

A large number of black bird silhouettes are scattered across the white background, appearing to fly in various directions.

Twelfth Annual International Academic Conference on European Integration

Rethinking Migration, Economic Growth and Solidarity in Europe

Twelfth annual international academic conference on European integration

**RETHINKING MIGRATION,
ECONOMIC GROWTH
AND SOLIDARITY IN EUROPE**

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**Twelfth annual international academic conference on European integration
RETHINKING MIGRATION, ECONOMIC GROWTH
AND SOLIDARITY IN EUROPE**
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Rethinking Migration, Economic Growth and Solidarity in Europe

Introduction

Robert C. Hudson, Ivan Dodovski and Marina Andeva

This volume is made up of a selection of peer-reviewed chapters originally presented at the 12th international conference entitled: “Rethinking Migration, Economic Growth and Solidarity in Europe”, which was held in Skopje on 25 May 2017. The primary purpose of the conference had been to provide a re-examination of the current situation in Europe, and to discuss potential scenarios for its future. In particular, the conference aimed at juxtaposing and rethinking the concepts of migration, economic growth and solidarity in Europe. Following on from the Brexit vote in June 2016 and amidst the continuing migration crisis, many contributors addressed the question of the very future of the European Union. Whilst it is difficult to predict how the greatest political project in history will be affected by the raft of existential pressures placed upon it, both within and without, it is necessary to consider the general trends and foresee potential consequences, as well as offering elucidations which go beyond current fears, continuing prejudice, and short-term interests.

Various questions have arisen. How are migrants and refugees being dealt with both at and within Europe’s borders? What are the challenges to European solidarity, migration, and security; and what might be the impact on EU enlargement on the Western Balkans? These are some of the issues addressed in this book, which also includes chapters on European security and responses to terrorism, the rise of populism in Europe and economic predictions for the EU and its member states.

The chapters were written against the background of a number of serious issues confronting Europe at the time, especially in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom, and the first six months of the Trump administration in the United States. Meanwhile, the threat of terrorism in Europe continued to raise its

ugly head; indeed, the Manchester bombings took place on the very eve of the conference which added greater urgency to the debate on security and terrorism in Europe in a period that can be identified as the “End of the End of the Cold War” in which Vladimir Putin’s resurgent Russia is playing a key role. Meanwhile, the continuation of conflicts in countries such as Syria, Libya and Iraq had added to the burdens of continued migration flows into Southern Europe in 2017, impacting on cross border cooperation across Europe that even threatened the continued existence of the 1995 Schengen agreement.

The key note paper was presented by His Excellency Professor Dr. Ivo Josipović, the third President of Croatia (2010 – 2015). This paper focused on Croatia’s Foreign Policy, set against the background of Croatian history since independence on 25 June 1991, and emphasising Croatia’s relations with its neighbours and the outside world since joining the EU as the 28th member state on 1 July 2013. The key issue was how a small power with a population of just over 4 million people could overcome its small power status whilst developing good relations with its neighbours. President Josipović explained how the negotiating process of joining the EU had been long and arduous but that Croatia had become a much better society as a result. Croatia has been faced with considerable foreign policy challenges since its accession to the European Union, and one of the hot spots has been EU – Russian relations, with energy security as a top priority. This came hand-in-hand with Croatia’s alignment with Common Foreign and Security goals with the EU. Ultimately, Croatia sees itself as a guardian of stability and as a leader of EU policy in the region as well as being able to play a key role in making regional agreements with its Balkan neighbours, whilst cooperating with the Great Powers. Meanwhile, Josipović places emphasis on the potential security risks emanating from: the destabilization of the region with reference to the impact of the conflicts in Syria and Libya; lingering problems with some of Croatia’s neighbours; and, the impact of migration and the threat of terrorism.

In the case of terrorism, the situation has changed considerably between the end of the 20th century and today, moving from the small terrorist groups of the mid-20th century to state-like structures and professional groups as presented by the self-styled “Islamic State” or Daesh, with its global ambitions as opposed to the limited goals of the past, and resorting to the latest communications strategies such as the Dark Web. Josipović also considered new challenges, such as the US-EU partnership since President Trump came into office. Russia too poses a significant challenge and there is a desire to ensure that the Western Balkans should not become a metaphorical “battlefield” between East and West. Meanwhile Croatia needs to be more engaged with China with regard to trade and investment whilst new energy opportunities in

oil and gas need to be explored with Qatar, before going on to deal with Croatia's foreign relations with each of the Western Balkan countries in turn. In sum, Croatia needs to support all of the countries in the region. Perhaps the biggest challenge is corruption, often linked with the aggressive style of privatization carried out in the early years of transition, alongside the quest for justice in the light of war crimes committed in the first half of the 1990s. There is, then a need to strengthen bilateral trade, fight transnational crime and strengthen the rights of national minorities, human rights and freedoms.

Our book is made up of nine chapters and divided into three parts. The first part is entitled "Rethinking Migration in Europe". The second part concentrates on "Economic Growth and Solidarity in Europe", and the third part is dedicated to "Security, Terrorism and Identity Politics in Europe at the 'End of the End of the Cold War'".

Part One: Rethinking Migration in Europe

Since the early 1990s, South Eastern Europe has had to contend with the influx of large numbers of refugees both from within the region and from North Africa, the Middle East and South and South East Asia, with the Republic of Macedonia finding itself at the cross roads in the Balkan region.

In the first chapter of the opening section in this volume, Nena Nenovska Gjorgjievska analyses the changing nature of the management of the migration processes in Macedonia from its independence in September 1991 to the migrant crisis in 2015. By employing a quantitative and qualitative approach to her research she has used statistical data provided by official Macedonian institutions in a bid to show how Macedonian legislation has developed and changed over the past few decades. Faced with the growing number of people who are in a state of transit from poor and war-torn countries, the author has attempted to identify the origins and flow of migration processes by addressing two key questions. She asks if the current migration crisis should be traced back to instability and conflict or to other reasons. Is it motivated by a personal desire to seek better economic living conditions elsewhere in Europe, given that numerous analyses have shown that migrants fleeing from their home countries because of armed lethal conflict do not necessarily seek asylum in neighbouring countries, but seek better opportunities further afield. She concludes that this has forced countries suddenly confronted with an influx of migrants to take additional measures in segregating migrants from armed conflicts (refugees) from those migrants in search of better economic conditions; the so-called economic

migrants. As a consequence, many refugees have transformed themselves into economic migrants, by moving further into Europe.

Learning the lessons of history, can help us in our understanding of how humanitarian crises have been dealt with in the past and can help us to deal with present-day humanitarian crises, such as the mass migration into the European Union in our own time. In the second chapter, Immaculada Colomina Limonero demonstrates the role played by the American Quakers in dealing with women and child refugees settling in France in the final phases and aftermath of the Spanish Civil War. The period covered in her chapter starts at the beginning of 1939, through to the Fall of France in June 1940, and on to the German *Wehrmacht* crossing the demarcation line between Occupied France and Vichy, and occupying the whole of France in November 1942. In this sensitive and informative chapter, the author shows how the reception and settlement of refugees from the defeated Republican side 75 years ago can serve as an invaluable historical model for confronting the successful reception and settlement of migrants and refugees in Europe today.

With an estimated 65.3 million people around the world being forced to leave their homes, the third chapter in this section on Rethinking Migration concludes with a totally different approach to how we see the impact of migration, through the eyes of architects Violeta Bakalchev, Sasha Tasic and Minas Bakalchev, as they explore the connection between physical and social change in a period of growing uncertainty, instability and change that is the current world order at the End of the End of the Cold War. Here, the authors set out to map the effectiveness of spatial forms as strategies of transformation in different contexts in the world. The authors begin their chapter with a presentation of the Balkan Route of 2014 – 2016, through which a long line of an estimated 800,000 migrants have already passed. They pass on to discussing the representational forms of lines and squares and their geometric characteristics, juxtaposing this with the relationship between geometry and the geopolitical landscape. This leads to a conclusion depicting the role of human experience and a redirection towards elementary forms providing a raft of potentials and opportunities in creating a new reality in the field of non-figurative architecture.

Part Two: Economic Growth and Solidarity in Europe

The second section of this book opens with a chapter by Jeremy Cripps on “Three Fair Winds in European Sails”, in which the author presents us with an optimistic portrayal of the future of the European Union based on a rethinking of economic growth and solidarity in Europe. Cripps believes that the sure foundations for economic growth are already in place alongside the product of investment so that the

prospects for EU economic growth are assured. He focuses his argument on three strengths; the “three fair winds” of his title. They are: Energy efficiency; Rethinking the EU through the changing nature of European politics; and, the growing strength of the Euro. With the fair wind of energy, the author identifies the need for firm leadership in energy efficiency in the areas of fusion energy, solar energy and wind farms, where significant advances in energy provision have already been prevalent. He also advocates the controversial use of hydraulic fracking so that the EU can compete with Saudi oil. Meanwhile, the lower and middle classes feel that they have not been getting a fair deal and this has fed into growing support for popular leaders in Europe and beyond. If populism is the product of socio economic disarray, then real solidarity in Europe should be built on what the author identifies as “shared selfishness”. The danger is the perception amongst European citizens that their labour provides the fortunes of the few, and they are becoming increasingly sensitive to the need for an improvement in their lot. Cripps argues that recent elections in the Netherlands, France and Austria have returned mainstream parties rather than populist ones as the mainstream parties are becoming more responsive to the needs for socio-economic change. The third fair wind is the growing strength of the Euro and the idea that the financial crisis is finally over and this is having its impact on the quality of life in the European Union. The stronger Euro will help the EU and Cripps concludes with the idea that the prospects for the European Union are both positive and prosperous.

On the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, in March 1957, which came into full effect on 1 January 1958, Zlat Milovanovic argues that the European Union is now at the crossroads. Does it become an ever-closer union, a Federal Europe and an integrated state or does it become an international organization of fully sovereign nation states? Confronted with a number of crises: Brexit; immigration; the democratic deficit; and, foreign and security policy to name but a few, in four carefully-crafted sections the author explains the key issues currently confronting Europe. Whilst the President of the European Commission Jean Claude Juncker defined five potential pathways for the future of Europe in his address to the European Parliament in March 2017, the Belgian politician and MEP Guy Verhofstadt has advocated that: “A federal Europe is the only option”; quoting from Eurobarometer that the majority of Europeans want more not less European integration and a more democratic and transparent Europe. For Verhofstadt, the average European citizen prefers a super-power Europe that is equal to the other super powers, not a weak international organization. At the end of the day, these issues affect the countries of the Western Balkans. Macedonia and the other candidate countries: Albania, Kosovo, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Montenegro and Serbia have the right to know more about the EU and its future. As Milovanovic notes, with some

irony implied in the light of Brexit; the next EU Summit on the Western Balkans will be held in London in 2018.

Europe is a continent which has always attracted outsiders, whether they be invaders, traders or migrants and refugees. Continuing with the theme of the future of the European Union, Branko Boskovic asks if multiculturalism is still alive and well in Europe, or if it has had its day. Whilst he accepts that multiculturalism is one of the corner stones of the European project and that it continues to breathe life, Boskovic argues that it is in need of profound reconsideration if it is to survive and that this should be based upon a more dynamic model, such as interculturalism or civic integration. One of the key driving forces for this situation is that with the rise in immigration, alongside growing threats of terrorism, fears of the European citizenry have deepened, playing straight into the hands of populist parties and leading to greater discrimination based on national and ethnic origin. Whilst a multiculturalist approach to integration has long been well-supported, this approach has altered more recently, especially in the face of the exponential influx of migrants and refugees since 2015. It is for this reason that Boskovic believes that multiculturalist policies have been surpassed by a more integrationist approach, referred to as civic integration and interculturalism. In this chapter the author explains that the social climate has moved to a more negative opinion of immigrants and that this has been reflected in official policy as well. Whilst this situation has been exacerbated by an increase in support for more radical, nationalist and populist parties, it should be noted that elsewhere in this book, and most notably in the chapter by Jeremy Cripps, it has been demonstrated how mainstream political parties, such as those to be found in the Netherlands, Austria and France, have taken heed of the rise of populism in their recent election results. So, there is hope yet for the future of Europe based on European normative values and especially that of tolerance.

In the seventh chapter in this book, Ivana Vuchkova argues that transition since independence has not been easy for the Western Balkan countries, which have endured a long and bumpy ride on the road towards economic, social and human development. Twenty-five years on, since the break-up of Yugoslavia, the World Bank, in 2015 showed that many economic and social aspects in these countries are under the threat of backsliding instead of providing evidence of progress. In the wake of promises of prosperity in the everyday lives of their citizens by the political leaders of the Western Balkan countries, the author argues that escalating unemployment rates, corruption and bureaucratization remain firmly embedded in the region. In her research, Vuchkova asks where the Western Balkans stand now in relation to European Union integration by focusing upon the situations in Albania, Serbia and

Macedonia. For Vuchkova, whilst the Western Balkans are geographically in such close proximity to the European Union, they are nonetheless far from being a part of it. There have been clear delays in progressing the candidacy status of Albania and Serbia, whilst Macedonia, with 50 per cent youth unemployment has been transmogrified into being a “captured state” with the highest levels of corruption, organized crime and political interference. Only Albania seems to be in the worst position in the region, with Serbia ranked just above it. Basing her argument on a qualitative research method based on questions, we learn that 81.5 per cent of those surveyed believe that the integration of the Western Balkans into the European Union is a necessity. Vuchkova’s research identifies how only progress in economic, social and human development with the growth of a healthy relationship in regional cooperation and an enhancement of the role of civil society will facilitate the future integration of the Western Balkan states into the European family. At the end of the day, it is not just a question of geographical proximity, but rather a firm commitment to European values that will count. In the author’s own words: “a true establishment of common community will bring the Western Balkans closer to EU development standards”.

The Paris attacks in 2015 marked a new era in the threat of terrorism which is characterized by attacks committed by individuals or network groups affiliated to or inspired by the self-styled “Islamic State” or Daesh. It may be noted that the recent wave of terrorist attacks across Europe has often involved the use of cars, trucks, knives and machetes against innocent victims in the absence of conventional weapons and explosives, in acts of terrorism that seem to be carried out without much planning by individuals or very small groups of terrorists. In his detailed and highly informative account of the “emerging threat of terrorism” and its impact upon the European Union Vasko Shutarov opens the third section on Security, Terrorism and Identity Politics in Europe at the ‘End of the End of the Cold War’. He sets out to illustrate the nature and main characteristics of the current threat of terrorism in Europe by focusing on the radicalized, foreign terrorist fighters who bring to Europe a set of skills honed on their fighting with the self-styled “Islamic State” and he sets this in the context of the Syrian conflict and the recent refugee and migrant crisis.

Terror attacks not only affect human lives, but also impact upon core European values, such as: human rights and human dignity; the freedom of movement and freedom of expression; equality, solidarity and pluralism. Indeed, it is worth noting that Shutarov’s original conference paper upon which this chapter is based was delivered on the morning after the Manchester bombings in May 2017. Shutarov considers these European values in turn and above all points to the importance of the

spirit of European tolerance, advocating that rather than allowing far right and extremist groups to provoke a backlash of intolerance which plays right into the hands of the Jihadists of Daesh, we should allow the moderate voices of religious leaders to prevail. Shutarov believes that strong messages from moderate religious authorities and believers from different religions are the best response to radicalism, not only from the perspective of European security, unity and solidarity, but also, most importantly in defence of European values. The key to this argument is to dissociate religion from terrorism.

In the final chapter in this book, Robert C. Hudson shows how four writers have played a major role in influencing our understanding of the ever-fluid role of identity politics in Russia over the last twenty-five years. He opens with Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations* (1993 and 1998) arguing that whatever the fault of his work, Huntington put culture firmly on the map in a number of disciplines, where hitherto inter-state relations had predominated. As such Huntington provided scholars with the essential tools that would assist their better understanding of the nature of the inter-ethnic conflict that would dominate the 1990s. Hudson then moves on to consider two influential Russian writers, Igor Chubais and Alexander Solzhenitsyn who were attempting to define Russian identity in a post-Soviet era of economic and political chaos otherwise dubbed the "Wild 90s". What is noticeable is that in their works, both authors advocated a return to Russian traditionalism, not unlike the 19th century Slavophiles who emerged during a period of reaction, reform and revolution in Russia. Then, from Chubais and Solzhenitsyn, Hudson moves on to Alexander Dugin and his writings on Eurasia and geopolitics, which build upon the ideas of his two predecessors and provide the *Leitmotiv* of the new, resurgent Russia that was ushered in since January 2000, under the leadership of Vladimir Putin. As such, in this article one can better understand the transition between the intellectual writings of the period of the End of the Cold War to those of the End of the End of the Cold War.

When comparing the situation in Europe as presented by the contributors to this year's volume with those of last year's, it is interesting to read how European citizens continue to live in consequential times, with major challenges presenting themselves, such as the continued threat of terrorism, chaos in the Middle East and worries over immigration. Whilst armed conflict in Syria continues into its seventh year it would seem that on a more positive note, the pressures of populism in Europe are beginning to wane, at least in some EU member states. At last it would appear that EU member states are also emerging from the financial crisis that started in 2008, and there is room for some optimism here as we rethink the role of Europe. However, there are

still concerns over the ambitions of a resurgent Russia in parts of Europe, as well as the uncertainties of the ever-fluid directions being taken in transatlantic relations. For some, there are also concerns over the potential economic and political impact that Britain's promised withdrawal from the EU might have upon European member states as well as the potential impact upon those states in the Western Balkans seeking membership of the European Union. This is a theme which will no doubt be developed much further in the next volume in this series on European integration.

**Part One:
Rethinking Migration in Europe**

An Analysis of the Management of the Migration Processes in Macedonia before and during the Migration Crisis of 2015

Nena Nenovska Gjorgjievska

Abstract

In the past few decades the Balkan Peninsula has held the status of being an intensive crisis territory. Regional countries were confronted with a huge number of refugees coming from different parts of the world, as well refugees coming from neighbouring countries. The Republic of Macedonia became a transit country within the Balkan states. It is one of the so-called “victim” countries of the migration process. There is a tendency for migration and asylum processes taking place towards, in and out of Macedonia, bearing in mind its geographical location. Consequently, there has been a need for public institutions to regulate migration processes. During the process of transition, legal acts were signed, amended and annexed which have regulated these issues. During the process of migration, in 2015 in the Republic of Macedonia as well as in other countries in the region many measures were undertaken which have been drastically different to the previous legal bases related to this problem. The main aim of these measures is to provide legal support, transport, and hygienic and food supplements to the refugees on the one hand, whilst providing state security on the other. One serious dilemma for the Republic of Macedonia and other Balkan and European countries is the doubt in the cause for migration: whether it is the armed conflicts in the countries which lies at the origin of migration, or is the main aim for migration which involves looking for better economic living conditions. Bearing in mind that most of the migrants are not fleeing to their neighboring countries, but are heading towards the European Union, makes us conclude that most of them are searching for better economic living conditions.

Keywords: migration processes, migration crisis, migrants, asylum.

Introduction

Since the beginning of 2015, southeastern Europe became a crossroad of active migration processes with significant migration from, through and into the region. This region is having to confront and deal with regular migration from other countries around the world, such as states in North Africa, the Middle East, and South and South East Asia. As of 2008, the statistics show that the number of migrants is almost doubling in number from year to year (Eurostat, 2008, p. 65). The final destination point of the migrants is the EU, while the countries from Southeastern Europe are simply represented as transit countries for migrants and refugees. This is one of the main trends in the region, today. The Southeast European countries that are part of the accession process to EU integration are mostly affected by transit migration. The situation in North Africa and the Middle East generates a significant flow of migrants and asylum seekers towards the region, especially the huge number of Syrian citizens who are heading to Turkey, and in huge numbers in the other countries in the southeastern Europe, including Macedonia. The migration flows today, are very dynamic and present enough in different parts of the world, especially in the Southeastern European countries and in the other member states of the European Union. Consequently, these migration problems need to be resolved. As in the words attributed to Benjamin Franklin: "If we do not hang together, we shall surely hang separately" (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, 1994, p. 1537).

The Republic of Macedonia is one of the so-called "victim" countries of the migration flows. It is part of the group of South East European countries and represents a crossroads among the Balkan countries. Throughout the recent history, the Republic of Macedonia has been subject to migration flows which became a regular process in the country. Therefore, these processes recently have caused amendments to the legislation which regulates this issue. Aiming towards facing the migration crisis, which started before the summer of 2015 and which took an intensive swing during the summer and autumn months of 2015, Macedonian legislation has undergone significant changes regarding these happenings. This analysis is directed towards explaining the intensive and drastic changes in the legislation, as well as the institutional reaction to the migrants' problem, which can serve as a means of finding a way out of the migration crisis in the Republic of Macedonia. Also, this paper will attempt to identify the causes of origins and flow of these migration processes. Does the cause of the current migration crisis lie in the conflict regions and unstable territories or is migration caused by a search for better economic living conditions?

The South East European countries including the Republic of Macedonia in order to face the migration crisis, took measures which are directed towards the protection of their safety. These measures have provided the conditions for the free movement of migrants through their territories, as well as providing the necessary conditions for meeting their hygiene and food needs.

In order to provide a qualitative outcome to this paper, a number of methods have been used. First of all, statistical methodology is used considerably. The statistical data are taken from the official institutions and official web sites. Therefore, the further step while using this statistical methodology is the analyses of the data. Hence, the analytical method is used when analyzing the obtained results. The comparative method is also used in order to make a comparison between one period and another, or between the Republic of Macedonia “before the migration crisis in 2015” and the Republic of Macedonia “during the migration crisis in 2015”. This comparative method is used when comparing the legal acts of these two periods. This methodology leads towards improved analysis when answering the main question of this paper, whether or not migration is caused by armed conflicts or if it is all a matter of searching for better economic living conditions.

The Republic of Macedonia before the Migration Crisis in 2015

Legal acts in force

In the transition period since 1991, there have been changes in the scope and nature of migratory movements in the country, which primarily took place due to the dissolution of Yugoslavia. In addition, the enlargement of the EU in some countries in South Eastern Europe caused an increase in the scope and pace of transit and illegal migration in the Republic of Macedonia. Given the geographical position of the country, further growth of migration movements in the country was expected.

The permitted and illicit movement of foreigners in the Republic of Macedonia, as well as their transit, is provided for in the Law on foreigners. According to the Law, “a foreigner stays illegally in the country, if:

- He has entered illegally into the Republic of Macedonia,
- Does not possess a valid and recognized travel document with a visa or residence permit,
- His visa has been cancelled, revoked or its validity reduced,
- The visa has expired,
- The right of residence has been withdrawn,
- He stays longer than three months during the six-month period from the date of arrival, and does not need a visa to enter the country, or
- Is rejected by the procedure of applying for asylum and does not leave the territory of the Republic of Macedonia within the specified term “(Law on foreigners).

This law, as well as the Criminal Code of the Republic of Macedonia (Official Gazette no. 37/1996 of 6 August, 1996) regulates the help of foreigners to enter illegally into the country and transit (Law on foreigners, Article 148) through the country, and the consequences for the perpetrators of that crime. The Criminal Code of the Republic of Macedonia clearly specifies penalties that follow in the case of the smuggling of migrants. (Criminal Code, Article 418-b) In terms of legislation, the issue of asylum is also related to migratory movements.

In 1994, the Republic of Macedonia ratified the Convention on the Status of Refugees of 1951 and the Protocol on the Status of Refugees of 1967. The right of asylum to foreigners and stateless persons expelled because of democratic political convictions and activities was guaranteed, initially by the Law on Movement and the Residence of Foreigners. Later, in August 2003, the Law on Asylum and temporary protection was adopted. According to this Law, there are two types of international protection:

- Refugees under the Convention on the Status of Refugees 1951 and the Protocol on the Status of Refugees of 1967, and
- A person under subsidiary protection (Law on asylum and temporary protection).

By applying the above mentioned legal regulations in the area of migration and asylum, Macedonia managed to face the massive influx of refugees from the crisis following the war in Kosovo in 1999 and refugees from the earlier conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, the persistence of the illegal migration of individual cases, and the trafficking of migrants remained to be settled in the courts which are also governed by legal acts.

Statistical Data of Migration and Asylum

The Republic of Macedonia, from a geopolitical perspective serves as a crossroads in the Balkan Peninsula. The Balkan Peninsula is a bridge between the Middle East and Europe is often the first choice for illegal migration.

