

The Jewel on a Frozen Lake: Kierkegaard on the Meaning of Action

Jasna Koteska

1. The Parable

On 30 March 1846 Kierkegaard published a book *Two Ages, A Literary Review*, his first book under second authorship (1846-1855), a period marked by rich literary production. The question about the meaning of action was not his prime interest during these years, but it was closely related to his main concern regarding the religious salvation. *Two Ages* tried to address the present situation, the responsibility regarding the “divine message”, the question of suffering, the pseudo-Christianity and above all what does the concept of selfhood mean. The question of selfhood was of the highest importance to Kierkegaard, and it was further developed in his book *Sickness unto Death* (1849), in which, he offered a highly abstract definition of selfhood, writing that self is “a relation that relates itself to itself or is the relations’ relation relating itself to itself in the relation”. Although abstract, for Kierkegaard the definition meant few basic things: a self is a *task*, a self is *not given*, a self includes *responsibility*, and the only medicine against despair of the selfhood is faith. The *Two Ages* was written as a prelude, as the explanation why the present age obstructs the self from achieving these goals.

The Jewel on Thin Ice parable reads as follows:

If the jewel which everyone desires to possess lay far out on a frozen lake where the ice was very thin, watched over by the danger of death, while, closer in, the ice was perfectly safe, then in a passionate age the crowds would applaud the courage of the man who ventured out, they would tremble for him and with him in the danger of his decisive action, they would grieve over him if he were drowned, they would make a god of him if he secured the prize. But in an age without passion, in a reflective age, it would be otherwise. People would think each other clever in agreeing that it was unreasonable and not even worthwhile to venture so far out. And in this way they would transform daring and enthusiasm into a feat of skill, so as to do something, for after all ‘something must be done’. The crowds would go out to watch from a safe place, and with the eyes of connoisseurs appraise the accomplished skater who skate almost to the very edge (i.e. as far as the thin ice was still safe and the danger had not yet begun) and then turn back. The most accomplished skater would manage to go out to the furthestmost point and then perform a still more dangerous-looking run, so as to make the spectators hold their breath and say: ‘Ye Gods! How mad; he is risking his life.’¹

The main idea with this parable for Kierkegaard was to explain the difference between an engaged, passionate age, and the objective spectatorship of modernity. His explanation was simple, if the age is revolutionary, the community celebrates the courage of a person who sacrifices his life for the common goal. And vice versa, if the age is reflective, people consider the hero’s action as unreasonable and meaningless, they ridicule his courage and strength, and they reduce the hero’s

sacrifice to a simple display of skills. The passion mobilizes the spirit; enflaming the passion will bring hopes in the possibility of a new form of spiritualized political collective. But for Kierkegaard, the passion is inevitably obstructed by the features of modernity.

Already Hegel voiced his melancholy about the lack of passion in today's world, but there is an important difference between the two thinkers. Not only because Hegel's main concerns were the nature of society, institutions and reality, and Kierkegaard was preoccupied with the destiny of the single individual; the difference was more fundamental. In his book *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* (1820), Hegel wrote:

In a completely organized state, it is only a question of the culminating point of formal decision and [institution is] a natural bulwark against passion [...] the monarch has only to say "yes" and dot the "i".²

For Hegel the institutions are the defensive wall against the passion, but at the same time he confirmed that there exists a need of people to periodically busy themselves with eager discussions about the polis just as Greeks did. He feared that concept of the polis will otherwise easily become innocuous, sentimental, equalizing and leveling. The same qualities of modernity worried Kierkegaard as well, but the difference between the two thinkers was that for Kierkegaard precisely these passionate debates were part of the problem, and not part of the solution. Here is why.

2.

The Present Age: Reflection and Reflex, Voice and Gaze

The features of modernity which bring decay of the civilization are listed in the third part of the book titled *The Present Age*, and they are: sensibility, endless reflections, the lack of passion, superficiality, short-lived enthusiasm, laziness;³ conformity; also lack in the erotic, domesticity, piety and vitality; also the publicity, media and newspapers serve to assimilate people into numbers and dumb the public (Kierkegaard writes that there are various announcements about nothing, and they still gain instant publicity). The result is that people are daydreaming about discovering new parts of the world, while in reality they cannot focus on finishing simple, specific tasks. He used two metaphors to describe people in the Present Age: they swim dangerously in shallow water, and they brilliantly declare what needs to be done, but as soon as someone even attempts to act on what was decided, everybody would be taken aback, "[and] would find it rash". The apathy is overcome with jokes, which makes the Present Age a comic age.

