and it was undoubtedly characterized by intense pressure from the international actors in the country, primarily the OHR, but also NATO, and OSCE, who used their institutional power, including also their authorizations as donors, to push through the reform agenda in the domain of defense (Perdan, 2008: 253-5).

The Dayton Agreement does not state the defense issue clearly as a function of the state (Perry, 2003). This is due to the fact that the DPA "did not specify a united national army and the establishing of a state-level ministry of defense; instead, it helped to establish a *Standing Committee on Military Matters* that was not strong" (Knight, 2009: 17). These separate military forces were actually the two formal armies that existed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, "one in each entity – the Bosnia and Herzegovina Federation, and Republika Srpska. However, the Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was composed of two elements based on the war-time Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian Defense Council (CDC)[89]" (Dopita, 2016: 103).

Although the terrible three-year war ended in December 1995 with the signing of the DPA, certain armed forces continued to function as previously. The patrons of the defense system reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina, primarily the OHR, were faced with some important issues such as: 1) the ethnic- and entity-based organization of the armed forces; 2) the size and cost of the armies; 3) the issue of command and control; and 4) democratic oversight. The Dayton Agreement addressed issues of arms control, separation of forces and confidence-building measures but the four issues mentioned above were left untouched (Riese, 2013: 120).

The dilemma faced by the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina embodied primarily through the OHR, in the context of the defense reform was that far-reaching structural changes were seen as unrealistic, potentially disruptive, even taboo-like (Barakat and Zyck, 2009: 548; Orsini, 2003: 73), but the state of division between the different military elements was also considered an unsustainable obstacle that was to be overcome in order to create prospects for the socio-economic and political development in the country (Vetschera and Damian, 2006: 29).

A catalyst for the defense forces reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina is considered to be the formal offer of NATO for Bosnia and Herzegovina to participate in the

[89] The Bosniak and Bosnian Croat forces were officially one army by then, but they *de facto* remained two separate entities (Riese, 2013: 122).

Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme, but this made conditional with the creation of an army that is under democratic supervision and is state-administrated (Dopita, 2016: 103). For this purpose, at the end of 2001, the Office of the High Representative (OHR), NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR), and OSCE, together with local political actors tried to launch this reform, which initially was accepted by the Bosniak and Croat political establishment, but was rejected in the Republika Srpska with qualification that the proposed reforms are unconstitutional (Vetschera and Damian, 2006: 32).

However, the implementation of the Euro-Atlantic reform agenda reaffirmed the idea of common state armed forces, which led to the establishment of a Defense Reform Commission in 2003. As a result of its work in September 2003, "the representatives from all three ethnic groups have agreed to establish a state defense ministry and unified military command" (Hawton, 2003). These positions were made concrete in the Defense Law of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was adopted in December 2003. "The outcome was that supreme authority over two different armed forces was entrusted to the Bosnia and Herzegovinian Presidency, where decisions are adopted by consensus, and within the administrative chain of command the entities still retained their own defense ministries for primarily administrative purposes (manning, training and equipping). At this stage of the reform Bosnia and Herzegovina received a third Defense Ministry on the state level…"(Dopita, 2016: 104).

It should be emphasized that the achievement of consent between the country's political elites in terms of the defense reform did not go so easily, because the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina, primarily the OHR, should moderate between three irreconcilable positions – *Bosniaks* who advocated an integrated defense establishment, which implies a single army, without the institutional role of ethnic components, in which the Bosniaks would almost automatically dominate; *Croats* – who generally did not oppose the reform because of the potentially larger Croatian role in defense at the state level than in the current agreements within the Federation and *Serbs* – to which the Republika Srpska armed forced was no longer needed in military terms, but was also important in symbolic, as an attribute of their autonomy, which was also a pretext for supporting any integrated army (Riese, 2013: 128 - 130, 153). This was one of the main reasons why the OHR faced obstruction by Republika Srpska that "wanted to preserve its "statehood" given by the DPA at all costs; building institutions at state level was not in its interest" (Hadžović, 2009: 25).

The defense reform of 2003 had only a partial result, because the attempts to exercise authority and coordination at the state level were meeting considerable institutional resistance and that was one of the reasons why under the auspices of the OHR, on 31 December 2004 a new[90] Defense Reform Commission was formed. There were three tasks assigned to the Commission – the two chains of command should be put under full state-level control; to transfer remaining entity defense competencies to the state level and to close entity defense institutions. All of these goals were translated into the new Defense Law adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina of October 2005, and its result was a complete coming together of armies and entity ministries into a single professional military force and the Ministry of Defense, which came into force on 1

[90]The commission essentially consisted of the same institutions and individuals as previous one. But because Bosnia now had a state level ministry of defense, the commission was now co-chaired by state defense Minister and Raffi Gregorian who served as the NATO Co-Chairman in it (Riese, 2013: 140).

January 2006. The main part of the army was reorganized in three multi-ethnic infantry brigades, consists of three mono-ethnic battalions, while the representatives holding decision-making positions in the spirit of the consociational model have been intended for the representatives of the three constituent people. When it came to operational level, the representation of the three peoples was based on a pre-agreed proportion. In this way the three-nation army formula, however, did not stop the B&H Army to be compatible and interoperable under NATO standards (see Dopita, 2016:104 - 6).

"Following a series of successful defense reforms, Bosnia and Herzegovina formed a single defense system with a clear chain of command, civilian control and parliamentary oversight" (Kržalić, 2015: 24). The defense reform was a huge success for the OHR, but also for other actors that supported it - NATO, OSCE, regardless of the fact that some aspects were not implemented and some were only symbolic. The success of the OHR in achieving a defense reform would not have been significant, had the will of Bosnia to be included in the NATO Partnership for Peace (which happened in November 2006, when B&H was officially invited to join PfP) (Perdan, 2008: 257) not been taken into consideration. This was an important catalyst for defense reform, because the DPA, from which the OHR is drawing its mandate and legitimacy, does not exemplify an integrated army, so it need to bring in correlation its forced capacity and forced measures in line with NATO standards, where the B&H wanted to become a part of the PfP. After the reform ended, it can be concluded that all the parties involved have been satisfied – the *OHR and the other intervening actors together with the Bosniaks* received an integrated Army, *Croats* got an ethnic quota, while the *Serbs* reduced defense spending by shifting budgetary responsibility from entity to state level (Riese, 2013: 134). According to Brljavac (2012: 32) "the unified Bosnian army, made up of soldiers from all three ethnic groups, working and training together is a proof that a multi-national and multicultural country is possible and feasible when there is enough political will to achieve necessary consensus".

3.1.2. The role of the OHR in the police reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In post-war Bosnia, as both the army and the police were quickly "divided into three separate, ethnically defined spheres of influence, while police officers of other ethnicities were removed and top positions were staffed by politically loyal personnel" (Lindvall, 2009: 65). The DPA "created conditions for a police system with no police competency anchored institutionally at the state level, except for 'international and inter-entity criminal law enforcement including relations with Interpol' (Dopita, 2016: 106)". Additionally, the DPA "left Bosnia and Herzegovina with 13 territorially separate law enforcement agencies (2 entities, 10 cantons, and Brčko District)" (Azinović at all. 2011: 40). Another chronic shortcoming of the Bosnian police system was "the continuing political interference and control over the police structures and appointments, with little democratic accountability" (Caparini, 2005: 29).

The early stage of police reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina started in the mandate of IPTF - The UN International Police Task Force (1995 - 2002), which was autonomous, but worked in coordination with the OHR, and "was characterized by capacity building on the one hand and the certification process on the other hand" (Riese, 2013: 160). These reform efforts were urgent in the post-conflict peace-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because police as an important instrument of war, if left unreformed, could continue to pose a threat to the security of ethnic minorities and undermine the process of their restitution (Collantes Celador, 2006).

All these reasons, once again, at the beginning of 2003 led the EU Police Mission[91], to begin investigating possible initiatives for further restructuring of the police, regardless of the fact that "the police reform initially was not part of the mission implementation plan but became a part of the OHR's agenda in 2004" (Riese, 2013: 169). According to Dopita (2016:106-107) three possible models were suggested: 1) The creation of one single national police force with 5 to 7 regions; 2) The creation of a two-entity police system with 5 regions in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 2-3 regions in the Republic of Srpska (including the Brčko District) (...) plus several additional competencies at the state level; 3) The integration of the existing police structures through the stimulation of collaboration among its components...

These EUPM initiatives were a prelude to the launching of the Police Restructuring Commission in the summer of 2004, by the OHR, which was assigned a mandate to propose "a single police structure for Bosnia and Herzegovina under the overall political supervision of a ministry or ministries within the Council of Ministers'' (Office of the High Representative et al., '26th Report'). The Commission's report, which was drafted at the end of 2004, largely anticipated the guidelines given by the European Commission: "budgetary and legislative authority set at state level; police operations free from political influence; and police districts based on operational and technical criteria''(Police Reform Commission, 'Final Report', 3).

Similar to the defense reform, in this case the OHR was supposed to moderate between the irreconcilable positions of the Bosniak, Croat, and Serbian political elites. The *OHR and the Bosniaks* were again on the same line as they advocated the transfer of police powers to the state level (Muehlemann, 2007: 3; Tolksdorf, 2010: 91). *The Croats* had to maneuver between the aspiration not to jeopardize their interests in Croatian cantonal strongholds, on the one hand, and Croatian influence at the state level on the other hand. Regarding the *Bosnian Serb* political establishment, they opposed any form of centralization of the police with indignation. Had they been more cooperative in the defense reform, where the army following the war was only important in a symbolic sense, they did not want to deprive themselves of control over the police as one of the important elements of political supremacy with the police reform. Another reason for this attitude of the Serbian political elite in Bosnia and Herzegovina was due to the fact that the police reforms had touched the territorial division of power in Bosnia, which required constitutional changes, due to which some experienced it as an attempt to abolish the Republic of Srpska on a small scale (see Riese, 2013: 164).

The most controversial aspect in the report of the Police Restructuring Commission, chaired by the former Belgian Prime Minister Wilfred Martens, strongly opposed by the Republic of Srpska's politicians, was the idea for reorganization of the Bosnian law enforcement agencies in a smaller number of police areas that would cross the inter-entity boundary lines. However, the 2004 European Commission-funded functional review of the police in Bosnia specifically mentioned that the existence of the present 15 law enforcement agencies[92] could not be considered a "a weakness, *per se*", taking into

[91]It should be emphasized that the EUPM mission arrived in B&H after competing with the OSCE and replacing the IPTF mission whose mandate expired in 2002. "EUPM is part of the Union's overall support to the rule of law sector in B&H" (Mounier, 2007: 57).

[92]The Dayton Peace Accords, as was mentioned above, resulted in a system made up of 13 police agencies that increased to 15 with the creation of two state-level police structures: the State Border

account that these model is inherent in some other countries that have a consociational model of organization similar to that in Bosnia and Herzegovina,[93] referring to the 25 autonomous police regions and the one central unit in the Netherlands, or the 26 cantonal police agencies and the one federal unit in the Swiss consociational system (Collantes Celador, 2009 : 238 - 239).

The reasons the OHR and other interveners failed to drive police reforms are multifaceted. They failed to make convincing arguments that would easily be shared by the Bosnian Serbs. The OHR could not effectively use the Bonn powers in the police reform as a potential threat to the non-cooperative Serbian political establishment in the country because the police reform required constitutional changes, and the primary goal of the OHR, as defined by the DPA, was precisely the protection of the Constitution and, consequently, it could not impose changes in this supreme law of the country. Even attempts to legitimize the police reform to meet European standards, as it was done by invocation of NATO standards with the defense reform, proved ineffective. In the end, all of this proved to be unsuccessful, and further diminished the legitimacy of the OHR, especially in the eyes of the Bosnian Serbs, who repeatedly referred to the Constitution and the parliamentary procedure by which the OHR and other intervening actors tried to bypass them during the police reform (Riese, 2013: 177, 183, 185).

After Republika Srpska refused to accept the final report insisting on more political negotiations, an agreement was reached in October 2005 to further discuss this topic. The 2005 October Agreement led to the creation of a Directorate for Police Restructuring Implementation (DPR), which included all police agencies in Bosnia and Herzegovina as members. Its mandate was assigned in order to develop a joint plan to conduct police restructuring by December 2006, when it had to come up with some suggestions of a nature similar to the Martens report (Collantes Celador, 2009: 238-9). However, the police reform entered a difficult phase between 2006 and 2007, until the Mostar Declaration was signed in October 2007, in which the ruling parties voiced the will to have the police reforms in compliance with the three EU principles mentioned above. "Even though the introduction of the police reform was a condition to sign the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the European Union, the confrontation lasted until April 2008, when the Bosnia and Herzegovinian Parliament adopted the Laws on the Directorate for Coordination of Police Bodies as well as the Law on Agencies for the support of the Bosnia and Herzegovinian police structure" (Dopita, 2016: 108). Legally established coordinating and supervising bodies were in line with EU requirements. Hence it can be concluded that "the outcome of structural police reform was clearly symbolic, leaving most of Bosnia's policing structures untouched" (Riese, 2013: 189). It was reduced to the establishment of several bodies that will integrate some segments, such as education and forensics (Perdan, 2008: 261), as well as by creating "through the various police reform efforts (State Border Police[94], SIPA[95],

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Service (in 2000) and the State Investigation and Protection Agency-SIPA (in 2002) (Collantes Celador, 2009: 234);

[93]The consociational model, invented by Arend Lijphart, in its theoretical and empirical sense, was developed specifically on the experience of the Netherlands (1917-1967) and Switzerland, and despite criticism and failure, it became an extremely popular constitutional engineering which found great application in the rearrangement of some post-conflict societies, which undoubtedly includes Bosnia (Vankovska, 2007: 162).

[94]Its formation was very important because "in Tito's Yugoslavia, Bosnia had no international borders since it was surrounded by Croatia and Serbia" (Mounier, 2007: 59).

(…) plus the state-level Ministry of Security (Azinović et al. 2011, p. 42). These police reforms, therefore, only partly carried out the de-territorialization of some police functions by being pushed to the state level (Collantes Celador, 2009: 240). However, this limited achievement "was considered by the European Union as sufficient to meet the conditions set for the initiation of the Stabilization and Association Agreement" (Dopita, 2016:108).

4. CONCLUSION

Established as an *ad hoc* institution, the OHR was tasked with overseeing the implementation of the civilian component of the DPA. Without the efforts of this institution, Bosnia would not have been able to carry out a successful reform of some sectors of the security system, primarily in the domain of defense, where a single army was formed, and the police, where the results may have been more modest, but nonetheless present. It should be emphasized that the construction of security institutions (including the military and police) in the B&H security system went through three phases – 1) conflict termination and pacification; 2) institution building at the entity level and, in the final phase, 3) building of security institutions at state level (David M. Law, 2006). However, from all that was mentioned above, it can be concluded that the OHR was involved in all phases, but the last phase sparked great debate between local partners and the OHR officials in charge of these reforms, since the biggest controversy that marked this stage was the transfer of competencies from the entity to the state level (Hadžović, 2009: 41). This situation once again confirmed the widespread scientific thesis of SSR that "the practice of assertive coercive power by international authority and the idea of sustainable local ownership are inherently difficult to reconcile" (Perdan 2008: 268). This connotation was best seen in the wake of the application of the Bonn powers, during the police reform, or the stick-and-carrot politics (Partnership for peace, but a previously unified army or a Stabilization and Association Agreement, but after police reform progress), who may have moved the B&H reform agenda forward, but how much this policy is sustainable in the long term, especially if local actors are not actively involved in it and is not acceptable to them, remains to be debated. It is because of the situation "when the local social and political forces, that have vested interests in the area of government under consideration, are not meaningfully involved in the reform process, they are able to spoil and block the reform-integration process, as has happened with the police sector reform" (Dopita, 2016: 108).

The work of the OHR in B&H has been a valuable lessons that can be applied to other parts of the world and in other state- and peace-building contexts. "These lessons can be summarized to a necessity for the international community to exercise a robust approach in post-conflict societies in order to achieve significant reforms, especially those in the domain of security" (Hadžović, 2009: 28). OHR efforts, especially those related to the disputed areas of the security sector reform (SSR), can provide valuable and important lessons not only for any future peacebuilding efforts, but for further academic debates where practical issues are addressed for peacebuilding matters worldwide (Ibid., 8).

[95]In June 2006, when the OHR adopted the Law on Amendments to the Bosnian Law on Criminal Procedure, the SIPA was given police authorizations (see in Hadžović, 2009: 63).

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CHALLENGE OF THE MULTIPOLAR INTERNATIONAL ORDER FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF DONALD TRAMP

Sasajkovski Slavejko, Dr.Sc
Institute for Sociological, Political and Juridical Research – UKIM
e-mail: bilbilef@isppi.ukim.edu.mk
Micanovska Ljubica
Graduated sociologist
e-mail: micanovskaljubica@gmail.com

Abstract

It is unequivocally that the period of the unipolar world order proclaimed by George H. V. Bush in 1990 with the role and power of the United States as one single pillar of that order was completed and that as a historical - political time it lasted extremely short. First of all, the economic growth of the People's Republic of China followed by the undoubted total social influence, as well as the reanimation and growth of the global power of the Russian Federation, formed a global structure and constellation of total social power which is obviously multipolar. Indeed, all those pillars do not own and do not radiate completely the same quantum of global social power, but a strongly hard social fact (primarily diplomatic - political, military - political and economic / economic - energy and economic - trade) is that none of these three pillars, including the United States, yet possesses such a quantum of global total social power that they can unilaterally shape and regulate all planetary social relations strictly in accordance with their state and national interests and in the function of their realization and materialization.

Examples of the war in Syria, Iran's nuclear program, North Korea's nuclear program and many other examples are the strongest and clearest examples that the global geostrategic and geopolitical structure of social power is not one polar, i.e. that the United States, their exclusive state and national interests are not a single exclusive pillar of structure and constellation of the global social power. This is the essential and fundamental challenge facing Donald Trump's presidential administration, the challenge of the need to realize and materialize US state and national interests within the triangle of the real three pillars of the modern world order of power - the United States - Peoples' Republic of China - Russia.

Key words: *Multipolar international order, Trump, Kissinger, Brzezinski, State Department.*

1. INTRODUCTION

The great pragmatist of the US foreign policy Henry Kissinger, who is permanently occupied with the problem of global order and the structure and constellation of global social power, in 2014, in a deep age, and in the most direct way in his capital work "World Order", emphasizes this fact explicitly and even dramatically strongly. In this work he spectacularly elaborates and argues his research conclusion focused and divided in two negations: there is no "end of history" and "no clashes of civilizations". In this sense, a very strong analytical influence must be paid to the residence of Kissinger in Russia in the

last days of June and in the first days of July 2017 and the meeting in the Kremlin with V. V. Putin on June 29, 2017, in particular with Trump's assertion that the United States should agree with Russia and not allow the formation of an axis between the Russian and People's Republic of China polar as opposed to the United States polar, as the real strongest and most powerful polar.

In this period of a scientific and theoretical plan, there was one big and fundamental turning point. Zbigniew Brzezinski as the Kissinger archetypal rival and as a member of the theory of ideology and the moralization of US foreign policy and global international relations, in his equally capital work "Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis of Global Power" (2011), essentially stands in the pragmatic positions of Kissinger, accepting and emphasizing that the United States alone do not possess a sufficient quantum of global social power unilaterally to shape the world social order only in accordance with its own state and national interests, meaning ignoring some other global, but also regional and individual regions, countries, and national interests.

2. KISSINGER AND BRZEZINSKI AS THE THEORY FUNDAMENT

The views of Kissinger 2014 and Brzezinski 2011 in their capital works previously addressed in the introductory part are absolutely relevant views when analyzing the problem of the structure and constellation of power of the global order. That order, which is contemporary and current, the order inherited by the Presidential Administration of Trump and which presents a colossal and essential challenge right up to the US diplomacy led by the new Secretary of State Rex Tillerson. At the elementary level, but without having to miss the essence, in the sequel, we will focus on the views of Kissinger and Brzezinski. However, one fundamental conclusion is extremely necessary beforehand. The diametrically opposed ideological and political profiles of Kissinger and Brzezinski must be known, and in the analysis they must constantly be kept in mind. Kissinger, a Republican, was a National Security Adviser and Secretary of State in the administrations of Presidents Nixon (1969 – 1974) and Ford (1974 – 1977). More importantly, Kissinger is a prominent pragmatist. Kissinger is a fierce adversary to any puts in the ideological framework of foreign policy and international relations. On the basis of that pragmatism he gained world and historical fame, becoming known as one of the greatest diplomats in the history of diplomacy and international relations. On the basis of pragmatism in the international relations, Kissinger set the basic concept of a pragmatic American foreign policy, and within that framework he solved the difficult problems he faced as a national security adviser and as a state secretary. The example of the pragmatic solution to the problem of the Vietnam War has gained historical glory and with the meaning of a kind of formula for how the toughest and most fraught international problems can be solved on a pragmatic basis. In the context of the subject of this paper, it is more important to emphasize the pragmatic basis on which Kissinger developed the concept of détente, as an exclusive platform for reducing and balancing tensions in the relations of the United States with then - Soviet Russia and with the People's Republic of China, and for finding a certain modus vivendi of the conflicting interests and goals of their diplomatic services and their international policies. And all this with the ultimate and crucial goal of preventing the "cold" war to escalate into a "hot" war (Bleau 2014). We emphasize this primarily because today US foreign policy is again faced with the need to find, to create within its foreign policy a kind of modus vivendi of its own state interest precisely with the state interests of Russia and the People's Republic of China. Of course, as any other concept of modus

vivendi among more competitive interests, and this concept must necessarily be a kind of perfectly structuring and balancing the powers of those interests, so that at the end of the ends the basis and the essence of those interests are satisfied, and to prevent further radicalization of their opposition, because in that case both the American and the other two interests will not be realized and will even be devastated in a certain essential way and level. Simply, the US state does not have the power of dominant superiority in relation to the interest of Russia and the People's Republic of China so that it can completely marginalize them, the contemporary structure and constellation of global power is not unipolar with American interest as the only pole of global structuring and constellation of social power, but basically is multipolar with the Russian state interest and with the Chinese state interest as two other pillars of structure and constellation of global social power (Boxill 2014).

This elaboration is the basic and essential theoretical framework of Kissinger's position, it is the theoretical framework of the foundation, through which Kissinger finds himself in the same theoretical position with the theoretical position of his ideological and political antipode, Brzezinski. Brzezinski was a Democrat, and President Carter's national security adviser (1977 – 1981).

The ideology of the foreign policy of the presidential administration of Carter completely coincides with the theoretical, ideological and political profile of Brzezinski. Indeed, it can not be said that Brzezinski is the one who essentially determines the ideological and political profile of Carter's presidential administration, simply because through his entire political career, primarily in his native state of Georgia, Carter elaborated and implemented policies, of course in line with its functions, which were entirely liberal policies, clearly characteristic of the left wing of the Democratic Party, a wing that is highly liberal. Carter's foreign policy, as well as Brzezinski's theoretical, ideological and political profile, was crystal – clearly designed and implemented as an (ultra)liberal foreign policy, a policy of forcefully ideologizing of international relations and US diplomacy. First of all, it was a foreign policy of strongly imposing the American ideology of the Western civilization concept of human rights, more precisely the (ultra)liberal concept of human rights, as its fundamental principle, and at the same time as the standard and measure of both US foreign policy and aggregate of international relations. It was the foreign policy of interventionism, the export and imposition of the (ultra)liberal idea and theoretical concept, above all the (ultra)liberal concept of human rights, that is, the totality of the "values of the American society" on the whole of international relations. In this sense, it must be noted that this (ultra)liberal ideology of the foreign policy of Carter's presidential administration was somewhat later revitalized and implemented by Clinton presidential administration (1993 – 2001) and Obama presidential administration (2009 – 2017), also ideologically and politically crystal - clear members of the left, (ultra)liberal wing of the Democratic Party. Anyway, with the full right we can conclude that the strong (ultra)liberal ideology of the foreign policy of the presidential administration of Carter fully coincided with the theoretical, ideological, and political profile of Brzezinski (Vinha 2014).

3. FUNDAMENTAL POINT OF CONSENT OF KISSINGER AND BRZEZINSKI

Now we come to a certain kind of core in this elaboration of the diametrically opposite theoretical, ideological, and political profiles of Kissinger and Brzezinski.

Ideologically and politically so different Kissinger and Brzezinski, the first hard creator and protagonist of pragmatic foreign policies and the second no less solid creator and protagonist of the ideologization of foreign policy, with his papers in the last few years (Brzezinski died on May 26, 2017) and with their overall public appearances, although in old age (Kissinger was born on May 27, 1923), found themselves in a clearly defined fundamental and essential point of their view and understanding of contemporary international relations and the interests and priorities of the US and their foreign policy within those contemporary international relations. That point is their analytical knowledge, inductively elevated to the level of theoretical knowledge and postulate, that contemporary international relations, primarily focused through their structure and constellation of power, are not unipolar but are multipolar. This means that the reality of the existence of a unipolar international order with the United States and with their state and national interests is the past, as the only pillar of structure and constellation of global total social power (political, economic, military, cultural, communication, propaganda...), such as the international relations, their structure and constellation of social power, with the fierce euphoria of a Cold War winner, were determined by President George H. W. Bush on September 11, 1990 as the successor to Ronald Reagan, thus usurping Reagan's glory and recognition (Knopf 2004).

Modern international relations, their structure and constellation of total social power, the contemporary global order, analyze and conclude separately both Kissinger and Brzezinski, is real multipolar. In fact, this unipolar structure and constellation of global social power, something like Pax Americana, in a historical time frame, took a rather brief. The modern world, it is the theoretical, ideological and political point of consensus of Kissinger and Brzezinski, is multipolar, with Russia and especially with the People's Republic of China as other two poles, and with an additional, but essential important conclusion, that China's relevance and power in the global power relations will increase. This conclusion does not mean that the real power of the United States is not the greatest, but that power is not so much dominant that it allows the United States to create and implement a global order, an order of constitution and functioning of global power, set on the pole of the special and selfish American state and national interests. Therefore the United States must negotiate and conclude an agreement with Russia and the Peoples Republic of China, because the power of the United States as the only superpower is still not superior enough to be able to neutralize the power of the state and national interests of the other two pillars, the Peoples Republic of China and Russia. The United States have indeed been superpower, but their global power in the near future will decline in relation to the powers of Russia and the People's Republic of China. Therefore, the opportunities for the realization and materialization of the US state interests imperatively require a correct global geostrategic and geopolitical agreement with Russia and the Peoples Republic of China. Only through such a fair deal the vital American state and national interests can be realized. For example, the United States alone cannot solve any more fundamental international problems, and therefore have the necessary need for cooperation not only with Russia and China, but also with certain relevant regional factors and actors (for example, with Iran and Turkey in the regions of the Near and Middle East as a completely obvious case).

And now here is the essence of this theoretical grounding of the subject of this text: if Kissinger and Brzezinski analyzed, thought, and concluded this way, if these two theoretical, ideological and political antipodes are found on the same theoretical, analytical, ideological and political point of view, then it must be concluded that the reality

is probably exactly what the two most glorious and most confirmed diplomatic and international political theorists, ideologists, and politicians in the United States saw and understood. It seems that the global geostrategic and geopolitical structure and constellation of social power is multipolar, set on the basis of the triangle of power to the state and national interests of the United States, the Peoples Republic of China and Russia (Keersmaeker 2015).

4. TRAMP AND THE GLOBAL MULTIPOLARITY

Everything can be said, and really everything is talked about Trump's competence to successfully perform the presidency. If the US economy is strictly seen, the social field most important for an ordinary American, the one who decides the election, it is a fact that the US economy is threatened with overheating and that the Fed seems to have to raise the reference interest rate. As for the US foreign policy, Trump still before taking office, obviously following Kissinger, stressed that the United States must agree with Russia, must find some modus vivendi of the coexistence of their largely competitive state and national interests. Trump apparently accepted that the global structure and constellation of power is multipolar and that the United States does not have sufficiently dominant power to shape the international order alone, although most realizing that, individually they are the most powerful pole, the US may / are probably the only superpower, therefore they must diplomatically perfectly precisely play in the triangle United States - the Peoples Republic of China - Russia. Trump obviously accepted Kissinger's analysis and conclusions that the Peoples Republic of China is a prospect of a stronger global rival, which means that it is not Russia. The United States must not impose an inaccurate, irrational and unpractical diplomatic platform and policy, placed on positions of hegemonic arrogance, to force China and Russia to rationally and pragmatically form an alliance against the United States. In this way, the United States will not be able to optimally realize and materialize its own state and national interests in the current global, geostrategic, and geopolitical circumstances. Therefore, the United States and Russia must at all costs find a modus vivendi for their conflicting state and national interests. That is the only way to successfully confront the Peoples Republic of China in the very near future the new / second global superpower. In this sense, the importance and significance of Kissinger's stay in Russia in the last days of June and the first few days of July 2017 and the meeting in the Kremlin with Putin on June 29, 2017, cannot be marginalized in any way. Indeed, what would be the need of a man of 94 years to embark on such a distant journey, and even more so if it is the celebrated diplomat Kissinger, if the motives, causes, themes, and goals are not of a first-rate global geostrategic and geopolitical importance!? (Wickett 2017)

But on the other hand, unlike Kissinger and Brzezinski, in the American establishment it is obvious that in some ways the disagreement with analyses and conclusions of Kissinger and Brzezinski on the existence of a modern multipolar global order prevails. Both from the Democrats and from the Republican side, a very strong lobby was formed that believes, that at least hopes that today's Russia is essentially nothing more different from that of Yeltsin’s Russia, and that the United States must enter into a determined competitive match with Russia, that they can win it, put it under its control, and then enter the final match with China, because also the United States accept that in the near future China will be the real rival and the global power of the United States and the American global order of power, structured and constellated around the US state and

national interests as the only such pole. And therefore Trump is confronted with all the inconvenience that is caused by the joint democratic-republican lobby ("Russophobic" and "Russohysterical"), basically aimed at disabling the possible partnership agreement for a sort of reset of the US - Russian relations (Deyermond 2017). Anyway, generally speaking, they are opponents of a new Yalta, whether it is bipartite or tripartite. On October 9, 2017, Trump and Kissinger held a public meeting at the White House, where Kissinger emphasized: "This Is a Moment When the Opportunity to Build a Constructive, Peaceful World Order Is Very Great".[96] It is clear that the key accent in this message to Kissinger is the need for the world order to be placed on the principles of constructiveness and peacefulness. Kissinger's position that precisely such an order, set up and emanated from actual geostrategic and geopolitical circumstances is obvious, and this order is productive for the implementation and realization of the US state and national interests (Schell 2017).

But precisely in this context, it must be noted that the undisputed geostrategic and geopolitical for the United States is necessity, if they already have to accept the Peoples Republic of China and Russia as global partners, they must never do that in the space of (Huntington's paraphrase) the western hemisphere. The United States in this geostrategic and geopolitical space must insist and ensure a functional unipolar order. This order may even be the key argument of the United States in the eventual achievement of a global geostrategic and geopolitical agreement with China and Russia, which will be constructive and form a peaceful world order (a paraphrase of Kissinger's above statement). The United States must not allow the formation of a geostrategic and geopolitical Eurasia; they must not allow the formation of a united Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, which will be one of the poles of any eventual multipolar world order (de Gaulle's idea and the cause of its defamation as an anti-American); they must not allow any EU as a pole to a global order; they must not allow even the possible axes Germany – France to become a pole of the global order. From this comes the essence of Trump's negative attitude towards some organizational and institutional strengthening of the EU, if it is a geostrategic and geopolitical rival of the United States, and here comes the essence of Trump's sympathies for the Great Britain's emergence form the EU. (Lehne 2017)

In this context speaking, it is very easy to conclude that Trump is a member of the concept of the Westphalian international political and legal order. For him, sovereign states are exclusively subjects of the international order and that sovereignty must not be relativized or reduced by international organizations, with a certain relevant understanding of the role of the United Nations, but only on condition that they serve the interests of the United States. Therefore, Trump has a strong negative attitude towards international agreements, for example to TTP and TTIP, unless they are biased towards the interests of the United States. That is why Trump is a fierce adversary to the (ultra)liberal globalization of the presidential administrations of Clinton and Obama.

Trump sees the whole state as a corporation and it should be actually constituted, institutionalized, organized and functionalized as a corporation. The essential importance and essential need for the existence and functioning of the state must be the same with the essential importance and the essential need for the existence and functioning of corporations, the results of their existence and operation must have the same nature. Primarily, the state exists and functions to ensure a free and productive action of the corporate world, and must be instrumentalized in its function, in the function of investor

[96]ttps://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2017/10/10/henry_kissinger_to_president_trump_this_is_a_moment_when_the_opportunity_to_build_a_constructive_peaceful_world_order_is_very_gre

capital, because it alone creates a new value. For Trump, the economic and commercial successes of diplomacy are primary and crucial, it is the sense of the existence of diplomacy. Therefore, for Trump, for example, and for Kissinger, the primary and biggest rival of the United States is the Peoples Republic of China, its explosive exports and the huge trade surplus in the exchange with the United States, further supported through the artificially maintained low rate of the yuan / renminbi, such as the US observations and accusations are voiced. That is why the head of the US diplomacy is brought a profile like Rex Tillerson, with his great experience and remarkable successes as the ExxonMobil CEO, means without any political career and without any diplomatic political experience. And moreover, John Sullivan is appointed as his deputy in the State Department, also without any diplomatic political experience, but this is very important to know, with experience as Deputy Secretary / Minister of Commerce at the time of the Presidential Administration of G. W. Bush (Schneider - Petsinger 2017). And lastly, Trump in his National Security Strategy, Trade / Trade results and effects of the United States sees and sets them as a stand-out security issue, along with the development of nuclear weapons ("force for peace") and the fight against terrorism.

5. CONCLUSION

Indeed, all the pillars of the structure and constellation of global social power do not really possess and do not radiate completely the same quantum of global social power, but a strongly hard social fact (primarily diplomatic - political, military - political and economic / economic - energy and economic – trade) is that none of these three pillars, including the United States, yet posses such a quantum of global total social power so that they can unilaterally establish and regulate the whole of planetary social relations strictly in accordance with their state and national interests and in the function of their realization and materialization. The unipolar world order essentially represents precisely this: one pillar of structuring and constellating global social power to possess and practically unilaterally apply such a quantum of social power necessary to be able to act literally at each geostrategic and geopolitical point and to regulate and model it strictly in accordance with their state and national interest. This conclusion essentially means that one pillar of structure and constellation of global social power possesses such a quantum of social power on the basis of which it can independently, without cooperation with some other global and / or regional geostrategic and geopolitical pillars of social power, or even in directly opposing the competitive and conflicting state and national interests, to regulate and model each geostrategic and geopolitical point of the whole of the global structure and constellation of social power exclusively in accordance with the definition and requirements of its own state and national interest. This is an indisputable fact: the United States is not capable, that is, does not possess such a quantum of social power within the current structure and constellation of global social power so that they can unilaterally promote and realize their own geostrategic and geopolitical state and national interests.

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BUILDING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EUROPEAN UNION GLOBAL STRATEGY 2016

Tatjana Gerginova, Dr.Sc
Faculty of Security – Skopje, Republic of Macedonia
tanjagerginova@gmail.com

Abstract

In present day, the European Union plays a very important role in the harmonization of the relations and interests of European countries and in the creation of European and global security.

In the framework of this paper, the author introduces European security in accordance with the EU Global Strategy of 2016. The author presents the EU main goal and the EU values and the five priorities of EU foreign policy according to the EU 2016 Global Strategy for promoting common interests.

The subject of research is an analysis of European security that highlights the changes in the global and regional environment.

The purpose of this study is to approach the importance of European security to scientific literature.

Key words: global security, values of the EU, priorities of the EU's foreign policy

INTRODUCTION

In the modern world, political, economic, cultural and military-security relations are increasingly taking place in the global multipolar and multilateral environment in which the complex interdependence of states is visibly manifested. The progress made in the implementation of the common foreign and security policy and the involvement of European Defense Force in addressing security problems, suggests a more significant role of the EU in the harmonization of the relations and the interests of European countries and in taking part in common responsibilities arising from European and global security. The countries in Southeast Europe also accept the promotion of values such as democracy, economic and social stability and security. Peace and stability are the foundation for the development of modern world.

THE ROLE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

The increased responsibility that the European Union has assumed in international politics implies its increasing activity in international relations. In order to protect and advance its own security and promote its values, as well as contributing to building a stable environment, the European Union is obliged to develop its own military capacities and to be coherent in the conduct of foreign policy. To respond successfully to the threats, the European Union is developing a strategic policy that supports early, prompt and necessary and strong intervention (Gnesotto, 2009:29). It is necessary for the European Union to develop operations that would include both military and civilian capabilities (European Union contributing to solving crises, such as preventive and post-conflict

situations). An important element with regard to the strategic autonomy of the Union is the promotion of an international order based on an effective multilateral system - the development of a strong international community, functional international institutions and international law.

In this regard, the Member States are urged to lead a process of developing a single strategic culture of the European Union, and strengthen their capacities in view of responding adequately to the security threats. Among other things, the transatlantic relationship between the United States and the European Union is indispensable in that the Union aims to create a uniform and effective partnership with the United States to act together in the world. This active and capable EU can leave a strong impact on a world scale and it can focus on achieving an effective multilateral system that would lead to a fair, secure and united world. Maintaining transatlantic partnership with the United States is necessary, but it is necessary to be based on an effective and balanced partnership. It means maintaining cooperation with NATO because of the signed Berlin Plus Agreement (according to the House of Commons, the Defense Committee, The Future of NATO and European Defense, the nine reports of Session 2007-08). The European Security Strategy enhances the European Union's cooperation with NATO and allows the Union's access to the Alliance's facilities and assets. The European Union - NATO secret treaties (in particular the Berlin Plus Agreement) increase the operational capacity of the Union, and provide a framework for strategic partnership between the two organizations in crisis management.

The European Union - NATO collusion (especially Berlin Plus agreement) increases the operational capability of the Union and provides a framework for a strategic partnership between the two organizations in crisis management. There is a need for preventive action, which allows for prevention of the problems and threats in the European Union and for assistance where necessary in order to overcome the security problems. The future operations and missions to be undertaken by the Union will be conducted by military capabilities, but will also include the use of civilian, non-military capacity (political, humanitarian and economic). Additionally, the European Union needs to build effective multilateralism - which means that solving international problems is possible only by joint action of the international community, institutions and rights. Multilateral cooperation is inevitable because countries cannot independently solve complex issues and provide a real solution. It is necessary to build a stable security environment, which indicates a peaceful and stable neighborhood (a ring of stable states around the EU), to ensure the Union's security and its further unobstructed development. Maintaining the transatlantic partnership and cooperation with the European Union and the United States is necessary, but it must be based on effective and balanced partnership. It means maintaining the cooperation with NATO and that was the reason for concluding the Berlin Plus Agreement. The harmonization of the European Union is the next item that must be addressed by the political decision-makers in the Union. The purpose of harmonized and concerted action of all institutions, politics and the Member States of the Union is of common interest. Only through cooperation for a joint strategic security policy and European security policy through the interaction of pillars II and III, can the European Union successfully participate in the fight against terrorism and organized crime. The Security of the Union is the first prerequisite for its further development, in general, and that development cannot be achieved unless there is reconciliation between all components of the European Union (Gerginova, 2015:171).

With the European Security Strategy of 2003, many activities were identified that enhance the role of the European Union in providing international security. This strategy defines the following main determinants of the role of the European Union in the achievement of international security: (Gerginova, 2015:171)

1. The global responsibility of the EU - the Union tends to make and keep a much larger role in international relations;
2. Effective multilateralism - solving international problems is possible according to the EU only through common actions of the international community, institutions and rights. Multilateral cooperation is inevitable, because states cannot solve complex issues independently and provide a real solution;
3. Preventive action - to prevent the emergence of certain problems and threats, the EU should act preventively and provide help where necessary in order to overcome the security problems. The future operations and missions conducted by the EU will not be conducted only by military capabilities, but will also include the use of civilian, non-military capacities (political, humanitarian, economic);
4. Stable security environment - the existence of a peaceful and stable neighborhood (ring of stable states around the EU) is necessary for achieving the Union's security and its further unobstructed development.
5. Final determination of the list of key security threats in the EU.

THE EU GLOBAL STRATEGY 2016

The EU 2003 strategy highlights poverty, disease, migration, environmental problems, competition for natural resources, in particular water, energy dependence and others as global challenges and terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, failure of states and organized crime as the main threats. The main point of this strategy is to give preference to the non-military means for resolving conflicts as a way to ensure security over a longer period of time. In order to prevent the threats it identified, the European Union has set itself a goal to develop "Strategic culture" (Gerginova, 2015). On June 28, 2016, a new Global Strategy of the EU was adopted in the field of foreign and security policy. Also in December 2016, an Implementation Plan was adopted, which actually presents a proposal for the implementation of the EU Global Strategy in the field of security and defense.

In the introduction to the strategy it is determined that today we need a strong Europe, because the region has become unstable and unsafe. In economic terms, the countries of the European Union are part of the G3 countries. The EU countries are the most important trading partner and the first foreign investors in almost every country in the world. However, the potentials of the European Union are not yet fully used. Most EU citizens understand that it is necessary to collectively take responsibility for the EU role in the world.

The word global is not only geographic: it also applies to a wide range of policies and instruments that the Strategy promotes. It focuses on military capabilities and the fight against terrorism, as well as business opportunities, inclusive societies and human rights. It deals with building the peace and resilience of the state and the companies in Europe and around it. As for Europe, the soft and firm power go hand in hand. The strategy fosters the EU strategic autonomy. It is necessary to promote the common interests of the EU citizens, as well as common European principles and values. The EU

foreign and security policy must take into consideration the global pressures and local dynamics. The European Union will continue to deepen its trans-Atlantic ties and partnership with NATO, but at the same time it will connect with new actors and explore new forms. Also, the strategy will promote reformed global governance, one that can meet the challenges of the 21st century.

First, the strategy determines the common interests and principles. It states that the EU will promote peace and guarantee the security of its citizens and the security of its territories. Internal and external security is mutually intertwined: internal security also depends on peace beyond national borders. The EU aims to promote the prosperity of its citizens that needs to be shared and demands that the goals of sustainable development around the world, including Europe, be met. A prosperous Union also relies on an open and fair international economic system and a sustainable approach to global goods. The European Union aims at respecting common values and determining external credibility and influences.

Furthermore, the strategy determines that the EU will promote a global rule-based order in order to provide global public goods and contribute to the achievement of peace in the world. The EU will promote a global order based on multilateralism rules as a key principle and the United Nations will be at the heart of that order. The EU will be guided by clear principles stemming from a real assessment of the current strategic environment as well as from idealistic aspirations to advance the world for the better. In this complex world, the EU emphasizes the principle of unification. Only with united power, the EU has the potential to achieve citizens' security, achieve prosperity and democracy.

In order to promote the safety and prosperity of its citizens, the EU will be guided by the principle of responsibility. The Union will engage all over Europe and the surrounding regions of the East and the South. The Union will act globally in order to reject the root causes of conflict, poverty and build and promote human rights. The EU will be a responsible global actor, but responsibility must be shared. Responsibility must be achieved through the modernization of external partnerships.

In order to meet the objectives, the EU will address countries, regional bodies and international organizations and deepen its partnership with civil society and the private sector as a key player in the world. With its foreign policy, the EU strives to achieve five priorities aimed at promoting common interests and adhering to clear principles: European Union Security, State and Social Resistance to the East and the South, Integrated Approach to Conflicts, Cooperative Regional Arrangements and Global Governance for the 21st century.[97]

The EU strategy identifies terrorism, hybrid threats, economic instability, climate change and energy insecurity as current threats to the security of its citizens and the territory. An appropriate degree of ambition and strategic autonomy are important for maintaining the ability of Europe to promote peace and security within and outside its borders. It is therefore necessary to strengthen the efforts in the area of defense, high-tech security, fight against terrorism, energy and strategic communications.

The main objective of the EU member states should be the realization of mutual assistance and solidarity as an integral part of the agreements for their establishment. The

[97] See more about this: *"Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe"*, A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, 2016, p. 15, 16.

EU will increase its contribution to the collective security of Europe, achieving close cooperation with its partners, starting with NATO.

The EU is committed to the global order based on international law, which ensures human rights, sustainable development and lasting access to global resources. This commitment will become an aspiration in order to transform the existing system, not just to preserve it. The EU will advocate a strong United Nations as a pillar of a multilateral order based on rules, and will develop a global coordinated response in cooperation with international and regional organizations, states and non-governmental actors. The EU aims to achieve priorities by activating networks, economic impact and by all available means coherently. In order to achieve these goals, it is necessary for the Union to invest in a credible, reactive and related Union.[98]

Credible Union.

Credibility is essential for responsible interaction with the world. The EU credibility rests on unity, on numerous achievements, on the continuing power of attraction, on the effectiveness and consistency of European politics, as well as on respecting European values. Stronger Union also requires investment in all dimensions of foreign policy. Investing in security and defense is a matter of particular urgency. A full range of defense capabilities is needed to respond to the external crises and achieve global security for Europe. Member states remain sovereign in their defense decisions: however, it is essential that defense cooperation becomes a norm in order to acquire and sustain many of these abilities. The EU aims to systematically contribute to strengthening defense co-operation and will strive to create a strong European defense industry, which is essential for independent decision-making and action in Europe

Reactive Union.

EU diplomatic actions must be based on the Treaty of Lisbon. Common security and defense policies must become reactive. Increased cooperation between member states should be explored, which may result in more structured forms of cooperation, which will fully benefit from the Lisbon Treaty's potential. It is also necessary that the development policy be more flexible and in line with the EU's strategic priorities.

Connected union

The member states of the European Union should be linked in relation to the issue of EU external relations and the relationship between member states and EU institutions. This applies in particular to the application of the objectives of sustainable development, migration and security, especially the fight against terrorism. The EU should also include human rights and gender issues in current sector policies and institutions. This strategy supports a vision and ambition for a Union that will be stronger and ready and capable of making a positive difference in the world. EU citizens deserve a genuine union that will promote common interests by engaging responsibly in partnership with others.

It is in the EU's interest to promote common values such as peace, security, prosperity, democracy and world order. They represent the core interests on which the EU external action relies. At the same time, the basic European values are an integral part of the European interest.[99]

[98] See more about this: *"Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe"*, A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy, 2016, p. 10, 11.

[99] Ibid, p. 14, 15.

Peace and security

The European Union will promote peace and guarantee the security of its citizens and territories. This means that the EU citizens, in cooperation with their partners, must have the necessary skills to defend and fulfill their commitments in terms of providing mutual assistance and solidarity, which is contained in the founding agreements. Internal and external security is intertwined more than ever: internal security implies the existence of a parallel interest in peace in the neighboring Regions. This implies the existence of a wider interest in conflict prevention, the promotion of people's security, the resolution of the root causes of instability and efforts in order to make the world safer.

Prosperity

The EU will speed up the progress of its people. This involves promoting economic growth, jobs, equity and a safe and healthy environment. The success of the Union is a condition for Europe to become stronger. Trade exchange and investments will support EU prosperity to a greater extent: a successful union depends on the strong internal market and the open international economic system. In the interest of the EU are open and balanced markets, shaping economic and environmental rules as well as sustainable access to global goods, as well as the free flow of information and global value chains supported by free and secure internet.

Democracy

The EU will foster the resilience of its democracy and will be at the level of values that have contributed to its creation and development. This includes respect for and promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the rule of law. This further includes justice, solidarity, equality, non-discrimination, pluralism and respect for diversity. Consistent respect of the values of the internal plan will determine both the credibility of the EU and the impact of the external plan. In order to preserve the quality of democracy, the EU should respect national, European and international law in all areas, from migration and asylum, to energy, the fight against terrorism and trafficking.

Principles governing EU foreign policy

The EU will be guided by clear principles. They are equally based on a realistic assessment of the strategic environment, as well as on the idealistic ambition to make the world a better place for living. Principal pragmatism will lead the EU foreign policy in the coming years.

Unity

The EU should act unified. The EU goal is to build unity - across institutions, states and peoples. By unifying the EU Member States, it will be more unlike a Member State acting alone or in a way that is not coordinated. There is no conflict of national and European interests. For the purpose of realizing their interests, it is necessary for the EU member states to act together. Only the combined influence of a sincere union can have the potential to bring security, prosperity and democracy to its citizens and make a positive movement in the world.

CONCLUSION

The progress made in implementing the common foreign and security policy of the European Union and the involvement of the European defense forces in resolving security problems points to the increasingly important role of the European Union in

harmonizing the relations and interests of European countries and taking part in the common responsibility for creation of European and global security.
States in the region of Southeast Europe are adopting and promoting the values of democracy, economic and social stability and security. In accordance with such determinations, they are committed to dialogue, which reduces the possibility of causing conflicts and positively affects the security environment. The promotion of regional security is increasingly based on cooperation and joint and coordinated activities in the area of security, politics and economy and other areas that are aimed at preserving stability and warning about crises in this region. The European Union will continue to deepen its trans-Atlantic ties and partnership with NATO, but at the same time it will connect with new actors and explore new forms.

With the European Security Strategy, adopted on 12.12.2003 under the title "Secure Europe in a Better World", principles have been established for the first time and the goals for advancing European security interests have been defined. The strategy is organized in three chapters: the first is an analysis of the security environment, that is, the global challenges and key threats to the European security are presented; further in the second chapter, the three strategic objectives are defined, one of which is aimed precisely at the fight against the mentioned threats; while the third part assesses the political implications for Europe.

This strategy defines the following main determinants of the role of the European Union in the achievement of international security: The global responsibility of the EU - the Union tends to make and keep a much larger role in international relations; Effective multilateralism; Preventive action; Stable security environment - the existence of a peaceful and stable neighborhood (ring of stable states around the EU) is necessary for achieving the Union's security and its further unobstructed development; Final determination of the list of key security threats in the EU.

Also with the 2016 strategy, the European Union will promote reformed global governance, one that can meet the challenges of the 21st century. The EU will promote a global order based on multilateralism rules as a key principle and the United Nations will be at the heart of that order. The EU will be guided by clear principles stemming from a real assessment of the current strategic environment, as well as from idealistic aspirations to advance the world for the better. In the complex world, the EU emphasizes the principle of unification. The Strategy nurtures the ambition of strategic autonomy for the European Union. It is necessary to promote the common interests of EU citizens, as well as the common European principles and values. The EU foreign and security policy must take into consideration the global pressures and local dynamics. The European Union will continue to deepen its trans-Atlantic ties and partnership with NATO, but at the same time it will connect with new players and explore new formats. Also, the strategy will promote reformed global governance, one that can meet the challenges of the 21st century. The European Union aims at respecting common values and determining external credibility and influences. According to the Strategy, the EU will be responsible for global actors, but responsibility must be shared. Responsibility must be achieved through the modernization of external partnerships. The EU will strive to achieve five priorities in order to promote common interests and in accordance with clear principles: Security of the Union, State and social resilience in our east and south, Integrated conflict approach, Cooperative regional revisions and Global governance for the 21st century. The main goal of the EU member states should be mutual assistance and solidarity. The EU will increase its contribution to the collective security of Europe, achieving close cooperation with its partners, starting

with NATO. The European Union also seeks to successfully promote European values such as peace, security, prosperity, democracy and world order.

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THE ENLARGEMENT OF NATO AND COOPERATION BETWEEN NATO AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AND COUNTRIES

Žarko Ćulibrk, Dr.Sc
Faculty of Security and Protection, Banja Luka, Republic of Srpska
e-mail: culibrk.zarko@fbzbl.net

Abstract

Dealing with contemporary security risks and threats, the achievement of security in the contemporary world often involves the process of creating collective security. Collective security implies international cooperation in the field of security, and a significant part of this cooperation is the regional security cooperation. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization – NATO stands out as one of the most important international factors of collective security. The main topic of this paper is the process of NATO enlargement, as well as the process of cooperation between NATO and other organizations and countries. During the development of this paper mainly methods which we used were content analysis, comparative analysis and review of the literature. This paper gives a brief history of NATO, and describes its organizational structure, process of enlargement and the activities of this organization. The aim of this scientific paper is to show the procedure of regional cooperation within the framework of collective security systems through the example of NATO.

Keywords*: North Atlantic Alliance; Collective Security; Regional Security Cooperation; Euro-Atlantic Integrations; Security Initiatives*.

1. INTRODUCTION

Regional security in different parts of the world, as well as in Europe, depends to a large extent on the level of mutual trust and cooperation between neighboring countries. One of the key factors in the stability of certain regions is regional security cooperation. Regional security cooperation between different countries can take place in several forms. It can be bilateral or multilateral cooperation between two or more states, whether they are members of the same collective security organization, whether they have different statuses. One of the forms of that cooperation is the cooperation of countries with collective security organizations that lead countries to membership of these organizations or strengthen their partnership relations. The most important collective security organization in Europe, but also in the world is NATO. It is precisely this security organization that significantly affects the security of the various regions of the world.

2. SHORT HISTORY AND STRUCTURE OF NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization – NATO (French: Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord – OTAN), North Atlantic Alliance, or NATO-pact is a collective defense organization that was founded after the Second World War. NATO is an

intergovernmental organization, the military-political alliance of North American and European countries, signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty.

NATO was founded on April 4, 1949, in Washington, DC, when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed between the United States, Canada and 10 Western European countries. This agreement established the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO has 28 member states. The official languages of the organization are English and French, and the Alliance's headquarters is located in Brussels.

Figure 1: NATO members in 2016 (Source: Wikipedia, 2017; Author)

NATO's organizational structure is comprised of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the North Atlantic Council, the Civilian structure of NATO, the Military structure of NATO and various organizations and agencies.

The NATO Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA) is an inter-parliamentary organization that brings together members of the NATO member states to consider security issues of common interest to all member states. The Assembly is completely independent of NATO, but it provides permanent contact between NATO and the parliaments of the member states, in order to provide parliamentary and public consensus in the NATO members in support of the NATO's policy. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly meets once a year. It was founded in 1955 and its headquarters is in Brussels. The composition of the assembly consists of 257 deputies from 28 member states. In addition, representatives of 13 associated members, representatives of four Mediterranean partners, eight observation delegations, as well as delegations of the European Parliament, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly are sitting in the assembly. The work of NATO PA is carried out through five committees and eight subcommittees.

The North Atlantic Council - NAC (French: Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord - CAN) is the main political decision-making body within NATO. The Council gathers the highest representatives of each member state, in order to discuss policy or operational issues that require a collective decision. However, the NATO Council provides a forum for a wide range of consultations on all matters pertaining to peace and security in the member states of NATO. The Council is the only NATO body established under the provisions of Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty and has the authority to establish subsidiary bodies, if this is deemed necessary. The head of the NATO Council is the Secretary General of NATO (French: Secrétaire général de l'OTAN) which is the highest NATO official. Secretary General is responsible for coordination of the work of NATO, he is the head of

the NATO Council and the entire staff employed in Alliance. The function of the Secretary General was established in 1952.

The Civilian structure of NATO consists of divisions and offices, such as the Division of Public Diplomacy, the Division of Political Affairs and Security Policy, the Division of Defense Policy and Planning, the Security Office, the Financial Control Office, and The Resource Office.

The Military structure of NATO consists of the NATO Military Committee, the International Military Staff (the Military Committee's executive body), the Allied Command for Operations and the Allied Command for Transformation.

3. ENLARGEMENT AND COOPERATION PROCESS

NATO was founded in 1949 by twelve countries. The founding countries of NATO were: the USA, Canada, Iceland,[100] Norway, Denmark,[101] Portugal, Italy, France,[102] the United Kingdom and the Benelux countries (Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg). (Treaty between Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland signed at Brussels, on march 17th , 1948, 1948, pp. 1 - 7) NATO then expanded and after seven enlargements (last 2009) there are 28 member states in present times.

In 1952, Greece[103] and Turkey joined NATO, and in 1955 West Germany became a member of this organisation. A few years after Franco's death, Spain joined NATO. It was in 1982. In 1990 NATO was expanding to the area of former East Germany.[104] Shortly before the aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on March 14, 1999, NATO opened its doors for the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary.[105] Major enlargement occurred in 2004 when NATO received seven member states: Slovenia,[106] Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia,[107] Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.[108] In 2009, Croatia[109] and Albania[110] were admitted into NATO membership.

[100] It is interesting to say that Iceland does not have its own military. The closest to military is the icelandic coast guard.

[101] It is important to say that the part of Denmark are the Faroe Islands and Greenland.

[102] Until the declaration of independence in 1962 Algeria was part of France (and NATO). From 1966 to 2009 France had withdrawn from the military wing of NATO.

[103] Due to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, Greece withdrew from the military wing of NATO from 1974 to 1980.

[104] After the unification of West Germany and East Germany in October 1990, NATO expanded to the area of East Germany, which was a member of the Warsaw Pact from 1956 to 1990.

[105] The Czech Republic (as part of Czechoslovakia) and Hungary were members of the Warsaw Pact from 1955 to 1991. Poland was a member of the Warsaw Pact from 1955 to 1990.

[106] Until 1991, Slovenia (as part of Yugoslavia) was a member of the Non-Aligned Movement.

[107] Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia (as part of Czechoslovakia) were members of the Warsaw Pact from 1955 to 1991.

[108] Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (as part of the USSR) were members of the Warsaw Pact from 1955 to 1991.

[109] Until 1991, Croatia, as part of Yugoslavia, was a member of the Non-Aligned Movement.

[110] Albania was a member of the Warsaw Pact from 1955 to 1968.



Figure 2: The NATO enlargement process (1949-2009) (Source: Wikipedia, 2017)

The first step towards NATO membership can be considered the membership in the NATO program Partnership for Peace, through which passed all the former socialist countries which later became NATO members. The next step on the path to membership in the North Atlantic Alliance is the signing of the IPAP (the Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO). This is followed by the so-called Intensified Dialogue with NATO. The last step before full membership in this military-political organization is the implementation of the MAP (NATO Membership Action Plan), followed by the country's NATO accession. (Ćulibrk, 2017, pp. 142 - 147)

The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is a NATO military-political program designed to build trust between NATO and the European countries and between NATO and the countries of the former USSR. It was established in 1994. In 2016, this program had 22 member states, including four countries of the former Yugoslavia (Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro), 12 countries of the former USSR (Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan), five EU countries (Austria, Finland, Sweden, Ireland and Malta) and Switzerland. The last countries that were admitted to the PfP were

Serbia and Montenegro (2006). The country that seeks membership in the Partnership for Peace is Cyprus, but this incentive is blocked by Turkey. All countries that entered NATO after the end of the Cold War were members of the Partnership for Peace. (Partnership for Peace programme, 2017)

The Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) is a document that NATO signs individually with countries that are willing to deepen their cooperation with NATO. The incentive was launched in 2002 at the NATO Summit in Prague. By 2016, the IPAP was signed with NATO by eight countries. First it was done by Georgia (2004), and the last by Serbia (2015). (Individual Partnership Action Plans, 2017)

Intensified Dialogue is the next step in getting closer to NATO membership. The incentive for this activity was created in 2005 at an informal meeting of foreign ministers of NATO countries in Vilnius. The first country with which it has instituted an "intensified dialogue" was Ukraine (2005). This was followed by a dialogue with Georgia (2006), and with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro (2008).

The Membership Action Plan (MAP) is a NATO program for providing advice, assistance and support tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join NATO. Participants in this program are Macedonia (1999),[111] Montenegro (2009) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (2010).[112] (Membership Action Plan (MAP), 2017)

[111] Macedonia has been a participant in the program since 1999, before the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) and Intensified Dialogue werw created. In the Membership Action Plan Macedonia participates under the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) due to a dispute with Greece over the name Macedonia. Since one of the provinces in the north of Greece is called Macedonia, Greece blocks Macedonia's entry into NATO.

[112] One of the unresolved issues in Bosnia and Herzegovina that block its membership in NATO is the issue of ownership of immovable military property.



Figure 3: NATO Programs in Europe (Source: Wikipedia, 2017; Author)

The Mediterranean Dialogue was initiated by NATO as a form of cooperation (forum) between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Mediterranean countries. This forum reflects NATO's view that security in Europe is closely linked to security and stability in the Mediterranean. By 2018, the Mediterranean Dialogue included seven Mediterranean countries: Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Israel and Jordan. The last country that joined the Mediterranean Dialogue was Algeria (2000). (NATO Mediterranean Dialogue, 2015)

ICI – Istanbul Cooperation Incentive was launched in 2004 at the NATO Summit in Istanbul. The aim of the Istanbul incentive is to contribute to long-term global and regional security by offering countries of the Middle East bilateral cooperation with NATO. The cooperation was offered to the member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council. By 2016, of the six countries of this council, to the Istanbul Cooperation Incentive have joined four countries (Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates), while the interest in cooperation showed Saudi Arabia and Oman. (Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), 2011)

"Partners across the glob" ("global partners") are the countries with which NATO cooperates individually which are not members of any NATO cooperation program. The global partners of NATO are Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Colombia, Mongolia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq. These countries develop cooperation with NATO in the areas of common interest and actively contribute to various NATO operations. (Relations with partners across the globe, 2017)



Figure 4: NATO partnership with countries in the world (Source: Wikipedia, 2018; Author)

In addition to these partners, NATO also has partnerships with the European Union, as well as with regional organizations such as the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).



Figure 5: Members of NATO and the EU (Source: Wikipedia, 2017; Author)

4. ACTIVITIES OF NATO

During the Cold War, NATO did not have military operations, since it was focused on defending against possible attacks by members of the Warsaw Pact. After the end of the Cold War, NATO began military action and has so far conducted more than 35 military operations. (Nato Operations: 1949–Present, pp. 1 - 8)

The first military operation of NATO was Anchor Guard, conducted after the Iraqi incursion into Kuwait (1990), and included the air surveillance in case of Iraqi attacks on the area of southeast Turkey. After that (1991) Operation Ace Guard was conducted, which involved the deployment of air force and anti-aircraft defense to help Turkey during the Operation Desert Storm. Since then, more than 30 operations have been carried out, of which we will highlight the most important ones. The largest number of NATO operations refers to the territory of the former Yugoslavia.

The first five operations on the territory of the former Yugoslavia (begun in 1992 and 1993) were Maritime Monitor, Sky Monitor, Maritime Guard, Deny Flight and Sharp Guard, representing the maritime blockade (primarily the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and airborne control and blockade of the sky above Bosnia and Herzegovina. These operations are followed by the NATO bombing of the Republic of Srpska, conducted through operations Deadeye and Deliberate Force. During this bombing, NATO used weapons with depleted uranium.