Bearing in mind the status of the Balkan Peninsula as a crisis territory in the latter decades of the previous century, the states in the region are now faced with a huge number of refugees, who are moving from one country to another among the neighboring states. The refugees have been leaving their home countries in massive numbers and were moving around the countries in the region, as well as in the Western European countries. As a consequence of the armed conflicts of the 1990s, 66,370 refugees have stayed in Serbia, while in the Republic of Macedonia that number is significantly smaller, at 750 refugees, as of 30 June 2013 (UNHCR, 2013, p. 14).

While Macedonia was part of the former-Yugoslavia, it was faced with migration problems. The data gathered from the Ministry of the Interior show that in the period between 1990 and 1991 there were 1,150 cases of registered illegal crossings over the borders. 300 of them were identified as refugees. In the period after the independence of Macedonia and the beginning of the Bosnian crisis, a new influx of refugees was noticed. In the period between 1992 and 1995 there were between 32,000 and 35,000 migrants and refugees registered in the Republic of Macedonia, coming from the territories of the former-Yugoslavia which were affected by war (Resolution of the migration policy of the RM 2009 – 2014).

The beginning of the crisis in Kosovo (1999) caused a drastic increase in the number of migrants in Macedonia. In 1999, the Republic of Macedonia faced a massive influx of 360,000 refugees from Kosovo. About 1,150 requests for asylum seekers (the largest number of ethnic minorities from Kosovo) were submitted from people who held the status of temporary humanitarian assisted persons. In the aftermath of the crisis in Kosovo, in the period between 2003 and 2008, there were 2,600 asylum seekers registered, of whom 2,580 were from Kosovo.

According to the data of the Ministry of interior, in 2013 there were 1,132 registered illegal border crossings. In 2014 there were 1,750 illegal registered border crossings.

As for the criminal acts of illegally transferring migrants in recent years, statistics from the Ministry of the Interior show that in 2013, there were 31 cases registered for the crime of smuggling migrants, while in 2014 there were 92 cases of registered smuggling crimes. Criminal charges were brought against 166 people. Also, in 2014,

there were 17 cases of criminal acts of organizing a group and incitement to commit crimes of human trafficking and migrant smuggling registered. Criminal charges were brought against 43 people.

Table 1: Criminal acts

Year	Illegal transit	Smuggling migrants	Criminal charges
2013	1,132	31	166
2014	1,750	92	43

Source: Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Macedonia, information gained by e-mail in December, 2015.

The above data indicate the massive migration processes that the Republic of Macedonia was confronted with, since its independence from the former Yugoslavia in 1991. In parallel with these processes individual illegal crossings of borders were also observed, that occurred independently of the mass migrations. At the level of individual migration and transit criminal actions could also be noticed. Most often, in such individual cases this concerned the smuggling of illegal immigrants, where court proceedings were undertaken. These procedures carry cases of organized crime related to drug trafficking, human trafficking and trafficking of migrants.

Meanwhile, in 2015 completely different rules and processes were created to solve these migratory movements, which have greatly facilitated the movement of migrants across the country. Hence, the question: “How would the previously mentioned court cases end, taking into consideration that the amended legislation that resulted from the migrant crisis of 2015 caused a facilitated way of travel and transit in Macedonia?”

The Republic of Macedonia during the Migration Crisis of 2015

Amendments to the legislation and institutional confrontation with migration and asylum

The Republic of Macedonia is a transit state, which in previous decades had confronted migration seriously. That is one of the reasons why the legislation of the Republic of Macedonia changed during periods of crisis. In the summer of 2015, Macedonia faced thousands of illegal migrants. To regulate their transit or residence, the Government of the Republic of Macedonia, decided to declare a crisis situation in

the regions of the southern and northern state borders on 19 August 2015 (Governmental session, 2015) thereby stepping up the presence of the Army of the Republic of Macedonia in these regions. The pressure prevailing in the southern state border and the increase in the intensity of transit through the so-called Balkan migration corridor, forced Macedonia to take measures for the more efficient control of border crossings within the integrated border management.

These measures were adopted by the Government. They have a dramatically different approach towards migrants before and during the migration crisis. Previously, the transfer of migrants by any means was meant as a crime which is punishable with imprisonment. With the adoption of new legislation, migrants can use transport organized by the state from the southern to the northern borders of the country. Clearly, these measures are undertaken in order to transfer, as many migrants as possible to the following transit countries. Thus the Republic of Macedonia would reduce the number of refugees who would come, and also the number of asylum seekers in the country. In parallel with the measures undertaken by the Government, the institutional capacities of the country were also strengthened. The Center for Crisis Management, took measures to establish infrastructures in order to provide for the basic living conditions of the migrants while they were on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia. Concrete decisions by the Centre for Crisis Management were adopted, among which the most significant are:

- The public utility company “Komunalec” Gevgelija to pump more water from the well to provide a greater quantity of potable water;
- A territorial fire brigade in Gevgelija to provide a water tank in the reception center;
- If you provide water from the well, it is fenced and secured by an appropriate official;
- The Centre for crisis management to provide tanks with drinking water from neighboring municipalities;
- The installation of barracks in order to receive migrants who might want to rest and spend the night in sheltered accommodation;
- To relocate several toilets from the railway station in Gevgelija in the shelter;
- The road to the shelter to be finalized;

- The municipality of Gevgelija, in cooperation with the UNHCR to take action to build a septic pit and to hire a firm for its discharge;
- The Border Police to provide safe direction to the migrants to other vehicles (Centre for crisis management, 2015).

Furthermore, the Ministry of the Interior had spread its branches throughout the borders of the Republic of Macedonia, in order to ensure internal peace and stability in the country, and to provide for the safe transit of migrants across the state. Also, based on the amendments of the Law on Asylum, as of 18 June 2015, the Ministry of Interior started issuing certificates to the foreign nationals who had illegally entered into Macedonia, with the expressed intention of submitting an application for asylum in the country. The Red Cross of Macedonia appeared as an institution which is responsible for providing humanitarian assistance and the care of migrants, providing assistance and protection against adverse factors. These institutional measures and decisions to some extent helped and are still helping in the process of resolving the migratory flows in the Republic of Macedonia.

Statistical data of the migration flows as of November 2015

The long term conflicts and the ongoing collisions in some of the Middle East countries, especially in Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq have caused enormous international concern and international humanitarian and security involvement. The instability of the region, has caused the displacement of population both internally and externally. As a way of escaping the armed conflict, most of the population is looking towards moving into European Union countries. The road to their goal goes through the South East European countries and these countries are the first to face the influx of migrants from the Middle East. Migration flows from the Middle East caused a migration crisis that was recognized in the spring of 2015, and continued undiminished in the summer and autumn months of 2015.

According to the data from the Ministry of the Interior, in the period from 19 June 2015 to 12 November 2015 there were transit or residence certificates issued in total to 241,649 foreign nationals, out of which:

143,622	Males
36,333	Females
55,086	Children in total
42,636	Children who accompany the holder of the certificate
12,450	Unaccompanied children who had been issued a certificate of expressed intent to submit a request for recognition the right of asylum




Figure 1: Issuance of certificates / Source: Ministry of interior of the Republic of Macedonia, information gained by e-mail in December 2015

According to the citizenship of the persons who were issued certificates, the most numerous are citizens of:

Country	Citizens
Syria	137,006
Afghanistan	45,451
Iraq	16,310
Pakistan	4,515
Iran	3,813
Palestine	1,758
Somalia	1,080
Bangladesh	990
Congo	504

Morocco	291
Algeria	281
Nigeria	264
Lebanon	255

There are migrants from other countries, but they are very few.




Figure 2: Migrants according to citizenship / Source: Ministry of interior of the Republic of Macedonia, information gained by e-mail in December 2015

Before 4 November 2015, there were 70 requests submitted to the Department for Asylum for recognizing the right for asylum, based on previously issued confirmation.

From the total number of requests for asylum, 15 requests from Syria relate to children accompanied by their parents and 8 requests relate to children accompanied by their parents from the other states.

Number of requests	Country
51	Syria

5	Afghanistan
3	Pakistan
2	Morocco
2	Lebanon
2	Palestine
2	Algeria
2	Iraq
1	Egypt

Bearing in mind the instability in the Middle East and the everyday conflicts in that part of the world, it is assumed that the number of migrants and the number of asylum applications will increase in South East European countries. According to the geographical location of the Republic of Macedonia, the tendency for such asylum-migrant processes undoubtedly will increase.

What can this crisis refer to?

So far, the aforementioned information can lead to the conclusion that the migratory movements themselves are related to conflict and criminal actions. The data suggest that migration flows are the result of instability and conflicts that occur in the countries of the Middle East. However, one of the key questions is why the largest number of migrants flees away from the conflicts in their countries, all the way to the European Union? Will the European Union protect them enough and will those seeking asylum ever be returned to their countries of origin?

Theory and practice recognize seven causes of migration: increasing armed violence, ethnic and racial conflicts, aspects of globalization, such as unemployment and cultural conflict, degradation of the environment, induced migration, the rejection of democracy and highly prevalent corruption (Adler and Gielen, 2003, p. 14).

Mass migrations taking place from the Middle East heading towards the European Union countries, point out that the reasons are not only increased armed violence in specific areas, but may include some aspects of globalization as a reason for migrating. That would include the search for better economic conditions. If the only reason for

mass migration is the armed conflicts, then the migration should not occupy the so-called Balkan migration corridor. In other words, the neighboring countries would be the first to face migration in the greatest number.

Syria, as a country that has recently been confronted with armed conflicts is taken as an example in this paper. The movement of migration from 2012 until today shows a growing trend of migration flows to countries of the European continent.

Total number of Syrian refugees, March 2012 to August 2015




Figure 3: Movement of migration / Source: www.vox.com, November 2016

Figure 4 shows the countries where the migratory movements arise. According to this, we can conclude that the majority of the population that emigrated from concretely marked countries does not immigrate to the surrounding neighboring countries. Mostly, they move towards the countries of the European continent, whether there is an armed threat in their home country or not. This is the dilemma that engulfed the European continent. This dilemma causes different attitudes between the state apparatus of the European countries.




Figure 4: Countries of migratory movements / Source: www.hrw.org, February, 2017

According to the statistical data, the Republic of Macedonia has faced many migration crises. When analyzing the data obtained before the migration crisis of 2015, we can conclude that the previous migration flows mostly consisted of refugees who were fleeing from the neighboring countries of Macedonia where armed conflicts had occurred. What differs from this, the further data obtained in 2015 demonstrates that most of the migrants were fleeing from the Middle Eastern countries. Bearing in mind that most of the migrants used the Republic of Macedonia as a transit zone, we can conclude that even though armed conflicts have occurred, most of the migrants were heading towards western European countries in search of better economic living conditions.

Conclusion

Macedonia is a country that has faced migratory movements for many years. Migration is a crisis in one country due to the large number of people who have gained illegal entry. Mass migratory movements create a number of negative aspects of migration, such as creating large amounts of waste, increasing health risks, providing accommodation facilities, ensuring smooth and safe transport to another destination for migrants concerned, the occurrence of criminal activities and so on. Such emergent problems create serious challenges for the country. Therefore, the Republic of Macedonia since the beginning of its independence from Yugoslavia, has enacted legislation that tackles these issues.

In terms of increased migratory movements, the authorities are undertaking additional actions. The current migration crisis that happened in the Balkans and the European Union provoked the countries to take enhanced measures. Bearing in mind the unpreparedness and the lack of facilities to accommodate such a large number of migrants, the countries of the region have taken drastic measures to transfer the migrants to other areas.

When trying to answer the following question: “Is it the armed conflicts in the countries which provide the origins of migration or the main aim for migration is looking for better economic conditions for living?”, a doubt has risen about the refugees and economic migrants. Numerous analysis confirm that the armed crisis that reigns in the countries where migrants originate from, does not provide strong enough evidence that migrants are fleeing from their home countries because of armed conflicts. It would be logical for them to migrate and seek asylum in neighboring countries of their home countries. This statement forced the countries which face the migrant crisis to take additional measures and segregate migrants: migrants from armed conflicts (refugees) and migrants in search of better economic living conditions so-called economic migrants. Therefore, as a conclusion to this chapter it can be said that both refugees and economic migrants can find a place in these migration flows. Maybe the reason is the armed conflicts in the migrants’ domestic countries; however most of them are not fleeing to their neighboring countries. Instead they head towards Europe that makes us conclude that most of the migrants are searching for better economic living conditions.

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Mitigating the Effects of War on Vulnerable Populations: Quaker Aid to Spanish Refugee Women in France in the Aftermath of the Spanish Civil War

Immaculada Colomina Limonero

Abstract

This paper deals with the humanitarian relief programs carried out in France by the *American Friends Service Committee*, generally known as *American Quaker Friends*, which focused on refugee women, mostly from Spain. This work is part of a broader research project on the aid provided by American organizations to Spanish civilians during and after the Spanish Civil War. Chronologically, it covers the period between early 1939 to November 1942, when the Germans invaded the remaining French free territory and the relief actions were transferred to the French Quakers or *Secours Quaker*. My research is mostly based on primary sources; archive materials in the central headquarters of the organization in Philadelphia, U.S.A.

Keywords: Learning the lessons of history, refugee camps, The Quakers, Post-conflict assistance.

Introduction

The Spanish Civil War ended in 1939 when the loyalist government was defeated by the insurgent army. Almost half a million people fled the country then, away from the repression by the new leader General Francisco Franco. Even though part of the refugees returned to Spain soon after Franco's victory, those who were politically committed did not return; there is no official data on the exact numbers, but according to researcher Alicia Alted (2012), there were 278,500 displaced to various countries.

France, as a neighbouring country, was one of the ways out from Spain and had been receiving refugees ever since the war began in 1936. However, most crossed the borders on foot between January and March 1939 –one of the harshest winters of the 20th century. Others crossed the sea to Northern Africa, to the territories under French dominion in Algeria and Tunisia. None of these countries were prepared to receive the crowds that arrived in search of aid and refuge, and most of them were secluded in camps; in the case of Northern Africa, these camps were right in the desert, whereas in France they were mainly on the Southern beachfront. In both cases, they were set up in vast sandy extensions of barren land, with no sanitation and the lack of minimal shelter from the cold or the rain, miserable conditions in wire-fenced enclosures controlled by Senegalese police on horseback serving the French government.

The international community was not alien to the drama of the Spanish refugees and various international organizations provided relief at the camps. Among them, British and American Quakers (*Friends Service Committee* and *American Friends Service Committee, AFSC*) carried out active work that has not been sufficiently recognized to date. Both began their relief work in Spain in 1936 and when the war ended they followed the crowd of refugees crossing the borders, providing aid along the way.

Once on French territory, they set up offices in various locations across the country in order to achieve maximum effectiveness; these were opened or moved as needed. By the end of 1940, Quakers had delegations in Marseilles, Toulouse, Montauban, Montpellier, Lyon and Perpignan. Around that same time, the Bordeaux delegation, on the occupied territory, was transferred to Biarritz (AFSC, 1940, July 3). The Paris office, which did not stop working, transferred its operations to Marseilles in the summer of 1940, becoming the central Quaker headquarters in France (AFSC, 1940, December 21).

Relief work was varied and in order to implement their projects they worked jointly with other local and foreign organizations. They set up and funded children's

colonies; they distributed food, clothing, and shoes; they set up training workshops, language schools, and occupational workshops. Quaker offices also provided social services, as well as medical and dental care; medicines –including life-saving medicines such as insulin- were also provided (In 1941 Denmark sent one hundred thousand insulin units as a donation to the Quakers) (AFSC, 1941). A good part of the work focused on child care, providing clothes, food, vitamins and extra rations at the soup kitchens. Despite the fact that aid to children was the initial goal, relief was extended to other population groups based on certain internal reports such as one dated in 1940 which talked of 2,800 wounded war veterans among the estimated 100,000-140,000 Spanish refugees.

Relief Action for Child and Female Refugees

Child health and welfare was one of the Quakers' primary objectives. According to an internal memo on the relief to be provided to mothers in the Toulouse area, the number of pregnant Spanish refugees in September 1940 was estimated at one hundred (AFSC, 1940, October 7). Soon the need to take care of them before and after giving birth was highlighted. For this reason, they were given bigger food rations. But still, many women in the camps suffered from severe malnutrition. This meant that their babies were not as healthy, and they suffered from post-delivery complications often producing less maternal milk. Due to the increase in numbers of debilitated mothers, one of the main projects was to distribute milk for babies, toddlers, and breastfeeding mothers. According to the reports, the number of premature infants and child mortality rates peaked in 1941.

Quakers managed the donations from various American organizations and individuals. With the American funding, they purchased milk and other milk derivatives from Switzerland and the U.S.A., which was then distributed to day-care centers, soup kitchens, nurseries, and schools. As a report of June 1940, Marseilles had fifty delivery points that were stocked every two weeks. By the end of this same year ten thousand infants whose mothers were not able to breastfeed received one pint (the equivalent of two cups) of milk per day (AFSC, 1940). The following year five thousand babies benefitted too. Delivery took place in small official stations, where there was a nursery in which child care classes were given, and advice was provided on how to better look after the child in each case. Children's health and weight was monitored. The reports show the success of the project with an increase in the children's weight curves.

Elna's Maternity, founded at the end of 1939, is the best example of a relief center for pregnant mothers. Here, they could give birth outside the camps in optimal sanitary

and health conditions, also benefiting from better nutrition. It was managed by the Swiss with the financial support of the International Commission for the Assistance of Child Refugees from the fall of 1940 until 1942 when the International Red Cross took over.

Another relief center was the *Centre Roseraie*, directed by a Spanish physician, Dr. De Aranguren. In the maternity section of this center, there were fifty-one births in 1938 and fifty-two in the following year (AFSC, 1939). It was set up in an old hotel by the sea and, apart from a hospital, a maternity ward and a children's hospital, it served as a home for wounded veterans and some of their widows who did not have a place to live.

At the occupational workshop, wounded or sick men made metal or wooden items that were sold at the markets (including shoes, drawing pencils, and baskets). They were re-educated to go back to civilian life and managed to be self-sufficient through their own work.

La Crèche, in the refugee camp of Argelès –considered to be one of the worst- was created in the need to care for post-delivery mothers that had to return to the camp after giving birth. These recent mothers had to protect their newly-born babies under the tough weather and poor living conditions in the camps. In January 1940 the Quakers asked the French authorities for permission to use two barracks at the camp with the support from the *International Commission for the Assistance of Refugee Children*. This organization was respected by the French, the Spanish, and other refugees. It provided furnishings, medical and sanitary equipment; it made the necessary reforms in the premises and provided all the necessary things, including food. The *International Commission for the Assistance of Refugee Children* was also funding *Elna's Maternity* at this time (AFSC, 1941).

La Crèche was fully operative in February 1940. It included a kitchen; one barrack for mothers and babies, and another for expectant mothers that could not be accommodated at *Elna's Maternity*. Both barracks were managed by a Swiss nurse and a Spanish doctor under the direction of the French government.

The Quaker office in Marseilles was the main location from which all Spanish child refugee colonies in France were managed. Apart from the administration offices, the building had a soup kitchen that served between 4,000 and 5,000 meals a month for the general public. There was also an employment office that procured an average of seventy jobs in 1942, as well as providing clothing for those hired; clothes came from American donors and from the Red Cross (AFSC, 1942).

That same building hosted a unique, pioneering project: a *Cooperative Club* held and maintained by the Quakers with funding from American organizations. It was funded in Marseilles at the end of 1940 for woman refugees in the last part of their pregnancy or mothers with very young babies with no other place to live. They were usually alone and had no resources or shelter. The women would come to the Club in a poor condition of health after tough stays at the refugee camps. But it was not only a hospital where health care, food, and vitamins were provided so that women could gather the physical and spiritual strength needed to go on. According to the report dated on 28 February 1941, there were 41 women and ten infants in the home. There are also documents dated at the end of 1943 that demonstrate that there was an average of fifty women of various nationalities and of all ages that stayed at the Club between January 1941 and November 1943. Here, women worked and lived in a mutually cooperative way to keep the Club. They lived in the community, sharing cooking, cleaning and other household duties. Work was assigned to them based on their health condition. The Club was such a success that the Quaker offices in Perpignan and Toulouse requested that they implement a similar project, but their initiative did not materialize. Thus, the Cooperative Club remained the only one of its kind. When all functions and projects were transferred to the Secours Quaker *The Cooperative Club* continued under the name of *Foyer Féminin*.

Self-help Projects

Self-help projects were aimed at women's empowerment. They received training, fostering their self-esteem and keeping them away from depression. These actions were highly valued and were considered a success. Every Quaker site organized workshops in order to promote women's social integration and help them regain dignity through work. Such workshops were not a new idea, but they were very effective in helping beneficiaries feel useful and empowered. The first sewing workshop outside a refugee camp opened in January 1941 and was located at the Catalan Refugee Centre of Perpignan. Two women sewed at this workshop, with two sewing machines. The great success led to the opening of more workshops where they not only made new items of clothing, but also mended and transformed old clothes. These clothes were distributed to hospitals, orphanages, child colonies, schools, refugee camps and other needy people. Thanks to the clothes made at the workshops plus donations from America, pregnant women were offered all the necessary clothing for their babies. However, for their smooth operation materials such as needles, cotton, and other basic items were needed. These were difficult to obtain in France so they were shipped from the United States.

The biggest workshops (Toulouse and Marseilles) were extended in 1943 to cover three sections, given their enormous workload: knitting, underwear and the sewing of clothes (AFSC, 1944). They employed an average of 25 women, of various ages and nationalities. Smaller workshops employed between eight and fifteen women, depending on the period. The social benefit of those workshops was unquestionable, and they meant a lot more than just a workplace for the women involved. Workers enjoyed warm food and certain social benefits, such as a fully paid maternity leave of six weeks (AFSC, 1944, January 18). Smaller workshops only offered work in exchange for room and board like the one in Toulouse where eight women worked by the end of 1941. In such cases, the workshop was not only a workplace but a place where you could live and eat (AFSC, 1942, January 26).

The End of Relief Work

During the German occupation of France the new Nazi authorities disliked the Quakers – let us remember they were Americans and despite their non-profit, charitable nature it was peopled by aliens from enemy countries in wartime. Despite their respected status, the situation eventually became unsustainable. They had to face numerous problems that the French government was unable to solve: endless bureaucracy, constant restrictions, fuel and food blockades, and difficult transportation and distribution. On 3 May 1941, with the permission of the French government, the American Quakers began the gradual transfer of their activities to French Quakers, the *Secours Quaker*. Thus, the *American Friends Service Committee* was officially disbanded in France on 11 November 1942. By the end of the Second World War this organization unified Quakers from various nationalities in a group of three hundred workers in eight delegations across France, who carried out the relief projects of eight delegations in France. For many years after the end of the Second World War, these relief workers carried out their projects with the same degree of commitment and determination as did their American predecessors.

Conclusion

The Knowledge of past experiences and the historical solutions concerning the placement of women and children refugees on foreign soil and how the crises was handled, may help the current decision-making process for better policies and actions within the framework of the European Union. In this paper we demonstrate the role of the American Quakers as one of the few international relief organization authorized to serve in French refugee camps was crucial to protecting the displaced population and saving many lives. The flight of the refugees after the Spanish civil war, their reception and resettlement in France, clearly unprepared and unable to take care and shelter the newcomers, serves as an historical scenario for confronting the reception of displaced people in Europe today.

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Lines and Frames: Architecture in a Period of Migration

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Abstract

The current state of growing uncertainty, instability and change in the current world has rendered our spatial perceptions blurred, fragmented and contradictory. In a period of substantial geopolitical crisis, uneven economic distribution, and climate change, with a growing number of people in a state of transit from poor and war-torn countries to more prosperous parts of the world, we can hardly talk about stable forms in a social and physical sense. But what are the forms and spatial patterns of the world during a period of continuous change? Could a certain depth structure be recognized in the contemporary dynamic of social and spatial transformation? Starting from the basic structure of human perception, and the basic spatial patterns such as center, line and domain, we shall attempt to derive the defined forms, not just as a form of representation but also as a form of action in the contemporary world. The aim of this chapter is to explore the connection between physical and social change; firstly through the elicitation of the defined forms of representation; and, secondly through an ability to act through them. Through a series of examples of hybrid spatial and social situations, we shall map the effectiveness of the defined spatial forms as strategies of transformation in different contexts in the world. As such, the line and the frame as opposing forms, act as the representation of the condition of change, but additionally as an opportunity for a new formal structure in the period of migration.