We can read the comedy of the Present Age at two different levels - if we read it as a part of historical reality, we can easily submit it to a "dialectical" comedy, not in the sense in which comedy produces a much needed laughter, or wit, or the Kierkegaard's beloved farce, but as the age of primitive and profitable industry of fabricating images (Kierkegaard's word "reflection" in this context is used in the sense of "mimicking", and "imaging"), and as the ultimate failure of history. If, however, we analyze the Present Age as an Event, as a representation of the idea of egalitarian justice, then the superficiality and comedy of the Present Age although suffocated with

conformity and numbness, continues to be the spectral display of the ghosts of failed ideals. For Kierkegaard it was clear which of the two reading, prevails, and he wrote: “We today long for a little primitivity, but what is more primitive than wit.” Since there are no more heroes, no lovers, no thinkers, no knights, and no humanitarians, the reflection is used by different occupations in the society, from political to scientific and theological “virtuosos”, who would issue invitations to meetings for the purpose of deciding on a revolution, then they would create the illusion of a revolution, and everyone would go home quietly, spending a pleasant evening.

Three instances are important regarding the uncanny resemblance of the Present Age to the life in the 20th and the 21st century: 1) the loss of individuality, 2) the blurred lines between good and evil, 3) and most importantly, the reflection/thinking as imaging. The *loss of individuality* is connected to the mathematical work of leveling humans and turning them into items. Kierkegaard described this process with uncanny vocabulary, such as engineer, statistician, company, and business; he saw the Present Age as mathematical work of flattened people, and he wrote:

“Leveling is a quiet, mathematical, abstract enterprise that avoids all agitation. Although a flaring, short-lived enthusiasm might in discouragement wish for a calamity simply in order to have a sense of dynamic life forces, disturbance is of no more assistance to its successor, apathy, than it is to an engineer working with a surveyor’s level.”

From the internet avatars to the small-town or tabloid gossips, contemporary ideology bares a disturbing resemblance to Kierkegaard’s descriptions. The world today favors small-town dramatization of a person; nobody is special, actual person, he/she is a specialty elevated to a nickname. This man is the Intimist, the other is the Cruel, the third is the Lover, the fourth is the Blacksmith, the fifth is Death, etc. People are simulation, emptied of their “full” contents, cubes on the ideological table, cliché roles in the comedy del arte, which are scattered across the big stage of life, where the battle between Good and Evil is played out. The ideology “incorporates” people in its theater; in a symbolic table of values, one code name becomes intertwined with another. It is not a real system, but it is an endlessly repetitive system, thus it is vital. The Russian formalist, Viktor Shklovsky said: “Some kind of elemental process is taking place where the living fabric of life is being transformed into the theatrical.” The elementary process he talked about is the transformation of the person into a symbol, the formal separation of the person proper from the theatrical version of that person, and it is the same process Kierkegaard described already in 1846.

The second devastating aspect of the Present Age for Kierkegaard is that it blurs the lines between *good and evil*; or as he says: no one is any longer taken by the great deeds of the good, no one is outraged by the deeds of evil. Already in 1785 when Immanuel Kant produced the categorical moral imperative, “Don’t do to others what you don’t want others to do to you,” the sentence underscore the difference between the principle according to which you *act* and the principle according to which you *judge*! This troubled Kierkegaard. If action is sunken to a public exercise of judgments, the truth gets lost in the multitude of individual judgments (the so-called Ockham’s razor), but it says nothing about the nature of truth. If you allow people to vote, we would still vote that we live in a geocentric universe, says Alain Badiou.⁴ We are used to thinking that the capacity to think is connected to the ability to tell good and evil apart—that the critical mass of people is enough. But, people do not choose good by default. People can be inclined towards evil, and be

easily seduced by it as well, that is why the concept “radical evil” exists. It says that evil is more powerful than good. If we ask people whether war is good, they shall all, in chorus, answer in the negative. However, politics remains closely related to wars.