It was Operation Joint Endevaour, conducted by IFOR, and operations Joint Guard and Joint Forge, conducted by SFOR.[113] The next five NATO operations were related to Kosovo and Metohija (support to the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosmet, aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the entry of KFOR into the southern Serbian province),[114] followed by two operations in Macedonia.[115] In Macedonia,

[113] The operation Joint Endevaour (December 20, 1995 - December 20, 1996) was conducted in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1031. In line with this resolution, NATO was in charge of the implementation of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The newly formed forces were the so-called Implementation Forces - IFOR. IFOR has replaced the former UN forces – UNPROFOR. This was the first NATO peacekeeping mission in history. The operation Joint Guard (December 20, 1996 - June 20, 1998) was in line with UNSC Resolution 1088. There were formed so-called Stabilization Force or Peace Stabilization Force – SFOR. These forces have replaced the former IFOR. The operation Joint Forge (June 20, 1998 - December 2, 2004) was also conducted by SFOR troops. The SFOR mission ended on December 2, 2004, when the mission was taken over by the EU in Bosnia and Herzegovina, starting with the operation Althea in which are engaged forces, named EUFOR (European Union Force).

[114] Operation Eagle Eye (October 30, 1998 - March 24, 1999) was conducted in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1199, where NATO was in charge of overseeing truce. The operation was part of the OSCE Verification Mission in Kosovo and Metohija. Operation Joint Guarantor (December 4, 1998 - March 20, 1999) was an operation in which NATO was preparing to evacuate the members of the OSCE from Kosovo and Metohija. Operation Allied Force (24 March to 20 June 1999), was in the United States known as Operation Noble Anvil, and in Serbia as Operation Merciful Angel. This operation, carried out without the permission of the UN Security Council, was an air campaign and aggression on FR Yugoslavia. During the aggression, with the use of ammunition with depleted uranium, more than 1000 soldiers and policemen were killed. Over 2,500 civilians were killed and more than 6,000 civilians were injured. In the territory of Macedonia, NATO had land troops, which eventually grew into KFOR forces. The operation Allied Harbor (16 April - 30 August 1999) was conducted by NATO on the territory of Albania, and the aim of the mission was to assist the Albanian population from Kosovo and Metohija. On that occasion, the forces deployed were called AFOR (Albania Force). Operation Joint Guardian (from June 12, 1999) implies NATO's entry into the territory of Kosovo and the deployment of KFOR (Kosovo Force). KFOR forces are deployed to Kosmet to implement the peace agreement, which includes a military-technical agreement signed in Kumanovo. KFOR's tasks were the demilitarization of the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army, consolidating military presence, preventing conflicts, establishing a safe environment for the return of internally displaced persons and refugees,

NATO carried out another operation in 2003.[116] In addition to the aforementioned operations in the former Yugoslavia, NATO has carried out a number of other operations around the world. We will mention the most important. NATO is participating in the fight against the Somali pirates, the operations Allied Protector and Ocean Shield. It is also a participant in the Libya intervention in 2011 - Operation Unified Protector.

5. CONCLUSION

Contemporary security challenges, risks, and threats are dangerous to the stability of states, but they are also dangerous for the regional stability. The achievement of regional stability and the resolution of frozen conflicts require stronger coordination and cooperation between different security actors, both at sub-national and national level, as well as at supranational level. Collective security systems play a major role in the realization of security at supra-national level. One such system is NATO, whose role in the modern world cannot be ignored. As a collective security system, NATO offers security and protection to its members and cooperation in the field of security to its partners. For countries that are not sufficiently military-politically strong, and if they are in the sphere of the interest of NATO, NATO is a "solution" for their security problems.

On the other hand, NATO often manages its own security interests (security interests of strong members), thereby violating the rules established by the United Nations. In this case, political arguments relate to the primacy of legal arguments, and politically and militarily weaker members of this organization most often reconcile themselves with this situation. Access to any collective security organization, whether it is NATO, the CSTO or a third organization, is a double-edged sword. As in the folk tale *The Dark Realm*: "If you take it, you will be sorry! If you do not take it, you will be sorry!"

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securing initial conditions for the functioning of civilian administration, border control towards Albania and Macedonia.

[115] Operation Essential Harvest (August 27 - September 27, 2001) was conducted in Macedonia. In 2001, Macedonia was on the verge of a civil war, but with international mediation an agreement was reached between Macedonian authorities and representatives of the Albanian National Liberation Army (ONA). Members of ONA surrendered their weapons to NATO troops, and then it is destroyed at locations in Greece. Operation Amber Fox (September 27, 2001 - December 16, 2002) followed the operation Essential Harvest. NATO actively supported EU and OSCE observers who oversaw the implementation of the Ohrid Accord, especially the part related to the re-entry of Macedonian police into areas inhabited by Albanians.

[116] Operation Allied Harmony (December 16, 2002 - March 31, 2003) is a continuation of Operation Amber Fox. NATO continued to provide support to international observers and Macedonian authorities in order to improve security throughout the country. Following this operation, since March 31, 2003, the European Union operation was called Concordia.

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STATUS AND CHALLENGES OF DEFENSE REFORMS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA FOR NATO INTEGRATION

Andrej Iliev, Dr.Sc
General Mihailo Apostolski Military Academy, Skopje
e-mail: andrej220578@gmail.com
Zlatko Stojovski, Msc
Command for training and Command in GS of ARM
e-mail: zlatko_stojovski@yahoo.com
Drage Petreski, Dr.Sc
General Mihailo Apostolski Military Academy, Skopje
e-mail: drage_petreski@yahoo.com

Abstract

After the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008, the focus of NATO discussions related to further enlargement has been directed towards considering the opportunities for admission of the interested countries from the region of Southeastern Europe. Most of them were countries with an Action Plan for membership in NATO for Southeastern Europe. Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of those countries.

At the same time the Bosnia and Herzegovina's integration path to NATO has been set through more dependent scientific variables and indicators which are fundamental foundations for meeting the basic conditions for NATO integration, such as: political, economic and judicial reforms, defense reforms, Interior Ministry, etc. The comprehensive analysis of the defense reforms focused on expenditures of the state's annual budget in relation to the number of armed forces and the needs for progressive increase in the defense budget. In addition, the strategic position of Bosnia and Herzegovina was analyzed and assessed in relation to the following variables: projection of the overall defense forces, internal borders, new types of risks and threats to the national security, deterrence ability, and influence on the cohesion of NATO. As a conclusion, an overall numerical assessment of the strategic position was made.

Comparison of the defense spending was made with other NATO member states from Southeast Europe, such as the Republic of Slovenia, Croatia and Montenegro.
An analysis of the transformation of the number and effectiveness of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina has been made with the countries of Southeast Europe which are NATO members and have approximately the same population, such as the Republic of Croatia and Albania.

Research analysis has also been done on Freedom House estimates in order to make an overall analysis and assessment of the fulfillment of the basic criteria for membership of Bosnia and Herzegovina in NATO: political, economic, military and final observations based on numerical parameters for Bosnia and Herzegovina's concluding assessments of the meeting criteria for NATO membership by 2020.

Keywords: *criteria, challenges, defense reforms, NATO integration, Bosnia and Herzegovina*

1. INTRODUCTION

After the end of the armed conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, this country has been facing a number of unresolved issues, starting with the unfinished transition process, tension in the part of interethnic relations, many unsolved disputes, infrastructure issues, organized crime, etc. The need to secure lasting peace and stability was the strongest motive for the political entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the efforts to join NATO. In this context, *"the concept of collective security is the cornerstone of Bosnia and Herzegovina's long-term defense strategy"*, based on political and defense determination of Bosnia and Herzegovina and a process of deep structural changes and reforms in the socio-political system, including defense reconstruction. In this direction, a change was made in the overall political dialogue in Bosnia and Herzegovina followed by political decisions with clearly stated commitments for the country's accession to NATO.

The accession of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Partnership for Peace program on 14th December 2006 was an event of particular importance and confirmation of the efforts of this country on the path to NATO. "Although the membership in this program does not imply guarantee of the collective security of the member states, as in the case with NATO membership, it is yet the first step in that direction"[117].

Bosnia and Herzegovina began active cooperation with NATO, primarily in the area of democratic, institutional, and defense reforms, as well as practical cooperation on issues of common interest. In accordance with the national legislation of this country, an agreement with the partner countries and NATO on the status of forces was signed. In the period from 2007 onwards, the status of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the framework of the Defense Planning and Review Process was constantly transformed. Moreover, the assistance provided by the NATO team in this process was of particular importance for progress in the process of Bosnia and Herzegovina's membership in NATO. "During April 2007, Bosnia and Herzegovina started cooperation with NATO in the Individual Partnership Program. As a result, Bosnia and Herzegovina in cooperation with NATO could carry out an independent selection of activities from the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Work Plan which NATO or the Member States offer for training on a two-year basis"[118].

Of a particular importance for the Bosnia and Herzegovinian progress in achieving cooperation with the countries in the region and the United States is its accession to the US-Adriatic Charter in December 2008. Bosnia and Herzegovina also greatly contributes to international peace and security through the participation of its military members and units in international operations led by NATO or UN. As a result of the progress made by Bosnia and Herzegovina in the democratization of the defense system, as well as the cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia at the NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008, NATO's cooperation with this country was intensified on the level of dialogue. During April 2010, the framework of NATO agreement was reached with joining Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Membership Action

[117] Defence White Paper of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2005). Ministry of Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 16.

[118] Turcalo, S., Kapidzić, D. (2014). NATO Integration of Bosnia and Herzegovina: The pursuit of local ownership in externally led-state building. Croatian International Relations Review. Institute for Development and International Relations. p. 79. Accessed on 7 December 2017. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/268514744_NATO_Integration_of_Bosnia_and_Herzegovina_The_pursuit_o_F_local_ownership_in_externally-led_state_building

Plan[119]. In this direction, NATO emphasized that Bosnia and Herzegovina's annual national plan will not be accepted under this program until all of the country's military property is registered as state property in the possession of the central government of this country. Over the past period, Bosnia and Herzegovina has made significant progress in the achievement of the technical and military aspects of NATO integration. Nevertheless, there is a lack of cooperation between the political entities regarding the fulfillment of the political criteria for membership in NATO. Bosnia and Herzegovina's progress on the road to NATO has been "status quo" for a long time because of irresponsibility and lack of serious access to certain political subjects of this country.

2. DEFENSE REFORMS AND FULFILLMENT OF MILITARY CRITERIA

The Ministry of Defense with the Joint Headquarters of the Armed Forces as its expert body performs the tasks as single defense system under the supreme command of the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina[120]. In order to strengthen the integrity of the defense institutions, among other things, measures have been taken to create an "effective system for equipping, supplying, and maintaining the assets and the infrastructure of the armed forces, intensifying the training and empowering the forces to perform tasks, education and training system and provision of an effective system for the full armed forces with personnel[121].

As part of the efforts in completion of the process of implementation of the defense reform decisions, measures were taken to resolve the surplus weapons, ammunition, mine-explosive devices and equipment, unexpected property and resolving ownership of the real estate. As a turning point which led to the creation of the current structure of the Armed Forces of this country, the achievement of an agreement between political entities during 2005 for the unification under a single command of their separate Armed forces and ministries was considered. "The Armed Forces constitute a single military force composed of representatives of the order of all three constituent ethnic groups and on the order of others in accordance with the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina"[122].

At the end of January 2006, the transfer of all responsibilities and personnel from the domain of defense and entities to the Ministry of Defense of this country was completed. In July 2006 the total number of Armed forces was limited to 16 000 of which 10 000 were active military personnel, 1 000 civilian, and 5 000 active reserves[123].

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[119] Woehrel, S. (2013). Bosnia and Herzegovina: Current Issues and U.S. Policy. CRS Report for Congress. p. 7. Accessed on 27 December 2017. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40479.pdf.

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[121] Medium-term plan of the work of the Ministry of Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the period 2016 - 2018. p. 3. Accessed on 16 March 2017. http://www.mod.gov.ba/foto2015/01.22.16.1Srednjorocni %20plan%20Edin%202012.pdf

[122] Law on Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina (2005). Art. 2, Para. 1, Armed forces. Official Gazette of Bosnia and Herzegovina No. 88/05. Accessed on 17 December 2017. http://www.mod.gov.ba/files/fil e/zakoni/Zakon-o-odbrani-bs.pdf

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Table 1. Peacetime Active Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Albania, 2001-2006

Year	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Croatia	Albania
2001	24000	68300	40500
2002	19800	61000	27000
2003	18800	30800	22000
2004	24000	30000	21500
2005	12000	31000	22500
2006	9000	21000	11500

From the data shown in (Table 1), peaceful situation of the Armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period from 2001 to 2006 was markedly reduced. In the stated period, an identical process of reducing the peaceful status of the Armed forces of Croatia and Albania was made. Defense spending by any NATO member state by the end of 2024 should be no less than 2 percent of their Gross domestic product (GDP)[124].

When it comes to Bosnia and Herzegovina's defense expenditures, (Table 2), as a percentage of Gross domestic product, they are only 50 percent of the mentioned reference value. Based on the data given in column 3 (Table 2) it can be concluded that defense expenditures as a percentage of the Gross domestic product of Bosnia and Herzegovina are higher than those of Slovenia which are 0.9 percent. These expenditures in Bosnia and Herzegovina amount to 71 percent in relation to those of Croatia and 67 percent in relation to Montenegro.

Also, the defense expenditures for a soldier in Bosnia and Herzegovina amounting to 15619 dollars (column 5 from Table 2) are significantly lower than the defense spending per soldier in Montenegro amounting to 34461 dollars and even lower than those in Croatia - 37466 dollars and Slovenia, worth 53,157 dollars.

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Table 2. Defense Expenditures of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia and Montenegro

State	Defense Expenditures[125]	Defense Expenditures as % of GDP[126]	Peacetime Active Force Size[127]	Defense Expenditures Per Troop[128]	Defense Expenditures Per Capita[129]
1	2	3	4	5	6
Bosnia and Herzegovina	$164 million	1,0	10500	$15619	$43
Croatia	$695 million	1,4	18550	$37466	$162
Slovenia	$404 million	0,9	7600[130]	$53157	$205
Montenegro	$67,2 million	1,5	1950[131]	$34461	$105

According to this, it is necessary to take into account that aspirant countries with low values of defense expenditures per soldier have armed forces with low degree of sophistication which is a disadvantage in terms of meeting the criteria for admission to NATO. Furthermore, the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina fall in category of less fashionable because their defense expenditure per soldier are lower than a NATO member state, with the lowest value similar to Albania whose defense expenditure per soldier amounts to 17294 dollars. Armed forces of Albania are 8500 persons[132] and defense spending is $ 147 million[133]. Nevertheless, Albania as a NATO member is far away behind in the field of economic and defense development from all other member states[134]. For example: Croatia which gained NATO membership status at the same time as Albania, has a twice bigger value of defense spending per soldier. Moreover, Bosnia and Herzegovina's Armed Forces belong to the category of small powers because their numerical status is less

[125] Calculated by SIPRI. Military expenditure by country, in constant (2015) US$m, 1949 - 2016. Accessed on 08 January 2018. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRI-Milex-data-1949-2016.xlsx

[126] The World Bank. Military expenditure (% of GDP). Accessed on 08 January 2018. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS

[127] The World Bank. Armed Forces Personnel, Total. Accessed on 08 January 2018. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.P1

[128] Calculated as a quotient of the expenses of defense (column 2) and the number of peacetime armed forces (column 4).

[129] Calculated as a quotient of the expenses of defense (column 2) and the total number of population.

[130] Sodobni vojaski izzivi (2015). Ministrstvo za obrambo, Znanstveno-strokovna publikacija Slovenske vojske, ISSN 2232-2825, December 2015 - 2017, p. 35. Accessed on 17 December 2017. http://www.slovenskavojska.si/fileadmin/slovenska_vojska/pdf/vojaski_izzivi/2015/svi_17_4.pdf

[131] Report on the state in the army of Montenegro for 2015. Ministry of Defense of Montenegro. p. 6. Accessed on 8 December 2017. file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/5_152_31_03_2016.pdf

[132] The World Bank. Armed Forces Personnel, Total. Accessed on 08 January 2018. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.P1

[133] Calculated by SIPRI. Military expenditure by country, in constant (2015) US$m, 1949 - 2016. Accessed on 08 January 2018. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/SIPRI-Milex-data-1949-2016.xlsx

[134] Madej, M., Gorka-Winter, B. (2010). NATO Member States and the New Strategic Concept: An Overview. The Polish Institute for International Affairs, Warsaw, 9.

than 50 per cent of the reference value of 25,000 soldiers[135]. By comparison, Armed forces of Croatia and Slovenia fall into the category of small and modern armies. Based on the data given in Table 3, it can be concluded that Bosnia and Herzegovina has 30 soldiers per kilometer border line towards countries without an Action Plan for membership, not NATO or EU members, as a rough gauge for determining the ability for distraction from aggression directed to its territory.

Table 3. Troops and Border Length Ratios of Bosnia and Herzegovina[136]

State	Peacetime Active Force Size[137]	Total Land Border Lenght + Coastline (km)	Total Border Lenght with Current Non-NATO or Non-EU States (km)	Troops per km of Current Non-NATO or Non-EU Border	Total Border Lenght with Current Non-MAP, Non-NATO or Non-EU States (km)	Troops per km of Current Non-MAP, Non-NATO or Non-EU Border
Bosnia and Herzegovina	10500	1543+20	345	30	345	30
Montenegro	1950	683+293,5	475	4	233	8
Latvia	5310	1370+498	493	11	493	11

By comparison, Bosnia and Herzegovina has a greater capacity in comparison to Montenegro and Latvia, which represent the countries with the lowest value within NATO, for an initial defense of its borders in eventual aggression.

3. FULFILLMENT OF POLITICAL CRITERIA

Based on the annual reports of the European Commission for the progress of Bosnia and Herzegovina, one can conclude that there is an insufficient commitment and absence of political will for achievement of serious progress in meeting the political criteria for admission to NATO. According to the data released by Freedom House, Bosnia and Herzegovina is estimated as a partially free country. In each column of Table 4, the first number represents the index of political rights, while the second issue is the index of civil liberties in the period 2012-2017. Both indexes are based on a scale of 1 to 7, where index 1 represents the highest and 7 the lowest level of development of political rights and civil liberties in the country.

[135] Szayna, S. T. (2001). NATO Enlargement 2000 - 2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping. Rand, Santa Monica. p. 89. Accessed on 16 August 2016 https://www.questia.com/library/103985408/nato-enlargement-2000-2015-determinants-and implications

[136] Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook (Page last updated on January 3, 2018). Accessed on 12 January 2018. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html

[137] The World Bank. Armed Forces Personnel, Total. Accessed on 08 January 2018. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.TOTL.P1

Table 4. Freedom House Rating of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2012-2017

State	2012[138]	2013[139]	2014[140]	2015[141]	2016[142]	2017[143]
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3, 3, DS / PF	3, 3, DS / PF	4, 3, DS / PF	4, 3, DS / PF	4, 4, DS / PF	4, 4, DS / PF

The third component in each column of the table is the assessment status of political rights and civil liberties expressed by "S" (free countries), "DS" (partially free) and "NC" (not free countries). Countries with an average value of the first two components between 1 and 2.5 are considered free, between 3 and 5.5 partially free, while between 5.5 and 7 for non-free countries.[144]

According to Freedom House on the data given in Table 5, it can be concluded that there are no changes in the status of press freedom in Bosnia and Herzegovina compared to the previous year, where it was estimated as a partially free country.

Table 5.Freedom of Media and Press 2016-2017 Status of Bosnia and Herzegovina

State	2016[145]	2017[146]
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Partly Free	Partly Free

For comparison, Croatia is also estimated as a partially free country, while Slovenia for the same period was valued as a free country. Nevertheless, the fact remains that further significant efforts are needed by Bosnia and Herzegovina to fully meet the political criteria, as well as a serious approach and unreserved support on the path towards NATO by all its political subjects.

[138] Freedom in the world 2013: Democratic Breakthroughs in the Balance. Freedom House. p. 14. Accessed on 6 November 2017. https://www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%20 2013%20Booklet.pdf
[139] Freedom in the world 2014. Freedom House. p. 18. Accessed on 6 November 2017. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW2014%20Booklet.pdf
[140] Freedom in the world 2015: Discarding Democracy, Return to the Iron Fist. Freedom House. p. 21. Accessed on 6 November 2017. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/01152015_FIW_ 2015_final.pdf
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[143] Freedom in the world 2018: Democracy in Crisis. Freedom House. Accessed on 19 January 2018. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/bosnia-and-herzegovina
[144] Szayna, S. T. (2001). NATO Enlargement 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping. Rand, Santa Monica. p. 63. Accessed on 16 August 2016 https://www.questia.com/library/103985408/nato-enlargement-2000-2015-determinants-and implications
[145] Freedom in the world 2017: Populists and Autocrats: The Dual Threat to Global Democracy. Freedom House. p. 20. Accessed on 6 November 2017. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/ default/files/FH_FIW_2017_Report_Final.pdf
[146] Freedom in the world 2018: Democracy in Crisis. Freedom House. Accessed on 19 January 2018. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/bosnia-and-herzegovina

4. ECONOMIC PROGRESS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

Bosnia and Herzegovina is in early stage in development of a functioning market economy and in early stage of achieving capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union[147]. A certain degree of progress has been made in the area of business climate, labor legislation, and identification of the existing weaknesses in the finance sector with the agreed reform agenda.

The public sector is estimated to be insufficiently effective, while progress within the private sector is moving in improperly slow pace. Based on the data in Table 6, the real growth rate of Bosnia and Herzegovina's GDP in the course of 2016 was 2 percent. For comparison, the real growth rate of Montenegro's gross domestic product for the same period was 2.5%, Croatia 3%, while Slovenia was 3.1%.

Table 6. General Characteristics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia and Montenegro[148]

State	Total Population	Gross Domestic Product (Purchasing Power Parity)	Gross Domestic Product – Real Growth Rate	Gross Domestic Product Per Capita
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3 856 181	$42,04 billion	2%	$10900
Croatia	4 292 095	$95,65 billion	3%	$22900
Slovenia	1 972 126	$66,5 billion	3,1%	$32200
Montenegro	642 550	$10,37 billion	2,5%	$16600

Bosnia and Herzegovina has made efforts to recover from the aftermath of the global crisis over the past period. Yet, this country is far behind the other countries in the region. The value of the Gross domestic product per capita in Bosnia and Herzegovina is 10900 dollars. According to the data given in Table 6, this value for Bosnia and Herzegovina is significantly lower than Montenegro, which is 16600 dollars and even lower than Croatia which is 22900 dollars and Slovenia - 32200 dollars per capita. In addition, integration of a particular aspirant country in the Euro-Atlantic structures is so much easier than the higher its GDP per capita value[149]. Also, the insufficient efficiency of the measures and efforts undertaken by Bosnia and Herzegovina to restructure the public sector in accordance with the actual needs for functional improvements of the internal plan and solving the existing problem with the excess staff were noted.

Existing investments in the private sector are insufficient, while in the part of foreign direct investments there is a significant decrease. An additional problem is the

[147] Bosnia and Herzegovina 2016 Report. Commission Staff Working Document, Brussels, 9.11.2016 SWD (2016) 365. p. 30 - 36. Accessed on 13 March 2017. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/pdf/key_documents/2016/20161109_report_bosnia_and_herzegovina.pdf

[148] Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook (Page last updated on January 3, 2018). Accessed on 12 January 2018. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bk.html

[149] Szayna, S. T. (2001). NATO Enlargement 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping. Rand, Santa Monica. p.51. Accessed on 16 August 2016 https://www.questia.com/library/103985408/nato-enlargement-2000-2015-determinants-and implications

phenomenon of leaving Bosnia and Herzegovina from educated young people, which has resulted in further deterioration of the country's economy.

5. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AS A FUTURE NATO MEMBER

The assessment of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a future NATO member is done by reviewing its progress in meeting the basic prerequisites for admission to NATO, as well as analyzing the strategic goal of NATO enlargement with this country.

5.1. Fulfillment of the basic preconditions for NATO admission

The aspirant countries on their way to join NATO have to meet three main categories of basic criteria: political, economic and military[150]. In this context, Table 7 provides an overall assessment of Bosnia and Herzegovina in meeting the basic prerequisites for NATO membership. Progress in meeting the political criteria, from possible four levels of valuation is valued at a low level ("countries with the sum of the first two components in the Freedom House estimates from 2 and 3 are valued at a high of 4 and 5 with intermediate- high, 6 and 7 with medium-low and with 8 and more are evaluated with a low degree[151], since the sum of the first two estimated components for 2017 in Table 4 is 8.

Table 7. Overall assessment of Bosnia and Herzegovina in meeting of the basic criteria

State	Political	Economic	Military	Total	Overall Assessment
1	2	3	4	5	6
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Low (1)	Low (1)	Medium-high (3)	5	2.2 (Low)

Each of the above-stated degrees in columns 2 to 4 is valued with a numerical value: 1 for low, 2 for intermediate-low, 3 for medium-high and 4 for high degree. Based on the time frame needed to establish a functioning market economy and gaining capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union, Bosnia and Herzegovina's economic progress is also valued at a low level.

The country's progress in meeting the military criteria is evaluated with a medium-high degree because the amount of its defense expenditure per soldier ranges up to 25 percent in a negative or positive direction compared to the European country with the lowest expenditures in NATO (Table 2)[152]. In addition, the sum in column 5 of this table is 5. By simply converting the given collective value represented on a measuring scale with 9 triangles (3-12) in the proportional value in column 6 using a measuring scale with finishes of 0-10 is coming to an overall assessment of the country's meeting of NATO's basic

[150] North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO Enlargement&Open Door. p.1. Accessed on 23 December 2017. https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_11/201711 30_1711-factsheet-enlargement-eng.pdf

[151] Szayna, S. T. (2001). NATO Enlargement 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping. Rand, Santa Monica. p. 68. Accessed on 16 August 2016 https://www.questia.com/library/103985408/nato-enlargement-2000-2015-determinants-and implications

[152] Szayna, S. T. (2001). NATO Enlargement 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping. Rand, Santa Monica. p. 69-70. Accessed on 16 August 2016 https://www.questia.com/library/103985408/nato-enlargement-2000-2015-determinants-and implications

criteria. From this aspect, Bosnia and Herzegovina is generally estimated at a low level (low for values from 0 to 3, average for values from 3.1 to 6.9 and high for values from 7 to 10) because the value obtained in column 6 of Table 7 is 2.2.

5.2. Strategic expediency for admission to NATO

By recognizing the strategic position and researching the armed forces, the strategic importance of Bosnia and Herzegovina's accession to NATO comes to light. Table 8 gives an assessment of the strategic position of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Table 8. Assessment of the Strategic Position of Bosnia and Herzegovina

State	Power Projection	Interior Borders	New Risks	Impact on NATO Cohesion	Overall
1	2	3	4	5	6
Bosnia and Herzegovina	High (1)	High (1)	Medium (LH) (0.5)	Low (0)	2.5 (Medium)

In the part of the *"projection force"* criterion (column 2), Bosnia and Herzegovina is highly valued (1) because its accession to NATO makes a contribution to increasing NATO's efficiency in carrying out operations in the Balkans and wider.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is also highly valued (1) in the category of *"internal borders"* (column 3), because according to the values in Table 3, with its admission to NATO, the length and exposure of its borders to countries without Action membership plan are not NATO or EU members. In the category of *"new risks"* (column 4) the existence of bilateral disputes between Bosnia and Herzegovina and any neighboring country, as the first sub-criterion is valued at a low level (0). For example, it is interesting to point out that Bosnia and Herzegovina is opposed to Croatia's plan to build a bridge from Klek to Peljesac, because they believe that this would impede the country's exit at sea as well as a gross violation of the rights they belong to in accordance with the international maritime law.

On the other hand, Bosnia and Herzegovina is highly valued (1) because its admission to NATO does not have a negative impact on the security environment in Europe, as the second subcategory of the mentioned category.

In the *"new risks"* category, Bosnia and Herzegovina is valued at a median level (0.5) as the average value of the individual assessments of the mentioned sub criteria.

In the category of *"influence on NATO's cohesion*" (column 5), Bosnia and Herzegovina is valued at a low level (0), primarily because it has not yet received a candidate status for EU membership. Column 6 of Table 8 gives the sum of the values from columns 2 to 5 and represents the overall assessment of the strategic position of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The strategic position of Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose sum is 2.5, is assessed with a medium degree ("low for values from 0 to 1.5, medium for values from 1.6 to 3.5 and high for values of 3, 6 to 4[153]). Furthermore, Table 9 provides an assessment of the Armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to the criterion of

[153] Szayna, S. T. (2001). NATO Enlargement 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping. Rand, Santa Monica. p. 96. Accessed on 16 August 2016 https://www.questia.com/library/103985408/nato-enlargement-2000-2015-determinants-and implications

"*projection of force"* (column 2), armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina are valued at an intermediate-low level (2), because they belong to the group of small and less modern armed forces, while in the *"deterrence ability"* criteria, the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina are valued at a high level (4), since it has a larger number of troops per kilometer border line towards countries without an Action Plan for membership, not NATO or member states of the European Union. For example, Montenegro and Latvia are countries with the lowest value in NATO (Table 3).

Table 9. Assessment of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina

State	Power Projection	Deterrence	Overall
1	2	3	4
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Medium-Low (2)	High (4)	Medium (6)

Column 4 of this table represents the sum of the values from columns 2 and 3, with possible values of the aggregate score of 0 to 8 and represents the overall assessment of the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition, the armed forces of this country are assessed in an aggregate grade, because the sum of the values from columns 2 and 3 is 6 (low for values from 2 to 3, average for values from 4 to 6, and high for values from 7 to 8[154]).

By reviewing the obtained results from the assessment of the strategic position and the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina we can make an insight of the strategic importance of Bosnia and Herzegovina's accession to NATO (Table 10).

Table 10. Assessment of Strategic Rationale of Bosnia and Herzegovina

State	Strategic Position	Armed Forces	Overall Assessment
1	2	3	4
Bosnia and Herzegovina	6.2	6.6	6.4 (Medium)

In addition, the numerical value for the category *"strategic position*" in column 2 of Table 10 is 6.2 and it is obtained by simply converting the value into column 6 of Table 8 represented on a measuring scale from 0 to 4 in the proportional value in column 2 from Table 10 using a measuring scale with fins of 0-10. However, the numerical value for the category of *"armed forces*" represented in column 3 of Table 10 is 6.6 and it is obtained in a similar manner with the exception that it converts the given cumulative value in column 4 of Table 9 represented on scale with values from 2 to 8.

Column 4 of Table 10 presents the average value of the sum of the multiple values of columns 2 and 3, with possible values of the aggregate score 0 to 10 and represents the overall assessment of the strategic validity of Bosnia and Herzegovina's accession to NATO. In addition, the strategic importance of Bosnia and Herzegovina's accession to NATO is generally assessed with a medium degree since the average value of

[154] Szayna, S. T. (2001). NATO Enlargement 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping. Rand, Santa Monica. p. 98. Accessed on 16 August 2016 https://www.questia.com/library/103985408/nato-enlargement-2000-2015-determinants-and implications

the numerical values of columns 2 and 3 is 6.4 (low for values from 0 to 3, average for values of 3.1 up to 6.9 and a high degree of values from 7 to 10[155]).

5.3. Final assessment for admission to NATO

Finally, by combining the obtained results that refer to the meeting of the basic criteria and strategic expediency, the final assessment for Bosnia and Herzegovina is coming to an end.

Table 11. Final Assessment of Bosnia and Herzegovina

State	Criteria	Strategic Attractiveness	Overall
1	2	3	4
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2.2 (Low)	6.4 (Medium)	4.3 (Medium)

In column 2 of Table 11 are represented the numerical values from column 6, Table 7, and column 3 presents the numerical value from column 4, Table 10. In column 4 of this table, the average value of the sum of the numerical values from columns 2 and 3, which is 4.3. Accordingly, Bosnia and Herzegovina is finally assessed with a medium degree (low for values from 0 to 2, medium-low for values from 2.1 to 4, average for values from 4.1 to 6, medium-high for values from 6.1 to 8 and high degree of values from 8.1 to 10) on the readiness and strategic desirability of admission to NATO.

6. CONCLUSION

NATO membership is an issue of vital interest for Bosnia and Herzegovina, not only in terms of preserving the existing borders under NATO's umbrella, but also for contributing to the international peace and security. Among other things, NATO membership implies acceleration of the economic progress of Bosnia and Herzegovina with creating favorable working conditions and increasing foreign direct investments. Such development would have a positive impact on Bosnia and Herzegovina's trade relations with other NATO member states. However, the eventual membership of Bosnia and Herzegovina in NATO, among other things, would result in the strengthening of the legitimacy of other countries and its rapid accession to the EU. Nevertheless, it can be concluded that in the period from 2010 onwards Bosnia and Herzegovina has not made a significant progress on its path to NATO.

The reason for this unfavorable situation is the lack of political will and unwillingness of some of the political entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina to register the entire military real estate of the country as a state property in the possession of the central government. Moreover, this "requirement" set by NATO in relation to the activation of Bosnia and Herzegovina's Membership Action Plan should in no way be misunderstood and interpreted. Finding a solution to this issue is an essential step for development of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a unified state.

It is also an opportunity for the Bosnia and Herzegovinian political leaders to demonstrate their determination for full implementation of the reforms as a prerequisite for

[155] Szayna, S. T. (2001). NATO Enlargement 2000-2015: Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping. Rand, Santa Monica. p. 99. Accessed on 16 August 2016 https://www.questia.com/library/103985408/nato-enlargement-2000-2015-determinants-and-implications

NATO membership. Considering the complexity of social and political relations and the marked division of ethnic backgrounds, we can conclude that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country that has no other alternative than its integration into the Euro-Atlantic structures, such as NATO. In this context, Bosnia and Herzegovina in the period up to 2020 will have to undertake measures and activities for meeting the criteria for admission to NATO as follows:

(1) Overcoming the essential differences between political entities and intensifying efforts to continue the ongoing process of comprehensive reforms in the country, with a focus on appropriate resolution of the basic and most important priorities in meeting the criteria for admission to NATO;

(2) Taking concrete steps by the political entities in the country for practical implementation of the undertaken obligations regarding the registration of the entire perspective real military property from the entities under the jurisdiction of the state, as a basic precondition for the activation of the Membership Action Plan;

(3) Promote overall relations with the neighboring countries through economic, cultural, and political cooperation within key areas, as well as peaceful settlement of all bilateral disagreements;

(4) Increasing public support for Bosnia and Herzegovina's membership in NATO, especially among citizens in Republika Srpska, through intensive holding of public discussions and informing citizens, including direct face-to-face communication, on the benefits of joining the country in NATO;

(5) Consistent implementation of defense sector reforms and achieving full compatibility of Bosnia and Herzegovina's Armed forces with the NATO member states;

(6) Continuation of the active participation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in NATO-led international peacekeeping missions and cooperation with member states and partner countries on issues of common interest;

(7) Promoting democratic processes and achieving high standards in respecting citizens' political rights and freedoms, including the rights of minorities;

(8) Increasing efforts and achieving progress in the area of establishing a functioning market economy and gaining capacity to cope with the pressure of competition and market forces with the European Union.

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GPS NAVIGATION, A SEGMENT OF THE NEW DIMENSION OF WARFARE

Toni Mileski, Dr.Sc
Faculty of Philosophy – Security, defense and peace studies
e-mail: toni@fzf.ukim.edu.mk
Nikolco Spasov, Dr.Sc
FON University, Republic of Macedonia
e-mail: nikolco.spasov@fon.edu.mk

SUMMARY

Nowadays it is almost impossible to travel without navigation systems. The Global Navigation Satellite System (Global Navigation Satellite System or abbreviated GNSS) is a satellite system that is designed and used to find the geographical location of the satellite receiver anywhere in the world.

Satellite navigation has been widely used in the military sphere and has shown inferiority during the GP in 1991, which has triggered the need and dependence of warfare on GPS technology. Although actual fighting did not occur in the upper atmosphere, the global positioning system (GPS) played a key role during the Persian Gulf War in 1991.

The modern term used in modern warfare is the increasing use of weapons like "shoot and forget". GPS-controlled projectiles that use the GPS navigation superb navigation, surveillance and observation capabilities can, after launch, transport a warhead to any part of the globe through the "interface", that is, the connection that lies in the internal projectile computer and the GPS satellite system.

Cruciform missiles have the ability to fly 15 to 100 km above mainland, which gives them excellent tactical ability not to be easily detected by enemy radars.

The paper will elaborate in detail the characteristics of the American "Tomahawk" missile, the Russian "Caliber" missile and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) with GPS support used for military purposes.

Keywords: GNSS, GPS, UAV, cruise missiles.

1. INTRODUCTUION

The modern technological era in which we live offers limitless possibilities for the use of modern technologies which can simplify the functioning of complex systems and offer adequate functional solutions in the most various spheres of social living. One of the benefits of modern technological era, the satellite navigation through the systems for satellite navigation and global positioning, is growing with certainty into a new international standard for navigation and positioning. This technology that marks its first use by the army, gives the ability to open up new horizons and possibilities in modern warfare.

The Global navigational satellite system is a satellite system that is designed and used to find the geographical location of the satellite receiver all around the world. Currently, there are two global navigational satellite systems which are fully operational: the Global Positioning System in the USA (GPS) and the Global Orbital Navigational Satellite System in the Russian Federation (GLONASS). The Global Positioning System (GPS) is

currently the most widespread and used. Hence, there are receivers for this system installed in every cell phone of the newer generation, in every newer automobile, in every plane etc., but there are a large number of independent GPS receivers as well. The distribution of this system, as well as the free-of-charge service that it offers, stimulate the development of a large number of navigation and observation systems with the goal of easing and simplifying life.

The third system is the European global navigation satellite system Galileo which should reach its full operating capacity by the end of the decade and should be compatible and operational with the first two systems for the purpose of accomplishing greater precision and coverage. China is also developing its own global navigational satellite system.

2. THE GENESIS OF THE GUIDED MISSILES

In the modern way of warfare, the need to be able to effectuate an attack on targets located on the opposite side of the globe is increasing. This need has led to the development of various types of guided missiles. These missiles are self-guided weapons designed to inflict maximum damage to the target, and reduce the collateral damage to a minimum. The modern term that is used in modern warfare for these weapons is "**shoot and forget".** The missiles that are guided by GPS navigation and use the phenomenal navigational, examining and observational capabilities of the GPS, can transport a warhead to any part of the world after their launch through the interface or the connection that is located in the internal computer of the missile and through the GPS satellite system. The GPS inert weapons do not depend on weather conditions, which allows the attacker to shoot freely at their target whenever they want. The GPS allows for precise aiming of various war weapons, including the intercontinental missiles (ICBMs). Crossing missiles send precisely-guided munition. The GPS signals can be affected by multi-way problems when the radio signals are reflected from the surrounding area, for example, buildings, canyons or a hard surface, etc. These delaying signals can cause imprecision**.** The cruise missiles have wings like a plane that allow them to fly at low heights. The harsh weather conditions do not affect the GPS-INS guided weapons, or the weapons controlled by a wire, nor do they leave the attacker exposed to attacks. GPS guided missiles with their technological advantages are a superior choice of weapon in the modern way of warfare as opposed to the warfare of the past.

3. CROSSING PROJECTILES

The name of these projectiles indicates the way that they move. Their ability is to cross above the land or in the water. They function in a similar way as the reactive drive. Their development started in 1930s and 1940s and the first time they were used was during World War II by Germany, with the projectile called "VI".[156] The crossing projectiles are subsonic and supersonic and that depends on their drive and design. They can be divided in two types: projectiles for attack-action on land (LACM) and anti-ship projectiles. The land projectiles are designed so that they could hit fixed and moving aims. Unlike the former primitive mechanisms with low precision, today's modern projectiles are managed through GPS and can destroy residential buildings going inside through a window or hit a vehicle in some garage with big precision. Today, almost every modern projectile costs almost one

[156] B. Hofmann - Wellenhof, H. Lichtenegger, and J. Collins., (2001), GPS Theory and Practice. Springer-Verlag Wien. NewYork. p.1-17, 76.

million per piece. But their precision and range make them a better choice than the attack or defense pilot war planes.

Only the USA and Russia have already developed long range land attack crossing projectiles with a range from 1000 to 3000 km that could be launched from land, ships, planes and submarines .This type of projectiles is mostly used by the USA and a few hundred "Tomahawks" projectiles were launched from ships, submarines and plans during the wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. This tactics is very expensive, but also yields the greatest success and effect because the aim is succeeded without risking and losing any war pilots. They use slowing performances and TV cameras on the "Tomahawks" projectiles for shooting the aims with high precision and optimal time. All of this has made "Tomahawk' to become the world's most famous projectile.[157]

Satellite navigation showed inferiority during the Gulf War in 1991, and this influenced the need for GPS technology. Although the real wars did not take place in the upper layer of the atmosphere, the global positioning system (GPS) had a major role in winning the army of Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 1991 during the war of mine bay.[158]

The crossing projectiles that are traveling a speed lower than the speed of sound are called subsonic. The advantage of these projectiles is their greater range. All crossing projectiles with a range of more than 800 km are called subsonic. These projectiles are smaller than the supersonic and are easier to launch. Crossing projectiles traveling the speed greater than the speed of sound are called supersonic. This type of projectiles is used by Russia because of their speed to avoid the enemy's air forces. Their advantage is that they can move with enormous speed and the enemy has short time to react after detecting the projectile, and many defensive systems are useless against these enormous speeds. The disadvantage is that the supersonic projectiles must have enormous size in order to have a range. Projectiles that are traveling the speed of more than 5 Max are called hypersonic. These projectiles are experimental and they are not used for now. It is considered that the USA, Russia, India and China possess hypersonic crossing projectiles and are in the developing phase for their active use.

The flying path (trajectory) of the crossing projectiles depends on the landing platform, control systems and the crossing counterattack projectiles usually fly low over the water surface, or in other words, just few meters above the water surface. This flying profile makes the projectile undetectable for the hostile radars up to 30 km from the ship simply because of the Earth's round surface. The low flying makes the detection longer than it should be on the hostile radar except if they possess a flying/plane radar. However, this kind of flying still has its own negative sides, especially with respect to the greater gasoline consumption. Land projectiles usually use a low-field flying profile. This means they fly very close to the field and stay covered from the radar detectors all because of the low sea level. Many of the projectiles use combined trajectories. After being launched, they fly on high sea levels for getting the optimal shot, and while approaching the target they go down for few meters and make the final access to the target. Many modern projectiles follow this kind of flying profile, and some of them fly supersonic in the last phase of the low flying above sea surface. Some of the projectiles fly exclusively on high sea surface and then going uphill to the target. This type of flying provides a very long shot because of the low air density on the higher sea surface and the very small resistance,

[157] Stubbs. R, Huang. W, Schbmitz. E. (1997), Integration of GPS into a ballistic missile navigation solution, https://arc.aiaa.org/doi/abs/10.2514/6.1997-3695

[158] Kopp. K,(2009) Cruise missile guidance techniques, Defence Today p.55-57.

reducing the gasoline consumption as well. The negative side of this type of flying is that it can be easily detected and destroyed.[159]

4. FEATURES OF THE CROSSING PROJECTILES

Crossing projectiles are rockets filled with a large amount of explosive in the warfare head. The projectile drives have an independent engine. They are used for destroying sea or land targets. Crossing projectiles are with inside big warfare heads in the body structure of the projectiles and have a big shot and high precision. The modern crossing projectiles can move with the speed of sound or even more, with its own navigation and can fly on a very low surface above the Earth. Their drives are predominantly two-way turbo-propulsion engines, sometimes even rocket engines. The difference between the crossing and the unmanned projectiles is that they have long lasting drive throughout the whole fly. From an aerodynamic aspect, the crossing projectiles have built-in wings on the body, while the strategy and tactic rockets which are earth-to earth do not have these aerodynamic specifics. Germany was the first to use the crossing projectiles with the project "V-I flying bomb', in the period of World War II, launching it in UK direction and West Europe in 1944. The 'V-I" precision back then was low and was practical only for large targets (cities) and their shooting range was up to 250 km. The progress in IT technology accelerated the modernization process of the crossing projectiles. The shooting of the crossing projectiles can be managed from submarine, ships, planes or land. They can fly from 15 to 100 km above land and therefore they have a very good tactic ability, which makes them hard to be detected on the radars. Today they are used in many local clashes and wars. Today, the largest use of crossing projectiles on one territory was made by NATO during the intervention above Yugoslavia, when NATO forces launched up to 1000 projectiles.

4.1 Tomahawk

The Tomahawk. This projectile was made for the first time in the American corporation “McDonnell Douglas" in the 70s. The first construction was long distance with low flight, which could be launched from land. Right after its first construction, the projectile was modernized several times. The American and British Navy possess the 'Tomahawk" projectiles. Given their high precision and minimal risk of loss, they are used to attack above targets that are assumed to be defended by nuclear weapons by the opposite site (strategy military basses etc.), or in other words, targets that require maximum precision. The American military forces used this kind of projectile for the first time during the Gulf War in 1991. After that, in 1995 the American forces undertook military actions on the Bosnian Serbs in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and NATO in 1999 in the intervention in Yugoslavia. The 'Tomahawk' projectiles were also used during the American invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2003. Also, these projectiles were used in 2011 in Libya and in 2017 in Syria in the fight against the ISIS.

[159] How Cruise Missiles Work (2014), https://defencyclopedia.com/2014/08/01/explained-how-cruise-missiles-work/

"Tomahawk"missiles used to date		
Operation	**Year**	**Quantity**
Gulf War	1991	288
Disarmament in Iraq	January 17, 1993	46
Disarmament in Iraq	June 26, 1993	23
Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Deliberate Force)	September 10, 1995	13
Disarmament in Iraq	September 3,1996	44
Operation in Afghanistan (Infinite Reach)	August 20, 1998	79
Operation in Iraq (Desert Fox)	December 16, 1998	325
Operation of Allied Forces of NATO in Kosovo	1999	218
Operation in Afghanistan (Enduring Freedom)	2001	50
Invasion of Iraq	2003	802
Operation in Somalia (Dobley airstrike)	March 3, 2008	2
Operation against al-Qaeda training camp in Yemen	December 17, 2009	2
Military intervention in Libya	March 19, 2011	124
Military intervention against ISIL	September 23, 2014	47
In response to anti-ship missiles fired by Huts in Yemen	October 13, 2016	5
Operation in Syria, attack on Shyarat	April 7, 2017	59

Tabular display of locations where Tomahawk missiles were used
Source: globalsecurity.org/forbes/statista

Tomahawk is a crossing projectile with an incredible precision. The well-known description of this projectile is ' It can fly 1000 miles and shoot a target with the size of a garage or a car". These projectiles are also very effective because they can fly very low above the earth, and can therefore avoid being found by most of the enemy's radar systems.

'Tomahawk' is a crossing projectile with very long/big shot and can circle around with hours before a task is given to aim a target. To date, around 2000 have been used in wars, and in 2011 around 90 pieces were used in Libya. One of these projectiles costs 1.6 million dollars.

Tomahawk specifications: weight 1600, length 6.25, the fighting head could be with conventional or nuclear filling. The engine it uses is Williams International F107-WR-402 turbofan. The wings length is 2.67 meters. The range depends on the types of the projectile, reaching up to 1700 km if it is Block 3 or Block 4, or up to 1300 km if it is from TLAM D generation. The speed is maximum 880km/h. The controlling systems it uses are: GPS,INS. TERCOM, DSMAC.

The crossing projectile 'Tomahawk' is classified with two marks: BGM (Boat Ground Missile) and AGM (Air Ground Missile). The first type of the projectile is used by the Navy and it is launched from a ship or land. The second type AGM is used by the aviation, and is shorter than the first type BGM. The next mark of this projectile is TLAM (Tomahawk Land Attack Missile). The last letter from the mark can be C or D. If it is C-the projectile is with conventional filling and if it is D the filling is nuclear. The last letter of the first Tomahawk projectile was A for conventional, and N for nuclear filling.

4.2 "Caliber" (Sizzler SS-N-27)

“Caliber" (Sizzler SS-N-27 is a NATO mark) is a Russian crossing projectile which is the equivalent of the American 'Tomahawk". This type of projectile was used by the Russian forces in the attacks on ISIS in Syria, when 26 were shot from the Russian ships in the Caspian Lake. "Sizzler" is a very precise crossing projectile and could hit a target that is 1,500 km away. It is designed to avoid the enemy's defense systems and inflicts an enormous damage on the target. It can fly with speed up to 3.580 km/h. The Russian crossing projectile is a modern version of the system that was first used in 2012. It can be fired from a ship or a submarine. The projectile can fly 50 to 150 meters above the surface with maximum deviation of no more than three meters. The projectile is constructed to act in five different ways: two against ships, two against submarines and one type of projectile for land purposes.

4.3 Using drones for military purposes

The unmanned aerial vehicles (DRONE) in most cases are connected with the military and the army, but they can also be used for searching, rescue, testing, traffic control, time control and fire extinguishing, as well as some other things.[160]

The first use of these aircraft was during Austrian attack on Venice through the use of unmanned balloons loaded with explosives. It was the earliest recorded use of unmanned aerial vehicles. Although some of the balloons operated and managed to bomb Venice, the rest of were redirected by the wind and returned back crossing the Austrian

[160] Combat Drones Public international law and military uses (2014), https://us.boell.org/sites/default/files/downloads/Richter_Combat_Drones.pdf

borders.[161] Later during the First World War and shortly afterwards, using AM radio control techniques, Lowe, the air strike drone "Ruston-Proctor" was built in 1916 by the Royal Flying Corps. The concept was to build a small, very simple spacecraft, arm it with explosives and lead it to the intended purpose. Shortly thereafter, on September 12, the Hewitt-Sary automatic airplane made its first flight. The air drones have a wide range of sizes, from helicopter-shaped, hummingbird-like, to huge solar-powered fixed-wing aircraft. Of these, the most significant are the two most recent ones, which are at both ends of the spectrum of size. One of them is the Black Hornet drill size 4 in 1 inch (1 inch = 25.4mm) and the weight of a half ounce (15.5 grams), which is equipped with a camera and which was used in Afghanistan by the British Army.

The other is the unmanned "F-16 Fighting Falcon", which was first used in September 2013 by Boeing, suggesting that the use of a fighter pilot in the cockpit any time soon could become an alternative. Drones have different uses, depending on their type. For example, the armies use the "MQ-1B Predator" for medium-sized and long-lasting missions because of its dual abilities that involve spying and distribution of ammunition. On the "MQ-9 Reaper" model, the main role is hunting combat, while spying is a secondary purpose.These drones operate reliably in the operation and depend on the global positioning system (GPS), far-reaching data links and are equipped with lightweight materials and visual sensors for navigation, stabilization and focusing on the target - these are all the features that remote pilot pilots can exploit and use during the attacks. More recently, the new generation of drones has emerged with performance and the ability to land at sea on aircraft planes. They are also designed to carry out self-contained air refueling.

The drone model "X-47B" is capable of calculating the flywheel at a speed of 20 times per second using GPS data to predict the movement of the carrier and in order to be able to successfully land (a characteristic of 40 times faster than the best human pilot). The X-47V's computer system does this without real time human control. Air support in combat actions with devices that have GPS systems are not the only ones on the fronts. One of them is "Pack Bot", a platform that has 8 separate payload areas and plugs that allow operators to join extended hands, mini-detectors, power sources, cameras and armed systems. The US military used "Pack Bot" in Iraq and Afghanistan. The modular-digital architecture provides a wide range of useful payloads and allows Pack Bot to be used in various military operations.[162]

The use of drones is not limited only to application in over ground environments, but there are also drones that are used above the surface of the water and float on the surface of the water. Water drones that float on the surface of the water fall into the class of unmanned vehicles on the water surface (USVs) or autonomous i.e. Solar Drone-ASVs, which are used to collect data and information from the underwater world. From the recent generation of devices used with remote-controlled underwater vehicles (ROVs) or Unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), they are designed and trained for underwater operations.

The US Navy has an underwater drone that has the potential to navigate along a path that resembles rounded curved lines and the ability and capacity to sail up to 5 years, which is known as the glider. These winged and non-propeller drones look like miniature

[161] Armed drones (2013), What technical revolution? What political and ethical implications? Alain De Neve, http://www.irsd.be/website/images/livres/enotes/en/eNote11EN.pdf
[162] Ibid,

"Tomahawk " missiles. The US Navy has also demonstrated a fully electric drone that receives power through fuel cells and is called an experimental low-power aerial fuel system (XFC UAS), which can be launched through a submarine torpedo tube and is designed to fit into an empty launcher "Tomahawk" canister. Whether in the air, on the ground or under the sea, drones are now at the forefront of the American way of warfare.[163] This new way of warfare gives a greater primacy to skill and precision than to the massive military and operations used to destroy certain goals. This new mode of warfare is in direct correlation with the development of technology, and today, drone components include precisely quoting weapons-weapons, computers, and information networks.[164]

One of the most powerful drones is the US "M-Q-9 Predator B", which is an unmanned spacecraft capable of operating in remote controlled or autonomous air operations. "MQ-9" is the first killer hunter, designed for long-term surveillance at high altitude. This drone, in addition to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance roles, has the primary purpose of using it in the killing operations of the enemy forces.

M-Q-9" is a bigger, heavier and more capable drone than the previous generation of atomic generation - "M-Q-1". It can be controlled by the same ground systems used to control the "MQ-1" generation. The M-Q-9 has a 115 PS (86 kW) engine. The high power allows the "M-Q-9" to carry 15 times more load and cruise with about three times the speed of the "M-Q-1". These drones can remain in the air for hours, allowing intelligence information without risking the life of the pilot.Drones "M-Q-9 Predator B" are not only used for intelligence, they can carry US missiles "Hellfire". The maximum speed is about 260 knots (480 km / h). The maximum carrying capacity is up to 1700 kg, and the "M-Q-9" can be armed with a variety of weapons, including missiles and bomb units with laser guided bombs. Active air duration is up to 30 hours when reconnaissance missions are carried out, which is reduced to 23 hours if there is a full load on the weapon. The operational altitude of 15,000 meters makes it particularly useful for long-term surveillance and monitoring activities and support of ground troops.

In March 2011, the US Air Force trained more personnel to handle advanced aerial drones than any other single weapon system. "M-Q-9" is also used by the US Navy, the CIA, customs and border protection of the United States, NASA and the military forces of several other countries in the world. The US plans to keep "M-Q-9" in use until the 2030s.

“Reaper” drones which include the “M-Q-9 Predator B”, have proved to be highly-effective in the ISIS bases. They can hit their target on the ground at a distance of 15,29 kilometers and can carry explosive weighing 4500 kilograms. With the help of this type of drone, the leader of ISIS in Afghanistan, Shahidula Shahid, was assassinated by the USA.[165]

The British drones “Reaper” have flown over 30.000 hours from their introduction in October 2007 and have fired around 300 missiles up until September 2015. The then-acting British Prime Minister, David Cameron, noted that up until December, 2010, 124 rebels were killed in the attacks by **armed-homing drones.** The US Department of Defense has not published the exact information on the use of drones in the armed attacks

[163] Drones-study,(2017) http://dronecenter.bard.edu/

[164] Gross O., (2016) The New Way of War – Is There A Duty to Use Drones, p.17 http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1219&context=flr

[165] Bataoel. V., (2011) On the use of drones in military operations in Libya: ethical, legal, and social issues, http://www.synesisjournal.com/vol2_g/2011_2_G69-76_Bataoel.pdf

in Afghanistan, but it is assumed that they were used for air-support in the operations which were led by the ground troops as part of the wider strategy for anti-rebels.[166]

5. CONCLUSION

The systems with GPS navigation play a huge role in modern warfare. They are used for observation, reviewing, scouting, and viewing, communication missions and for the identification of dangers, risky explosives and explosive operations in artillery missions. They can also effectuate the detection of hazardous, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive materials and have the ability to assist in search and rescue operations. They can function as sentries or guards, and they can also take part in combat operations.

In warfare, the need to be able to effectuate an attack on targets that are located on the opposite side of the globe is increasing. This need has led to the development of various types of guided missiles. Today, these missiles represent self-guiding weapons, which are designed cause maximum damage to the target and reduce the collateral damage to a minimum. The missiles that are controlled via GPS navigation and which use the astounding navigational, examining and observational capabilities of the GPS can transport a warhead to any part of the world after their launch.

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SECURITY SYSTEM REFORMS IN THE WESTERN BALKANS: ENSURING HUMAN DIMENSION OF SECURITY

Astrid Orovcanec, Dr.Sc
Independent researcher
e-mail: astridsky@yahoo.com

Abstract

Notwithstanding the overall progress of the Western Balkan countries during the last quarter of the last century, the region is still characterized by high human insecurity due to the poor socioeconomic performances and unfinished structural adjustments. For a long time, the socioeconomic and democratic development of the entire region was marginalized because of the given priority to security, even though these categories are mutually reinforcing. As a result, today the region is exposed to numerous internal weaknesses mainly deriving from the underdevelopment, such as: high poverty and inequality, corruption, organized crime, illiberal democracies, weak rule of the law, etc. At the same time the region is facing external security threats such as: global financial and economic crisis, EU identity and euro crisis, migrant crisis, global terrorism etc., which are additionally emphasizing its vulnerabilities and influencing its internal security dynamics. In this context the concept of security system reforms provides a framework for addressing security issues and simultaneously enhancing development and democracy, thus improving the situation with the human security in the Western Balkan countries. The paper argues that security system reforms in the region should be focused more on the human dimension of security, i.e. human development and human rights as to resolve or prevent violent conflicts and build greater resistance to contemporary security threats. The findings obtained by application of content analysis, secondary analysis of statistical data and comparative analysis will show that economic weakness, political instability, and fragile state security are inhibiting the region in creating wealth, achieving stability, and integrating into the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Therefore, only comprehensive security system reforms understood as a component of human security agenda and based on people's needs along with the national security interests, will ensure human rights and freedoms as well as human development without which there cannot be sustainable peace.

Keywords: *security system reforms, human security, human rights, human development, Western Balkans*

1. INTRODUCTION

Stabilizing the Western Balkans today is as important as it was right after the end of the Cold War, when the entire Balkan region was faced with serious security challenges that were a consequence of major shifts in the global security constellation. Those challenges led to dissolution of Yugoslavia followed by violent conflicts, civil wars, genocide, human casualties, material damages, destroyed infrastructure and even grater poverty. Today, the global security structure is shifting once again, and the Western Balkan countries are still lagging behind their Balkan neighbors, which in the meanwhile became part of the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Unfinished structural reforms affected the socio-economic and democratic progress of the region which brought to

enlargement of fatigue both in the European Union (EU) and the Western Balkan countries. Losing the EU and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) perspective further slowed down the reform process necessary to strengthen the resilience of each Western Balkan country and enable stabilization of the whole region.

Even so, during the last 27 years the region underwent serious structural changes understood as comprehensive transformation of the overall society, i.e. economic, political, and security transformation. In the course of this period, the socioeconomic and democratic development of the region was marginalized because of the given priority to security, neglecting the fact that these categories are mutually reinforcing. Security reforms focused exclusively on military and defense, i.e. the national security system could not answer contemporary security threats which seriously demand fundamental and integrated reforms of multiple societal (sub)systems, including the inter-linkages within it and emphasizing the human dimension of security. In this context, the concept of Security system reforms (SSR) provides a framework for addressing security issues and simultaneously enhancing development and democracy, thus improving the situation with the human security in the Western Balkan countries.

This paper is built up on previous researches (Orovcanec, 2016, 2017) which gradually investigated the link between security and development, and subsequently democracy. The research was performed by adding the concept of Security system reforms within the theoretical framework consisted of grievance-based theories of conflict, regional security complex theory and human security concept. The findings showed that due to the unfinished reform process in the Western Balkans, the structural weaknesses related to fragile states and economic backwardness continue to be major threats to the regional security and stability. In such conditions, although renewal of violent conflicts between the countries was not expected, the possibility of internal violent conflicts remains. This is because the economic, social, and political pressure upon any fragile state may have consequences for the state itself as well as for the region.

2. SECURITY SYSTEM REFORM AS A COMPONENT OF HUMAN SECURITY AGENDA

In their efforts to broaden the security framework, i.e. to expand and deepen the traditional security concept, as to influence simultaneously security and development, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) invented the Human Security concept and the concept of Security System Reform, respectively. The most common definition of the security sector by OECD states that: "all actors, their roles, responsibilities, and actions working together to manage and operate the system in a manner that is more consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, and thus contributes to a well-functioning security framework." (OECD, 2005, p. 20). After the end of the Cold War it became increasingly evident that the security sector urgently needed to be transformed, particularly in post-authoritarian and post-conflict countries, taking in consideration that "democracy, poverty reduction, and development were impossible without adequate security" (Galletti & Wodzicki, 2010, p. 286).

For that reason, the traditional security concept needed to be redefined regarding three important aspects that provide the basis for SSR (OECD, 2005, p. 16):

- Security and development are increasingly seen as being inextricably linked;

- The focus of security policy itself is broadening from an almost exclusive focus on the state stability and regime security to include the well-being of their population and human rights; and
- Re-evaluation of the state institutions providing security, with greater emphasis on legal, social and economic instruments.

United Nations (UN) define the security system reform as: "A process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities with the goal of enhancement of effective and accountable security for the state and its peoples without discrimination and with full respect for human rights and the rule of law" (United Nations, 2008: para. 17).

Even though the traditional security threats are still vital, the human security paradigm placing people at the center should be at the core of SSR in countries that underwent the transition to a modern democratic model of development. In the democratic societies, human security and state security are interconnected components that complement each other. Shifting focus from state to human security is "an irreversible process regardless of the different levels of readiness of various countries and regions to accept this modern development and despite recurrences of traditional security threats" (Khylko & Oleksandr, 2017, pp. 1-3). It is of vital importance for countries implementing SSR to avoid postponing human security issues and focusing only on traditional state security issues. In this regard, the European Commission for a long time has favored long-term and state-centered institutional capacity building approach regarding justice and security system reform. Unfortunately, this approach has "certain limitations which have limited positive impact in terms of improvements in the citizens' welfare and state security, indicating lack of integrated and holistic approach" (ADE Analysis for Economic Decisions, 2011, pp. 66-67).

For Commission of European Communities (2006) security includes both the external and internal security of a state and its people. Thus, it focuses on human security, putting the security of citizens at the center and thus complementing state security. Citizens should be able to expect the state to be capable of maintaining peace and guaranteeing stability of the state; security of the nation i.e. the strategic security interests of the country; as well as safety and well-being of the people, ensuring that their lives, property, and political, economic and social rights are protected. Therefore, the state security and effectiveness are still critical because states still have the primary responsibility for protecting their population, creating and enabling conditions for development and delivering the core services they require. For that matter, a greater emphasis is needed on structural reforms. (OECD, 2005, p. 125) SSR in order to be effective and sustainable, should seek to provide people's fundamental freedoms such as "freedom from fear"," freedom from want" and "freedom to live in dignity" as they are the three basic dimensions of human security. The overall objective of SSR, as it is stated in the OECD/DAC Handbook (2005, p. 16) is "to create secure environment that is conductive to development, poverty reduction and democracy." Thus, the two essential pillars of the secure environment are the development and the people's well-being.