Keywords: line, frame, square, transformation, non-figurative architecture, migration.

Introduction

In a period of substantial geopolitical crisis, uneven economic distribution, and climate change, we can hardly talk about stable forms in a social and physical sense. We are now witnessing the highest levels of displacement on record. An unprecedented 65.3 million people around the world have been forced from their homes. Among them are nearly 21.3 million refugees, over half of whom are under the age of 18. There are also 10 million stateless people who have been denied a nationality and access to basic rights such as education, healthcare, employment and freedom of movement. In a world where nearly 34,000 people are forcibly displaced every day as a result of conflict or persecution (UNHCR, 2017).

But what are the forms and spatial patterns of the world during this state of continuous change? Could a certain depth structure be recognized in the contemporary dynamic of social and spatial transformation? The form of inhabitation incorporates the physical structure, spatial configurations and the social structure. Housing is defined as a process and an artifact, as a way of living and its physical imprint. Different cultures in different conditions project different types of housing (Rapoport, 1969). They have different types of expression and a different investment in physical, material and meaningful, symbolic structures. This is why in extremely unstable, insecure and shifting conditions, the question of the form of inhabitation is important in recognizing, understanding and practicing the typologies of housing as well as distinct socio-cultural contexts.

Christian Norberg Schultz has pointed out the archetypical conditions of behavior in space, which he connected to the psycho-physical dealings of man (Norberg Schultz, 1985). In his eyes, existence is the establishing of a meaningful relationship between man and a given environment. This relationship is represented, firstly by the act of, “identification”, belonging to a certain place, the determination of the world and secondly by the act of “orientation”, the ability to move through the world. Therefore, the dialectics of the place and the path of departure and return, is essential in any existential space. He defined the basic schemes of spatial orientation as the “center”, “path” and “domain” (surface). But what happens in the periods of change, in extreme social, cultural and spatial conditions? How will these basic spatial schemes express themselves as the exclusive results of changed conditions?

In the conditions of evermore intensive migrations, resettling from the crisis ridden areas to the more stable regions of the world and when an ever-growing number of emigrants are moving from east to west, from south to north, from Africa and Asia to Europe, the changes in the social and spatial conditions of the world are expressed in

the most direct way (Figure 1). These are movements along certain corridors, certain geographical lines which have the best economy of motion and through which the emigrants penetrate into Europe. In the same way, the transit countries which are attempting to stop these motions are using lines of exclusion, such as barriers, fences and walls, as well as exclusion zones, surfaces and frames as temporary stopping points for migrants. So, in a dramatic way, we are back to the main geometrical characteristics and schemes of the organization of space. Hence, in the metastable contemporary world, things with their historic occurrences are neither surpassed nor do their boundaries disappear, but they occur in different ways in the new reality. How can we today recognize the lines and frames as the main organizational form and use them in architectonic projects? In several episodes, we shall show a different interpretation of the line and surfaces in different urban - rural contexts.



Figure 1: A columns of migrants moves along the path in Rigonce, Slovenia, in October, 2015.

It is exactly the unequal development, the unequal distribution of goods and resources that are the source of geopolitical polarization, militarization, and the uncontrolled motion of people. What should have been overcome a long time ago, becomes the basis of our world. The simultaneously uneven geographic development caused opposing motions of neo-liberalism with a number of possibilities and barriers in looking for alternatives (Harvey, 2006, pp. 69-116).

Sequences of Inhabitation, Figures of Exclusion

In critical situations forms of inhabitation are to be understood as dynamic sequences. The migrant crisis became a context through which we could unfold conflicting settlement procedures. The recent wave of migrants reconsiders Europe in many essential aspects; social, cultural, and spatial. A particular segment of migrant flow, currently known as the Balkan Route, dramatically sets elementary human values. The Balkan route covers the period 2014-2016, although informally as a line of refugees and migrants it is not a new phenomenon, but in the summer of 2015 with the escalation of the wave of migrants this has been transformed into a formalized corridor (Bez nec, Speer, Stojić Mitrović, 2016).

The Balkan Route, 2014-2016

The Balkan route was the only channel which allowed migrant inflow into Europe, it is estimated that nearly 800,000 migrants have passed through this route. The route consists of sequences of an array of countries from Turkey, Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia to Slovenia, as transit countries (bridge countries), as opposed to destination countries, primarily Germany. In the initial period the route continued from Serbia to Hungary, but because of the militarization of the southern border of Hungary, the route was redirected to Croatia and Slovenia (Figure 2).



Figure 2: The Balkan Route, 2014-2016. / Source: Eurostat, Frontex.

With regard to the form of inhabitation in an intensive migration period, we can differentiate certain models throughout the flow. The differentiation of the migrant wave is best understood as the unfolding of two parallel processes: (1) the evolving population structure of the migrant population; and (2) the gradual replacement of criminal mechanisms of migration with government mechanisms (Mandić, 2017).

Migrant structure is transformed in a few crucial phases: social, economic, gender and age structure changes from a well-educated majority of young men to a poorer, less educated majority of women, children and the elderly; the ethnic/national ratios evolved from different nations to only three source nations: Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan; traveling units evolved from individuals and couples to groups of five to fifteen; transport transformed from illegal movement toward government-sponsored transportation; as the speed of migration accelerated.

Consequently, the forms of inhabitations should look at the stages of this dynamic process. If the first phase is assimilated to existing physical structures of urban and rural situations in informal illegal camps or "safe" houses. Reports indicate the two villages, Lojane and Vaksince on the northern border of the Republic of Macedonia, led by illegal structures. In the second phase there were sequences of movement, from the camp in Gevgelija on the border with Greece, to the camp in Tabanovce on the border with Serbia.

The transformation of the patterns of movement reflect the speed, from five to fifteen days in an informal illegal flow, up to 24 hours in the corridor formalized by the introduction of 72-hour document for transit through Macedonia.

72-hour city: Thus the whole system turned into a certain paradigm of movement: the camp in Gevgelija, the organized rail transport from the southern to the northern border and camp in Tabanovce. Thus the forms of settlement were a sequences of this mass movement as places to stop and the line of travel, a sort of "72-hour city".

The experience of the Balkan corridor as the most direct way set patterns of inhabitation within the mass movement as basic schemas of *paths and goals*. The basic sequences that are a fragmented and reduced practice of inhabitation can be seen in the various situations in which the usual spatial syntax of human habitats is composed. We will adopt the line and the square (the frame) as basic spatial images, extracted from the basic schemes of spatial orientation, the path and the goal. Through several different historical episodes and spatial situations, we will reconstruct their phenomenon as exclusive figures of settlement and organization.

A Line

A line is length without breadth (Pickering, 2010/1847). A line's character depends on the interpretation of this geometrical characteristic. Lines are symbolic and concrete organizational forms of the new modern times. In several key positions, we shall consider the genesis and the modes of their interpretation.

Architecture as a part of the modern movement accepted the consequent stage of production. The practices of Taylorism and Fordism were proposed as models for the regeneration of architecture and society (Hill, 2003; McLeod, 1983). Architecture should be seen as a means of dissolving the existing needs of people at different levels and their massive application. To that effect, the line of connection, or the line of production in both a conceptual and concrete sense as a line of machines and workers in a factory with a product that moves along while it is being built or produced became the main organizational model of space. The use of an assembly line reduced the assembly of cars from 12 hours to 93 minutes. The increase in the speed of assembly meant faster availability, giving an impetus to the American car culture as well as an increase in the mobility of society (Figure 2).



Figure 2: Workers on an assembly line at the Ford Motor Co.'s Highland Park. The use of an assembly line reduced the assembly of cars from 12 hours to 93 minutes. Retrieved from http://www.cleveland.com/business/index.ssf/2012/07/minimum_wage_hike.html

The line as a continuous action is an expression of the modern paradigm, both of production and the social and spatial organization. We are following the spatial approximation of production models in a number of anthological examples, namely architecture as an infrastructure in the proposals for the city-viaduct by Le Corbusier. These showed the idea of the line in a most suggestive way, as a pluralistic infrastructure, as a dialogue between architecture and theory, and as a programmatic layering of parallel bands.

In the 1930s, ideas about the linear form of the city developed as extreme scenarios in respect to their structure and position. Le Corbusier proposed a model of the city arising from the logic of traffic infrastructure, a city-viaduct, on two challenging locations, namely Rio de Janeiro (1929) and Alger (1930-33) (Frampton, 1985/1980, Frampton, 2001) (Figure 3).




Figure 3: Le Corbusier, A city-viaduct against the dramatic background of Rio de Janeiro, 1930.
Source: Tossiaki Oba, 2015.

In the drawings of the city-viaduct, we see a wavy line that penetrates into or is layered and juxtaposed in relation to the landscape. The theme of the linear form is derived through the direct relationship between architecture and territory. The territory and its environment is not only a background, nor is it simply a system in which architecture dissolves, but the actual material of the architecture that it modifies or

governs. In their sensual play, the play of the line and the ground, we may refer to the eroticized lines of the Le Corbusier's drawings of female figures from this period (Figure 4).




Figure 4: Le Corbusier, female nude. Alger, 1931. Source: McLeod, 1998, p. 500.

But behind the modernization of a territory, a colonial mission of transformation and integration can be found, through which, in the case of Algeria, the French rule, of not just Algeria but the entire continent will be established (Çelik, 1992). In several of Le Corbusier's drawings a spatial axis which from Europe continues to Africa is represented, connecting France through the Mediterranean to Algeria (Figure 5). Along this axis, tall structures are distributed, which are meant to unify Greater France through novel architecture and urbanism. So the meaning of the axis as a linear distribution of new architectural transformation confirms the colonial discourse as an affirmation of the mission of civilization (*mission civilisatrice*).




Figure 5: Le Corbusier, diagrammatic maps showing geographical axis between France and Algiers. Source: Çelik, 1992, pp. 58-77.

In the “Bull” series of 1946, Picasso demonstrated how the entirety of the presentation of the bull is reduced to just a continuous linear gesture. Through 12 lithographs of one and the same object of presentation, he shows the development of a piece of art from academic to abstract level. In the series of presentations, Picasso sets apart the image of the bull to disclose its essential presence through a progressive analysis of its form. Each sheet is a successive level of research toward expressing the spirit of the presentation by reducing the drawing. In the final presentation, Picasso reduces the bull to a simple contour (Figure 6). However, while the line resulting from progressive reduction and showing the essence of the presentation fascinates and captivates us, the entirety of the body with all the brutalities and attractions of its animal energy is lost and missing.




Figure 6: Pablo Picasso, 'Bull - plate 11', January 17, 1946 (lithograph). / Source: Pablo Picasso – Bull: A Master Class in Abstraction. Retrieved from http://www.artfactory.com/art_appreciation/animals_in_art/pablo_picasso.htm

A Square

In geometry, a square is a flat, two-dimensional geometrical figure with four equal sides and four straight angles. It represents a certain surface extracted from its environment, and is described as closeness, exclusion, surrounding, and confinement; something which is projected upon something else, something that needs protection, framing and closing. Therefore, through a square, through its frame, different spatial and social conformations are conveyed. The square is a window of imaginary utopic visions or an example of different spatial, social experiments.

The figure of the sanctuary of Asklepios Soter in Pergamon is constructed as a basic frame, a square and supplement, upgrade or ingrade, as a type of mechanism, or instrument of healing and protection (Figure 7). We can connect the term apparatus (*apparecchio*) as a means or an instrument for unfolding the events (Rossi, 1981). This exclusivity of the frame and the surface will remain in any further interpretation.





Figure 7: The sanctuary of Asclepius Soter at Pergamon. / Source: Sanctuary of Asclepius. Retrieved from <http://kannelura.info/?p=1317>

The projection of the “society of equality” by Robert Owen in spatial interpretation is in the ideal figure, the square (Figure 8). Robert Owen believed that in the forming of the character of man, the key influence is the environment. Therefore it is necessary for new generations to be placed in a better and superior environment (Owen, 1920). From 1816, Robert Owen elaborated the concept of new types of communities of 500 to 1,500 individuals, with a balanced combination of agriculture and production in the form of a large square. Traditional practices of collaboration in rural agriculture are now provided by a modern and rational spatial frame.



A VIEW & PLAN OF THE VILLAGES OF UNITY & MUTUAL CO-OPERATION.
 DESCRIBED IN MR OWEN'S REPORT ON THE POOR. 1817

Figure 8: Robert Owen (1817). Plan for Villages of Unity and Mutual Cooperation. A New View of Society. / Source: Robert Owen: The Delicious Dream of the Future. Retrieved from <http://specialcollections.vassar.edu/exhibit-highlights/2006-2010/owen/communities.html>

The relationship between geometry and the geopolitical landscape is shown in a very explicit way in the project entitled 'The City of Refugees', *Cité de Réfuge* (Office, Geers & Van Severen, 2007) (Figure 9). The project expresses the polarized condition of the border zone between Ceuta and Tangier, between Spain and Morocco, between Europe and Africa. A square of 483x483m is interpolated in the no man's land, as a frame constructed from a colonnade structure. Inside the perimeter are all the infrastructural and program elements of a border crossing. The space inside is left free, without a predetermined program. In this way, through an extreme scenario the contradiction of this border is expressed, but at the same time, the project explores the city, the form of inhabitation in most radical and concise form as a conceived deed, a political decision (Office, Green, Van Severen, 2007).





Figure 9: Office Kersten Geers David Van Severen, (2007). Cité de Réfuge. / Source: Office, Geers, Van Severen, 2007.

In 1915 Kazimir Malevich represented the “Black Square” in the “Last Futuristic Exhibition of Paintings 0.10”, in Petrograd. The painting of a “Black Square” was a twist towards non-objective painting, the prevailing interpretation of the realistic appearance of reality. This was an icon of the theory of non-objectiveness, that was meant to evoke pure immaterial experience in a white void, to go to the other side of the known towards the new realism of incorporeal creation (Figure 10). “Only when consciousness is liberated from the habit of seeing pieces of nature, Madonnas and shameless Veneras in the paintings, shall we witness the true work of art” (Malevich,

1916). Thus, apostrophizing the pure form returns us the null position of a “new realism”, about which Malevich spoke, whilst facing us with the basic ontological questions of our own existence.




Figure 10: Kazimir Malevich (1915). Black Square. / Source: Retrieved from https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kazimir_Malevich,_1915,_Black_Suprematic_Square,_oil_on_linen_canvas,_79.5_x_79.5_cm,_Tretyakov_Gallery,_Moscow.jpg

Through the critical phases of comprehension and practice of the form of inhabitations, we can perceive a historical dedication to certain spatial themes as well as their application in the specific period of questioning and deconstructing the continuous architectural language. From the application of political and production models, to the idea of architecture as a tool, the spatial syntax of figurative architecture in the architectural figures of exclusion is broken. In this way the complex continuity has been reduced and excluded in particular extracted figures.

But the line and the square in the history of architecture have a complex and contradictory geometrical and program meaning as primary forms which experience different ideal imprints. This ambivalence, the program interpretation and elemental formality of their dedication, makes them essential for spatial and social questions throughout history, from open forms of distribution to closed, conserved forms of architectural artifacts. Thus, we want to use this duality of forms in the line and the square as a basis of non-figurative architecture, which will establish a distinct dialogue with a program, as well as a place, thereby resulting in an archetypical form which can have a direct, but at the same time autonomous relationship with the program as a changeable content, and a place as a territorial entity.

Towards Non-figurative Architecture

In a number of projects from architectural studies, we used the basic conditions, the line and the frame, not as dominant models related to systems and strategies of hierarchical organization but as a direct tactic of urban and rural transformation - to return it to the real needs for surprise and utilization. In the research carried out through the project, we called the referent approaches and methods of transformation, tactics unlike strategies that meant complete systemic and hierarchical approaches to the city. Tactics are approaches that arise from the local situation. Through two explored cases we will reflect the recent situation, in relationship with the domination of the formal organization, as the linear distribution of a frame.

Roadside Picnic

In the project “Roadside Picnic”, the condition of the Balkans from the perspective of a certain unforeseeable future is presented (Tasic, 2016). The project consists of the graphical part of a diagram, and a picturesque representation and a story (Figure 10). The story is shown in its entirety:

“Roadside Picnic: The Lost Balkan city”

For a long time, the vertical structures in a regular rhythm along the Vardar valley, running in the north-south direction, in the southern part of the Balkan Peninsula have been an enigma. Who erected them and why? Their regularity points to a certain intent and activity, their configuration and typology towards certain symbolisms and permanence. For a long time, they have been deserted, and afterwards the entire surrounding zone closed off. Different stories have been spread about the previous inhabitants of the area, thousands that at a certain moment erected the vertical structures as a linear city. Some said that they are symbolic monuments, without a specific purpose, that they are necropolises, fortifications, the deeds of a faraway civilization and even alien artifacts from unknown visitors. But no one ever knew anything with certainty, except that they originated in the early XXI century. There were witnesses of strange and inexplicable things, happening in the closed zones, shadows of people, sightings of desperate children, women and men, of desperation and hope, of different voices telling their own stories. At the edge of these zones, existed people who had the ability to enter them, and they were guides into the uncertainty of these areas, which are rumored to contain the secret of this world” (Tasic, 2016).

The diagram relates to the north-south direction, which leads along the Vardar and Morava valleys in the territory of Republic of Macedonia and the Balkan Peninsula. The marked lines point towards a certain intensity in the past, a distribution in a certain interval of identical physical mechanism. The structures are utilitarian but also symbolic, from the current perspective connected to recent or possible massive movements. So these vertical structures provide places to stay, but also serve as a symbol of presence. In the future there is no document of the events. This project is inspired by the science fiction novel “Roadside Picnic” (Strugatsky and Strugatsky, 1972/77) and furthermore by the movie “Stalker” by Andrei Tarkovsky (1979). The project extends and shows the impossibility of the contact of different civilizations. In the movie an alien visit is suggested, while in the project this is unclear, but is definitely a marking from someone else. Exactly in this condition the layering and interposition as the source of an enigma and oblivion is expressed. The lost city is a repressed memory, but also an opportunity to unfold the relationship between different socio-cultural layers.




Figure 11: Sasha Tasic (mentor), Viktorija Taseva, Maja Velkova, Katerina Ristomanova, Bojan Gjurov, (2016). Architecture during migration.

Square, Forms of Inhabitation, 72-hour City

In the project “Square, forms of Inhabitation”, we develop a scenario for a possible transition of the interaction between different people from different socio-cultural backgrounds. On the border between Greece and the Republic of Macedonia, between the railway and highway lines is an interpolated square, to accept and encourage the refugees in their journey, forming a transfer center of sorts, as a temporary city, a 72-hour city (based on the 72-hour document for transit through Macedonia). The frame is a square shape with dimensions 400x400m, containing a closed service perimeter and an open structure which can accept standard containers, depending on the capacity of visitors. In this way, a continuously mobile system in perpetual construction is formed. The space in the middle remains open and within it is installed the common content, with a utilitarian but also narrative character, a theme park of an instantaneous archeology which is being built and handmade by the refugees, and which references the local area, as well as their home countries. “Amphitheatres”, “temples” and “stoas” are traces of the presence of the refugees from different cultural and spiritual backgrounds (Figure 12).




Figure 12: Katerina Ristomanova, Bojan Gjurov, (2016/2017). Square, forms of inhabitation. Border Crossing, Bogorodica, Integrative Studio UKIM.

Spellbound – Lines on a White Tablecloth

There is something odd about Edwards, the character in the film *Spellbound* by Alfred Hitchcock (1945). He exhibits a hostile reaction when young psychoanalyst Peterson draws certain lines with a fork upon a tablecloth. The main character in this film has a phobia of lines on a white background (Figure 13). An incident caused by his amnesia and a general guilt complex. The lines are connected with tragic events, the murder of his friend during skiing and the accident that happened to his brother in his childhood. These two incidents are associated with a linear structure and disturb him by evoking memories that make him feel guilty hence his attempt at trying to suppress these memories.



Figure 13: Lines on a tablecloth with a fork, footage from the Alfred Hitchcock's film, *Spellbound* (1945).

We are confronted with a world of fragments from different layers of modernization that disturb us consequently we try to suppress our memories of them. However, they are still present. Their historic failure in reorganizing society and the total

environment, blurs their contours. We associate our failure not with the mode of behavior, but with them, as the subject of action.

But what are the forms and spatial patterns of the world during the state of continuous change? Could a certain depth structure be recognized in the contemporary dynamic of social and spatial transformation? Obviously they arise from certain crisis situations. In the condition of continuous change we can recognize certain forms of inhabitations such as extreme scenarios in our everyday lives. If in the past they were a part of an exclusive paradigm of domination, today they appear as fragments of order, but also as opportunities for a new interpretation. How can we today perceive these elementary formal organizations?

Firstly, crisis situations lead us to extreme interpretations of formal patterns. We lose the complex syntax of man's spatial organization and it is reduced to certain primary gestures. In periods of migration, the linear and closed formations become dedicated to the intervention of forms of inhabitation.

Secondly, crisis situations lead us to a reinvestment of the founding principles of order, towards the reconstruction of the basic forms of settlement, as defined forms. Contrary to the continuous deconstruction of form, the basic forms bring us closer to the new realism of the word.

Both cases, "Roadside Picnic, the lost Balkan City" and "Square, Forms of Inhabitation" are related to different conditions of form; firstly, in a metaphysics of form; secondly, in a pragmatic interaction of form. The first describes the impossibility of a true relationship of different cultural affiliations, while the second is about a social and cultural continuity. Formal organizations are traces of possible events, which describe the tragic exclusivity of a lost Balkan city and of the pragmatic performance of a transit city. If both cases depict the separation of human experience, the redirection towards elementary forms depicts the potential, opportunities and limitations of a new reality of a non-figurative architecture.

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**Part Two:
Economic Growth and Solidarity in Europe**

Three Fair Winds in European Sails

Jeremy Cripps

Abstract

Addressing the conference themes, this paper contributes to rethinking on Economic Growth and solidarity in Europe. Rethinking requires facts so that a distinction may be made between the culture of Euro-pessimists, who see the European Union falling apart, and Euro-realists, optimists who base their positive assessments on facts. The facts are clear. The sure foundations for economic growth are in place, the product of investment is in place and the prospects for economic growth are assured. First contribution to future economic growth is European leadership in the Energy efficiency field. Remarkable foundations for cheaper energy, a rapidly expanding set of renewable energy resources and the prospects for European energy independence are described. A second contribution comes from the changing nature of politics in the European Union. Solidarity or the populism movement are shown morphing into a centrist movement of main stream parties as elections in the Netherlands and France have demonstrated. The need for socio-economic adjustment is recognized and underway. A third contribution is the hard earned case being made for the Euro. There is the recognition that that the Euro, an idea once ahead of its time, has caught up with the growth and gradual changes which have been taking place in Europe and which are impacting the quality of life for everyone in the European Union. Based on the facts considered, the prospects for the European Union are positive and prosperous. These are three of the “Fair winds in European Sails.”

Keywords: Recent economic theory, renewable energy, energy efficiency, fair trade, strong Euro.

“We can’t direct the winds, but we can adjust the sails”

(Monson, 2012)

Introduction

The Wall Street Journal is right to recognize that “the Economic Winds are at Europe’s Back” (Sharma, 2017). The pace of economic recovery, albeit “disappointing” until now, “is continuing” (Economist, 2016) and “investors have overlooked Europe’s brightening prospects” (Hildebrand, 2017). Euro-pessimists are readers of Forbes and other magazines that see “the EU’s prospects are bleak” (Lehmann, 2016). Residents of Europe however, are continually more optimistic (Eurobarometer, 2017), they know that Europe includes 6 of “the 10 most competitive economies in the world” (Comen et al, 2015). The Post Second World War, European revival in the industrial and information ages has been supported by global trends which are “richer with opportunity than ever before” (Global Trends, 2017).