The third uncanny resemblance to today’s ideology is the status of reflection in Kierkegaard’s *Two Ages* - one is connected to the *voice*, and the other to the *gaze*. As is known, in the book, Kierkegaard used two different words for Reflection. When he wrote about reflecting images (the gaze), he used the Danish word *Reflex*. When he wrote about deliberation and thinking (the voice), he used the Danish word *Reflexion*. Kierkegaard was not just staging the nightmarish world of alienated bureaucracy; he explained the worrying dimensions of immortal, no goal-oriented, irrational activity, an activity with no purpose and no utility, which serves nothing, yet it exists. It dissects people into partial objects, and what is supposed to be a modern subjectivity is transformed into a ridiculous metamorphosed object (like in Kafka’s stories, and the strange ontology of Odradek, or the metamorphosis of Gregor Samsa into an insect). That is precisely why people chatter - not to capture some truth or essence, but to miss it, to miss the experience. The gossips are told and retold without any deeper aim, except to exhaust the *experience* itself! While I’m relating some story, I neutralize the danger in it; the “witty” gossip is told in order to say that there is no reason for tragedy. When a person gets a nickname, he or she should laugh at the nickname with the same intensity as those who created and conferred it. If you play yourself, you are alienated from the point of pain, you become a *mirage* of yourself, and nothing hurts you, hence the *mirroring* appears side by side with *chatter*, and Reflex and Reflexion work as two sides of the same coin of producing a straight division between the real reality and the mirrored reality. This troublesome outcome lead Kierkegaard towards the possibility where the polarization is overcome in the Age of Revolution.

3.

The Age of Revolution: Lenin’s Laughter

For Kierkegaard to act *does not* automatically mean to choose the good, and it does not necessarily manifests itself with good deeds. By itself, passion does not guarantee the good ethnical outcome, and because the Age of Revolution is also the age of contradictions, the action might actually have either good or evil outcome. How to understand this extremely strange paradox in Kierkegaard that the action is *always good*, even though it may end up as either good or a bad? And vice versa, how to understand that the non-action is *always bad*, even though it may have a good outcome? The resolution to this paradox comes in the form of Kierkegaard’s believe that on a higher level whatever a person choses, the impetus of passion and action remains. And the action always makes *progress*! Even if one makes a wrong decision, the very fact that the action takes place is a “saving factor”, “for decision is the little magic word that existence respects.”⁵

The same idea is to be found in historical examples in the 20 century, from Che’s famous quote “You may have to cut the flowers, but it will not stop the spring”⁶ to example’s from the beginning of the 20th century.

In 1908, when Maxim Gorky was on Capri, he organized a philosophical debate together with a group of Bolshevik emigrants, and invited Lenin to be his guest. Although Lenin considered Gorky a bourgeois, he appreciated his talent and respected him as one of the rare Russian writers who could help the Revolution. Lenin immediately replied to Gorky, but clearly set the conditions of his visit: “Dear Alexei Maximovich, I should very much like to see you, but I refuse to engage in any philosophical discussion.”⁷ Lenin wasn’t a naïve political strategist, he knew he would need support from all of the emigrants, yet excused himself from the debate in what Althusser called an act of “Lenin’s laughter.” Lenin didn’t excuse himself from the philosophical debate because he considered theory unimportant, but because he wanted the philosophical innocence, he wanted thinking to be only a remnant of politics. Quite similar to Kierkegaard, in 1908, Lenin poses the question, which marks the communist thought of the 20th century: When thought has reached the threshold of the thinkable, what will thought be like? The last and most famous thesis from Marx’s 11 Theses on Feuerbach (1845) reads: “Philosophers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.” Althusser notes that when you proclaim an end of interpretation, you are left with nothing else but to shut up. Lenin’s laughter is not philosophically naïve and Althusser says that Lenin believed philosophy doesn’t even happen, philosophy has no real history. But, for Kierkegaard, the Age of Revolution should be left without theory and thinking, because the present age of theory and reflection “lets everything remain but subtly drains the meaning out of it”.⁸

In the 17th seminar *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis* (1969-1970), Jacques Lacan says that the key feature of the Present Age in Kierkegaard is “delay”, the reflection delays the event, because it has built a repetition, it is an era that is “marked by repetition,”⁹ and what has been repeated is the loss itself. The loss here should be understood at many levels, first as the loss of the present moment (a temporal loss), and also a loss of passion. But the strange feature appears when Kierkegaard describes the Revolutionary Age, and he does not use the temporal playfulness and vigor, but, on the contrary, he gets stuck in stylistic repetition. How to grasp his dubious discursive choice? Here is how Kierkegaard describes the Revolutionary Age:

“The age of revolution is essentially passionate and therefore essentially has culture... The tension and resilience of the inner being are the measure of essential culture... The age of revolution is essentially passionate”¹⁰

What is confusing in these lines is the contradiction between the pronounced immanence of the revolution and the way in which Kierkegaard expressed it, as Žižek says. If the era is revolutionary, we would expect a momentum, an urgency, and speediness which corresponds to the revolutionary vigor. Instead we get the same rhetorical repetitiveness with which Kierkegaard described the Present Age. Hence the logical question: why did Kierkegaard, who was a master of style, described the Revolutionary Age with same banal, repetitive and dull sentences? Was it because Kierkegaard wanted to emphasize the contradiction within the Revolutionary Age, in terms of Lacan’s idea that one cannot speak about the revolution without stating that it can come only in terms of the repetition? Or was it that what is lost in the revolution is precisely the loss of temporality, the idea of progress, and the loss of enjoyment? Or with the words of Lacan: “In repetition there is a reduction of jouissance.”¹¹ But, what if there is no age which can be called revolutionary? Žižek’s reading of the two ages in Kierkegaard asks what if every gesture of self-sacrifice (the hero on thin ice) is always already an act of senseless sacrifice, a sacrifice which cannot be approved by the community.¹²

It was Kierkegaard who fully articulated this logic of meaningless sacrifice (his term for it is 'infinite resignation')... It is not surprising that Kierkegaard laid out its most concise formula: 'The fact of the matter is that we must acknowledge that in the last resort there is no theory.' In all great 'anti-philosophers,' from Kierkegaard and Nietzsche to the late work of Wittgenstein, the most radical authentic core of being-human is perceived as a concrete practico-ethical engagement and/or choice which precedes (and grounds) every 'theory,' every theoretical account of itself, and is, in this radical sense of the term, contingent ('irrational') - it was Kant who laid the foundation for 'antiphilosophy' when he asserted the primacy of practical over theoretical reason... Thus Kant and Fichte – unexpectedly - would have agreed with Kierkegaard: in the last resort there is no theory, just a fundamental practico-ethical decision about what kind of life one wants to commit oneself to".¹³

It is precisely the melancholy and standard mourning with which Kierkegaard describes the Present Age which should be read as an expression of the essential historical trait – What if there is nothing exclusive in "our" Present Age? What if there is no Age which we can call revolutionary, Žižek asks? What if, for the gesture of sacrifice to make sense, the gesture should be totally irrational, to be made with the idea that "you do it spontaneously," or as Kierkegaard says in the "urgency of reaction," without any rational thinking? In other words, the gesture which makes sense should be done only by sacrificing exactly the very meaning of the gesture, the very irrational move which brings it forward, the loss of faith? That is, probably the best reason behind the paradox contained in the description of the revolutionary era in Kierkegaard. And if that is so, what if the Revolutionary Age is indeed liberated from philosophy, as we saw it in the case of Lenin's Laughter, "I am doing it immediately, without thinking", while you, the philosophers continue to bubble about the concepts.

4.

The Single Individual: Don Quixote, Prince Myshkin, Jesus

In Kierkegaard, however, these dilemmas are false. He clearly says: should an Apostle come, his greatness could be recognized only with corresponding expression in an external form of action. The metaphor of the Apostle is not used randomly, quite on contrary. The whole idea behind Kierkegaard's *Two Ages* is to make a *religious point* about the meaning of action. The meaning of action for Kierkegaard is *not* something which has implication on the *aesthetics* (the categories of beautiful or ugly), nor on the *ethics* (good-evil - as is described in Althusser and Žižek). Kierkegaard's understanding of the meaning of action is strictly *religious* and is connected to his concept of the single individual. In his study *The Point of View for My Work as an Author* (1848), Kierkegaard makes this clear, when he says:

The literary review of *Two Ages* is no argument against this [esthetic production – note JK], both because it is not, after all, esthetic in the sense of being a poet-production but is critical, and because it has a totally religious background in its understanding of 'the present age.' Once and for all I must urgently request the kindly disposed reader continually

to bear in mente [in mind] that the total thought in the entire work as an author is this: becoming a Christian.¹⁴

What does it mean that for Kierkegaard the concepts of good and evil are not connect with the meaning of action, and are dimensions related to the history as open toward the future? Here, we should avoid a key misunderstanding about Kierkegaard's dialectics, because he was not Hegelian in the sense of adopting the present age in order to point toward finality, but the opposite, finality is already incorporated into Kierkegaard's vision of the Present Age.