3. RELEVANCE OF SECURITY SYSTEM REFORM IN THE WESTERN BALKANS

The document of the European Commission (2018) titled "A credible enlargement perspective for enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans" reconfirms region's European future if the countries manage to strengthen democracy and carry out comprehensive reforms in crucial areas such as: the rule of law, economy (competitiveness), regional cooperation (solving bilateral disputes) and reconciliation. On the part of EU, further enlargement is an additional incentive toward wider European stability and security, economic growth and influence and its ability to protect its citizens. (European Commission, 2018) On the part of integration of the Western Balkan countries into the EU and membership of NATO, they are part of the enlargement process that provides an important incentive for structural reforms. Unfortunately, these reforms are not motivated by a genuine understanding of the inherent need for such changes. Western Balkan countries have begun SSR as a part of their Euro-Atlantic integration, since democratic security system is a criterion for EU and NATO accession. EU and NATO enlargement has shown the gap between the Balkan countries, whereof Western Balkan countries are significantly lagging behind due to socioeconomic and cultural obstacles intensified by contested borders and rights.

To limit the influence of the old military and secret police and to restore democratic control over the use of force by the state institutions, the post-communist Balkan states needed to democratize their societies and particularly their security systems. In this regard, the Western Balkan states continue to face significant challenges, as the case of large number of illegally intercepted communications in Macedonia has showed. European Commission (2015) recruited a group of independent, senior, rule of law experts to make rapid analysis of the situation and provide recommendations based on its findings, by addressing systemic problems revealed or confirmed by the scandal. The cause of the scandal was traced back both to a concentration of power within national security service (UBK) and to a malfunctioning of the oversight mechanisms. Today, Western Balkan countries face security challenges that extend beyond the responsibilities and capabilities of traditional military and police, requiring a broader approach that involves building basic political consensus. This implies setting up legal framework and oversight mechanisms and solving issues as they are appearing when aligning their security system with the principles of democratic governance.

3.1 Structural Challenges to the Security of Western Balkans

SSR encompasses wider social, economic and political reforms, which must include the underlying causes of violence and conflict in order to be successful. Theories investigating how and why violent conflicts occur, as clarified by OECD/DAC Guidelines (2001) differentiate structural from accelerating or triggering factors as a cause of violent conflict. Structural conditions create potential climate for a violent conflict and must be viewed on a long-term horizon. They include inter-related political, social and economic factors such as population density, the level and distribution of wealth and opportunity, the state of the resource base, the ethnic structure of the society and the history of inter-group relations. On the other hand, the events, actions, and decisions which result in escalation of disputes into violent conflicts, depending on a specific context, are accelerating or triggering factors (p. 87).

Some of the most common causes and contributions to conflicts recognized by OECD which at the same time can be clearly identified in the Western Balkan region are (p. 88): problems in managing transition and rapid change, widening socioeconomic disparities, the exploitation of ethnic and other differences, resource based conflict, and the legacy of violence.

Previous studies have identified poverty and inequality as two major structural challenges to security, both on national and regional level. Extreme and prolonged poverty and inequality as structural weaknesses can result in a high degree of vulnerability and conflict. Therefore, SSR should be directed towards poverty reduction and eradication when possible, reduction of inequalities regarding human capabilities and access to assets and productive resources. (OECD, 2001, p. 10)

3.1.1. Poverty and inequality

Poverty as a multidimensional phenomenon "encompasses different dimensions of deprivation that are related to human capabilities including consumption and food security, health, education, rights, voice, security, dignity, and decent work" (OECD, 2001, p. 10). For poor people, insecurity is at the same time "a major dimension and a principle cause of poverty" (p.48). Poor people face substantial risks coming from variety of sources such as food shortages, sickness, old age, natural calamities, unemployment, and other economic adjustments shocks.

Inequality between ethnic and social groups primarily due to unequal allocation of the resources among them, sometimes leads to violent conflicts. Significant and long-lasting horizontal inequalities defined as "serious inequalities between culturally defined or identity groups" (Stewart, 2002), can lead to social and eventually to structural exclusion, group grievances and group mobilization which can trigger collective violence and conflict.

Table 1: Population of Western Balkans living below international and national poverty lines (Source: World Bank's PovcalNet, UNDP and the World Factbook, CIA)

Country	Population	MPI (%)	1,9 $/day (%)	3,10 $/day (%)	Nat. poverty line	
			2013	2013	%	Survey (year)
ALB	3.029.278	1.2	1.02	6.37	14.3	2011
BIH	3.867.055	1.7	0.07	0.40	17.2	2011
BGR	7.186.893	-	2.03	4.78	21.8	2014
HRV	4.464.844	-	0.92	2.37	19.5	2014
GRC	10.775.643	-	-	-	36.0	2014
KSV	1.870.981	-	-	-	30.0	2013
MKD	2.096.015	1.7	2.19	9.27	30.4	2011
MNE	647.073	0.5	1.04	2.53	8.6	2013
ROU	21.666.350	-	0	4.05	22.4	2012
SRB	7.176.794	0.4	0.19	1.33	9.2	2013
SVN	1.983.412	-	0.03	0.05	13.5	2012

Western Balkan countries are still struggling with poverty reduction and eradication which can be seen from the data presented in Table 1 above. Absolute or

extreme poverty, when people lack basic necessities for survival during a longer period of time is presented as a percentage of a population living below the international and national poverty lines. As to the international poverty lines set by the World Bank at 1,9$/day and 3,10$/day, the highest poverty in the region is registered in Macedonia and Albania, while the lowest poverty is registered in Slovenia. Poverty at the national poverty line is determined by each country separately depending on the living standard of the majority population. The highest poverty as per national poverty line, around one third of the population, is noted in Kosovo and Macedonia but also in Greece which has serious difficulties recovering from the global financial and European debt crisis. Romania and Bulgaria, even though EU member states have high poverty of around 20%. Population living in high poverty deprived in regard to health, education, and standards of living exists only in the Western Balkans region.

3.1.2. Economic development

Economic growth is necessary for securing sustainable economic development, which is essential for providing sustainable peace. In order to be sustainable, development has to be balanced. Thus, economic growth has to be inclusive and balanced as to create opportunities for each segment of the population. Economic growth that does not provide human development is not sustainable on a long run, because slow human development may slow down the economic growth.

Table 3: Balkans Economy (Source: The World Bank national accounts Data 2016; 2017)

Country	GDP (current us$) (million)	GDP growth rate (% annual)	GDP per capita (current us$)	Unemployment (%)
ALB	11.398,39	2.8	4,125.0	15.0
BIH	16.191,72	3.0	4,808.4	25.8
BGR	50.199,12	3.6	7,469.0	6.0
HRV	48.732,00	1.6	12,149.2	11.5
GRC	194.851,32	-0.2	17,890.6	23.1
KSV	6.400,69	3.9	3,661.4	(‘16) 30.9
MKD	10.086.02	3.7	5,237.1	24.4
MNE	3.987,06	3.2	7,028.9	17.7
ROU	177.954,49	3.7	9,522.8	5.9
SRB	37.160,33	0.8	5,426.2	14.4
SVN	42.774,77	2.3	21,650.2	7.5

The data presented in Table 3 shows that the Western Balkan countries have significantly lower economic capacity (GDP) and economic well-being (GDP per capita) than the new Balkan EU member states. For instance, Slovenia’s GDP per capita is the highest in the region and it is six times higher than the lowest one in Kosovo. Even though the average rate of the economic growth for the West Balkans is higher than the average economic growth in new Balkans EU member states, it is not enough to provide sufficient economic and human development. However, the biggest problem of the regional economic model is extremely high unemployment, which combined with poorly structured social welfare system and slow economic growth significantly contributes to poverty and inequality in the region. The highest unemployment is in Kosovo where one third of the population is unemployed, then in Macedonia and Bosnia and Hercegovina where one

fourth of the population is unemployed. It is evident that all Western Balkan countries have unemployment higher than 10% which indicates the need for change of the regional economic model.

3.1.3. Human Development

In general, but also evident from the data presented in Table 2 below, countries with a higher Human development index (HDI) value have better results in all three basic dimensions of human development, i.e. a longer life expectancy at birth (LEB), a greater mean years of schooling (MES) and more expected years of schooling as well as a higher living standard presented as gross national income (GNI) per capita. This means that human development addresses the long term structural causes of conflict, thus strengthening the resilience of the society, i.e. its ability to absorb and recover from shocks, and contributes to greater human security.

Table 2: HDI for Balkan countries (Source: Human Development Report, 2016)

Country	Rang (of 188)	HDI	LEB	MYS	EYS	GNI p.c.	Gini
SVN	25	0.880	80.4	11.9	16.8	27.852	24.9
GRC	29	0.865	80.9	10.3	17.6	24.524	34.7
HRV	47	0.818	77.3	11.0	14.8	19.409	33.6
MNE	49	0.802	76.2	11.2	15.2	14.558	30.6
ROU	52	0.793	74.7	10.8	14.2	18.108	27.3
BGR	59	0.782	74.2	10.6	14.4	15.596	34.3
SRB	66	0.771	74.9	10.5	14.4	12.190	29.7
MKD	81	0.747	75.4	9.3	13.4	11.780	44.2
ALB	85	0.733	77.8	9.3	11.8	9.943	29.0
BIH	85	0.733	7605	8.3	13.6	9.638	33.0
KSV	-	0.714	71.0	-	-	3.344	-

Western Balkan countries have high human development. Montenegro is an exception with very high human development, as a country which is in the most advanced phase of the European integration process, together with Slovenia, Greece, and Croatia. Gini coefficient indicates that the highest vertical inequality i.e. income inequality between individuals exists in Macedonia, almost split in half and here is the highest poverty in the region. High levels of inequality may also indicate hidden or relative poverty when some people live much worse than the general standard of living within a country or a region.

3.2. State of security in the Western Balkan region

Analysis of some most relevant structural indexes such as Fragile State Index, Global Peace Index and Positive Peace Index will determine the influence of the structural factors upon human security in each Balkan country and consequently upon the regional stability and security. The results will also show the importance and advantages of a structurally balanced society.

As a general rule, a society endowed with a good balance and distribution of social and economic resources as evidenced by HDIs, is able to manage tensions with less risk of institutional and social breakdown than a society marked by destabilizing conditions such as pervasive poverty, extreme socioeconomic disparities, systemic lack of

opportunity and the absence of resources to credible institutions to resolve grievances (OECD, 2001).

3.2.1. Fragile State Index (FSI)

FSI measures the risk of destabilizing the states as well as the pressure that might push them into a failure. It is crucial to identify and understand the causes of a fragile state and follow the conditions which contribute to their vulnerability. The Index is consisted of 12 indicators divided into four categories: social (demographic pressure, refugees and internally displaced people), economic (economy, uneven distribution, human flight and brain drain, external intervention), political (state legitimacy, public services, human rights, external intervention) and cohesion (security apparatus, factionalized elites, group grievances).

Table 4: FSI for the Balkan countries (Source: Fund for peace, 2017)

Country	Rank	Value	Stability
Bosnia and Hercegovina	93	73.0	Elevated warning
Serbia	107	70.0	
Macedonia	112	66.1	Warning
Albania	124	60.5	
Greece	127	57.5	Stable
Montenegro	130	55.7	
Bulgaria	132	53.7	
Romania	136	50.9	
Croatia	138	50.6	
Slovenia	162	32.4	Very stable

In table 4, Balkan countries are ranked according to their stability level in a way that enables country comparison. Western Balkan countries, with exception of Montenegro, are in warned category, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia are with elevated warning, while Macedonia and Albania are simply warned. The rest of the countries, which are new EU member states are stable countries, with Slovenia being very stable. Detailed analysis of the indicators shows that the biggest pressure in the region is coming from group grievances, poverty, factionalized elites, and refugees.

3.2.2. Global Peace Index (GPI)

GPI measures the negative peace defined as “absence of violence or fear from violence” in 163 countries. In this way, it establishes global peacefulness and the country’s level of peacefulness using 23 qualitative and quantitative indicators split in three thematic domains: the level of societal safety and security; the extent of ongoing domestic and international conflicts; and the degree of militarization.

Table 5: GPI for the Balkan countries (Source: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017)

Country	Global rank	Regional rank (out of 36)	Value[167]	Militarization	Society and Security	Ongoing domestic and int. conflict
SVN	7	6	1.364	1.185	1.411	1.229
ROU	25	17	1.600	1.823	1.923	1.045
BGR	28	19	1.631	1.662	2.098	1.028
HRV	20	20	1.665	1.649	1.855	1.43
SRB	56	28	1.888	1.721	2.194	1.604
ALB	57	29	1.908	1.751	2.54	1.229
MNE	67	31	1.950	1.504	2.618	1.43
GRC	73	32	1.998	2.144	2.072	1.833
KSV	76	33	2.007	1.53	2.459	1.805
BIH	84	34	2.035	1.544	2.468	1.833
MKD	102	35	2.133	1.791	2.582	1.833

In accordance with the Global Peace Index value for 2017, the least peaceful countries in the region are the Western Balkan countries of Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. Macedonia had the biggest drop in the global ranking as a European country followed by Kosovo for 2016. Compared to results from the previous year, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia became less peaceful, while Kosovo and Albania became more peaceful countries in the region.

3.2.3. Positive Peace Index (PPI)

PPI measures the level of positive peace defined as "attitudes, institutions, and structures that create and maintain peaceful societies" in 163 countries. It is composed of 24 indicators as to capture the eight pillars of peace: well-functioning government (WFG), low levels of corruption (LLC), sound business environment (SBE), equitable distribution of resources (EDR), acceptance of the rights of others (ARO), free flow of information (FFI), high levels of human capital (HHC), and good relations with neighbors (GNR). The evidence, so far, has proven that a higher level of positive peace for a country means a more stable country and much smaller deteriorations in their GPI score. Positive peace factors lead to many other positive outcomes for the society by supporting the optimum environment for human potential.

[167] Its value varies from 1 to 5 or from higher to lower levels of negative peace.

Table 6: PPI for the Balkan countries (Source: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2017)

Country	Rank	Overall score[168]	WFG	LLC	SBE	EDR	ARO	FFI	HHC	GNR
SVN	22	1.91	2.27	1.98	2.53	2.12	1.61	1.88	1.72	1
GRC	40	2.37	2.62	2.94	2.81	1.45	2.27	2.52	2.25	1.66
HRV	41	2.43	2.65	2.8	3.1	1.98	2.32	2.38	2.21	1.66
BGR	44	2.56	2.95	3.28	3.04	2.29	2.42	2.3	2.31	1.4
ROU	47	2.62	2.94	3.05	2.79	2.68	3.02	2.24	2.29	1.56
MNE	50	2.72	3.01	3.29	3	2.25	2.94	2.22	2.52	2.04
ALB	53	2.79	3.08	3.5	3.15	2.49	2.4	2.59	2.55	2.16
MKD	57	2.88	3.09	3.58	2.93	2.48	2.56	2.92	2.4	2.73
SRB	57	2.88	2.97	3.62	3.33	2.51	3.28	2.34	2.36	2.12
BIH	74	3.06	3.34	3.82	3.4	2.27	2.93	2.59	2.76	2.78
KSV	124	3.61	3.25	3.67	3.89	3.93	3.3	2.76	4.44	3.62

All Western Balkan countries are at a high level of positive peace, only Kosovo is at medium level, while their Balkan neighbors are at a very high level of positive peace. According to the Positive Peace Index value, the lowest levels of positive peace are registered in Kosovo, Bosnia and Hercegovina and Serbia, while the highest levels are in the EU member states of Slovenia, Greece, and Croatia. A thorough indicators analysis shows that the weakest peace pillar in the region are those of a well-functioning government, and low levels of corruption and sound business environment. At different stages of development, different factors are becoming important. A higher level of positive peace indicates a greater capacity for peaceful conflict solution, higher standard of living, balanced distribution of resources, better social cohesion, etc. Reduction of PPI value means reduced resilience toward external shocks as well as internal changes.

4. CONCLUSION

This paper addresses the regional and human dimension of the security system reform. In order to make positive contribution to the regional stability, SSR in the Western Balkan region require paradigm shift and structural reforms in many sectors of the society. There is a need to shift the concept of SSR to human security perspective in which way the reform will secure human rights and freedoms, human development, and human security. Despite the definite advances achieved in the Western Balkan region, security challenges in the form of poverty and inequality still remain. The present model of SSR failed to address those issues and because of that the SSR should be a framework for addressing diverse security challenges facing states and their population. This implies that current SSR model should be broaden as to ensure the human dimension of security.

SSR viewed as a component of the broader human security agenda for the region requires application of the human security concept into practice through effective policies,

[168] Its value varies from 1 to 5 or from higher to lower levels of positive peace.

programs, strategies, and approaches. Understood as such SSR is supportive of human development goals, protection and advancement of human rights and freedoms and complements national security interests with people's needs. Economic liberalization, political democratization and EU and NATO integration are key incentives for SSR in the region.

The Western Balkan resilience was first tested by the pressure of economic crisis, and soon afterwards by the refugee crisis and the terrorism threat that followed the uncontrolled movement of people, running away from war destruction. It became evident that the Western Balkan countries needed to complete the structural reforms as to strengthen their resilience. For that reason, SSR in the region should be aimed to provide support to strengthening the resilience of the states i.e. to strengthen security by enhancing countries' economic resilience through sustainable development, inclusive growth, social welfare and even distribution of income and resources; and to consolidate the political resilience through protection and advancement of human rights, rule of law and improved democratic governance.

The state can soften the vulnerabilities to which people are exposed through its development policies and programs as well as to prevent security threats affecting people's well-being such as poverty and inequality reduction through a range of policy instruments. This requires combination of development and other diplomatic, military and economic instruments. Strengthening of the resilience of the state by strengthening and fostering coherence between security and development means strengthening of the capacity of the society to manage tensions and disputes without violence, which can strengthen the possibility for peace and development.

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MODERN CHALLENGES AND THREATS TO THE SECURITY SYSTEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Muhamet Racaj, Dr.Sc
Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Macedonia
e-mail: racaj61@yahoo.com
Sasho Janev
Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Macedonia
e-mail: maksasoj@gmail.com
Zekirja Aziri
Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Macedonia
e-mail: zekirjaaziri@gmail.com

Abstract

The countries in the region are deeply involved in the process of transformation and democratization for accession to the EU and NATO, except for Serbia. Serbia hopes for membership to EU only. The current reform processes contribute to the improvement of the security state in the region. The circumstances in the region can be defined as dynamic due to the introduction of global and regional questions that directly or indirectly have a negative impact on certain regional security questions.

As part of the Balkan region, the Republic of Macedonia faces multidimensional threats and risks and the challenges to the national security originate from the dynamic and complex conditions in the region that directly or indirectly affect national security.

The existing trend of armament and modernization of the armed forces in the region (the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Serbia) does not pose a threat to the national security, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the Republic of Macedonia. Still, there is a real danger of disrupting of the security and the security system by the non-government actors.

The current security circumstances in the Republic of Macedonia have notably improved, but are still under the influence of the complex relations in the region and the world. That is where the complexity of the challenges and the threats which the security system of the Republic of Macedonia faces come from. They are characterized by unpredictability, dynamics, multidimensionality, asymmetry, hybridity, and nationalism, with a tendency to cause a cumulative effect on the security in the region as well. Apprehending the complexity of the relations in the region and the world, as well as their influence to the security in the region, and by that to the security of the Republic of Macedonia, we can determine the challenges and the threats to the national security of the Republic of Macedonia. They are: terrorism, violent extremism and radicalism, migration (the current migration crisis), cyber terrorism and cybercrime, activities of foreign intelligence services, organized crime, the variability of the economic, social, and political stability, natural catastrophes, technological and technical catastrophes, epidemics and climate changes, degradation and devastation of the environment, etc.

***Key words**: challenge, threats, security, national security.*

1. INTRODUCTION

Today's world, obsessed and led by the unstoppable process of globalization, brings big political, national, economic, cultural, and other processes. There are different views to the increasing number of opened questions important to the citizens, but also of essential meaning for the state. The dependence of the conditioned process of internal and external factors of the security, especially the phenomena of externationalization and internationalization of the internal conflicts, point out that the modern world is in a social, political, and security instability. The security, with the differential priorities, will face numerous challenges in the future as well, that cannot be controlled from all aspects. This can lead to different crisis and endangerment of the stability of the state. The divergence between the increased expectations and the real possibilities for creating a secure society is big and conditioned by the balance of the social development and the needed level of security. The synthesis of the desired and the possible predetermines a sequence of questions that explicitly lead to the need for a comprehensive perception of the imperilment factors to the security of the Republic of Macedonia. Hence the complexity of the endangerment, risks, and threats that the Republic of Macedonia faces, characterized with unpredictability, dynamics, multidimensionality, hybridism, asymmetry and transnationalism, with a tendency to affect the regional security as well. The question what, or who the sources of endangerment to the security of the Republic of Macedonia are can be observed only if we take into account the overall interactive relations of its surrounding.

2. TERORISM

Terrorism as a tool, method, process, and projection of physiological and physical violence in breaking the law is not a novelty. Terrorism is a systematic use of terror and violence often as a means of coercion. Still, in the international community, there is no a legally binding criminal definition for terrorism. The collective definitions of terrorism refer only to violent actions with the purpose to create fear (terror); they are carried out in the name of religious, political or ideological goals and deliberately oriented or do not take into consideration the security of the non-fighters (civilians). Terrorism has been practically present since the beginning of the civilization and the first social and political organizations, until present[169]. Nevertheless, although it has been present for more than 21 centuries, still there is not an official definition.

Terrorism presents a current threat not only to the security of the Republic of Macedonia, but to the regional and global security as well. Global terrorism is characterised by tight connections with the violent terrorism and religious radicalism. The possibility for terrorist attacks in the Republic of Macedonia is low, but there is a possibility that the territory of the Republic of Macedonia is used as a logistical support for the terrorist groups whose final goals are directed to the broader region and Western Europe. The biggest risk for the security of the country from the aspect of terrorism as a threat are the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia who took part or are taking part in the current world war conflicts and crisis regions. In the era of wide availability of radical

[169] Wilkinson, P. (2003). Why Modern Terrorism? Differentiating Types and Distinguishing Ideological Motivations. The New Global Terrorism: Characteristics, Causes, Control (ed. Kegley, C. W. Jr.), New Jersey: Prentice Hall.

information on the internet and the easy communication of the so called repatriates over the protected social networks with the religious radicals outside of the country, there are real preconditions for indoctrination and recruitment of new persons from our country, with the aim of carrying out terrorist attacks in the country and the region. In general, terrorism as a threat for the security of the Republic of Macedonia is with low intensity, and in the long run, depending on the circumstances in the region and broader, with mid intensity. The support in the fight against terrorism on a global level and the efforts for EU and NATO integration as well as the participation of the Army in the peacekeeping operations outside the country, in which way the country proves its determination to contribute towards keeping the peace and stability on a global level, presents a calculated risk from terrorism for the Republic of Macedonia.

3. VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND RADICALISM

Extremism is a term which denotes actions or ideologies that are out of the socially accepted frameworks, regardless if it is for pragmatic or moral reasons. In politics, usually, extreme ideologies are considered the ones belonging to the extreme left wing, extreme right wing, or to the religious fundamentalism. As a rule, followers of these ideologies never call themselves extremists, but prefer to call themselves radicals. Hence, nowadays, radicalism is a kind of euphemism for extremism.

In politics and political theory, radicalism is a term which describes individuals, movements, and ideologies that in principle exert for radical social changes of the community or uncompromised implementation of their political goals. Very often, the term radicalism is associated with the term extremism, but the radical individuals and movements more often call themselves radicals, but never extremists. The radicalism is also a branch of the liberal ideology developed in the 19 century that had an important influence on the politics of some European and South American countries.

There is still no an internationally recognized and accepted definition for the violent extremism and radicalism. According to Ben Emmerson, a UN special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the human rights while countering terrorism, the term violent extremism and radicalism is an "elusive concept", even within the borders of Europe, where the United Kingdom, Sweden, Denmark and Norway have different definitions on what constitutes violent extremism and radicalism. Emmerson points out that the lack of an internationally recognized definition for the violent extremism, radicalism and terrorism, created what he called a "well-founded concern" because the authoritative states could use the terms to target "members of the religious minorities, civil society, human right defenders, peaceful separatists and the indigenous groups and members of political opposition parties"[170].

Adding to the statement of Ben Emmerson on the lack of definition for violent extremism and radicalism, François Heisbourg, a former French diplomat, a Special Advisor to the Foundation for Strategic Research, states that "You facilitate the life of dictators, because you enable them to define these terms by themselves"[171]

The violent extremism in all its forms (national, political, and religious)[172] was and will continue to be one of the main threats and risks to the security of the Republic of

[170] http://globalanalitika.com/tag/nasilni-ekstremizam/April 2016
[171] http://globalanalitika.com/tag/nasilni-ekstremizam/April 2016
[172] https://sh.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ekstremizaam

Macedonia as well as the region. The inherited ethnical and religious contradictions and disagreements represent a serious challenge, and the slow social and economic progress in the region adds to the rise and possible escalation of inter-ethnic and inter-religious disagreements. The risk arising from this threat can be located in the existence of isolated but purposely created non-state actors or groups, with the intention to explore these weaknesses. Inciting internal inter-ethnic disagreements would weaken the defending and security capacities of the Republic of Macedonia. In that context, radicalism caused by the actions of individual religious groups and sects, led by extreme nationalistic ideology and religious intolerance, represents a serious threat on both mid and long run.

4. MIGRATION (CURRENT MIGRANT CRISIS)

The Republic of Macedonia is on the route of the migrant-refugees who travel to the western European countries from Syria via Turkey, Bulgaria and Greece. Some of the migrants use our country only as a transit route on their way to the European countries. However, the number of those who decide to stay and request asylum in Macedonia is getting bigger. Besides the undoubted fact that the Syrian refugees are unsheltered, abandon and misfortune, if we go back to the moment when the Huns came to Europe, the question of what will the consequences be of the Syrian refugee tide arises. First, the problem with the refugees would be an additional burden to the economy of our country. Second, the moment of growing xenophobia would cause a general discomposure to the social living. The growing tensions would encompass the fear of crime as well. We cannot get around the theft of food or clothes and other necessary means for living. In such circumstances, we cannot disregard organized crime like human trafficking. If we look at the Syrian refugees in Lebanon who, in order to survive, produce hashish, we cannot disregard drug trafficking as well. In Syria, there have been theft of antiquities in 6 museums, meaning, in case of a need, there is the possibility of illegal trade of artefacts[173].

Going further into the consequences, we can also include the Syrian infantile paralysis epidemic. The infantile paralysis, known as polio, is transmitted by contaminated food or water. Although eradicated for 14 years in Syria, in October, a polio epidemic was confirmed among Syrian children. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), the disease probably spread from Pakistan, one of the three countries in the world, where it is endemic. WHO warns that the Syrian epidemic can become a threat for millions of children in the Middle East. The infantile paralysis transmits and spreads easily among children, especially in unhygienic conditions in which millions of people now live in Syria due to the 4 years of war, but also in the overloaded refugee camps in the neighboring countries.

Migration is not a direct threat for the national security of the Republic of Macedonia, but it threatens the overall security and seriously burdens the defense-security entities and the other state institutions. The current phenomenon of migration is primarily a result of the conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa. Thus, the geostrategic location of the region, including the Republic of Macedonia, is a key factor that determines the intensity of this occurrence across the territory of the Republic of Macedonia. In that context, the illegal routes and established channels for trafficking that can be misused for infiltration of individuals and groups on European ground (foreign/fighters repatriates, potential terrorists, crime offenders, etc), represent a risk. At the same time, migration can

[173] http://www.utrinski.mk/default.asp?ItemID=0944212C2DD1CA47BFF298BEC6C8E414

have negative influence on the security and the economic-political relations in the broader region.

Although the EU refuses to give the necessary tools for dealing with the migrant crisis, the Government of the Republic of Macedonia considers that it should meet the provisions of the Brussel's policies. If this continues, the public opinion on the European integration might change.

5. CYBER TERRORISM AND CYBER CRIME

Cyber terrorism[174] implies premeditated, politically motivated attacks against information, IT systems, computer programs and data resulting in violence against non military targets, by sub-national groups or secret agents.

According to our understanding, there is a political motivation in the launch of the term cyber terrorism. The primary goal of the cyber terrorism is infiltration in the system of a certain institution with the goal of causing damage (financial loss, casualties, or property damage) thus causing destabilization of the security of the state itself. The hackers (cyber terrorists) who are often part of terrorist organizations like Al Caeda, ETA, IRA, etc., do this with a certain political goal. The cyber terrorists can attack clearly defined targets with strategic meaning in certain states, which does not mean that the attack has to be with big proportions in order to achieve a certain goal.

Cyber crime is any kind of crime performed with IT systems and networks, or against IT systems and networks. The hackers, who are the usual executors of cyber crime, often do this out of fun and competition for higher personal success, as well as gaining means and other goals.

Cyber attacks are the current and the fastest growing global threat. The expansion and mass use of the internet technology has a strong influence on the detection of criminal activities. The increased use of the internet in the business sector and the electronic transactions between business subjects and the internet business communication make this area attractive for the criminal groups and individuals. The security risk from the cyber attacks lays in the possibility foe endangerment of the critical infrastructure as well as segments of the system for security and defence of the Republic of Macedonia. Cyber attacks as a threat for the national security will be prevalent in short run, but stay one of the major challegens for the Republic of Macedonia in mid and long run. Having in mind the nature of the cyber attacks, it is possible that most attacks will be organized and carried out from outside of the Republic of Macedonia, both from military and civilian factors. In that line, the protection of the critical national infrastructure and capacities with special importance are segments that require particular attention.

6. ORGANIZED CRIME

There are two approaches in defining the term organized crime in the sociological literature. According to the first approach, which is broader, we are talking about activities of criminal organizations. According to the second one, a more narrow approach for the existence of this type of criminality, the existence of a criminal organization (organizational dimension) alone is not enough. Other conditions like organized economic activities (criminal corporations), the use of violence for holding on to the position of

[174] Symantec Cyberterrorism? by Sarah Gordon Senior Research Fellow Symantec Security

priority or monopoly for expansion of profit but also for financing killings in order to avoid the application of law or passing political decisions that endanger the corruption of the police, judiciary, and the political-executive power are needed[175].

Organized crime is a relatively new phenomenon in the Republic of Macedonia. The growth of the transnational criminal organizations on a global level and the security problems in the region followed by embargoes parallel with the internal transitional problems were the factors that had a serious impact on the appearance of organized crime. At the same time, due to its geographical location, the Republic of Macedonia is susceptible to border crime. The data shows increase in the efficiency of the relevant bodies, especially from the aspect of human trafficking, drug trafficking and corruption. However, in practice, the absence of quality proofing means, produces long term proceedings which disturb the authority of the institutions and projects a sense of inefficiency of the courts. Therefore, besides creating appropriate judiciary and institutional framework, the strengthening of the capacities of all involved institutions in the area and allocation of appropriate resources is crucial[176].

Organized crime is already a recognized threat to the Republic of Macedonia. As such, it develops new forms, adapting to the current social conditions and circumstances. The organized crime as a threat to the Republic of Macedonia manifests mainly through drug and human trafficking. The migrant crisis, the limited capacity of the state institutions, and the corruption are factors that add to its existence. Serious risks that arise from the organized crime are the unsettling of the overall business climate and proliferation of the conventional weapons and the weapons for mass destruction, i.e., the strategic materials for dual use. The big amount of illegal weapons and ammunition in the country and the region are risks due to the possible use of the same by the criminal-terrorists groups and organizations. The success in dealing with the organized crime as one of the main threats for the national security will stimulate the progress of the Republic of Macedonia. At the same time, the success, in a large measure will depend on the strengthening of the national capacities and mechanisms for cooperation between the states and the international institutions.

7. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SERVICES

Intelligence services are specialized, relatively independent institutions of the state apparatus, authorized with legal and secret means to gather intelligence data and information for other states or their institutions and about the possible internal or external enemies of their homelands. This intelligence data information is needed for implementing the policies of their own country and carrying out other actions during peace and war. Furthermore, they are needed to carry out elements of their national and political goals by their own activities or in cooperation with other national bodies. Starting with the definition of intelligence services, there are three kinds of activities of the intelligence services with the aim of achieving their tasks and missions: intelligence, counterintelligence and subversive activities.

[175] Lampe Klaus „The Concept of Organized Crime in Historical Perspective" http://people.freenet.de/kvlampe

[176] Professor D-r Vlado Kambovski, Legal State and Organised Crime, Faculty of Law, Skopje, 1996

Having in mind the surroundings of the Republic of Macedonia and its development and tendencies, our country is not spared of all the activities of the foreign intelligence services. Their work and activities are a threat for the security of the Republic of Macedonia. Their interests are mainly the political-security conditions in the state. The final goal of their activities is disruption of the integrative processes, mainly the membership of the Republic of Macedonia in NATO. The previous attempts, in different forms, methods and activities to influence the dynamics of the state processes and endanger the national interests of the Republic of Macedonia will continue in the future as well. Their infiltration in the vital national institutions is a risk.

8. ECONOMIC – POLITICAL PROBLEMS

Globalization implies economic, political, and cultural processes enabled by the development of the transport and communications, led by the desire of the big corporations for conquering new markets. At the same time, it is a controversial process as well. The economic globalization implies mainly creation and establishment of rules for a single world market with free flow of goods and capital across the state borders. The supporters claim that this is how the competition and development of the states is stimulated. On the other side, the opponents of the economic globalization claim that this is how the multinational companies use their capital for disabling the creation of new competition to share the market with.

The political globalization is closely related to the economic one. The existence of a single world market reduces the possibility for national governments and states to stimulate directly the development of their own economy by setting up rules that give advantage to local companies. With the political globalization, the place for reaching decisions is being transferred to the international institutions, thus decreasing the possibility for the people to elect Government representatives in direct elections and by that to influence the development of their own country.

Corruption is the cancer of every society. As long as the slightest form of corruption exists, we cannot talk about a free market and market oriented towards society and economy. The political corruption is the main danger for the national and foreign investors. It distorts the political and economic surrounding, decreases the credibility and the trust in the government of a certain country and brings instability to the whole society. The most frequent form of corruption is the financial corruption shaped as special requests for payment and offering bribery, which are related to gaining export-import licenses and decrease of the tax obligations.

Political instability in the contemporary settings of free flow of capital, people, goods, technology, stability of a country’s political surrounding, and the political stability of the state itself is one of the key foundations and factors that determine the economic development of the country and the national and foreign investments.

The economic and political problems of the Republic of Macedonia as well as of the countries of the region present a threat to their security. The regional and local conflicts in the previous period, social problems, slow economic development, corruption, and the separatist tendencies in the region continue to be factors that will influence the security in the mid and long run, negatively influencing the economic growth and prosperity. The insufficiently constructed capacities of the institutions, unemployment, unreformed judicial system and the political influence over the democratic institutions present a risk for the successful functioning of the security entities.

9. NATURAL DISASTERS, TECHNOLOGICAL - TECHNICAL CATASTROPHES, EPIDEMICS AND CLIMATE CHANGES

Natural catastrophes like floods, fires, earthquakes and other geological processes are huge negative events, a result of the earth's natural processes. A natural catastrophe can cause loss of lives or damage to property and usually causes economic damage as well, the heaviness of which depends on the endurance of the affected population or the ability to recuperate[177]. The existence and the development of technical and technological plants such as factories, electric power plants, laboratories, research institutions etc. are potential carriers of threats (from technological – technical sources) to the life of the people, their health and the environment. A technical- technological accident – catastrophe is a sudden and uncontrolled event or a chain of events that get out of control during handling certain means for work and during the processes involving dangerous materials in the production, use, transport, processing and storage, with consequences which endanger the security of the state and the lives of the people, material goods, and the environment.

Epidemic is an occurrence of a disease spreading within the human population. Pandemic is an epidemic that spreads on a global level. Throughout the history, there are many epidemics, like the Black Death for example. In the last 100 years, significant pandemics were the following:

- In 1918, the Spanish flu, when 50 million people died all around the world
- In 1957-58, the Asian flu, when 1 million people died
- In 1968-1969, the Hong Kong flu appeared
- The 2002-3 SARS pandemic
- The AIDS pandemic, starting in 1959
- H1N1 flu (swine flu) pandemic in 2009-2010

Other slowly spreading diseases that are still considered a global health emergencies by the WHO include: XDR TB, a kind of tuberculosis that is considerably resistant to medications, malaria, which kills 1.6 million humans every year, ebola, hemorrhagic fever, which killed hundreds of people in Africa during few outbreaks.

Although the climate on the planet Earth is always changing, today, the term climate changes unambiguously refers to the change in the climate caused by the activities of the mankind, from the start of the industrial development. These problems are recognizable to the broader population from the start of the 21 century, since in the last decade of the previous millennium it was noted that the average yearly temperature was higher from all the meteorological measurements until present. The climate changes develop very fast, and the data shows that the temperature in the whole world is moving towards the so called warm zone, creating a new climate that threatens losing the living balance and disruptions that are not possible to predict. All these global changes cause natural catastrophes like storms, snowstorms, floods and fires in all areas of the Earth. These occurrences affect the people through the use of food, water, as well as the appearance of new diseases and extinction of the flora and fauna.

The natural disasters, technological-technical catasrophes, and epidemics and climate changes pose a threat for the global security as well as to the national security of the Republic of Macedonia. The aforementioned threats will be present on mid and long

[177] G. Bankoff, G. Frerks, D. Hilhorst (eds.) (2003). Mapping Vulnerability: Disasters, Development and People. ISBN ISBN 1-85383-964-7

run and can seriously burden the security and other state institutions. The disrupt of the whole security ambience and the limited means for dealing with the same present a risk.

10. DEGRADATION AND DESTRUCTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT

Pollution and the protection of the environment became a global problem. The big concentration of population in certain regions is accompanied by the presence of industry, traffic, energetics, rubbish dumps, etc. All of this causes pollution of the natural elements of the environment: the air, water, land / soil, flora and fauna.

The Republic of Macedonia, with its natural characteristics and resources, offers possibilities for a quality life of the citizens. It has a rich geo-morphological and biological diversity, sufficient drinking water, beautiful lakes and river confluences. This is a significant potential for the present and future generations. Unfortunately, the desire for a fast profit, the disrespect of the legislation, the nonexistence of appropriate institutional and personnel capacity led to enormous pollution of the air, soil and water and disruption of the natural habitats. The fact that the Republic of Macedonia in the 21 century has problems with the environment, characteristic for the third world countries, is devastating.

The degradation and destruction of the environment represents a threat that derives from the human factor and the global warming. The aforementioned, in the future, will be one of the more significant problems and will present a threat to the Republic of Macedonia, the region, and broader. The tendency for an increased pollution of the soil, air, and water is a risk.

11. CONCLUSION

The synthesis of the desired and the possible predetermines a sequence of questions that explicitly lead to the need for a comprehensive perception of the imperilment factors to the security of the Republic of Macedonia. Hence the complexity of the dangers, risks and threats that the Republic of Macedonia faces, characterized with unpredictability, dynamics, multidimensionality, hybridism, asymmetry and transnationalism, with the tendency to affect the regional security as well. Taking into account the overall interactive relations of the surrounding, we wonder about what, or who are the sources of endangerment to the security of the Republic of Macedonia.

The stated threats to the security of the Republic of Macedonia are complex and interweaved. They differ by the plausible influence, the capacity for their detection and the possible consequences to the security of the Republic of Macedonia. Every threat and risk has a different influence on the defining of the national security policy, thus requiring development of the appropriate capacities and capabilities for prevention and management. This is where the risks to the national security of the Republic of Macedonia derive from.

Considering the geostrategic location and the global challenges it faces, the strategic aim of the Republic of Macedonia is strengthening the regional and international cooperation for prevention and more efficient dealing with the threats, risks and challenges to the national security.

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SECURITY AS PART OF DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLANNING

Maja Timovska, Dr.Sc
Protection and Rescue Directorate, the Republic of Macedonia
e-mail: timovskam@yahoo.com
Metodija Dojcinovski, Dr.Sc.
Military Academy "Gen.Mihailo Apostolski" - Skopje, Republic of Macedonia
e-mail: metodija.dojcinovski@morm.gov.mk
Mende Solunceski, Dr.Sc.
Ministry of Defence, the Republic of Macedonia
e-mail: mendesolun@yahoo.com

Abstract

The trend of natural disasters shows no decrease in global scale, and there is an urgent need for all organisations to address the priority of disaster preparedness and risk reduction. New forms of crises are calling for new and innovative approaches. Therefore, there is a need of coordinated comprehensive disaster management planning with special attention on safety and security.

In this paper authors give an overview and framework on safety and security in disaster management planning, understanding of its usefulness and the benefits and problems involved. It is true that we cannot predict when a disaster will occur, but in order to protect lives from an unexpected, it is important to get prepared. There is a need to increase the capacity to predict, monitor and reduce or avoid possible damage, addressing potential threats and strengthen preparedness for response to a disaster. The important thing is to present a complex approach and relation to the national institutions on safety and security planning level in the disaster risk management. In order to integrate disaster risk reduction we have to begin with risk assessments and integrating into planning process. More importantly the challenge remains to ensure that decision makers have to streamline collaboration between national civil protection authorities before, during and after disasters.

Safety and security in disaster management planning involve tools, methods and actions for improving response, recovery, rehabilitation, and reconstruction. This paper highlights the needs of professional, continuous and constant personnel, experts of speciality according to the disaster management planning process. The mission of the National strategy for protection and rescue is to create, sustain, and improve the capability, to mitigate against, prepare for, respond to and recover from threatened or actual natural disasters or other man-made disasters.

Effective security preparedness should be on good and proper planning. Disaster management planning should include the preventive measures, vulnerability and risk assessments, awareness raising and education with safety messages.

***Key words**: safety, security, disaster, management, planning*

1. INTRODUCTION

In the recent years the nature and magnitude of disaster have changed globally, sometimes even drastically. Disaster managers often need to make ad-hoc decisions in situation where they are just partially aware of the common operational picture. The crucial aim is to improve preparedness and resilience to disaster events by facilitating the manipulation and visualisation of complex disasters, which typically have multiple effects on society and require the integration of expertise from multiple sectors and involve financial and ethical concerns with new and innovative approaches, coordinated comprehensive disaster management planning with special attention on safety and security.

The National Plan for protection and rescue is an outcome of the national and international commitments of the Government of Macedonia for addressing the disaster risks comprehensively. According to the Protection and rescue law, the Plan was developed to reduce the vulnerability to the effects of natural, environmental, and human induced hazards to a manageable and acceptable humanitarian level by bringing a paradigm shift in disaster management from conventional response and relief practice to a more comprehensive risk reduction culture and strengthening the capacity of the disaster management system in improving the response and recoverying management at all levels.

The protection and rescue system is related to the process of successive and interconnected activities, such as: prevention, reduction of consequences, preparedness, response and recovery, which should be properly processed and represented in all segments and stages of planning and response at local, national, regional and international level. Investing in prevention and preparedness, many times reduces the consequences and resources needed for response and recovery. The Plans for protection and rescue against natural disasters and other accidents will be reviewed and transformed into practical and specific documents, which give a clear message about the procedures that should be performed by all entities. Consequently, the plans for protection and rescue will be publicly transparent planning documents, accessible to every legal entity and individuals. During this period, the legal basis for harmonization of the protection and rescue plans and other types of planning will be provided with the European directives, recommendations, standards and norms.[1][178]

The authors present that it is crucial to establish strategies to mitigate hazards, prepare for and respond to emergencies and recover from effects. At each level of government, laws define the responsibility and authority of emergency managers. The local government is responsible for emergency planning response and continued assessment of its ability to protect citizens and property within the community. According to the Yokohoma Strategy and Plan for Action for a Safer World [2], “Preventive measures are most effective when they involve participation at all levels from the local community through the national government to the regional and international level”. According to Twigg [3], preventive measures fail because the role-players involved in long-terms sustainable development programmes work in silos.

This led to adopting and implementing the concept of community based disaster risk management. It is an approach that relies on the capacity of the community to remedy their disaster situation and to help each other (Heijmans & Victoria) [4]. *A weakness in*

[178] National Strategy for Protection and Rescue for the period 2014 - 2018, "Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia" no. 6/14

security creates increased risk, which in turn creates a decrease in safety, so safety and security are directly proportional, but are both inversely proportional to risk!

2. COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH IN DISASTER MANAGEMENT

"A comprehensive approach in supporting disaster management on the ground by various means refers to civilian and military disaster management, development of co-operation, and humanitarian assistance. The goal is to coherently coordinate different activities while respecting the independent role of each actor. The impact of activities must be assessed in its entirety."

From the very beginning, a coordinated comprehensive disaster management planning with special attention on safety and security is created with the National Risk Analysis which attempts to identify both the observable physical consequences of a disruptive event and the social and psychological impacts that can be so strong that in the worst case will have a destabilising effect on society. Risk is always about what can happen in the future and is therefore associated with uncertainty. Uncertainty is connected to whether a specific disruptive event will occur and what the consequences of this event will be. In risk analyses, probability is often used as a measure of how likely it may be that a specific event will occur during a given period of time, given our base of knowledge. (Aven et al. [5].). The effects of the disruptive event on given societal assets are called consequences. [179]

The National Risk Analysis urges societal actors at all levels to answer two important questions:

1. How will my sector, county, municipality or establishment be affected by the catastrophic events that have been analysed? All events take place somewhere and have a "host municipality" and a "host county" that must manage some of the consequences locally. However, all events cannot take place everywhere. Incidents also come under the area of responsibility of one or more sectoral authorities. What events are relevant for separate risk analyses and emergency planning?

2. Which of the major events with national consequences should be scaled down based on local conditions to less serious events that will nevertheless be a disaster for the local community? A weaker storm, a smaller fire or landslide, are possible examples. An assessment should be made as to whether all the national events that are analysed in the National Risk Analysis should be included in a scaled-down form in local or sectoral risk analyses or emergency preparedness plans.

There is no single national disaster risk reduction strategy in Macedonia but there are: Legislation, Government resolutions, or various strategies and programmes. They form together the necessary preparedness of the society to the different kind of situations including disasters: National Strategy for protection and rescue, Protection and Rescue Act, Act on Security, National Assessment of endangerment for natural disasters and many other regulations and procedures.

There is a need to create National Risk Assessment in order to analyse what could happen considering what happened already, from the methods of good practices on risk assessment, with the tools structured collection of damage and loss of data, use of scientific models to forecast what could happen including climate change.

[179] Aven T., Røed W., og Wiencke H. S. (2008) Risikoanalyse [Risk Analysis]. Universitetsforlaget

Risk Management Plans based on the outcomes of the National Risk Assessments:

- adopt mitigation actions
- implement adaptation and / or preventive measures
- install Early Warning System
- plan adequate response and recovery resources
- get prepared for the reconstruction

For example, in the Netherlands, according to their National safety and security strategy, the goal is to increase the national resilience and capabilities, to prevent disasters or minimize their consequences and to minimize societal disruption. They create National risk profile updates every four years, Risk analysis of disasters, crises, threats which may affect Dutch society. All hazard thematic & correlation / cascading effects, with vulnerabilities, existing capabilities, national risk profile results: input to capabilities programme.

3. DETERMINING TERMINOLOGY

The United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) Terminology [6] aims to promote common understanding and common usage of disaster concepts and to assist the disaster efforts of authorities, practitioners and the public. According to UNISDR ***Preparedness*** is define as **"**The knowledge and capacities developed by governments, professional response and recovery organizations, communities and individuals to effectively anticipate, respond to, and recover from, the impacts of likely, imminent or current hazard events or conditions. Comment: Action of preparedness action is carried out within the context of disaster risk management and aims to build the capacities needed to efficiently manage all types of emergencies and achieve orderly transitions from response through sustained recovery. Preparedness is based on a sound analysis of disaster risks and good linkages with the early warning systems, and includes such activities as contingency planning, stockpiling of equipment and supplies, development of arrangements for coordination, evacuation, and public information, and associated training and field exercises. These must be supported by formal institutional, legal, and budgetary capacities. The related term "readiness" describes the ability to quickly and appropriately respond when required."

Disaster risk reduction is "the concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyze and manage the causal factors of disasters through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events. Comment: A comprehensive approach to reduce disaster risks is set out in the United Nations-endorsed Hyogo Framework for Action adopted in 2005, whose expected outcome is "the substantial reduction of disaster losses in lives and the social, economic, and environmental assets of communities and countries." The International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) system provides a vehicle for cooperation among Governments, organisations and the civil society actors to assist in the implementation of the Framework. Note that while the term "disaster reduction" is sometimes used, the term "disaster risk reduction" provides a better recognition of the ongoing nature of disaster risks and the ongoing potential to reduce these risks.

Disaster risk management is "the systematic process of using administrative directives, organizations, and operational skills and capacities to implement strategies, policies and improved coping capacities in order to lessen the adverse impacts of hazards and the possibility of disaster".

4. COPING WITH UNCERTAINTY

In his 1988 book, Searching for Safety, Aaron Wildavsky [7] frames this question as he seeks to identify the appropriate balance between anticipating risk and generating resilience in response to disaster. This review also addresses new methodological approaches to anticipating risk, including network analysis and computational modeling as a means of generating credible scenarios for action under known constraints of resources and law. These methods provide a way to anticipate natural, technological, or deliberate threats that government agencies have not seriously considered before. In significant ways, these methods of research are changing the perceptions, policies, and practice of managing risk and disasters over extended periods. *The dialogue between risk and security will continue. By developing new concepts, methods, and skills to reframe old questions of safety, security, and disaster management, academicians can contribute to the sustainable management of continuing risk.*

The quintessential role of government is to protect its citizens from harm. This role, widely accepted and understood for over two centuries in the United States, has led to a series of public policies and government actions that were designed to anticipate risk, prepare citizens to manage risk, and assist them in recovering from damaging events May 1985 [8], May & Williams 1986[9]. These policies and procedures, however, assume that the government itself remains intact and that citizens are the unintended victims of destructive events. The rational underlying of these policies is that the government's primary role is to pool resources from the wider society as a means of reducing the uncertainty and adverse impact from potentially extreme events. This formulation is based on the interpretation of extreme events as largely probabilistic occurrences that lay outside the control of individual citizens.

5. METHODOLOGY FOR THE CONTENTS AND MANNER OF ASSESSMENT OF HAZARDS AND PLANNING OF PROTECTION AND RESCUE

The plan for protection and rescue from natural disasters and other accidents contains the following documents - Preparedness of the protection and rescue forces; - Mobilization of protection and rescue forces, material and technical means and equipment; and - Engagement of protection and rescue forces. These documents should be mutually consistent and constitute a single whole, in particular with regard to the gradual or rapid activation of the protection and rescue system and its use in case of natural disasters.[10] The documents from the Protection and Rescue Plan are prepared in the form of examinations, diagrams, charts and appropriate instructions defining the tasks and procedures in the implementation of preventive and operational measures for protection, carrying out the actions for protection and rescue of the population and material goods, and removing the consequences of natural disasters and other accidents. The document of readiness for the protection and rescue forces was worked out in three levels of

endangerment. It is important to note that in the first degree of endangerment the following activities are planned:

- Updating all documents of the Protection and Rescue Plan,
- Introduction of continuous duty at the Directorate for Protection and Rescue and other competent bodies for protection and rescue,
- *Implementation of security measures*,
- Termination of the annual leave of the employees of the Directorate for Protection and Rescue and persons deployed in the units and headquarters and the providers of material and technical means and equipment,
- Limitation of movement of persons deployed in units and headquarters and *Security measures during mobilization.*

5.1 Preparing to handle the disasters

- Includes plans or preparations made to save lives and to help response and rescue operations.
- Evacuation of plans and stocking food and water are both examples of preparedness.
- Preparedness activities take place *before* the disaster occurs.

This phase includes developing plans for what to do, where to go, or who to call for help before an event occurs; actions that will improve your chances of successfully dealing with an emergency. For instance, posting emergency telephone numbers, holding disaster drills, and installing smoke detectors are all preparedness measures.

6. SECURITY COMMUNICATIONS IN DISASTERS DISTURBANCES

Disaster risk reduction is every one's care as it is described into the article 4 of the Protection and rescue law[180].[11] For this to become reality and part of every one's daily life, a culture of disaster safety should prevail within the society.

Disasters can be substantially reduced if people are well informed and motivated towards a culture of disaster prevention and resilience, which in turn requires the collection, compilation and dissemination of relevant knowledge and information on hazards, vulnerabilities and capacities.

Communication is a tool for the management. Communications are an integral part of managing a disturbance. The authority responsible for action is also in charge of disseminating information. Disturbances are often situations which involve a number of authorities and where other authorities support the one in charge. It is typical of a serious disturbance that an investigating authority is involved with the responsibility to disseminate information. Alarm and duty systems must be organised so that the communications staff receives relevant information without delay and is able to take measures to support the authority in charge. In organising communications, the situation awareness of the relevant staff must be seen to so that they can start communications measures to support the competent authority. It is necessary that on the local level, central administrative sectors and rescue services agree on emergency announcements in situations that pose an immediate threat to health; such situations include disruptions in the

[180] Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia, issue No. 36/04, 49/04,86/08 and 93/12

energy supply, contamination of the drinking water, radiation, and other similar disturbances.

Communications must be active. Communications are carried out effectively through various channels: official and emergency announcements to rapidly warn the population, news briefings, briefings for the media, webpages, the social media, expert interviews and guidance over the phone. It is important during a disturbance to take the initiative and communicate without delay to avoid rumours and misunderstandings which are very hard to correct afterwards. Speed is not, however, more important than the correctness of information.

Strategic communications are made more effective in conflict situations, competitive situations and when conducting co-operation. To co-ordinate messages, both regular negotiation mechanisms and mechanisms for daily communications co-operation between administrative sectors are needed.[12] [181]

It is clearly determined in the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction that *"Prevention begins with information. Awareness is the first step toward the action. Awareness can trigger interest, interest can lead to attention, and attention can prompt action. As schools are the best venue for sowing collective values, school students and teachers can serve as vehicles for building a culture of Prevention".* (UN/ISDR, 2007). The above facts remind us for proper awareness and sensitisation with strict adherence of school safety norms.

In order to manage threats against the population, society, and the state, modes of operation that are known and exercised by all actors who participate in the preparedness and management of disturbances need to be in place. As the vulnerability of society increases, it is essential that initial situation management and co-ordination on unexpected and rapidly emerging disturbances be implemented without delay. Because most disturbances have multifaceted consequences, it is important that the competent authority can rely on as broad based cross-sectoral support as possible.

Co-operation plans and exercises have to extend to all levels of administration. Apart from operational measures, provision of information among actors is highlighted as well as the importance of keeping the state leadership well-informed.

6.1 Situation awareness and situation picture

Every organisation needs information of the environment and its events as well as their impact on its own functions. *Relevant and rapid situation awareness, based on correct information and assessments, is of particular significance in disturbances when prompt decision-making is called for with possibly far-reaching effects. In order to make the right decisions, decision-makers need to know the basis and consequences of their decisions, how others will react to them and what risks are involved*. Decision-makers must therefore possess, on all operating levels, sufficient situation awareness which is instrumental in timely decision-making and operations. Situation awareness requires co-operation and competence, which enables decisionmakers to comprehensively monitor the operating environment, to compile, analyse and disseminate information, to identify research needs and to manage networks. Situation picture arrangements support the forming of situation awareness of organisations and decision-makers. In general, a situation picture refers to a description, compiled by experts, of prevailing conditions and

[181] Tiina Takala (2011) Security strategy for society, Government Resolution 16.12.2010, / Ministry of Defence , PL 31, 00131 Helsinki

the response capabilities of various actors, incidents generated by the disturbance and relating background information and assessments about developments.

The Protection and Rescue Directorate as a national disaster management authority has taken a lead in detailing the emergency plans and planning process. A key aspect of this plan at the local level is the selection in each community. These decisions must be coordinated and communicated. Perhaps this is the most important process in the National protection and rescue strategy.

Also, the National Protection and rescue strategy explicitly says *that the system for protection and rescue of the Republic of Macedonia is a unique system that will enable optimal efficiency of protection and rescue against natural disasters and protect the permanent interests arising from the fundamental values determined in the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia .Development and improvement of the preparedness of the municipalities for preventive and operative action and recovery from natural disasters and other accidents will provide effective participation of local self-government in the protection and rescue of citizens and material goods.*[182]

The Sendai Framework also articulates the need for improved understanding of disaster risk in all its dimensions of exposure, vulnerability and hazard characteristics; the strengthening of disaster risk governance, including national platforms; accountability for disaster risk management; preparedness to "Build Back Better"; recognition of stakeholders and their roles; mobilization of risk-sensitive investment to avoid the creation of a new risk; resilience of health infrastructure, cultural heritage and work-places; strengthening of the international cooperation and global partnership, and risk-informed donor policies and programs, including financial support and loans from the international financial institutions.[183][13]

7. CONCLUSION

Vulnerability to disaster is growing faster than resilience. Disaster risk reduction should be an everyday concern for everybody. There is an urgent need of reforms in the disaster management system in Macedonia. We could only advise, persuade, threaten, agreements among the multiple national and local agencies with differing responsibilities to share information and coordinate their activities.

When we start thinking of forming a security plan, then we firstly need to do *a risk assessment* for ourselves first. This risk assessment will look at amongst other things. Only by having the *essential elements of information* on hand when we start, are we off to a good start. *Start, with the identification of ris*k, by doing a thorough risk assessment, which forces us to seek out mitigation options immediately once we see the risk, thus creating a total realization of risk, and their perspective mitigation requirement, and most importantly at this stage the costs involved in getting it right, thus giving us factual elements to plan and work with.

We work best with planning if we do it strategically, if we have a model, something to mould our ideas into plans. For these people – the security cluster – above anyone else that will in most cases be the first to report, react, respond, and inform; on any potential hazard, incident as well as accident, pre, during, and post event, at any event.[14]

[182] National strategy for protection and rescue "Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia*", issue No.* 6/14
[183] Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015 - 2030, UNISDR/GE/2015

Therefore, we can no longer afford any ill or poor perception about security and security personnel and their role and function at events. Professionalism does not require a degree, it is a trained response. Only Proper training should and could address this type of required change, and we need it drastically. Mainly because the facts speak for themselves, their (our securities) burden and duty transcends the mere obvious performance of guarding and patrolling as primary security duties. We need to look into their secondary functions. It needs to become a mindset, and the place where it all starts is with creating this required focus, and awareness. By creating awareness of the role and function of event security, it has to become a totally different breed of security, by anyone's standards!

Together, these trends paint a picture of global complexity that challenges risk managers, especially at the national level. *This changing landscape requires the Protection and Rescue Directorate to adapt their processes, structures, tools and equipments to manage disruptive events of a new form*. Today, risk managers are confronted with: dealing with the unknown, dealing with other administrative levels, organisations, or reduced capacities of the local government due to decentralisation and / or privatisation, new actors with different agenda and approaches: the private sector, NGOs, constant security of the higher demands and expectations of the citizens.

Meanwhile, governments need to maintain capacity to deal with more traditional disasters as in the past. The innovations required to adapt to new features of disasters and societies replacements for existing capacities can be built on them.

Burke once said: ***"The only thing necessary for the triumph of evil is that good men should do nothing."***

We should be prepared! It is important to get prepared, coordinated comprehensive disaster management planning with special attention on safety and security! *"Natural disasters are terrifying - that loss of control, this feeling that something is just going to randomly end your life for absolutely no reason is terrifying. But, what scares me is the human reaction to it and how people behave when the rules of civility and society are obliterated". – Eli Roth*

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MANAGING IRREGULAR MIGRATION AT THE BORDERS OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA: THE CASE STUDY OF THE AIRPORT "NIKOLA TESLA" IN BELGRADE[184]

Slobodan Ćopić, Dr.Sc
Border Police Directorate, Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia
copicslo@gmail.com
Sanja Ćopić, Dr.Sc
Institute of Criminological and Sociological Research, Belgrade, Serbia
sanja.copic011@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

To enable efficient risk management at the external borders and safeguard internal security, the European Union developed the concept of Integrated Border Management (IBM), which rests upon two key principles: openness of the borders for trade and border crossing of legitimate travellers with full respect of human rights and freedoms, and closure of the borders for irregular migration and other forms of cross-border crime, which jeopardize the internal security of the respective country. This concept is relevant in contemporary Europe since it faces different security challenges, threats and risks. The subject of this paper is the analysis of managing one of the identified security risks – irregular migration at the borders of Serbia. The aim of the paper is to present the case study of managing irregular migration at the international airport "Nikola Tesla" in Belgrade. The paper starts with a brief discussion of irregular migration as a security risk. This is followed by pointing to the state of the art irregular migration at the borders of Serbia, focusing on the border crossing at Belgrade Airport. We analyse and discuss procedures of risk management by the border police in relation to irregular migration at this particular border crossing. In the conclusion we try to assess the extent to which the implementation of the IBM concept secures efficient countering of irregular migration on this part of the state border of Serbia.

Key words: *irregular migration, Integrated Border Management, risk analysis, airports, Serbia.*

1. INTRODUCTION

The increase of the scope and intensity of international migrations has become more visible since the 1970s due to the strong influence of the process of globalisation (Bobić and Babović, 2013; Feller, 2006). Forced migration has intensified as well, particularly in the post-Cold War period and political and social changes in Europe. During the past years, Europe has been facing the biggest migration, refugee or, as it is often

[184] This paper is a result of the project "Crime in Serbia: Phenomenology, Risks and Possibilities of Social Intervention", which is implemented by the Institute of Criminological and Sociological Research in Belgrade (no. 47011) and financed by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia.

referred to, humanitarian crisis after World War II, which escalated in 2015 (Metcalfe-Hough, 2015; Zirojević and Nikolić, 2017).[185] The number of mixed migration flows is increasing since people are fleeing from war, political oppression, persecution and poverty in their countries of origin, primarily in the Middle East and Africa (Jelačić et al., 2014: 14). Consequently, migration in general and issues such as exile, asylum, human trafficking, human smuggling and other forms of forced and irregular migration in particular has remained one of the core concerns of international and regional organisations and national states (Castles, 2003). Migrant or refugee crisis did not bypass the Western Balkan region, which found itself on one of the main migration routes towards the European Union (EU) countries (the so-called Western Balkan route) (Frontex, 2014). Therefore, migration and the policy of managing migration, including irregular migration, is an important issue in the Western Balkan countries, as well.

Effective and efficient migration management should be a shared responsibility of all the states, including the states of origin, transit and destination; it should combine internal and external policies that need to be harmonised. In order to enable efficient risk management at the external borders and safeguard internal security, the EU developed the concept of Integrated Border Management (IBM), which rests upon two key principles: openness of the borders for trade and border crossing of legitimate travellers with full respect of human rights and freedoms, and closure of the borders for irregular migration and other forms of cross-border crime, which jeopardize internal security of the respective country. This concept is based on cooperation within and among relevant border agencies, on the national, regional and international level (Milošević and Dostić, 2011), as well as on the risk analysis and regular information exchange. This concept is relevant in contemporary Europe since it faces different security risks, threats and challenges, including irregular migration.