Three particular trends in the developing European Economy are causes for optimism. First, “we are witnessing a transformation of global power markets led by renewables” (IEA, 2016). Europe is leading this transformation (EC, 2017). The benefits in terms of low cost even free Internet and communications as a human right (Brookings, 2016), cannot be underestimated. Second, the nature of international institutions in Europe is maturing into a “multi-perspectival society” (Thomas et al, 2011). There is wide recognition that the growth achieved by the European Union has not been proportionately distributed, that neoliberalism “is dead” (Hanson, 2016). In practice, Globalization has proved to be “a boon to the members of the global elite” (Pearlstein, 2011) and protection from the idea of competitive advantage. Dani Rodrik in his book “The Globalization Paradox” (2011) clearly explains how traditional economic theory has become a myth in the global market place. Third, while the value of the Euro may not be obvious to the desk bound observer, commentator, or economist, the benefits of the common currency are immediately obvious to anyone travelling abroad or shopping on line” (Europa, 2017). Clearly the Euro “offers many advantages and benefits” (Johnsen, 2015). These then are the three fair winds in the sails of Europe that will produce “beneficial reforms” that “ultimately transform the bloc into a more effective entity” (Archick, 2017).

Literature Review

Recently the traditional theory on the absolute and comparative advantages of international trade, found in every undergraduate text on Economics (Mankiw, 2014; Samuelson and Nordhaus, 2009; etc.) and one of the essential aims of the World Trade Organization (WTO, 2017) has been proved to be “out of date and effectively dead” (Poweronomics, 2017). There is an increasing realization that a distinction must be made “between traditional theory and recent theory” (Soren Kjeldsen-Kragh, 2001). The global market place provides a bureaucracy of barriers to the idea of free trade. Rules and regulations established by multilateral trade agreements have built huge legal barriers. They protect the elite corporate organizations from competition especially when the market for goods and services changes.

The European Union is one of several multi-national organizations which have demonstrated that transnational trade agreements have led to significant economic growth. The European Union GDP Annual Growth Rates from 1996 – 2017 (Trading Economics, 2017) confirm such a pattern of sustained economic growth. However, while the overall GDP growth rate has been positive, more detailed analysis for the World Economic Forum reveals significant variations of growth within the European Union membership (Myers, 2016). The Gini, which measures income inequality, confirms a growing gap between rich and poor within the European Union (Eurostat, 2017). Data also confirms that Overall European Union wage growth (2009-2017) was 1.7 per cent during a period when inflation was 1.8% (Trading Economics, 2017), indicating that the benefits of growth were going to those who held “capital” rather than fairly to all those whose work was generating the economic growth. The data was further confirmed by Deloitte when preparing their 2017 Mid-year Economic Webinar.

Recently celebrated United States economists noted that increased trade with China “caused severe and permanent harm to many American workers” (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2016). The debate between the left-leaning economists who theorize “negative” effects of free trade and more conservative economists who theorize “positive” are now challenged. Economists ought no longer to consider the case for free trade “on theory alone.” Now the time has come to build their arguments “on a foundation of evidence” (Denning, 2016).

The evidence suggests that one of the features with multinational trade agreements is that the negotiating teams for the agreements are largely made up of the industries' most experienced leaders (seen as an elite) who tend to look for the trade agreements to provide

- Appropriate “present day” regulation (even restriction) for the purposes of contractual recognition of the trading items – thus regulation may limit “new technological” entrance into the trade agreement markets
- A strategic context which is inevitably seen from the point of view of the industry elites since they are the inevitable products of the limited people available for selection – this confirmed by the data above.
- A (perhaps inevitable) “present-day” rather than a “new technology” (or future) strategic perspective leading to rules and regulations that fail to keep up with (or even recognize) developing technology and discovery.
- A narrow traditional view of “Free” trade, when present marketplace evidence points to a demand for focus on “Fair” trade (Hainmueller, Hiscox, and Sequeira, 2014), this impacting the supply chain for the industry.

Purpose of this Paper

This paper recognizes the preference for facts before fiction, for reality when studying market activity, and for serious reflection on the future prospects for Europe. The paper is therefore written in the context of current market practice in international Trade. Three significant opportunities are considered. Together they clearly show that while the pessimists in Europe expect a break-up (Oliveira, 2015), it is the realists who “will adjust the sails” (Ward, 2009) and provide for the three fair winds to be adjusted to blow “at Europe’s Back” (Sharma, 2017). This paper projects three particular strengths, three fair winds, that will be found to impact the future for Europeans:

- Energy Efficiency
- Rethinking European Union
- Growing Strength of the Euro

Fair Wind: Energy Efficiency

Energy consumption in the European Union is falling (Eurostat, 2017). The reduction reflects “efforts taken by member states ... to cut energy use and improve efficiency” (Harvey, 2015). Part of the reduction can be attributed to the focus on low-cost clean solar power currently led by the UK “with the biggest market ahead of

traditional solar powerhouses Germany and France” (Shankleman, 2015). Europe’s solar power sector is also “on the growth path” and this is an area where the European Union policymakers have an opportunity “to contribute to achieving climate goals” (Gupta, 2016) and to provide “a secure political framework for the generation of self-consumption and the storage of solar energy.” An energy revolution is taking place recognizing “the fast increase of renewable power production” (EUREL, 2013). Europe, already in the vanguard of energy efficiency, is a leading player in the renewable energy revolution and “rapid, affordable energy transformation is, in fact, within our grasp” (McCauley, 2016).

Prospects for continuing energy efficiency in Europe may be expected from many revolutionary energy generation programs that are already in process. Leading the way is ITER (Latin for “the Way”) an international collaborative project to capture the potential of nuclear fusion as an energy source (European Commission, 2016). The ITER project, located in Cadarache, in the South of France, is expected to lead to the provision of “virtually limitless energy” (ITER, 2017). Tokamaks are “toroidal devices for producing controlled nuclear fusion that involves the confining and heating of gaseous plasma.” The cost of constructing a conventional Tokamak required financial commitment from the 35-nation collaborative program. Yet, in the last decade private enterprise has discovered potential for spherical tokamaks as possibly, a faster way to fusion (Kingham, 2017). Clearly the potential for economic growth in Europe depends on energy and clearly fair winds are behind Fusion (Offenberger, 2013).

Europe’s leadership in renewable energy generation is not limited to the Fusion projects. Proactive research continues seeking to maximize solar, wave and tidal energy resources. Today’s solar (mostly crystalline silicon photovoltaics) technologies will “likely scale up to multiple terawatts of capacity by 2030” and that without likely technological advances (Jean, 2015). These advances include a fundamental transformation of revenue generation and conversion from the old analog system to a fully digital network in the energy sector. Solar power in Europe “has a huge amount to gain from this” (Stojanovik, 2017).

The “high power density” of wave energy suggests that wave energy “has the capacity to become the lowest cost renewable energy source” and “there is a growing feeling that wave technology can be successful (Martin, 2009). The World Energy Council has estimated that double the current world electricity production may be produced by wave power (ThinkGlobalGreen, 2017). The Economist (2008) reported that power buoys are being tested off the coast of Scotland by AWS Ocean Energy and Iberdrola off the coast of Spain. Aquamarine, another Scottish firm, is testing their

Oyster wave-power device off the Orkney coast. The Scottish subsidiary of Voith Siemens Hydro has also successfully tested a limpet device. Forbes Magazine (Ferris, 2012) noted that the United States are racing “to catch up to Europe in Wave Energy.”

“A huge jump in turbines in German waters” contributed to record-setting energy generation from wind power in Europe in 2015 (Carrington, 2015). Already the ten biggest wind farms have the capacity to generate 6.9 Terra watt hours “equivalent to the consumption of 1,804,744 average European home” (EWEA, 2013).

Added to the revolution in the exploitation of renewable resource energy resources are technological moves to improve the transfer of power generated, this is known as “cogeneration.” Cogeneration “optimizes the energy supply to all types of consumers” promoting significant cost savings by minimizing the power loss that comes when, after power is generated at source, it must be transferred to the user location (COGEN, 2017). Europe’s proactive approach to energy efficiency is also seen in the ways renewable energy research sharing is being facilitated like the renewable energy transparency platform (European Commission, 2017).

Taken together the prospects for energy efficiency in Europe provide the first of the three fair winds that promise Europe’s future prosperity.

Fair Wind: Rethinking European Union

There are significant differences between the structure of the United States of America and the European Union. Indeed “lawyers would say that the European Union and the United States of America are completely different” (Henning, 2010). Many of these differences derive from the founding philosophies and that may be seen in the structure of many of the socio-economic practices which began these modern nations. The United States Constitution, in only seven articles, identifies the powers of the central government and those denied to it “as few, brief, and well defined” (Niskanen, 2003). The European Union, in contrast, has no constitution. The Constitution proposed in 2004 comprised 448 articles, was divided into four parts and has yet to be ratified. Problems identified include the length of the proposed constitution, the perception that the process was not democratic and the failure to incorporate the public into the decision-making process (Toops, 2010).

The inevitable impact is that “for all the buzzwords” like “efficiency and coherence that emanate from Brussels” there is significant overlap between the 33 Directorate-Generals of the European Commission (Docip, 2017) which provide reasons “for this bureaucratic mess” (Weisbrode and Hofman, 2009). Further the European

bureaucracy is seen to founder in a “taxpayer-fluffed feather bed” while the poor people of Europe “suffer the contempt of Brussels” (Batchelor, 2015). While the United States Constitution enjoys a uniform code of commercial and criminal law, a unified language, and a single currency, the European Union is moving stealthily in that direction as revolutions in technology (and especially the supply of energy) provide increasing support for improvement in the quality of life which a growing number of Europeans enjoy. While across Europe people may not trust the bureaucracy, they “continue to get the greatest satisfaction from their family life and personal relationships” (Eurofound, 2016).

This brings us to the nature of ‘solidarity’ in Europe. Real Solidarity comes with a movement that projects the charisma of shared selfishness. Far from ideological unity, the ‘solidarity,’ the populism, in Europe is the product of socio-economic disarray. There is a wave of recognition that “capital” remains “in the hands of individuals. For the few, a perceived oligopoly, an elite, as already noted, statistical analysis confirms theirs’ is the greater portion of the growth in international trade. For the many, those Europeans whose work makes the fortunes of the few, they are increasingly sensitive to the limited improvement in their lot. The good news, confirmed by the recent elections in the Netherlands is that the mainstream parties, responsive to the demand for change, “are already voicing arguments once heard only on the extremes” (Economist, 2017). So here too we see the sails in Europe being reset.

Fair Wind: The Euro

Then the big story this March is that “Europe’s economy is no longer spluttering” (Sharma, 2017). The World’s Elites recognized that “the economic crisis is over” (Coy, 2017). In Europe “the financial crisis is done, finished” (Coy, 2013). From the elite economists, the conventional viewpoint was that the Euro was “a bad idea” (Mankiw, 2015: Feldstein, 2012: Stiglitz et al, 2016, Worstall, 2016). Like Continental Drift (Wegener, 1929) the Euro may well have been “an idea before its time.” The financial elite were constrained by their “deeply old-Keynesian” view (Cochrane, 2015). After all, if you repeat the same story it becomes familiar and familiarity “is the key to fostering belief” (Schwarz, 2007).

More recognition is needed of the elite’s misunderstanding of yesterday’s economic theory, the neo-liberal irony of a “liberal” reform ideal that failed to understand the tenets of laissez-faire. “Like communism, neoliberalism is the God that failed” (Monbiot, 2016). Elite ideas of free trade theory may have facilitated growth but fail to realize that the rules and regulations for multi-lateral trade treaties included protectionist barriers that limited the sharing of the benefits within the “free” trade

areas. Too much regulation choked shared economic growth and now there is recognition of increasing prospects for “fair” trade.

The idea of “fair trade” follows the philosophy of international projects by Starbucks with the production of “fair trade” coffee and Cadburys with “fair trade” chocolate. These projects offering examples for the bureaucrats in Brussels to study so they too can provide better conditions for European workers marginalized by free trade. After all workers in Europe, burdened by the European workplace, environmental and other legal protective rules and regulations, can hardly be expected to compete on an even playing field with workers whose employers are not required to pay for such workplace, environmental and legal overheads. The workplace playing fields need to be levelled. Future trade treaties need to recognize the fact that the workplace, environmental and legal overheads have proved to be protectionist for the International companies who compete in the European market. When appropriate equivalent cost tariffs are imposed, it is likely that many European workers will cease to be marginalized. So, developing trade negotiations needs to take much more notice of a modern ‘fair-trade’ and not yesterday’s ‘free’ trade approach to trade negotiation. Europe’s elite trade negotiators will “provide support to deepen social and environmental sustainability” (Fairtrade, 2017). This in turn will strengthen the balance of trade and therefore the Euro.

Recently the prospects for the Euro have been seen internationally to have improved. The Euro / US dollar exchange rate has been rising steadily “on an improved outlook” and foreign exchange strategists “have conceded they might previously have been a little negative on the Euro’s prospects” (Howes and Monfort, 2017). Writing in the Chicago Booth Review John Cochrane (2015) was already writing of the negative views of “deeply old-Keynesian” economists and explaining “Why the Euro is a good idea after all” (and this makes a good read for Euro supporters). Reuters (2017) reports that Euro zone factories start 2017 “with the fastest growth in nearly 6 years” and notes that “optimism about the year ahead has risen to the highest since the region’s debt crisis.” Bloomberg too also reports on the “robust pace” of the euro-area’s economic expansion, notes “an upturn in hiring” and concludes that the Euro “starts 2017 on a strong note” (Randow, 2015). So, breezes are blowing strong in the Euro’s sails.

Conclusion

The purpose of this paper was to identify facts that distinguish between pessimists who see the European Union falling apart and realists who have good reason to take a more positive view. The paper has focused on three significant areas ‘three fair winds

in European sails, where the facts clearly establish the growing strength of the European Union and the bright future to which we Europeans may look forward.

The first fair wind identified is leadership in the Energy efficiency field and the remarkable prospects for cheaper energy, rapidly expanding renewable energy resources and the likely achievement of energy independence. Europe has already seen social benefits which are not identified when growth is measured by the raw measure of Gross Domestic Product. Benefits flow from the Internet, from advances in medicine, from technology, and now the prospects of abundant inexpensive energy provide for further improvement in our socio-economic life.

The second fair wind we have noted is the changing nature of the politics in the European Union. The nature of the 'solidarity' or populism movements and the recognition of previously considered extremist ideas as centrist, and their adoption by the main stream parties with elections in the Netherlands and France recognizing the need for socio-economic adjustments.

The third fair wind we have examined is the case for the Euro. We recognize that the Euro was perhaps an idea ahead of its time. Post market has kept pace with the growth and gradual changes which have been taking place and which are impacting the quality of life in the European Union. As we note the Euro is the only currency known to 30 per cent of the population of Europe and therefore firmly established as part of the culture of Europe.

Addressing the conference themes this paper contributes to rethinking on Economic Growth and solidarity in Europe. We note the trends and expectations and, perhaps more important, the rethinking of economic theory. In conclusion, based on the facts considered, the certain prospects for the European Union are positive and prosperous. 'Three fair winds' have been identified and, with some adjustment of the European rudder these three fair winds will blow peace and prosperity into European Sails.

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The European Union at the Crossroads: An Ever Closer Union or a Community of Sovereign States?

Zlat Milovanovic

Abstract

What kind of Union will there be after Brexit and potentially other exits? Will the European Union (EU) be able to survive its various crises, with immigration, democratic deficit, and its foreign and security policy, to name just a few? The crossroads we refer to are the decisions expected in 2017 on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, between the two concepts of: the EU as an ever-closer union forming an integrated state, or as a (a community?) joint (multinational?) organization representing fully sovereign nation states. There will be four sections in this paper: The EU as a permanent international organization; Political forces within the EU; Getting out of the crises; and, Additional EU issues. By the time of the UACS Conference, some answers will have become clear. We seek now to discover what they will be. Macedonia and other candidate countries have the right to know more about the EU and its future.

Keywords: EU crises, immigration, democratic deficit, foreign and security policy, functional international organizations, national sovereignty.

Introduction

On 17 January 2017 Antonio Tajani became President of the European Parliament (EP) for the period 2017-19, following the resignation of Martin Schulz, President from 2012-17. Neither Schultz nor Tajani had much to say about the current crisis in the EU nor about plans for the future, and the 751 members of the European Parliament (MEPs) did not have any major questions. Tajani did, however, point out that the EU faced poor growth, strong immigration, dissatisfaction with governance in the EU, and the rise of nationalist, far right and anti-EU forces (Euronews, 2017).

This paper is about immigration, dissatisfaction with governance in the EU and ideologies and forces affecting foreign and security policies which would, potentially, destroy a “successful supranational project.” How could this “successful supranational project” of integration be destroyed? Speaking in Malta on February 2, the EU President Donald Tusk concluded that the EU was threatened by the Russia of Putin, by the U.S. under Trump’s presidency and internally by emerging political ideas of the far right (Mediapart, 2017).

The EU as a Permanent Project

Given the rather turbulent present, predicting the future is even more difficult than in normal situations. On the other hand, the history of the EU has determined its future. We should remember the Founding Fathers of the EU, such as Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, Konrad Adenauer, Alcide de Gasperi, and Winston Churchill who were convinced that an integrated Europe would be there and grow forever. The 60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, which established the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Commission (EURATOM), will be another occasion to remind us of this fact. From the original six, there are 28 member states today. The EU is one of the most active global actors, associated with territories and countries all over the world, with the candidate countries, with the Mediterranean Union, with the African-Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) group, cooperating with scores of countries and international organizations across all continents.

In the Project Europe 2030, developed in 2010 by a Wise men and Wise women Group presided over by Felipe Gonzales, the further development of the EU was defined as: strengthening and modernizing the European economic and social model, competitiveness, rule of law, sustainable development, global stability, MIGRATION (our emphasis) energy and climate protection, fighting global insecurity, international crime and terrorism.

The Report states:

- The EU Project should become a citizens' project;
- The EU should avoid economic nationalism, including in the area of services and in the development of a digital society;
- The EU should develop a strong political leadership of the Union...

Addressing immigration and the integration of migrants, the Report calls for a concerted effort “to make the EU an attractive destination for immigrants” [Sic!]. “Without migration, the EU will not be able to meet other labor and skills shortages. It will also see a reduction of cultural diversity and experimentation, a prerequisite for creativity and innovation.” The demographic extremes of a very high life expectancy and a very low fertility rate, will also have their effect (Project Europe 2030, 2010). The thrust of this Report differs enormously from what the present EU treatment of refugees and migrants involves. The wise men and women did have a clear concept of what was needed – not necessarily just from the Middle East but from everywhere! How did the EU arrive where it has arrived? What would a crisis of immigration have meant in 2010?

The Report was submitted to the European Council, with a recommendation that it be followed with the fuller participation of EU citizens in its implementation. The Report was well received, despite the financial crises at its conclusion. The gist of the Report was a closer relationship between the EU institutions and EU citizens. Citizens were asked to express their views and make comments and proposals. It was a nice thought but provided inadequate conditions for the self-expression of citizens.

The immigration crisis started in 2015 and increased in 2016. The EU countries were not ready for a growing influx of refugees and migrants escaping wars, insecurity, and collapsing economic conditions. Hundreds of thousands were risking their lives to cross the Mediterranean to a prosperous Europe. The institutions for receiving refugees and the resources for the refugees' reception were quite inadequate. Germany turned out to be the most welcoming, receiving more than a million refugees and migrants, followed by Sweden and France. The solidarity did not go far enough in many European states. Some of them closed their borders by building walls, gates, razor-wired access roads and similar impediments. There were various reasons for that, including the opposition in some countries to receiving Muslim refugees, of which some must have been terrorists (Verhofstadt, 2017). The quota system of the distribution of the number of refugees among member states did not work in some of them. Some states even claimed their national sovereignty in rejecting the acceptance of refugees.

A European Council meeting was held in Bratislava on 9 September 2016, the first without the U.K. after the Brexit vote. What was discussed there, among other issues, was the nature of the EU itself: a closer integrated union or a community of sovereign states with their own, national interests. Both German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Donald Tusk wanted a new EU “narrative” before 25 March 2017 – in order to rescue the EU. The EU is to remain whole and united, but having the personal interests of each state in mind. We have to protect the external borders of the EU, and the economic and social interests of our citizens first. Not in 60 years has such a dilemma emerged.

Several major events contributed to the EU worries: Brexit itself, something unknown in EU history, and Donald Trump, the new US Presidential candidate. An organization constantly enlarging had to accept the defection of one of its major members while confronted with criticism from the U.S. – until then its major ally and supporter, that the EU was irrelevant to the point of disappearance. Trump was then only a candidate, proclaiming the need for each nation to stand for its own interests and contribute to the highest degree to its own defense.

The EU may not have been as successful as it had once been considered to be. To be saved, it had to be renovated. Guy Verhofstadt (2017) calls it: “Europe’s last chance: Why the European States must Form a More Perfect Union?” The EU will have to follow its own model of confederation or federation, similarly to the U.S. before it became a federation. Europe will need to be redefined, accepting into its membership those states which accept a federal model.

Political Forces at Work

To get back to the European Parliament, Martin Schulz, its successful former President with considerable European experience, is a German socialist (SPD) who decided to leave the EP in order to enter the race for the federal chancellorship in Germany (2017). In the EP he belonged to the Socialists’ and Democrats’ parliamentary group. His background is clearly socialist and has been since his earliest youth.

The new President, Antonio Tajani is an experienced Italian politician, formerly with Berlusconi’s “Forza Italia” and other parties of the coalition. His EP parliamentary group is the European People’s Party (EPP), a center right European party, now reinforced by Belgian Liberals, who may be losing their group of Liberals and Democrats (ALDE) due to Brexit. EPP and the S & D are the two largest EP parliamentary groups. They have different ideologies, but until most recently had a

working agreement on alternating at the helm of the EP. Together they have the majority of the MEPs' vote, otherwise divided into seven parliamentary groups.

Tajani and Schultz espouse different and even mutually opposed policies, and still they find ways to cooperate successfully, something that would have been difficult in their national parliaments. But even ideologically opposed groups can find ways of cooperation at a European level in much closer if not identical political lines. In a Macedonian context, what that means is cooperation of VMRO-DPMNE with SDSM and DUI (DUI being in the socialist group in Strasbourg).

The citizens who vote for the EP in their own countries are familiar with some but not all European politicians they vote for. Close to 40-50 per cent eligible voters vote, depending on the country. It is likely that most would not know the name of their Euro-deputy. Contacts between the MEPs and national deputies are rare. Within the European Council and other Councils are members of national governments, the Heads of State or Government, Ministers and other officials, even some representatives of non-political social forces.

The most independent body of the EU is its European Commission (EC) consisting of commissioners elected in their personal capacity, not as representatives of the member states from which they come. Once they have been confirmed by the EP and the Commission is in place, its members are all independent of their national governments. They stand for the EU citizens at large.

Looking at all these institutions, ideologies are less relevant than on the national level. They are more goal oriented, bound to create policies and apply those policies successfully in cooperation with the national governments of other member states. If the Commission stands behind a legislative proposal, it is likely to be accepted. On technical grounds, once the EC decides that incandescent lightbulbs are to be replaced by long life, energy saving and cheaper bulbs, the decision is likely to be implemented.

In those EU bodies where member states are represented, the opposition of one or two states may block the best possible decision. This is also true of the EU administration as well. For instance, the information about potential terrorists and their whereabouts is not necessarily exchanged among the 28 intelligence and security services of the member states. EUROPOL does exist, but it does not have all the information it needs to operate successfully. The Schengen system has the capacity to record information about who has entered the EU – but it does not do so accurately.

The asylum-granting procedure differs from one member state to another, despite the attempt to unify this system (Dublin IV at this stage). Migrant visas are standardized at the EU level but issued by each member state and only if the migrant is present in that EU country! How many lives could have been saved if these documents were issued overseas, by the EU missions or embassies and consulates of member states.

European citizenship is granted exclusively by member states' institutions, according to their own laws. By contrast, the U.S. citizenship is granted by the federal government, under one set of laws for all the 50 states! (Verhofstadt, 2017)

While ideologies play a significant role at the national level, they are less apparent in international matters where a set of theories in International law and International relations often have a greater impact than political ideology. Here are the examples.