There is a strange scene, key to understanding the extreme conditions of goodness, in Cervantes's *Don Quixote* (1605). The Knight of Goodness meets a group of silk merchants and he stands before them in military fashion, requiring that they should admit that no girl is more beautiful than his Dulcinea; otherwise he will consider them to be the enemy and shall have to fight with them. The merchants stand completely stunned by this totally absurd request, and in the first moment rationally answer that they would, without reservation, admit to the superior beauty of the girl if Don Quixote offered them some proof, a portrait, or anything else for that matter. Don Quixote answers:

If I were to show her to you, what virtue would there be in confessing such a manifest truth? The important thing is for you to believe, confess, affirm, swear and defend without ever having seen her.¹⁵

In a nutshell, this controversial scene contains the radical position that one should start from when pondering the good. Don Quixote poses the unrefined question of trust, and trust is not received for obvious reasons—it is silly, even dangerous, to testify in regards to something of which you know nothing, and as such is commonly reflected in the legal world of today. But Don Quixote's experiment is more complex than the request for trust without grounds. Don Quixote appears before people with a grandiose project—to test the capacity of the world for ultimate goodness, whether the world carries goodness, and he basically experiments with a *religious issue*—I ask of you to *act* and *believe* me without seeing (just like one should believe in God without even seeing him). The question is posed with childish naivety and childish cruelty, but notice that the concept of ultimate good is impossible without that combination of infantilism and cruelty. Don Quixote is like Prometheus, but unlike Prometheus he has very little or no political experience. That is why he is a paradigm closest to Jesus; another similar example can be found in Dostoevsky in the shape of *The Idiot* (1869), Prince Myshkin. Kierkegaard reminds us, the inner journey of remembrance is something that concerns the traumatic external encounter with the social and political world and it always embodies jouissance. He says that people are capable of differentiating between the aesthetic and ethical-religious reasoning, while not being corrupted by norms in Christendom. Kierkegaard was not writing for people who are in a hurry. His involutions and repetitions were directed toward the reader who is capable of delightfully "Socratic" path and the beginning of a journey one has to make for oneself.

His book *Two Ages*, drafted as review already in 1845 shortly after the book *Two Ages* (1845) by Thomasine Christiane Gyllembourg-Ehrensvarð was published under the pen name "The Author of An Everyday Story", became the paradigm of his life-long journey towards the complex elaboration on the meaning of action. It became more than a review, it ended up almost as long as

the novel under review, and was connected to his ever urgent request, what means to be a person who suffers, what ultimate price one has to be willing to pay for the communication and what the royal command “Love your neighbor as yourself” genuinely means? As he stated repeatedly, the individual must break out of the prison in which his/her own reflection holds him/her, and if s/he succeeds, s/he still should broke only by religious inwardness. An individual is someone who determines the significance, and after s/he begins the path of the single individual. The message is to arrive at the simple movement: from the public to the single individual.

BIOGRAPHY

Althusser, Louis. *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001.

Badiou, Alain. *Manifesto for Philosophy*. Translated, edited and with an introduction by Norman Madarasz. Albany: SUNY Press, 1999.

Cervantes Saavedra, Miguel de. *Don Quixote*. Translated, with Notes by James H. Montgomery. Introduced by David Quint, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 2009.

G. W. F. Hegel's *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* (1820), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

Kierkegaard, S. *Parables of Kierkegaard*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.

Kierkegaard, S. *Two Ages*, Vol. 14, edited and translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong., Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978.

Kierkegaard, S. “On My Work as an Author, The Point of View”, *Essential Kierkegaard*, edited by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong., Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Lacan, Jacques. *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, book XVII, translated with notes by Russell Grigg, W.W.Norton and Company, New York, London, 2007.

Pattison, George, “Art in an age of Reflection”, *The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard*, edited by Alastair Hannay and Gordon Marino, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

The essential Kierkegaard, edited by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong., Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000.