The subject of this paper is the analysis of managing irregular migration as a security risk at the borders of Serbia. The aim of the paper is to present the case study of the way this security risk is managed at the international airport "Nikola Tesla" in Belgrade (hereinafter referred to as Belgrade Airport). The paper starts with a brief discussion of irregular migration as a security risk. This is followed with pointing to the situation of irregular migration at the borders of Serbia, focusing on the border crossing "Surčin", which is situated at Belgrade Airport. Afterwards, we analyse and discuss procedures of risk management in relation to irregular migration at this particular border crossing. In the conclusion we try to assess the level in which implementing the IBM concept secures efficient countering of irregular migration on this part of Serbia's state border.

2. IRREGULAR MIGRATION AS A SECURITY RISK: DEFINING THE BASIC CONCEPTS

There is no clear or universally accepted definition of irregular migration. According to the International Organisation for Migration, it generally refers to different forms of illegal movement of people and their illegal status in a given country (IOM,

[185] According to the data of the Commissariat for Refugees and Migration of the Republic of Serbia, 579518 migrants from the Middle East and Africa crossed the state border of the Republic of Serbia in 2015, which was several times more than the number of asylum seekers in 2014 (Bilten Komesarijata za izbeglice i migracije, January-December 2015, Available at http://www.kirs.gov.rs/docs/aktuelno/20160119_newsletter_sr.pdf, page accessed on 22 January 2016).

2011). According to the Serbian legislation,[186] which uses the term illegal migration, illegal migrant would be a foreigner who enters the country illegally or who enters the country legally but remains in it after the time for legal stay has expired. However, in more recent literature the term irregular migration is correctly more often used than the term illegal migration (Pace and Severance, 2016; Babić and Babović, 2013; Carens, 2008; Koser, 2005). By using the term irregular migration, the criminalisation of migrants and their stigmatisation is avoided; this term is also more adequate from the human rights-based approach since it is less devastating and humiliating; finally, using the term illegal may negatively impact the legal procedures (e.g. asylum procedure) and consequently providing assistance and protection to those in need (Ćopić Slobodan and Ćopić Sanja, 2017). Thus, for the purpose of this paper we opt for the term irregular migration as more convenient and broader.

Transnational migration in general and irregular migration in particular has become "one of the most important security issues in the EU" (Zirojević and Nikolić, 2017: 139). As some authors pointed out, "it is believed that irregular migration negatively impacts host communities by undermining the rule of law, fostering labor exploitation, increasing poverty [...], and putting pressure on public services" (Morehouse and Blomfield, 2011: 2). On the other hand, migrants in irregular situation are particularly vulnerable to different forms of discrimination, violence and exploitation, including human trafficking and migrant smuggling. Therefore, a comprehensive, inclusive and holistic approach to migration issues is required. However, the policy of managing migration in general and irregular migration in particular depends on the dominant public discourse, political paradigm and the context in which migration is considered. One of these frameworks considers migration as a risk, threat and challenge to the security – the so called *security-migration nexus* (Levy, 2010: 93; Feller, 2005: 30). The recent situation of migration in Europe has been predominantly considered as a threat to national (state) security. But, the state-centric concept of security is narrow, particularly for understanding the position of people in the context of migration, being rather ignorant towards the threats to their personal security and their rights and interests. In other words, considering migration within this framework only shifts the focus from dealing with migrants as human beings and leads to the securitization of migration policy and management. Therefore, there is a need for an approach that will also encompass the so called *migration-asylum nexus* (Levy, 2010: 93; Feller, 2005: 30). Such an approach would make a balance between the state security policy and human security and the rights-based approach, which calls for providing assistance and support to those in need.

Therefore, when speaking about managing irregular migration as a security risk we refer to the integrated concept of security which refers to both 'state' and 'human' security issues, which are of equal importance. This is the so called humanitarian border management, which endeavours to help the state to make a balance between humanitarian response to migration and the care for the security and safety of migrants, transit countries and the countries of origin.

[186] Zakon o upravljanju migracijama [The Law on the Migration Management], "Službeni glasnik RS", No. 107/2012.

3. IRREGULAR MIGRATION AT BELGRADE AIRPORT

In the last few years, the passenger traffic at the Belgrade Airport has increased significantly and, on an annual basis, a growing trend has been registered (Table 1).

Table 1: Passenger traffic at the Belgrade Airport

Year	Number	Index
2010	2698730	100
2011	3124633	116
2012	3363919	125
2013	3543194	131
2014	4638577	172
2015	4776164	177
2016	4924992	182
2017	5343420	198

Source: Annual Statistics of the Airport Nikola Tesla Beograd[187]

If we consider the data in Table 1 in the context of migration and refugee crisis during 2015 and 2016 from the perspective of the border police's jurisdiction, we may argue that irregular migration has been recognised as a risk at the border crossing at the Belgrade Airport. This is supported by two trends noticed by the border police officers: firstly, an increase in the number of refusals of entry into the territory of Serbia and, secondly, an increase in the number of asylum seekers, and tightly linked to that the abuse of the right to asylum in a certain number of cases.

The data in Table 2 suggests oscillations in the number of refusals of entry into the territory of Serbia at Belgrade Airport since 2010. The largest increase was registered in 2015, coinciding with the migration pressure on Serbia, and in 2017, which we will explain later.

Table 2: Refusals of entry into the territory of Serbia at Belgrade Airport

Year	Number	Index
2010	713	100
2011	1516	213
2012	825	116
2013	1337	188
2014	1017	143
2015	1893	265
2016	1379	193
2017	2037	286

Source: Annual Reports of the Border Police Station "Beograd"

The most frequent reasons for denying entry to foreign citizens included non-possession of entry visa or expiration of the visa validity period, non-possession of a travel

[187] Available at http://www.beg.aero/lat/strana/11191/arhiva-statistike, page accessed on 26 February 2018.

document or an identity card, possession of a forged passport or other travel document, search for a person or a document, unclear purpose of stay, failure to provide means of subsistence and lack of fulfilment of conditions for continuing travel to a third country. In these situations, foreign citizens resorted to misuse of the visa-free regime, abuse of transit through identity change or by using airline tickets of other companies, using forged Serbian visas, forged passports, visas and residence permits of the EU Member States or other countries, or misuse of invitation letters. According to the border police assessment and risk analysis,[188] it was reasonably suspected that in these cases the foreigners who attempted to enter Serbia would not use their stay in Serbia for tourism or business purposes. Their main goal was to leave Serbia illegally, once entering it through Belgrade Airport, in order to reach their final destination in some of the Western European countries. This is supported by the data on the structure of persons who were refused entry by citizenship: these were mainly citizens of Turkey, Iran, Tunisia, India, Syria, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Nigeria, Indonesia, the Philippines, Ghana, Cuba, Iraq, Algeria, Mongolia and Brazil. These were mainly persons coming from countries 'at risk' of being an irregular migration source and countries that produce refugees. In 2015, 2016 and 2017 an increase in the number of citizens of Iran, Tunisia, India and Mongolia was registered. After an assessment of the benefits of their stay and based on a suspicion that their stay would not be used for the intended purpose, they were refused entry. Finally, in the last few years, a new trend has been noticed: a number of refused entries to citizens of the Russian Federation.[189] However, in these cases these were passengers originating from Syria who had Russian travel documents. In several cases, passengers also had Syrian documents, and it was assumed that after entering Serbia they would continue their journey through Hungary and Croatia to the countries of Western Europe.

The second registered trend is the increase in the number of asylum seekers at Belgrade Airport (Table 3).

Table 3: Foreigners who expressed intention to seek asylum at the border at Belgrade Airport

Year	Number	Index
2010	2	100
2011	1	50
2012	0	0
2013	2	100
2014	19	950
2015	265	13250
2016	24	1200
2017	66	3300

Source: Annual Reports of the Border Police Station "Beograd"

[188] According to FRONTEX standards and guidelines, risk analysis is done, inter alia, on the basis of airline company data, specific nationalities, routes and information on incidents at international airports. When making a risk analysis, information about the number of persons refused entry into the country, the total number of asylum seekers, relevant data on misuse of documents, falsification of travel documents and data on characteristic and specific events at international airports are taken into account.

[189] In 2014, 16 citizens of the Russian Federation were denied entry into Serbia, in 2015 - 22, in 2016 - 30 and in 2017 - 27.

The largest increase in the number of asylum seekers in comparison to 2010 was registered in 2015, which is in line with the increase in the total number of asylum seekers in Serbia that year (Commissariat for Refugees and Migration, 2015).[190] In the structure of asylum seekers, citizens of Syria, Turkey (persons with Turkish travel documents but originating from Syria), Iraq and Pakistan prevailed. In 2016, the largest number of asylum requests was filed by citizens from Cuba, followed by those coming from Syria, Afghanistan and Algeria. In 2017, Iranian citizens expressed their intention to seek asylum in Serbia in most cases. Additionally, in 2017 the number of foreign citizens who were only in transit via Belgrade Airport has increased. This is primarily related to the citizens of Iran, India, Tunisia and Turkey who do not need visas for Serbia.

Another point to be made here refers to the abuse of the right to asylum. The border police have noticed that foreigners who were denied entry at Belgrade Airport subsequently expressed their intention to seek asylum in Serbia. In the first contact with the police officers during border control, the foreigners coming from migratory high-risk countries mainly stated that the purpose of their travel was tourism. However, immediately after their entry was denied for some of the above mentioned reasons, they expressed intention to seek asylum in Serbia and enter its territory in this way. In a certain number of cases this presented an abuse of the right to asylum, since in most of these cases, the foreigners who were issued a confirmation on the expressed intention to seek asylum did not approach the asylum centres nor officially continued the asylum procedure in Serbia.

Recent trends related to irregular migration at Belgrade Airport can be explained by the geographical position of Serbia and the fact that many countries are not in the visa system with Serbia. Furthermore, the transfer via Belgrade Airport may be an easier and faster route for part of the migrants towards their final destination, the EU countries. Additionally, the opening of some new direct flights (in particular with Asian countries) contributes to the increase in the number of passengers, which is reflected to a certain extent in the increase in the number of asylum seekers and, in some cases, in the abuse of the right to asylum.

4. THE PROCEDURES OF MANAGING IRREGULAR MIGRATION AT BELGRADE AIRPORT

The security of state borders presents the first "pillar" of safeguarding the security of each country and its citizens (Živković, 2008: 95). This requires a full implementation of the IBM concept. According to the Integrated Border Management Strategy of the Republic of Serbia,[191] the following border services are part of the IBM at Belgrade Airport: Border Police Station "Beograd", Customs Office, Phytosanitary Inspection, Sanitary Inspection and Veterinary Inspection. The Office of the Commissariat for Refugees and Migration operates at Belgrade Airport as well. In this section, we focus on

[190] In 2015, there were 579,518 expressed intentions to seek asylum in Serbia, from 313,335 men and 92,188 women (Commissariat for Refugees and Migration, 2015: 56). The majority of asylum seekers came from Syria (52.1%) and Afghanistan (27.8%), followed by Iraq (13.3%), Iran (2%) and Pakistan (1.6%). This was 35 times more than the number of asylum seekers in 2014 (16,490) (Visoki komesarijat UN za izbeglice, 2015). However, out of the total number of those that expressed intention to seek asylum, only 586 persons (0.1%) filed an application for asylum (Commissariat for Refugees and Migration, 2015: 58).

[191] Strategija integrisanog upravljanja granicom u Republici Srbiji [Integrated Border Management Strategy of the Republic of Serbia], "Službeni glasnik RS", No. 11/06 and 111/2012.

the role and conduct of the border police in managing irregular migration, as the key stakeholder of the IBM model.

Since 2005, the Border Police Station "Beograd" (hereinafter referred to as the BPS) has been an organizational unit of the Border Police Directorate in the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia (MoI). It is, *inter alia*, responsible for border crossing control and state border security, including combating cross-border crime and irregular migration. The Section for the Suppression of Cross-Border Crime, Illegal Migration and Trafficking in Persons is also part of the BPS. In comparison to land and sea borders, the air border is somehow abstract, so the point of entry is usually a passport-control booth. Consequently, nobody can enter the country undetected and this is why international airports in general represent a specific range of border management issues.

At Belgrade Airport, based on the risk analysis and assessment, which is carried out based on the Common Integrated Risk Analysis Model (CIRAM) methodology (Ćopić, 2016), flights from certain countries 'at risk' of being an irregular migration source are registered and specific procedures applied. In these cases, following the examples of best practice from other European airports, the passengers (foreign citizens) are checked at an earlier point, i.e. at the exit from the gate; they are profiled, their travel documents and the purpose of their travel checked. Special attention is given to foreigners who come to Serbia for the first time, who continue their journey (en-route passengers) and when a larger group of people come. This is the so-called preventive control, which is performed by border police officers. The purpose of this control is to prevent entry of passengers into the transit zone and possible abuses (e.g., to prevent passengers from destroying their travel documents) and to identify risky and undocumented passengers on time. It is performed prior to passport, i.e. the first-line check control, and it also enables identification of potential victims of human trafficking,[192] refugees and asylum seekers (vulnerable groups of passengers).[193] If this preventive control has not been carried out, passengers come directly to the passport control (passport-control booth) where the first-line check is performed. During this control, personal documents and other requirements for allowing entry are checked.[194]

When there is a suspicion of irregular migration, either at the so-called preventive control or during the first-line check, police officers separate those passengers in order to perform the second-line check. These passengers remain in the place where passport control is regularly performed; thus, they are not placed in a separate area during the second-line check. A search of the passenger and his/her baggage is performed as well. If during the second-line check border the police officers determine that the entry requirements are not met, the passenger is denied entry into the territory. A passenger who is denied entry remains in the transit zone of Belgrade Airport until the conditions for his/her safe return to the initial destination are met. These persons are kept in an area specifically designated for this category of passengers; thus, they do not interfere with other en-route passengers. Securing safety in this area and taking care of these persons (providing food, water, etc.) is a responsibility of the security service of Belgrade Airport (the operator), and not of the border police. However, in more complex cases, which

[192] Handbook on Risk Profiles on Trafficking in Human Beings (2015) Risk Analysis Unit, Frontex.

[193] More on the procedures of the border police at the airports in Serbia can be found in: Ćopić, 2016. It is also relevant to mention that Slobodan Ćopić, one of the co-authors of this paper worked as a Commander of the Border Police Station "Beograd" in the period 2008-2017.

[194] For the control of the documents the *DOCUBOX Dragon Projectina* equipment is used. More on this can be found at http://www.optoteam.at/fileadmin/optoteam/PDF/Forensics/001%20DBDragon%20EN.pdf

require a longer stay of passenger(s) before their safe return to the initial destination, the foreigner(s) are detained in the Shelter for Foreigners (an organisational unit of the MoI) in accordance with the provisions of the Law on the Police[195] and the Law on Foreigners[196]. The accommodation of a foreigner in the Shelter is organised in coordination with the police officers from the Department for Foreigners of the Police Directorate for the City of Belgrade (territorial police).

If a foreigner expresses intention to seek asylum, either during the first contact with the border police officer or after his/her entry into the territory was denied, the procedure is carried out in accordance to the Law on Asylum[197] (see more in Ćopić Sanja and Ćopić Slobodan, 2016). A foreigner may express intention to seek asylum either orally or in writing. If a person expresses intention to seek asylum during the border control at Belgrade Airport, he/she will be registered by an authorized police officer. The registration includes the issuance of a certificate, which allows a foreigner to stay in the territory of Serbia for 72 hours and, consequently, protection against punishment for illegal entry and stay in the territory of the country and forced removal. In other words, the issuance of this certificate legalizes the stay of the foreigner in the territory of the country for a certain period of time. However, the recording itself is not considered to be an application for asylum. After registration, the foreigner is referred to report to the Office for Asylum or the Centre for Asylum within 72 hours and file the asylum application form.[198] The jurisdiction of the BPS police officers ends at that point.

5. CONCLUSION

Irregular migration has been recognized as a security risk in the practice of the border police in Serbia, including the boder police at Belgrade Airport. This is supported by two above analysed trends: an increase in the number of refusals of entry into the territory of the country, and the increase in the number of asylum seekers, particularly in cases when entry into Serbia was previously denied. The increase in these phenomena, quite expectedly, coincided with the increased migratory pressure during 2015 and 2016, although it continued throughout 2017, even though the Western Balkan route was closed. Nevertheless, observed in absolute numbers and in relation to the constant growth of the number of passengers, it can be concluded that the issue of irregular migration over Belgrade Airport has been kept under control. On the one hand, this can be explained by the fact that the border police officers exercise their duties in accordance to the legal regulations and act on the basis of risk assessment and analysis carried out according to the CIRAM methodology. Finally, this situation can at least be partly explained by the specificities of travelling in air traffic (e.g. costs of airline tickets, the fact that persons cannot enter the country undetected, etc.).

The full implementation of the IBM concept at Belgrade Airport contributes to better cooperation among border services, crime-intelligence, risk analysis and information exchange, which certainly contributes to the increase of efficiency in the suppression of all forms of organised and cross-border crime, including irregular migration. This was already recognised in 2006 when Serbia adopted its first IBM Strategy since implementing IBM

[195] Zakon o policiji [The Law on the Police], "Službeni glasnik RS", No. 6/2016.
[196] Zakon o strancima [The Law on Foreigners], "Službeni glasnik RS", No. 97/2008.
[197] Zakon o azilu [The Law on Asylum], "Službeni glasnik RS", No. 109/2007.
[198] For more information on the asylum procedure see in Ćopić Sanja and Ćopić Slobodan, 2016

model was one of the requirements for more liberal visa regime with the EU, but it is also relevant in the process of Serbia's accession to the EU. In practice, particularly in regard the air border, it is essential for efficient border control and risk assessment and management.

Nevertheless, it can be concluded that some reforms are still needed in order to improve the system of migration management at Belgrade Airport, which could be considered at three levels: at the level of legislation, at the level of obligations of the operator (Airport itself) and at the level of the border police practice and cooperation with relevant actors. In order to improve the system of control and management of irregular migration at the air border, it is necessary to define more precisely the powers and actions of the border police officers in the transit zone of the international airport (also see: Jelačić et al., 2014: 29), which is important from the perspective of the procedures in general and the access to asylum in particular. It is necessary to reconstruct and adapt the airport premises where the passengers who are denied entry into Serbia stay in order to fully comply with the standards and principles stipulated by the relevant international and European instruments, especially with regard to the protection and respect of their fundamental human rights. It is also necessary to ensure a complete separation of passengers upon departure and arrival in order to avoid their mixing and possible abuses. At the same time, international regulations in the field of air security would be respected. Furthermore, it is important to ensure implementation of the good practices, especially in regard to applying the API (Advanced Passenger Information) and PNR (Passenger Name Record) systems, which allow for timely risk analysis and adequate response of the border police officers. Finally, it is important to continue bilateral, regional and international cooperation, particularly with FRONTEX and MARRI initiative, which contributes to the continuous exchange of experience, knowledge and information, which is relevant for the continuous improvement of the work of the border police and the procedures and practices of migration control, including irregular migration at international airports.

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DATA AS THE STARTING POINT OF A SECURITY ASSESSMENT

Zeljko Nincic, Dr.Sc
Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, Belgrade
zeljko.nincic@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

Throughout history, there has been a constant need to confront with different types of threats that humans had to find the most effective way to protect their own values and the values of the community in which they live. The choice of effective way of protection implies identification of all endangering factors, analysis of their influence, strengths and the means they use to materialize their destructive character, but also development and operative prediction of such phenomena in the future. The basic document, whose quality production guarantees the timely response of the security system to all forms of social threats, is the security assessment. On the other hand, the starting point for making the quality security assessment is data or information. The correctness of conclusions and decisions made by those who are in charge of managing the society's security system depends on the quality of the collected data and proper analytical processing. Quality security assessment means timely reaction and adequate response to the destructive effect of certain phenomena.

Starting from the issue of actuality, the paper points to the goal of collecting the data, but also to the conceptual distinction of the terms *data* and *information*. Different data sources and collection ways are considered separately. The importance of analytical data processing and the influence it has on the quality security assessment is emphasized. Special attention is paid to the importance and basic characteristics of the police - intelligence model, which is being developed in the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia, as a modern model of managing police actions based on criminal – intelligence information.

Key words: security assessment, data, information, police – intelligence model.

1 INTRODUCTION

In order to protect their own values and the values of the community in which they live, people plan and take actions to collect data on all phenomena which can make negative influence on them and their living environment by their scope, intensity and mode of expression. The Recognition (identification) of destructive phenomena, the analysis of the strength and the means by which they express their negative effect, represents only the beginning of a society's reaction to the negative effect that such phenomena have on human beings and society as a whole. In addition, it is crucial to anticipate the possible negative action of such phenomena in the future. In this sense, the key factor of an adequate response to the destructive character of certain phenomena is the security assessment. It is an analysis of certain factors that, individually or jointly, influence the sescurity degree in affected communities or societies, as well as the analysis of the system

readiness, or the readiness of the security services to address the threatening activities (Djordjevic, 1986: 299).

In order for the reaction to be adequate, it is necessary at the very beginning to clearly define the relationship between the protected good (*value*), in which way it is in danger (*endangering*), and how we should try to eliminate or reduce the negative impact of such phenomena and create normal living and working conditions (*safety*). In this sense, the value should be considered as an ideal of certain objects (items, actions, contents of consciousness) that people attach to them and that makes them desirable for people because they use them to improve their lives and enjoy them (Lukic, 1982: 121). On the other hand, endangering is every event, phenomenon, violent action of people, natural occurrence or by technical means, which is sudden, unpredicted and happens in different time intervals, causing different (harmful) consequences for people and property. As a certain balance to endangering, safety appears as the absence of danger for the acquired values, or the absence of a threat to vital values of a certain human collectivity. This is, in fact, the state of someone who is not endangered, where the danger for his physical, spiritual or property integrity is absented (Mijalkovski and Djordjevic, 2010: 285).

At the end, safety depends on the social response to various forms of endangering. However, the answer depends on the quality of the document for identification of the endangering phenomena, analysis of their intensity and means and the prediction of their development in the future. That document is the security assessment. For decision-makers, security assessment is the basis for timely "setting up" the security system and an adequate response to all forms of endangering. Achieving such a goal is conditioned by the quality of the security assessment basic element, which is the *data*.

2 CONCEPTUAL DEFINITION AND THE GOAL OF DATA COLLECTION

The importance of information collection was pointed out by Byzantine emperor, Nicifor II Foka (ruled from 963. to 969.) in his treatise on military issues, where he says "Don’t ever chase away a free man or a slave who tells you that he has something important to tell you, no matter whether it is day or night, you are sleeping, eating or bathing" (Dvornik, 1974: 53). This warning was promulgated in all military branches because those who freely offer information are considered the best data sources.

The main goal of data collection (in security sense) is identification of the security risk of a certain phenomenon or activity. It is not a simple sum of certain facts and data collection has to be a cognitive process, a logical connection of facts which, once they are analytically processed, will result in correct conclusions. The correct conclusion further leads to correct decisions, which is (in security sense) priceless. That is the way to create conditions for a reaction that is adequate to the destructive action of a certain phenomenon or activity.

The data is a set of interconnected facts, representing a unique whole, whereby it may relate to an event, state, relationship, phenomenon or a process that exists in the objective reality, independent of our consciousness and will (Djordjevic, 1980: 86). It is a fact statement exposed – represented in the way that fact is understood or presented by data source. The data is all cognition, data, which comprise certain information (Boskovic and Matijevic, 2007:106). It is a certain quantity of raw, unanalyzed information which identify persons, organizations, evidence, or show processes which indicate the phenomenon of a criminal offense, a witness or evidence of a criminal act (GIWG: 2004).

Data as a “raw” set of certain facts, by itself, will have no sense if it is not placed in a certain logical order, brought into a certain connection and processed. Such a procedure leads to information that actually represents data and means something, that is usable. Only data that can be properly interpreted contain information. Information is the meaning given to data, using the rules used for their interpretation, such as verification, assessment, classification and indexing (Brincka and Raguz, 2010: 41). It is the result of analysis and organization of data in a way to give knowledge to the information receiver. The information consists of data with a meaning given by relationships, or organized data that is arranged for better understanding. (Sebek, 2015:54). The one who receives information should recognize the right, true information and to select and analyze it in order to use it. Information is obtained from the so-called data source (Malis Sazdovska, 2006:135).

3 DATA SOURCES AND COLLECTION METHOD

Collecting information is the starting phase in the process of possible threat sources. The high availability of different data sources imposes the need for a planned approach to collecting information, if we want to avoid a certain "confusion" that may occur as a consequence of random collecting and analyzing the available data. Therefore, data collection, as well as any activity aimed at some expected outcome, must be approached through an organized method. This is necessary, especially when it comes to security phenomena and events, bearing in mind their character and possible consequences. Planed collection is a set consisted of identifying the necessary information, identifying and using adequate information sources, identifying the necessary resources for collecting, arranging and documenting the collected information, analyzing the information and making adequate conclusions, or assessing the situation. This way ensures that the information sources are properly identified, data and information are properly processed and analyzed, right conclusions are made and appropriate measures and actions are taken. It means that the proper security system is “set up“ and protected against possible endangering.

Data sources are intermediaries, responsible for finding out facts and they can be human, document, material or tehnical devices. Humans are the largest and the most complex data source. Human senses are not perfect, so perceptual and cognitive skills are limited and conditioned by the abilities and the state in a concrete situation. Objectivity and precision of cognition depend on the tendency, experience and state (frightened, irritated), in which a person is at the moment of observing the facts. Perceptual skills are individual and two persons can have the same knowledge about the same fact in objective reality. The differences can be larger during the presentation of the observed. The data will be more precise if it is collected from a person with good linguistic skills and thus the observed events, states or phenomena are more authentic (Djordjevic, 1980: 86). With respect to the importance of direct observation, there is a fact from the First World War, when a large number of people in Belgium were spying on the movements and supplying of German forces. It is thought that over two thousand Belgians observed the railroad traffic and reported on it. The most famous network was the so-called *White lady*, which was spread all over Belgium and counted over 1200 people (Messenger, 1988: 44).

In theory and practice, the classification of data sources is different and it depends on the established criteria of division. One of the most widespread classifications is the division of resources into open, closed and disguised information sources.

Open sources of information are all sources that are available in public. Information collected from these sources is any kind of information that can be collected in a legal, but also ethical way, describing people, behavior, locations, groups, events or trends (Carter, 2004: 284). The open sources of information include electronic and printed media, the Internet, statistical and other publicly available databases, public debates and the like.

However, there are often debates about the values of open sources of information and the value of confidential (closed) sources of information. Mostly, there are three different stances. *The first*, where the information obtained from an open source has less value than the information obtained from confidential sources. *The second*, which sees open source information not only as an addition to classified information, but also as a potential source of valuable criminal-intelligence information. *The third* is a moderate solution, which claims that open sources can be helpful as a first step in collecting information, but are unlikely to play the first role in tackling certain threats (Best and Cumming, 2008: 2).

Closed sources of information are all sources that are not available to the public. These sources also include information that is classified by some degree of confidentiality in information systems. Closed sources of information are different databases of law enforcement agencies, databases of other state authorities, organizations and institutions (customs, military, prosecution, courts, inspection bodies ...), information obtained through international data network (Interpol, Europol ...) on the basis of bilateral and multilateral agreements and the like. Information obtained from closed sources is available only to a certain circle of people, which makes them protected against unauthorized use, transmission or disclosure to other people or bodies, without the permission of the provider.

In modern conditions, *covert* data collection is becoming significantly important as open and closed sources of information. Inter-state cooperation, increased communication and contacts between people are conditions which favor covert data collection. Covert data collection is much more economical, the process is simpler, faster and cheaper. Reliable people are engaged, so re examination of the sources is almost unnecessary in the collected data evaluation (Djordjević, 1980:67). Covert (secret) methods of data collection may include the use of informants, interception of information, electronic and physical surveillance, and photographing. When those methods are used in a way to temporarily limit the individual's privacy, they are called *intrusive methods of investigation* and those are - special investigative measures or special investigative techniques (Hutton, 2012: 92).

4 ANALYTICAL DATA PROCESSING AND INFLUENCE ON THE SECURITY ASSESSMENT

The analysis is considered as one of the most important processes in the information collection / processing/analysis/use cycle. It is a thoughtful process which means that collected and processed information is in a certain logical connection defining links between them and taking appropriate measures and actions by the user, with the aim of protecting the defined values from certain threats.

This is especially important in making a security assessment, where we have to take care of different factors that may have a negative influence on its adoption and on making wrong decisions. For example, the occurrence of skepticism, subjectivism or prejudices in the person involved in the process of creation can have far-reaching

consequences. Having prejudices during the analyzing of collected data negatively influences the perception process of a particular phenomenon and its further development, hence, the probability of a particular event occurrence. The analysis process itself consists of determining the essential characteristics of the collected information by using different sources. The analysis should determine their cause-consequence connection and help the end users make an adequate decision. In this sense, one of the basic requirements in the process of security assessment making is complete coordination of all stakeholders whose involvement in that process is necessary. This means (Nincic, 2017:391):

- *First*, the establishment of a unified information system which collects information on the phenomenon which is assessed, or "pooling" of information at one place (defining the roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders, establishing the required relationships and modes of communication, the choice of activities, etc.);
- *Second*, defining clear procedures in all phases of the security assessments and defining the specific tasks of all participants in the assessment process;
- *Third*, clearly defining the tasks and procedures provides immunity of the security assessment system, or protection against a "breakthrough" due to the lack of understanding of its essence by certain students in the decision-making process, which could lead to incorrect assessing and wrong decision making;
- *Fourth*, analysis of the information obtained from the persons who previously had experience in dealing with this kind of information, thus achieving full understanding of the available information by all participants in their analysis, and
- *Fifth*, the possibility for review of the security assessment, if at an early stage of its development, by identifying the changes of the security challenges, risks and threats. The objective of a review of the security assessment is to determine the relevance of the current assessment and if necessary, take certain corrective measures in the process of its creation.

However, the quality of the analysis process does not depend only on the quality of the analysis, but on the quality of the collected "raw" information (Carter, 2004: 68). Data quality is the basic precondition for its "usability". The quality of the data depends on its possibility to "become" the information. They must be usable, adaptable, economical and must be prepared for transformation into knowledge. Transformation of data into information must be in real time and in short time intervals, so their analysis can lead to correct conclusion and predictions, or correct decisions based on them. Quality information is contributing to proper decision-making. Also, the assessment of information should be in accordance with three basic principles (UNODC, 2010: 25): it must be based on its own judgment rather than under the influence of personal feelings; the assessment of the information source and the assessment of information must be carried out independently; the assessment must be carried out as close as possible to the source of the information.

The essence of analytical work is to analyze the collected information in order to gain a certain meaning and develop one or more theories about current happenings or what can happen in the future. This analytical process consists of several phases (UNODC, 2011: 66): *integration of information, interpreting information, developing a hypothesis.*

If the data collection and processing phases are carried out in a proper and organized way and if the quality of the collected data is at a level to enable a quality analytical process, it leads to a conclusion as the basic product of that process. The quality of the previous phases is rightly conditioned to reach a conclusion, which is of particular importance for making a security assessment, which should represent an imaginary picture

of the future development of a certain phenomenon, on the basis of which measures are taken to protect the vital values of the company. The quality of the previous phases is a condition for the right conclusion, which is of particular importance for making a security assessment. The security assessment should represent an imaginary picture of the future development of a certain phenomenon. On these grounds, measures should be taken to protect the vital values of society.

5 POLICE INTELLIGENCE MODEL[199]

The specificity of modern crime requires adjusting of the security structures, primarily in the intelligence sense. First of all, this includes an organized information collection about all the important elements of criminal activities, their quality analytical processing and, on this basis, their future development assessment. This creates conditions for an adequate response of the security system and reduction or complete elimination of the negative consequences of such destructive phenomena. In this sense, it is very important to collect information in an organized and systematic way and to create an adequate system for collected information managment.

The Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia has, with the help of the Swedish Police Directorate and the Swedish Development and Cooperation Agency, initiated the development of a police intelligence model (Intelligence-Led Policing) at the beginning of 2017 as a modern, proactive concept of managing the police in countering crime. It is a model that is based on criminal intelligence information, which servesd as ther foundation for defining the strategic and operational priorities, and directing the activity of the police with the use of human and material capacities in the most rational way.

The implementation of the police intelligence model is carried out through the *criminalistics – intelligence process*, which is made of twelve basic functions. These are: strategic and operational planning, request, planning criminalistic-intelligence works, collection, processing, analysis, delivering, deciding, planning operational-police works, implementation, monitoring, evaluation and quality management.

The afore-stated functions of the criminal intelligence process indicate that it is a set of three interconnected subprocesses: *leadership and management tasks* (strategic and operational planning, requirements, decision making, evaluation and quality management); *criminalistic – intelligence jobs* (planning, collection, processing, analysis, delivery); and *planned operational – police affairs* (planning, implementation, monitoring).

[199] Костадиновић, Н., и Клисарић, М., (2016). Полицијско – обавештајни модел. Приручник. *Министарство унутрашњих послова*. Downloaded from the site http:/www.mup.gov.rs., January 18th 2018.

5.1 Leadership[200] and management[201] jobs

The police-intelligence model includes leadership and management jobs at three levels: central, regional and local. At the *central level* (it includes the police jurisdiction on the entire territory of the Republic of Serbia), the Strategic Group for leadership and management of the Police Directorate[202] and the Operational group for leadership and management of the Criminal Police Directorate[203] have been established. At the *regional level* (includes the area of police administration), operational groups for leadership and management of the police administration have been established, while at the local level operational groups for leadership and management of the police stations (where necessary) have been established.

The groups set up at these three levels are different by jurisdiction, authorization, composition, and the time needed for planning. The basic precondition for the effective functioning of the groups is the interconnection of the plans, decisions, goals and composition. The highest representative / representatives of the lower group, at the same time, are part of the higher groups, and that constitutes a chain of command and the principle of unified leadership.

5.2 Criminal Intelligence work

Criminal Intelligence work means planning, collecting, processing and analyzing data and information relating to crime and other security endangering phenomena, which are the basis for creating criminalistic-inteligence information (products) and delivering them to the users – strategic and operational groups for leading and managing the operational police units. This work is carried out on three levels: central, regional and local. The central level includes the territory of the Republic of Serbia, while the criminalistic-intelligence work is carried out by organizational units responsible for this type of work. The regional level includes the area of police administration. Criminal intelligence work on this level is performed by the organizational units of the police

[200] Process during which the supervisor influences personnel (motivation, selection, training, schedule, promotion) In order to reach defined goals of POM.

[201] Process of planning, organization, coordination and control, which is aimed at the organizational resources (human, financial, physical, information), in order to reach the strategic and operational goals of POM in an effective, efficiency and economical way.

[202] The Strategic Group for the leadership and management of the Police Directorate is composed of strategic and high level managers and includes the Director of the Police, Deputy and Assistant Directors and Heads of the Organizational Units of the Police Directorate. The strategic group makes decisions on: the priorities and goals for the planned operational and police work in the long-term; the needs for criminal intelligence products; the balance of allocating resources between proactive and reactive police work; the needs and provision of organizational and individual competencies; developing methodology of work in all jurisdictions; the cooperation with external authorities (security services, judiciary bodies, customs, local self-government bodies and the like)

[203] The Operational Group for leadership and management of the Criminal Police Directorate has high level Heads of the Criminal Police Directorate and medium level Heads – units which are performing crminalistic intelligence and operational police jobs. The Operational Group has four basic functions: operative planning; acting on concrete criminalistic intelligence products; coordination of planned operational – police work and actions in fighting crime between regional police administrations; evaluation of the conducted operational - police affairs and actions.

administration criminal analytics and the organizational unit for criminal intelligence work at the central level responsible for the area of police administration. The key tasks and areas of the organizational unit for criminal analytics are mostly same with the tasks and areas charachteristic of the central level except for those which are charachteristic of the central level (strategic analitic researches, cooperation with the state authorities on the highest level, organizing trainings for the leadership and supervisors for work with operational connections with criminal analyzers and managers; development of methodology and data collection, processing and analysis; providing professional help).

The local level covers the area of police stations. On the local level, where the operational group for leadership and management is established, the criminal intelligence work, processing and analysis are carried out by the criminal analyzer.

5.3 Planned operational – police work

Planned operational – police work is police work which is conducted on the basis of the decisions made by the leadership and management groups, drawing on the criminal – intelligence information (products) and the use of operational-tactic, technical and investigative methods and actions. The basic goal of the planned operational – police work is developing strategic, operational and tactical plans for fighting crime and better prevention, reducing the crime ratio, improving the efficiency of detecting crimes and identifying unknown perpetrators, especially in the area of organized crime, corruption and other serious crimes.

The main stakeholder of the operational – police work in the Minstry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia is the Criminal Police Directorate, but there are other organizational units engaged in fighting crime, in accordance with their competencies. The operational – police work is established on three levels: central level (Criminal Police Directorate at the headquarters of the Ministry); regional (police administrations); and local (police stations). The decisions of the operational group for leadership and management in the Criminal Police Directorate for undertaking operational activities shall be referred to the competent organizational units of the Criminal Police Directorate at the headquarters of the Ministry, while the decisions of the operational group of the police administration shall be sent to the competent organizational unit of police administration.

The process of operational – police work is comprised of the following functions: planning, implementation and monitoring. Planning is a process that involves the determination of operational - police activities which have to be undertaken in order to implement the strategic and operational plans of the operational groups for leadership and management and the decisions of these groups are based on particular criminalistic intelligence information (products). The performance of the planned operational - police work is the process of implementation of the organizational and tactical plans. The planned operational - police work can be implemented within the planned regular operational - police tasks or as planned actions. Monitoring is a continuous, systematic and purposeful observation, recording of the operational police actions, which are undertaken based on the decisions of the leadership and management groups, or criminalistic intelligence information (products). The goal of monitoring is to measure the results and expand the knowledge about the police working methods.

The police intellingence model conceived like this, is a step forward to a new, systematic approach to countering crime. Its basic quality is leadership and management at the strategic and operational level based on criminalistic intelligence information made

through interdependent and connected phases of collecting and analytical processing of data and information, with the most rational use of human and material resources.

6 CONCLUSION

The fact is that timely identification of the endangering phenomena and information about the intensity, way, powers and tools of its manifestation represent basic criteria for adequate assessment of their development in the future. The corectness of the conclusions, the assessment of the endangering phenomena development and the quality of the decisions depend on the quality of collected data (information) and their correct analytical processing. This especially occurs in modern-day circumstances, when the level of technical and technological development is so high that ensures rapid exchange of a large amount of information among different users (especially among the holders of criminal activities), which requires an additional effort by state authorities to be ready to respond in such conditions. This implies the creation of a system that provides the possibility of collecting a large amount of data and the ability to select and transform them into quality information, which enables unified use and management of such information at the strategic and operational level.

In this sense, the development and use of the police intelligence model should contribute to a better organization and functioning of certain parts of the security system and ensure the reliability and quality of the collected information, a realistic assessment of the state of security and, hence, adequately counter all forms of threats.

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THE CORRELATION BETWEEN EXTERNAL THREAT AND INTERNAL WEAKNESSES - THE BASELINE FOR SECURITY REFORMS

Adrijana Kalachoska, Msc
PhD student at the Faculty of Security-Skopje
Mite Kjesakoski
Master's student at the Faculty of Security-Skopje

ABSTRACT

In a time when the geopolitical interests in the Balkans are the focus of attention of the Great Powers, the necessity of a contemporary security system which is prepared to face modern security threats and risks is all the more obvious.

The greater the security threats and risks are as a burden of today, the weaker the security institutions in the Republic of Macedonia are. They are more vulnerable and evidently demonstrate inability to respond to the security threats timely and appropriately, as well as an evident incompetence to deal with all security challenges. These are the reasons for the increasingly growing need of drastic reforms and thorough reorganization of the security system. Additionally, improvement of the legislation is necessary in order to enhance the security system in Macedonia.

First of all, the cause of this paper is precise and thorough identification of all disadvantages and weaknesses of the security institutions, finding the best model for proper and timely resource allocation and directing the interests to the right address during the process of reorganization. The ultimate aim is successful dealing with the real asymmetric threats and strengthening the efficiency in the prevention of the contemporary forms of crime.

Key words: reforms, threats, risks, weaknesses, dealing

INTRODUCTION

Keeping track with world trends in the process of modernization and improvement of everyday life is present everywhere, the process of globalization has affected all countries, and hence the Republic of Macedonia is not exempted from the same process. This actually implies new forms of security challenges and threats, new and contemporary forms of crime, which are increasingly crossing state borders and are more often a problem that countries cannot cope with on their own without uniting and creating joint forces. Unfortunately, Macedonia is one of the countries affected by the transition process, but it does not go well along these winds of change. It has been in a disadvantaged position over the past few years, subject to increasing pressures and turmoil by the larger countries at the European and world stage, and the influence of the neighbouring countries and their different aspirations has almost never ceased. They all directly or indirectly affect the security situation in the country and its current ability and capacity to deal with current threats. The state itself and its internal political party relations are worse than ever before in the history of this small country; the relations and disagreements among the political parties have ruined the entire system of the country creating thus fertile ground for resolving the misunderstandings of certain world powers, allowing spears to break up here

in this unstable state with its unstable politics. This has mostly affected the institutions that are part of the national security system, namely, the security system and its services have been brought to a collapse. It is therefore necessary to thoroughly reform them and identify a new system that will adequately deal with and respond to these emerging and changed security aspects.

1. GLOBALIZATION AND CHANGE OF SECURITY THREATS AND RISKS

We are aware of the circumstances that surround us nowadays in conditions of fast modernization and sophistication, total global connectivity and trans-nationalization of all aspects of living. Namely, technology has begun to move forward at a rapid speed, that is, it has become the driving force that moves the world toward new changes, as well as a means of transport and communication, but also of exchange of information, and the world has begun to shift towards interconnection and advanced interstate communication and cooperation. The growth of interdependence between people and countries in the world both economically and socially, i.e. the steps towards creating the so-called global village and the unification of the political, economic and security systems can all be defined as a process of globalization. Globalization is one of the most frequently mentioned phenomena today, a process of spreading and deepening of social relations and institutions in a time and space framework.

The process called globalization has caused the internal political issues to become completely external, and the external political issues completely internal. The traditional domestic political concerns, such as health and rights, are becoming increasingly prominent on the global political agenda, and events occurring in other countries, such as accidents or massacres, are increasingly gaining political significance for people who are not personally affected by their occurrence.[204]

The world globalization trend besides advantages has also brought about a number of new threats, as previously mentioned, primarily by deepening the gap between the social strata and internationalization of certain dangers, of which the most extreme are international terrorism and organized crime. Apart from them, illegal migration and illegal trafficking in drugs, weapons, people and strategic materials are on the expansion. The danger of using weapons of mass destruction that are prohibited by international law has also increased.

The threat to security in South Eastern Europe still has its roots in political extremism and extreme nationalism, religious and racial intolerance, combined with the existence of weak state institutions and the lack of law in some countries and regions, as well as transnational dangers. A special threat and source of instability is the presence of huge amounts of illegal weapons.[205]

Given the changed security environment and the new security risks and threats, it is necessary to find new mechanisms and instruments for the preservation of national and international security.

The new forms of security threats are a global problem around the world. The severity of this problem, its specific characteristics, its secrecy and complexity, makes the fight even more specific. The key element in such fight is intelligence and the information

[204] Hugh, P., The Notion of Global Security, Tabernacul, 2009.

[205] National Concept of Security and Defense - 23 June 2003.

that is placed as the final product of the intelligence teams on the ground. If the entire security system of a state presents itself as a supporting wall that protects the state from all kinds of risks and threats to the security of all citizens and their properties, intelligence information may be defined then as the foundation of the supporting wall, without which no further masonry is possible, and all further care and efforts to preserve security would simply mean improvisation.

Intelligence services are now engaged in "predicting the future" of a special interest to national security, which means life or death for the state. They represent the "eyes and ears" of modern states and their underestimation inevitably makes the states "blind and deaf," calling into question their state's sole survival.

All this indicates the need to put an emphasis on prevention in the fight against the new so-called asymmetric and unconventional threats. For the sake of successful prevention, we need the knowledge provided by the intelligence services based on the intelligence information they possess.

Hence, the need for emphasizing and drastically reforming the overall security community in Macedonia as the weakest link is evident.

2. IN GENERAL FOR THE INTELLIGENCE AND THE NEED FOR QUALITY INTELLIGENCE CAPACITIES

The term intelligence has nowadays become an imperative, and it is most often associated with activities of state institutions. Moreover, it is increasingly used by private mega-companies, banking institutions, international representative offices and business groups, but also by paramilitary formations, rebel groups, criminal gangs and terrorist organizations.

Intelligence is underpinned by the primary necessity for possessing the necessary information, knowledge, monitoring certain events, phenomena and trends, the awareness of the plans and activities of the potential competitor (opponent), and even the need to act in direction of creating conditions for development of their own potential.[206] The term information (data, news, announcements) is encountered in many intelligence bodies in the European countries. Intelligence is related to the specific features of the semantic neaning of the words: intelligence, information and knowledge. However, there is also a close connection between the similar terms of knowledge and information in the Macedonian language. In this narrow sense, the term intelligence means secret research (study) for a special purpose.[207]

It can be said that the essence of acting and the social character of intelligence roughly consists of four elements:

- By means of intelligence activity, the state helps and facilitates the achievement of foreign political goals, regardless of what they are (defensive, conquering, peaceful, cooperative, friendly, economic, technology theft, etc.);
- Providing timely information enables the successful suppression of subversive (offensive) activity by the intelligence services of powerful and dominant states in the world;

[206] Dojcinovski, M., Odzakov, F., Intelligence Operations and Asymmetric Threats, Solaris Print, Skopje, 2010, p. 21.

[207] Bujakovski, S., Intelligence, Kosta Abras, Ohrid, 2005, p. 23.

- Preserving the security, integrity and independence of the country (revealing the intentions of other countries);
- With the help of secret information obtained through intelligence activity, action is undertaken in order to cut off activities aimed at inflicting damage on the state by other countries (the counter-intelligence activity is strengthened, organized and successfully implemented).[208]

Knowledge and true and timely information are the real weapon against the asymmetric threats in today's world. The fear we live in today can not be defeated by power; instead, it can only be dispelled by knowledge, organization and experience. The most effective weapon in the fight against terrorism and all other asymmetric threats is the possession of quality intelligence information and prevention of attacks, that is, preventing something before it takes place.[209]

There seems to be a global consensus among policymakers that strengthening intelligence services would automatically facilitate the anticipation of and the fight against this contemporary evil. Intelligence theory is based on the rule that intelligence does not exist to detect the perpetrators of certain serious criminal activities retroactively. Hence, they act preventively. However, no matter how much is invested in intelligence, whatever intelligence potential we possess and all modern technology we have, there is simply no absolute intelligence and protection. Once we are aware of this fact, the priority should be placed on minimizing any possible damage, in terms of human casualties or material and financial damage.[210]

All this will be kept to a minimum when the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of the services are reduced to a minimum, and it will first require real identification and diagnosis, and then finding a way to minimize and eliminate them.

3. FACTORS AFFECTING THE QUALITY OF THE WORK OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

3.1 Expertise and Competence as Influential Factors of Quality

The work of the intelligence services cannot be performed without their own staff, operatives and analysts who should possess the right expertise and be tasked to conduct and organize the intelligence activity, that is, to successfully create a network of collaborators that will work on collecting the necessary information and carry out all planned actions of their intelligence service. Basically, the operational staff, including top specialists and specialists in certain areas, is generated in three basic ways:

- Education of staff in their own educational institutions;
- Taking young qualified people, specialists and experts from other institutions and areas;
- Taking over personnel from other intelligence services in the country;

[208] Bujakovski, S., Intelligence, Kosta Abras, Ohrid, 2005, p. 31.

[209] http://www.diis.dk/files/media/publications/publikationer_2015/priorities_within_the_intelligence_services_in_the_fight_against_terror.pdf, [accessed on 15. 02.2015]

[210] Dojcinovski, M., Odzakov, F., Intelligence Operations and Asymmetric Threats, Solaris Print, Skopje, 2010, p. 178

The intelligence services in many countries across the world are striving to engage the staff they have selected, educated in their institutions and trained to conduct the activities within their competence.

Selection Criteria

The criteria for staff selection are the required standards in terms of psycho-physical abilities, knowledge, skills and other personal characteristics necessary for working in intelligence-based security systems. Namely, the selection in employment is a necessity and an opportunity to select the best from a larger number of applicants for a particular job.

Selection is therefore aimed at giving a precise assessment of the personal and professional capabilities of the candidates, i.e. their good or bad predispositions for the performance of certain tasks. The selection is carried out on the basis of methodological criteria that should be correct and indiscriminate.

The most important criteria include the criteria for selection of candidates to enter the security services, or the so-called entry criteria. According to comparative practice, this most often refers to the requirements that fall within the following six groups: the place and status of the candidate in society, his/her age, education, physical abilities, mental abilities and moral qualities.[211]

One of the common features that can be seen in many countries and services is the infinite rotation of the intelligence and operational staff with very little or no concern for consistency or growth of knowledge. Given the complexities of today's security environment, it may take years to achieve competency. However, the rotation and advancement of the intelligence staff with the least care of career development is still ongoing. This is self-destructive in the best case, and reckless in the worst.

As long as the attention is not diverted from technology to the humanization of the intelligence process, it is not very likely that any serious progress will occur.[212]

3.2. Cooperation and Exchange of Information at International and National Level

In the fight against transnational threats, cooperation among intelligence services from many countries is very important, especially given the international characteristic of threats.[213]

There is no intelligence service, regardless of whether it is military or civilian, that is capable of working independently and in isolation to fully act upon all its intelligence claims. On the other hand, due to the nature and specificity of its activity, it is quite natural that in the course of their work, the intelligence services receive certain intelligence information that is of no interest for their work, that is, for the conduct of their particular intelligence activities, but that they are of interest to other security - intelligence services they cooperate with, regardless of whether these services are from the same or another country. The practice of intelligence services exchanging information is not a new

[211] Bujakovski, S., Intelligence, Kosta Abrash, Ohrid, 2005, p.120

[212] Quigin, T., To see the invisible: Intelligence about national security at a precarious time, Magor DOO, Skopje, 2009, p. 106, 107

[213] Gacinovic, R., "Antiterrorism", The Tragus Library, Belgrade, 2006, p. 49

phenomenon at all. Allied states have always shared intelligence information. The exchange of intelligence is also carried out as part of the diplomacy tasks.

Intelligence cooperation is less and less one-off or ad hoc, and is increasingly based on what we have previously seen, on mutually signed multilateral and bilateral agreements and agreements on the exchange of information, especially when it comes to cooperation between services in direction of suppressing international tran-snational terrorism.[214]

However, co-operation between the intelligence services is never complete and is always limited by numerous factors. They include, inter alia, the different foreign policy interests and perceptions, different positions in international relations, legal restrictions, fear of compromising their own sources of information by exchanging information or revealing their methods, or fear that the other party may abuse the data beyond the established agreement. According to Richard Aldrich "there is no friendly secret service, there is only a secret service of a friendly country."[215]

Interoperability between the different institutions that are competent to collect information regarding threats within a country is of immense importance.

Intelligence products have value only if a system that ensures timely submission of relevant information to those who have the power to decide is developed. This is provided through the development of dissemination standards that are actually systems and standards for recording intelligence data, privacy protection, information security systems, operational security system for shared information, dissemination tools, and interoperability issues between different data bases. In practice, the emphasis in exchanging information and spreading knowledge of various terrorist threats is placed on "security of operations" due to concerns that critical information could fall into the wrong hands, thereby jeopardizing the investigation, personnel, sources and information collection methods. Such an extreme leads to the risk of keeping the information related to certain threats within a narrow circle of subjects, limiting the possibilities for their prevention. Information security should always be kept in mind, but the philosophy of thinking and awareness needs to be changed in terms of wide spreading of the knowledge of certain threats. The greater the number of entities that dispose of information, the greater the possibility of the threat being identified and prevented. The key issue raised in this regard is the question "Who is considered as an authorized entity to dispose of the information?" In terms of facilitating the response to such a question, that is, applying the philosophy of dissemination of knowledge, the European countries and the United States have established the criteria and standards "have the right to know" and "need to know" to determine who should dispose of the information.

Rule of a Third Agency (Authorization to Spread Information)

Another restriction with regards to the mutual use of intelligence is commonly referred to as the Rule of a third agency. In essence, if an officer receives intelligence from an intelligence source (institution), he can no longer spread intelligence to a third party without the approval of the original source. In the dissemination of intelligence, it can be intelligence pertaining to a case or intelligence products that provide information on threats or indicators. When intelligence is disseminated in a case which contains data for

[214] Dojcinovski, M., Odzakov, F., Intelligence Operations and Asymmetric Threats, Solaris Print, Skopje, 2010, p. 199.

[215] Gacinovic, R., "Antiterrorism", The Tragus Library, Belgrade, 2006, p. 49

individuals or organizations, the third-party rule is fully applied, while when intelligence products containing information on threats or indicators are disseminated and human rights are not infringed, the rule of a third agency is invalidated.
It is important to underline that heretofore the three rules of dissemination "have the right to know", "should know" and the rule of a third agency have the following goals: protecting the civil rights of the individual and maintaining the security of a criminal intelligence inquiry.[216]

3.3 Centralized Intelligence As a Weakness That Affects the Quality of Information

To overcome a serious asymmetric threat, knowledge is the key weapon. In order to achieve the greatest effect, the integration of intelligence and operational information should take place as close as possible to the front line and as timely as possible. Only at the front line we can best understand the "fine structure" of intelligence data within their context. If it is deprived of context, most of the value of the information will be lost.
Part of the inability to react in a multiple crisis situation is that intelligence and knowledge-builders are now forced to work in hierarchical organizations that are full of "silos" and information retention. Constantly, what hinders them is the bureaucratic mentality of mid-level managers who prefer the bureaucratic process versus operational imperatives. Information that needs to flow from one center to another in a few minutes or hours is instead forced to penetrate upwards through one command line to be transferred to another organization and then down again after another command line to where they could be applied practically. All of this can take hours, days, weeks, assuming mid-level managers will allow this to happen. It often happens that an organization does not share information with another, because bureaucrats in any domain usually jealously keep information from one another to increase their "power" over those they perceive as competitors for rare sources.
Authorities should continue to adapt and develop structures of "spokes and wheels" instead of hierarchies. In order to successfully adapt, they must decentralize intelligence more effectively when it comes to gathering, analysis and control, and bring the information as close as possible to the level of the street, and at the same time it should become more of a policy guidance and decision making from a higher level.

Such changes in the structure and organization cannot occur and implement only within isolated ministries or certain institutions. The solution to the current problems must be a response of the overall government and a strong cooperative network must be built to connect all departments. This network must be uninterrupted so that the staff can communicate well enough and reveal weak signals that so often predict an attack or crisis, but are omitted due to bureaucratic structures and organizations.

It should be clear that most of the threats are localized and "down in weeds". And if institutions want to have a chance to confront by predicting threats in a timely manner and providing useful advice to senior leaders, then those institutions must have eyes and ears down at the local level. These eyes and ears must be in constant communication with each other others, regardless of the boundaries of the departments.[217]

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[216] Chavkov, M., Criminal Intelligence in Combating Organized Crime, Skopje, 2011, p. 107.

[217] Quigin, T., To see the invisible: Intelligence about national security at a precarious time, Magor DOO, Skopje, 2009, p. 111-116.

4. INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS FROM THE RESEARCH

Empirical research was conducted for the needs of this paper. Twelve respondents were interviewed in total. This is a representative sample, because the survey included representatives from the Intelligence Agency, the Security and Counter-Intelligence Directorate, the Ministry of Defense, the Military Security and Intelligence Service and representatives of the expert community.

The purpose of the survey is to consider certain views on issues such as: human resource management as a factor that influences timely, accurate and complete information which is important for the quality work of the intelligence community, international cooperation as a key factor affecting the quality of work of the intelligence community, mutual cooperation and coordination at the national level.

The questions were designed to indicate that the timely and correct detection and determination of the correlation between the weaknesses of the institutions in the intelligence community and the new asymmetric threats in the changed security environment can provide the basis for efficient reform of the security system.

The respondents were asked two questions in total:

- What is the international cooperation with the security intelligence services of the countries in the region and beyond, as a key factor affecting the quality of work of the services in the intelligence community;
- What is the inter-institutional cooperation and coordination regarding information between services in the intelligence community.

After receiving the answers, they were selected, grouped and processed based on the most frequent views of the respondents on each particular question, as an appropriate reflection of the attitudes. For easier data processing, the respondents were divided into several categories:

1. Representatives of the Intelligence Agency;
2. Representatives of the Security and Counter -Intelligence Directorate;
3. Representatives of the Military Security and Intelligence Service of the Ministry of Defense;
4. Representatives of the expert community.

4.1. International Cooperation As a Factor Affecting the Quality of Information

Modern security phenomena are a global threat against which no country can fight alone and independently of other countries in the region and beyond. In order to perceive the importance of international cooperation in the field of intelligence sharing and the coordination and cooperation of security intelligence agencies around the world in the action against asymmetric threats, the respondents were asked the question "What is the international cooperation with the security intelligence services of the countries in the region and beyond, as a key factor affecting the quality of work of the services in the intelligence community."

According to the representatives of the Intelligence Agency, it builds its international cooperation on bilateral and multilateral agreements, but when it comes to terrorism, all political barriers in the exchange of information are removed and submitted directly to the affected state, on an institutional basis. One of the respondents from the Intelligence Agency, as well as one representative from the expert team stated the principle of reciprocity in a partner relationship with the intelligence services from other countries in their responses to this question.

According to the responses received from the representatives of the Security and Counter–Intelligence Directorate (SCID), international cooperation mostly refers to the bilateral and multilateral relations, on the basis of concluded mutual agreements. They define the international cooperation with the services of the Western countries, the services of the countries in South-Western Europe, and especially with the services of the neighbouring countries as being strong. This official co-operation is maintained through representatives with security clearances in the consular and diplomatic missions, and these representatives are the official link for arranging each meeting between senior officials of the services, whether it will be held in our country or on the territory of a friendly country. There may also be cooperation at a lower level, which mostly pertains to personal operational contacts between service officers.

With respect to to institutional international cooperation, the answers of the SCID representatives coincide with the answers of the representatives of the Intelligence Agency, specifically stating that multilateral cooperation is actually taking place during international meetings on a certain topic, at the expert level. Multilateral co-operation at the institutional level between our security intelligence services and the services of other states can be at the regional level, namely cooperation in South-Western Europe, Central Europe, or at the global level, through the membership in NATO's Intelligence Agency. The Intelligence Agency and the Security and Counter-Intelligence Directorate are members of two such international organizations that maintain the cooperation between the states on a multilateral level. One is MEC (Middle European Conference) at the level of Central Europe, and the other is SEEIC (South East Europe Information Services Conference), at the level of South-Western Europe.

In terms of the international cooperation of the military intelligence services, a representative from the Army of the Republic of Macedonia stated in his response that security neither starts nor ends at the borders of a particular country. It must be followed beyond borders. Modern terrorism is not a problem only of one state. This is why co-operation is advisable or necessary, because if there is no cooperation, efficiency is considerably lower.

The position of the representative of the Sector for Military Security and Intelligence Service is no different from the position of the representative of the Army of the Republic of Macedonia; on the contrary, it complements it with an explanation that the military intelligence service has the exclusive right to conclude bilateral and multilateral agreements with other services, without neglecting the fact that the military service has the highest level of international cooperation.

Generally speaking, collecting data through co-operation with other intelligence services is a legal method of data collection consisting of institutional cooperation between two or more intelligence services, based on bilateral and multilateral agreements.

4.2. Mutual Cooperation of the Security Intelligence System Services of the Republic of Macedonia As a Factor That Affects Quality

In order to determine the impact of inter-institutional cooperation on the quality of information in the preventive action, the respondents were asked the question "What is the inter-institutional cooperation and coordination regarding the exchange of information?"

From the answers to this question by the representatives of the Intelligence Agency we can see that they are of the opinion that mutual cooperation and exchange of information is not on an enviable level, the political and party influence prevails and certain persons are too self-conceited to out the security issues of common interest first.

The opinion of the representatives of the Intelligence Agency is that the least that can be done in the current situation in the country is the appointment of one person, in each of the security intelligence services, on the second or maybe third level of hierarchy that will be solely responsible for cooperating with the other services, on a daily, weekly or monthly basis, depending on the needs and for exchanging information and coordinating and synchronizing the service with the other services, primarily between the Agency, SCID and the Military Security Service Intelligence. Additionally, there should be a person who will be in charge with collecting and updating data from the Financial Intelligence Directorate, the Financial Police, the Public Prosecutor's Office and other relevant institutions in the Republic of Macedonia.

From the response of the representatives of the Security and Counter Intelligence Directorate, it can be interpreted that they share the opinion with the representatives of the Agency that the mutual cooperation of the services is not satisfactory, that there is a lot of unnecessary interference of political and party interests that very often affect negatively the final outcome of certain operations.

We would particularly like to highlight the response of one of the respondents, a representative of the Security and Counter-Intelligence Directorate, as very important for the concrete research. Namely, he offered a constructive proposal for establishing a common database, where each person authorized by the services will have access with a unique user name and password, in accordance with the principles “should know” and “need to know” in order to avoid formal data exchange procedures.

One of the respondents from SCID defined the cooperation at the national level as being spread in several directions. Cooperation between the Intelligence Agency, the Security and Counter-Intelligence Directorate, and the Military Security and Intelligence Service Department. Another cooperation is the cooperation with other institutions in the country which can also come up with certain information such as the Financial Intelligence, Financial Police, Customs, Public Prosecution Office, etc. Third is the cooperation at the level of the Ministry of Interior, and this cooperation is between SCID and the Public Security Bureau. Nonetheless, the cooperation between the operational and analytical level has been emphasized as inevitable and currently quite neglected, and that it needs to be raised to a slightly higher level.

A major problem in the respondent’s view is the overlap of the work of the Security and Counter-Intelligence Directorate and the work of the Intelligence Agency, even though the scope of work of the Security and Counter Intelligence Directorate is aimed to protect the state from the inside, i.e. collect information on its own territory, and the scope of work of the Agency refers to collecting information from the outside. However, they mostly overlap in the collection of information from the same sources on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia. A possible solution in his view would be the merging of the Agency and SCID into a single service, whose competencies would be regulated by law.

Moreover, with respect to the cooperation between SCID and the Public Security Bureau, and taking into account the fact that public security intertwines in certain jurisdictions when it comes to organized crime, it is necessary to constantly synchronize and negotiate the operations and exchange information, in order to svoid overlapping of the activities, namely a situation when two institutions are working on one and the same case without being aware of their mutual actions.