- a. Most International Organizations (IOs) are based on *idealism within a liberal international order*. The United Nations is an example of such an organization, the EU as well. Idealism defines an IO by its goals based on humanity and its survival. Ideals of peace, justice, human rights, solidarity among nations, are all included. Liberalism means freedom of states and citizens, common good, free trade, globalization, and freedom of thought and religion. The ideals and freedoms, once proclaimed, are forever, that is permanent. That is why, the IOs are permanent.
- b. Another group of IOs is based on *pragmatism*. They view their role as establishing and protecting practical advantages of international cooperation and integration. They support integration achieved through law. Building International law accepted by all helps present and future steps towards unity.
- c. *Scepticism* is based on doubts about international cooperation and integration. Sceptics prefer closer links with those countries that resemble them and collaboration with others principally where there is a clear current advantage. IOs are not forever, they are created by those in whose interests they serve. They can be abolished if there is a need to do that.
- d. *Populists and new nationalists* stand for full national sovereignty and full respect for the particular interests of every nation. They are against long term plans of integration. They prefer alliances that serve national interests best. Some populists are against social elites, against liberalism of any kind, against refugees and migrants, against mainstream politics. Occasionally, some stand for racism, extreme nationalism, national-socialism, and opposition to foreign relations.

The Republican Party in the U.S. under Donald Trump's leadership has some of these tendencies, and supports the so called "alt-right movement" and white nationalists. Marine Le Pen, the leader of the National Front in France, states that "all people aspire to be free" and that they feel that the political leaders "do not defend the people's interests but special interests instead" (Le Pen, 2016). We should also remember Vaclav Klaus, the President of the Czech Republic, whose populism was new in 2009, occasionally called "europhobia". He thought that the EU had not been liberal enough, compared it to the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia and called for a "Prague spring" in the EU". He called himself a dissident within the EU. Together with Philippe de Villiers, the French Eurosceptic politician, he went to Ireland to congratulate the Irish on their rejection of the Treaty of Lisbon (Le Monde, 2009).

There are some 30 populist or extreme nationalist parties in the EU countries. They have joined the anti-immigrant movements, inter alia in Germany, Sweden... Such parties are: Alternative for Germany, Sweden Democrats, Danish People's Party, Austrian Freedom Party, Party of Freedom (the Netherlands), Slovak National Party, Jobbik (in Hungary), Law and Justice Party (in Poland) etc. Some of these parties have increased their numbers and strength, especially due to increasing immigration.

In the U.S., President Trump opposes the acceptance of more refugees, especially those from Muslim countries. His Executive orders are now being tested in the U.S. courts. At the same time, he openly supports all those populist parties and groups in Europe, occasionally predicting the end of the EU. Immigration policy has progressively become central to EU policy as a whole, to the point where it can be considered a "make or break issue." Whatever the power of the populists, it is hard to imagine that they will be able to cause a Frexit, a Grexit or the break-up of the Union. The pro-EU forces are growing stronger and will not allow themselves to be unseated.

The EU stands by its idealism and liberalism. The most humane reaction is to be welcoming to those fleeing catastrophe in their own countries, such as wars, massive destruction, economic disaster, or climate change. It is also an obligation under International law, which applies within as well as outside the EU. Other countries should be helping the EU in their efforts... Countries like Germany, Sweden, France, the U.K., Turkey, Lebanon – have received a lion's share of refugees from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

Out of the Crises

The refugee crisis can and should be solved as soon as possible. Yes, the EU member states should have a say, and they cannot be forced to receive refugees. The world leaders who gathered at the U.N. Summit in New York on 19 September 2016 – adopted *The New York Declaration*, expressing their political will to protect the rights of refugees and migrants on a global scale. They agreed to start negotiations leading to an international conference in 2018 and the adoption of “a global compact for a safe, orderly and regular migration”. They agreed, inter alia to:

- Protect the Human Rights of all refugees and migrants regardless of status;
- Ensure that all refugees’ and migrants’ children are receiving education within a few months of their arrival;
- Support those countries rescuing, receiving and hosting large numbers of refugees and migrants;
- Find new homes for all refugees and migrants identified by UNHCR;
- Strengthen the global governance of migrations by bringing the International Organization of Migration (IOM) into the U.N. system.

The Secretary General’s campaign to counter xenophobia and intolerance, was most welcome! (U.N. New York Declaration, 2016). Then-Foreign Minister of Germany Steinmeier (at this writing the President of the Federal Republic of Germany), called for fairness in sharing the burden. “We need to pursue a comprehensive approach linking migration, development and security... We must finally move ahead with tackling this crisis”. (German Mission to the U.S., 2016).

Does the New York Declaration apply to the EU and its member-states? Yes, it certainly does, as the EU and its member-states took part at the Conference. The EU member states are all members of the U.N. as well. Implementation of the Declaration is a moral and political duty, if not a full legal obligation. Populists may be tempted to reject their obligations, as some of them are already doing so. They can even call for the United Nations to be abolished. This is unlikely to happen, as they would not have the necessary number of votes, given that most nations still stand by the U.N.

Looking at the countries on the refugees’ Balkan route, Turkey, Macedonia and Serbia are not EU members – although the EU expects them to help. Greece is an EU member, the first EU country the refugees and migrants come to on their journey. All those countries are U.N. members but they have neither the facilities nor the resources to provide help for hundreds of thousands of people.

Positive International law, adopted within the U.N. (or even earlier within the League of Nations) – creates the obligation for signatory states to accept refugees (if not migrants), with the help of the UNHCR. An unlimited number of refugees is possible, for instance after the Second World War, Europe dealt with as many as 40 million refugees (Milovanovic, 2016).

It is fair to say that refugees in Europe should not be the concern of the EU alone. There are other international organizations which should be participating, such as: the Council of Europe, the OSCE, the IOM, the U.N. and its agencies, and the Black Sea Cooperation Council, to name just a few. There is no reason why Switzerland, Norway, Iceland – should not participate more fully. The need for more international cooperation is enormous.

Syrians, Iraqis, Afghanis, Libyans too, are still citizens of their countries, even if they are accepted in the EU as refugees or migrants. Ultimately, once the peace is signed, the refugees and migrants should have the right to return to their countries. (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948). Syria should be rebuilt with the help of the international community, especially of those countries which participated in war operations or supplied weapons to those involved in the fighting. Even by the standards of The Hague Regulations, countries causing damage unnecessarily in an armed conflict should have the obligation to compensate. This kind of rule is not easy to apply – but it would be absolutely essential. Country X which provides bombs to be launched from the air should either desist or be ready to compensate for the damages to country Y (in an internal armed conflict). Those who do not have weapons will not use them – it is as simple as that.

Another issue is the international aid necessary for the reconstruction of those countries that have suffered through wars. That is the question of international solidarity as well: Creating conditions for the return of refugees who are not likely to remain in countries where they are not welcome, or where they do not want to stay.

Additional EU Issues

Democracy

The strengthening of EU democracy goes back to the Treaty of Lisbon, “which puts the citizen back into the heart of the European project and aims to strengthen the citizens’ interest in the institutions and achievements of the EU, which often appear to be far from their day-to-day concerns” (The Strength of European Democracy, 2014). This was a response to various criticisms from many sides pointing out the so called “democratic deficit in the EU”.

Citizens are called to participate in the functioning and development of the EU. European citizenship is better recognized by the Treaty of Lisbon, which states that citizens are directly represented by the European Parliament – and that this democracy is one of the foundations of the EU (Treaty of Lisbon, 2007). The Treaty of Lisbon also recognizes, in its Art. 10, the existence of European civil society and proclaims a greater participation of citizens in the electoral process. The *citizens’ initiative* was also introduced by Art. 11 of the Treaty. The citizens can directly submit their proposals to the European Commission, which will then have to make a decision if the following procedure has been properly observed. The procedure is “simple”: a group of one million citizens from at least seven EU countries must sign the initiative and the signatures must be confirmed by a local notary public. Needless to say, no citizens’ initiative at the EU level has been attempted. In some countries, a citizens’ referendum can take place under easier conditions. This occurred in Ireland, for instance, where the Treaty of Lisbon was originally rejected by voters, blocking it at the EU level as well. The Constitution of Europe, proposed by the EU Constitutional Convention in 2004, was rejected by the 2004/2005 referenda in France and the Netherlands, at which point a number of other scheduled referenda did not take place (the U.K. was one of them).

European citizenship has so far been tied to citizenship in an EU state. With Brexit in mind, the question arises whether those who are now EU citizens can keep that citizenship in some form. A group of British subjects has proposed that their European citizenship continue as a matter of choice or privilege. It would be called “associate citizenship” which would allow at least free travel to the EU (even if a fee had to be paid for it). This proposal, suggested by Luxembourg MEP Charles Goerens, is in the British Parliament.

Finally, for citizens or non-citizens who live in the EU, there is an institution called the European Ombudsman. Any private person or a businessman having a complaint

about an EU institution can appeal to this Ombudsman, whose role it is to investigate and propose an amicable settlement (Fontaine 2010).

EU Common Foreign and Security Policy

EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, came to Washington, DC on 9 and 10 February 2017. This was her first visit since the election of President Trump, who hasn't shown much interest in the EU. Mogherini spoke with several officials of the present administration and left the following message: The EU is asking the U.S. not to interfere in EU politics, as "we do not interfere in U.S. policy." We are a union of 28 countries and the U.K. will be with us for at least another two years. Today, she said, the unity of the EU countries is more manifest than only a few months ago. While the Brexit talks are engaged, the U.K. cannot negotiate any new trade agreements. This was all very clear, a message of independence and sovereignty (Le Monde International, 2017).

The EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was originally the so called Second Pillar of the Treaty of Maastricht, based on intergovernmentalism – that is the unanimity of member states. The European Council is the main institution which decides in this area, helped by the Council of Ministers. The Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 created the Office of the High Representative, to coordinate and conduct those policies. The High Representative is also a Vice President of the European Commission, in charge of the European External Activities Service (EEAS).

The objectives of the CFSP are to:

- Safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the U.N. Charter;
- Strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;
- Preserve peace and strengthen international security in accord with the U.N. Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on the external borders;
- Develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

The High Representative is also the head of the European Defense Agency, while the Western European Union has been a part of the EU since 2004. The CFSP considers NATO to be responsible for its territorial defense – although not all EU countries are NATO members. Since 1999, the EU is in charge of peace-keeping and nation

building missions, policing of its treaties, humanitarian aid, EULEX, and the protection of sea and coastal borders. The forces of NATO and the EU are “separable but not separate” (CFSP Overview, 2007).

There were a number of earlier plans on European common foreign policy and defense. Originally, it was proposed that a European Defence Community (EDC) be established, that it join the European Political Community (EPC), and that together they prepare a European Constitution. A Constitutional Committee did work in this area, in the so called Heinrich Von Brentano constitution. The whole project failed in 1954 when the EDF failed to be approved by the French Parliament (Verhofstadt, 2017). Guy Verhofstadt, then the Belgian Prime Minister, wrote a letter to then-British Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac in July of 2002. It was an attempt to restart the process of creating a European Defense Community – after the EU “negligible role” in the Operation Allied Harmony (in Macedonia). At that point the idea of a European General Staff was considered. With the support of Jacques Chirac and the then-German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder (but not of Tony Blair), they decided to go ahead. In the spring of 2003, a defense mini-summit was held in Brussels. The European General Staff was to play a role within NATO, while being responsible for planning and carrying out the autonomous European operations. Troops from Belgium and Luxemburg were to be integrated within the Franco-German brigade, forming Eurocorps. Several components of the European force were planned. In order to get British support, a few concessions were made: the Headquarters was to be called a “strategic civil-military planning cell” and unanimity in voting was to be re-introduced. Not a single operation has taken place since this system was put in place. Verhofstadt now concludes that the EU definitely needs a *European Army!!* Eurocorps, established in 1992, should be expanded as a center of that new Army (Verhofstadt, 2017).

In February 2017, in an interview with The Guardian, UNSYG Antonio Guterres described the world as “largely chaotic.” He also said that a united and integrated Europe is essential to prevent its succumbing to a deepening conflict. He draws a parallel with the run-up to the First World War. What we need is a multi-polar world with stronger multilateral institutions. The UN Secretary General must be in the frontline of the defense of all the principles essential to the UN Charter (Guterres, 2017).

Another attempt to adopt an EU Constitution was made by the Constitutional Convention. A Convention on the Future of Europe was signed by Heads of State and Government in 2004. The initiative by 25 EU states failed to be approved by the referenda in France and the Netherlands.

Why does the EU need a Constitution of its own?

Varied activities of the EU, from economic integration to the CFSP – are all pointing in one direction: The EU is a quasi-state with most state functions but not all the functions needed for a single federation. What Margaret Thatcher once called a “super state” would necessarily lead to a federation along the lines of an American or some other type. That federation would be much more efficient than the present day international organization.

The member states are often prevented from adopting certain measures just because a few states are opposed to them. The financial arrangements, including the EURO, cannot function without a Finance Ministry. In other words, there is no government behind the EURO, which is one of the leading world currencies. The foreign and security policies also function without a government behind them (there are 28 governments instead). The U.N., disarmament, development, are all national policies of member states, not of the Union. The crisis with refugees and migrants has also shown that there is a need for a unified policy, based on a single law (not 28 laws).

The EU administrative and geostrategic position makes it the largest actor in world politics.

Geostrategy

The EU is much bigger than the total surface of its member states. The concept of the EU does not provide a definition of Europe. The terms EU and Europe are often used interchangeably. But distinctions must be made.

There are candidate countries that wish to join the EU as full members. Some of them are negotiating their membership, some of them waiting for the negotiations to begin. The waiting time could be as long as 10-15 years or more. Other states interested in joining the EU include but are not limited to Morocco, Cape Verde, Israel, Palestine, Faeroe Islands, Northern Cyprus...

There are Outermost Regions (ORs) and Overseas Countries and Territories (OCTs). The EC Directorate General for International Cooperation and

Development is in charge with respect to the ORs and OCTs, as are the states claiming sovereignty over those regions and countries. Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Reunion, Martinique and the Azores are included here, as well as Greenland, the British Antarctic Territory, Falkland Islands, Curacao, New Caledonia, and French Polynesia.

There are neighboring countries with association agreements and partnership agreements.

There are members of the Mediterranean Union (43 states), the African-Caribbean-Pacific or ACP countries (74 states), there are mini-states in the EURO zone, there is the European Economic Area, EEA (3 countries), there is the Schengen zone with additional and waiting to be members, and there are bilateral agreements.

When the U.S. was formed, both the developed and less developed states were accepted as full members of the Federation. Later, some were territories before becoming states. Some territories were won in wars or by purchases.

With all the countries and territories mentioned above, the EU definitely has a chance, no matter how many exits occur. The EU will be a state. The EU will have its constitution, a democratic constitution, continuing its traditions.

Will the European Citizens Go for It?

This is, as we have seen, not an easy question. There are political forces in the European Parliament in favor of further federalization and there are those opposed to it. Is it “the last chance” as Guy Verhofstadt maintains, or not? He has pointed out the urgency of the EU federal project. The EPP, the S and D, the ALDE, are the prime supporters in the European Parliament of further integration. If there was a vote in the European Parliament, those three parliamentary groups would already provide a majority in favor. Add Greens / ALE and, maybe, The European United Left / Nordic Green. Among the opponents, one can easily see Europe of Nations and Freedom Group, Conservatives and Reformists, Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy group, all together with 156 votes. On paper there is a clear path but of course, it would not necessarily be that simple.

One challenge would be the existence of monarchies (5 + 2) and republics (19 + 3). A liberal solution would be to have the existing structure such as it is, without an obligation to unify the system. As long as each nation’s constitution provides for democracy, the form of government wouldn’t have to change, as is already the case within the EU.

“A federal Europe is the only option. It is both logical and inevitable. But that federal Europe will not create itself. We will have to fight for it. We will have to forge it with all the strength we possess.” So Verhofstadt dixit (Verhofstadt, 2017, p. 272). He also quotes the Eurobarometer which found that Eurosceptics from left and right, nowhere represent more than a quarter of the population! The majority of Europeans want more not less European integration. The average European wants a thoroughly reformed union that is more efficient, more democratic, more multifaceted and more transparent. Provided that he thinks about it, the average European prefers a superpower Europe, equal to other superpowers, not a weak International organization. The EU can go back to Von Brentano’s Constitution and adjust it to present day conditions. Guy Verhofstadt gives his ideas. The most important is to have multinational European lists in every country when it comes to the election of the Commission, the new Government of the Federation.

On 1 March, Jean Claude Juncker, addressing the European Parliament, defined the “five pathways for Europe”. In the first scenario, the EU would continue its present direction of the search for unity and solidarity among all member states, solving existing problems as they come. Not all member states will necessarily be able or willing to pursue this path. The second scenario would be less developed and demanding: a single market, internal security, solving the problems of refugees and migrations, more bilateral than collective decision making. The third scenario would be to create a several speed EU, in other words to have some nations do more together than others, as coalitions of the willing. Those who want more do more. The fourth scenario is for the EU to do less together but more efficiently, for instance, deepening the single market, focusing on research and development, as in digitalization and decarbonization, or other areas. The fifth scenario would be to do much more together to respond better to the global challenges. Make decisions and act more rapidly, have a single seat in international fora, build common defense with NATO, etc. (The Telegraph, 2017/03/01).

Each scenario has some background in EU history. Technically, the proposal would create several EU organizations and develop major differences among them. On the other hand, it could strengthen the cooperation of all.

As for the candidate countries from the Western Balkans, the door remains open, although it is not clear within which of the scenarios. The EU Summit on the Western Balkans is to be held in 2018 in England!

Ancient Greek states and their allies could have saved themselves through a federation!

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A Different European Union: Is Multiculturalism Still Alive?

Branko Boskovic

Abstract

Discussions on the future of the European Union are booming over the question of whether European nations and states are still on the same course. Multiculturalism has for long been one of the corner stones of the European project but recently, there has been more and more doubt of its sustainability. This paper aims to show that multiculturalism is still alive but it needs thorough reconsiderations if it is to be retained. We argue that it is necessary to look more towards a more dynamic model, such as interculturalism or civic integration. Looking into the problem from three levels, we want to show the need for a theoretical and practical rethinking of European national and political relations. Firstly, from the micro level, public opinion polls will be examined to show how people feel about other nations and minorities. Secondly, from the macro level, legal and institutional changes concerning citizenship status and minority rights will be researched, to show the new ways of states' dealing with the inflow of migrants. Finally, what could be considered as a mid-level, we will look at the political landscape of the European Union, to explore which political parties and coalitions are in power and whether or not it makes a significant shift from the previous decade and the beginning of the twentieth century. The three stated levels of research will provide evidence on the question of the state of multiculturalism in Europe at the moment, which will be discussed from a theoretical overview. It is a matter of the utmost importance due to the recent inflow of migrants and their future status, which is a question on which there is still no agreement at the level of the EU.

Keywords: European Union, multiculturalism, public opinion, political parties, nationality, interculturalism.

Introduction

Globalisation has changed our everyday routine and meet people of different backgrounds, coming from different social milieu with which we are unfamiliar. Europe is a continent that attracts many immigrants and it has been like this for a long time but ways of dealing with differences have changed. Previously highly favoured and well-supported, the multiculturalist approach has more recently been altered and we are with new challenges to integration. We are focused on the extent of the policy modification and the way it happened. We will show that multiculturalist policies have been surpassed and superposed by a more integrationist approach, referred to as civic integration or interculturalism.

We are looking at different layers of the ways in which society deals with immigrants and minorities. The focus is on Europe, more specifically the European Union. The three levels we are looking at are: first, public opinion on immigrants and discrimination, second, the policies countries adopt for dealing with immigrants, especially those seeking citizenship and third, the rise of rightist and populist political parties which signal a change in people's thinking. The paper is divided into five sections. The introduction is followed by the second part, discussion on why multiculturalism is important in Europe. The third section looks into the major theoretical overview of multiculturalism and interculturalism. The fourth part is the major section in which we develop our argument, looking at three levels of thinking and dealing with immigrants. We show here how public opinion has changed, and how governments react to the influx of immigrants, adopting new integration procedures, but also how citizens react, in creating nationalist and rightist political parties, showing a willingness in introducing institutional policy changes. We discuss our findings in the fifth part, which is followed by a conclusion.

Why Should We Speak of Multiculturalism in Europe?

Discussing the European future is growing in terms of relevance as different outcomes are opening up and becoming a reality. From Brexit to the ever-rising strength of populist and rightist parties all around Europe, it is no wonder that from the lowest level of citizen up to the European elites, the future of the European Union is in focus. Understanding the current moment depends on explaining, cultural and national relations among citizens. It is on the micro level that this is often disregarded in this discussion, due to other issues such as the economy and political relationships, but we argue that this should not be the case. Furthermore, everyone is often reminded of this by sudden and unexpected outrages.

Multiculturalism has for a long time been one of the corner stones of the EU, as “[f]rom its inception, united Europe is a de facto multicultural due to the coexistence and representation of several cultures [and] is also being shaped by supranational institutions to give cultural, national and linguistic diversity legal status” (Kastoryano, 2009, ix). Values of tolerance and appreciation have been preserved and put into major official documents, as it is the case with the Lisbon Treaty. However, discussing open borders by leading European politicians has been followed by instances of the harsh answers on a number of occasions and it was non-Europeans that were at once found guilty. Dialogue on distinguishing European and non-European identities is looming, resulting in political movements that are gaining support and entering parliaments and governments, affecting the orthodoxy of European political and party systems. The point is raised whether we are confronting two kinds of Europeans or there are only Europeans, detracting the identity from all the others who are not. On the other hand, there is a question of the way political institutions responded to the new social circumstances, which separated not only individuals, but also groups and states.

An Overview of the Theoretical Concepts of Multiculturalism and Civic Integration

The basic argument of the paper is not to show that multiculturalism and civic integration exclude one another. As Cantle states, the failure of multiculturalism means that policies have failed to respond to changing social composition (Cantle, 2012, p. 53), rather than the concept itself. It is of the greatest importance to stress this because we are looking into practice and policy effects, rather than the way policies were supposed to work out or the two concepts. Difficulties of integrating into a dominant culture were common for migrants and had negative effects on their life opportunities. Multiculturalism was more identity oriented and resulted in closing and segregation, which are not unsatisfactory per se (e.g. Finney & Simpson, 2009, in Cantle, 2012, p. 59). Therefore, interculturalism is more culturally oriented, moving away from dominant ethnic relations. It aims at creating social conditions where individuals cannot only preserve their ethnic identity but also have to learn dominant cultural patterns. It is the key difference substantially, but its practice is even further away from multiculturalism.

We do not discuss multiculturalism and interculturalism in detail, but only present the basic theoretical ideas. Multiculturalism can be broadly defined as a set of policies and measures that aim at the protection of identity and the granting of a special status to minorities (e.g. Heckmann, 1993; Kymilicka, 2012; Rosado, 1997). It means

providing minorities with social status and rights which will enable them to preserve their specificity and their way of life. European practice and official documents recognized this and minorities have had a special status which could be realised in significant areas of life: public 'recognition', education, social services, public materials, law, religious accommodation, food, broadcasting and media (Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2009). Multiculturalism provided recognition but that was where it effectively ended. These policies were unable to incorporate citizens into social life and provide them equal opportunity. It meant that more had to be done than just watch how neighbourhoods are becoming closed and sealed, often according to national and status belonging.

Critics of multiculturalism looked for new answers, after a backlash against multiculturalism (Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2009). The importance of multiculturalism must not be underestimated, nor its values, but it is its ability to cope with diversifying social practices that is becoming more problematic. European experience is even more relevant here because it is difficult to speak of multiculturalism as a unitary project, due to national differences but also due to different policies. Its major weakness is its static nature, meaning it does not support integration and dialogue between cultures (Giddens, 2014). Therefore, separation becomes its actual reality. Interculturalism or civic integration can be understood as a more active policy which enhances common interests and values. It supports the more direct involvement of all citizens, irrespective of their national and cultural origins (Giddens, 2014; Joppke, 2007).

On the other hand, it raises levels of the possibility of receiving citizenship, by setting minimum standards for obtaining it. Joppke (2007) emphasises how important it is to integrate immigrants into the mainstream of society, stating four principles: first, they should be employed; second, they should respect basic liberal-democratic values; third, they should know the language of the society they live in as well as its most important institutions; and fourth, there have to be anti-discrimination laws and policies. The Council of the European Union stated in 2004 that integration is a process that can last, it is encompassing and takes into account different levels of political institutions, from the local to the EU level, but having national institutions as the key ones (Council of the European Union, 2004).