The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, edited by Alastair Hannay and Gordon Marino, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Žižek, Slavoj. *The Parallax View*, Cambridge, London: MIT Press, 2006.

ABSTRACT

The Jewel on a Frozen Lake: Kierkegaard on the Meaning of Action

Jasna Koteska

The paper analyzes the paradox in Søren Kierkegaard's interpretation of the meaning of action in his famous 1846 tract "Two Ages: A Literary Review". As is well-known, to describe the two ages Kierkegaard used a parable of a precious jewel on a frozen lake covered with thin ice. If the age is revolutionary, Kierkegaard writes, the whole community celebrates the courage of a person who will sacrifice his life for the common goal. And vice versa, if the age is reflective, people consider the hero's action as unreasonable and meaningless, they ridicule his courage and strength, and reduce the hero's sacrifice to a simple display of skills. The paradox occurs when Kierkegaard describes the revolutionary vigor. Otherwise known for his masterful literary style, Kierkegaard enigmatically avoided the playful, urgent and swift descriptions, which would correspond to the momentum needed for revolutionary action and instead chose repetitive and dull sentences. E.g.: "The age of revolution is essentially passionate and therefore essentially has culture"; "The tension and resilience of the inner being are the measure of essential culture"; "The age of revolution is essentially passionate" and so on. (Kierkegaard, S., *Two Ages*, H.V. Hong, E.V. Hong, Princeton UP, 1978, 61-62).

The obvious question is why Kierkegaard, who was aware that repetition brings reduction of *jouissance*, chose to interpret the revolutionary age through repetition, and with the same melancholy and mourning with which he described the present age? Was it because he considered every revolution as essentially a repetitive event? Or, because he believed that each self-sacrifice (the hero on thin ice) is always already a senseless gesture, which cannot get an approval of the community? Or, more radically, what if there is no age which can be called a revolutionary age? What if there is nothing exclusive in history, and each epoch is just a set of practical decisions about what kind of life one wants to commit oneself to? The paper argues that Kierkegaard developed a notion that both pleasure of the aesthetical and the ethical existence - "the life of a poet" and "the life of a judge" are incomplete, the only resolution of human's destiny must come about in the form of a religious choice. Due to the radical antagonism of human situation, humans are incapable of bypassing the abyss between the finite and the infinite, therefore the action is always conducted without a full meaning, without a rational knowledge of the consequences of that action and with a leap of faith; therefore the true action can come only in the form of a conduct of the single individual directed towards the *highest good* as it is understood in Kierkegaard.

¹ Kierkegaard, Soren. *Parables of Kierkegaard*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 15-16.

² Hegel, G. W. F. *Elements of the Philosophy of Right* (1820), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 280.

-
- ³ *The essential Kierkegaard*, edited by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong., Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000, 126.
- ⁴ Badiou, Alain. *Manifesto for Philosophy*. Translated, edited and with an introduction by Norman Madarasz. Albany: SUNY Press, 1999, 13.
- ⁵ *The essential Kierkegaard*, edited by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong., Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000, 124.
- ⁶ Žižek, Slavoj. *The Parallax View*, Cambridge, London: MIT Press, 2006, 281.
- ⁷ Althusser, Louis. *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2001, 13.
- ⁸ Kierkegaard, S. *Two Ages*, Vol. 14, edited and translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong., Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978, 77.
- ⁹ Lacan, Jacques. *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, book XVII, translated with notes by Russell Grigg, W.W.Norton and Company, New York, London, 2007.
- ¹⁰ Kierkegaard, S., *Two Ages*, H.V. Hong, E.V. Hong, Princeton UP, 1978, 61-62.
- ¹¹ Jacques Lacan: *The Other Side of Psychoanalysis*, book XVII, translated with notes by Russell Grigg, W.W.Norton and Company, New York, London, 2007, 46.
- ¹² Slavoj Zizek: Kierkegaard as a Hegelian, in: *The Parallax View*, 2006, 77.
- ¹³ *Ibid*, 75-6.
- ¹⁴ Kierkegaard, “On My Work as an Author, The Point of View”, *Essential Kierkegaard*, p. 457, note 2.
- ¹⁵ Cervantes Saavedra, Miguel de. *Don Quixote*. Translated, with Notes by James H. Montgomery. Introduced by David Quint, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company Inc., 2009, 35-36.