Regarding the cooperation with the police, a constructive and more efficient way of organization and set-up was proposed, as it was before, when a police station and a

criminal office were positioned within the police station for a certain area, where there was at least one SCID representative for that region and thus continuous cooperation and exchange of information was possible on a daily basis. The respondent also stated in his response that increasing the analytical and operational cooperation at a higher level would be of particular importance, especially in terms of pointing to a certain disadvantage in the collected data, or if the analysts think that there is some data missing and or cannot be placed in the right context, etc.

One of the interviewed experts from the expert group explained in response that each of the key institutions in the intelligence community, the Agency, SCID, the Military Security and Intelligence Service all have their own operational and analytical sections that work on the basis of their own concepts that are consistent with the permanent and vital state interests envisaged in the National Security Strategy. Mutual co-operation between the services is important and it is necessary to make a joint assessment on the basis of their analyses and assessments, and therefore an Assessment Group and a Steering Committee have been established within the Crisis Management Center. CMC should prepare a synthesized assessment and submit it to the Government, but according to the respondent, in practice this does not work at all. In all systems, much attention must be paid to coordination and synchronization. Security must act accurately, fully, in a timely manner, and if one element is missing, there will be errors and omissions. Unlike the answers given above, the responses of the representatives of the Military Security and Intelligence Service in the Ministry of Defense and the representative of the Army of the Republic of Macedonia are somewhat different and two positions can be distinguished. The representative from the Army of the Republic of Macedonia believes that although all three services, the Agency, SCID and the Military Security and Intelligence Service are separate entities and have different structures, their mutual cooperation is necessary and is accomplished through the Security Council of the President who is the supreme commander that coordinates all these structures and the ministers must co-operate with the President. Collaboration is necessary because security cannot be divided. In situations as a crisis and in a military situation, the police and the Army work together, cooperate and complement each other. But, of course, it is necessary to exchange information on a daily basis in conditions of peace and stability as well.

Cooperation is not only about exchanging information, but also about joint trainings and seminars. Within the service there are assigned employees whose obligation is cooperation with the services.

However, the respondent underlines a problem that affects both the exchange of information and the activities undertaken on the basis of the received information, and that is the high classification of the information, strictly confidential, and the creator of the information assesses whether there is a need for that degree of classification. When that classified information comes into the hands of one of the superiors, some of them think it is very important but do not share it because they think it is a secret; after some time, this information becomes old news. The problem is in the mindset of people. But there is a reverse tendency as well, if the information is more transparent, there is a syndrome among the Macedonians of everyone wanting to know everything and in that case the principle "need to know" and "should know" is not complied with to the fullest.

As far as political influence is concerned, it is a huge problem in the country, but the military service is somehow most affected by those influences.

The cooperation between the Intelligence Agency, the Security and Counter Intelligence Directorate, and the Military Security and Intelligence Service is the most

important when it comes to gathering information pertaining to terrorism. They are the key factors in the process of intelligence and protection of the state order and the safety of the citizens. The cooperation among them is usually done through written exchange of information and periodic mutual contacts, but it can be said that the exchange of information is dosed, the information subject of the exchange is often incomplete or untimely, and sometimes it may be inaccurate or irrelevant to the particular object of interest, but given purely to observe the moment of mutual cooperation. Today, such cooperation is often reduced to personal contacts, friendships or acquaintances between members of the various services and the goodwill for timely exchange of full and accurate information. Although this should not be so, that is the reality and it is to a large extent, despite all the formalities put on paper, the result of the influence of politics, vanities and putting personal before the interests of the service, the influence of the state that is all too present and it affects negatively the overall performance of the services. It is not a new phenopmenon, it is rather a long-lasting process that has been dragging for years, but as years go by, it is just escalating more and more. The very subordination of the services under different authorities aggravates this situation even further. Specifically, the Intelligence Agency is subordinated to the President of the State, SCID is part of the Ministry of Interior subordinated to the Government and the Military Service as part of the Ministry of Defense is also responsible in front of the Minister, as part of the Government. Yet, they are all part of the National Security Council and they jointly coordinate the activities and make security decisions, their meetings are not regular, only when a necessity arises and at the moment the Council does not have that power to coordinate and manage them effectively. In fact, all cooperation and coordination would work much better if there are employees in each of these services, whose only task would be to coordinate and synchronize with other services and exchange information, for a specific time period and, if necessary, more often than prescribed. These persons would be at least on the second or third level at the hierarchy and would function according to the established rules for arranging the cooperation and exchange of data.

In order to improve coordination and synchronization and mutual cooperation for exchange of information, several constructive proposals can be pointed out, established and conceived on the basis of previous experiences, experiences from other countries, which seem really promising and can largely improve the co-operation and thus indirectly affect the quality of information and assessment of possible risks and security threats.

First of all, a rule that will regulate the cooperation and coordination (exchange of information between entities, using a common database, cooperation in the planning and execution of joint operations); establishing a common database where each member of the service would have an access based on the "need to know" principle with a single user name and password, which would allow for rationality, efficiency and, of course, economy in the operation of the security bodies; merging the Intelligence Agency and the Security and Counter-Intelligence Directorate into a single service, an institution that will be based on a single law that will specify all their competencies, obligations and authorizations. Another option, apart from unification, is to strengthen the activities of the joint coordinating body, which should provide more appropriate integration of the services within the single security system.

The cooperation within the Ministry of Interior itself is also invaluable. This refers to the cooperation between the SCID and the PSB, and as equally important is the cooperation within the Public Security Bureau and in the police stations and inspectorates, and border guards. SCID and PSB should actually cooperate on a daily basis, whether it

will be a matter of written exchange of information or by direct meetings of their members, in order to monitor everyday work and the information that they have at their disposal which is of mutual interest. As a positive model of operation, specifically because of the existing cooperation, is the system of work on a territorial basis in the police stations, where the uniformed police and the criminal office and the office of the security administration and Counterintelligence cooperate among each other. The information obtained from the police officer who is exposed on the field is indispensable as through community policing and patrols he can get security-relevant information to share with both SCID and PSB. All this cooperation, especially with this model of PSB organization, is very efficient on a much lower level.

Finally, it is possible to emphasize the necessity of raising the cooperation between operation and analytics on a much higher level. Analytics may be said to be the brain of the intelligence process. These are highly intelligent and well educated individuals who have analytical abilities to separate the bit from the intrinsic and give it the right meaning and translate it into an intelligence product. This fact must not be overlooked. Therefore, the analysts are those who can rightly point out to the operatives to some irregularities, defects of the type of incomplete information, indicate a lack of information in the mosaic that should constitute a logical whole. Nevertheless, we can say once more that vanity in the Republic of Macedonia overshadows the needs and interests, and if cooperation between these two elements is achieved in this way, the mistakes will be minor.

The cooperation between the services in times of crises is a bit different from peacetime cooperation. In that case, from our experience hitherto, the cooperation is in the direction of a coordinated and synchronized action, by creating crisis staffs composed of members of the three services, but also in the direction of daily exchange of information of interest to the current situation.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The information received by the security intelligence services is the first level of state protection and is of paramount importance. They are the ones who detect threats and provide guidance as to where and how to act in order to prevent any danger to the security of the state and the citizens.
2. The human factor is crucial in collecting data. Despite all the circumstances prevailing in modern world, the technological development and the advancement in science and technology, HUMINT plays a major role in obtaining quality information. And no country, when investing in the work of its security intelligence services, must neglect this fact and in any way underestimate the importance of man.
3. Information is always in direction of prevention. Experience shows that states invest heavily in this segment. The point is that accurate and timely information is knowledge in advance of things, and knowledge is the only powerful weapon against modern terrorism. What contributes to the successful prevention is only the interaction of all institutions in the state system, as well as the private and non-governmental sector, in order to strengthen the physical security of certain key locations and the safety of infrastructure facilities, reduce vulnerability and increase capacities, organize surprise actions, but be ready at the same time.
4. For making correct and timely decisions in dealing with asymmetric threats by the authorities, the most important is the existence of relevant, accurate, verified and of

course timely information. However, it is equally important that it is timely and appropriately addressed and distributed to those who have the power to decide.

5. Due to the transnational character of the new security threats of today, no state can act in isolation and only within its national borders. International cooperation with the services of friendly countries in the region and around the world plays an enormous role in obtaining quality intelligence. Because of this, countries, especially the economically and security weaker ones, such as Macedonia, need to make huge efforts to build solid and correct partnership relations with the intelligence services in the world, because it is one of the more frequent ways through which relevant intelligence information the fight against transnational criminal forms.
6. Security is a complex phenomenon and no institution within a national security system is capable of functioning in isolation and independently of others. Daily exchange of information and coordination and synchronization in operation is necessary and crucial. Institutions in their day-to-day work come up with certain information that may not be within their scope of work and are obliged to forward them to the institution that is interested in the same information in a timely and complete manner. Every security system in its operation should function impeccably as a human organism, if there is no synchronization and coordination, then the functionality of the system is disturbed.
7. Precisely because of the appropriate and timely exchange of information and mutual cooperation of the services, there is a need to create a single body, which will be established by law, where the obligations and powers, in fact, the scope of work of the security intelligence services will be strictly outlined, without to have intertwining in competencies. Also, the manner and form of information exchange and representatives of all services would be strictly regulated on a daily or weekly basis, in order to have an insight into the work of others and to share information of common interest.

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ROLE OF THE NON-STATE ACTORS IN REDUCING THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR

Gospava Stojanovic, Msc
University of Belgrade, Faculty of Security Studies
e-mail: gospava88@gmail.com
Nenad Putnik, Dr.Sc
University of Belgrade, Faculty of Security Studies
e-mail: nputnik@fb.bg.ac.rs

Abstract

Although nowadays great powers claim that nuclear powers are a factor of stability on the political scene, this attitude should not be considered a positive aspect, since the primary role of nuclear weapons is not preserving peace. A risk that this kind of weapon can be seized by terrorist organizations which would not hesitate to use it at all, is one of the major security problems in the world. It should also be mentioned that there is a great risk of accidents and mistakes during handling, maintenance and transport of nuclear weapons. A wide use of nuclear weapons in large-scale war conflicts would result in a great number of casualties, destroyed cities and areas with lethal levels of radiation even a few kilometers away from the explosion site which could cause grave consequences – genetic mutations, high cancer incidence and disruption of the balance of nature in biocenosis and biosphere. Regardless of the fact that a certain country does not possess nuclear weapons, it can be affected by consequences of a nuclear attack. Therefore, the question of nuclear security is important for the whole international community. Europe has been engaged in disarmament processes since the late '80s, in order to eliminate the risk of indiscriminate weapons dissemination. A new model of humanitarian disarmament is emerging. Civil society, including the youth, has taken part in the security process requiring protection of civilian population from these weapons. Civil society became a partner and interlocutor of the states, the EU, and the international organizations such as the United Nations.

The concept of humanitarian disarmament has emerged as a new security paradigm, as a liaison of cultures, to ensure the future of new generations. The involved youth are widening the field of humanitarian disarmament, arguing against nuclear weapons to ensure the security and peace in Europe and the rest of the world. The youth, with a vision of peace and security, need to acquire the skills necessary to directly influence NGOs, civil society, governments and politicians. Their civic engagement also enhances their professional prospects in the humanitarian fields of international relations and security.

Keywords: *Nuclear security, Nuclear war, Non-state actors, Humanitarian disarmament, Southeastern Europe*

1. INTRODUCTION

In the postwar world development, almost every country in the world strives to strengthen its armed power. The main feature of "the Arms Race" is production and

stocking of nuclear weapons which have extremely destructive power. Despite numerous declarations and resolutions of unilateral, bilateral and multilateral character, nuclear weapons became the main means of demonstrating influence and power at the global level by great powers, and the countries which aspire to become great powers. Today, any great power is unimaginable without nuclear weapons. The whole world realizes that this kind of weapon is a major asset in the hands of a state. Therefore, there is always a big risk that some other state will develop a nuclear weapon or obtain it in the future in order to achieve significant political influence. Although great powers claim that nuclear weapons are a factor of stability on the political scene, this attitude should not be considered as positive, since the primary role of nuclear weapons is not preserving peace. A risk that this kind of weapon can be seized by terrorist organizations, which would not hesitate to use it, is one of the major security problems in the world.

This paper aims to open a debate on these issues in academia, in order to provide an alternative approach besides the dogmatic approach to nuclear weapons as a "guarantee of our security and stability". The specific objective of the paper is education, aiming to raise general public awareness and the level of knowledge of the issues regarding humanitarian disarmament, with a special focus on groups like academia, young people, civil society, policy makers, etc. The general population – regardless of the citizenship, gender, age, and religious or political affiliation – has to be informed and educated about problems of humanitarian disarmament, the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and promotion of the international law.

2. NUCLEAR THREAT IN THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

The international scene is nowadays especially characterized by the process of proliferation or accumulation of nuclear weapons. Superpowers announce further development and improvement of the weapons, while the fact that other countries or a terrorist organization can create or obtain them in the future means additional danger. Research studies conducted in the United States in the early 1960s identified almost 30 countries that could develop nuclear weapons within a short time (Howlett, 2001). In the period between the 1960s and the 1980s, a number of countries which came into possession of nuclear weapons increased. A few countries are suspected to be secretly working on nuclear weapons development. Iran is one of them and has been working on uranium enrichment, claiming that those activities have an exclusively peaceful purpose. Some other countries were suspected of having been secretly working on such projects, but voluntarily gave up – Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Egypt, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Norway, Romania, Yugoslavia, South Korea, Taiwan, Canada, Finland, Greece, Spain, Turkey, Syria, Libya, South Africa, and Algiers (Levite, 2003). However, such data remain unreliable due to the secrecy that follows the development of nuclear programs or intentional covering up or misinforming.

During the 20th century, most countries which had nuclear weapons tested them in order to assess their explosive yield, intimidate opponents, and prove themselves as scientific and military forces. Nuclear weapon testing inevitably brings a great danger. One of such dangers happened in 1954 when the United States conducted a dangerous Castle Bravo explosion by means of a new hydrogen bomb on the Marshall Islands. The detonation created an unexpectedly high amount of radioactive material, which was disseminated over a large area by a weather change, but there were also other issues such as contamination of water sources, food and population in some other areas. In the second

half of the 20th century, over 2,000 nuclear tests were conducted mainly by the United States and the Soviet Union. Since the dawn of the atomic era in July 1945, nuclear tests were carried out on more than 60 locations around the globe, often on the lands of indigenous and minority peoples, far away from those who made the decisions to conduct them. While some test sites were virtually uninhabited, others were densely populated. The tests irradiated people working on the programs, the downwind and downstream communities, and the whole global population (Bergkvist & Ferm, 2000). Nuclear testing in several parts of the world has left a legacy of serious and persisting health and environmental impact that cannot be undone and yet has to be adequately addressed to. It has been scientifically proven that even a minimal amount of radiation can cause cancer in people and result in huge environmental damage. A growing concern over increased levels of radiation in precipitation finally led to negotiations about limiting nuclear tests to strictly underground.

According to official data, there are about 15,000 of nuclear warheads in the world, with the majority belonging to the United States and Russia. It is estimated that the United States possess about 6,800 nuclear warheads, Russia about 7,000, while the rest of the overall arsenal belongs to Great Britain, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea (Arms Control Association, 2018). Still, the difference in the number of nuclear warheads does not diminish the political and military power of smaller nuclear powers because nuclear weapons are an equally strong asset regardless of who possesses them. Next, there are those countries on whose territories these weapons are deployed on the basis of NATO agreement on nuclear weapons deployment – Belgium, Germany, The Netherlands, Italy and Turkey. It is necessary to emphasize that the USA, with those bombs in the European countries, violates the Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty. The use of this kind of weapon by a state would mean that soon there would be an equally forceful response by some other state / states.

Twenty years after the world nuclear powers agreed on putting nuclear weapons testing to an end, North Korea still conducts tests against all norms and principles of the international law, putting peace and security of the whole region under great threat which can lead to the escalation of tensions. As a matter of fact, North Korea is the only country which carried out nuclear tests in the 21th century. This country is among those who neither signed nor ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Perry, 2015). Since 2006, North Korea has carried out six nuclear tests and a series of ballistic missile testing. This has imposed severe international sanctions against it, which have been further tightened. North Korea's sixth nuclear test has been rated in the international circles as "absolutely unacceptable", although earlier UN resolutions ordered North Korea to suspend all nuclear activities and the ballistic missile production program. Pyongyang’s disregard of the obligations imposed by the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and international law certainly deserves the harshest condemnation, bearing in mind that the North Korean government has created a serious threat to the security of the entire world. This test should be seen as a warning to the international community to finally put the CTBT into force, since nuclear tests lead to arms race on one hand, and pollute the environment on the other.

3. CONSEQUENCES OF NUCLEAR WEAPON USE

The knowledge of nuclear weapons is not complete yet. The only experiences of these weapons use are from the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9, 1945. It is assumed that 140.000 people died in these attacks, and that twice as many died

from the consequences: burns, radiation, famine, etc. (Tele, 2015). An atomic bomb called the "Little Boy" exploded above Hiroshima, so the 500 year-old town vanished in a white cloud within minutes, along with 70.000 people. The detonation set a stroking wave that demolished everything in 10 kilometers radius. Two thirds of buildings in Hiroshima were completely ruined within a few seconds, and the fire storm and the heat caused multiple fires. Near the explosion site, rock and metal melted, and people turned into black, charcoal mass. During the explosion, a great number of gamma rays and neutrons were released, which irradiated the inhabitants. The inhabitants who survived the first strike inhaled the fatal dose of radiation and died from poisoning. According to data of Hiroshima from 2004, the number of casualties caused by the atomic bomb is 237.062 people. Three days later, a bomb called "Fat Man" was dropped from the altitude of 9, 6 kilometers and exploded above Nagasaki, raising the mushroom cloud of 18 kilometers in height. According to Comity for preserving the memory of atomic bomb on Nagasaki from 1950, 74.884 people died, 74.909 were wounded, and forty percent of buildings were ruined (Reed & Stillman, 2009). Adequate help for the injured was impossible to a great extent, and besides medical issues, great consequences upon electro structure, drinking water, food, and homes were evident. On the impact site, there was a great emission of several types of radioactive particles that polluted the atmosphere, and then were carried by winds, to continue falling on the ground for years as deadly rain. The long-term radioactive pollution during the 20th century caused severe health problems and death of thousands of people (Borrie & Caughley, 2013).

The possibility of an atomic war requires wide understanding of its consequences. The nuclear arsenal that already exists contains megatons of weapons with greater devastating power than all explosives ever used. In that sense, the possible consequences of the nuclear war, no matter where it would begin, could not be limited to the involved forces. The neighboring states would also be affected, as well as those on the far end of the world. In that way, the main features are huge devastation or destructive effects and enormous human sacrifices, i.e., mass starvation - "mass destruction", potentially endangering lives of billions of people and the whole civilization, and causing ecological changes by destroying normal living conditions for a long time (Lazarevic & Radovanovic, 2015).

The challenge is not only primary prevention of war but also secondary prevention by conflict resolution and tertiary prevention by clinical work in war zones and intervention as honest brokers in achieving reconciliation. It is important to ask what everyone should be doing personally in response to the threat to our children's future and the planet itself. Today, humankind has the science and technology to destroy itself or to provide prosperity to all. Yet, science cannot make that choice for everyone-only the moral power of the world acting as a community can (Taipale I. et al., 2002.).

4. ROLE OF THE NON-STATE ACTORS IN REDUCING THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR

During 2015, activities for carrying out a big project of the European Union commenced, named "ICAN Academy: Youth Supports Humanitarian Disarmament", with the support of Erasmus + and partner organizations from the Republic of Serbia, France and Turkey. The goal of this project is to engage young people in spreading knowledge about the importance of eliminating nuclear weapons in the world. In the Republic of Serbia and Southeastern Europe, this project is implemented by students from an informal

group “Youth for Disarmament”, who are, actually, part of a large International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN). The project will enable the development of expertise and involvement of young people and their partners from three European geopolitical regions which are likely to establish a common understanding of European security: France, as a state with nuclear weapons and vast democratic experience; Serbia and Eastern countries, which are facing the consequences of wars in the late 20th century and internal instability; Turkey and Eastern Europe, which are in direct contact with new conflicts and risks of dissemination of mass destruction weapons in the Middle East. Based on access to knowledge, project management and know-how, this project will implement the action and dissemination plans in each country: faculty tours, advocacy policy, meeting with political leaders and NGOs, etc. Learning and implementation methods are based on popular and active education combining formal and informal learning. National and regional educational objectives of the “Youth for Disarmament” are shown below.

General Objective: Raised public awareness and youth mobilized on the issues of humanitarian disarmament. The project “Youth supports humanitarian disarmament” aims to build on the previous aims and efforts of ICAN in the region of Southeast Europe in regard of even dissemination and distribution of information, knowledge and campaign participation opportunities. Therefore: it is necessary to inform people about the consequences that nuclear weapons can produce if used again; it is imperative to point out all the harms that the very existence of such weapons brings to everyone (economical, security, environmental hazard).

Project Objectives:

- Engagement of Experts: For the opinion of the youth to be recognized, a wider network of experts with authority in this field is needed to provide input, advice and expertise. Participation of experts is needed in a wide range of activities - from lectures to taking part in academic discussions and communications with the media.
- Enhanced Public Outreach: Public outreach will be achieved through public events as the main form of information dissemination and media outreach. Public events include: lectures and presentations at universities and other institutions; participation in other lectures, panels and academic venues as guests, participants and panelists; seminars and conferences for students to interact with students and academic staff; debates and round tables with experts and students, where different arguments can be heard. Announcements about future events can be made by using different media.
- Outreach to parliamentarians and other decision makers: This includes meetings and discussions with lawmakers and other decision makers about humanitarian disarmament.
- Regional Outreach: The regional outreach campaign is an informal network of civil society organizations, with regional outreach in all its segments.
- Expanding the network and cooperation with local NGOs and student organizations: The main goal of every partnership is raising awareness and education of members and others, as well as concrete actions planned and implemented together.

Education and Training Action Plan of the "Youth for Disarmament"

Group of Activities 1 – Preparation of Educational Materials: List of proposed literature to be used as the compendium for the program, but also means of awareness raising and advocacy, among the wider group of project beneficiaries and in the course of official meetings with university representatives and state officials.

Group of Activities 2 – Training of Youth Steering Group (YSG): As the participants/members of the YSG have various levels of knowledge and experience in these areas of work, they have reached a consensus that the opportunities for this practical training will be made possible in order to enable the youth to effectively and efficiently run the project.

Group of Activities 3 - Multiplier Events: The topics, themes and expert approaches identified as relevant by the members of the YSG are being presented for wider audiences at universities in Serbia and the region.

Group of Activities 4 – Production of Outreach Materials: The Youth Steering Group starts the work on production of materials and the media disseminating information about the project, the humanitarian initiative and the objectives of the campaign.

5. PROHIBITION ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

Issues of arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament can be solved most productively in multilateral fora. A multilateral approach is the only way to reach sustainable and long-term solutions. Common challenges require common solutions. As the nuclear-weapon states "club" expands and nuclear weapons proliferate, there are organized international efforts to put an end to that. The world had been waiting for such a legal measure for more than 70 years. Since February 22, 2016 the Open Ended Working Group – OEWG has been working in Genève, formed by a resolution adopted by the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations, with the purpose of dealing with legal norms that will have to be adopted in order to achieve the goal of the world without nuclear weapons. This Resolution was supported by 138 countries while nuclear-weapon states and their allies were against it. All members of the United Nations, as well as representatives of civil society, were invited to participate in the work of this group (Reaching Critical Will, 2018). On October 27, 2016 the First Committee of the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution L.41 to convene negotiations in 2017 on a "legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, leading towards their total elimination". The voting result was 123 nations in favor and 38 against, with 16 abstentions (UN resolution L.41, 2016).

At the meeting of the United Nations General Assembly held on 7th July 2017, 122 of the UN member states were in favour of the draft Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons- first international agreement to ban nuclear weapons (It is worth mentioning that 135 Member states had officially taken part in preparation of the document, and 14 more unofficially). The main leaders of this process were Austria, Brazil, Ireland, Mexico, Nigeria and The South African Republic. The Vatican and Kazakhstan actively participated. However, no country possessing nuclear weapons supported this document. Nevertheless, most countries in the world, practically two thirds, declared themselves against nuclear weapons. Therefore, the next step towards reaching the world without nuclear weapons must also include nuclear-armed states. The Treaty on

the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons represents one aspect of great efforts made toward its elimination, and is seen as the next vital step in such a process.

The aforementioned Treaty obliges all the Member states under no circumstances ever to develop, test, produce or purchase and stockpile nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The Treaty prohibits any form of transfer or use of nuclear weapons, as well as threats of its use. There is no military-strategic or legal justification for possession, use or threat of using nuclear weapons. In addition to the explicit ban of this terrible weapon, The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons represents the will and intention of most countries and people of the world to strengthen and keep the international legal order. The goal of these countries and the Treaty itself is to gradually lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons through its stigmatization and de-legitimization. The Treaty sealed in July 2017 has been open for signatures and ratifications of the Members since 20th September 2017. At this moment, more than fifty countries have become signatories, and this is certainly a favourable dynamics (Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 2017).

Official and unofficial nuclear states (as well as a number of their allies) were not in favour of this international agreement because of its contradictions with the interests of national security. In general terms, Russia's attitude is based on the fact that there are oppositions between the goal task of international peace, indivisible security for all countries without exception, and the prohibition of nuclear weapons as a means of preventing global conflicts. All NATO members (which either have a nuclear weapon or have deployed it on their territory in accordance with the nuclear exchange program), as well as most of the countries associated with the United States regarding security agreements, do not support the Treaty. Especially interesting is the position of Japan, which completely supports the world without nuclear weapons, and is the only country that has suffered from the use of nuclear weapons in combat. However, for reasons of national security (and, possibly, under the pressure from the United States), Japan is not planning to sign the Treaty. The Republic of Serbia does not possess nuclear weapons, is a contracting party of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (the agreement of 1968 which obligates the country to refrain from developing or purchasing nuclear weapons), and participated in the humanitarian initiative - the process that led to the negotiations on the Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty. However, for reasons which are not clear, Serbia stopped participating in this initiative and decided that banning nuclear weapons was "premature". With this act and arguments, Serbia stood side by side with NATO countries in the defense of nuclear weapons.

Today's tensions in international relations are no exception in the continuous risk we have been living in since the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. The only difference is that the destructive potential of today's nuclear missiles is far greater. The danger is very realistic and, as time goes by, is getting greater. We can hope to live in a world without nuclear weapons, but we must continue to work on that. The threat of a nuclear conflict is today greater than ever, and so is the importance of international cooperation. In order to eliminate threats of a nuclear attack, it seems purposeful to intensify activities within existing formats: implementation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which has not been signed or ratified by a number of nuclear and border countries; keeping and extending the Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and other agreements between Russia and the US; building trust and transparency in the field of nuclear arsenals, as well as the formalization of nuclear doctrines. With a high level of certainty, we can assume that the Treaty will not affect the global nuclear picture

in the medium-term perspective. Arsenal management and renewal, maintenance of operational capability - all that costs, and the price is paid by citizens at the expense of health, education and other elements crucial for the well-being of society. If a country which owns nuclear weapons stands for its democratic status and the welfare of its citizens, it will have to make a choice. Negotiations in the field of nuclear weapons and the progressive reduction of nuclear arsenals are a minimal set of verified measures which, if spread to all nuclear countries, will allow the world to slowly get out of the perspective of a nuclear apocalypse.

6. CONCLUSION

Although the number of nuclear weapons in global stockpiles is declining, the risk of their use, by accident or design, appears to be growing. A nuclear attack anywhere in the world would have profound implications for the work of organizations that provide disaster relief, refugee assistance and health care, as well as those promoting human rights, food security, poverty alleviation and environmental sustainability. All such groups must play an active role now in efforts to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe by eliminating nuclear weapons. As long as there are nuclear weapons, a risk of nuclear war exists. Therefore, it is important to enhance the effect and implementation of the measures that have already been taken and continuously take them to a higher level, as well as to implement new, more efficient measures. The constant strengthening of current treaties and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by means of strengthening control and sanctioning mechanisms should be established.

It is necessary to focus on a national approach to nuclear education and the need for regional cooperation and connection. In accordance with that, certain strategic activities are suggested: support to the development of M.A. and Ph.D. study programs in the field of nuclear security; development of applied courses in the field of nuclear security for students from different studies; establishing cooperation through educational institutions and civil society networks; raising awareness of wider audience about the necessity of the "culture of nuclear security" and the level of general public knowledge about the issues of humanitarian disarmament with special focus on groups such as academia, the youth, civil society, policy makers. Information about the catastrophic effects of nuclear weapons must be spread through the mass media, become part of the national education curriculum, and be shared widely through NGO networks. Ultimately, it should result in changing the perception of nuclear weapons.

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THE CONTEMPORARY TERRORIST THREAT AND THE RESPONSE OF THE SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES – INTERNAL REFORMS, COORDINATION AND COOPERATION

Vasko Shutarov, Dr.Sc
Intelligence Agency of the Republic of Macedonia
sutarov@yahoo.com

In the past two years, the European continent has experienced a wave of terrorist attacks mainly executed by small cells or individual perpetrators, self-radicalized or directed by extremist structures in the Middle East (predominantly Syria). The nature of the threat, which is difficult to detect and deter, has imposed many challenges on the security and intelligence agencies, especially regarding their internal strengths and capacities, coordination on national level and their international cooperation. The aim of this paper is to present a comparative view of the measures taken to strengthen the capacities of the security sector and the efforts to improve the intelligence sharing at national level. The examples of Belgium and France are presented, as well as Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republic of Macedonia. The research shows that the main challenge for the different agencies is cooperation and coordination and how to better detect and deter threats originating from radicalized persons.

***Keywords**:* security agencies, terrorism, cooperation, coordination, radicalization,

1. INTRODUCTION

The emerging conflicts in Syria and Iraq in the last several years have brought serious threats and challenges to the security and intelligence agencies, *inter alia*:

• *Foreign terrorist fighter (FTF) phenomenon*, consisting of radicalization, recruitment, travel to crisis areas, returning to domicile countries and cross border movements;

• *Lone attacks*, by self-radicalized individuals on behalf of the so called "Islamic State" (IS), without having true connections to this group or directed by IS operatives in Syria and Iraq;

• *Domestic terrors cells attacks*, with functional links and logistics by terrorist organizations in Syria and Iraq, or without being connected to these groups;

• *Potential FTFs*, who didn't managed to travel to war zones and try to commit terrorist acts at home as a way to show solidarity to their fellows on field;

• *FTF returnees*, including those who return periodically and those who come to stay, who stop with their illegal activities or get further engaged in radicalization and recruitment or even option a terror attack;

• *The illegal migration and terrorism nexus*, especially the use of migration routes for terrorist travel to Europe, or returning fighters, the backgrounds of migrants, as well as the attempts of radicalization and recruitment in asylum and detention centers;

• *Radicalization* as a continuing challenge, with or without the Syrian context;

• *Internet use for terrorism purpose*, including the growing role of the social media and other internet tools for radicalization and terrorist purposes.

The security agencies needed to learn, adapt, and most importantly, to respond to these new challenges. They require more knowledge about new individuals and groups, news tactics, different religious and ideologues teachings, and focus more attention to the developments in the Middle East and its links to Europe. Considering the permanent, unpredicted nature of the threat, the agencies needed to learn how to select targets, make threat assessment and priority lists. Legal changes have also been necessary to adapt this new reality and to prescribe punishments for the new crimes. The importance of intelligence came in the focus again, but the nature of the threat has also led to growing importance of the police and army in order to better ensure public security and protect critical infrastructure. Furthermore, most of the perpetrators have criminal background and have been known to the local police. This pushed the need for cooperation among the intelligence and the police and among the security agencies and other institutions such as the public prosecutor, the judiciary, and the penal system.

1. BELGIUM

Following the Paris attacks in 2015, it became apparent that the real intelligence failure had not been French, but Belgian. This provoked the debate regarding the problems within the Belgian security system, especially the intelligence services that lacked the capability to deal with an internal threat from the IS (Bury 2016). Intelligence officers in other European countries also blamed their Belgian counterparts for failing to detect terrorist cells (Einchenwald 2016).

1.1. Identified problems

Lack of intelligence personnel. Before the Paris attacks, one of the intelligence services (Surete de L'Etat), had only 600 personnel to monitor 900 "persons of interest", many of whom have travelled to Syria and Iraq. In 2016, a counter-terrorism official admitted they did not have enough people and infrastructure to investigate or monitor hundreds of suspected individuals (Bury 2016).

Lack of intelligence operationalization. Some of the perpetrators were known to the law enforcement officials prior to the attacks, and at least some of them lived in the Molenbeek area in Brussels, noted for links to extremism. This suggests that intelligence was "pretty good" but the ability to act on it was "lacking". (Einchenwald 2016).

Lack of communication within the intelligence community. There are linguistic divisions between Flemish and French speakers, a decentralized government, and numerous separate and overlapping security agencies (McNamee 2016). Because of the decentralization, the investigators are known for not communicating with colleagues in other agencies and locations (Einchenwald 2016). An additional problem is the failure to develop relationships regarding complementing human and signal intelligence (Bury 2016).

Complex police system. As a result of deep political divisions, there are numerous police forces. The local police deployed in 196 police sectors (small or big municipalities) and a federal police, which are independent of each other, but are jointly responsible for providing full police activities. Their cooperation is more reliant on culture than on regulations and institutional structure. There is coordination through "security councils" at

all levels: national, regional and local and coordination, especially regarding information exchange (Populari 2016).

Lack of International cooperation. Besides poor domestic cooperation, the Brussels attacks also showed poor cooperation with international counterparts. The US services, for example, complained about difficulties in cooperation, especially regarding which of the many agencies at odds with each other actually has the information requested (Eichenwald 2016).

2. FRANCE

The attacks in France also revealed intelligence failures. All three of the attackers at the Bataclan 2015, for example, were known to the security services and yet all trace of them had been lost and one of them was able to get to Syria in 2013 despite a travel ban (BBC 2016). Many problems within the system have been identified, but also a set of measures, reforms and improvements has been initiated.

2.1. Cooperation and coordination problems

Complexity and overlapping competences. One problem is the multiplicity of competing agencies and "no clear vision of which does what" (BBC 2016). The National Police, which protects large cities, and the Gendarmerie, a branch of the military that protects small towns and rural areas, have separate intelligence divisions. The Domestic intelligence agency (DGSI) has national competency, but often gives way to the local police on specific tasks. The failure to coordinate between the DGSI and Paris police (with a separate intelligence division), interrupted the surveillance of Said Kouachi, participant in the Charlie Hebdo attack (Pratt 2016).

Lack of police-military coordination. During the Bataclan attack, the special police unit that came first was insufficiently armed to take an action. But when they asked a group of soldiers (deployed as part of an anti-terrorism operation) to lend their rifles, the soldiers refused because they were ordered not to fire their weapons (Pratt 2016).

Failed intelligence reform. Former president Nicolas Sarkozy designed a reform to deepen the co-operation among the intelligence units. The idea was to merge the counter-espionage and domestic surveillance units, because it became clear that the old system could not answer the contemporary threats coming both from the inside and outside the country. The reform was criticized because it reduced the network of field officers built up for over 50 years that is now badly needed to contain the homegrown jihadism threat. It also placed too much emphasis on "strong signals" from the top echelons of terrorist groups at the expense of "weak signals" from operatives and sympathizers on the ground. (Financial Times 2016).

2.2. New response to the threat

Strengthening the system. The Parliamentary committee investigating the systemic security failures during Paris attacks 2015 identified the general point that France's intelligence system failed. The commission proposed the six intelligence agencies operating in France should be merged into a single agency directly under the prime minister that would improve information-sharing and make it easier for foreign agencies to know who to deal with. It would become a "national counter-terrorism agency" whose chief would be France's *de facto* head of domestic security. Priority was given to

intelligence gathering in prisons (BBC 2016). It was suggested that all French police and gendarme intelligence groups should be placed under the authority of the Ministry of Interior (MoI), and the DGSI (under the MoI) should be under direct command of the President (Pratt 2016).

Strengthening public security. Intelligence experts suggested more attention on spotting signs of radicalisation which involves monitoring sensitive suburbs, immigrant communities, violent gangs, mosques and NGOs (Financial Times 2016). Also, protection of sensitive sites (major transit points such as stations, airports, etc.) and measures implemented in order to prevent radicalised individuals from accessing these sites (Gouvernement 2016). In 2017, it was announced that 1,600 troops would be deployed at border checkpoints, and on air, sea and rail transport infrastructure and 400 additional police officers will boost security in the greater Paris area (The Conversation 2016).

Monitoring of radicalized individuals. This is very important especially when the courts do not have enough evidence for prosecution, particularly the returning FTF. About 1,600 young people and 800 families affected by radicalisation in 2016 were managed appropriately by the prefectural monitoring units and police, teachers and social workers have learned to share their information and pool their actions (Gouvernement 2016). With more than 10,000 radicalised people potentially posing a threat, the services get a lot of tips and the issue is more how to analyse them. They need psychologists, academics, religion experts and good analysts to detect the moment one of them becomes dangerous. (Financial times 2016).

Increase of the services' workforce. The Government decided to increase the services' workforce, although analysts note it may be years before they are fully operational (Financial Times 2016). For Paris, the priority will be to build up intelligence, cybersecurity, specialized internal security units and rapidly deployable combined arms special forces (Taylor 2017).

New legislation. Since November 2017, a new anti-terrorism law is implemented which authorizes the prefects or the MoI to assign someone, organize searches or close a place of worship without the consent of the judiciary and focus on terrorism prevention (Bouf 2017). Law enforcement are permitted to establish security zones around places of events that they consider to be vulnerable to attack and place suspected extremists under the constraints of their town or city's boundaries for up to one year. The law also allows the security services to access the travel data of airline passengers, and intelligence agencies to tap into phone and email communications in order to detect suspicious behavior (Di Matteo 2016).

New Counter-terrorism center. In June 2016, a National Centre for Counter-terrorism was created, with a view to strengthening coordination between the intelligence services to respond and prevent terror attacks (Di Matteo 2016).

3. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

A public acknowledgment of the lack of adequate coordination, cooperation and exchange of information among security agencies arrived after the terrorist attacks, for example the killing of the soldiers in Sarajevo's suburb Rajlovac in 2015 (Halimović 2015).

3.1. Identified problems

Regarding terrorism prevention, the following shortcomings are listed: poor coordination of the security institutions, lack of capacity to conduct investigations or border crossing (Fena 2017), political interference in the services (especially the police), lack of quality experts who will be able to make a quality assessment of the security situation, lack of procedures for information fusion, unclear lines of coordination and subordination, obsolete equipment and a general lack of resources, jurisdiction of the agencies with an unclear definition of jurisdiction, and maybe the biggest problem is the lack of commitment and lack of accountability (Visoko 2015). Lastly, the lack of political regulations is also listed among the problems to deal with terrorism, for example a policy toward FTF returnees (Halimović 2015).

3.2. Cooperation and coordination problems

Problems of internal institutional and personnel weakness. Communication and information exchange still goes through "courier service", which in practice is implemented by phone and other traditional communication means. Information is distributed by phone, thanks to personal friendships and collegiality, which in urgent cases could be a very big problem. Cooperation is not efficient because it depends more on personal relations, than on obligatory rules, the police officers cannot take decisions based just on laws, but must also consider compliance with the ad-hoc arrangements among the agencies. (Populari 2016). For example, BiH established a unique electronic data exchange system and the best equipped and most functional situation center in Europe in order to avoid problems in communication in emergency situations. Both systems, situated in the Directorate for Coordination of Police Bodies (DCPB), are out of work because the individual police agencies must voluntarily give the information they have, and their synchronization is very low. Republic of Srpska (RS) chooses what information would share and does not update information, and some cantons also do not accept the fact that the Federal MoI controls the centralized server. (Populari 2016).

Problems originating from the complex state structure. The entities in Bosnia have the main responsibility for their security. In RS there is only one institution – MoI, while in FBiH there is MoI, which further divides the responsibilities to 10 cantons, each with its own ministry. Brcko has its own police. At state level, there are three police agencies: State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA), DCBP and the Border Police. They act independently in organization of the Ministry of Security (MoS), a body without any direct police responsibilities. There is a lack of consensus among the police agencies regarding who is in charge and a lack of a clear understanding with respect to the division of jurisdiction among police agencies and a lack of personnel and technical capacities (Populari 2016).

This makes the concept of "national security" unclear. State level agencies have no authorization, just some few competences, such as fight against terrorism or inter-entity crime and have no authority over the lower institutional levels, which also provokes inefficient coordination. The country has no special coordination agency. The DCPB, which is authorized to coordinate and facilitate the cooperation and communication among different police agencies has no legal basis, and its initial responsibilities, such as international cooperation, were contested. There was even no coordination protocol among the agencies (Populari 2016).

Task force for fight against terrorism (TFFAT), formed in 2013 upon the decision of the Minister of Security, is composed of representatives of judicial institutions, police and security agencies, and the Bosnian Public Prosecutor as its first chairman. With the formation of TFFAT, a joint conclusion was adopted that all institutions within their joint activities, information sharing and cooperation should be more active in future in the fight against terrorism, in order to detect, prevent and investigate terrorist activities (Srna 2013). However, this process was further politicized and provoked confusion in terms of the name and competences, which marked this initiative with a political-security dispute. The security experts also did not favor this body believing that there is already an operative group within SIPA, consisted of inspectors and experts (Šišić 2016).

The Operative group for fight against terrorism (OGFAT) was formed in 2016 as an operative body within the TFFAT (Beta 2016), although the decision was taken 5 years previously. It comprises representatives (experienced operatives) of all police bodies in BiH in order to collect all information related to terrorism (Đugum 2016). This process also faced political debates and obstacles, mainly from RS, fearing this would transfer responsibilities form entity to state level (Beta 2016). RS supported the group and the idea for it to serve as a focal point of information sharing among the agencies (Đugum 2016), but opposed its being led by the Minister of Security, instead of the Public Prosecutor, who only has the authorization to run investigations. RS also thought it would be a new police agency, a legal and political precedent that would seriously violate the existing coordination and cooperation model of the police agencies (Beta 2016).

4. REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

The primary responsibility for detecting and investigating terrorism falls under the security and intelligence agencies: the Directorate for Security and Counter-Intelligence (DSCI) within the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the Intelligence Agency (IA), as a separate state institution. The Special Units, namely the Rapid Deployment Unit (RDU), the Special Task Unit (TIGAR), and the "Alpha" units of the Skopje Police Department (also MOI), are responsible for interdiction and arrests. Except the "Kumanovo case" 2015, the Macedonian services have not experienced religiously motivated terrorist attacks, but also share the contemporary threats with their European counterparts (FTF phenomena) and conduct significant counterterrorism operations in this regard.

4.1. Identified problems

The security system remains unchanged, as it was shaped 20 years ago, when the IA came out of the MoI (DSCI). The legal basis is old and insufficient, the laws and regulations for the functioning of the services remain the same without any changes and adaptation to the new reality. There is also overlapping of responsibilities, even improvisation and work outside the legal and institutional framework. Competition, mistrust and animosity between different services, as well as animosity provoked by personal reasons and political reasons are also present and affect the cooperation and coordination. As different institutions have similar responsibilities, there are attempts to interfere in competences. There is no mechanism or any other institutional solution to the challenge of coordination and cooperation. The heads of services have no willingness to overcome their mutual personal and political disputes in the name of improvement in the management and operation of the system.

In 2015, the State Department Report on Terrorism assessed that the security sector is equipped and disposed to deal effectively with terrorism within its borders (State Department 2015). However, in 2016 the report suggested that the capacity to detect and deter acts of terrorism without international support needs to be strengthened. Specifically, the police need training on command and control, tactical planning and execution, casualty care, and messaging. The report recognized that Macedonia successfully executed arrests and search warrants against actual and would-be FTFs. It also coordinated with regional partners to disrupt terrorist attack plans and to arrest Macedonian citizens attempting to join the IS. The MOI developed operational plans to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks on soft targets (stadiums, hotels, etc.). Regarding the improvements required, it was noted that the long political crisis inhibited decisive action by the government to address deficiencies in law enforcement and border security, including shortages in personnel and equipment (State Department 2016).

In the outbreak of the migrant and refugee crisis and the growing terrorism threat (2015-2016), requiring strengthened security measures, the security agencies and police experienced shortages of personnel, particularly intelligence officers and technical resources to detect extremists and monitor FTF returnees (Jakov Marusic 2016).

The well-known "Kumanovo case" in 2015 exposed many failures of the security agencies which came under public scrutiny for not appropriately responding to terrorism threats. First, this refers to prevention, because the armed group entered the country without being detected by the police or other agencies, and second, because it did not manage to neutralize the group in the initial phase, and later did it at the cost of many human lives. It was revealed that the action of the special police forces was quickly prepared, involved police officers who were not appropriately informed (they were told they were going to arrest drug dealers) which lead to casualties at the beginning of action. DSCI later admitted that they were responsible due to a wrong threat assessment and should not have allowed it to reach an urban area (Kod 2017). The „Kumanovo case" also sparked a debate over the exchange information between the IA and Law Enforcement, whether accurate information was delivered, and whether there was an appropriate reaction from the police and the other institutions (Meta 2015). The police action revealed command and control, tactical planning, casualty care and messaging as areas for improvement (State Department 2015).

The strategic document for police development 2016-2020, funded by EU, identified a lack of a defined police role and a lack of communication equipment with the Operative Center and field patrols. It underlines the need to define the role of the Bureau for Public Security (BPS) regarding terrorism, but it also reveals a lack of information sharing with the DSCKI. In the upcoming years, BPS should make improvements with respect to more qualified personnel, threat assessment, prevention, profiling and protection against terrorist attacks, countering identified groups and better investigations after a terrorist attack (Shashevski 2016).

4.2. Expecting the reforms

The Macedonian security system reforms were initiated according to the "Pribe Report" 2015, which mainly refers to DSCI and the surveillance of communications. The main goals of the reform, which tops the new government agenda, are restoring the image of professional and reputable service, professionalism, diminishing the party's influences and transparency (Faktor 2017). Unfortunately, the reform still has not entered the phase of

reshaping the security system, including more efficient prevention of contemporary threats. The Faculty of Security-Skopje is maybe the only institution that initiates and organizes public discussions on these issues.

The main challenge should be strengthening the internal weakness within the security agencies and the police and better cooperation and coordination in order to avoid overlapping in operations and make integrated analytical products. With only few security institutions, these problems could be overcome either by inter-institutional protocols or by creation of a new institution.

5. CONCLUSION

The wave of terrorist attacks in Europe provoked public debates regarding the security system work, the need for organization and reform. Public pressure on political and security officials in some countries has led to very rapid changes, adaptations and improvements. However, in other countries (Republic of Macedonia), the security systems remain locked due to the lack of public debate, political instability, different priorities, and most importantly, the lack of political will and understanding among policymakers with respect to the security threats.

Cooperation and coordination is the main problem among the agencies. Governments consider various institutional mechanisms, but the personal factor seems to further overshadow this important aspect of intelligence and police work. Capacity building, technical and workforce improvements and training in expertise would take time to yield results. Better intelligence work could help detect terrorist cells, and there have already been dozens of terror plots foiled across Europe. The main challenge is posed by self-radicalised individuals and lone attacks which do not involve a high degree of planning. The security and police agencies could only detect them in their final phase of radicalization, and cannot prevent this problem. The specifics of the phenomena requires a broader cooperation with the local communities, teachers, social workers, religious communities and NGOs, and this could be the new coalition for prevention of contemporary security challenges.

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INTELLIGENCE DEPENDENCE ON THE POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS AS AN IMPERATIVE FOR ACHIEVING THE GOALS OF THE STATE (THE ROLE OF THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS)

Ljupcho Stankovski
Balkan Energy Security
e-mail: ljupcostankovski@yahoo.com

In the context of social and political science and the theory of international relations, intelligence activity is an inevitable subject of scientific research and viewpoints.

The complexity of the role of the intelligence services as an integral part of the state institutional mechanism in the internal political life of social groups and international relations, throughout the entire history of the human society, certainly represents a phenomenon which requires a comprehensive approach and scientific theoretical approach and explanation. It is a fact that irrelevant of the type of the intelligence security system within a society, its role to this day is beyond dispute. In time, its activity without an official form and organization, grows into a complex state institution having a professional intelligence function, to which other activities are subsequently added.

In order to successfully create the policy and make decisions, the government must have broad knowledge of certain issues. Most often, the legal sources are not able to give answers to many subtle matters, hence the intelligence factor is used. With application of its means and methods, it has greater possibilities to find the right answers to the raised issues on the part of the policy makers. This is the main reason why the intelligence service should have strong support from the political leadership.

This paper will focus on the close connection between politics and intelligence, especially in the decision-making process, and the implementation of the established foreign policy goals, as well as on intelligence as one of the strongest tools of power, its activities and tasks, and finally intelligence services operational control.

Key words: *intelligence, intelligence service, politics, nation, features.*

Introduction

The intelligence security system as part of the national security system and the executive authorities as a whole, together with diplomacy and the armed forces, are the main mechanism for preservation and promotion of national security and national interests being the paramount ideals of every nation and country.

Therefore, in modern conditions of development of international relations, intelligence activity is considered one of the basic and key elements of the national power of each state. Intelligence activity is important for world politics, and that is evident on a daily basis, primarily due to its significance in the prevention of global challenges and

threats to security. The afore-mentioned is a confirmation that the state itself is in the limelight. Its power is reflected through diplomacy and other state information systems (mass media) and intelligence institutions, united under the national intelligence system. Hence, each state seeks, through the functioning of the executive branch - the Government, to establish an intelligence - security system as well as sub-system of national security, whose specialized institutions carry out intelligence, counterintelligence and other security activities in accordance with the defined national interests and strategy for national security[218].

It would be wrong if one thinks that the intelligence system primarily deals with information and it is its only task. It has to predict the development of events in the future, it should make assessments of the events, and what will happen, and regularly inform and warn the Government.

The policy makers, by means of the intelligence service, define the basis of the policy regarding a particular country. This knowledge must be complete and contain data from a variety of fields, ranging from the physical – geographical sphere, ethnic issues, to the area of science, production, individual characteristics of the socio - political and economic system, etc[219].

Knowledge is a complex research process where modern scientific - technical and technological innovations and methods are applied, because the intelligence hires highly specialized experts in the field. The purpose of this process is providing the government with the necessary material to create policies. Knowledge, being power in the context of the needs and actions of the political power holders, must be integrated, accurate and usable for making strategic decisions. It is provided, inter alia, through the implementation of intelligence activities. The goal is with the realization of intelligence activities to timely discover the aims, objectives and interests of others, to determine correctly, clearly and comprehensively a strategy to protect their interests, values and goals.

The close connection between politics and intelligence

The close connection between national policy and the intelligence service, as well as the perfect balance between them, can guarantee the security of any nation. The knowledge of changes in the external environment of the country, is primarily the concern of modern intelligence systems and their members (intelligence services). Therefore, the holders of political power and intelligence services are directly connected, especially in the process of making political decisions and implementation of established foreign policy goals.

The political leadership requires accurate intelligence, relevant answers to insiders in the intelligence requirements. Politics actually requires relevant, timely and objective intelligence analysis. On the other hand, intelligence structures seek freedom, fairness and objectivity in action.

Policy makers have three basic options when it comes to accepting the analysis and assessments by the intelligence services. These define the global nature of intelligence activities. First, they may recognize the intelligence assessments and analysis broadly, even when they contain bad news and facts. Second, they can politicize the intelligence

[218] Bajagikj M (2010) p.30, Methodology of intelligence work, Criminal - Police Academy, Belgrade
[219] Milashinovikj R (1979) p.100, CIA, Power and Politics, Belgrade

services exerting some pressure on the freedom of their action and objectivity of their assessments, in order to harmonize their positions entirely with the politics. Finally, politicians can only accept the evaluations favourable to them or ignore the significance of intelligence activities and their results.

The role of the intelligence activity is a very sensitive area and it is a great enigma in understanding the process of foreign policy decision making so that the analyses and assessments of the inter-relationship of the intelligence activities and politics are extremely complex and require thorough knowledge of the nature and political decision-making techniques, as well as the core of intelligence.

Harmonized relations between the intelligence services and political decision-makers result in fulfilment of multiple tasks on both sides. In that respect, the intelligence activity needs to perform the stated tasks if it wants to play its real role (legally established and expected) in the creation of the foreign policy:

1. To monitor the important developments abroad and report these in order to warn the policy makers about current threats and problems,
2. To give assessments of future developments in the world to reduce surprises and risks that the policy makers meet.
3. To provide assessments in a separate context, referring to actual reactions of policy - makers in terms of the determined policy;
4. To monitor conditions that may affect the acceptance of the established policies or the course of the operation of other subjects in international affairs.

In order to fulfil these functions, intelligence officers must perform the following four tasks:

1. Providing leadership in the data collection process,
2. Adjustment of the intelligence activities to the requirements of policy makers, which will enable intelligence analysts to design intelligence final studies necessary for the adoption of political decisions.
3. Preparation of high-quality and objective intelligence reports and assessments,
4. Preparation of reports and assessments in an acceptable norm, given the efforts, final intelligence data, i.e. united intelligence information to exercise influence on the impact that it already deserves[220].

Intelligence activity, in addition to the informative - intelligence and preventive - security function and the function of national security, is close to the political power because timely current forecasting and warning intelligence activity of the holders of political power provides information superiority over its opponents and allies both internally and externally.

The intelligence operations must be considered depending on the political needs, therefore they should determine, according to the requirements of the policy makers, what directions are to be taken. This guidance will usually depend on the relationship between the service and the customers of intelligence data.

[220] Bajagikj M (2010) p.77, Methodology of intelligence work, Criminal - Police academy, Belgrade, 2010

The intelligence requirements for data collection specify the manner in which the intelligence service will get to the information they need for the decision-makers. So, numerous stakeholders should be involved in defining the requirements to collect information.

Political decision-makers determine the intelligence needs, i.e. specify those areas or objects that must be investigated by the intelligence in order to collect the necessary information for the future decision-making process and provide defence in terms of foreign political actions, as well as monitor and promote national security.

Directing the intelligence work is a very complex issue where you cannot predict that intelligence will consistently act according to the directives of the political leadership.

Considering the fact that national authorities are responsible for political issues, they greatly depend on the intelligence services and their knowledge gained from a wide scope of data, providing thus a strong mechanism for directing the political activities.

Between the official policy and the intelligence operation, general policy sets the guidelines for the action of the intelligence activity and its subject of work to some extent, while information policy timely indicates: what resources it can or will provide in what form, to whom it will be delivered, by which means and what is the aim it needs to achieve. This information is used to initiate certain activities, both on the internal and foreign policy plan.

The preparation of the final intelligence files involves engaging the most professional intelligence personnel, if necessary, entire analytical teams and specialized business intelligence services.

Intelligence as one of the strongest tools of the executive bodies

It is considered that one of the strongest tools of the executive branch power is the intelligence service. The quality of the intelligence operations largely depends on the effectiveness of the use of other instruments of state policy, such as diplomacy, military force, economic pressure, psychological propaganda, etc.

The intelligence service is an organized activity or organization that by request and intention of the leading political forces, collects, evaluates and presents to the leading political structures in the country specific data for the opponent. It protects the interests of the country guarding it from the opponents and engages in other activities, which contribute to the achievement of certain political goals[221].

The fact is that in the process of political decision-making, among other factors, the intelligence element is necessarily present and being ahead of all others, it is a major tool in the system of creating political activities.

The close connection between power and intelligence activities, i.e. the country's ability to promptly detect the intentions of others, is expected through the following five functions, based on which one can analyze and measure the power of any state:

1. The function of collecting information (how the state defines the needs for information and how to collect, analyse and use it),

2. The function of decision- making (whether the state can unite all its resources into one efficient strategy),

[221] Gjorgjevikj O, p. 27, Basis of State Security

3. The function of providing resources (how well the state can provide the elements of power to achieve its strategic objectives),

4. The function of selecting a method how to use the resources (efficient organisation of all means placed at the state's disposal),

5. The function of resistance (how flexible is the state to the demands and challenges emerging from other states)[222].

Having the knowledge of the intentions and potentials of other countries, opposition is much easier. Therefore, intelligence activity is a very important part of state authority and power - the ability to influence another country in a predictable manner is crucial and it is the key to national security.

The intelligence activity involves timely collected and processed intelligence data which further processed and analysed, are transformed into final intelligence information in the form of complete and reliable information about an issue, occurrence or incident upon which the political power is based.

Activities and tasks of an intelligence service

In the process of implementing the complex intelligence activities, the intelligence services have a duty to provide information to the political decision-makers, thus revealing the intentions and plans of other countries, as well as interpreting the adopted foreign policy decisions, in a way that will ensure a successful foreign policy action.

Foreign policy makers present the needs to the top of the intelligence service and introduce specific intelligence requirements, based on which the intelligence service plans the further course of the intelligence cycle. Who will be the person in charge of referral or transmission of the intelligence requirements, primarily depends on the position of the intelligence in the intelligence - security system.

Transferring the intelligence requirements involves high awareness of the political decision-makers and those who receive them. As with the determination of the intelligence needs, intelligence requirements must be based on real problems and must not be fully exposed to the intelligence services. These claims should be consistent with the real possibilities and potentials of the intelligence service.

The intelligence requirements are analysed in view of their nature, complexity and urgency, depending on the material, human and other possibilities that lie with the capabilities of the intelligence service. It devotes special importance to the evaluation and assessment of its own capabilities that can effectively respond to the specific intelligence needs and requirements.

The five main areas of intelligence activity are:

-**defining the intelligence needs** and priorities of the government,

- **gathering intelligence data** at the request of the government with open, secret and technical methods,

-**counterintelligence activity and safety,**

-**covert action**, which is the extension and application of the government's policy on covert and illicit means,

-**analysis and assessment** of all collected intelligence.

[222] Bajagikj M (2010) p.32 Methodology of intelligence work, Criminal - Police academy, Belgrade, 2010

A growing number of theorists agree that essential and primary phases in the overall process of the intelligence work are directing, collecting, analysing, processing and presenting.

The task of the intelligence service is to be a guard of the world so that it provides a benefit for the state, as well as its interests. One of the most elementary activities of the intelligence service is research. Some experts of the work of intelligence services indicate seven most important stages of Intelligence research:

1. General introduction to the problem,
2. Defining the used terms,
3. Gathering facts,
4. Facts interpretation
5. Setting hypotheses,
6. Conclusions,
7. Disclosing the obtained results and conclusions.

Of all listed items, the most important one is to detect the problem and then develop an action plan, with all components that must be determined (time, route, sources, enforcement officers, etc.) so that the hypothesis can be proved or rejected, as a final conclusion. Finally, the intelligence cycle should be completed by a draft document, which must necessarily include the benchmarks for the degree of reliability of any claim. Even the best intelligence in the world will be useless unless it is delivered to the user in a timely manner, in a medium compatible with the system used by the user, with appropriate security and in an easily understandable format.

The most important link, among other elements, is the systematization and the analysis of the obtained data. It is a very complex task, which requires exhaustive processing, classifying, registering and making general conclusions that are shared at a later stage (classified) according to the related issues. The last stage involved a complex analysis made on the basis of the mental operations for the needs of the state leading positions.

Intelligence has two main objectives: primarily, to inform the political leadership, secondly, to support the military, police or other operations, whose ultimate goal is to preserve the security of the state. And this is achieved through the four main functions: collection, analysis, counterintelligence operations and covert action.

The ultimate goal of the intelligence function is gaining information about the state and the intentions of foreign governments, and reporting these to their own government. Based on the obtained data, the government creates its strategy. It is practically included in the overall system of the political decision-making process.

Control of the operation of the intelligence service

The lack of an appropriate control over the Intelligence operation endangers the most elementary rights of citizens, despite the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and human dignity. Although the intelligence service does not make political decisions, and has no responsibility for it, the fact is that it imposes its views on politics, and in a certain way has strong influence. And if there is no adequate factual control over its operations, in reality it may become a very powerful factor.

The veil of secrecy which wraps the intelligence agencies enables smooth implementation of their activities without fearing the public opinion, which is not able to judge the correctness and usefulness of such actions.

One of the most important issues in the study, organization, powers, methods and means for the operation of modern intelligence is the accountability of these institutions on the executive level. Namely, democratic systems require the intelligence agencies to be responsible, i.e. to act in accordance with the law and be subject to control and external monitoring. The degree of control over them varies from state to state, but certain universal principles are applied in most countries, especially where developed democratic relations prevail. Monitoring by the executive power primarily focuses on the usefulness, i.e. the assessment whether the intelligence services fulfil their mission for which they are intended and whether their actions are in line with the defined strategy of both the national security and the intelligence service. In other words, whether they fulfil their tasks and functions regarding the needs and demands of policy makers.

Political control in the broadest sense means activity of the law enforcement bodies (parliament, assembly) in regard to monitoring the work of the intelligence services. Two main tasks of this type of monitoring include: control of the legality of work and the amount of spent financial and material assets authorized by the state authorities.

Conclusion

The good relationship between the political decision-makers and the intelligence services, which includes consideration of the organizational and institutional framework of this relationship, allows adequate and timely definition of the intelligence requirements, thus reducing the possibility to blame the intelligence service that is under political pressure, the latter jeopardizing the impartiality and objectivity in the work of the intelligence services.

To enable the relationship between the intelligence services and the political decision-makers to take place within the normative - institutional context which includes consistent relationship (absence of conflicting interests), political decision-makers should be less secretive and more direct in the introduction of intelligence officers with long-term foreign policy priorities and goals. For this purpose, they must rely on the established subordination among all participants in the process of adopting foreign policy decisions. This is necessary because the state bodies dealing with the planning and implementation of foreign policy become effective in their operations.

For the policy makers, it is necessary that the intelligence estimations also cover the connection between vulnerability and the actual impact of the procedure. Without such differentiation, policy makers could take unnecessary procedures to protect unimportant vulnerabilities while developing a sense of "fatigue" in reacting to problems[223].

Great damage can be caused when the relationship between politics and intelligence structures becomes very close. In such a case, the political decision-makers are uncritically content with the intelligence data and assessments they receive, while the intelligence officers become too confident in their conclusions.

Enormous damage is caused by the politicization of the intelligence services, i.e. the overlapping of the intelligence analyses with the desired policy. It is particularly

[223] Kviging T (2009) p.26, To see the unseen, Skopje, 2009, p.26

dangerous because it leads to a situation where the intelligence assessments serve mainly for further justification of already (pre) defined decisions and performed actions.