The need of stronger cultural integration, but also economic and political integration, is essential so there is a greater possibility of decent life opportunities and less possibility of inheriting inequality due to social background. On the other hand, the blending of different people, with different origins and ways of life makes it easier to create a common identity, which can hardly be the case if all are separated according

to their previously defined lines. We are unable to set the exact period when the shift happened but broadly put and according to the reports we use here, it has happened since 2000. Some countries already had the established practice, while others adopted it later. More specifically, it could be set at 2004 as it is the year the EU adopted a common immigrants integration policy (Joppke, 2007).

Moving Away from Multiculturalism

The current European practice is far from multiculturalism. Clarifying this, we state that it has vanished or has been abandoned altogether, but rather that it has supplemented by new policies. Banting and Kymlicka (2012) discuss the similar issue. We believe that it can be observed on three levels: first, on the micro level, we see that the thinking of people has changed and major worries and attitude changes can be observed in thinking about 'others'. Second, the introduction of new policies and tests for obtaining citizenship are being introduced across European Union countries, aiming at strengthening the process of providing immigrants with an opportunity for obtaining citizen status. Finally, the rise of nationalist, rightist and populist political parties can also be observed all around the EU member states. It is a signal that public opinion can be channelled through political movements and also, that there is a willingness to institutionalise anti-immigration thinking.

If we speak about public opinion polls, recent Eurobarometers show a dramatic increase in the perception of immigration as the public's major concern. We can see that immigration and terrorism are two major concerns for a great number of people, and that these numbers have been kept at steady levels and have not dropped significantly since 2014. If we look at 2013, immigration was an important issue for only around 10 per cent of people and in 2014 it rose to around 20 per cent (European Commission, 2013a; 2013b; 2014a; 2014b). In the spring of 2015 it rose to 38 per cent and in autumn to 58 per cent and it had already become the issue of the greatest relevance for Europeans (European Commission, 2015b; 2015c). In 2016, it was just a few percentage points below 50 per cent (European Commission, 2016a; 2016b). On the other hand, we can follow the same way of thinking on terrorism, which was not, generally speaking a relevant issue for Europeans until 2015, when its relevance gained attention and in 2016, it seen to be second most important issue, standing at 39 percentage points (Ibid.). Table 1 shows the rise to prominence of the two issues for the period mentioned. Data on the perception of terrorism are also presented, for two reasons. Firstly, because it is often related to immigrants and secondly, because its rise coincided with the issue of immigration and has been steady as well.




Table 1. Immigration and Terrorism perception levels 2013-2016 (Source: Eurobarometer).

In the same manner, data show that discrimination is on the rise and is the most widespread in the area of ethnic origins (European Commission, 2015a). The same document states it is followed by discrimination by sexual orientation, gender identity and religious belief. Also, it is of relevance to see that it is younger generations that state that discrimination by ethnic origins is the most widespread (Ibid.). Therefore, the public perception of difference has changed and this has coincided with the refugee crisis. The result is not only the higher attention given to the issue but also seeing it as the major issue for Europeans. If we have in mind that the European Union is seen as unity in diversity, this is an alert that more has to be done and the approach to practices thus far will have to be amended. Accordingly, multiculturalism as a way of perceiving others as equal is obviously at odds with reality and it must be redefined.

Looking at the level of the member states, we can observe redefining citizenship conditions. Policies differ, but as Vertovec and Wessendorf state, recently: “there is no doubt that the ‘integration’ of immigrants and ethnic minorities has become one of the foremost themes in national domestic policy throughout Europe and at the EU level itself” (Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2009, p. 26). The same authors see this as a shift from supporting immigrants’ integration to the calling of immigrants to make their own efforts to integrate (Ibid.). Some states have introduced new procedures, of which we state some we see as the most relevant and worth showing. The German Immigration Act of 2004 has introduced an integrationist approach which can be

seen in the necessity of knowing the German language and culture, through attending language and history courses (Halibronner & Farahat, 2015). Newly naturalised Dutch citizens, as in the case of some other countries, have to swear or promise they will respect constitutional order with freedoms and rights (Böcker & van Oers, 2013). Before this, future citizens have to know the Dutch language but also do a test in which they prove they are aware of the social climate and way of thinking (Ibid.), and the same can also be said for Denmark (Ersbøll, 2013). Austria has citizenship tests that prove a candidates' knowledge of its history (Stern & Valchars, 2013). The United Kingdom has tests which check a candidate's knowledge of the social climate and way of thinking as well (Wray, 2013) and the number of similar measures has risen since the end of the nineties. Integration is a must for prospective citizens of Belgium (Wautelet, 2013). 'Previous knowledge' of the country became a norm (Carrera & Wiesbrock, 2009).

Also, many countries are not encouraging naturalisation and what can in some cases be an obstacle as well is the high price of citizenship tests that are obligatory. The French authorities check vast amounts of data on each applicant for citizenship, even his 'moral' record (Hajjat, 2013) and Sweden has a policy designed in a similar manner (Bernitz, 2013). These are cases of some of the countries, which show that citizenship status has changed and is far from recognition. Rather, it is much more demanding and puts greater responsibility on the citizens themselves. Multiculturalism is still anchored in their official documents but it is supported by much stronger and resolute requirements.

Official documents of these countries reveal a rising number of integration requirements of prospective citizens. However, it is the perception of the majoritarian population that is also discouraging for a multiculturalist approach. We observe this in the rise of the populist political parties and movements across Europe, which have been gaining significant support over the last decade or so. We cannot speak of all political movements that can be cast into this group but we mention only the ones whose popularity has arisen and whose political strength has been on the increase. All the results are taken from the database of Wolfram Nordsieck (Nordsieck, 2017).

The Freedom Party of Austria has been increasing its share of the votes, from 11 per cent in 2006 to 20.5 per cent in 2013. The Danish People's Party now has the support of 21.1 per cent of the population, increasing from 13.2 per cent in 2005. The Finns party had only 1.57 per cent of the vote in 2003 and in 2015 it was supported by 17.6 per cent of Finnish voters. The National Front in France is prevented from entering parliament by the electoral system but its leader is now one of the favourites to win the presidential elections this year, entering the second round ballot. The Five Star

movement in Italy is a new political group, currently supported by 23.8 per cent of Italian voters. The Dutch Party for Freedom won 13.1 per cent support in the most recent elections which is more than twice that of 2006. The very conservative Polish Law and Justice Party is one of the major parties, with a majority at the moment. The same is the case with the Swiss National Party which is the strongest political actor in the country. Sweden Democrats had been an insignificant political party before 2014, when they won 12.9 per cent of the vote, becoming the third largest party in Sweden. Slovakia and Latvia have also seen a rise in populist parties, having Kotleba – People's Party Our Slovakia winning 8.4 per cent in the 2016 elections and the National Alliance having 16.6 per cent support in 2014, respectively. The UK Independence Party has not gained significant support in numbers but can clearly be stated as one of the key actors in the Brexit debate. Table 2 shows levels of support for some of the mentioned parties. Each of the rows represents one election and due to different election times, we divided the time frame into four periods. The first elections in all countries were held before 2007, second before 2011 and third before 2015. Some countries had four elections (e.g. Denmark, Poland, the Netherlands) and the fourth electoral cycle was after 2015.




Table 2. Major rightist parties vote share, 2005-2016 (Source: Nordsieck, 2017).

We see here that all of these parties and movements have seen a significant and often very sharp rise in support and none had any major fallback. All of them are united by one distinctive characteristic: their right-wing ideology, which is anti-immigration oriented and nationalistic. They are seen as the counterpart of what the EU stands for and what multiculturalism as a concept pledges to support. They are united in being anti-multiculturalist and progressing on the idea of multiculturalism as a concept that

is reversing Europe and turning it into something different, many even looking at disintegration as a likely future. What also makes it different and specific is that these parties are gaining support in countries which are mostly the ones with the highest proportion of incoming immigrants (Eurostat, 2017).

Discussion

We have seen that the image of a multiethnic and diversified Europe has changed, from the bottom up. Multiculturalism as the basic and only concept is no in jeopardy if we look at the three levels described in the previous section. Why is it so important and what do these three actually mean? First of all, we can see that reaction is coming from the 'majoritarian' part of the community. They perceive incoming immigrants as being different and what is even worse, as a threat. It is a reaction to the European Union's unpreparedness in the case of the most recent influx of immigrants and its inability to cope with the effects of these events. Alexander (2013) stresses that the EU has failed in creating civic solidarity, thereby resulting in what we see today and discuss in this paper, as the outcome. Uncoordinated and often changing politics of the EU member states contributed to these effects. Seeing minorities in this way from the beginning is a strong deviation from multiculturalist politics as it inhibits any recognition of equality at the very beginning.

Second, citizens' perception does not have to be considered as the problem per se. However, knowing that the highest growth in populist support has coincided with high immigration, it has to raise an awareness of the problem. It is the case because perception is treated as an obvious problem and citizens are in need of transferring it to representative institutions. This could be treated even as a rejection of multiculturalism as part of the population is looking for the discouragement of multiculturalist principles. The diversity of politics and party programs makes it hard to make a single conclusion, but it is certain that they are united in keeping the community less different in its social composition. On the other hand Rooduijn et al. (2014) argue that populism is not contagious and multiculturalism is not dead. It supports our thesis. The same authors also identify many more political parties that can be grouped in the same manner, which depends on the level of activity and party programs (Ibid.). Similar to the argument that we are making, just looking at the issue in more depth.

Third, at the official state level, countries are moving away from multiculturalism by adopting more integration-oriented policies which aim at creating capable citizens, ones that are socially well-equipped. Citizen integration aims at knowing the language, history, and the necessary social skills as well as an ability to adopt a new

identity. As has been stated above, it is not only their successful social integration that is at stake. The utmost aim is lowering the probability of social exclusion and enhancing the opportunity for employment, it being one of the key elements for economic sustainment. These are seen as the key requisites of independence and a decreased need for state dependence. It is not the case at the moment as immigrant status is one of the components contributing to the risk of poverty and social exclusion (Eurostat, 2017). In other words, countries do not support immigration but make acquiring citizenship status more difficult.

The role of the state has turned from that of protector into that of controller. It is a major turn, which signals towards shifting politics from recognition to integration. The inability of the European Union to make a common stance on the immigration crisis contributed to this in two ways. First, in countries which did not officially support the opening-up of borders, by strengthening and solidifying public opinion. Second, in creating a sense of the nonexistence of a common policy which is rooted in far-sighted aims and not in short term measures. Delanty (2013) argues that the national imagination of a migrant will determine developments on the European Union level. Due to all the differences and problems as already described, he proposes a cultural model of the nation, seeing it as being more open and inclusive (Ibid.). It is an argument that deserves support but due to all that we have stated above, it is the idea that can hardly be taken as a basis on which we should try to overcome all of the obstacles.

Combining all three ways of thinking and acting shows that the European continent is not becoming undemocratic but rather that democracy in Europe is shifting. Instead of providing rights we are dealing with providing duties and responsibilities, which are more individualized and not community oriented. The rights of groups are not detracted but are compiled in a way that they function only if each individual is able to fulfill his or her commitments to the state or local level. We could refer to it as a specific type of investment. It does not imply the rejection of multiculturalism but rather, that it must be supported by other means. Civic integration or interculturalism has been recognized as the official policy and public opinion in the European Union strongly supports this way of thinking. Populist parties are still not that strong to cause any political shock but they pose a large enough alarm to multiculturalism as a practice.

Having a more differentiated Europe is a everyday reality. Discussing the three important matters demonstrates the need of further and stronger coordination of the activities at the EU level. It is of the greatest importance for the European Union to show this, so that citizens can feel the systemic way policies are organized.

Recognition of the other as different and acknowledging their rights is not a sufficient policy any more. We can only observe shifting patterns but not see what the outcomes are.

Conclusion

Everyday European life is being altered in two ways: it is becoming more diversified and ways of dealing with others are changing as well. The number of immigrants is rising but the level of their social acceptance does not follow suit. We have tried to show that the social climate has moved towards a more negative opinion of immigrants. What is even more striking, the official policy has changed as well. Furthermore, a certain proportion of the population wants to deal with immigrants in a more radical way by supporting radical and nationalist political parties.

Assessing the change on three levels of thinking and acting showed us that we are witnessing a move towards a more integrationist approach to the status of immigrants. Immigration is a major issue for Europeans and fears of terrorism and discrimination based on national and ethnic origin are seen as the most widespread example. States have adopted a more integrationist approach towards citizenship, clearly looking at prospective citizens as persons who are more familiar with the social climate and integrated, rather than just recognized as members of a minority group. Rightist political parties are still not ruling in the numbers that we could admit to as being threatening. Their presence is looming in two ways: they are becoming more numerous and their share of the vote is increasing.

All of this supports the fact that multiculturalism is not dead in Europe but rather that it is being altered and upgraded by more civic integration or interculturalist policies. The relationship between the immigrant and the state has changed in a way that responsibility is now placed more on the individual with the state being seen as an evaluator of how integrated a person is. Consequently, it is a relocation from a multiculturalist approach. Increasing support for this kind of approach is seen as being a very strong signal of changing patterns, but we are still unable to see a systemic approach from the European Union and if there was one, the concept of citizenship might respond in a different manner. At the moment, nationalism is on the increase and it is the one thing that is closed and unwilling to open out to any acceptance of difference. The forthcoming period will answer the question if this frame of mind continues to gain support or it will be put on hold.

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EU Enlargement and the Development of the Western Balkans

Ivana Vuchkova

Abstract

The major challenges of Western Balkan countries are mostly evident through their long and bumpy road towards economic, social and human development. Recent indicators show that many economic and social aspects in these countries are under the threat of backsliding instead of the providing evidence of progress (World Bank, 2015). The political discourse of two and a half decades without proper dialogue between progressive stakeholders and decision-makers has resulted in a deficiency of clear development strategies. In the hesitant sense of where to go further other than fulfilling the EU requirements, these countries seem to be abandoning the need to develop for the well-being of people. The consequences are already visible, and urgent actions are needed. Consequently, this research tends to examine where the Western Balkan countries stand in development beyond the delayed and painstaking EU integration process. By following a qualitative research method based on questionnaires, the aim of this study is to see current achievements in development and identify how progress can be reaffirmed in order to assure economic, social and human development.

Keywords: Western Balkans, Development, EU Enlargement, Political Dialogue, Qualitative Study.

Introduction

The continuous process of expanding the European Union has introduced a vast array of promising expectations for the development of the Western Balkans. The initial announcement of embracing these countries into the European family in the near future was positively received by the entire region. Though it required a bit of patience for those who were faced with difficult periods and still recovering from war, other countries such as Macedonia immediately took a decisive position in implementing deep and structural reforms in terms of following the EU agenda. Soon afterwards, the example was followed by the rest of the region (Slavica & Andreja, 2009). The people of the Western Balkans were celebrating the EU and enthusiastically anticipating better times to come.

The overwhelming promises of political leaders at that time that EU integration would bring prosperity in every aspect of life, concealed the existing problems and concerns that would postpone these promises to a later period. The economy which had suffered a lot during the transition period was highlighted by escalating unemployment rates (IMF, 2015). Corruption and bureaucratization were still found to be the main characteristics of the system.

However, existing problems and unresolved issues were not exempted from the regular reports prepared by the European Commission on the progress shown. At first, these reports served as guidelines for initiating and implementing reform. Later, as doubts about EU enlargement began to arise, reports on the progress shown were going largely unnoticed in governmental programs (Florian & Marko, 2016). Heads of state in the Western Balkans deluded the broader public from the importance of EU integration processes using the EU internal crisis as the main argument. As a result, nationalist movements began to flourish and the EU agenda became yet another nuisance for government officials.

Comprised of the current EU candidate countries Albania, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro, as well as the potential candidate countries of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, the adequate development of this region is of particular importance for the Union and its future enlargement scheme. In the next sections the current state of the Western Balkans in the EU integration process will be discussed by examining the progress of Albania, Macedonia and Serbia. It is important to see where these countries stand in the process according to the latest reports, so that impact on development can be better understood. Indicators on economic, social and human development will also be added to the discussion in order to demonstrate the

tendencies of lagging behind the rest of Europe. After this, our research findings will be presented, followed by a conclusion and recommendations based on these findings.

EU Integration and the Western Balkans: Where Are We Now?

Looking for the right answer about where the Western Balkan countries stand in the process of EU integration, it would not be too far from the truth to state that whilst they are so close to the EU, they are nevertheless far from being part of it. Countries of the Western Balkans are lagging behind significantly in making real progress with respect to EU integration processes (BIEPAG, 2014). Being geographically close is not enough to lavish the real connection of this region with the EU over the past years. On the contrary, these countries seem to be in a prolonged and painstaking process of integrating with the European family.

Albania which received official candidacy status three years ago is not expected to open the negotiation processes in the near future. The reason is evident and alludes to the fair progress the country had made in implementing given mandatory reforms. Besides adopting constitutional amendments for deep and structural reforms in the judicial system and public administration, progress on the ground has been moderately achieved; as stated in the last Report by the European Commission, in which the administration of justice continued to be slow and inefficient. The fight against corruption and organized crime is still in a preparatory phase. Human rights protection is compatible with EU standards, yet only on paper. Albania has to enforce human rights protection mechanisms according to the ratified conventions and enable conditions for human freedoms to be met in the everyday lives of people. The economic criterion is one of the basic functions for meeting the above, and unemployment has to be tackled as a main concern of the business-relevant regulations.

As for the candidacy status of Serbia which dates from March 2012, the initial reforms and prompt adjustments to the EU legislative were evaluated positively by the Commission, so that a formal start of Serbia's accession negotiations took place in January 2014. Though the successful opening process augured continuous progress in every sphere, the 2016 Report raised many concerns regarding more recent developments, including corruption as a serious problem prevalent in many areas. Human rights protection arose as another concern that requires the consistent implementation of the adopted legal and institutional framework across the country. The economy lacks investment activities. Consequent high levels of youth unemployment once again demonstrate that education programs must be adjusted to societal needs. On a regional level, the country has participated in undertaking

constructive initiatives, but the limited progress requires continuous efforts in order to align its foreign policy with EU standards.

Macedonia, which represents a unique case when it comes to EU enlargement in the Western Balkans, is found in a disparate situation if the evaluations and remarks from the last report are considered. The continuous show down in reforming state institutions and the judiciary reflects a lack of political will in addressing the already identified urgent reform priorities. Instead, political interference, corruption and organized crime remain as the most prevalent features of the country. This has portrayed Macedonia as a captured state in the last report by the Commission. The long-lasting political crisis has additionally ground down the principles of democracy. Economic developments do not differ from the political discourse. The country lacks investments that will divert the economy towards high value-added products. Measures have to be devised in the current system of delivering public services as well.

The Development Lag of the Western Balkans

The Western Balkan region represents a perfect example of why geographical location does not mean by definition an advantageous position when it comes to development. Though geography is considered to be an important determinant of comparative development, here it is not the case. Adjoining the EU was not enough to endorse countries of the Western Balkans to stand in line with the European educational and health systems, or economic activities. While it appears easy to identify this region as part of the EU in geographical framework, it is very difficult when it comes to a comparison of achievements in development.

As a result, it is very important to discuss the basic indicators of development as real income, and health and educational attainments in the respective countries. In order to provide a more comprehensive picture on how development has been experienced in different timeframes, the Human Development Index (HDI) will be discussed as well as a holistic measure of standards of living levels and capabilities.

It is a generally accepted practice to look at real income ratios when discussing growth and development. According to the World Bank, the standard of living and the overall economic activity of a country are measured by the Gross National Income (GNI) per capita. GNI represents the sum of value added by all resident producers plus any product taxes (minus subsidies) not included in the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (such as compensation of employees and property income) from abroad (Todaro & Smith, 2011). As a more accurate measure and

something more widely used there is GNI per capita PPP, which adjusts the GNI per capita indicator rates for the Purchasing Power Parity rates.

Figure 1 shows the trend of GNI (PPP) per capita of Albania, Macedonia and Serbia in the period between 1991 and 2015. To provide a better understanding and comparison of the progress in terms of GNI (PPP) per capita increase, relevant cumulative values for selected regions such as Europe and Central Asia, the European Union and the aggregate upper-middle income countries are added to the graph. The differences indicate towards a wider imbalance in values by the end of the observed period. Although Albania, Macedonia and Serbia have significantly improved their economic well-being according to the corresponding indicator, they are more backwards today than 25 years ago if compared to the progress achieved by the EU, or upper-middle economies in general.

Another important indicator when evaluating the development of a country is the mortality rate of under-fives. According to the World Bank, this rate shows the probability per 1,000 that a newborn baby will die before reaching the age of five, if subject to age-specific mortality rates of the specified year. As shown in Figure 2, during the period of 1991-2015, all of the observed countries have significantly reduced the child mortality rate. In the case of Albania, Macedonia and Serbia, it is important to notice that they have a slower tendency in decreasing the rate compared to upper-middle countries taken together. The observed countries, especially Albania, have achieved positive development in this regard, but the number of deaths under the age of five per 1,000 births is still higher than the EU average.

Since educational attainment as one of the basic indicators of development will not be elaborated due to the lack of serial data for the respective period, the HDI ratio as a tool for measuring and ranking countries in accordance with their levels of social and economic development will complete this section. Looking at the HDI values of the indicated countries, a consistent improvement can be perceived (See Figure 3). However, if compared to the rest of Europe, these countries are still lagging behind in achieving satisfactory development. If we take into consideration that Europe holds the first twenty places in the top 30 HDI list, Serbia, Albania and Macedonia are ranked far behind ranked at 66th, 75th and 82nd respectively (UNDP, 2016).

EU Development Criteria – Lately as a Nuisance for WB Leaders

Why do some countries make rapid progress towards development, while others remain poor and are lagging behind on the HDI rankings? Considering the elaborated development indicators in the previous section, this question arises from the existing

differences perceived in the EU and the Western Balkans. Such a comparison is particularly interesting as these countries share the same continent – they are all European countries.

When the countries of Western Europe decided to create the EU as a joint project that will guarantee their peace and stability and enhance common economic progress, they also enabled and ensured their further development. This is confirmed by the growth and development that EU countries achieved before and after creating the union.

On the other hand, the Western Balkans witnessed the break-up of a federation that had held them all together. The end of Yugoslavia meant the beginning of war for most of these countries. The conflictual discourse did not bring any benefit to anyone. Countries were left in a devastated position – both economically and in terms of co-operating with one another. Coming next was a long and difficult transition period that laid off thousands of workers from the previous socially-owned enterprises, pushing the life of many families to the edge of poverty. At the same time, Albania was slowly reviving from economic collapse and social unrest succeeding the communist regime. Being in an invidious situation, without a clear vision of where to head further, the Western Balkans were encouraged again when the EU launched the Stabilization and Association Process and the Stability Pact as a framework that will gradually integrate these countries in future (European Parliament, 1999).

As a grand welcome to EU values and standards, the celebration of the EU candidacy in each country of the Western Balkans was demonstrated on the streets, and reflected immediately into initiating structural reforms and the replacement of the old semi-functional state system. To ensure successful performance of the process of becoming an official EU member state, countries have had to fulfill the EU criteria and harmonize with EU legislation. Countries receive respective financial assistance to carry out the necessary reforms. The European Commission regularly provides a report on the progress shown.

While at first glance the reform processes looked smooth and straightforward to the EU criteria, the positive expectations and anticipated progress of the region in general were discontinued soon by the country's unreformed elites. Realizing that their personal interests differ largely than the broad public needs which is in line with the EU agenda, they had to step aside and change the reputational appraisal of the EU. The process was additionally distorted by arising doubts regarding the future of EU's enlargement policies and the assorted problems inside the union. After the last two enlargements, the EU also showed a lack of political will to accept new member states.

Such proceedings alibied elites of the Western Balkans in their strategies of lacking attentiveness and interest to perform in conformity with the EU agenda.

While every next report of the European Commission was going less noticed by the governments of Western Balkan countries, recommendations and criteria were seen more as a nuisance rather than a will of these countries to join the union in the near future. Reforms were paper-based, but no real progress regarding the rule of law, judiciary or public administration is seen. The EU incentive-based approach of implementing the recommendations given and the urgent reforms indicated in annual reports, resulted in a ticking-the-box administrative exercise.