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TYPES AND EXTENT OF DATA SIGNIFICANT TO MONITORING AND ASSESSING SECURITY THREATS TO CERTAIN PERSONS AND FACILITIES

Slaviša Krstić, Dr.Sc
Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia
e-mail: slavishakrstic@gmail.com
Dane Subošić, Dr.Sc
Academy of Criminalistics and Police Studies
e-mail: subosicdane@yahoo.com

Abstract

Basic and special types of data necessary for monitoring and assessing security threats to certain persons and facilities are defined based on the analysis of historical data, legislature, manuals, security plans and other documents that regulate working of security services in the Republic of Serbia and foreign countries (the USA, the Russian Federation, Germany, Slovakia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), as well as UNDSS and OSCE, on the deduction of planned measures for security of certain persons and facilities, and on the PESTLE analysis. These types of data are related to: a) sources of threats, b) targets of threats, c) ways of threats, d) time and place of endangering of security. Collection, processing, and analysis of security data about sources of threats, ways of threats and time and place of endangering of security should provide an overview of the security situation in relation to the environment and the protection unit which undertakes security measures, and connects data to possible endangering of security of certain persons and facilities. Thus, a causal link is established and it can be seen in the activity of the heads of protection units (defined by their decisions and security plans) in order to prevent endangering of security. In the conclusion, security threat assessment for certain persons and facilities depends on the types and extent of data collected, and they are linked to consequences that could occur if appropriate measures are not taken.

Key words: data, monitoring, assessment, security, *certain persons and facilities*

1. INTRODUCTION

Data are raw, unprocessed facts and numbers about events.[224] Datum is a character or a set of characters that describes attributes of the object about which the information is formed. It is a statement about true reality, information model. One can say

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[224] See: Stoner, G. and others. ,*Menagement,* Želnid, Belgrade, 2002, p. 558.

that data represent information overview which can be interpreted formally, and it is suitable for communication, interpretation, or processing.[225]

According to Obrad Stevanovic: "Security datum is a fact related to certain security condition, phenomenon, or event, to security actors, characteristics, and consequences, as well as police organization (organization in general - author's note), its work and results of that work. Data can describe security condition which could endanger or create security. Data could have higher or lower level of significance and more or less point out to the risks of endangering of security and probability of creation of security.[226]

Security data, collected, processed and analyzed during the monitoring and assessing of the security situation, can generally be classified into data related to environment, function and structure in systematic sense. Given the fact that certain persons constantly, temporarily or occasionally stay or work in certain facilities, in most cases security data about them are not separated. The data about a person are assessed according to the premises in which they are staying. Special types of data are data about routes of certain persons, from their house to the working place and other facilities.

The Head of the protection unit has the task of constant monitoring of the general situation in the country and the region, i.e. political, economic, socio-demographic, technological, and legal situation. Important political decisions made by a certain person, or decisions of national authorities which affect certain person directly or indirectly, can more or less affect security measures of that person.[227] The economic and social situation is monitored for analysis of the security condition in the state, primarily for their influence to public peace and order, and criminal activities of individuals and groups. Technological opportunities influence the possibilities of usage of new ways of endangering security of certain persons and facilities. On the other hand, the usage of sophisticated technology allows improvement of the security protection system. Legal regulation affects all spheres of society and therefore monitoring is necessary because changes can significantly affect the social events that may affect endangering the security of certain persons and facilities.

According to Sasa Mijalkovic: "The phenomena of endangering security, in principle, consist of several elements, and is characterized by: a source of endangerment, actors of endangerment, forms of endangerment, object of endangerment, with reference values which are attacked, the consequences and effects of consequences on the source and the actor of endangering of security".[228]

Basic and special types of data necessary for monitoring and assessing security threats to certain persons and facilities are defined based on the analysis of historical data, legislature, manuals, security plans and other documents that regulate working of security services in the Republic of Serbia (military[229] and police[230]) and foreign countries (the

[225] Kostic, B., *Menagement and corespondention,* Institute for schoolbooks and teaching material, Belgrade, 1994, p. 53.

[226] Stevanovic, O., *Police menagement,* Police Academy, 2003, p. 151.

[227] Proclaiming a certain person persona non grata affects the limit of their movement, transit through certain countries, participation in international conferences under special conditions and more. This results in a necessary use of alternative means of transport, places of accommodation, the route of movement which calls for increased involvement of security officers and increased costs.

[228] Mijalkovic, S., *National security,* Police Academy, Belgrade, 2009, p. 113.

[229] *Protection of persons,* School Center of Security of YNA, School of military police, January 1958.; *Protection of persons in different conditions,* School Center of Security of YNA, 1965.; *Security service,* School Center of Security of YNA, School of military police, 1970.; *Protection of*

USA, the Russian Federation, Germany, Slovakia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), as well as UNDSS and OBSE, on the deduction of planned measures for the security of certain persons and facilities, and on the PESTLE analysis. These types of data are related to:

- sources of threats,
- targets of threats,
- ways of threats,
- time and place of endangering of security.

In a special sense, each of the above data content is decomposed into individual that affect them or contain them.

2. SOURCES OF ENDANGERING OF SECURITY

The source of endangering security is a subject that, by doing or omitting to do some action, conducts endangering phenomenon[231].

Data regarding the sources of endangering of security is related to: a) the activity of foreign intelligence and military intelligence services, b) terrorist, nationalist, ideological, racial, religious, and other extreme organizations, c) criminal organizations, persons and groups who are sentenced for crimes that are prosecuted ex officio, d) persons from the close surroundings of a certain person who are registered as kidnappers and blackmailers, e) former members of the national and military leadership who represent the interests of foreign countries and armed forces, f) persons who abandoned the political party of certain person, or persons aspiring to top positions in the party, g) close family members of a certain person who claim inheritance, h) persons who are in daily direct contact with a certain person (cooks, waiters, butlers, servants and others), i) the doctor and the dentist of a certain person, j) journalists and cameramen at press conferences, k) participants in traffic, l) persons associated with certain person's vices (gamblers, prostitutes, alcoholics, drug addicts), m) mentally ill persons, n) adventurers, m), complainers whose motive for endangering the security of certain persons and facilities is some personal reason, political, ideological, religious and other beliefs and others.

According to relevant laws, regulations available, guidelines, plans, and other documents providing domestic and foreign security services, there is no article that provides for the collection of security data about their own security services dealing with security protection of certain persons and facilities. However, given that the work and results of operation of these units can very much affect the security of certain persons and facilities, it is necessary to constantly monitor the condition and possibilities of protection units. Data collection on the aims of the protection unit, on its activities and tasks, methods

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residential building, SSNO, Security Directorate, 1971.; *Protection of persons in movement in settlements* and *Planning and organization of protection of persons in movement by car outside– on the open road*, SSNO, Security Directorate, 1971.; *Military Police Security Service*, SSNO, Security Directorate, 1973, p. 25.; *Rule service of Yugoslavia Military*, GŠ VJ, NIU „Vojska", 1996, *Rule service of Serbia Military*, Media centre „Odbrana", Belgrade, 2012.

[230] Radjenovic, R., *Security of persons and facilities*, MDD System, Belgrade, 2003, p. 75 and *Security and security protection of certain persons and facilities*, Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia – Institute of Security, Belgrade, 1995.

[231] See: Mijalkovic, S., *National security*, Police Academy, Belgrade, 2009, p. 115.

and forms of work, ensures evaluation of functional elements of the protection unit. At the same time, according to certain contemporary authors of security management, it is essential to continuously collect the data and analyze the security officers, their knowledge, experience and moral values.[232]

3. TARGETS OF SECURITY THREATS

Data relating to the *targets of security threats* apply to certain categories of persons, i.e. most important state officials whose security is endangered. The largest number of endangering the security of certain persons in the last sixty years was made over the presidents and prime ministers of the countries, followed by endangering kings, ministers and other senior government officials. There is an insignificant number of endangerments of security of high-ranking military officials and judicial office holders, which can be interpreted as a better work of competent security services of the military and the Ministry of Justice, which are assigned with their protection, but on the other hand, this interpretation is not justified, given the generally lower significance of these figures in political and economic terms.[233]

4. METHODS OF ENDANGERING SECURITY

The forms, i.e. methods of endangering security are a manifestation of the destructive phenomena which by characteristics and specificities are different from other similar phenomena.[234] In order to properly track and assess the security situation and identify ways of possible threats to the security of certain persons and facilities, data are collected on possible: a) assassinations, kidnappings, threats, blackmail, b) diversions and sabotages, v) the possible use of firearms (from close range and from a distance), cold weapons and various objects, g) planting explosives, d) flammable and explosive substances, f) radioactive, chemical and other hazardous substances, e) means of transport used by certain persons, f) possible poisoning of water, drink, food, z) transmitting infectious diseases, i) floods, fires, earthquakes, j) espionage and others.

5. TIME AND PLACE OF ENDANGERING SECURITY

Data concerning the *place of endangering* include: a) information about the certain person's workplace (residential building) and place of residence, b) information about the facilities that a certain person occasionaly visits or temporarily uses, in) information on the route of the movement of the person. During the collection and analysis of data regarding the certain person's workplace, that is usually a residential building and place of living, following is monitored and evaluated: a) location (city, town or suburb), b)

[232] According to the results of the scientific research which analyzed 112 endangering the security of certain persons in the period from 1950 to 2009, it was found that in 15 cases the actors of endangering were national security service officials responsible for security protection of such persons, which in 46% cases resulted in the death of the protected persons (more in: Krstic, S., *Security threat assessment of certain persons*, Millennium Group, Belgrade, 2012.).

[233] Fein, A.R.. and Vossekuil, B., *Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment Investigation*, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, 1998, page 5.

[234] See: Mijalkovic, S., *National security*, Police Academy, Belgrade, 2009, p. 116.

environment (dominant structures, parks, rivers, lakes, seas), c) the position in relation to the settlements, communications, natural obstacles and the state border, d) possible disclosure of information about the facility and impact on the protection of the facility, e) the existence of physical and technical security, f) passes through the building, entrance in the basement and the basement rooms, doors, and door frames (security keys, whether the doors are made of solid wood or metal, and frames securely attached to the building structure), locks (quality locks and metal shield of their cylinder, the chain on the door, etc.). Information about the place and facilities that a certain person occasionally visits are related to: a) information about facilities (institutions, companies, exhibitions, etc.), b) environment of those places (buildings, stands, parks, ceilings, terraces, flat roofs, exits, platforms and the lodges) and c) data about locations of parades, celebrations, meetings, etc.

Data on the route of the movement of certain person include all relevant facts concerning: a) the movement of a certain person on foot, by car, by plane, train or boat, b) moving in a populated area or outside of it, c) data on railways and roads, bridges, tunnels, culverts, viaducts, railway stations, warehouses, switch, bend, embankments, cuts, d) data on the waterway: coast, bridges, persons employed in port and terminal captaincy, e) the order and the way of transport (how far on foot, how far by vehicle), f) the place and duration of rest, the persons whom certain person will meet, g) uncertain and dangerous places (the place that was flooded and the city that were under earthquake or after the explosion), h) buildings on the route of movement (the existence of large and tall buildings with a large number of apartments, entrances and balconies, buildings under construction, connected blocks), i) data on the locations where large groups of people are gathered - tram, trolleybus and bus stations, hotels and restaurants, sports and other facilities, shopping centers, museums and exhibitions, public buildings, parks and walkways and similar places, narrow streets, intersections, sharp curves, the vehicles parked along the street, containers, flower pots, etc., j) bottlenecks that prevent the rapid movement of vehicles under escort in some places, k) facilities on the route of movement - underpasses, overpasses, cuts, bridges, various natural objects (subways, city sewage, water supply, telephone networks and power lines and signaling systems) and construction works, l) electrical wiring, installation of overhead electric city transport and power lines, electrical networks for lighting, underground high-voltage lines, m) the regulation of traffic signal light, n) the types of roads - wide streets and boulevards, unidirectional or bidirectional traffic, and o) the various shafts and openings.[235]

[235] Data collected by the national security services about sources and places of endangering security are almost identical with the foreign. More on foreign way of collecting data in Field Manual FM-34, Intelligence Analysis, Washington, DC, 15 March 1990; Braunig, M.J., The New Executive Protection Bible, ESI Education Development Corporation, 225 Teal Court, Aspen, Colorado, 2000; Schneider, G., Close Protection Operation in South Africa, University of South Africa, march 2005, p. 57 - 60; Guidance on personality and predprinimatel, VIC, Moscow, 1996; Gantzer, L., Polizeiliche Massnahmen bei Staatsbesuchen Erfahrunden beim besuch des französischen Staatspräsidenten, Die Polizei, Köln, 6/93, p. 165 - 172.; Dorevski, Z., Security, Practicum, Skopje, 2004, p. 158 - 164; Puseljic, M., Organization and functioning of the police, The Croatian police, Zagreb, 2008, p. 267 - 271; Ilogistical Administrative Aspects Relating to Ministerial Meetings Counsil, OSCE, Vienna, 2015, p. 2 - 15; UNDSS, Format of Security Risk Assessment, New York, 2015.

Data on the *time of endangering* is related to: a) security, social, economic and political conditions, b) climatic and meteorological conditions, and c) the time of day and year.

6. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the collection, processing, and analysis of security data about sources, methods, and the time and place of endangering security should provide a picture of the security situation or phenomenon in relation to the environment and protection unit which undertakes security protection measures and to bring them to specific connection with possible threats to the security of certain persons and facilities. That way, a causal link is established and it is reflected in the corresponding action, i.e. measures, actions and procedures that managers of security protection of certain persons and facilities define by their decisions and security plans in order to avoid endangering security. According to that, the conclusion is that the type and extent of collected data affect the security threat assessment of certain persons and facilities, which is causally related to the consequences that may occur if appropriate measures are not taken to protect security.

According to Obrad Stevanovic, the essential characteristics of the collected data on security events and incidents are the following: a) the type, number and frequency, b) place and time of manifestation, c) actors and means of endangering, c) facilities that are endangered and consequences, and e) the causes and factors which are favorable to them.[236]

However, due to the unavailability of data that are categorized by secrecy label "strictly confidential", it was not possible to get an insight into these documents and information concerning the characteristics of the collected data used for this study. Unfortunately, the only sources of these data are rare excerpts from reports published in the media, which are made after realized endangering of the security of a certain person or facility.

As an example, by using the method of deduction we can analyze the report on the assassination of Zoran Djindjic, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia, which took place on 12.03.2003 at 12:35 hours. According to the court verdict, the actor of endangering was Zvezdan Jovanovic, a member of the Ministry of Interior. The endangering was realized with the assistance of the Special Operations Unit of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia, the Security Information Agency and members of the criminal group called "Zemunski klan". The target was the Prime Minister of Serbia, the method of execution was the assassination with firearms, the place of endangering was a protected location of the Government of Serbia, that is also the working place of the Prime Minister, and the time of endangering was daylight, with good visibility and no rainfall.

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PUBLIC POLICY, TERRORIST THREATS AND RANDOM CHECKS

Ferid Azemi
Kosovo Academy for Public Safety
e-mail: feridazemi@gmail.com, ferid.azemi@waldenu.edu

Abstract

The primary focus of this study is the analysis of democratic principles and the way standard governance functions during terrorist threats. There are scenarios where democratic governance is tested. The methodology of this study is based on a case study of Transportation Security Administration (TSA) that is under the jurisdiction of the Department of Homeland Security in the U.S. This study is an evaluation of how the democratic principles are effective or ineffective during the terrorist threats, and how transportation is protected against a variety of threats. This study is related to the issues that officers face under a threat at airports, while ensuring security at airport checking points and the random check phenomenon. Ethnicity and color are the two main reasons why security agencies are often harshly criticized about the philosophy of "random checking" which may be in violation with equality as a democratic principle. The phenomenon of random checks is widespread, due to terrorist threats. Often random checks based on statistical data are not very efficient, if the other components of law enforcement sections are not aligned and entirely in collaboration with each other. Law enforcement agencies often face issues of racial discrimination and racial profiling due to the random checking philosophy.

There are ethical implications in the aftermath of 9/11 and the beginning of the war on terrorism. Racial discrimination and moral implications had led researchers to find a new solution to this issue. Some of the recommendations to address this issue are offered in this study, such as the implementation of various strategies to prevent any form of discrimination. Such plans may include: leaders monitoring their officers and the program of random checking, promoting workplace diversity and hiring minority members as officers in these security agencies such as TSA.

Keywords: Security, ethics, implications, terrorism, threats.

Public Policy, Terrorist Threats and Random Checks

This study presents a straightforward analysis of the democratic principles, the way of democratic governance that functions during terrorist threats, and also sceneries where democratic governance is tested. According to Kolar (2005), democracy by definition means the government by people. This means that all people should be able to have their say in one way or another in everything that affects their lives (Kolar, 2005). Even though this may be true about the democratic governance and democracy in general, in practice this does not occur. Democracy consists of essential elements: political system, active participation of the people, protection of the human rights, and the rule of law ("what is democracy? 2004). The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is taken as a case study, of how the democratic principles function during terrorist threats, and how the transportation is protected against a variety of threats. "Following September 11, 2001, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was created to strengthen the security

and the nation's transportation systems and ensure the freedom of movement for people and commerce. TSA uses a risk-based strategy and works closely with transportation, law enforcement, and intelligence communities to set the standard of excellence in transportation security" (About TSA, n.d). The primary focus of this study falls on airport security, airport checking points, and the random checking phenomenon. According to Wilke (p.638), a significant number of persons were detained by U.S personnel in various places on suspicion of having committed terrorist acts or being members or supporters of terrorist organizations. As a result of terrorist threats, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) created a color-coded system to warn other departments and agencies of terrorist threats. When the U.S. Senate approved the USA Patriot Act, the U.S.A. was in a difficult situation with terrorist threats, and as a result of this, the legislators approved and established this Act by giving broad authority to the federal agencies, and reducing civil liberties. With the increase of the terrorist threats, there are decreased individual freedoms, and many scholars feel that in one way or the other, the U.S. Constitution is violated by legislators because they completely disregarded the Bill of Rights when they approved the USA Patriot Act.

Democratic Principles and Networks Shaping Public Policy

Since democracy is related to governance and the people's decision making, it is essential to understand that in most of the Western hemisphere, the people elect their representative to represent their interests and thus, their representatives will fight for the interests of those who elected them for political positions. The election process is a democratic principle that consists of people voting for their favorite candidate. If the candidate wins the majority of votes, he/she will be the representative of the group, and this representative process is called representative democracy. However, sometimes candidates are supported by interest groups, businesses, and other agencies. Often enterprises lobby for their favorite candidate, and the lobbying is another democratic principle. For instance, many critics have blamed the Bush Administration for the "war on terrorism" and accused the private corporation Halliburton of lobbying for the "war on terrorism" in order to get lucrative contracts in supporting missions in the Middle East. In the same way, many networks are connected, and they influence legislators' decision-making and the approval of new laws or maintain the status-quo, just like in the gun control policy case. According to Victor (2007), the empirical design associates direct and indirect interest group lobbying activities with specific policies and tests the hypothesis that interests groups use the legislative context as part of their decision calculus when considering how to lobby in Congress. Furthermore, based on Victor (2007), the research shows that the legislative context is an important component of lobbyists' tactical choices (p.842). The interest groups try to use the resources wisely and also influence the general public, especially before elections. Klijn (1996) defined policy networks as a changing pattern of social relationships between independent actors, which takes shape around policy problems or policy programs and which is being formed, reproduced, and changed by ecology of games between these actors (p.111). Furthermore, Klijn (p. 91) stated that the policy processes take place within networks of actors that are mutually dependent on each other, and the concept of this system initially emerged in the policy science literature addressing the topics of implementation and intergovernmental relations. Depending on the issue and the political agenda, the network actors from many fields gather by their interests and invest in influencing the public policy. These networks also use the situation and the fear of the public in case of terrorist threats and shape public policy and the general

attitude toward this particular issue. According to Thatcher (1998, p. 410), networks provide a way of measuring the effects of different factors on actor coordination/exchange, as part of testing hypotheses derived from other models. Apparently, sometimes network actors implement strategies and models to see if these models or strategy would succeed before making a policy change.

Separation of Powers and Federalism

Separation of powers in democratic governance consists of the government that implements the policies, the legislative system that makes laws and policies and the executive system that enforces them. According to Koenig and Krane (2004), federalism as a political issue was conspicuously absent in the 2004 presidential contest. Thus, federalism is a political concept that reflects a system of government in which sovereignty is constitutionally divided between central authority and provincial units such as states, geographical areas, etc. Furthermore, according to Wilson and DiIulio (Boyd, 1997), federalism is a system of government in which sovereignty is shared between two or more levels of government so that the national government is supreme on some matters and the state, regions, or provincial governments are supreme on others. Federalism in the broad meaning of the word is a governing system where the authority and jurisdiction are separated between the central and local levels. Thus, in case of TSA, as a law enforcement agency under the Department of Homeland Security, it is centralized and in this organization, there are no regional levels or urban and rural areas since TSA operations mainly consist of transportation and airport checks. According to Eugene Boyd (1997), when the state and the federal authorities come into conflict, federal law is supreme under the Constitution. The constitutional provisions regulate the authority on both levels, and in case when state and federal units are in a dispute, the courts may often interpret the legal requirements and make their final verdicts. Thus, if a person is suspected of any form of terrorist threat or is stopped to be searched, and in some instances randomly checked at the airport, the federal law may apply for such suspicions, and TSA is a federal agency that overpowers the state level in such cases. According to Albert Richie (1936, p.17), today it involves the responsibility of the state to resist the tendency of the federal government to deprive them of the right to local self-government and to centralize more functions in the federal government, although they constitutionally and traditionally belong to the states. On the other hand, separation of powers divides power among the executive, legislative and judicial branches as distinct departments of American national government (“Federalism," 2013). It is essential to understand that the separation of powers in the past and even today does not seem to be without issues and problems. Often the Supreme Court is involved in solving both state and federal issues related to constitutional provisions.

Equality and Discrimination

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has created various forms of security levels, which are called Layers of Security. By these multiple passengers from multiple places and locations are singled out and screened in detail. For instance, travelers that are originated from underdeveloped countries are asked more questions and are doubled checked, and this is not only happening in the U.S., but in various European countries as well. Ethnicity and color are the two main reasons for what the security agencies often call “random checking", which is in complete violation of equality as a democratic principle. According to Post (2006, p. 24), democracy requires equality of the

democratic agencies, which is different from the forms of equality that stem from the values of distributive justice or fairness. On the other hand, according to Frias et al. (2012), terrorist profiling based on characteristics such as national or ethnic origin and religion has been employed, for example, in the context of data mining initiatives, that is, searches of large sets of personal data according to presumed characteristics of suspects. Furthermore, Frias et al. (p.611), elaborate that in many cases police forces have relied on profiles that are based on a person's ethnic and/or religious appearance when deciding who to stop for document checks or searches for counter-terrorism purposes. The so-called "random checking" is becoming a big issue, and the official agencies are sometimes violating the Constitutional provisions. According to Carols Estevez (2012), beyond profiling a given race or type of individual, TSA discriminates against citizens of individual nations for security purposes and some countries carry a stigma of danger and possible terrorism. Even though democratic principles are based on equality, during terrorist threats, this is very difficult to maintain, because the security agencies are in the middle of two main arrows, one to secure the balance of the people, and the other to prevent any terrorist attacks. If the terrorist act occurs in the boundaries of TSA jurisdiction, then everyone would point the finger at them and their agency, but at the same time, their internal regulations are based on random checking and discrimination. Frias at al. (2012 p. 613) elaborated that the risk of bias presented by the law enforcement efforts to counter terrorism has been highlighted by several international and regional human rights bodies. The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has called upon sates to ensure that any measure taken in the fight against terrorism does not discriminate, in purpose or effect, or on the grounds of race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin and that non-citizens are not subjected to racial or ethnic profiling or stereotyping. Interviewing TSA officers at Logan Airport in Boston, Erich Lichtblau and Michel Schmidt from The New York Times (2012), revealed that officers from the Transportation Security Administration's Behavior Detection Program at Logan International Airport in Boston asserted that passengers who fit certain profiles-Hispanic travelling to Miami, for instance, or blacks wearing baseball caps backward- are much more likely to be stopped, searched and questioned for suspicious behavior. Applying such programs as mentioned in this interview may lead TSA into legal implications and court procedures. According to Price and Forrest (2013), some members of the airport community accuse the TSA of trying to fix its budget and staffing challenges under the guise of security.

The problem with understanding common concepts is that many people think that democracy is decision-making in all fields of life where the majority groups may bring various policies for a number of departments, including airport security. According to Post (p.25), democracy is not the same thing as popular sovereignty, a state of affairs in which the people exercise ultimate control over their government. Furthermore, Post (p. 25), trying to explain democracy and equality in the same context, stated that democracy is distinct from popular sovereignty and majoritarianism because freedom is a normative idea that refers to substantive political values, whereas popular sovereignty and majoritarianism are descriptive terms that refer to particular decision-making procedures. Thus, a state or a country can be democratically based on elections, but won't be democratic in the field of applying the law and treating individuals in an equal way without any discrimination. Similar cases of airport " random checking" occur in most of the European countries too, for instance at Vienna Airport, security agencies single out individuals based on the point of origin, and these individuals are checked and screened, and the unpleasant thing is that they are put aside where everyone passing by sees them as suspects. Such public disclosure

of these people singled out in Vienna constitutes discrimination, as well as the racial profiling program they may apply. In the same way, in the UK, at Heathrow and Gatwick Airports, the security agencies, single out individuals from certain country origins and double check them using " random checking" justification, or in some cases, " random computer selection." At London Airports in some cases, depending on the situation, some officers even make sure passengers open their wallets and make them count their sums of money. Security agencies and law enforcement officers are often so overwhelmed by the authority and powers at their disposal that they often abuse and even violate the public trust. This is a result of the policy changes in the wake of 9/11 terrorist attacks, when politicians using the situation and state of crisis, shaped the public perception and approved new counter-terrorism laws, gave the police and federal agencies additional authority to detain and check anyone that they perceive to be suspect without reasonable doubt. Post (2005, p. 28) elaborated that democracy requires that persons be treated equally insofar as they are autonomous participants in the process of self-government. Furthermore, democratic governance employs the debate and the mass decision making processes, such as referendums, elections, etc.

Policy Implications

To a certain extent, racial profiling and discrimination in general comes as a result of public policy that is designed to secure airports or other areas. With the approval of the security acts, and the new public policy on counter-terrorism measures, many security agencies often created their programs, such as "random checks", and this is not serving well the security purpose. On the one hand, public policy on security and terrorism gives authority to the TSA and extra power to other law enforcement agencies to search individuals, but at the same time, the officers of these organizations are under pressure to prevent terrorism and protect the security of airports and other areas. However, to do this, they must follow the procedures and programs implemented by their administrative and management teams. At the same time, enforcing such programs will discriminate some people, and perhaps violate their rights.

The USA Patriot Act enables the law enforcement agencies to exercise extra powers and authority over various issues. The Patriot Act allows investigators to use the tools that were already available to investigate organized crime and drug trafficking ("The USA" n. d). Furthermore, " before the Patriot Act, courts could permit law enforcement to conduct electronic surveillance to investigate many ordinary, non-terrorism crimes, such as drug crimes, mail fraud and passport fraud" (" The USA," n. d). Now, the agents do not need to ask courts for permission to conduct surveillance of terrorist suspects and other crimes. Agents, without a court warrant, can search and arrest anyone that may appear to them as a suspect or anyone who does not cooperate. The terrorist threats changed the public perception as well, and in some cases courts became polarized. According to Wilke (2005, p. 662), the post-9/11 trials demonstrate the attractions and dangers of highly politicized cases in times of public fear. The problem with random checks not only at airports but on streets, buildings and in general is that law enforcement agencies are provided with immunity by this Act. A person may do an experiment and go through security checks at airports, if the same person passes many times, despite not posing any risk to the TSA officers, he/she will be doubled searched and screened and asked additional questions, just because the program or so-called "random check" requires such procedure. Discrimination is occurring at many world airports even today, and this is thanks to the "random check"

justification. One person may be checked many times because he or she is singled out due to his or her race, ethnicity or point of origin. Many human rights organizations and critics of counter-terrorist measures state that security agencies often abuse their authority and are usually led by prejudice elements in selecting people for random checking. Discrimination is becoming a very negative and increasing phenomenon in this modern era. Perhaps the security policies are outstanding, and they are part of terrorism protection, but in most of the cases, the U.S. and EU airport security imposes discriminatory practices. According to Thompson (2008, p. 44), the Fourteenth Amendment directly prohibits the creation of any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, and the Equal Protection Clause prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race.

Ethical Implications

The problem with random checking at airports and other areas is that, to some degree, people are not treated equally. Another ethical implication is that TSA officers and even other law enforcement agencies are not sure what random checking comprises, or who qualifies for random verification. Race, ethnicity and the point of origin are the most common contributing factors and elements of a random check. This creates the right conditions for racial and other forms of discriminations. There is no problem with random checking of people at airports or any other places, such as checkpoints in various neighborhoods, but the problem is that bias becomes the central element for checking an individual. This gives enough grounds for these individuals to sue law enforcement for racial profiling and violating the democratic principles of equality and freedom of movement. The war on terrorism has become very complicated in recent years, and many scholars call the justice system the political justice system. According to Wilke (p. 638), the U.S. legal approach in the *war on terror* has, to no low extent, shifted from what criminal law theorists have called a *criminal law for citizens* to a *criminal act for enemies*. Furthermore, Wilkie (p. 638), explains that while criminal law for citizens treats its addressees as law-abiding persons, who cannot be convinced but only forced into submission to the law, the U.S. approach to the war on terror, however, ventures beyond the criminal law for enemies period by placing the enemy combatants beyond the law: criminal law becomes a moot point where detention is solely based on a person's alleged dangerousness.

Another issue about the random check and terrorist threats is that often separation of powers is mixed, and decisions on trials are politically affiliated. Wilkie (p.639) elaborated that the detainees (in case of terrorism) are accorded procedural rights by the courts, these rights are understood as a separation of powers within the government-which branch may decide what and how-and as a matter of detainees' human or civil rights. Thus, instead of giving justice without being interfered by politics, in case of terrorist suspects, the courts make the cases politically contentious and turn from natural justice, as imperfect as it may be, into instances of political justice (Wilkie, 2005). The random checking phenomenon may often result in arrests, and the arrests are based in many cases on the fact that the person did not obey the random checking procedures. According to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN, 2015), Article 3, all are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and incitement to such discrimination. Even though the Universal Declaration of Human Rights condemns

any form of discrimination, the airport " random check" has become an everyday tool for discrimination of a class of people based on their race, ethnicity, or their appearance and way of dressing and even their nationality in some cases. According to Rebekah Thompson (2008, p. 44), profiling may tend to isolate minorities and destroy the confidence in the American system of justice. In order to gain respect, the law enforcement agents and our criminal justice system must apply the law equally across all racial and ethnic lines. Thus, the racial profiling and the random programs in various airports and even areas in the streets of neighborhoods should be neutral toward race or ethnicity. Furthermore, Thomson (2008) argued that race is an ineffective measure of an individual's intention to commit any crime or terrorist activity.

Solution to Discrimination and Random Checks

To prevent discrimination related to random checks, it is important to eliminate discriminatory and arbitrary check programs. One way to do this is to validate random checking, but not by selecting people on the grounds of their race, religion, ethnicity, etc. There are many options to prevent this form of discrimination, and there are many strategies to counter this negative phenomenon. TSA as a security agency may implement various procedures to avoid any discrimination. Such strategies may include: leaders monitoring their officers and the program of random checking, promoting workplace diversity, and hiring minority members as TSA officers, and also allowing the non-government organizations to monitor their missions and operations. Before implementing these strategies one fundamental thing needs to be changed, and that is the public policy or the laws that may allow for or have loopholes allowing for discrimination.

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THE ROLE OF NGOs EDUCATION SECURITY CENTERS ON THE ROAD TO MEMBERSHIP OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Ilija Zivotic
Center for Security DBA Belgrad
e-mail:ilijazivotic@gmail.com

Abstract

Establishing security subjects which are not part of the official state administration should not be considered hostile. The donations that they may receive from the European Union or NATO do not have to be with aim of destabilizing the state system. Although it is not pleasant for any administration to hear that another country or organization is donating to improve security, these grants have exactly this purpose. A successful reform of the security system is necessary for joining the European Union. This does not mean mirroring life values, but rather approaching a system that has proven to be successful while maintaining the local specificity.

The purpose of the paper is to present non-governmental centers that deal with security as socially useful institutions with their possibilities to improve the country's security culture.

Keywords: *system, ngo, security, state.*

1. Introduction

Ever since gaining its independence in a referendum on September 8, 1991[237] when its citizens decided to secede from Yugoslavia, Macedonia has been seeking to join the European Union and NATO. In last few years it seems that this road is nearing its end. Given this reason, Macedonia can expect major changes in the functioning and understanding of its security system. The transition from a post socialist system of security, which was characterized by containment and control exercised by a small number of people, to a completely different, democratic security system in which every citizen has the same rights and has a wide range of control and monitoring mechanisms will not be easy. Nevertheless, the social order in Macedonia is far from socialist.

This was confirmed by the declaration of a referendum in which the citizens themselves, without government pressure or a unilateral government decision that would have happened under socialism, will decide on the new state name in order to lift the blockade of Greece as a NATO member, which will also accelerate the country's integration into the European Union.[238]

In this transitional period, the Government of Macedonia will need all the help and non-governmental organizations may be of great benefit.

[237] https://hr.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Referendum_o_neovisnosti_Makedonije

[238] http://www.rts.rs/page/stories/ci/story/3/region/3008620/zaev-novo-ime-makedonije-potvrdicemo-na-referendumu.html

2. Theoretical definition in the real world of NGO centers in the field of security

In terms of the education of the security services members, it should not be forgotten that the subsequent training of such personnel who already have a certain attitude developed through earlier education programs and work experience is a very complex and therefore expensive business. Such projects in countries like Macedonia, aspiring for Euro-Atlantic integration are largely financed by the US Administration, the EU and regional foundations which allows certain saving in the Macedonian budget. The exact amount of resources is currently difficult to determine if one bears in mind that the USA invests a lot of money through NGOs. In 2004, it was estimated that NGOs were responsible for about $ US 23 billion of total aid money, or approximately one third of the total overseas development aid which could be considered with great certainty that the money for this purpose will be enough. (Riddell, 2008; 53)

When we talk about NGO training centers in the field of security, such centers can be understood accordingly based on the definition granted by David Korten in 1990.[239]
The first generation of NGOs focuses on welfare and social services (distribution of food and water, building shelters, providing health assistance).
The second generation of NGOs conducts small, local campaigns, relying only on their capacity.

The third generation of NGOs which are the subject of this paper, comprise Korten's NGOs which try to improve society's politics and institutions. Such NGOs are becoming NGOs for social development.

For the development of these NGOs in Macedonia it is of great importance that the official state policy for EU and NATO accession coincides with the program for education of the population and the security services members by NGOs. This will avoid perceiving the training centers as state enemies, which often happened in the past with a number of NGOs not only in Macedonia but in the whole region. In this regard, the NGOs will complement only the activities that the Government of Macedonia is implementing or intends to implement. These NGOs having a narrow circle of action and a specific security field, should apply participatory management in education[240], in which employees are considered a source of knowledge and skills.

Of course, to achieve this, it is necessary to adequately train and educate the employees, and send them to similar NGOs, which are plenty in Europe, to acquire practical experience. Only then they can be stationed in Macedonia to train volunteers, and together with them to participate in the educational process. This sequence is a necessary measure for the successful operation and expansion of knowledge. For even greater success, in the initial period of work, it is necessary to appoint a permanent member who already has an extensive experience in knowledge transfer in the field of security. Greater success can be achieved if that person is from Macedonia.

The national state of Macedonia[241] has a lot of different cultures, and therefore diversity management[242] is also important. This is important because the security services comprise people of different ethnic, religious and cultural groups. None of them should feel neglected because for Macedonia the statement given by Ludwik Fleck is still valid,

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[239] Korten D. Getting to the 21st. Century, chapter 7, part 2, page 203,Kumarian Press, W.Hartford,1990.
[240] http://cec.vcn.bc.ca/gcad/modules/pm-pmsb.htm
[241] https://sh.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Popis_stanovni%C5%A1tva_2002._u_RepubliciMakedoniji.
[242] Group of authors, Kako funkcionišu NVO, Centar za unapređenje Brčkog, 2006, Šamac.

namely, that we all look at the world with our own eyes, but we see the face of our collective, nation, religious group, race and family. An important element in the work of these specific NGOs is strategic planning. The Macedonian Government gave itself a short deadline for entry into the EU and NATO, and therefore the work plans and programs of these NGO centers must comply with it. In this case it is necessary to perform a so-called SWOT analysis[243] to comprehend the objectives and capabilities.

Possible SWOT :
S- strengths:
1. Adequate education of NGO managers and volunteers.
2. Organization of efforts
3. Compensation for work
4. Easily accessible location
5. Developed NGO relations with the Government of Macedonia, NATO and EU authorities, close contact with similar NGOs in the region and Europe.
6. Accessible training programs
7. Support by celebrities

W-weaknesses:
1. Poor image on the part of the public
2. Inexistence of communication and trust with state institutions
3. Poor education and preparing employees and volunteers.

O- opportunities:
1. Possibility for additional education, training, volunteers in EU bodies for establishing cooperation
2. Taking positions in society
3. Obtaining significant projects whose successful implementation may lead to the strengthening of the NGOs

T- threats:
1. Bad security situation in Macedonia
2. Creating a negative image by ,,patriotic organization"
3. Political changes that lead to withdrawal from EU accession and NATO
4. Unsound educational campaigns.

3. Understanding the NGOs in Macedonian society

After the breakup of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia[244], the term non-governmental organization (NGO) began to be massively used in all former republics. In Macedonia, as in all other republics, there were conflicting perceptions of the NGOs. One part of society, the opposition-oriented claimed that the NGOs were an extended arm of the government because they get significant funds from the budget, while some members of government declared individual NGOs as weapons of foreign powers that want to

[243] https://sh.m.wikiedia.org/wiki/SWOT_analiza.
[244] https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/1045340.html

destabilize the Republic of Macedonia creating in their sympathizers a sense a conspiracy of global proportions, managed by some famous philanthropist.[245]

Both the ruling majority and the opposition, abused the public stating untruths about the NGOs as to enable them to fit into a particular political moment, deliberately forgetting the real role of these organizations in society. According to a survey of the local office of Transparency International, an organization that promotes the best management practices leading to the creation of public opinion, 67.5 percent of 1,000 surveyed citizens believe that the only role of the NGOs is to serve the interests of political parties.[246]

A far more negative opinion of NGOs is held by the anarchists in Macedonia for whom the existence of NGOs is another big lie of capitalism, which serves to maintain the illusion of choice, or the illusion of freedom, creating the illusion of good corporations with the real aim of channeling the anger of the masses in a legal, peaceful, controlled and for power in general harmless discontent.[247]

What must be emphasized is that Macedonia today must avoid a situation that Dichiter (1999, 44) describes in his scientific work as a characteristic of earlier periods in the world, but which can be applied on the territory of this part of Europe because of the specific way of thinking and resistance of a large part of the population to everything that is new and comes from the west and has to do with politics. This is the reason why most NGOs were not taken very seriously by most Government agencies.

The suspicious attitude of the population towards the NGOs is a result of the absence of internationally recognized definitions of these organizations, everything being left to national laws.[248] Much more important than the definition is that the NGOs promote civil society organized as an area of life that is voluntary, self-generated, self-sufficient, autonomous from the state, and connected with a legal order or set of common rules. It is different from society in general, in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, moods and ideas, exchange information, achieve common goals, highlight country requirements and make government officials accountable. (Diamond, Paunovic, 1997)

The UN, on the other hand, recognized the status and importance of NGOs in the development of society, democracy and human rights many decades ago.[249] This recognition of the exceptional role of civil society has been manifested in a number of resolutions and conventions of this organization.

These attitudes and thoughts are the result of communism[250] for nearly half a century, which is why Macedonia is deprived of many of the values of European society. Many of these values are presented as a weapon for destroying communism, which would achieve the goal of world conspirators for capitalist enslavement of the world. The NGOs in the form of various voluntary associations of citizens existed in this region before communism (Stanisavljevic 1995, 22), as hunting, poetry, sports, which were different from the gatherings of people with similar interests, but with an educational role as well.

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[245] http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/planeta.300.html:640486-Gruevski-najavio-filtriranje-NVO-u-Makedoniji

[246] http://www.balkaninsight.com/sr/article/necivilno-civilno-dru%C5%A1tvo-politizacija-nevladinih-organizacija-u-makedoniji

[247] https://anarhisticka-biblioteka.net/library/crn-blok-nvo-sektor-trojanski-konj-kapitalizma

[248] http://pravo.org.mk

[249] see more http://research.un.org/en/ngo

[250] https://sh.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Komunizam

The first important scientific work that deals with NGOs is the book International NGOs and UNESCO.[251]

This book gives only partial responses to the questions about NGOs. Today, in all countries of the region, as well as in Macedonia, the main question when it comes to NGOs, is the question of financing and the conditions governing the registration in domestic legislation. The most common sources of funding are philanthropy, membership fees or funds from the budget foreseen for NGO projects. In Macedonia, a lot of the financing of projects by the European Union is under strict rules.[252] Some Eastern European countries are allowed to organize economic activities to the level necessary for normal functioning of the organization. Although philanthropy represents the largest source of funds in the world, in this part of Europe and in Macedonia, the most frequent sources of funds are from the state budget and the projects are developed by the EU requirements.

The well known researcher and author of several books on NGOs, Adil Najam, in his book from 1996[253], counted as many as 47 different acronyms for NGOs. There are recognized authors today who claim that the acronym has certainly ten to twenty more variations.

The most known are :
NGDOs- Non-governmental development organizations
NNGOs- Northern NGOs
POs- People organizations
PVOs- Private voluntary organizations
NGIS- Non-governmental interests
VOs- Volunteer organizations
NPOs- Non-profit organizations

The situation is similar to the definitions of NGOs. Here, the rule is that any author or researcher has his own view of the matter and the need to define the organization. Yet in most of these definitions legal and economic independence and functionality are mentioned.

Salmon and Angrier (1992) believe that definition must have five key characteristics:

1. The organization is formal
2. The organization is private
3. Non profit distribution
4. Self-government
5. Voluntary

The definitions written by Vakil (1997, 2060) are also well known: “self-governing, private, not-for-profit organizations that are geared to improving the quality of life for disadvantaged people". It is important to be familiar with the various definitions of NGOs because not all organizations or definitions appear at the same time. There are also organizations that have a complex structure and combine in their work certain characteristics of the organizations that make profit or have a role to help society.

[251] Pavlovic Z., International NGO and UNESCO, Sremski Karlovci, Izdavačka knjižara Zoran Stanojevic, 1993.
[252] https://www.bastabalkana.com/2010/03/neprofitne-i-nevladine-organizacije-treci-sektor/
[253] Najam, A., Understanding the third sector : revisiting the prince, the merchant and the citizen, Non-profit management and leadership, 1996.

Several important authors noted that it is necessary to distinguish the organization resulting from the west and the industrialized countries from those that have been formed in the east in the less developed countries. Of course they all agree that the level of democracy is closely linked with industrial development. According to the afore-stated, the understanding of the functioning of NGOs in the west and the east is significantly different and therefore the position and the ability of the organizations to help the society in which they occur. These authors divide them in Northern NGOs and Southern NGOs. One thing they all agree on is that society should not rely too much on NGOs because these organizations and all others are transient. They may last for a longer or shorter period of time, but one day philanthropists and benefactors will no longer be interested. There will be a new way of helping society.

3. NGO management

A good start for managing these NGOs can be the "Project Cycle Management" which was adopted in 1992 by the European Commission.[254] This guide is a set of tools for designing and managing a variety of projects based on the method of analysis of the Logical Framework).[255] The aim of the document is to facilitate project management system, simplify it and to eventually obtain a good result.

This is important for countries like Macedonia that are not EU members as it can help a lot in creating and implementing projects. Although this project is dedicated to cooperation between the EU and some countries, it may be useful for NGOs as well. First of all, the NGOs can propose to the Government of Macedonia to conclude an agreement based on this model, and can use themselves certain organizational elements of the agreement for internal use and communication with the authorities or directly use funds to financially support the project of education of security services members in Macedonia.

The project contains five phases:

1. Programming:

Based on the analysis of the problem, which in this case is insufficient, or according to EU standards, unfitting training of the security services personnel, creating ideas for projects and education programs based on the Support Strategy between the EU and Macedonia where there is mutual interest. On the EU part, the benefit is reflected in the fact that the training of the security forces would be conducted in the pre-accession period so that they would be ready to fulfill their tasks immediately after accession. Macedonia's interest to education and training indirectly increases the security of its citizens and the state and creates quality employees to work in everyday situations, but also to participate in projects as a sign of good will for cooperation.

2. Identification:

The previously adopted national strategic documents analyze the problems, needs and interests of the stakeholders (EU, Macedonia) and define ideas for projects and other actions. It is important that NGOs introduce their ideas and projects before the government so as not to waste precious time. The government must be ready to respond to the questions in advance of the EU for greater efficiency.

[254] https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/project-and-programme-cycle-management-guidance_en
[255] http://www.tools4dev.org/resources/logical-framework-logframe-template/

3. Formulation:

This stage involves active participation of stakeholders (EU and Macedonia). It is necessary to make a detailed implementation schedule and a resource plan. At this stage, Macedonia must ensure quality staff who understand the functioning of the security services. The management of state and public security must be consulted at all times. The administration of the Government that has nothing in common with security should not be allowed to have a major role in this process.

4. Implementation:

In order to achieve the purpose of the project, which is increasing the safety culture that will lead to increased security, the target group (Security Service) receives the intended benefit (adequately trained personnel of the security services). This stage includes checking the progress through monitoring (compare the number of complaints on illegal labor or excessive use of force, comparison of results in combating corruption, money laundering, terrorism financing, etc.) depending on which part of the security services the attendants belong to. This is followed by a decision on the termination or extension of the mandate. At this stage, cooperation of the people on the ground is important. It is necessary that the EU representatives are given real data without staging any information. It is better to admit failure of implementation.

5. Evaluation and Revision:

After completing the training of the first group of participants and the expiry of a predefined period of time, it is necessary to make an assessment of the quality of their work in order to determine whether the training met its purpose. The evaluation may be conducted during the work following the training process when it is intended to help the security services members to use the acquired knowledge on the spot. The evaluation can be made after the initial period if it is intended to provide lessons for future projects or groups of students following this kind of additional training. There are views that the first generation of participants in the training should have a slightly longer period of time to reach complete quality after the training process.

4. Conclusion

The Republic of Macedonia is moving forward in every respect. Part of this progress is the strong desire of the Government of Macedonia for EU integration and NATO membership. In order to achieve this goal, major efforts will be required on the part of the entire system and citizens. They will create a huge social change. The Government of the Republic of Macedonia will have a difficult task, which consists of educating members of the security services in order to meet the standards of the European Union and NATO. Also, great effort must be made to introduce the importance of these changes to the population, as well as the benefits that they bring along from the perspective of security. With limited capacity, the Macedonian Government has non-governmental centers that deal with education in the security sector, which can play an important role. The prerequisite for this is that these NGOs are seen as a partner and not as a competitor or enemy. The special significance of these NGOs is reflected in the rate of training of members of the security services and citizens who are not highly educated by the standards of the European Union through courses, seminars and practical workshops. These NGOs can have primarily an educational role, and if they have a role of a partner, they will

definitely give a great contribution to bringing the values underpinning the European Union and NATO closer to the average Macedonian citizens and officers.
Accepting the existence of such non-governmental centers in Macedonian society will be a confirmation of the great steps to discontinue the socialist past and make a major shift towards a modern and democratic society.

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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXTERNAL THREATS AND INTERNAL WEAKNESSES – THE BASIS FOR SECURITY REFORMS

Mr. Orlando Mardner
CSM Dpi PSO PFSO
Professional Security Academy UK Limited
e-mail: orlando@psa-academy.com

Abstract

Security risks and threats have many dimensions in the society. It is important to appreciate the developments and advances in these security threats, especially the rising terrorism threats and major crimes that are life-threatening. As a result, there is need to enhance global security and intelligence using strategies and measures that target country-specific security concerns. Security involves the protection of human beings; thus, it is always strengthened when the human dimension is deepened. Notably, the recent advances in terrorism, expansion in the internationally operating criminal networks, cyber attacks, immigration flows and asymmetric threats have all found safe haven within our internal borders. Thus, the need to appreciate the vulnerability of the open society to the outside world, which implies that the relationship between external and internal security must become tangible and visible. Based on the external-internal security relationships, the present research investigated this relationship as the basis for security reforms within the context of Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Besides, possible strategies to prevent internal risks and asymmetric threats as well as how regulated and standardized training can be of benefit in the CARICOM were studied.

Therefore, this study adopted a mixed method research to collect both primary and secondary data on the current internal situation and future risks and threats in terms of the external and internal security within CARICOM. The results indicate that the current external and internal security relationship encompasses immigration, terrorism (asymmetric threats), cross-border crime, and cyber-attacks. Moreover, the effective strategy to prevent internal risks and asymmetric threats requires classical strategic thought and strengthening of the existing regulated and standardized training. Overall, this study recommends expansion of the traditional approach and concept in addressing external threats to encompass non-traditional and new threats, which are characteristic of weak states.

Keywords: *Asymmetric threats; terrorism; Immigration; cybercrime; cross-border crime*

1. INTRODUCTION

Since the invention of the word terrorism, there have been various concepts developed to describe and justify the dynamism and specific aspects involving a society, community and a country. Some of these concepts include external threats, internal weaknesses, internal risks and asymmetric threats (Rubin 2007; Drent et al. 2014; Brauch 2011). Notably, the reconceptualization of the global security has been triggered by globalization as well as the gradual transition of old forms of threats during the Cold War

to the present and contemporary use of sophisticated methods in war (Brauch 2011; Brauch 2008). Based on the changing dynamics in terrorism (Buffaloe 2006), and with the introduction of the concept of the internal weaknesses and external threats to a country (or region), it is important that every country, appreciate all aspects that are involved in global terror war in terms of weaknesses and threats.

A threat, in a general use, refers to an external danger, whereas weakness refers to an internal vulnerability (Zeid 2015). These descriptions are applicable in almost all settings ranging from an organizational to a country to regional and to continental levels. In the context of a country's security, security refers to (Brauch 201):

> "*absence of objective dangers* such as the security 'threats', 'challenges', 'vulnerabilities' and 'risks', and of *subjective fears or concerns*, and to the *perception thereof*." (p. 61).

It, therefore, implies that the presence or absence of objective dangers and threats in a country justify the country's vulnerability or risks to terror attacks including the perception of the society and other countries on the specific country. Today, security as a political tool and a global concern, the concept of internal weaknesses and external threats is not a new scenario in the world's security platform, where several studies (country-specific studies) have focused on identifying either internal weaknesses or external threats to a country.

In full appreciation of the concept of internal weaknesses and external threats with respect to terrorism and asymmetric threats, this study investigated the relationship between internal weaknesses in Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the external threats. This study, therefore, purposed to achieve the aspects of the relationship between external threats and internal weaknesses as the basis of security reforms in CARICOM as well as other countries or regions around the world. Thus, revealing the specific scenarios and examples on how internal weaknesses are related to internal threats in CARICOM was envisaged to help devise proper strategies for the prevention of internal risks and asymmetric threats as well as justification of the regulated and standardized training as a beneficial strategy.

2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EXTERNAL THREATS AND INTERNAL WEAKNESSES - THE BASIS FOR SECURITY REFORMS

The interrelatedness of the internal weaknesses and external threats has manifested in various forms, with specific countries reporting similar or unique external threats and internal vulnerabilities to their security concerns and other illegal actions that may cause harm to human beings. The review of the internal weakness and external threats at the European Union and African Union levels revealed a varying relationship between these aspects, where development of sophisticated terrorism methods of terrorism activities and development of asymmetric threats complicating proper classification of a continent's or region's specific internal weaknesses and external threats (European Parliament 2017, p. 14). However, the relationship between external threats and internal weaknesses is increasingly recognized, where various countries continuously updating their list of internal weaknesses and external threats. In the last two decades, there is a considerable change in the classification of external threat and internal weaknesses, which implies that security reforms or measures are also changed accordingly. Notably, one of the constant factors that must be appreciated is the relationship exhibited by internal weaknesses and

external threats as the basis of security reforms that a country or region integrates into the security agenda.

In order to appreciate a country's or regional position in terms of external and internal weaknesses, the following diagram depicts a real situation of internal weakness or external threats, and the ratings within a country. This approach was used in the case of Netherlands, where both internal weaknesses and external threats were established and rated in the risk diagram in *Figure 1*.



Figure 1: The position of scenarios in the risk diagram on relationship between internal and external security threats ***Source:*** *Drent et al. (2014)*

In this risk diagram, internal weaknesses and external threats could be easily established, considering the country's security state as well as the capability to fight asymmetric threats and global terrorism in general. Thus, Drent et al. (2014) established that policies, organizational structures, and capabilities are the main determinants of the relationship between internal weaknesses and external threats. These aspects, determining the security state of a country, appear to resonate with all countries' security situations, especially when looking at the asymmetric threats and the ability to combat or prevent such threats. It is at this point that we appreciate the relationship between internal weaknesses in security (ability to combat asymmetric threats) and external threats (attacks targeted to the country). Countries such as Belgium, Germany, France, the UK, and the US have all appreciated this relationship in terms of how their security forces integrate policies, organizational structures, and capabilities in dealing with their internal weaknesses and external threats.

One of the main issues that come into the scene when internal weaknesses and external threats are addressed is terrorism. In the analysis of this relationship, external threats-internal weaknesses between developed and developing countries, the concepts of asymmetric threats, terrorism and globalization come into play. In most studies, it is a common agreement that "threats are multidirectional (from outside and from within) (McCormack 2009, p. 139; Aliboni 1992; Ivanov 2003); thus the existence of external threats posed by a country's economic state and favored by globalization is no doubt a

contributing factor in the relationship between internal weaknesses and external threats, which favors terrorism. In terms of globalization, movement of people (workers from one country into another part to get better-paying jobs or employment opportunities (IMF staff 2002)), exchange of information and technology and financial flows (Ouattara 1997) are external threats to security situations of several countries irrespective of economic status.

However, the concern is who gains in the case of such globalization amidst the increasing forms of asymmetric threats across the world? International terrorism is developing into an asymmetric and strategic threat to the security of mankind (Ivanov 2003), which implies that the changing methods, tactics, and means of terrorism and terrorists may be enhanced through globalization. Considering the positions of some countries; whereby some of the developed countries are important destinations for medical tourism and such-like global economic activities, it is possible these top destinations for health tourism may be prone to the external threats (emanating from medical tourism), exhibited through asymmetric threat, where terrorist come with intention of healthcare tourism may end up achieving their terror mission. A case study supporting this theory was established by *Dr. Prem. Medical Tourist Guide* (2014), where countries such as Turkey and Egypt, considered to be the paradise of medical tourism, may be targeted by terrorists targeting interests of developed countries. Thus, in this case, globalization, which favors existence of medical tourism, is considered an external threat, a state propelled by the countries' internal weaknesses of not be able to fight terrorism. Moreover, in the case where revenue generated from economic globalization declines as a result of terrorism, then it is obvious that a country becomes weak in terms of financial muscles to fight effectively external threats such as asymmetric threats which require a well-coordinated approach and constant training of security personnel.

Still, on terrorism, there are various predisposing factors in a country or region, which CARICOM is not unique. The main external threat, which takes the advantage of the community's internal weaknesses, was predicted to be asymmetric threats in terrorism. Asymmetric threats are the threats involving "not fighting fair" and which takes advantage of the critical weak points in a stronger enemy's defences (Primmerman 2006, p. 1). Some of these asymmetric threats include the asymmetry of the method, where Johnson and Metz (2001) indicate to imply that the terrorist use of different tactical doctrines and operational concepts compared to the target or enemy. Notably, CARICOM has never experienced this type of asymmetric threat; however, with its increasing position as an interest and allies of some of the world's superpowers, this asymmetric threat cannot be ruled out completely within the community. Further, there is the asymmetry of technology (Butler and Gates 2010, p. 18; Johnson and Metz 2001), where the threat of technology in terrorism emanates from industrial advancements involving a state against the one considered to be backward in terms of industrial advancements. Moreover, the asymmetry WILL, wherein an antagonist considers its vital interest to be at stake, thus it launches attacks as a strategy to calm the attacks by the less-than-vital interest (Johnson and Metz 2001). In this type of asymmetric threat, terrorism is achieved where developed countries play a role in conflicts in vulnerable and poor states so as to protect their interests (Johnson and Metz 2001, p. 10). The, based on the position of CARICOM and the associated vulnerabilities and increased emergence of new forms of asymmetric threats globally, there is a possibility that asymmetric threat (as external threats) can serious impacts on the region's social and economic development as well as stability. That will then increase numerous and complex risks to CARICOM states in terms of cyber threats and terrorism

which will then be difficult to properly counter or prevent (exposing their internal weakness).

The other risks in asymmetric threats, considered within the scope of the internal weaknesses-external threats relationship, include immigration, cross-border crime, and cyber issues. Immigration is a current and future security problem in various countries including CARICOM. Since the terrorist attack in the US in 2001 (Drent et al. 2014, p. 13), the issue of immigration and immigrants is increasingly becoming a major security problem, as witnessed in the present US political and security scene. This case is manifested in the way the US formulates its internal security measures as well as the consideration and appreciation of the immigrants or immigration as one of the major external threats to the internal security within the country (Rudolph 2017, p. 3). The case of Netherlands and the neighbouring countries such as Belgium, France, the UK and Germany, immigration is a serious current and future external threats to the security in these countries; where Drent et al. (2014) established that a considerable percentage of population in the EU (44 percent) view immigration as a serious security threat (considered in this case as the external threats). However, the form of immigration which is viewed by the security organs across the world is the illegal immigration, which may pose a direct threat to the national security (Rudolph 2017; Drent et al. 2014, p. 14). In the Caribbean states, immigration is mainly viewed in terms of the number of immigrants into other countries such as the US as depicted in table 1.

Table 1: The distribution of CARICOM immigrants into the US, 2014

Region and Country	Number of Immigrants	Percent (%)
Caribbean	**4,000,000**	**100.0**
Cuba	1,173,000	29.3
Dominican Republic	998,000	24.9
Jamaica	706,000	17.6
Haiti	628,000	15.7
Trinidad and Tobago	220,000	5.5
Barbados	51,000	1.3
Grenada	34,000	0.9
Bahamas	32,000	0.8
Dominica	28,000	0.7
West Indies	26,000	0.6
St. Vincent and the Grenadines	23,000	0.6
Other Caribbean	81,000	2.0

Source: U.S. Census Bureau. 2015. 2014 American Community Survey

Suppose these immigrants would have gone to very fragile states in terms of terrorism and terror activities (such as recruitment of individuals into terror groups), they can simply become the most dangerous external threats to the security situation in CARICOM. In the study by Bove and Böhmelt (2016), this claim that immigration is associated with both domestic and transnational terrorism was proved; where the spatial-

econometric analyses of migrant inflows (between 1970 and 2000), as well as the number of terrorist attacks in 140 countries in the same period, confirmed that indeed movement of people across countries is an important vehicle "which terrorism does diffuse" (p. 2). For example, a likelihood of conflict in a country often causes refugees to settle in neighbouring countries, which eventually result in a large refugee influx (Milton et al. 2013), contributing to the spread of terrorism across the states. This case has been reported in neighbouring countries such as Kenya and Somalia (Mogire and Mkutu Agade 2011; Menkhaus 2013). However, in the case of CARICOM, the member states are fortunate enough not to have experienced any case of civil war in the recent past, since the 1990s to date (Murphy 2017). Otherwise, the external threats posed by immigrants from CARICOM moving into some of the terrorist-prone countries is not only based on the possibilities that more immigrants may be influenced into joining terror groups and thus helping the terror groups achieve their objectives by coming back to the original society and causing conflicts. For example, the *US News* (2016) reported about 150 radicals, within the CARICOM member states, who have attempted to join ISIS in 2016 only. This is a considerably big number that can cause a major threat to the CARICOM owing to the fact that it most of these CARICOM member states lacks proper intelligence and capability to fight asymmetric threats emanating from immigration influences compared to the US that has FBI. Thus, immigration cases and the possibility of people from joining extremist groups are major external threats to countries with serious internal weakness, especially where people move from their country of origin (in search of better jobs, escaping politically hostile activities, and rising cases of insecurity) to seek for better living standards abroad.

Lastly, the cross-border crimes and cyber issues are becoming external threats and advancing in countries characterized by internal weaknesses such as poor security policies and lack of capacity or instruments to fight against or prevent these activities. In the review of various sources of literature on cybersecurity as a potential external threat in various countries, several issues were established to arise from this problem. In the contemporary society, cyber issues have taken a different paradigm shift, with the introduction of virtual currencies and other electronic money payment methods becoming major points of debate (Cian 2016). Among the possible outsider threats in cyber issues include money launders and internet hackers among others. In the analysis of the potential threats that cybercriminal pose to the internal security situation of a country, Shaw (2006) found that the most dangerous cyber criminal is the one who was once an insider. This can be seen in the sense that local citizens, who are members of CARICOM, can, therefore, be used as accomplishers in the international cybercrime, where locals who migrate to other countries conspire or directly involved in the money laundering, or launching a cyber attack to the local organizations within CARICOM. Notably, the lack of a national computer security incident response team (Saavedra 2015) in some of these countries such as Guatemala and weak policies in other countries to counter issues on cybercrime exposes the countries to external threats of cyber attackers. Moreover, the increasing concern over virtual currencies, money laundering and terrorist financing through cryptocurrencies further imply the extent at which countries in the Caribbean region are faced with the major external threat to security with respect to their capacity, capability and security measures to protect their people from such harms.

Overall, in this section, it was important to establish that the existing and future external threats to security in various countries and not only in CARICOM are based on the four major aspects; immigration, terrorism, cyber issues and cross-border crimes.

Notably, the three issues that are elaborately addressed are immigration, cyber issues, and terrorism. However, cross-border crimes are believed to happen through the three major issues addressed; immigration, terrorism and cyber issues. For example, the possible external threat to the neighbouring countries within the CARICOM has a possible influence from Jamaat al-Muslimeen, a traditional extremist group comprising of Afro-Trinidadian Muslim converts (*Caribbean News Service* 2015; *The Atlantic* 2016). Besides, the existing terror group that may cause these cross-border crimes, the CARICOM member states are prone to high rates of violent crimes and homicides (*Caribbean News Service* 2015). Looking at the external threats, it was important to appreciate the fact that they are only referred to as external threats whenever internal weaknesses (such as weak policies, security measures and laws are not put in place to prevent or fight against them) characterize a state. Thus, the subsequent section presents the several strategies that must be incorporated in the prevention of the internal risk and asymmetric threats emanating from these external threats. This was done with a range of activities focusing on dealing with security organs and civilian operations carried out to defend the region or countries from these external threats. Moreover, the description and appreciation of these threats and weakness provided the basis for the analysis of the relevance and possibility of using the suggested regulated and standardized training in these areas.

3. PREVENTION OF INTERNAL RISKS AND ASYMMETRIC THREATS

Several strategies have been developed, which have been detailed in various security-based articles, state security agency websites, laws and regulations, and international security organs. Researchers and security experts argue that the answer to the transnational asymmetric threats requires an integration and understanding of the national security systems and collective knowledge of multilateral security forums (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007; Trump 2017; Weber 2017; Katainen and Mogherini 2017). Consequently, both theoretical and practical strategies have been proposed with respect to preventing asymmetric threats and minimizing internal weaknesses to these threats. They include: redefining of its policies on illegal guns and drugs, migration and financial crimes; increasing the trans-border intelligence and information sharing among the member states (CACI International 2008); political means; integrated national asymmetric threat strategy (CACI International 2008); innovative diplomacy and proper regional commitments (Wilson 2010; Kugler and National Defence University 2011); and Classical Strategic Thought (Zhu 2016). All these strategies are useful and important in preventing asymmetric threats and external threats to various countries; however, with the evolving asymmetric threats and external weaknesses, it is critical that better strategies are also used to prevent internal risks and the asymmetric threats. Thus, asymmetric threats, asymmetric terrorism and other external weaknesses can best be dealt with using strategic measures regulated and standardized training of the stakeholders involved in the security issues of a country, region or continent.

3.1. The importance of regulated and standardized training in the prevention of internal risks and asymmetric threats

In the security sector/industry, ensuring a proactive and counter-productive security measure to match, prevent and manage contemporary asymmetric threats is no doubt a challenging task. Having reviewed the various security provisions and measures outlined to help address the issues of internal weaknesses and asymmetric threats (external

threats), it was important to appreciate the role of a standardized security training in order to handle all the security-related tasks. Notably, the primary research from the security training academies such as Universal Training Academy (Australia) and the European Commission, as well as the review of reports on security measures such as the PASAG Report (2017) on international security trainings proved very crucial in appreciating the benefits of regulated and standardized training in preventing internal risks and asymmetric threats. The findings from these study revealed that the security organs must take up a challenge of undertaking research and innovation activities as well as standardized training to protect the citizens, society and the economy from external threats.

In a report by the European Commission on "Secure societies – Protecting freedom and security of Europe and its citizens", it is indicated that the protection of the European borders requires a joint effort involving the development of systems, tools, processes, and methods that can rapidly identify and prevent security threats in the context of the customs policies in EU. This implies that for this kind of idea to be incorporated, there must be an integrated and standardized measure put in place to ensure uniformity in the fight and prevention of the security threats. Thus, the main challenge of standardized measure and fight against terrorism should be done through bringing together all security stakeholders, which include research organizations, public authorities, universities, non-governmental organizations, and both public and private organizations involved in the security (European Commission. n.d). Moreover, Universal Training Academy (2011) recommends a standardized training as a tool that can help provide security facilities as well as maintaining complex security operating system. Thus, standard security operating procedures are required to help provide effective security services involving cross-border crimes, and international terrorism among other external threats.

There are important benefits of integrated and standardized training on the asymmetric threat, with respect to the global and regional fight and/or prevention of external threats and internal risks. In the report by PASAG Report (2017, p. 3), standardization of training in the security industry, with international cooperation is beneficial in the global prevention of external threats and internal risks, where solutions and possible measures to improve internal capabilities are commonly understood and improved. For example, within the context of CARICOM, harmonization and acknowledgement of the asymmetric threats and internal risks require an integrated and standardized training to help individual member states to ensure similarity in cross-border management, technical harmonization as well as transparency and inclusivity in the prevention of these threats (PASAG Report 2017, p. 3; Caparini and Marenin 2004). This has a scientific basis, where cognitive learning and other models and theories in learning such as social learning theory which supports this practice. Besides, a joint training on the manifestation of asymmetric threats is beneficial to the law enforcement agencies, whereby, these agencies increasingly rely on the constant sharing of information (PASAG Report 2017, p. 9). This aspect of joint and integrated training has been approved and recommended for implementation in the EU external border security measures; whereby, standardized training and harmonization of skills and competence amongst the security agencies are reported.

4. CONCLUSION

Overall, this study established that the policy debates on the possible integration and standardization of the training on asymmetric threats and internal risks are important considerations amidst the increasingly challenging and emerging new forms of asymmetric

threats. It was also found that both internal risks (weaknesses) and external threats require a joint effort from all stakeholders in the security industry in CARICOM to help in the prevention and fight against asymmetric threats such supported by immigration, cross-border crimes, cyber issues, and terrorism. Lastly, it was important the basis of prevention of internal risks and asymmetric threats within the context of the relationship between internal weaknesses and external threat; whereby, integrated and standardised training in the security industry is rooted for. However, the training should focus on appreciating both internal weaknesses and external threats in a country so that all these aspects can be effectively addressed at the national, regional, continental and global levels.

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HYBRID COALITION AS A NEW FORM OF SECURITY ASSOCIATION

Dusko Tomic, Dr.Sc
dusko.tomic@aue.ae
Eldar Saljic,Dr.Sc
Stanko Bulajić, Dr.Sc
College of Security and Global Studies-American University in the Emirates, Dubai

Abstract

The security concept rests on the strategic preposition that national security is a field through which a nation secures existence and creates requirements for the development of the society in relation to other international factors. Within the mentioned approach, the strategic tendency of national security prioritizes components that aim towards the international environment in their nature. Other components, such as the social activism, are only included in a way where they participate in the improvement of security potential and resistance to security risks and threats with their aspects. Methodologically speaking, the security concept presents itself through the goals of a given state and the aims through which security policies secure their goals on the level of national security by applying measures and instruments. How are the security systems applicable to changes in the already changed geopolitical environment? In other words, maybe we switched from the geopolitical to the geo-economical and geo-energetic distribution of power and interest. Hence, every occasion on which a country from the Balkans joins a military group is, in some way or another, a hybrid alliance, where internal interests expire and clear the way for international powers and interests.

Key words: *security policy, national security, geo-policy, geo-economics*

1. INTRODUCTION

Ever since their beginning, humans always sought for ways to remove dangers that threatened their physical integrity and other values in their possession. With the conclusion that the own existence and development can be much more successful by joining other people and merging similar interests, humankind created a human collective. By improving and organizing this collective, they brought the concept of it to perfection and thus, created the most organized form of the society – the state, which secures the highest level of physical, spiritual, and property security. Of course, the search for more strength and better security does not end there. On the contrary, humans have and still invest great efforts to improve their own security, and most often by overlooking the fact that this can cause distrust to others, especially the neighboring subjects, who then tend to act similarly. The competition in the field of security, covering ideological, political, economic and other goals and motives, leads to the situation where security constantly preoccupies every subject in the modern world, while the way of securing itself often varies from subject to subject. Not even the Balkan countries are autoimmune to this principal.

Since the theory and practice often puts a nation and a state on the same level, it is important to mention the following:

1) Members of one nation are mostly concentrated within a country, but many nations can also live in different states,
2) Independently from the territorial concentration of a nation within one or more states, it is necessary to have a mutual identity of all followers (nations and ethnic minorities) within a state, because a national state is based on the "doctrine of nationalism and requires the geographic location of a state and a nation";
3) In the actual, dynamic process of globalization, a "nation-state" underlies several forms of denationalization, especially in regards to "removing" the territorial and ethnic comprehension of the nation and weakening of a dominant national identity.

Because of that, it is clear that many national states have great problems preserving their identity and maintain the adequate national security. Many states still have members of a different nation (ethnic minorities), who, blinded by nationalistic chauvinism and often try to use violence in order to destroy the territorial integrity of the national state and form their own national state. Such a problem is often internationalized and gains dangerous dimensions for both, the security of the target country and the regional and international peace. The Balkan states are the best example in this regard.

National interests are often cyclic processes that have a starting point, a turning point and the desired condition (national security). The national interest (engagement) of the society within a certain territory aims towards a long lasting goal – establishing a national state and securing the existence and sustainable development in order to continuously express the planned efforts of the state and the social subjects. The active thinking of the minority (political elite, state government) is an important (and the conditional starting) form of engagement for a state regarding the operationalized permanent goal compared to permanent sub-goals, which would achieve the identification of national values (vital social values). Therein rests the essence (the goal) of national power and its "product" – national security, further achieved, maintained and improved through the national security system. Yet, in such a philosophically and politically imagined reality, we are only following the Machiavellian idea: "The end justifies the means". Every citizen of a certain state knows the vital (or national) values, especially regarding their beliefs and duties, which everyone has to defend and develop.

Yet, the national interests at a certain time or time period can often only express the subjective perception and opinion of the political elite of the country. Eventual mishaps in their selfish behavior can lead to wrong decisions regarding the protection and development of the national security. If the other side has no means to get rid of such capital decision making of the political elite in their home country, the national values will be either destroyed or endangered.

However, there is the possibility where some subjects see the goal as positive (in their subjective comprehension), when in reality and according to the criteria of an objective ambient (subjects interacted with) this goal is actually negative. One can observe and evidence progress whenever a subject is close to achieve a set goal (no matter what kind of goal it is). This progress can then be evolutionary (gradual) or revolutionary (rapid), and hints to the possibility of achieving the set goals. Thus, eventual hurdles that hinder or move the subject closer from achieving its goal express regression and it could something stop a subject achieving its set goals.

Given that politics conduct the basic and the overall activity above all, the essence of power of its actors (subjects, sides) is expressed as opportunistic or supremacy policy. If a certain human collective secures its existence and sustainable development by following the principle "living in measures", logic dictates that its major activities are moralistic and creative. The communication within the group (within the members and the groups inside the collective), and the communication between the groups (with surrounding subjects) will be characterized by cooperation and creativity. Such subjects will express their power in an attractive way (through influence, propaganda, convincing, suggestions and recommendations), with little needs to violence or force. In other words, such a state will tend to impose their will to others through prioritized use of a so-called "clean" or "soft" power. On the other side, a human collective with existence and sustainable development based on the principal "living with something or too much of everything", independently from the amount of power it has, will always have communications within the group or between groups that are characterized by conflicts. In such a case, these conflicts lead to extinction and destruction, combined with the neglect of the human population. Such a subject will always try to impose their will on others repulsively by using force and violence. In other words, it will rely on the so-called "dirty" or "harsh" power.

Of course, it is all about the possibility of a certain subject to be able to achieve their goals in a specific frame of social communication, regardless of the resistance posed by other subjects. An ambitious goal like this strongly depends on the power possessed by a subject and the way a subject uses it. This further connects with its capabilities and skills. In that regard, it is very important to know if a subject is capable to materialize the set idea (registered goal – future condition) through its effective practical engagement in order to develop a hybrid alliance or coalition.

We can only anticipate the pragmatic discourse in the Balkans based on the starting points of the current Russian energy policy, defined in the document "Energy Strategy of Russia for the period up to 2020", implemented in 2003.[256] The starting constitution is that "Russia possesses great energy resources – the territory has one third of the global gas reserves, one tenth of the global oil reserves, one fifth of the global coal reserves and 14% of the global Uranium sources. Additionally, it has a great energetic complex that serves as a basis for economic development and acts as an instrument of the internal and foreign policy". Energy policy should undergo changes. Instead of being a deliverer of resources, it should be an active participant on the global markets. This is an assignment "with strategic meaning". This assignment ensures Russia's security and Russia "continues to be a stable and reliable partner of the European countries and the entire Global Community". This strategy identifies Europe and Asia as primary markets for the Russian foreign energy policy by formulating that "the strategic interests of Russia would encourage the founding of a common energy policy, as well as a common energy and transport infrastructure between regions in Europe and Asia, together with securing a non-discriminatory energy transit." The state will "support the participation of Russian companies in the development and realization of many great international programs regarding the transport of gas and crude oil to East and West", states the document. Especially interesting is also this sentence: "The problems of transit for Russia, with its unique geographic and geopolitical position, have special meaning for […]… The markets

[256] Summary of Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period up to 2020, found at: ec.europa.eu/energy/russia/events/doc/2003_strategy_2020.en.pdf

of Central and Western Europe will be one of the greatest markets in the following 20 years."

The Russian foreign policy conception from 2008 talks only sparse about energy. Yet, it places important tasks before the Russian diplomacy: "To strengthen the strategic partnership with the leading producers of energetic resources, develop active dialogues with consumer states and transit countries and [….] measures for sustaining reliable energy delivery supported by appropriate activities aimed towards stability of demand and security of transit". It is also important to point out the task to pay special attention to energy producers in the Middle East. This is, according to the document "of special strategic importance to the Russian national interests".[257] In comparison to the previous strategy of national security, energy gets more priority in the new text and plays a role in two aspects: as a resource and as a question of security. Energy is presented as an instrument of power – it can strengthen Moscow's position in the international business and secure resources for strategic deterrence.[258] Here, we can say that the statement of the Russian President Putin from 2005, where he stated: "Russia has no other areas where it could be a leading power" is fully applicable. Russia's concurrent, natural and technological advances could secure Russia's role as the leader in the global energetic market. Similar to that, at the National Security Assembly, Putin mentioned, "Energy is the greatest force of the global economic progress. This is how it was, and this is how it is going to be in the future".[259]

On the other side, we can witness the geopolitical engineering of Euro-Atlantism presented in the creation of hybrid identities as a guarantee for the continued fragmentation of the Balkans and the easier control over the area.

The support of the USA in the creation of a hybrid identity was one of the most supported in vivo experiments in Langley, created for the Serbian ethnic being, but developed so that Ukrainians could oppose the (great) Russian civilizational hearth, change their geopolitical code and make them a steady source of problems for Russia. The Anglo-Saxon school of geo-policy, with its long historical continuity, has constantly developed different strategies to surround the Euro-Asian continental area, starting with Alfred Mahan, and going through Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman, all the way to Donald Meinig and Zbigniew Brzezinski. The authors of this text think that this is one of the greatest flaws in the Euro-Atlantic school, since "from Iran to Turkey, a bigger hybrid coalition between Russia, Turkey, and Iran was created".

Under the influence of Brzezinski that the importance of Ukraine is of a great value for the geo-political goals of the USA, they oversee things, just like Hitler and Bonaparte. By creating the hybrid Ukrainian identity, a geopolitical hotspot arises. This hotspot can last very long. Looking at it from the other side, it can be a great starting point for the further destabilization of Russia. Furthermore, it can make the consolidation of Russia and the strengthening of its influence in the Middle-European area impossible. The hybrid Ukrainian identity is founded on extreme anti-Russian opinions and is being used to create much opposition between Russians and Ukrainians. In long terms, such an opposition can hinder their approach to one another. The weakening and separation of the (great) Russian corpse, according to Atlantists, aim at the final control over the resources,

[257] The Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, 12.07.2008, see on www.kremlin.ru
[258] Russian Analytical Digest, No.62, 18.6.2009,http://www.res.ethz.ch/analysis/rad/index.cfm
[259] Russia: Is Georgian Gas Crisis Evidence of Moscow's New Energy Strategy, RFE/RL, 23.01.2006, http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1064978.html)

natural goods, and traffic corridors of Euro-Asia. Hybrid nations are only the means for achieving goals fast and as cheap as possible. Yet, this long-term goal, for which the USA do not have the potential, sparked the creation of hybrid coalitions that completely change the current conceptual ideas. One of such coalitions was the mentioned one between Turkey, Iran, and Russia. They have presented their efficiency test proudly in the case of Qatar. The gradual introduction of the Chinese Dragon as an economic answer to the Euro Atlantic Thalassocracy is a special challenge. The New Silk Road in the 21st century covers the Submarine Silk Road and the Economic Belt. This new, multidimensional concept is also known as an incentive called "One Belt One Road Incentive". This incentive has a long-term character, with prescribed 35 years needed to complete it. Around 60 countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe actively participate in it. Up until now, 30 countries have signed memorandums and other documents of participation to realize this incentive. The costs are estimated around 900 billion Dollars, with additional 315 billion Dollars being invested by the European Union for the modernization and expansion of own infrastructure.

The prescribed resources would be invested in the development and modernization of road networks, railways, air traffic, telecommunications, harbors and water ways, logistics and everything else necessary for improving the efficiency of trade, investments, industry, energy and other cooperation areas. All of them should contribute to the faster overcoming of socio-economic problems and secure conditions for mutual economic progress. For many participating countries in the incentive, this will mean better opportunities for employment for young people, eradication of poverty, reduction of many views of extremism, elemental migrations and many sources of instability and conflicts.

Additional to the economy and infrastructure, the One Belt One Road Incentive also covers connections in culture, science, media and other important forms for better understanding, mutual respect and cultural and social progress.

Even though a few years have passed since the One Belt One Road Incentive, for its creation, 75 economic and Free-Trade Zones in 35 countries along the Silk Road were established. According to the official Chinese data, these Zones have had a great contribution to the budgets of their home countries, paying over a hundred billion Dollars in taxes. Simultaneously, these zones employed over 950 thousand workers until the end of 2015.

The scientifically perceived pragmatism is a unique opportunity, presenting the active thinking of the minority (political elite, state government) is an important (and the conditional starting) form of engagement for a state regarding the operationalized permanent goal compared to permanent sub-goals, which would achieve the identification of national values (vital social values). Yet, in such a philosophically and politically imagined reality, we are only following the Machiavellian idea: "The end justifies the means".

The original hybrid coalitions revealed new challenges for the security systems. These challenges require a high level of pragmatism and political creativity, as well as analytic observations. The affiliation of a certain military collective does not guarantee internal stability, and the economic dependency is a new area for many political security manipulations. The best example for this is Turkey – even though Turkey is a NATO member state, it created a hybrid coalition with Russia primarily for improving its own energy potential. This has created the base for Turkey's self-reliance and strengthened its political capacity in negotiations in comparison to other countries.

2. INSTEAD OF THE CONCLUSION

National values can be threatened in three ways: internally, within the territory of the home state – primarily through independent unlawful destructive behavior of citizens, individually and in cooperation with illegal, semi-legal or legal collectives, but also through foreign actors who are somehow physically present in the given area; externally – through aggressive actions of sovereign (states, state unions, groups of states) and non-sovereign (foreign or transnational) subjects; combined threats, through actions of internal and external factors. There can be public or secretive threatening actions. Yet, it is important to keep in mind that overcoming many threatening actions requires secretive actions. Therefore, if the national security system has active knowledge and observation of the scope and the character of secretive dangerous activities, it can create conditions for planning and conducting adequate offense-defense measures. In other words, it contributes to the successful defense of the vital values from secretive or public threatening activities. In such a discourse, hybrid coalitions should be observed as a potential threat and as a potential mechanism for strengthening own capacities, together with preserving the internal hyper-sensibility and the possibility of self-defense.

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THE ROLE OF BORDER CONTROL IN THE SECURITY OF THE STATE BORDER

Željko Z. Spalević, Dr.Sc
Humanities, University of Donja Gorica, Podgorica, Montenegro
e-mail: zeljko.spalevic@udg.edu.me
Žaklina Spalević, Dr.Sc
University of Synergy, Bijeljina, Republika Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina
e-mail: zspalevic@sinergija.edu.ba
Milutin Ateljević, Dr.Sc
University of Synergy, Bijeljina, Republika Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina
e-mail: mateljevic@sinergija.edu.ba

Abstract

The concepts and activities of border control and legal support for the work of the border authorities are studied in this paper. The subject of the paper is the border control in the safety of the state border, taking into account the modern forms of threat to the state, with a special attention to the surveillance of the state border and border check. From the above, the goal is examining the methods of securing the state border, combating the commission of criminal offenses and protecting the life and health of people.

The research should point the importance of police work, its effectiveness and the importance of the integrated use of human factors and technical means. In this paper, following scientific methods were used: content analysis method, normative method, induction and deduction, description method, comparative method and other scientific methods that should contribute to the clarification of set problems of research.

Keywords: *State Border, Control, Supervision, Checks, Security.*

1. INTRODUCTION

The border represents the first line of protection of every modern state, and the concept of state border protection is a challenge that is posed before each state or group of states that have common interests or agreements affecting contemporary forms of threat. A significant number of threats contribute to the disturbance of the state border security, so security is set as an imperative to all competent authorities involved in the border protection process. Threats are always the same or similar, only the intensity and form of manifestation of border breach changes.

The aspirations of the Western Balkan countries to join the EU impose obligations and requirements that must be fulfilled in order to become a full member. One of them is undoubtedly the border security of the EU's external borders. Entering of these countries in the EU means that some of its borders will become the EU's borders, and all the obligations that follow from it must be fulfilled.

As security can be seen as a function, condition, or organization, the border safety can be also considered as a part of the rights, jobs, coercion, and protection, positive and negative phenomena and organizational units that function at border crossings, beyond

the border crossings, along with the borderline and the border area. It is realized by the border control of the police and other bodies that carry out operations at the state border.

The application of modern measures and actions at the border indicates their importance in controlling the crossing of the border and the necessity of their permanent innovation. The trained personnel at the border, the application of professional and tactical principles of work, the adoption of new technological achievements and the use of technical resources are the main preconditions for controlling the state border.

An unambiguous indicator of border security is certainly the presence and absence of forms of endangerment, their prevention, suppression or management to the extent that the unhindered movement of people, things and resources is established, and the sense of security is created. This relationship is certainly interesting, and it will be the subject of further attention.

The time period that is discussed below is from 2014 to 2016. In order to provide a better insight into the frequency of occurrence and engagement of the border police, data from other periods were given also. In the case of border control, a shorter timeframe is processed out, primarily due to the availability of relevant documents.

2. SECURITY OF THE EU EXTERNAL BORDERS

The security of EU's external borders is regulated by binding regulations, primarily by the EU Regulation 2016/399 and Regulation 2016/1624, which will be treated in this title, while other regulations governing this area, primarily due to the rationality of space, will not be considered. Regulation EU No. 2016/399 on rules governing the movement of persons across borders (the Schengen Borders Code) [260]regulates the rules for the control of external borders, and the control of the state border is in the interest of all EU Member States which should help to combat illegal immigration and human trafficking and to prevent any threat to internal security, public order and peace, public health and the international relations of the Member States. The lack of internal borders between EU members creates an area where people can move freely. Re-establishment of borders can be specially introduced in situations of serious threat to public order and peace, in cases of terrorist threats. Also, in accordance with this Regulation, migration and the crossing of external borders of a large number of third-country nationals are not considered a threat to public order and peace and internal security. It should be noted that the "external borders" are the land borders of the Member States, borders on the sea, rivers and lakes, airports and ports on which the so-called " "State border control" exists. This regulation calls for the testing of fingerprints and the use of the Visa Information System which puts technical means, in addition to people, to the forefront.

State border control implies an activity that is carried out at the border-related with an attempt to cross the border or to the border crossing process itself and consists of border control and state border protection. Border control is the control carried out at border crossings in order to allow persons and their means of transport and objects to enter or exit the EU Member State.

Protection of the state border is the protection of the border between border crossings and the protection of border crossings after established working hours in order to prevent persons from escaping border control (Article 2).

[260]Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Union Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code) (codification), Official Journal of the European Union L 77/1.

At the external borders, all persons are subject to border control officers in order to determine their identity on the basis of travel documents. Here, a basic border control is carried out where the crossing of the border is permitted through personal insight into the travel document, technical examination of the travel document and search in the appropriate databases on forged, stolen or alien travel documents. Persons who are not EU citizens may enter the EU under the conditions of having a valid travel document, valid visa or residence permit. Also, these persons should not have a ban on entry, should not be a threat to public order and peace and internal security (Article 6 of the Regulation).

The protection of the state border has the role of preventing the unauthorized border crossing at border crossings and beyond border crossings, suppression of cross-border crime and taking measures against persons who have illegally transferred the meaning of their detention and transfer to further, regulations, established procedures. In order to protect the state border, border control officers are organized in stationary and mobile units. These units perform their tasks by patrols or by installing them in sensitive places and using electronic technical means (Article 13). Today, these units come to the fore due to the experiences of the major migration crisis in 2014 and 2015, when hundreds of thousands of migrants arrived at the EU's borders.

The influx of migrants to the EU's external borders has prompted the adoption of the EU Regulation on the European Border and Coast Guard[261], which strengthens the Integrated Border Management (IBM) EU which, in addition to preventing and combating cross-border crime, aims to control mass migration. As regulated by the Regulation (Article 4), the European Integrated Border Management consists of several elements, such as: State border control (legal border crossing, prevention and detection of cross-border crime, smuggling of migrants, trafficking in human beings and terrorism ...), search operation and rescue at sea, risk analysis for internal security and threat analysis, interagency cooperation within each country, border related issues, cooperation with third countries, technical and operational measures within the EU relating to state border control, return of third country nationals, mechanisms of solidarity.

Thus, by the said Regulation, the European Border and Coast Guard are established for the implementation of the European IBM. This Agency should provide the necessary information relating to all areas important for the IBM - control of the state border, in particular, return, irregular secondary movement of third-country nationals within the EU, prevention of cross-border crime and unauthorized border crossing, migration flows, human trafficking. The Agency should organize technical and operational assistance for the EU member states, in order to increase and improve all the capacities for monitoring the external borders.

Some of the tasks of the Agency are to: assist Member States when greater technical and operational assistance is needed at the external land and water borders by coordinating and organizing joint operations by sending European border and coastguard teams, including forces for rapid intervention; establishes a reserve of technical equipment; within the teams to support migration management in focal areas, deploy teams of European border and coastal guards and technical equipment providing the assistance

[261] Regulation (EU) 2016/1624 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Border and Coast Guard and amending Regulation (EU) 2016/399 of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 and Council Decision 2005/267/EC, Official Journal of the European Union, L 251/1.

related to the verification, testing, identification and taking of fingerprints (Article 8). The part of realization of the tasks of the Agency remains an open question, related to the competence of activities at the border crossing or in the border area.

The border area defined by Regulation (EZ) no. 1931/2006[262] regulating rules on local border traffic at the external land borders of the Member States and amending the provisions of the Schengen Convention where the border area is designated as an area extending at a distance of 30 kilometers from the border. The local administrative areas to be considered as the border area are determined by the States concerned in bilateral agreements. If a part of such an area is between 30 and 50 kilometers from the borderline, then it is considered as a part of the border area (Article 3).

3. SECURITY OF THE BORDERS OF MONTENEGRO

The police perform tasks that, among other tasks, relate to the protection of citizens' safety, prevention of the commission and detection of criminal offenses and misdemeanors and the finding of their perpetrators and border control. Border control includes the surveillance of the state border, border checks and assessment of threats to the security of the state border and is done due to: ensuring the state border, protecting the life and health of people and the environment, preventing the commission and detection of criminal offenses and violations and finding and capturing their perpetrators, illegal migration (Article 2 of the Law)[263].

Illegal migration in Montenegro in the context of the current mass movements of migrants relates to the migration of migrants towards the EU and do not have the tendency to retain in Montenegro. The table[264] below provides an overview of the prevented migrants in the illegal crossing of the border. In order to prevent the illegal crossing of the state border and in order to carry out business control, the police set up and use technical means: for forcibly stopping vehicles, helicopters, means of communication, various detectors and readers, radars, classic optical devices, CCTV, thermo-vision devices, geophones mobile kits and other numerous observation sensors. Some of the listed technical systems are connected to national databases and international databases.

Table 1: Prevented migrants in the illegal crossing of the border

Year	Number of prevented migrants in the illegal crossing of the border
2010.	489
2011.	529
2012.	608
2013.	753
2014.	280
2015.	255
Total	4939

[262] Regulation (EC) No 1931/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down rules on local border traffic at the external land borders of the Member States and amending the provisions of the Schengen Convention, Official Journal of the European Union L 405/1

[263]Law on Border Control, "Sl. list CG "no. 72/09, 20/11, 40/11, 39/13

[264]Strategy for Integrated Migration Management in Montenegro for the period 2017 - 2020 with the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Strategy for 2017, Podgorica, January 2017.

The borders of Montenegro with the neighboring countries are of the total length of 840.4 km, of which: Albania 207.2 km, Croatian 41.7 km, Serbia 168.5 km, Kosovo 75.6 km, Bosnia and Herzegovina 254.4 km and 93 km in the open sea. There are 28 border crossings on the Montenegrin border: 19 in road traffic, two in railway, two in the air and five in maritime traffic[265]. The land border is 571.6 km long and the border at sea, lake and rivers is a total length of 268.8 km.

The state border is the borderline in the narrower sense, while in the broader sense is the borderline and the border area. The borderline is a well-defined line dividing the territory of one state from the territory of the other state on land and water surfaces and in the air. The border has a border area of 30 - 50 km in the EU. On the other hand, the border area between Montenegro, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina covers the territories of the municipalities that are in the zone of 10 km from the borderline, which is regulated by mutual agreements. The 100 m borderline from the borderline (as it was arranged in the earlier time period) is no longer relevant but has not given up the significance of this distance when arranging the space or in the adoption of a planning document when the police give their suggestions and opinions.

When it comes to the width of the sea belt, Montenegro has a territorial sea that is far from the so-called "Baseline", 12 nautical miles to the sea. Fishing in the depth of the territory up to 300 meters from the borderline must be announced to the police.

The territory of Montenegro, related to the jurisdiction and police affairs (the Border Police Division), is divided into three regional centres: North, Center and South, with six border security units with a total of 12 stations and border police units. The Border Police Sector systematized 1427 positions police officers. Dividing this number with the total length of the borders of Montenegro, that are 804.4 km long (the "green and blue border"), and allocating the existing composition in three shifts, results that one shift of 1000m border is covered with approximately 1.7 border police officers.

4. BORDER CHECKS

The border check includes measures and actions that are taken at the border crossing during the crossing of the state border in order to control the legal entry of a person in Montenegro or exit from Montenegro (Article 28 of the Law)[266].

Border checking implies checking of persons, things of a means of transportation. insight into the travel document, determine the identity of the person, take biometric data (fingerprints, etc.) as required, inspect and search the person and other checks. Checking things and the means of transportation implies checking vehicle documents, searching for available records, reviewing and searching.

Border checking is a complex and demanding activity that is performed in relation to the traffic of passengers registered when crossing the border (entry/exit). Representative example: in 2014 it was total of 13,607,924 registered, in 2015 - 14,925,986 and in 2016 - 16,799,859 passenger transfers[267].

[265]Report on the Implementation of the Integrated Border Management Strategy for the period 2006 - 2012, Podgorica, January 2013, p. 17.

[266]Law on Border Control, "Sl. list CG "no. 72/09, 20/11, 40/11, 39/13

[267] Ministry of Interior of Montenegro, Report on the implementation of the Action Plan for Implementation of the Integrated Border Management Strategy in 2015, with the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Integrated Border Management Strategy for 2016, Podgorica, March 2016

Thus, the border check is carried out at the border crossing and the practice shows that the most frequent attempts to illegally cross the state border at the border crossings are: an attempt to cross using a forged travel document, an attempt to cross with a valid travel document in which a forged visa is entered, an attempt to cross using another person's travel document, lack of required visa, hiding in the means of transport and lack of identification documents[268]. The border checking results of border crossings in the period of 2014 to 2016 are shown in the following table 2 and table 3[269].

Table 2: Results of border checks

Year	Number of visas issued in BC	Number of prevented illegal crossings		Allowed entrance in MNE	Denied entrance in MNE	Forged documents discovered		
		Forged travel document	Without travel document			Travel documents	Visas	Other documents
2014.	19	47	9	1518	1511	56	3	23
2015.	24	27	8	2012	1308	49	1	16
2016.	5	32	20	1144	833	33	0	28

Better results are expected when Montenegro coordinate its regulations with EU visa regulations and link it to the EU's Visa Information System.

Table 3: Results of border checks

Year	Found persons with warrants						Conducted foreigners	
	Nationals - MNE			Interpol			To BC	In transit
	Persons	Vehicles	Documents	Persons	Vehicles	Documents		
2014.	124	3	2	416	150	178	111	103
2015.	149	4	4	373	110	244	229	89
2016.	187	0	0	909	50	309	163	89

In addition to the aforementioned border checks in 2015, the border police deprived of liberty 66 Montenegrin citizens and 303 foreigners by regulating traffic of

and the Ministry of Interior, Report on the Implementation of the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Strategy Integrated Border Management in 2016, with the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Integrated Border Management Strategy for 2017, Podgorica, March 2017.

[268] Strategy for Integrated Migration Management in Montenegro for the period 2017 - 2020, mentioned edition

[269] Data processed according to: MIA of Montenegro, Report on the implementation of the Action Plan for Implementation of the Strategy of Integrated Border Management in the 2015 issue and the MIA of Montenegro, Report on the Implementation of the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Integrated Border Management Strategy in 2016

means of transport (3,848,466 motor vehicles, 20,430 aircraft, 9,333 vessels and 4,429 trains). They were charged on the basis of committing criminal offenses and violations[270].

Table 4: Joint controls and seized narcotics at border crossings

Year	Joint Controls of Border Police and Customs Administration at border crossings	The quantity of narcotic drug seized on BC during joint control (kg)	The total amount of narcotic drugs seized at border crossings (kg)
2014.	25.890	284.6	454.1
2015.	28.705	69	107.3
2016.	28.788	1242.6	1242.6

Similar to the previous year, in 2016, border police deprived of liberty 73 Montenegrin citizens and 243 foreigners by regulating traffic of the means of transport (motor vehicles 4.234.015, aircraft 21.113, vessels 10.177 and trains 3.408)[271]. They were charged on the basis of committing criminal offenses and violations. Significant results have been achieved in cooperation with customs in the fight against narcotic drugs, as shown in the following table[272].

5. BORDER CONTROL

State border control implies measures, actions and authorizations undertaken on the state border, between border crossing points and at border crossings outside established working hours, with the aim of eradicating cross-border crime, preventing the illegal crossing of the state border, protecting its integrity and taking measures against persons who are illegally crossed the state border (Article 25 of the Law)[273].

The most common reasons for the illegal crossing of the state border outside the border crossing are: not having a travel document, not having a visa and forged documents relating to temporary residence[274].

For the purpose of surveillance (security) of the border, the concept of "deep" security is implemented in the border area on territory beside the borderline. This gave up the once-present "line" concept in the 100m-long belt along the borderline, so now police operative-tactical actions are applied across the entire border area.

Today, along with the borderline, the joint patrols of the two countries can be in patrol in order to carry out border operations. In addition, the police may cross the border

[270]Ministry of Interior of Montenegro, Report on the Implementation of the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Integrated Border Management Strategy in 2015 edition.

[271]Ministry of Interior of Montenegro, Report on the Implementation of the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Integrated Border Management Strategy in 2016 edition

[272]Data processed according to: MIA of Montenegro, Report on Implementation of the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Integrated Border Management Strategy in 2015, published by the MIA of Montenegro, Report on the Implementation of the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Integrated Border Management Strategy in 2016.

[273]Law on Border Control, "Sl. list CG "no. 72/09, 20/11, 40/11, 39/13

[274] Strategy for Integrated Migration Management in Montenegro for the period 2017-2020. mentioned edition.

of the neighboring state in an emergency search and prosecute the perpetrator, but under strict conditions and for specific criminal offenses defined in a bilateral agreement[275].

With the aim of preventing and suppressing the illegal crossing of the state border, patrol activity is carried out by motorized patrols, patrols on vessels and pedestrian patrols. In addition to patrols, ambushes are carried out, checkpoints, field searches, observations from observation posts are performed, and thus predefined directions and areas are controlled. When carrying out these measures and actions, official dogs and technical means are used on land and air. One of the basic principles when carrying out these measures and actions is to make them frequent and unpredictable, so it could not be detected and monitored by persons who illegally cross the border. The number of realized patrols in border control is given in the following table[276].

In the course of 2015, Border Police Officers controlled 41,047 persons, 32,803 vehicles, performed 16,195 controls of things and found 370 persons in the misdemeanor and 52 persons with criminal offenses during their duties of surveillance (security) of the state border. Good results were made by border police officers in the performance of these activities during 2016 when they were controlled 64,682 persons, 46,340 vehicles, 36,198 items and found 1,047 persons in the misdemeanor and 56 persons during execution of criminal offenses[277].

Table 5: Realized patrols in controlling (securing) the state border

Year	Patrols		Number of patrols by country					Total
			Albania	BiH	Croatia	Serbia	Kosovo	
2015.	Patrols on the green border		4.796	3.279	934	3.722	2.396	15.127
	Joint patrols		195	349	6	338	69	957
	Patrols on the main border	Sea, rivers and lakes	1.514		633			4.920
		Open sea	2.773					
2016.	Patrols on the green border		5.422	2.865	969	4.064	2.645	15.965
	Joint patrols		251	340	4	256	100	951
	Patrols on the main border	Sea, rivers and lakes	1.307		722			4.566
		Open sea	2.537					

[275]More on: Law on Ratification of the Convention on Police Cooperation in South East Europe, "Sl. list CG ", number 1/2008.

[276]Data processed according to: MIA of Montenegro, Report on Implementation of the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Integrated Border Management Strategy in 2015, published by the MIA of Montenegro, Report on the Implementation of the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Integrated Border Management Strategy in 2016.

[277]Ministry of Interior of Montenegro, Report on the Implementation of the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Integrated Border Management Strategy in 2016 edition

The implementation of the Electronic Border Control System plays an important role in the achievement of the stated results of border control and surveillance. Electronic surveillance is carried out at sea, lake and rivers and part of the so-called. "Green Border" and consists of stationary and mobile centers and electronic monitoring stations that monitor the border continuously or according to the plan of use.

6. CONCLUSION

To the security of state borders, considerable attention is given, especially in EU member states, so the countries of the Western Balkans have to follow the requirements and standards and more important to apply them on their borders to fulfill the conditions for EU membership. Having in mind contemporary threats such as terrorism, organized crime or illegal migration, the security of the state border is not only imposed with this goal but also as a traditional requirement for the internal stability of states.

The EU regulations regulate the border area. One of them is the Schengen Borders Code, which regulates the rules of external border control, internal borders and creates an area where people can move freely. The state border control of the EU consists of border control and border protection carried out by stationary and mobile units at border crossings, between border crossings and border postage protection after working hours. The latest migration crisis has contributed to the adoption of a regulation establishing the European Border and Coast Guard, which should provide technical and operational assistance to EU members and, where appropriate, operate with its teams at the EU borders. Beyond the border (borderline), in the EU, there is a border area of 30-50 km from the borderline.

Similar to the EU, Montenegro is securing its borders with border control, which includes state border control and border checks. By border control, over the course of six years, 4,939 migrants were prevented from attempting to cross the state border illegally and thus preventing their further movement towards the EU. The "Green and Blue" border of 840.4 km is "covered" by the Border Police with its organizational units at border crossings and beyond border crossings. Unlike the border area in the EU, Montenegro border area is 10 km, as defined in the mutual agreements with some countries.

In the period of 2014 to 2016 of border crossing, border checks have registered over 45 million passenger crossings, and many illegal crossings have been prevented, falsified travel documents were discovered, persons with the warrant were found, seized narcotics and various administrative measures were taken.

For the control (security) of the border, the concept of "deep" security in the aforementioned border area is applied, using tactical operations. The specificity is that the joint patrols of two neighboring states are being implemented at the border, in order to carry out border operations.

Processes of unhindered movement of people, things, and means and realization of border control at border crossings, between border crossings, along with the border and in the border area are in the interdependence relation. On the one hand, a smooth flow is required and, on the other hand, strict security requirements are required. In the border control, the indicators indicate that the activities of border police officers and technical means are necessary in the broadest sense in order to accomplish border operations and achieve appropriate results. As we observe, this relationship appears inseparable, so the threats and their forms must constantly be monitored and implemented in the work methods and tactics, aiming the improvement of border control,

The use of a variety of technical means, the introduction of the Electronic Border Surveillance System and the connection with national and international databases certainly affect the performance of the border police. The disadvantage is the lack of connection with the Visa Information System of the EU, which should be eliminated until Montenegro joins the EU.

Finally, on the basis of all the above, we conclude that border control is in accordance with EU regulations and that good results are achieved. The inseparable action of people and technical means is essential, but there is room for improvement in the technical sense, which should be done in the following period.

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STRATEGY FOR FIGHT AGAINST DRUG TRAFFICKING AND PROPOSED MEASURES FOR STRATEGIC ACTIONS IN THE AREA OF SECURITY

Ljupco Todorovski, Dr.Sc
Faculty of Security – Skopje, Republic of Macedonia
e-mail: ljupcoatodorovski@hotmail.com
Ice Ilijevski, Dr.Sc
Faculty of Security – Skopje, Republic of Macedonia
e-mail: iilijevski@hotmail.com

Abstract

As a result of the fast advancement of the society many things have improved, but the activities concerning drugs instead of getting reduced in intensity or disappear completely, have reached a large scale. These challenges in the globalized world are demanding new ways of acting and joint actions of the police units internationally, as an answer of the problems the society is facing in a whole. For that purpose in this paper we will stress the need for strategy for fight against the drug trafficking regarding the necessity of coordinated acting of the institutions against the drug crime as well as the international collaboration and the international policy.

Also, in the paper the proposed measures will be given according to the monitoring, the information exchange, the analysis, and the research of the illegal drug trafficking. If we want the Republic of Macedonia to progress it should follow and evaluate the experiences gathered in the past years by pointing out the best practices in order to be reached consistency of the acting in the fight against the drug trafficking and to pointing out new challenges and strategies that should be implemented in the collaboration with EU and other international partners.

Keywords: *strategy, drug trafficking, crime, crime organizations*

1. INTRODUCTION

The drug related crime is a mass and complicated problem. It refers to various criminal acts that can hardly be connected with each other and be put in one frame. Drug trade and supply in the Republic of Macedonia is not an isolated phenomenon. It depends on the European and world trends on the drug market. Crime related to drugs cannot be seen only in national frames because there is a strong bond of producer and consumer countries. Therefore, the prevention of drug related criminal activities should not be dealt with in an isolated way, without paying attention to the other criminal activities such as smuggling weapons and people, terrorism and money laundering. Naturally, the trade of narcotic drugs is one of the most productive forms of organized criminal activity, both in the world and in Europe, as well as in the Republic of Macedonia. It is characterized by great flexibility. The emergence of increasingly complex forms of drug trafficking, its organized transportation through our country, the increased presence of it on the domestic illegal market, the supply due to the long-standing worldwide overproduction (especially of opium and cannabis type drugs) and the increase of the number of users, talk enough

about the actuality of this problem. From this the need for establishing a strategy for combating drug trafficking is also perceived.

For successful implementation of the measures for reducing the drug supply and effective combating of the smuggling narcotic drugs, it should be set a close connection with certain countries. This requires maximum engagement and co-ordination and cooperation. The mutual cooperation between the police, the customs and the judicial authorities should be encouraged by participation in joint projects and through exchange of information.

2. POLICE ACTIVITIES AND COOPERATION WITH THE COMPETENT STATE AUTHORITIES

The pressure on Macedonian borders and the impact of smuggling drug groups at regional level continues to make our country an attractive secondary route for transit of illegal drugs. In order to reduce the supply of drugs, i.e. the availability of narcotic drugs, a series of activities are carried out by various social entities, primarily the police and the customs. These activities constitute an important part of the efforts undertaken by the society in order to solve, or to put the problems of narcotic drugs in a socially acceptable framework, because they, directly or indirectly, affect the everyday life of the citizens. By taking measures and implementing activities, the problem is monitored, as well as the domestic and international trends in drug trafficking and its abuse.

According to the statistical indicators related to the drug abuse and the crime, in the Republic of Macedonia, no major changes are expected in the reduction of the demand for narcotic drugs (frequency of drug use), i.e. further attempts for increasing the supply of drugs to the illegal drug market in the Republic of Macedonia can be expected.

According to the analysis of the situation in the region[278], in future we should expect more cases of organized drug production in the Republic of Macedonia, especially if we take into consideration the fact that in some of our neighboring countries were discovered illegal chemical laboratories ("precursors") used for the production, i.e. preparation of drugs of natural and synthetic origin.

2.1. Priority objectives and fields of activities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Macedonia

The priority objectives are constant and effective legal actions and measures for reducing the drug supply. Such goals include prevention of the production and trade of narcotic drugs, prevention of trafficking and use of substances (precursors) that can be used in the production of opiates, detecting money laundering, and seizing money acquired through illicit drug trafficking.

In order to achieve the goals of reducing the supply of drugs, the scope of activities should be directed to the following:

- Increasing of the administrative and operational capacities of the Ministry of the Interior and the Customs Administration, oriented towards the fight against drug

[278] Strategy for struggling against drugs in the Republic of Serbia for the period 2009 - 2013; National Strategy against Drugs 2004 – 10 of the Republic of Albania" http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/publications/country-overviews/al; National strategy against drugs 2009 – 2013**,** the Republic of Bulgaria; National drug control strategy in the Republic of Croatia, 2006 - 2012

trafficking and crime related to drug abuse (including crime committed by drug addicts) aimed at the purchase of narcotic drugs.

- Continuous training (special types of training) and maximum engagement of all police and customs officers in dealing with drug related problems (especially control of street distribution of drugs and the use of drugs in public places).
- Directing the activities of the special police forces to national and international organized criminal groups, dealing with smuggling and illegal sale of narcotic drugs, precursors and potential production of narcotic drugs.
- Prevention of drug smuggling through effective supervision of the state border (passenger and freight transport) with an emphasis on detecting and preventing international smuggling chains throughout the Republic of Macedonia and in it ("Balkan Route").
- Formation and use of material and technical means and official dogs for detecting drugs by the border police and customs teams specialized in combating all types of smuggling, especially against smuggling of narcotic drugs.
- Technical equipment and organization of border crossings in accordance with the European standards, opening new border crossings with appropriate personal reinforcement, due to the growth of passenger and cargo transport, in order to improve border control (and control of goods).
- Timely registration of new forms of smuggling (models, trends) and abusing new drugs,
- Fighting the organized illegal sale and distribution of narcotic drugs on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia, prevention of illegal street sales on smaller quantities of narcotic drugs.
- Planning and undertaking preventive measures and activities related to the prevention of drug use in certain "zones", where the young population is collected.
- Active participation in media campaigns aimed at educating young people about the harmfulness of the use of drugs, and thus informing the public of the measures taken by the police in order to prevent, reduce and mitigate the damages.
- Authorized bodies and institutions should establish effective control over the trade in chemicals that can be used for the production of narcotic drugs and prevention of their smuggling and abuse.
- Strengthening international police and customs cooperation within bilateral or international police organizations, carrying out joint activities, increasing joint operational capabilities through an international exchange of knowledge, experiences and information.
- Analysis of all types of related information, drug crime and interchange of this information on a regional and international level.
- Implement all necessary measures and activities aimed at reducing the production or growth of narcotic drugs.
- To intensify the cooperation between the organizational units within the Ministry of the Interior, especially the police activities at the local level.
- To improve the cooperation between the Ministry of Interior and other institutions competent for controlling the drug supply in the Republic of Macedonia (at the state and local level). Above all, the Ministry of Finance, the Customs Administration, the Ministry of Economy and the Ministry of Justice are considering the possibility of establishing joint investigative teams for the purpose

of more efficient criminal prosecution of perpetrators charged with drug crimes (abuse of narcotic drugs and smuggling), and

- Improving techniques related to the discovery of financial transactions, that is, the flow of money obtained from illegal drug trafficking (money laundering detection), and legal actions against organized groups and legal entities involved in money laundering, primarily acquired by smuggling and smuggling and sale of drugs.

3. COORDINATED FIGHT AGAIST THE DRUG RELATED CRIME

In the Republic of Macedonia there are several institutions with statutory authorizations for dealing with drug-related crime. It often opens up space for conflicting competencies between the institutions and creates unacceptable competition, which reduces the effectiveness of the fight against crimes related to drug. It also creates irregularities in the area of the institutional responsibility. Such a status-quo negatively reflects on the possibility of obtaining a full picture of drug-related crime in the Republic of Macedonia, such as statistics on crimes committed, and drug seizures. The main objective is to clearly identify the leading body responsible for combating drug-related crime and to coordinate the activities in this field.

Taking it into account the scale of drug-related problems, we should bear in mind the fact that the police officers designated to resolve them are not able to effectively prevent any problems. A facilitating component in this field is the adoption of a drug-related anti-crime strategy that outlines the priority action guidelines.

The Macedonian police have developed an exchange of intelligence information with the neighboring and western European countries, thus contributing to the realization of drug seizures and the arrests of drug traffickers in these countries; has developed comprehensive support for an operational plan and facilitated communication on cross-border criminal investigations and targeting drug related crime. From the above, we can conclude that most drug seizures are the result of the international exchange of intelligence information, good interagency cooperation and increased cross-border information exchange.

4. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STRATEGY THROUGH FORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL POLICY

As a consequence of the global movements and openness of borders around the world, smuggling of illegal addictive substances has turned into an international crime. The increased number of users, the high profit margin, the terrorist acts, and the shift in the political structure of the world have an impact on the production of substances that create addictions and drug trafficking, thereby making it a global problem.

In order to ensure a more efficient and visible cooperation with the international organizations and countries for reducing the supply and demand of substances that create addiction, it is necessary to build a global system of international cooperation. The international cooperation in the field of narcotic drugs should be based on the effective promotion and promotion of a balanced approach to the drug problem, primarily through the mechanisms of regional cooperation. This implies the involvement of the countries through which the drug routes ("Balkan Route"), finding potential partners, as well as

cooperation with international organizations and institutions from the European Union member states.

International participation provides multilateral, balanced, and integrated opportunities for undertaking various measures and activities through the process of approximation to the European Union. The Republic of Macedonia is trying, through involvement in international activities in the area of drug control and the consequences of drug use, to actively participate in solving these problems and in creating a policy of professional approach in this field. In addition, international co-operation can contribute to a more effective fight against criminal organizations, corruption, money laundering and in general, for controlling and preventing the illicit trade in narcotic drugs and precursors. National and international coordination is an effective way to intensify the process of obtaining the desired results in the fight against drug supply and demand. The importance of coordination is highlighted in the documents of the EU drugs strategy[279].

In order to approach the problem in a multidisciplinary and balanced way, the co-ordination mechanism for reducing voltages and drug demand should be strengthened, which implies facilitating activities at all levels. In other words, the strengthening of coordination should contribute to the fulfillment of the goals set out in the documents and the action plan.

5. MONITORING, INFORMATION EXCHANGE, ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH

The monitoring, reporting, research and analysis system in the field of narcotic drugs is a continuous process. This includes the advancement of information systems for collecting and exchanging data between different entities, defining and evaluating frameworks and standards and research implementation, together with setting a sound financial basis for their execution. The system is based on the following criteria that need to be complementary with each other:

- Strengthening the country's capacity, in cooperation with the EMCDDA[280], in order to ensure quality data collection, analysis and evaluation, as well as comparing activities within the EU - processes that will be used in the treatment of drug-related issues.
- Making efforts for development of systematic, integrated and scientific activities, in favor of rational approach in reducing supply and demand of drugs through effective cooperation in this direction with international agencies and organizations.
- Providing active participation in the EMCDDA and activities in other relevant monitoring EU institutions[281], implementing international conventions and improving legislation, creating an institutional strategy and policy as well as ogrami covering geopolitical aspects of the supply of illicit substances.

[279] The EU drugs strategy (2005-15), http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/combating_drugs/c22569_en.htm

[280] EMCDDA- European Monitoring Center for Drugs and Drug Addiction, Lisbon

[281] UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, ECOSOC Committee on Narcotic Drugs (CND)) The International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), the World Health Organization WHO), International Criminal Police Organization (ICPO), Europol, World Customs Organization (WCO), Pompidou Group

- Implementation of activities aimed at preventing the supply and demand of drugs in accordance with measurable criteria, translating these activities into general complementary data through the so-called. "evaluation studies" at the national and local level and their use in the national information network.
- Implementation of research that will facilitate the establishment and implementation of systems that will strengthen prevention efforts at the international and regional levels, following changes and while providing continuity in the information network.

The adoption of new approaches to work on drug trafficking and its abuseis considered a necessity; the implementation of activities in accordance with scientific forecasts and principles of strategies that are developed in accordance with new approaches in the accumulation and use of knowledge and experience; systematic evaluation of research using realistic and acceptable models and indicators and the strengthening of the national network of scientific institutions, agencies and organizations, experts and other persons working on the problem of illicit drug trafficking and its abuse.

5.1. Developing an information system for monitoring the drug-related conditions

The best answers about the phenomenon-supply and demand of drugs can be obtained through the processing of information based on measurable data. For this purpose, it is necessary to update the informative infrastructure that should be accessible for communication and disposition of the publication instrument.

The practice of collecting and analyzing data related to all aspects of drugs has been present in Macedonia for years. The existing information system for collecting data and analyzing drug-related problems is not uniformed and compatible. The standardized ways of collecting and using data from different areas, although in line with the scope of work of certain entities involved in the system for controlling the abuse of narcotic drugs, is necessary for the purpose of providing quality and objective information for policy creation for drugs, to establish an integrated drug information system at the national level. In order to implement such an information system, it is necessary, in cooperation with all bodies and entities involved in the drug abuse control system, to determine the scope and content of the data and to harmonize the system of data collection with the EU standards. In other words, the introduction of a statistical reporting system, that is, a network for exchange of information between the state administration bodies.

5.2. Information system and automatic data processing

The conclusion of the experts is that there is a lack of electronic systems for recording the wholesale prices, i.e., limit of the database. This situation prevents fast access to information and an effective comparison of data on wholesale drug prices at the national and European levels. In other words, it means that it is necessary to establish a uniformed information system for comparing drug prices from numerous and different sources.

Establishing an Internet system is a strategic commitment of the Ministry of Interior, which requires development of the so-called. "security line" for internal and external connection of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This will ensure efficiency in collecting and storing data. Within the Ministry, this task should be undertaken by a special body (Information Technology Unit, Management, and Services). Then, the revoked data can be made available to the Department for Analytics and Research at the

Ministry of Interior. Within this Sector there should be a unit in charge of "screening" data, with the task of checking and correcting the eventual differences. Such subordinate and recorded data, can be used in investigative procedures for drug-related criminal cases.

The innovative system should be constructed so that it can be easily upgraded whenever it is needed, because the times, the crime and, consequently, the requirements are subject to rapid changes. For the specific case, this means enabling a rapid upgrade of the data collection system for drug prices (wholesale and retail) and, accordingly, to their purity.

Also, this IT system will enable collection of key data for the needs of the prosecution. On the other hand, for internal needs, the system will be adapted for automatic processing of statistical data. Such applications should generally be applicable in all areas for which the Ministry is responsible. The advantage of investing in such an automated data collection system is that it will primarily be useful for law enforcement agencies, health care institutions, international organizations, etc.

6. CONCLUSION

We can conclude that in addition to the activities that have been undertaken so far for the preparation of strategic documents that should be the basis for realization of the activities of legislative, institutional, and educational plan as well as the programs that monitor the situation regarding drug crime, drug trafficking, the supply and demand of drugs, certain parts of the strategic policy of the Ministry of Interior, within the National Drugs Strategy of the Republic of Macedonia, have not yet been fully realized in order to be able to say that the conditions of the national plan have been fulfilled.

The absence of deeper strategic commitments only emphasizes the needs that should go towards the conception and adoption of a consistent and transparent long-term drug policy. This means overcoming the existing situation and exploiting the available potentials in the direction of efficient management. However, the development of a consistent anti-drug policy is in direct connection with the intensification of international co-operation in this field, as well as with the trends in this field in the country in the last decade.

From the analysis of the documents and the reports, as well as from the evaluation procedures and the recommendations of the European Union based on compiled reports and from the information from the international and intergovernmental agencies and associations, it can be concluded that the process of realization of the priorities in the part of the activities being undertaken about the development of a strategy for effective detection and prevention of drug crime, is taking place at a planned pace positively reflecting the establishment of the policy of implication of EU standards in the l segment-condition for the Republic of Macedonia in the European Union.

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THE REFUGEE CRISES ON THE BALKANS – PARADOXES AND EXPERIENCES OF REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA VS. THE CHALLENGES OF NATIONAL STATES

Ivanka D. Vasilevska, Dr.Sc
Ivan Ivanov, M Sci.
University "Ss. Cyril and Methodius", Skopje, Republic of Macedonia
ina.vasilevska@gmail.com

Abstract

The contemporary world, globally, is still facing serious issues from the past. These social issues can be seen through the religious, racial and ethnic intolerance, prejudices, humiliation of the people, but also, the same issues can be recognized through the negation of the historical injustices. Migrations are means for achieving ends without military involvement, while putting pressure on Europe and its ability to solve these issues. This paper will focus on the Macedonian experience of dealing with refuges and illegal migration as two distinct matters. Emphasis will be put on the paradox in the case of Macedonia and the incapacity of the mechanisms of the European Union to sort out the issues of the third millennium, which are not merely refugee crises. The paradox in this paper will be further elaborated through Macedonian's role in protecting Europe as a non-member of the EU, from a territory of a member state of the Union. This study can bring us closer to some clear findings about the omissions and the mistakes that were made in the past, through a more lucid picture of the level of preparedness of the Macedonian state for handling this kind of humanitarian catastrophes.

Key words: *Balkan region, Refugee crises, Republic of Macedonia, Middle East, European values.*

Introduction

Southeast Europe is a transit region, which has been used for centuries as a crossroads from the East to the West and from the North to the South. In various historical stages, different ethnic and religious groups passed through this area. Along their way, some of them left their mark and left, others remained and settled permanently in this region, participating in the creation of the specific Balkan amalgam, out of which the Balkan national states were created during the XIX and the early XX century. Over the past few decades, this region, influenced by the destruction of the bipolar world, with a varying intensity, still remained a geographical determinant - a crossroads for different ethnic groups, which moved across it due to the pressure of the wars in the former Yugoslavia.

At the beginning of the XXI century, this region gained momentum once more, especially after the events in the USA on September 11, 2001, when the world-wide war against international terrorism began.[282] Under the influence of these events, at the

[282]Haj, C. Џозеф, Помладиот, Разбирање на меѓународните конфликти: Вовед во теоријата и историјата, Академски печат, Скопје, 2008. Pg.344.

beginning of the second decade of the XXI century, the Middle East became a huge hotspot once again, where the East and the West clashed. Therefore, the outbreak of the Arabian Spring and the Western world's attempt to create liberal governments on the predominantly Islamic soil, made a huge impact on the citizens of the Middle-East countries. The result of the military clashes, as well as the influence of the radical extremist groups, roused the refugee masses, mainly from Afghanistan and Syria, to seek a new and safer residence, mainly in the West European countries.[283] For these reasons, in 2014 and with a great intensity in 2015, an enormous mass of refugees, displaced persons and asylum seekers came to the European soil. These people, during the spring and summer of 2015, crossed the Greek territory and arrived at the Macedonian boarders.

This situation especially escalated during the summer of 2015, when coming through Greece, Republic of Macedonia was flooded by an enormous number of emigrants, seekers of political asylum and refugees, additionally motivated by the announcement given by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel who stated that they were welcomed in Germany. After this statement, the emigrants headed to Western Europe in increasing numbers.[284] Not everyone agreed with this new situation, as was evident with the disagreement within the European Union. The reasons could be found in the explanations of the protection and securing of the boarders of the countries, the protection of the national interests of the countries transited by the refugee masses, as well as in the fear that the world's image will change, which along with the other side-effects, will be facing a change of demography and a change of the secular concept of the West, with the new, rapidly-growing Islamic order.[285]

The European Union and the challenges of the 21st century

The world that we live in has already changed. Shaped by different ideas, concepts and visions, the world represents a conglomerate of contrasting cultures, values and states of mind. Every epoch brought its own challenges and issues that resulted with ideas, theories, and new visions of how to overcome these challenges.

One of the most significant concepts or ideas of our time is the European Union. However, the European Union represents a complex process which is far from complete. The Union itself is faced with a new reality different from one or maybe two years ago. European societies are caught in a condition full with reluctance. Many questions that were brought with this new reality still remain without any answers or solutions for the wellbeing of the continent. The migrant waves as one of the symptoms of this new world that is emerging in front of our eyes, brought with themselves a burden which now becomes an inseparable part of European reality. The old concepts and paradigm of the European Union seem insufficient and not applicable for solving these issues. On the one side, there are the mechanisms of the states, which are outdated and unpopular, and on the

[283](personal note) "Theywerefurthermotivatedbythe propagandaaboutthe gains and thebenefits,for a betterlifeintheWest."See more in: Lewis, Bernard, The Middle East: A Brief History of the last 2.000 Years, SCRIBNER, New York, 1995. Pg. 357 – 387.

[284]http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-opens-its-gates-berlin-says-all-syrian-asylum-seekers-are-welcome-to-remain-as-britain-is-10470062.html Accessed on 08.04.2017 in 19:42.

[285] http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3234524/Europe-slams-migrant-door-Hungary-Austria-Slovakia-Holland-shut-borders-Germany-imposes-controls-saying-t-cope.html Accessed on 09.04.2017 in 22:50.

other hand, there is the skepticism and fear within the societies of those states. The situation inside the societies is largely the fault of the inability to manage with the diversities, particularities and uniqueness of the groups that disrupt the comfortable nation-state concept of modern European post Westphalian world order.

South Eastern Europe is based on societies that are multiethnic, which is a product of the long epoch of ruling empires in this part of the world. It is important to emphasize that these empires were present in power for centuries, for example, the Macedonian Empire, or Byzantium. The epoch of Byzantium lasted for a millennium, and the Ottoman Empire lasted for five centuries. It is known that the structure of those empires was based on diversity and coexistence. This very structure was indeed a conglomerate of different religious, ethnic, and language groups. For these reasons, the mechanisms that were built by the empires were first of all complex, and what is more important, non - territorial. Today we find this relationship which represents religious - interethnic - language correlation, as a complex one.

We can conclude that the peace in South Eastern Europe was possible only if some imperialistic power was performing the role of an arbitrator between peoples and religions, establishing some sort of intercultural order. For many centuries those were the empires, and especially the Ottoman Empire with the Millet system. Later in the 19th and 20th century, the Austro - Hungary and other European powers were able together with their allies from this area to decide which definitions for people apply on which territory, causing in some ways the wars in this part of the world. Today we witness the inability of the European Union to be the arbitrator in this new reality that is widespread through the entire continent, through all member states, and through all countries that are still not part of this Union.