Research Findings Presentation

Following a qualitative research approach based on questionnaires and a sample size of 150 respondents from Macedonia, Serbia and Albania, this paper will present the opinions, experiences and suggestions of different groups of respondents regarding the development of these countries, beside the previously elaborated reportative evidentials. The questionnaire which was carried out in an online format in the first half of March 2017, included academics and students, public officials, representatives of civil society organizations and other individuals between the age of 18 and 35. The results acquired will indicate the main determinants of development backsliding tendencies in these countries; evaluate the current situation on a grassroots level, and recommend further actions.

In this section we will present the main findings resulting from the conducted research. The questions focused on the main themes presented in the paper, with the intention of inquiring into development experience at a grassroots level. The first section of the questionnaire consists of statements that may represent respondents' perceptions about social, economic and human development of their respective countries. According to the answers given, there is a major disagreement that governments of these countries initiate and support development. Moreover, provided responses indicate towards a lack of equal opportunities and fair treatment by state institutions for start-up businesses. Guarantees of human rights and social protection are poorly rated. There is also a low awareness of state institutions as to the importance of cooperation with CSOs for achieving social, economic and human development goals. In general, over 80% of those surveyed do not agree that the EU-integration related activities undertaken by their countries have achieved the desired or expected development results. Another interesting thing to note is the existing difference in perceiving governmental commitment to enhance development in order

to provide a better life perspective for every citizen, or to accomplish EU requirements.

The Majority of the respondents evaluated economic and social development as poor, since their country was granted an official EU candidacy status. Social development is rated as poor (See Figure 4). As most pertaining to the development of these countries, respondents selected the indicators of economic conditions, opportunities for youth, and education opportunities in the country. Considering that youth unemployment is a serious problem in these countries and 70 per cent of respondents of the questionnaire are below the age of 29, it is evident that the listed indicators were valued the most. According to the World Bank, youth unemployment is measured at the level of 29.2 per cent in Albania, 49.5 per cent in Serbia and 50.8 per cent in Macedonia.

However, youth struggles to find a job is not considered in the national spending programs of the indicated countries. Even 76.7 per cent of the respondents declared that government spending programs in their country are not in accordance with the development priorities and needs of citizens. In continuation, 86.7 agreed that our country needs additional actions outside the agendas created and followed by state institutions in order to enhance development. Some of them even pointed towards concrete actions such as the inclusion of the civil society sector in policy and decision-making processes. Respondents have also indicated the need of relevant and up-to-date data that will define the needs of citizens and enable undertaking proper measures.

Regarding the question on existing discrepancies between the “paper” and genuine implemented reforms, more than two thirds of the responses agree that they exist. Respondents from Macedonia indicated that their government and correspondent ministries initiate reforms and adopt strategic papers which are further elaborated into well-articulated action plans. Yet, their practical realization is often deficient. Similarly, Albania was described as a Janus-faced applicant state. On the one hand legislators accept EU recommendations and try to implement indicated policy reforms. On the other side, policy implementation is deficient because of the political polarization of society. In general, the effective implementation of EU conditionality depends on the will of the domestic political elite that has already shaped the democratic norms according to its own interests. In Serbia, as stated, significant reforms may be implemented on paper by now. Most of the respondents are hesitant in evaluating their progress since after all changes are neither enough noticeable, nor visible in practice.

However, predominant opinion is that the EU integration of the Western Balkans is more than a necessity in terms of development, but also a process that affirms the belonging of all European countries in one European society.

Conclusion: Ideal Time for a Change in the EU Perspective

In a period when positive changes of the political discourse are likely to happen and are initiated by civic movements and public efforts, it is time for the EU to step further in their attempt to integrate the Western Balkans. A more affirmative approach is needed to embrace these countries and ensure healthy relationships in their regional cooperation and with regard to EU integration, rather than the current incentives-based strategy.

While the governments of these small Balkan societies have left real interest to follow the EU agenda, civil society is even stronger in their commitments to bring their countries into the European family. Considering their consistent fight with the polarized political proceedings, a new paradigm for enlargement is paramount. People of these countries have firmly declared the EU integration of the Western Balkans as more than a necessity in terms of development, but also as a process that affirms the belonging of all European countries in one European society.

Therefore, a change of narrative that will offer a change of perspective is also needed, which is not about the enlargement 'of a club' but rather about one European society whose stakeholders are active citizens throughout the continent. Changing the existing narrative can allow Europe to harness the progressive energy present in the Western Balkans today. A true establishment of common community will bring the Western Balkans closer to the EU development standards. Connecting the Western Balkans beyond the geographical habitation is the only way to bring the EU into these societies.

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Figures




Figure 1: GNI per Capita (PPP) in Selected Countries (1991-2015, U.S. \$). Source: The World Bank.




Figure 2: Mortality Rate, under-5 (per 1000 life births) in Selected Countries (1991-2015). Source: The World Bank.




Figure 3: Human Development Index in Albania, Macedonia and Serbia (1991-2015). Source: The World Bank.



Figure 4: Questionnaire Results on Rating Development since the EU Candidacy of the Country of the Respondent.

ANNEX (Questionnaire Sample)

*Your country of origin _____

PART ONE: Listed below is a series of statements that may represent your perception about *your country's social, economic and human development*. Please read each phrase carefully and circle the response you consider as the most appropriate.

	Strongly Disagree	Moderately Disagree	Neutral	Agree	Strongly Agree
The government of my country works hard to enhance social, economic and human development in order to provide a better life perspective for every citizen.	1	2	3	4	5
The government of my country works hard to achieve social, economic and human development requirements in accordance with EU integration agenda.	1	2	3	4	5
The state institutions in my country provide equal and fair opportunities for start-up businesses in order to provide sustainable economic development and improve the standards of living.	1	2	3	4	5
The state institutions in my country guarantee the protection of social rights of its citizens including the elimination of poverty and ensuring a satisfactory livelihood for all.	1	2	3	4	5
The state institutions in my country guarantee the realization of human rights in a manner essentially free of abuse and corruption, and with due regard for the rule of law.	1	2	3	4	5
The state institutions in my country are aware of the importance of cooperation with CSOs for achieving social, economic and human development goals.	1	2	3	4	5
In general, the EU-integration related activities undertaken by my country achieve the desired/expected development results.	1	2	3	4	5

PART TWO: The following questions require evaluation and recommendations on *your country's social, economic and human development* based on your personal experience. Please circle the response you consider as most appropriate and give a brief explanation where requested.

How would you rate the development of your country since the EU candidacy status in terms of:

	Poor	Fair	Good	Very Good	Excellent
Economic Development					
Human Development					
Social Development					

Choose three of the most important development indicators pertaining to your country:

- | | |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> Educational opportunities | <input type="checkbox"/> Poverty eradication |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Political circumstances | <input type="checkbox"/> Opportunities for youth |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Public service | <input type="checkbox"/> Career opportunities |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Economic conditions | <input type="checkbox"/> Leisure activities |
| <input type="checkbox"/> Social standards | <input type="checkbox"/> Other: _____ |

Are the government spending programmes in your country in accordance to the development priorities and needs of its citizens?

- Yes
- No

Please explain your answer:

Do you consider that your country needs additional actions outside the agendas created and followed by state institutions in order to enhance development?

Yes

No

Please explain your answer:

Please explain your view on the reform processes of your country regarding the EU integration, both on “paper” and in practice/everyday life. How would you explain the discrepancies (if existing)?

Do you think that the EU integration of your country is a necessity in terms of development, while also a process that affirms the belonging of all European countries in one European society?

Yes

No

Other (please specify):

Part Three:
Security, Terrorism and Identity Politics
In Europe at 'the End of ohe End of the Cold War'

The Emerging Threat of Terrorism to the European Union and Its Influence on Member States, Institutions and Basic Values

Vasko Shutarov

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to illustrate the nature and main characteristics of the current threat of terrorism in Europe and its impact and influence on particular EU member states, the EU institutional and legislative mechanism and its basic values. In this regard, focus is placed on the threats originating from the so-called “Islamic State”, foreign terrorist fighters and radicalized individuals, in the context of the Syrian conflict and refugee/migration crisis. The impact of threats on particular member states is presented through a comparative overview of Belgium, France and Germany in the face of recent counterterrorism efforts. The response at EU level, is presented through new initiatives regarding coordination, cooperation and information sharing among the European member states. The threat of Terrorism also has an influence on basic EU values, bringing about different attitudes to migration and Islam, whilst demonstrating the importance of inter-religious and inter-cultural relations in Europe.

Keywords: Terrorism, threat, radicalization, attack, European Union, cooperation

Introduction

The Paris attacks in 2015 marked a new era in the threat of terrorism characterized by attacks committed by individuals (“lone actors”) or network groups, mainly directed or inspired by the “Islamic State” (hereafter IS). Belgium, France and Germany had already experienced this new wave of individual terrorist attacks against civilians, police officers and soldiers (Dugulin, 2017), which demonstrates the success of IS strategy in inspiring young people to adopt its ideology and attack Western countries, if they are unable to travel to Syria or Iraq. Some of the attacks were instructed or directed by “IS” members, others were simply inspired by propaganda that had already been disseminated.

Recent terrorist attacks have been executed without much planning, with limited personnel, and lacking in financial support. The absence of weapons and explosives has resulted in having to resort to the use of knives, machetes, cars, trucks, automatic guns and home-made explosive devices. Besides limited casualties (compared with past attacks), they attract considerable public attention, cause fear and uncertainty and have a big psychological and political impact on the general public (Dugulin, 2017). These attacks have confirmed IS’s global agenda and capabilities as a terrorist organization that poses a direct and indirect terrorist threat to Europe. Pressed by international coalition, territorial losses, limited resources in manpower, finances and equipment are contributing factors to growing IS interest in attacking Europe. In addition, European countries are potential targets due to their participation in the coalition against IS, ongoing counterterrorism operations or other measures that can be seen as violating against Muslims (Zavis, 2016).

Foreign terrorist fighters, estimated at 5,000 alone from Europe, contribute to the general threat emanating from IS. These fighters possess training for arms and explosives, have combat experience and a high level of ideological indoctrination. There are four general aspects of the foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon: persons who have traveled from the EU to Syria and Iraq to become Foreign terrorist fighters ; returnees who have gained military training and experience abroad; the impact of social cohesion within the EU on Foreign terrorist fighters; and, would-be Foreign terrorist fighters , who have been prevented from traveling to Syria and Iraq, yet are able to carry out attacks in the European Union (Baroudos, 2016).

Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups inspired by religion should not be excluded or underestimated as a threat. Al Qaeda executed the most brutal attacks in the past and took responsibility for the *Charlie Hebdo* attack in Paris, in 2015. There are also European Foreign terrorist fighters in Al Qaeda affiliates, such as Al Shabab and

Jabhat Fateh al Sham. Although US campaigns and America's current focus on Syria, is a limiting factor for Al Qaeda in targeting Europe, potential threats remain as follows: directed or Al Qaeda-blessed plots, inspired freelancers, European targets, and kidnap for ransom operations in MENA (the Middle East and North African region (Van Ginkel and Entenmann, 2016).

The ongoing migrant and refugee crisis contributes to the current threat of terrorism, fueling fears about the transfer of terrorists into Europe. Yet, there has been no evidence of the systematic flow of Jihadists into Europe, apart from those cases when Foreign terrorist fighters used migrant routes to travel into Europe – namely the perpetrators of the Paris and Brussels attacks who used the “Balkan route”. (Simcox, 2016). By 2016, the German authorities recorded 300 Jihadist attempts to recruit refugees trying to enter Europe (Russia Today, 2016). An additional 17 IS followers were detected among migrants in recipient centers or asylum homes (Hedge, 2016). Due to the great number of refugees and migrants, this does not exclude dangerous people who have already entered Europe. In this regard, Greece has been strongly criticized, mostly by Germany for failing to identify and register refugees and migrants (Tomlison, 2016).

The terrorist threat reflects on public security, the political situation in particular EU member states, EU internal cohesion and its institutional architecture, the security services and the economy. The main challenges are cooperation and coordination among member states, in strengthening the EU and the preservation of its core values.

The Terrorism Threat and its Response – Belgium, France and Germany

Belgium

The Paris and Brussels attacks were conducted by the same cells, based in the Belgian capital, as part of a greater network of Jihadists who moved freely through Europe (Traynor, 2015). Again, they show the problem of domestic radicalization and recruitment for terrorism. Half of the Molenbeek population are Moroccan immigrants, among whom 35 per cent are made up of youths under 35 years of age, who are unemployed, and living in isolated communities, without adequate government services (Goulard, 2016). Belgium is a European leader in Foreign terrorist fighters, totalling 440 individuals (160 of whom are still in Syria and Iraq, with 110 who have died, and 120 who have returned to Europe). As such Belgium remains one of the most vulnerable countries in the EU (Paul, 2015). Belgium suffered deadly suicide attacks in Brussels in March 22, 2016, leaving 32 dead and 300 injured, with individual attacks on police officers in Charleroi and Brussels.

Weaknesses in counter terrorism were revealed by the Brussels and Paris attacks: inefficient information sharing among agencies due to linguistic divisions, decentralized government and overlapping competencies; a lack of human & technological resources; restricted laws for monitoring suspected persons; a lack of cooperation with other member states EU institutions and the USA and the lack of a long-term vision & strategy of how to counter terrorism (Van Ginkel & Entenmann, 2016).

After the attacks, the Belgian authorities took various steps to improve their capacities through 30 counter terrorism measures, such as: providing increased resources for security and intelligence agencies; improving communications between local and federal police and intelligence bodies; raids conducted against suspected individuals; the criminalization of support for terrorist groups and public incitement to carry out an attack. Measures were also introduced against foreign terrorist fighters; whilst participation, traveling, and training were criminalized and passports and the IDs of potential foreign terrorist fighters were confiscated. Belgium became an initiator of regional cooperation within and outside the EU (Renard, 2016). Cooperation between France, the UK, Germany, Turkey, Morocco and the US was strengthened. In 2016, a Franco-Belgian summit was organized in order to boost cooperation regarding police and intelligence exchange and the formation of Joint Investigative Units (JIT). Also, a French liaison magistrate was introduced for judicial cooperation and agreements for cooperation on radicalization prevention programs. In January 2017, Belgium, France and the UK agreed on joint security checks on trains, and a joint database on the identity of passengers. Belgium soon became a leader in information sharing within EUROPOL. There were also measures regarding radicalization with: new prevention units in the most affected communities to monitor radicalized cases; local coordination cells at the municipal level; regional platforms to facilitate the exchange of information and good practice among municipalities and numerous counter radicalization initiatives and multidisciplinary support centers to help citizens against radicalization (Sarma, 2016). Belgium has also established the Syria Strategic Communication Advisory Team (SSCAT), whilst the EU financed a project for the exchange of best practice in the area of strategic communication with a view to preventing and countering radicalization (European Parliament, 2017).

France

More than 230 people have been killed in terrorist attacks in France since 2015 (Russia Today, 2016), dozens occurred in 2016 and more are expected in the future. There were both individual attacks on police officers and soldiers (Paris and Magnanville), a catholic priest in Normandy and a Jewish rabbi in Marseille, alongside 86 civilians in (Nice) as well as serious plots (Paris, Strasbourg and Marseille) consisting several suspected terrorists. In addition, there are around 900 foreign terrorist fighters, of whom 570 are still abroad, 137 have died and 246 have returned (Sarma, 2016).

France is high on the target list because it serves as a symbol of Western culture and is a cultural capital of Europe (Zavis, 2016). Furthermore, France's involvement in military operations against Al Qaeda in the Maghreb (Mali) and the IS in Syria alongside the country's secular tradition, which is considered as being repressive by Muslims only serve to heighten France's risk of terrorism. Radicalization is also a great challenge due to the social and economic isolation of France's Muslim communities, the unemployment of urban youth, and a low trust in the French government. 17,393 people are currently registered on the French terrorist monitoring database (Michael Smith News, 2017).

After each attack, France upgraded its counter terrorism strategy, tightened border controls, and deployed additional police and military personnel and technology. It introduced a three-month-long state of emergency to help fight terrorism: banning public demonstrations, allowing the police to stop and search without warrants, as well as introducing house arrests without trials, and blocking websites with extremist content. Changes in legislation were adopted granting greater police powers, including the so called "dead powers" of killing any individual posing as an imminent threat and house arrests for one month for foreign terrorist fighters (Sarma, 2016). France's services were foiling terror plots and dismantling militant networks on a daily basis (BBC, 2016).

Germany

In 2016, Germany experienced dozens of attacks and plots, on civilian targets, mainly by self-radicalized individuals guided by young IS men, including refugees and asylum seekers. There were individual attacks in the name of IS on police officers (Hanover), civilians (Wurzburg and Berlin), a Sikh temple (Essen), as well as the prevention of plots in Ansbach, Chemnitz, Dusseldorf, Ludwigshafen and Northeim. There are

about 800 foreign terrorist fighters of whom 130 have been killed and a third have returned to Germany (Van Ginkel & Entenmann, 2016).

After the Paris attacks, Germany strengthened its counter terrorism mechanisms, including the adoption of a comprehensive counter terrorism strategy; which involved a wide range of federal and state authorities. The government also introduced new laws; criminalizing travel and training for foreign terrorist fighters; as well as strengthening the security authorities; and, placing a greater obligation on private companies to contribute to counter terrorist efforts. Meanwhile, a new elite police unit which was better prepared for large scale attacks was formed, whilst the state introduced border traffic controls alongside the new monitoring of financial flows;, whilst authorizing the Ministry of the Interior to deprive individuals of passports, along with an exit and entry ban and the criminalization of any incitement, support, recruitment, preparation or encouragement in the carrying out attacks, including the introduction of electronic tags for those considering carrying out a terror threat without trial and a prolonged period of keeping suspects in custody. The new surveillance law also gave priority to public safety (Sarma, 2016). In March 2016, Germany announced a plan to increase the domestic security budget by 2.1 billion euros by 2020, whilst commenting that the needs were far from adequately financed (Stratfor, 2016).

Germany also strengthened security with regard to asylum seekers, thereby easing the deportations of those whose cases had been rejected, increasing the surveillance of those who were to be deported and those who were considered as a terror risk, thus limiting movement within Germany, and limiting development aid for countries that did not cooperate in the deportation process (Donahue and Jennen, 2017). In the past, the Bavarian government had often criticized the slow asylum process, the lack of registration, fingerprinting and hearings.

With regard to radicalization, various federal states offered rehabilitation programs and de-radicalization in prisons whilst carrying out dozens of police actions against hate speech & counter extremist messages (Utrinski vesnik, 2016). Meanwhile the Salafist movement which takes a fundamentalist approach to Islam continues to grow in Germany, from 3,800 in 2011 to 7,900 in 2016 and this has produced some violent individuals. Another challenge has been that of refugees, who are vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment to carry out attacks due to their personal psychological situation and the fact that they have often been separated from parents in war zones, deprived of social contacts with their fellow countrymen, and have been frustrated by the slow bureaucratic process of the German authorities. The organization Violent Preventive Network (VPN) in Berlin focuses on this vulnerable category of refugees

(Knight, 2016). The German authorities had 100 warnings of IS fighters among refugees coming into Germany, some of whom entered with fake or stolen passports, alongside 230 attempts by Salafists to recruit refugees (Durdin, 2016). In order to undermine the indoctrination and recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters and propaganda efforts, the police raided the well-known “Abu Wala” nationwide Salafi network, at the end of 2016 (BBC, 2016).

EU Response: Cooperation, Coordination, and Information Sharing

Even before major terrorist attacks can occur, the EU and US counterterrorism veterans have warned EU policymakers regarding the major vulnerabilities of the Union. This has often meant: weak and uncoordinated internal borders, further compromised by the refugee/migrant flow, and exacerbated by differences in laws and security cultures that hamper intelligence-sharing and law enforcement cooperation. Other factors include: separate EU and member state data bases that are not linked, alongside fragmented and incomplete databases for terror suspects as well as a lack of willingness among member states regarding the supply and usage of data. Meanwhile, short prison sentences for terrorism cases have allowed former convicted individuals to continue their activities; whilst there have often been limited resources and support for the security forces of some member states such as Belgium and Greece (Rotela, 2016). In addition, there have been slow rates of approval of EU laws regarding counterterrorism measures, as it was the case with Passenger Name Record (PNR), initiated in 2011, and adopted in 2016 which allows EU agencies and national law enforcement authorities to identify suspicious individuals, their journeys and contacts (Merritt, 2015).

There are also differing terrorism laws within EU member states, for example on how long a person can be questioned and detained, or what is actually considered to be a “terror attack” in the first place. All these weaknesses have been fully exploited by terrorists.

First of all, terrorist attacks have demonstrated the vulnerability of open borders, and the lack of coordination and information sharing between member states. Two of the suicide bombers in Paris attack had traveled to Western Europe via the “Balkan route” with forged Syrian passports, whilst several Brussels attackers had also used these migration routes. Many of them were known to national police or intelligence services in several EU member states, but the information had not been shared between member states or registered on EU databases (Calamur, 2016). The transnational nature of the threat requires a transnational response, thereby

emphasizing the role of EU mechanisms. Information sharing was and still remains a significant challenge.

Following the Paris attacks, the Dutch intelligence agency (AIVD), initiated a meeting of the intelligence agencies of all the EU countries, Switzerland and Norway, to improve information sharing, and the exchange of new clues, insights, suspect alerts and a discussion of the improvement of the European system of intelligence and counter terrorism (Esman, 2016).

Following the Brussels attacks, EU president Juncker, launched the idea of a 'Security Union', as a way of going beyond the concept of cooperation in protecting internal national security to the idea of protecting the collective security of the EU. The aim of this concept is to improve the coordination and information-sharing of national police forces regarding transnational threats (terrorism). In September 2016, a new Commissioner for the Security Union (Sir Julian King) was appointed with a mandate to strengthen the overall effort to combat terrorism, prevent radicalization and strengthen cooperation and the ambitions of data exchange (Rankin, 2016). His competences, vis-à-vis other counter terrorism actors, especially the EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator, could further complicate coordination.

In November 2016, a new directive on counter terrorism was initiated as the EU framework for rules on terrorism offences and it widened their scale to include emerging threats, such as: traveling abroad to join a terrorist group and/or a return to the EU with the aim of carrying out a terrorist attack; recruiting for terrorism; training or being trained for terrorism; aiding, abetting or attempting to carry of an attack; public incitement or praise of terrorism and the financing of terrorism and terrorist groups. The EU member states have 18 months to transfer it into their national laws (Diplomatic Intelligence, 2017).

EUROPOL is still considered as a key counter terrorism institution. Coordination within EUROPOL proved difficult due to: the different political, administrative, judicial frameworks of the EU member states; different agencies and services responsible for counter terrorism (in some member states it is the police, in others the intelligence services); as well as the reluctance of member states to share information, and different data protection regimes (Bureš, 2016, pp 57–66). As a response to foreign terrorist fighter phenomenon, EUROPOL in 2014 launched a focal point travelers scheme to help European countries by collecting and sharing information on the movements of foreign terrorist fighters to Syria and Iraq and their return to Europe. Only half of the 28 members states reported their national situations to EUROPOL databases at the time of the Paris attacks. The importance of EUROPOL

in counter terrorism was confirmed by the fact that most of the perpetrators had a criminal background. In 2016 Europol supported 127 counter terrorist operations (a 50% increase). (Europol, 2017).

In January 2016, a new European Counter Terrorism Center (ECTC) was established within EUROPOL, as the central information and expertise hub for dealing with growing EU needs in the fight against terrorism. Its principal task is to provide operational support to EU member states in investigations, as in the case of those following the Paris, Brussels and Nice attacks, and it can contribute to a coordinated response. Its main focus is in: tackling foreign terrorist fighters, sharing intelligence and expertise on the financing of terrorism, online terrorist propaganda and extremism, and illegal arms trafficking, as well as international cooperation among counter terrorism authorities. In Greece and Italy, the ECTC provided security checks at external borders, supported the EU internet forum and was involved in various initiatives to enhance cooperation in the Western Balkans and MENA regions. ECTC services, used by member states, increased information sharing. (Europol, 2016).

Many EU member states simultaneously participate in informal multilateral networks such as the Club de Berne and the Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGT). Although this cooperation often is at the expense of support to EUROPOL, these informal networks have proven to be much more suitable for information sharing than the usual hierarchical EU agencies.