Contemporary migrant societies handle the social complexity through the concept of multiculturalism. The concept of multiculturalism in Europe, however, is an idea that has been imposed from above or from the mechanisms of the state, and does not come from below, meaning from the tradition for respecting diversities which is generated progressively through coexistence. On that note, it is important to emphasize the distinction between multiethnic and multicultural societies. The first ones crawl out precisely from that tolerance which was constructed step by step for many centuries in the Balkans, and was eroded to a large extent with the nation-state concept. The inability of European countries to face the new challenges brought by the migrant waves today is the product of the insufficient role of the national states to achieve the philosophy of respecting and accepting the diversities, which was the case in the previous epochs when the power of the open space brought peace and understandings, although they were not liberal societies.[286]

The crucial turning point regardless of the future of the European Union will be its ability to adjust to the challenges of the new reality. Otherwise, the core idea of the union will be completely eroded. As the famous quote says: "it is not the strongest of the species

[286]"But it was not a liberal society, for it did not recognize any principle of individual freedom of conscience. Since each religious community was self-governing, there was no external obstacle to basing thisself-government on religious principles, including the enforcement of religious orthodoxy. Hence there was little or no scope for individual dissent within each religious community, and little or no freedom to change one's faith. While the Muslims did not try to suppress the Jews, or vice versa, they did suppress heretics within their own community".
Kymlicka, Will, *Multicultural Citizenship,* Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 157

that survives, nor the most intelligent that survives. It is the one that is most adaptable to change."[287]

In order to face the new reality and the challenges that are strongly shaping the new history of Europe, the Union decided to increase security in favor of freedom. But it should be clear that sometimes the ones who decide to chose security over freedom, or freedom over security, might eventually lose both of them. However, the continuing lack of reforms is showing its flaws. According to some scholars, "Europe is committing suicide. Or at least leaders have decided to commit suicide".[288] We must focus as well on the obvious discrepancy between public opinion and reality. Murray argued that "in response to public concern, governments and mainstream parties of all political stripes talked about controlling immigration – sometimes even getting stuck in a competition to sound tougher than each other on the matter. But as the years went on it began to seem as though this might merely be an electoral trick".[289] Europe is under direct and permanent threat of terrorist attacks. The recent attacks were an obvious indicator that the Union needs a crucial change in its security policies. From the case of the migrant crisis we witnessed reactive decisions instead of active ones. Another indicator is the necessity of integration, regional security cooperation and data exchange in order countries like Macedonia, which are among the most affected, to act actively rather than reactively. The migrant crisis is a "desperate call" for the national states and the members of the Union, as well as the leadership of the Union to finally reform its outdated mechanisms in order to survive the challenges of the new era.

However, the migrant crisis is far from finished. Every day, more than 500 migrants from Afghanistan enter Turkey. Some of them stay in Turkey, and some of them continue towards the other European countries. In Greece there is a capacity for 40.000 migrants financed by the European Union with almost 1.5 million euros. The crisis is a threat that increases the security risks, but also threatens the relations between countries, mostly neighboring ones. Koronakis stated that the migrants that are arriving within the European borders in large numbers in most of the cases are without papers or some other elements of identification, and yet, the European Union accepted all of them. The tragedy of this challenge, he stated, is that the problem of securing the borders of the Union from uncontrolled guests became a problem of the Europeans for internal relocation of those who should not even be in Europe. He gives the answer to this paradox through the accusation addressed to the European leaders, which instead of finding solutions to the problem, are hypocritically trying to transfer it to their neighbors.[290] Macedonia felt this paradox first-hand. Namely, Macedonia was the first country in Europe which declared a state of crisis and deployed its army on the border. This crucial decision enabled a blockade to the illegal migration through the Balkan corridor. Even though Macedonia did not have access to the European data bases for sharing data concerning the migrants and foreign terrorists, and even though Macedonia is not a member state of the Union, its institutions accomplished the crucial challenge for securing the region while taking over the role of a "gate keeper" of the European Union. In 2015, some 300.000 migrants passed through Macedonia, and each month the country spent little over one million euros from its

[287]Supposedly a quote from Darwin's "Origins of Species"
[288]Murray, Douglas, *The Strange Death of Europe – Immigration, Identity, Islam,* Bloomsbury, 2017
[289]Ibid, 25
[290]Koronakis, A., Vasilis, *Evropska Unija, Otuđena Država,* Laguna, 2016.

own budget. The help from the Union is still lacking. What makes this paradox even greater, Greece refused to exchange data and records about the migrants leaving its territory, even though it is a European border. Unfortunately, the lack of data exchange which contains sensitive information is also present within the Union.

Concerning the migration, the European Union made three major omissions. First of all, the Union showed its dysfunctional mechanism for distribution of migrants in the country members with the so called quotas. The second huge omission was the permission of the member states not to register the refugees and the migrants, and the third omission of the European Union was the fact that it allowed one-sided decisions of the member countries. Macedonia was directly affected by these three omissions of the Union and suffered from the powerlessness of its crisis management.

It is more than obvious that the European Union crashes in times of crisis and shows its weakness. During peace and prosperity the Union's engines are functioning with full power and full capacity. In times of crisis, the Union cannot provide decisions and find solutions, mostly because of its outdated mechanisms. The ineffective migrant and security policy escalated into a serious security challenge. The problem lies in the fact that the European Union is lacking common policy regarding the migrant crisis, but also with respect to many other challenges. The future of Europe is full of uncertain alternatives and many challenges that are about to emerge. States must cooperate with each other and understand that we are all part of this world which is first and foremost a world order, rather than international order. The world based on Westphalian values is faced with challenges that are mostly the product of the erosion of the states' sovereignty caused by radical movements, terrorists, and by the international organizations and institutions as well.

Republic of Macedonia and the refugee crisis in 2015

In 2015, the Republic of Macedonia faced yet another refugee crisis. This country had already faced such challenges several times since the gaining of its independence in the 1990s until the present day; therefore, the new refugee crisis represented a test of endurance and of the abilities of the Macedonian government, as well as of its citizens. In both humanitarian and security sense, this refugee crisis revealed all the advantages and weaknesses of the Macedonian country, through which more than 700.000 refugees transited from the Middle East.[291]

Greece represented the line through which nearly all the emigrants coming through Turkey headed to pass through the Republic of Macedonia towards Western Europe. It is interesting to note the fact that nearly 100% of them crossed the sea to the Greek islands. It is also estimated that over 851.000 emigrants traveled through Greece in 2015.[292] Through the islands, the larger part of the refugees immediately continued their way to the Greek-Macedonian border. As a result of this enormous inflow of people which entered Macedonian territory in waves, the Macedonian Government and the Parliament made changes to the Law on Asylum and Temporary Protection in June 2015. Hence, the emigrants could obtain a document which enabled them to legally transit across Macedonia

[291]https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/09/syrias-refugee-crisis-in-numbersAccessed on 03.05.2017

[292] http://www.acaps.org/img/documents/a-160111-acaps_mapaction---an-introduction-to-the-balkan-migrant-crisis.pdf, page. 4.

and to leave the country in 72 hours.[293] However, the growing numbers of refugees and emigrants on the border between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia increased the alarm of security risks which influenced the adoption of the decision of the Macedonian Government to temporarily close the border and to pronounce a crisis situation in August 2015.[294]

It became evident that the refugee crisis had its own accumulation immediately after entering the railway station in Gevgelija, through the Greek border. The statistics confirm that only in the course of one day in the area surrounding Gevgelija there were over 8000 emigrants, which equals one third of the total population of this town. Regarding this security aspect, an emigration center was formed near border stone 59, and this Center accommodated 1500 emigrants for a few hours each day. In September, due to the increasing inflow of refugees, the Macedonian Parliament extended the duration of the proclaimed state of emergency on the northern and southern border until June 2016. This raised the tension on the border, because, as we already stated, the inflow of refugees and emigrants continued to increase, which necessitated an active collaboration between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece, in order to avoid any further complications or worsen the entire situation.

In the summer of 2015, the number of emigrants crossing the state border and entering Macedonia in the course of only one day reached 14.000 refugees. This condition alarmed the state authorities which proclaimed a state of emergency. President Ivanov sent the army forces to help the border police in dealing with the fast-growing number of unregistered and uncontrolled masses of refugees which entered the territory of the Republic of Macedonia. When the Macedonian security forces closed the southern border, there was nearly no reaction from the Greek side. The reason was very simple. The Greek Government was dissolved. The Greek Vice-Minister of Emigration Policy, Tasia Christodoulopoulou, answering a journalist question by the Athens newspaper *To Vima* regarding the government's plan for resolving the humanitarian crisis on the border with the Republic of Macedonia, pointed out : "The Government resigned and it is not informed about the conditions and activities on the terrain."[295]

The Greek Prime-Minister Alexis Tsipras won the early parliamentary elections, which were held on 21 September 2015. His victory was an opportunity for a greater inclusion of the Greek Parliament in the refugee-emigrant crisis. On the other side, the European Union could not stay away from the crisis. Therefore, the leaders of the EU member-states held a meeting in Brussels on 25 October 2015. They adopted an action plan composed of 17 points, in which it was demanded of Greece to cooperate with the Republic of Macedonia, Albania and Turkey.[296] Greece was satisfied with the results of the Summit, but on the occasion, Prime-Minister Tsipras stated that his Government declines

[293]БИЛТЕН: Подобрување на заштитата на правата и услугите на мигрантите и барателите на азил во Република Македонија, Бр. 02 и 03, Март, 2016, Македонско здружение на млади правници. http://myla.org.mk/wpcontent/uploads/2016/09B8-03.pdf

[294]http://www.sobranie.mk/content/%D0%9F%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%BD%20%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B8%D1%82%D1%83%D1%82/Efektite%20na%20migratskata%20kriza%20vo%20zemjite%20na%20JIE%20-%20MK.pdf

[295]http://www.tovima.gr/en/article/?aid=730954

[296]Triandafyllidou, Anna, Turning the Refugee Crisis into an Opportunity? Current Challenges for Greece and Suggestions for Action, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced studies, Issue 2015/12, December, 2015, page. 6.

the idea of the new operation of Frontex on the border crossings in the northern part of Greece. Tsipras claimed that the protection of the borders is an exceptional national interest, pointing out that the involvement of Frontex will be limited to the documentation of the refugees which are still not included in the registration procedure at the islands.[297]

The President of the Republic of Macedonia, Dr. Gjorge Ivanov, before the mini-summit in Brussels dedicated to the refugee crisis, attended by ten EU member-states and the representatives from Macedonia, Serbia and Albania, stated: "If we do not stick together –we will hang separately".[298] Answering a journalist question, he pointed out to the bad collaboration between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia regarding the emigrant crisis, and confirmed that this is the key demand of the Macedonian side in this meeting at the highest level. – "This is the moment when all of us should prove ourselves as neighbors with mutual solidarity and face the challenges together. We expect that Greece will cooperate in regards to this European crisis and will exchange data, because we have days when up to ten thousand refugees come to our territory in Macedonia. The communication with Greece is at a very low level. There is no cooperation between the Ministries or Governments", stated president Ivanov before the Summit.[299]

After the meeting in Brussels, the contacts in the region of Southeast Europe intensified. Slovenia called for a meeting of the Ministries of Internal Affairs, on 16 and 17 November, which was attended by Macedonia, Serbia and Greece. The participants agreed to better the coordination, including the exchange of information about the number of refugees crossing the border.[300]

On 30 November 2015, the President of Republic of Macedonia, Dr. Gjorge Ivanov, had a meeting with the German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Both sides exchanged views regarding the current emigration crisis, the security challenges and the status of the European integration of the Republic of Macedonia. Of course in this sense, one of the most important meetings held on the margins of the Summit for climate changes in Paris, was the meeting of Macedonian President Ivanov with the Greek Prime Minister Tsipras.

President Ivanov and Prime Minister Tsipras discussed on this meeting the problem with the refugees and the emigrants. – "What I asked of the Greek Prime Minister in Brussels and here, is to encourage the institutions to cooperate and exchange information, because this would be in the interest of our countries and people, but also of the region. A great number of foreign fighters from Syria and Iraq now find their way to Europe, as refugees and emigrants, thus endangering the security of Europe", stated the Macedonian President, pointing out that he also discussed with Prime Minister Tsipras building measures of confidence between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece, as well as the need for their proper implementation. – "We have to pay more attention to the implementation of these confidence building measures, whose aim is to encourage better cooperation in the areas which cannot suffer the consequences due to the issue of the Constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia. They include cooperation between the

[297]http://www.tovima.gr/en/article/?aid=748810
[298]http://republika.mk/502455Accessed on12.05.2017, 12:14.
[299]http://www.president.gov.mk/en/media-centre/news/3489.html Accessed on 18.05.2017, at 11:57.
[300]Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the follow-up to the Leaders' Meeting on refugee flows along the Western Balkan route - http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/securing-eu-borders/legal-documents/docs/report_western_balkans_en.pdf

academies and the business communities, as well as the communication between the populations" –President Ivanov stated.[301]

At the Summit in Brussels held on 16 December 2015, President Ivanov stated with respect to the refugees that: "We suffer the consequences of the emigration crisis, without enjoying the benefits from membership in the Union."[302] This concern of the state leadership rose from the fact that the Republic of Macedonia was under the direct impact of the wave of refugees, which was coming from Greece, which continued to send the refugees to the Macedonian border every day without any control.

Despite all the efforts and activities taken by all relevant state authorities, the Republic of Macedonia was left to deal with the refugees on its own, with its own funds and resources. Halting the flow of refugees, at the behest of the EU member-states, was the reason why Macedonia had to channel the refugee wave and build a fence at the border. "Recently we have a new reality. We have a great inflow of falsified documents; we have people with false identities, trying to gain the status of a refugee and these emigrants will use it and exchange it for a refugee status. It is hard to check where these people come from because all they have is a statement and we cannot take biometric data from them" – stated President Ivanov after his meeting with Donald Tusk.[303]

In his international activities, President Ivanov appealed that: "In only one year around 700.000 refugees passed through the Republic of Macedonia, and the country spent over 12 million Euros to deal with the refugees." In his annual address to Macedonian Parliament, he also underlined the need for allocating a higher budget to the Army and the subjects are dealing with the migration crisis, concluding that: "we have to change ourselves and start behaving as if we are in a constant crisis.[304]

By the end of 2015, the cooperation between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia was significantly improved. Communication was established between the Macedonian and the Greek border authorities. Furthermore, contacts were established between the respective Ministries of the two countries.[305] After the adoption of the decision and the signing of the Treaty between the EU and the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, which officially came into force on 20 March 2016, the enormous migration wave was temporarily stopped. This Treaty halted the inflow of refugees from the Middle East for a certain period, but the Treaty also became a serious argument for Turkey regarding the great number of strategic issues, and on the other side, indicated the European disunity regarding the key decisions, along with the future development plans. All of that did not come any closer to ending the Near-East clashes, nor to ending this migration process – in other words, the crisis continues.

[301]http://www.president.gov.mk/en/media-centre/news/3552.html Accessed on 25.05.2017 at 12:48.
[302]http://kanal5.com.mk/vesti_detail.asp?ID=85982Accessed on 25.05.2017 at 09:48.
[303] http://www.mkd.mk/makedonija/politika/migrantite-stanuvaat-begalci-ivanov-vo-brisel-pokazha-falsifikuvani-dokumenti-na Accessed on 15.09.2016 at 10:00.
[304]http://www.alfa.mk/News.aspx?ID=103536#.V9peQYp97IUAccessed on 25.05.2017 in 10:40.
[305] http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2016/01/29/sealing-off-greece-a-second-worst-scenario-says-macedonian-minister/Accessed on 30.05.2017 at 13:43.

Conclusion

On a geopolitical plan, the events in Ukraine, then the clashes in the Middle East, along with the war in Syria, as well as the re-actualization of the Kurdish question, the terrorist attacks in Paris, Ankara, Munich, Istanbul and Nice, significantly reinforced the fear of new terrorist attacks all over the world, and at the same time influenced the enhancement of the Russian foreign policy.[306] This condition of constant tension, in the actual sense of the word, became a real threat by the unknown, especially after the great migration waves during the previous two years, because they were experienced as a kind of an army which slowly conquers the heart of Europe. Faced with the reality of huge global changes, increasing violence, wars and mutual intolerance, placed civilization in front of a new challenge of its self-sustainability and the need for finding new solutions to preserve the values drawn by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the series of internationally ratified documents which guarantee the indivisibility of the rights of every human being.[307]

In that sense, it is also obvious that the universality of the democratic values represented the main effort of the Western concept. The West expects that everyone will be included within this frame. However, in this totality, there is still no way to include certain countries, as is the case with Saudi Arabia, Syria and the other Arabian countries, in which the concept of limited sovereignty is predominant. It is evident that, unlike the democratic concept of liberty and equality of citizens, regardless of which Islamic school or belief we are considering, we cannot predict whether every one of them exceptionally points to the universal and central place of the Islam in the life of the Muslims, because the sources of the Islamic law regulate all religious and worldly questions. Even more importantly, the idea of citizenship as an active subject in the political process is unknown in the Islam and in the Arabic language. Therefore, the difference is complete if we take into consideration that the bigger part of the Islamic world has no practice which would imply the idea of equality of all citizens before the laws, nor their individual political rights, let alone citizenship as the foundation of national sovereignty. From the totality of the differences which are evident, there is also the firm connection in the Islam between the secular and the spiritual authority.[308] Therefore, the Islamic world along with many other worlds, provide an everyday proof that they do not wish for democracy more than what they already have.[309]

The Republic of Macedonia has had its active role in these processes in regards to dealing with the humanitarian disaster it faced, on the one hand, and on the other hand, the country represented a dam which protected the European Union from its own self. All the way through, the country was faced with serious issues regarding the protection of the state's interests and the security of the Macedonian citizens. It became evident that the new conditions which influenced the change of priorities of the state policies in the region of

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306 http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/12/world/middleeast/new-diplomacy-seen-on-us-russian-efforts-to-end-syrian-civil-war.html?_r=0Accessed on 30.05.2017 in 21:34.

307 Al Sayyad, Nezar, Castells, Manuel, Muslim Europe or Euro-Islam, Politics, Culture, and Citizenship in the Age of Globalization, Lexington Books, Boston, 2002. Pg. 91.

308 Кризите на модерниот свет, регионални и глобални предизвици за либералната демократија наспроти религиозниот фундаментализам, Конрад Аденауер Фондација и Институт РесПублика, Скопје. 2014. p. 19.

309 Ручнов, Драго, *Актуелно стање и перспектива демократије*, Архив за правне и друштвененауке, 4, Београд, 2003. pg. 404.

Southeast Europe and beyond, on European soil, encouraged the necessity of urgent handling with the humanitarian and security risks. Looking backwards, all of this not only influenced and tested the elasticity and capability of the Macedonian state authorities, but also confirmed the fact that the Republic of Macedonia proved to be able to deal with such risks, much better than the European Union member-states.

As for the Republic of Macedonia, it is evident that it remains a transit country with a daily capacity of 2000 emigrants. Apart from the pressure from Brussels for opening of refugee camps, Macedonia does not step back from the position that it has the capacity to offer only two transit centers, which at the same time also serve as a checkpoint for registration of the emigrants.

As we already concluded, it is clear that the refugee crisis is not going to stop, nor the problems for dealing with it will disappear overnight. What can be done is, to influence the subjects of the national security system which have to be in constant awareness in order to be able to protect the territorial integrity, the unitary character and the sovereignty of the country, and to secure the coexistence and the property of the citizens, without endangering the integrity of the refugees, seeking opportunities for a brighter future.

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IMPORTANCE OF THE REGIONAL ORGANIZATION IN THE SECURITY OF THE STATES AND THE CASE OF TURKEY IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD

Volkan Tatar, Dr.Sc
İstanbul Arel University, Turkey
e-mail: volkantatar@arel.edu.tr
Inst. Serda Güzel
İstanbul Arel University, Turkey
e-mail: serdaguzel@arel.edu.tr

Abstract

Security is an integral part of the state, and it is also important and necessary for the states apart from the concept of territory, the people, and sovereignty of the states. If there is a problem in the security of the state, it is impossible to talk about full sovereignty of the state. States have different hegemonic powers, different levels of development, and quite different geographical locations. In line with this, with these different features and factors they have different foreign policies for their security. The most significant thing in this issue is the necessity of careful examination of the international political system of the period. The essence of the international political system, which has different characteristics and recognizes different playgrounds to the states, is also guiding and is sometimes even determinative in the foreign policy of a state for security purposes and aims.

Based on these statements, if the measures and collaborations that are introduced at the regional and global level are invested and analyzed, it is a more correct way to define security issues in this context. Turkey established itself in the interwar period, and it is trying to overcome problems which are related to issues beyond the establishment of the state. The great neighbor, the Soviet Union, the powerful and revisionist Italy and Germany, along with the status quo of England and France, all influenced and directed the foreign policy of Turkey. Especially with the influence of the international political system of the period, Turkey followed the regional policy and tried to settle its security with various alliance treaties such as Sadabat Pact (1937) - Balkan Entente (1938). In this present study, the researchers try to explain the international situation and the political system of Turkey in the interwar period, and researchers try to analyze Turkey's alliances with other states. Security measures will also be discussed, especially from the aspect of Turkey's foreign policy.

Key Words*: Turkey, Security, the period between the two World Wars, Foreign Policy, Regional Policy*

INTRODUCTION

At the end of the First World War which resulted in the defeat of Germany and its allies, the borders beyond Europe were devastated. It was the most brutal and disastrous war up to date; it lasted for nearly four years and showed its influence in every aspect of life. Not only armies fought in the war but also the war affected cities and houses which were left into a very difficult situation as to their material state. People died from poverty

and illnesses and these two factors were the destructive effects as much as it was the civil war and the turmoil in the states like the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution. They were other destructive causes of life (Kreis, 2012). At the end of the war, a number of agreements were signed in Europe, and the Treaties of the Alliance states in Versailles, Trianon, and Mondros were some of them. Especially in Europe and around the world, where the economy, urban infrastructure, and social collapse were experienced, countries were in an effort to recover from all these problems. There were radical changes in the international political system, especially in Germany, which was trying to dominate the system which was defeated. Beyond the defeat, the Treaty of Versailles brought about new difficulties in the process of strengthening. The most important industrial regions of Germany were having hard times, and the military power was limited because of a very heavy reparation debt, a type of war compensation which was charged. The repayment debts were well above Germany's payout capacity (BBC, 2010).

The idea of preventing a war of revenge by France under pressure was another important thing. The old power in France was far from Germany. The frontier war with Germany, which had a long history, ended both the economic and military power of France. Britain was one of the most important countries of that time; yet, it was not in the old power, even though it was slightly damaged compared to its victor and its opponents. Britain was spread in the southern Europe and the Middle East in the end, in history. The Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian Empires lost ground by defeating the long-standing war and now the dynasties were no longer in power. A movement with young and new hopes emerged in the territory of the Ottoman Empire which again entered into war to save and establish the state. The 10-year uninterrupted war started in the 1912 as a Balkan War and continued in Anatolia after the First World War.

The uncertainty lasted until 1924 when this situation and place would end with the Treaty of Lausanne (Bilsel, 1998). The Austro-Hungarian Empire was no longer there, and the Habsburg dynasty was also overruled. The war caused it to emerge in a socialist state, and the Romanoffs left the place in the Soviet Union in the power of Lenin and his companions. The USA was the country which profited from the war, and it was the highest profit with the least loss. The long-time non-war status and increasing industrial production were the important positions of the USA.

Another development in the international political system was the establishment of an international organization, which by then had been referred to in the Wilson Principles by the American President Wilson. The League of Nations, which will be a model for the United Nations in the future, was especially supported by two states, the United Kingdom and France.

The fact that colonial governments had the right to be represented was very profitable in Britain and France, and came to an advantage over decisions. It should be noted that the United States did not participate in this policy proposed by its President. Despite the President's willing attitude, the public, which did not want to participate in the possible conflict of Europe, and the congress concerned, remained distant. The Soviet Union and Germany were not initially members of the League of Nations. Germany's war defeat, and the exclusion of the Soviet Union due to its "withdrawn" socialist regime by other states, has left them outside the League. Turkey did not refuse the invitation from the League of Nations, wanting to protect the desire for peace and the status quo and it shows the importance of the integration of Europe.

1. 1920 - 1939 AND FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES

1.1. The period from 1920 to 1924:

This was the most demanding and difficult period in Turkey's history. The defeat of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, then the Mondros Agreement, the occupations, and finally the attack that Greece launched to İzmir to seize all of Anatolia, all brought very difficult days to Turkey.

The most important was the Anatolian movement which started in 1920 outside the Istanbul Government. At the beginning of this movement Mustafa Kemal was one of the legendary commanders of the First World War. The unification of defense organizations in Anatolia and the victory gained against Greece in this respect increased the prestige of Ankara.

A prisoner Sultan in Istanbul and the People's Assembly in the leadership of the former General who fought for the defense of the state in Ankara, were short-lived. With the help of the public support given to the Government of the Republic of Turkey, the War with Greece also resulted in victory. In this period, the security concerns of the state were at the highest level. We see that policies were built on the exploitation and recognition of the contradictions in the states of the entente.

The most important advantage of a new state was the Soviet Union, which was supported by withdrawal from the war with the October 1917 Revolution. Lenin and the ruling proprietors, drawn from the First World War as an imperialist war, were supporting states fighting 'imperialist' states. The army and the armed forces and territories and people put their efforts to defend the state together. Active efforts to survive a war and diplomacy were the most important priority in Turkey during that period.

1.2. 1924 - 1939 Security in Turkish Foreign Policy

1.2.1. International Political System after the Treaty of Lausanne and the Impact of TEP on the Neighboring States

States try to ensure their security by different foreign policy outcomes. These foreign policy outputs are influenced by their attitudes and behavior in the states where the state is intensely connected with the character of the international political system. The attitudes and behaviors of the neighbors are especially influential on the security of the country. Iceland is an island where the state's foreign policy outcomes are directed to defense spending; Turkey is not expected to be the same as Iceland, or more than a land surrounded by states such as Macedonia. Consequently, the priorities should be discussed carefully; that would be the location and the neighboring policy of Turkey after the Treaty of Lausanne. The Treaty of Lausanne is considered to be Turkey's founding treaty because the disputes concerning its borders and sovereignty ended with this Treaty. With these borders, the Republic of Turkey was accepted by the whole world (Bilsel, 1998).

Although there were debates on the southern borders, they were settled soon afterwards in a non-combat manner. It is very important to say which countries were neighboring countries of Turkey in 1924. While Bulgaria and Greece were its western neighbors, Italy was located in 12 islands, France as a colonizer of Syria, and Great Britain as a colonizer of Iraq were at the southern border. Iran and the Soviet Union were the land neighbors in the east.

At this point, the important Turkey had land or sea borders with important countries which were active in the international political system. In particular, the two

most effective states of the League of Nations were its southern neighbors, Britain and France. The Soviet Union, excluded from the system, was the north-east neighbor. Italy was the south-west neighbor of Turkey (Armaoglu, 1998: 172 - 175), which declared a different vision with Benito Mussolini's power and expressed its intimacy with the Balkans. Turkey felt the necessity and the great pressure of the need to build a strong and cautious foreign policy.

We should remembered that in that time in Turkey, the efforts of settling the country's internal political regime were so much present, undergoing a long period of nearly 10 years of constant war, which left a tired and poor generation in Turkey. At this point, the importance of the regional politics and the effort to provide territorial defense with the territorial alliances and good neighborly relations was, to some extent, the result of it. Greek Prime Minister Venizelos is always welcomed very sincerely in Istanbul with the establishment of friendship and cooperation with Greece which is an important point for this context. (Kreis, 2012).

At the same time, it was important to approach the status quo of the 'status quo' countries that emerged at the end of the First World War and to show constant self-esteem, as well as try to take measures against the revisionist states.

It is worth trying with the power balance system when it comes to revisionist nationalization in the Balkans, considering the international political system. This is undoubtedly underlying the effort to establish alliances with the Balkan states and the active powers of the period. The fact that most of the Balkan States suffer from the same troubles made it easier to participate in the cooperation with a similar pace.

2. REGIONAL COOPERATION AND THE STATE SECURITY

2.1. Friendship with the Soviet Union and the Neighborhood Treaty (1925)

It was the convergence of two young states which felt security concerns over the emergence of the two wars. The most important element of the confrontation of the Soviet Union with this concern is its regime and its exclusion. In the Rapallo Treaty, the Soviets asked for Germany's support against the West, which was also an indication of this because the proposal came from the Soviet Union (Armaoglu, 1998:166).

It was much more important for Turkey to comply with the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the political conjuncture in effect at that time. Protecting the friendship ground that was near Moscow in the past four hundred years of war was regarded by the ruling elite. In this way it was also possible to send an implicit message to the governments where the discussions had taken place in those years and the problems could not be resolved yet.

Turkey's rapprochement with the Soviet Union and England, and the effective states in the political system of the period such as France or Italy were also important. Similarly, the effort to strengthen security was also clearly seen in the Soviet Union. For Turkey it was especially important to strengthen its position in the Caucasus. Lithuania positively responded to the offer for neutrality and non-aggression, but Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and France ignored the praise of 'neutrality and non-aggression' in 1926. (Armaoglu, 1998:169)

On September 28, 1926, a similar alliance agreement with Lithuania was signed. In Asia, however, treaties of nonaggression and neutrality were signed in Afghanistan in 1926 and Iran in 1927 (Armaoğlu, 1998:169).

On 17 December 1925 in Paris, the 'friendship and non-aggression pact' was signed (Kreis, 2012) between Turkey and the Soviet Union. This brought the two countries closer to solution of the problems concerning the Western lands, Turkey. The security and the defence of the newly established countries were also helped with regional alliances. It is very important to say that the 'pact' is an assertion that if one of the parties is attacked, the other will be neutral, they will not attack each other', and 'they will not participate in alliances or political agreements directed against each other'. Here we can say that the two countries acted in order to prevent a possible negative alliance. Thus, Turkey's land border with the Caucasus was protected in this context.

2.2. Balkan Entente

The 1930s brought good political circumstances and Turkey became a member of the League of Nations, which also brought to the rapprochement in the Balkans (Kreis, 2012). It is significant that the Entente for cooperation and peace in the Balkans was also important in relation to the Turkish - Greek friendship. The banning of the war as a foreign policy instrument in the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the efforts to protect the unity and status quo, such as the Little Entente, were also influential in the Balkans (Armaoglu, 1998: 337 - 338).

Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Romania signed a pact for peacekeeping in the Balkans, which was very important for the security of the region. By this Pact, the signatory countries strive for cooperation and aggression against attacks which could come either from the Balkans or from outside (Kreis, 2012). There are certain security concerns against external threats in the Balkan countries. This effort to prevent from attacks and ensure security in general, also shifted the power balance to the status quo. The sensitive ethnic and religious structure of the Balkans is very important in the constellation of such alliances. When the division and the destruction brought about by the clash are considered, these outputs made by the states in their foreign policy are also manifested as a mortar effect in domestic policy. Irredentism is another issue on the Balkans for the alliances and cooperation, where it reached the highest proportions and where it is not possible to divide the state borders with ethnic boundaries. This in turn has an effect on ensuring the inner peace needed at that time. Another important issue for Turkey concerning the Balkans is the importance of cooperation with neighboring countries. Turkish entrance into the territory of the Balkans is quite small and it is not considered a natural barrier. This fairly flat terrain around the Evros River includes a structure that can be easily defeated. This is also the reason behind the introduction of the 'Cakmak Lines' for defense of Istanbul, which is analogue to the Maginot Line during the Atatürk Period. The project, which was abandoned for many different reasons and was at a high cost later, is important in terms of pre-calculation of the threats from the Balkans, the region, or from the outside. Precautions must be taken in the cooperation level accordingly.

Figure 1. Cakmak Lines (https://www.haberler.com/cakmak-hatti-ndaki-tarihi-siperler-kaderine-terk-6434312-haberi/, 2014)

As it is seen in the images, they tried to build the defensive line in the area without natural defenses. The Balkan Entente has not achieved the desired success due to the problems between the states of the region and the states outside the region. The Macedonian problem between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia weakened the punching power of the Balkan states as an example to their own problems. The plans of Italy and Germany over the region also caused anxiety and shadowed the success of the pact.

2.3. Sadabad Pact

In the interwar period, the Turkey's neighbors and the possibility of a renewed conflict in the western border and the eastern border brought some risk to this context. Even in the southern and eastern states the enormous oil deposits draw colonialist powers. After the First World War the regime in Turkey endured, but the regional states were at risk of a conflict because of the fact that the independence had not yet been fully realized and that the forces of influence were the petroleum or geopolitical contention. In the sense of ethnic, religious and sectarian problems, the Middle East was similar to the Balkans and the Caucasus. Turkey's long imperial history in the region was also met with sympathy, and impatience, while there was no question of such a situation for Iran.

The long-standing border, the friendship and cooperation between the two leaders of Turkey and Iran in the early years of the Republic, brought them closer together. Also, the threats received from the powerful state of Iran were another reason for Turkish rapprochement. The Italian invasion on Ethiopia and the fact that the area attracts interest due to the presence of oil raised new security concerns for Turkey and the countries in the region. In particular, Iraq gained its independence, and the internal political developments in Afghanistan and Iran were also among the reasons for the rapprochement to the Pact (Palabıyık, 2010: 147 - 179).

Four countries, especially the revisionist countries, which are considered to provide cooperation and non-aggression treaties of foreign policy and security primarily in the region are getting closer with increasing aggressive attitude (Erdal, 2012: 77 - 88).

The Iranian Shah of 'Sadabat' referred to the agreement as the Sadabad Pact, because it was signed in the palace of Sadabad by Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, against the Afghanistan aggression and for good neighborhood relations. (Historical Dictionary of Afghanistan, 2012:375).

TURKEY'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The emergence of some great thinkers, states, and institutions in the combat against great tragedies and conflicts is a situation which often happens in history. The idea of the League of Nations was put forward by the President of the United States during the First World War, for the purpose of prevention of a major conflict from happening by establishing an international organization (Britannica, 2018). After the World War I, the League of Nations was established by the victorious forces of the war on January 10, 1920 (Britannica, 2018). The League of Nations came up with the thought of the need of all mankind at that time, such as 'international co-operation, peace, and compliance with the international law' (Britannica, 2018).

What Turkish Foreign Policy needs then, especially after the Treaty of Lausanne, is to solve the problems peacefully. It was one of the reasons for the approach to the League of Nations, because in the case with the Iraqi boundary it was determined to result in a negative way for Turkey. Mosul and the Soviet worries about the situation of the West of Russia are another reason why Turkey established itself as a long time member. There is also a great dilemma here. While not being a member of the line, like Mosul, the address of the settlement can sometimes be the League of Nations (Ulusan, 2008). For this reason, the organization started negotiations between Turkey and the positive approach by the League of Nations. In the interwar period, at the regional level, the Turkish friendship, non-aggression and cooperation attitude can be considered as a result of the Turkish membership in the League of Nations. As a result, the General Assembly of the League of Nations on May 6 1932, with the support of the proposal of the Spanish representative and the representative of Greece, decided to invite Turkey to the League of Nations. Then, the Turkish Grand National Assembly discussed and adopted the decision. Turkey became a member of the League of Nations on 18 July 1932 (Palabıyık, 2010: 147 - 179). After this date, Turkey participated at the meetings of the League, and reached its security and foreign policy through direct talks with the states in the luxury of negotiations.

CONCLUSION

The Caucasus, the Middle East, and the Balkans, apart from having ethnic, religious, and sectarian distinctions, are also areas of conflict with the states trying to dominate the international political system. While the First World War was fired in Sarajevo, oil constantly fueled conflict over Middle Eastern peoples. The Balkans was the place where the Eastern and the Western Bloc were recently separated by the sharpest lines, and the Warsaw Pact, NATO, the Non-aligned Movement and the Isolating Example states existed in this region at the same time. Turkey increased its security concerns, as it was a country with a large inland sea, a road holding the Black Sea straits, the largest neighbor of the Soviet Union, and in the Britain's imperial history at that time it was on the

path and destination to Italy. In addition to increasing its own power and capacity for solution, Turkey tried to ensure the state security through regional alliances and cooperation. The Balkan Entente, the Sadabad Pact, the signing of the Friendship, Neutrality, and Cooperation Treaty with the Soviet Union were examples of this. In addition, the membership in the League of Nations in the global image debate meant accepting the security, cooperation, and the rule of law in the societal sphere. This implies, in a sense, cooperation with the strong states to reduce security concerns and to contribute for peace and cooperation in the region, generally integrated with the international political system. The Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East were always at a risk of conflicts. With the thought that such conflicts would harm the countries if not included, these three regions were secured by treaties and such assurances were given to the states. The success of this policy until the Second World War can be seen if we take into account the short years of peace in that period.

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ANALYSIS OF THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES IN THE US WHEN THEY SPY ON US CITIZENS (MECHANISMS, BODIES AND PROCEDURES), A MODEL TO BE FOLLOWED BY THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA?

Zoran Todorov, Msc
Ph.D Student at the Faculty for Security, Skopje,
zoran_todorov2003@yahoo.com

Abstract

The main subject of my research is intended to focus on the Civil and Democratic control over the security system. The paper will concentrate on analyses of the phenomena of accountability of the intelligence agencies, using the U.S. example. Mechanisms, bodies and procedures will be presented, highlighted and described appropriately. The research will focus more specifically on the question whether this model could be followed by other democracies, and more generally, which tools, procedures and methods could be explored in that sense. The whole issue will be treated from the perspective of the Euro - Atlantic integration ambitions of the Republic of Macedonia. The sensitivity of this issue in the context of regional and international security will be addressed as well.

First and foremost, I will precisely define the problem in its entirety and complexity. Different methods and methodology of research, already applied in modern theory and practice will be pursued, among which the case study will prevail. Numerous quotations and data will be included in the work. The sources used in the research will be listed and presented in the Bibliography as an integral part of the paper.

Part I will describe the basics of the problem. Macedonia has been independent since 1991, but there is substantial evidence that many aspects of the work of its secret intelligence agencies have not changed since the communist era. These secret intelligence agencies undermine democratic governance and civil society because.... One important question is how to make these agencies more accountable to the elected officials and the public.

Part II will focus on the strategies that the U.S. has employed to increase the accountability of its intelligence agencies.

Part III will consider the extent to which these American strategies might be successfully employed in Macedonia. What would be the benefits of employing these American strategies? What would be the disadvantages? How realistic would it be to attempt to import these American strategies into Macedonia - i.e. what would have to change to make that possible?

Key words: Security system, Macedonia, reforms, democratic control, Euro-atlantic integrations, International security.

1. INTRODUCTION

Confirming the statehood and sovereignty of the Republic of Macedonia, the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia expressed their own will and gave their

vote for the Republic of Macedonia to be constituted as a sovereign and independent country at the referendum held on
September 8, 1991 and this was constitutionally and legally concluded by adopting the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia on November 17, 1991.
According to the Constitution, the social economic and political system of the Republic is based on the principle of rule of law, human rights and freedoms, separation of powers, market economy and other fundamental values of the modern democratic society.

For the purposes of this analysis, the principle of the separation of powers in Macedonia, introduced for the first time in its history with this Constitution, could practically be explained as a struggle to "guarantee the equal status of the holders of all three powers, including their bodies in the unique system of the state power." Such definition is closest to the concept of separation of powers initially promoted by the Swiss philosopher and scientist Montesquieu as early as in the 15th century. The first two modern (written) constitutions in the World were based (or inspired, rather) exactly by this concept: the US Constitution of 1787 and the Constitution of the French Republic from 1791, adopted after the Great Revolution in 1789.

The basic determinative idea of the concept of separation of powers was to introduce a system of power which would establish a *mutual control* and interdependence of all three powers. In fact, the whole concept was established and introduced in order to limit the absolute power of the sovereign, in that time the unique holder of the executive power (in different countries called with different names - Royal, King, Emperor, President etc.). The first, dominant control was introduced by the representative bodies - Parliaments. In some systems (primarily the U.K. system), other holders of executive power took that task - the Government. In many systems, however, certain, hence, significant, role was given to the judiciary, and its institutions. One can never speak about accountability and control without taking into account the role of the "readers of the Constitution", in different countries different institutions who, diversely, belong or do not belong to the judiciary: the Constitutional courts.

The Constitution of France, for instance, establishes the Constitutional Court (Conseil
D'Etat) as a separate body, independent from the judiciary. On the other hand, the Constitutional Court of Germany (and some other European countries, Austria, Italy, Spain) considers the Constitutional Court as part (and the top institution) of the judicial power.
So, the system of control and interdependence of powers was and remains a very delicate issue, especially in the context of the process of control and accountability of each of the powers. The system of separation of powers is today adopted in probably most of the countries of the World.

Where is the place of the secret intelligence agencies in the wider system of separation of powers? Depending on the definition and the structure, they are, most often, attached to the executive power. Consequently, first and foremost, they are responsible and accountable to the bodies or holders of power (secret intelligence agencies in Montesquieu's sense) and secondly, to some other bodies or holders of power. The goal of this paper is to address, to the extent possible, exactly the second part of this control, or more specifically, accountability.

By illustrating one, in my view, successful model of control over the work of the secret intelligence agencies, which the US certainly is, I will try to offer an answer to the crucial question which the democracies in most of the transitional countries of Central and Eastern Europe faced or are facing: how can the democratic control of the work of those agencies which are at the same time competent, legal and legitimate, foster the democratic development of these societies and eliminate the practices of (still existing) control of different areas of life pursued (in most cases completely legally, from the formal point of view) by those agencies.

2. DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM

As stated before, Macedonia has been independent since 1991, but there is substantial evidence that many aspects of the work of its secret intelligence agencies have not changed since the communist era.

First and foremost, in spite of the adoption of a very precise and express provisions of the Constitution in 1991.....

Article 17

The freedom and confidentiality of correspondence and other forms of communication is guaranteed. Only a court decision may authorize non-application of the principle of inviolability of the confidentiality of correspondence and other forms of communication, in cases where it is indispensable to a criminal investigation or required in the interests of the defence of the Republic.

Article 18

The security and confidentiality of personal information are guaranteed. Citizens are guaranteed protection from any violation of their personal integrity deriving from the registration of personal information through data processing.

AMENDMENT XIX *to the Constitution from 1991, adopted in December 2005, reads*

1. The freedom and inviolability of correspondence and other forms of communication is guaranteed. Only a court decision may, under conditions and in procedure prescribed by law, authorize non-application of the principle of inviolability of correspondence and other forms of communication, in cases where it is indispensable to preventing or revealing criminal acts, to a criminal investigation or where required in the interests of security and defence of the Republic.

2. This amendment replaces Article 17 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia.)

Several cases were published in Macedonian media/public, showing even the transcripts of the tapped telephone conversations made by different bodies. Even though it was never officially confirmed, there is an evident practice of direct violation of the constitutional principles for "inviolability of correspondence and other forms of communication" by parts of the Ministry of Interior and two other specialized secret agencies whose directors are appointed: 1. Directorate for Security and Intelligence and - by the Government of Macedonia and 2. Agency for Counter-intelligence, by the President of the Republic. The practices indicated that in some cases the equipment of those agencies was used for political purposes, namely, to gain information for the

purposes of organizing election campaign, to obtain private information about the political opponents, which could be later used for their political elimination.
The "procedure" of ordering such actions which would "skip" the clear obligation that "Only a court decision may, under conditions and in a procedure prescribed by law, authorize non-application of the principle of inviolability of correspondence and other forms of communication, in cases where it is indispensable to preventing or revealing criminal acts, to a criminal investigation or where required in the interests of security and defence of the Republic", and upon the order of the Minister of Interior, which is a practice inherited from the previous system of establishing "special measures" against some citizens. This document (the Order) is certainly not public, and its legal bases are By-Laws adopted in the previous system which do not allow appeal or any kind of revision of its legality, and on the other hand it was:

1. Never published in any publicly provided Official Gazette, and,
2. Is not being challenged before the Constitutional Court, whether it is in compliance with the existing constitutional provisions.

But, even though this was just one example of misuse of the Secret Services and their competences foreseen by Laws, there are so many practices of their involvement in the media (there are even claims that there are media that exclusively publish materials whose sources are in fact the secret services) shaping, thus, the public opinion in the direction they want, getting involved in procedures of appointment and even electing their supporters for some top positions. Hence, the purpose of this paper is to present, at least, theoretically, a possible way of establishment of democratic control over such and similar practices, which would lead to an establishment of real and effective governance by the representatives elected in democratic manner and of course, accountable to the public.

The existing possibilities in the Macedonian legal system which would enable democratic and efficient control over the work of the secret intelligence services are rather poor:

1. Probably the most credible entity is the Parliamentary Committee for Supervising the Work of the Security and Counter-Intelligence Directorate and the Intelligence Agency. This Parliamentary body has a Chairperson, eight members and their deputies.

The Committee considers issues concerning:

- the respect of the freedoms and rights of the citizens, companies and other legal entities, stipulated by the Constitution and the Law, by the Security and Counter - Intelligence Directorate and the Intelligence Agency;
- the respect of the Law in exercising the authority of the Security and Counter - Intelligence Directorate and the Intelligence Agency in terms of encroaching on privacy, unauthorized activities, abuse and other adverse trends in their work, contrary to their rights stipulated by law;
- the methods and means used by the Security and Counter - Intelligence Directorate and the Intelligence Agency in terms of respecting the Law and respecting civil rights and the rights of other subjects;
- the financial, personnel and technical facilities of the Security and Counter - Intelligence Directorate and the Intelligence Agency; and

- other questions regarding the Security and Counter - Intelligence Directorate and the Intelligence Agency.[310]

2. Considered through the prism of relationships of different holders of power in the organization of the state government[311], the Constitutional Court, in accordance with its constitutional status, does not belong to the system of separation of powers, but is a special constitutional body with a status, composition, organization and competences properly defined within the Constitution itself. Organizationally and functionally, it does not stem from the legislative organ, nor is it accountable to. The protection of the constitutionality and legality does not represent any exercise of state power and is an autonomous and independent function; therefore, its exercising is beyond any form of established relationships between the legislative and executive power. In accordance with this, the Constitutional Court is one of the factors for implementation of the Constitution and thus it maintains the relationships defined by the Constitution as an organization of power. This organ, as all the other constitutional bodies, is an institution of the Constitution whose base and boundaries of its functions are solely taken from the Constitution and are in function of its implementation. This position of the Constitutional Court guarantees at the same time that the conditions for exercising the constitutional/judicial function are already protected from alternation by the current holders of political power in terms of the adjustment of this function to the present political needs and interests. By virtue of their constitutional definition, the comparative durability of these conditions is guaranteed within the durability of the Constitution as the supreme act in the country. The constitutional status of the Constitutional Court enables the court to distance itself from any political authority while performing its constitutional/judicial function, especially from the political authority presently in power, and continually and persistently perform the duty in its jurisdiction independently of the changes of the holders of power. Regardless of the intensity and scope of performance of its functions, the Constitutional Court is constantly active in guaranteeing the protection of the constitutionality and legality. Thus, this organ becomes a guarantee for enabling the rule of law and is a real societal factor in implementing the Constitution and eliminating the arbitrary and free interpretation, execution and implementation of the Constitution and the laws. In the period of transition, the Constitutional Court did not allow, or in other words, avoided the danger of assuming elements of the executive body of the operative everyday politics or becoming a subordinate organ of the legislative and executive power.

The Constitutional Court does not make a law and *does not determine what law is, but states what is unlawful.*[312] It does not stipulate original norms, but examines, evaluates and finally decides upon whether the given norms and the established relationships are in accordance with the Constitution and the laws.

[310] www.sobranie.mk The official web-site of the Macedonian Parliament, document of the establishment of a working body

[311] www.ustavensud.gov.mk Rules of Procedure of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Macedonia

[312] Ibidem, the same page

Constitutional Court decisions are a consequence of a violation of the Constitution or the law and consequently have an interventional character. The essence of this function is the essence of the constitutionality and legality and the rule of law, implying that there is no higher constitution than the Constitution and there is no higher law than the law; no one has more power than the one delegated by the Constitution and the laws, no one should tolerate violence upon one's personality; every person has the right to exercise the widely accepted and recognized freedoms and rights; no one has the right to abuse those freedoms and rights, and every person is obliged to discharge one's duties and responsibilities[313].

According to the Constitution, the Constitutional Court *shall annul or repeal* a law if it is not in conformity with the Constitution, or it shall annul or repeal other regulations that are not in conformity with the Constitution or law. The Constitutional Court decisions are final and executive. With these constitutional provisions, the principle of the constitutionality and legality, as well as the obligation to respect the Constitution and laws, is consistently performed.

Undoubtedly, the Constitution entrusts supreme authority to the Court decisions and is binding

for all legal subjects they refer to and no legal means are permitted against them.[314]

The decisions on the protection of freedoms and rights violated by an individual act or action determine whether there is violation of the freedoms and rights and, dependent on this, the Court shall either annul the individual act that forbids the action, or deny the request. The effect of the decision is *inter partes.* In the decision, the Court shall determine the manner in which the consequences will be eliminated from the performance of individual acts (including the acts of the governmental bodies).

2.1. Guarantees of the basic freedoms and rights which are introduced with the Constitution of Macedonia

Article 50

Every citizen may invoke the protection of freedoms and rights determined by the Constitution before the regular courts, as well as before the Constitutional Court of Macedonia, through a procedure based upon the principles of priority and urgency.

Judicial protection of the legality of individual acts of state administration, as well as of other institutions carrying out public mandates, is guaranteed.

A citizen has the right to be informed on human rights and basic freedoms, as well as to contribute actively, individually or jointly with others, to their promotion and protection.

Article 51

In the Republic of Macedonia laws shall be in accordance with the Constitution and all other regulations in accordance with the Constitution and the law.

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[313] Ibidem, end of quotation

[314] Article 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia

Everyone is obliged to respect the Constitution and the laws.

Article 52

Laws and other regulations are published before they come into force.

Laws and other regulations are published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Macedonia seven days after the day of their adoption at the latest.

Laws come into force on the eighth day after the day of their publication at the earliest, or on the day of publication in exceptional cases determined by the Assembly.

Laws and other regulations may not have a retroactive effect, except in cases when this is more favourable for the citizens.

Office of the Ombudsman (Public Defender)

However, for any of these possibilities in the past 27 years of Macedonia's independence there has been no distinguishable practice of filed complaints or registered procedures for investigating the cases of breach of the constitutional and legal provisions guaranteed to the citizens of the Republic of Macedonia.

1. If we speak about the practice of the Parliamentary Committee for Supervising the Work of the Security and Counter-intelligence Directorate and the Intelligence Agency, in fact, we could hardly speak of *any existing practice.* This body, being a highly politicized one, has held only 3-4 sessions in the past 11 years, proving thus its political character and refraining from adopting any substantive decisions, let alone exercising any control or assessing the accountability of the two secret agencies which are, truth be told, within the scope of competence of this body - according to the quotation laid down in the document for establishment of this Committee.

2. Secondly, the Constitutional Court (in its constitutionality/legality segment of work) could practically be the most competent body to challenge the legality of the acts, both individual and those of relevant state bodies (including their by-laws), and suspend or annul the existence of anti-constitutional and illegal acts and practices. However, in the past 27 years the Court, hiding itself behind the (rather procedural) precondition that it does not initiate procedures *ex officio,* but rather upon request of individuals or competent bodies, has played the role of protector of the Government and (most often) the ruling party, rather than of corrector of (in its nature) illegal and un-constitutional practices.

3. As to the role of regular courts, we could hardly note any practices of submission of requests for protection of the constitutionally recognized rights. As an isolated example, I should certainly present the example of more than 30 journalists, who filed a civil case, before a Court of First Instance in Skopje in March 2001, claiming the right for material damage caused with the publication of their names and their communication (telephone) in the media by one opposition party, claiming that the source of these materials was the Government. However, even after more than seven years, there is no even first instance decision of the Court in this case or any substantial outcome of this request. The conclusion seems self-evident: this legal possibility for protection of individually violated rights in Macedonia is simply still not explored enough for different

reasons, among which the independence of the judiciary is probably the most significant one. However, it is probably a question for another research.

4. The Office of the Ombudsman established in 1997 was probably the most active and persistent in its endeavours concerning the legality of the work of the Secret Intelligence Agencies in the past years. However, the lack of any kind of direct competence *vis a vis* the work of the agencies and certainly the limited scope of its decisions that can only have advisory character, or structure of an appeal, have determined the extremely weak, symbolic and obscure nature of its role in the entire process.

3. STRATEGIES THAT THE U.S. HAS EMPLOYED TO INCREASE THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF ITS INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

The US system in the past seventy years has developed a remarkable amount of experience with cases of accountability and pursuing a sort of control on the work (and not just work) of the intelligence agencies. The experience with those kinds of issues was developing with years and years and is a consequence of a compilation of both historic and political experiences and other circumstances characteristic for this period of time. The pioneer event and (from today's perspective) model case which determined the latter events, and in enormous extend - development of the legal framework which covers this area is The Final Report of the Select Committee of the US Senate established to study governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities, adopted on April 26th, 1976.

"The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities has conducted a fifteen-month long inquiry, the first major inquiry into intelligence since World War II. The inquiry arose out of allegations of substantial, even massive wrong doing within the "national intelligence" system. This final report provides a history of the evolution of intelligence, an evaluation of the intelligence system of the United States, a critique of its problems, recommendations for legislative action and recommendations to the executive branch. The Committee believes that its recommendations will provide a sound framework for conducting the vital intelligence activities of the United States in a manner which meets the nation's intelligence requirements and protects the liberties of American citizens and the freedoms which our Constitution guarantees."[315]

The Senate's Committee continues with its Introduction to the Report in which the background information for a crucial importance of this paper is laid dawn: "The shortcomings of the intelligence system, the adverse effects of secrecy, and the failure of congressional oversight to assure adequate accountability for executive branch decisions concerning intelligence activities were major subjects of the Committee's inquiry. Equally important to the obligation to investigate allegations of abuse was the duty to review systematically the intelligence community's overall activities since 1945, and to evaluate its present structure and performance. An extensive national intelligence system has been a vital part of the United States government since 1941. Intelligence information has had an important influence on the direction

[315] Final Report of the Select Committee of the US Senate established to study governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities, adopted on April 26th, 1976

and development of American foreign policy and has been essential to the maintenance of our national security. The Committee is convinced that the United States requires an intelligence system which will provide policy-makers with accurate intelligence and analysis. We must have an early warning system to monitor potential military threats by countries hostile to United States interests. We need a strong intelligence system to verify that treaties concerning arms limitation are being honoured. Information derived from the intelligence agencies is a necessary ingredient in making national defence and foreign policy decisions. Such information is also necessary in countering the efforts of hostile intelligence services, and in halting terrorists, international drug traffickers and other international criminal activities. Within this country certain carefully controlled intelligence activities are essential for effective law enforcement."[316]

The Committee concludes: "The system's value to the country has been proven and it will be needed for the foreseeable future. But a major conclusion of this inquiry is that congressional oversight is necessary to assure that in the future our intelligence community functions effectively, within the framework of Constitution."[317]

The previous two quotations are outstandingly precise and close answer to the questions which usually occur or are usually posed by the representatives of the holders of the executive power or the intelligence agencies themselves.

We should certainly not "fall into the trap" which could happen if we simply copy the above elaborated practice or use a more general term strategy. However, the elaborated example clearly shows that even in such a developed (in democratic sense) country as the US has proven to be, the question of control is not easy to raise. On the other hand, the above example proves that such control is possible and even desirable, at some point. Parliamentary committee is necessary, as, though still politicized, this body conducts the study, and ultimately, it is *the body* which makes the recommendations and is authorized (according to Senate's Resolution 21, adopted on January 27,1975) to "conduct an investigation and study of governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities and of the extent, if any, to which illegal, improper, or unethical activities were engaged in by any agency of the Federal Government". The mandate of this Committee is very clear and precisely laid down in the Resolution[318], and on this occasion **I** am not going to quote it, but **I** must admit that the most impressive authorization is foreseen in point (13) of the Resolution: "whether any of the existing laws of the United States are inadequate, either in their provisions or manner of enforcement, to safeguard the rights of American citizens, to improve executive and legislative control of intelligence and related activities and to resolve uncertainties as to the authority of United States intelligence and related agencies."

[316] Ibidem, the same title, pages 2 and 3
[317] Ibidem, end of quotation
[318] Resolution of the US Senate Number 21, adopted on January 27,1975

It is, however, important to stress, that in addressing the mandated areas of inquiry, the Committee, according to its Report, has focused on three broad questions:[319]

1. Whether intelligence activities have functioned in accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the United States.

Whether the structure, programs, past history, and present policies of the American intelligence system have served the national interests in a manner consistent with declared national policies and purposes.

Whether the processes through which the intelligence agencies have been directed and controlled have been adequate to assure conformity with policy and the Law."

It seems that these three (we could freely call them) principles or prerequisites of any system of accountability or control are applicable to any country in the World, because of their general nature and substance.

SUMMARY OF THE US EXPERIENCE

After the presentation of this (in its nature, parliamentary) mechanism, which provides

a clear procedure of investigation, applicable, hypothetically, as concluded above, to any parliamentary democracy an inevitable question occurs: Who, and under which circumstances is in charge for implementation of the recommendations and (not less important task) consideration of the findings, sub-findings and other parts of the Study and the Report as a whole?

In the above elaborated model-example, the answer is already given, and foreseen with the mandate, laid down in the quoted Resolution: the whole Report was addressed to the executive branch (meaning the Government), and it is to their representatives and departments to abide by the recommendations.

However, one might, at this point, notice that the legal nature of recommendations does not give a guarantee for the imperative character of this form of a decision.

Actually, this conclusion might link us with a second form of legal control or oversight over the work of the Intelligence agencies - the regular judiciary control of the legality of the acts and conduct of the holders of these competencies. That brings us to another branch of the separation of powers and we come back to the principle of Montesquieu and its ideal: *to have (achieve) mutual control (and balance) among all three powers.*

The examples of judicial control over the legality of work of the intelligence agencies are numerous. In fact, this form of review is much older than the previous, in detail and with a thoroughly elaborated mechanism (or procedure). The advantage of this form of control is that it clearly establishes the legality, in some cases constitutionality of certain acts or behaviour of those bodies. The advantage of this form is the precedent character of the court's decisions. However, as a disadvantage, without any intention to involve into a comparison between those two forms of control, I would stress out the limited

[319] Final Report of the Select Committee of the US Senate established to study governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities, adopted on April 26th, 1976, pages 3 and 4

scope of the court decisions, meaning - they are limited with the existing laws.[320] On the other hand, the parliamentary bodies can even propose and encourage review of certain laws and propose adoption of new laws which makes their role more creative and, finally, more efficient.

In conclusion of this paper, 1 would just like to remind of the crucial importance of existence of critical, well educated and correctly informed public, and when I say public I mean both - General and Expert's public. It is sometimes of crucial importance to be able to make political or public pressure through the system of free media in order to raise awareness and necessity to pursue certain reforms, changes and introduce a system of control and review of some procedures, in order to accomplish the common goal of every democratic system of governance: full legality of all the acts of government and conformity with the existing constitutional norms and in democratic procedure adopted legal standards. However, this topic could be used as a base for another, even wider research and analysis, involving some other areas of our everyday life.

CONCLUSION

(or, **How can this USA strategy be implemented in Macedonia ?)**

In the above text, in the part that elaborated the US practice and the strategies, three areas of action were identified: Parliament, Judiciary and Media.
If the initial and, at the same time, main goal of this text was to, in a certain manner, "copy" the US example into Macedonian practice, in my opinion, the US strategy should be implemented in the Republic of Macedonia in the following order:

Firstly, on the political level, the Parliament of Macedonia should adopt a comprehensive Strategy, which would seize the existing momentum, almost three years after the release of the Priebe Report (June 2015), and similarly to the US example, identify and underline the necessity of deep reforms in the security sector, I quote the part of the report of the Senate Committee:
"*an evaluation of the intelligence system of the United States, a critique of its problems, recommendations for legislative action and recommendations to the executive branch".*

The Macedonian Parliament should similarly to the US Senate, *make recommendations of obligatory character to the Government* for immediate legislative action, i.e. propose a Law on a review of the competencies of the existing Agencies which would indicate the existing provisions of separate character of the security agencies in Macedonia. The recommendation should establish legal grounds to transfer the existing competencies of the secret intelligence agencies to the legal bodies, which are part of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia (for instance, the Public Prosecutor's Office, the Supreme Court or the Constitutional Court). Moreover, the thorough analysis of the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia might, in my opinion, prove/show that the formation and very existence of the secret intelligence agencies in Macedonia is not based on specific constitutional provisions and that they are actually not a

[320] This conclusion applies to the final goal of any initiated judicial procedure – which is necessarily adopting or reaching court's decision based on existing laws and, in some cases, other sources of law

constitutional category! The only body which can give authentic reading and explanation of certain constitutional provisions is the Macedonian Parliament.
Secondly, the other field of action, similarly to the US experience, should be the area of protection of individual rights of the citizens:

"... to safeguard the rights of American citizens, to improve executive and legislative control of intelligence and related activities and to resolve uncertainties as to the authority of United States intelligence and related agencies."

In the Macedonian legal system, the protection of the individual rights of its citizens is under the competence of the Courts of Justice (Basic, Appellate and Supreme) and a procedure for alleged breach of a particular constitutional right may be initiated before the Constitutional Court.

However, one may certainly object the different nature/character of the system of protection of individual/human rights, foreseen in the American legal system and the Macedonian one. Especially bearing in mind that the US System is part of the Common Law; on the other hand, the Macedonian system is part of the so-called Continental Law. But, in my view, both systems provide similar frameworks for protection of individual rights. And the name of this possibility is – Individual complaint. According to Macedonian laws, each individual could initiate a procedure before the regular court and, consequently, before the Constitutional Court, if an individual right is violated. This legal possibility of protection of the right to privacy, i.e when an individual suspects that his or her personality is the object of interest by the intelligence agencies (by telephone tapping, other forms of surveillance, searches, seizures and similar forms of intrusion), undoubtedly does exist (in Macedonia, as well). In this case, the defendant/accused side in the initiated procedure is the Macedonian Government.
The Courts would, accordingly, play the role of the "third power" and correct/control the acts of the executive power.

The precondition of the elaborated legal possibility is the constitutional obligation for independence of the judicial power and application of the main constitutional principle of the rule of law.

Thirdly, the corrective character of the free press/media should not be underestimated. Free media can play the role of "voice of the public", as it literally happened in the US example: the media were the first place where the inappropriate behaviour of certain agencies and individuals were published. The findings and deliberations of journalists represented the initial triggers for an action by the other stateholders of power in the US. The critical role of the free media was just a tool to raise certain questions, establish some facts and a framework of awareness raising of the public for certain wrong doings.
A similar situation happened in Macedonia in 2015. So, the parallel with the US experience could be drawn in these fields as well.

Finally, what would be the benefit of implementing these (above elaborated) practices in the Republic of Macedonia?
In my opinion, already presented above is self – explanatory: the implementation of these practices would give significant contribution to the process of ongoing reforms in the country, make the (state), institutions more accountable to the independent bodies and what is most important - to the public. The final goal of

these reforms is building a real democratic society based on the principles of accountability, freedom of expression and rule of law.
Those principles are cornerstones of the EU and NATO and the necessary preconditions to be fulfilled in order to integrate the Republic of Macedonia into those two structures – exclusive clubs of democracies and alliances of the free world.

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