In February 2017, on the initiative of the German BKA and EUROPOL, almost 100 high ranking police representatives met in Berlin, to consider the best means by which to enhance the coordination of European police efforts to fight terrorism, and discuss the current state of the terrorist threat in Europe, best practice methodologies for the police response to terrorist incidents, and the enhanced use of ECTC (the European Counter Terrorism Centre) for increasing information (Europol, 2017).

Apart from initiatives and declarative willingness, one of the obstacles to an efficient common European counter terrorism response is the slow bureaucratic process, the *ad hoc* nature of initiatives-launched only after terror attacks, and the reluctance of some member states to transfer sovereignty to an EU supranational body. Policy makers at the EU easily launch initiatives to enhance counter terrorism but are less effective in persuading their own national agencies to comply with such initiatives at an EU level (Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2016). Furthermore, the contemporary political context is not always in favor of enhanced cooperation in the face of a growing euro-skepticism, and the reassessment of some member states regarding their

future benefits from EU membership. For these reasons, some member states are more in favor of bilateral agreements for cooperation between their security and intelligence agencies, which is now evaluated as being a more effective and practical response. National databases usually contain more detailed data for individuals of particular member state interest, which are not usually transferred to joint EU databases. This is why the EU should facilitate, and not replace such cooperation. The Union is not against such cooperation, and even encourages it, recognizing its practical value.

The importance of cooperation and information sharing in a counter terrorism context remains a future challenge. Similar calls for improved cooperation existed before but have been ignored or not even recognized by some member states. For example, in March 2014, the EU issued a counter terrorism memo urging member states to share more information with the authorities such as EUROPOL about foreign terrorist fighters in Syria and Iraq. 90 per cent of the information submitted to EU data bases on foreign terrorist fighters came from just five of the 28 member states (CNBC, 2016).

Radicalization prevention also remains high on the EU agenda. In its 20 April 2016 Communication, the EC proposed concrete actions to further support the effectiveness of member state national policies to tackle radicalization through improved EU coordination structures and the better deployment of funds and European scale projects, with several concrete measures. The European Commission allocated 400 million euros for developing new policies and projects supporting these priorities, and an additional 13 million for supporting grassroots initiatives. New bodies were also established, as the EU Internet forum to detect and address harmful material online, and the Excellence Centre at Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN), as a support to the EU and its member states in fighting radicalization (European Commission, 2016).

European Values Challenged

Terror attacks not only affect human lives, but also core European values, which also come under attack, such as: human rights and human dignity, the freedom of movement and the freedom of expression, equality, solidarity, tolerance, pluralism and the freedom of movement.

Human rights are always at stake when it comes to counter terrorism measures, in what can best be described as a continuous bargaining between freedom and security. European and international human rights groups criticized the new EU directive on

counter terrorism, claiming that it would lead to the criminalization of public protests and other peaceful acts, and that it would suppress the freedom of expression, as well as limiting the freedom of religious expression and other rights, bringing about the risk of discrimination against particular ethnic and religious communities. They called upon safeguards in the implementation of national laws (EDRI 2016). However, public polls have since shown that Europeans are willing to give up more of their rights for more security (Euranet plus, 2015).

Freedom of expression is mainly related with attempts of countering online propaganda, media and social media regulation as well other disputable content. In contrast, public opinion reacted strongly when the EU leadership urged the British media to not report terrorists as being “Muslims” or “Islamic” (Laszlo, 2016).

Freedom of movement came into the debate because of the fact that the perpetrators of the Paris, Brussels and Berlin attacks had moved so freely from one country to another, without being checked or detained. Yet, inspite of growing criticism, the president of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker said that open borders are still the best way to combat international terrorism, pointing out that the basic values for which the EU stands are unchained (Street, 2016).

Solidarity is especially important as a means of demonstrating unity. The Lisbon treaty introduced the solidarity clause under which any member state hit by a terror attack must receive help from other member states. However, not all member states see the current (religiously motivated) threat of terrorism as their priority. The current counter terrorist agenda reflects the primal concerns of Western Europe and the Northern European member states, those of Central and Eastern Europe fear Russia and the situation in Ukraine, while the Southern member states fear the current flow of migrants and refugees.

Tolerance, as a value on which the EU was built is endangered not just by radical religious ideologies (Salafi-jihadism), but also by growing right wing movements who think that governmental measures and the overall response to radicalism and terrorism, as well as the refugee/migration crisis, has so far been insufficient. Extreme far right groups and national extremists have already conducted attacks on mosques, community centers, migrant and asylum shelters and private shops owned by Muslims (Dugulin, 2017). This tendency could continue further, fueled by new terror attacks. Right wing political parties are also on the rise, the National Front in France, Alternative for Germany, and the Freedom Party in Austria continue to attract new votes. Yet, in spite of regular attacks on its migrant policy, the CDU and Angela Merkel still maintain popularity (Peek, 2016).

Terrorist threats have further encouraged politicians in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic to criticize migration policy and they have called on the EU to close its borders and return refugees and migrants to their own countries. They argue that Muslim migrants are fueling the terrorist threat, arguing that all recent terrorists have been migrants. For example, Slovakia showed a willingness to accept migrant Christians only because Muslim refugees would build mosques and change Slovak culture (The Irish Times, 2016). Meanwhile, official German policy has remained unchanged, with the call that terrorism should not be linked with Islam, which is in turn misused by terrorists (Montgomery, 2017).

Public opinion polls have also shown that Europeans think that the migrant flow contributes to the threat of terrorism. An EU-wide study from April 2016, showed the vast majority of Europeans are worried about the number of Muslims in their country and believe that the terror threat is far from over. They also believe that Muslim migrants are a serious threat to Europe, that terror attacks are likely in their country and that the immigration wave increases the risks of terrorism and crime, and poses a risk to the cultural integrity of the country. Besides these worries, most Europeans don't want to leave the EU (Cooper, 2016).

Some preventative measures by governments also affect tolerance. France closed 20 mosques and prayer halls under allegations that they were spreading radical ideas, and proposed to ban the funding of foreign mosques (Russia Today, 2016). Another measure was to end the ability radical Muslims to benefit from welfare programs, after it was revealed that some of the best known Jihadists received thousands of euros in unemployment benefits (Esman, 2016).

The abovementioned illustrates the extent to which the so called individual, isolated or limited attacks impact on European societies. A divided Europe is something the IS wants to achieve, exploiting the current and future alienation of European Muslims, provoking a backlash from far right and extremist groups, and sparking a religious war. The Normandy church attack, the Church plot in Paris or attacks on Jews demonstrate the determination of IS to undermine religious tolerance and provoke religious divisions according to their ideology.

This is why tolerance should remain a basic European value and the voices of the religious leaders should prevail. After the Würzburg attack, the Central Council of Muslims in Germany warned that the intention of the assailant was to spark growing division in Germany over the integration of foreigners and the reception of refugees and it pledged to prevent such attempts (DW, 2016). The Belgian Muslim Group, The League of Imams publicly condemned the Brussels attack (Socolowsky, 2016).

The Union of Islamic Organizations of France strongly condemned the Paris attack (Muslim News, 2015). Such strong messages from religious authorities and believers from different religions are the best response to radicalism and ongoing EU efforts to preserve its security, unity, solidarity, and most important, its values.

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A Clash of Civilizations? Revisiting Russian Identity Politics at the 'End of the End of the Cold War'

Robert C. Hudson

Abstract

In the summer of 1993, the article “The Clash of Civilizations?” (with the question mark) was published by Samuel Huntington in *Foreign Affairs*. Three years later Huntington’s expanded thesis was published in book format. Article and book generated both discussion and controversy, given that the author had posited the idea that civilizations, which may also be read as cultural communities or cultural fault lines posed a great threat to world peace in the New World Order that had emerged from the end of the Cold War. Is his work simply rooted in its own time period as a response to Fukuyama’s *End of History and the Last Man* (1989 and 1992) and the beginning of the War against Terrorism (11 September 2001) – roughly a ten year-long period? Or, does it still resonate today at the ‘End of the End of the Cold War’ in the continuing aftermath of the 2008 Financial Crisis, growing terrorism and the rise of right-wing populism? This chapter will revisit Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations* with reference to key Russian intellectuals writing in the period, most notably Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Igor Chubais and Alexander Dugin. It will demonstrate how these writers have influenced Russian opinion both during the crisis years of the 1990s and in Vladimir Putin’s resurgent Russia. The focus of this chapter will be on Russia, Europe and the influence and fluid nature of identity politics.

Keywords: Identity politics, cultural conflicts, the ‘End of the End of the Cold War’ contested pasts, sub-state nationalisms, core states, ‘fault-line wars’ Eurasia and thalassocracy.

Introduction

One of my scholarly activities over the past twenty-five years has been to try and understand Russia in terms of its own sense of identity and its ever-changing and usually ambiguous relationship with Europe. How do Russians perceive themselves; and, how have Russia's relations changed with Europe and the West? This has been driven not just by my scholastic and research-based interests, but also by my teaching. The result has been not just reflections on the contemporary period of Yeltsin's two terms of office (1991 – 1999) – otherwise known as the 'Wild 90s', Putin's two terms (2000 – 2008), Medvedev's single term (2008 – 12) and Putin's current term (2012 -), but also considering the long view of Russian history, going back to the time of Kievan Rus', Muscovy, the 300 year-long Romanov dynasty and 75 years of Soviet history.

The original intention of this chapter had been to view Russia through the prism of Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations*, given that it is now twenty-five years since the first publication of his ideas in *Foreign Affairs* and that, although highly critical of his work, I had nevertheless been stimulated by his thoughts on core and cleft societies and also comments that he had made on Russian identity and Russia's relations with Ukraine. However, I also wanted to revisit this work and put it into a more solid context, with references to other writers from the 1990s, most notably Alexander Solzhenitsyn and his 1995 publication *The Russian Question at the End of the Twentieth Century* and Igor Chubais' *From the Russian Idea to a New Idea for Russia*. I felt that putting this work together would resolve questions which had arisen from two earlier papers I had written in this series on relations between Russia, Ukraine and Europe and, indeed the actual introduction to my PhD thesis, some fifteen years ago. In the process of putting this work together, I was introduced to the recent translations into English of Alexander Dugin, one-time advisor to President Putin. The works are: *Eurasian Mission* (2014) and *Last War of the World-Island: The Geopolitics of Contemporary Russia* (2015). So, in this chapter, I will be referring to four key writers: Samuel Huntington, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Igor Chubais, and Alexander Dugin. Needless to say, this is still very much work in progress, but I would like to share some of my observations.

Situating *The Clash of Civilizations* in Its Own Time

In the summer of 1993, "The Clash of Civilizations?" was published by Samuel Huntington in *Foreign Affairs*. Huntington's thesis was developed into a book and published by Simon and Schuster in 1997. Article and book generated both

discussion and controversy given that the author posited the idea that civilizations, which may also be read as cultures or cultural difference posed a great threat to world peace in the New World Order that had emerged from the end of the Cold War.

It would be easy to just dismiss *Clash of Civilizations* as a response to Fukuyama's *End of History* (1989 and 1992); yet, it was very much a product of the time in which it was being written. They were certainly heady days, with the end of the Cold War, the birth of a New World Order, the emergence of the European Union and new nations rising. On the down-side, we witnessed the rise of nationalism and inter-ethnic conflict which impacted so heavily upon the Western Balkans and the former Soviet Union. Huntington's work certainly opened up a huge and often vitriolic debate in the fields of International Relations and Identity Politics. Particularly, from scholars working in the field of post-colonial studies, who objected to his treatment of 'civilisations' as an agglomeration of lower-level cultures, and as some sort of mega-culture concept. Also, from scholars working in much more clearly-defined areas of regional studies, such as the Balkans and South Eastern Europe.

At first sight *The Clash of Civilizations* seemed to replace one paradigm with another; the struggle between two competing ideologies was replaced by a clash between seven competing civilisations. The question was, did we need yet another paradigm (exactly my reflections on Alexander Dugin today!)? The book was a product of its time, but it was also rejected by many scholars who were also writing at the time, much as some have been rejecting Edward Lucas' ideas on 'The New Cold War' more recently (2008, 2014). Yet, Huntington was basically trying to understand and explain the inter-ethnic conflicts that were taking place in the 1990s and predict what might take place in the not too distant future.

He produced a "master plan" which drew from many other writings of the day. Huntington's work was very much a synthesis of ideas that were already predominant among Western thinkers and academic writers in the early 1990s. Indeed, one can easily find similarity in other works written at the time, though written on a much smaller scale, such as Misha Glenny's book *The Fall of Yugoslavia* which was published in September 1992.

To be kind, perhaps the key criticism was that Huntington painted too broad a canvas and missed out on the detail. The result was an apparent drift into essentialism at a time when there was a real crisis in the representation of local conflicts, and one was left with the feeling that he avoided local identities on the ground because he was looking at the bigger picture by trying to trace global connections. So that the more deeply that one understood and experienced a society, the more one found holes in

Huntington's argument. I, for one particularly found his depiction of the Western Balkans irritating and made much of this in the introduction to my PhD thesis (2002).

There was considerable confusion over 'Slavonic identities'. I will cite just one paragraph adapted from the abstract to my thesis:

...whereas Huntington's ideas on 'torn societies' and 'civilizational fault lines' might seem feasible on the grand scale, the overriding architecture of his theories seemed to crumble, the more one paid closer attention to the detail. Herein lies one of many contradictions to be found in Huntington's work. For example, in his original *Foreign Affairs* article (p. 15 in the 1996 edition) within one page, he has consigned Yugoslavia to the dustbin of history because of religious difference (completely ignoring other cultural markers of ethnic identity, such as language, culture, ethnicity, and a shared, common history). Yet, in the same breath, by reference to the then current tension and the risk of potential armed conflict between Ukraine and Russia in 1991 and 1992 over the Crimea, the Black Sea Fleet and nuclear weapons, he argues that conflict will not only break out between the two states because of that self-same Slavonic ethnic identity (without mentioning Orthodoxy), and one assumes a common history, that he has denied the Serbs, Croats and Bosnians above. (Hudson, 2002, p. 23)

Perhaps, what causes one 'civilization' to go to war with another can also cause another 'civilization' to refrain from conflict.

But, we should not dwell too much on past criticisms. Some of what Huntington wrote in 1993 and 1997 still holds water today. First and foremost, he helped to put culture firmly onto the map of various disciplines, such as International Relations and Politics. Though historians had been doing that for some time, going back to Marc Bloch and his *Annales* school of history. Furthermore, Huntington's work helped us to understand sub-state nationalisms, lingering conflicts and ripple effects, long before we even called them that.

Now, twenty-five years on, the post war settlement (1945) has been exhausted (Furedi, *Spiked*, November 2016) whilst the post Cold War 'new world order' has more recently come to an end. We now find ourselves at the 'End of the end of the Cold War.' So, maybe it is time to revisit, revise and reappraise Huntington's work alongside other works on identity politics in the light of the 2008 financial crisis, the shift towards populism and the rise of demagogic leaders.

What *The Clash of Civilizations* Said about Russia and Ukraine

Perhaps the best way to provide a flavour of Huntington's take on Russia and Ukraine is simply to reflect on one or two quotations taken from his *Clash of Civilizations*. For example, when discussing to the role of language politics from the perspective of communication rather than identity, Huntington comments that: "Throughout history the distribution of languages in the world has reflected the distribution of power in the world" (p. 62). He then goes on to add that: "The decline of Russian power is accompanied by a parallel decline in the use of Russian as a second language" (p. 63). This was reflected in the retreat of the Soviet/Russian military presence from the whole of Eastern and Central Europe after 1989, from former East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, then later from the Baltic States of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, and then from western Ukraine. More recently, since the first decade of the 21st century the resurgence of Russia has been prominent especially in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea. This has had a ripple effect throughout Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans. Indeed, Russian influence is clearly expanding at a time when public support for EU membership in the Western Balkans is declining as the UK's influence seems to be fading after the outcome of the so-called 'Brexit vote' on 23 June 2016 (Wintour, 2018). The situation has no doubt been exacerbated since Jean-Claude Juncker announced that EU membership is off the agenda for the Balkans "until some distant date in the future". In the meantime, Russia has clearly been playing on its Orthodox and Slavonic ties in countries such as Serbia and Macedonia and among those sub-state nationalities to be found in Republika Srpska and the northern, predominantly Serbian entity of Kosovo and Metohija around Mitrovica. Witness for example Russian cultural initiatives in Macedonia today with regard to encouraging the study of Russian culture, language and literature. But, if Russian soft power and the siren calls of Sputnik are having any effect in the Western Balkans it may be noted that the BBC World Service will soon be returning to the region in digitised format, following its demise under the Cameron government in 2011. We can only look to the Western Balkans summit planned for London in 2018 and also to an ending of the 'name dispute' being negotiated between Macedonia and Greece through the auspices of Matthew Nimetz. In the interim, Macedonia must join NATO.

Twenty-five years ago, and with regard to Ukraine, Huntington added this rather interesting piece of foresight, quoting a comment made by a Russian general: "Ukraine or rather eastern Ukraine will come back in five, ten or fifteen years. Western Ukraine can go to hell" (p. 167). It would in fact take twenty years for this to happen with the occupation of Crimea and the conflict over eastern Ukraine which

erupted in 2014. Huntington adds that a rump western-oriented Ukraine would only be viable if it had strong and effective Western support: “Such support is, in turn, likely to be forthcoming only if relations between the West and Russia deteriorated so seriously and came to resemble those of the Cold War” (pp. 167-168).

This last statement might appear to resemble the situation we find ourselves in today, twenty-five years on, especially if one follows the line advocated by Edward Lucas in his book *The New Cold War: Putin’s Threat to Russia and the West* (2008 and 2014). Personally, I still prefer to refer to the current climate between Russia and the West as “The End of the End of the Cold War” rather than “The New Cold War”.

Huntington sees Russia as a ‘torn’ country since the reign of Peter ‘The Great’ in that it is “divided over the issue of whether it is a part of Western civilisation or is a core of a distinct Eurasian Orthodox civilization” (p. 138). This is an understanding of the conundrum of Russian identity, which takes us straight back to the divide between Westernisers and Slavophiles, to say nothing of the *Narodniki* in the 19th century, all nicely illustrated in a recent close reading of Turgenev’s *Fathers and Sons* (1860), written on the eve of the Emancipation of the Serfs, or indeed one of the overriding intellectual themes of Tolstoy’s great novel *War and Peace* (1869). One could even take this all back to the Normanist versus Slavacist controversy over the origins of the Kievan Rus’ state in the 9th century.

Finally, on this there is Huntington’s most useful interpretation of how Russian identity differs so much from that of Europe:

Russia’s relations with Western civilization have evolved through four phases. In the first phase, which lasted down to the reign of Peter the Great (1689 – 1725), Kievan Rus’ and Muscovy existed separately from the West and had little contact with Western European societies. Russian civilization developed as an offspring of Byzantine civilization and then for two hundred years, from the mid-thirteenth to the mid-fifteenth centuries, Russia was under Mongol suzerainty. Russia had no or little exposure to the defining historical phenomena of Western civilization: Roman Catholicism, feudalism, the Renaissance, the Reformation, overseas expansion and colonization – religion, languages, separation of church and state, rule of law, social pluralism, representative bodies, individualism – were almost totally absent from the Russian experience. The only possible exception is the Classical legacy, which, however, came to Russia via Byzantium and hence was quite different from that which came to the West directly from Rome. Russian civilization was a product of its indigenous roots in Kievan Rus’ and Muscovy, and the

substantial impact, and prolonged Mongol rule. These influences shaped a society and a culture which had little resemblance to those developed in Western Europe under the influence of very different forces (Huntington, pp. 139-140).

If Huntington was trying to explain Russia to a western audience in the period of the New World Order, what were Russian writers making of Russian identity at the same time? For this we need turn to two key Russian thinkers in the 1990s, Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Igor Chubais.

An Idea of Russia: Solzhenitsyn and Chubais

The collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s led Russians once again to attempt to explain themselves, not unlike their forbears, the Slavophiles and the Westernizers in the 19th century. What were the Russians? What was Russia? Although these questions and the literature that stemmed from them pre-dated *Glasnost* and could be found in a proto-nationalist literature of the 1970s, and were obviously predated by writings in the nineteenth century, it was Solzhenitsyn who became the main mouthpiece in the 1990s of this essentially Russian question of seeking their own identity.

A new literature built upon Russian soul-searching had emerged in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union. This particularly focussed upon the writings of Alexander Solzhenitsyn and Igor Chubais. In this interplay between literature, history and politics one is confronted with a return to an old issue of identity, that of the *Russian Idea* which first appeared at the end of the nineteenth century. This begged the following question, were Russian intellectuals working in the tradition of their late nineteenth century predecessors, especially the *Vekhi*, or Landmarks of 1909, in an attempt to find genuine solutions to the Russian problem, usually by rejecting western values, or were they instead involved in some sort of self-centred, navel-gazing, or Russian collective solipsism, that fed off the eternal sufferings of the Russian soul?

Clearly, Russia had experienced a difficult period of transition. Russians perceived themselves to have been in an ideological vacuum, lost at sea and trying to find themselves again after the collapse of the Soviet Union. At the end of the millennium it seemed as though Russian *imperium* had been passed on the 'sick man's baton' from the Ottoman Empire in the continual European relay of the 'powers'.

The three books, which had a great impact upon that debate, were Igor Chubais' *From the Russian Idea to a New Idea for Russia* (1995) and Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *Rebuilding Russia: Reflections and Tentative Proposals* (1991) and his *The Russian Question at the End of the Twentieth Century* (1995). Both writers were to influence Boris Yeltsin, who had organised a committee of writers and intellectuals with the task of coming up with a new 'Russian idea' with the aim of creating a 'normal society' within two to three decades from the then perspective of Russia's difficult transition. Interestingly, the UK edition of Solzhenitsyn's *Rebuilding Russia* has the sub-title *Manifesto for a New Russia*.

Igor Chubais argued that there was a need for the creation of civic organisations to act as channels for the people to express their opinions and that the idea of a new Russia should be based upon a connection with Russia's historical roots. The reason for this was his belief that Russia had suffered from a collective memory loss and the problem of self-identification. At the heart of the affair was the fact that in the past Russian national identity had always gravitated around the idea of imperialism and expansion and had never really centred upon its own specific sense of identity. Russians therefore saw themselves as belonging to a country that had torn itself away from the European mainstream, but that it had been desperately trying to return to Europe. Chubais feared that the dangers of developing a national Russian idea might easily be abused in the hands of fascists, extremists and nationalists whose activities had been so widely reported in the early 1990s (Zhirinovskiy, Limonov and Dugin among them!) For Chubais, Russia was a sick state; a sick society and its only salvation in his eyes lay upon the three pillars of Orthodoxy, communalism and the acquisition of territory. It is fascinating how these things often tend to be expressed in triads... and here one thinks of Count Sergei Uvarov, advisor to Tsar Nicholas I on the development of the Russian Empire with his policy of Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality (1833).

For Solzhenitsyn, the real problem for Russia had been western civilisation. He argued, like Chubais, for a regeneration of traditional Russian values, backed by constant criticism of the West. In his *Rebuilding Russia: Reflections and Tentative Proposals* (1991), also known as *Manifesto for a Rebirth of Russia*, Solzhenitsyn advocated that Russia should give up its empire and look into the essence of Russianness. This might lead us to interpret Solzhenitsyn as a cultural nationalist, whilst relegating those believers in a 'greater Russia'. Which could regain its so-called 'near abroad' to the ranks of imperialists: Zhirinovskiy, Zyuganov, Limonov, Dugin et al., since Solzhenitsyn identified the Russian nation with the Russian state and

ridiculed Zhirinovskiy for his empire-building and 'near abroad' demands in *The Russian Question* (1995) and in his eyes empire-building was contrary to the Russian national interest. This tied in well with a statement by Chubais that eighty-five per cent of Russians were actually against the idea of Russia 'lording it over others.' Although Solzhenitsyn advocated the fundamental unity of the Belarussian, Ukrainian and Russian peoples, as three Slavonic branches that had been historically separated by "The Mongol Invasion and Polish colonisation" (Coalson, 2014). That was the 1990s.

Alexander Solzhenitsyn strongly criticised the influence of what he perceived as having been 'failed' western models imposed on Russia, both in the past, with regard to adopting western bureaucratic absolutism (under Peter 'The Great' and Catherine 'The Great') in the eighteenth century and the adoption of socialism in the twentieth century. Likewise, clearly a writer who had managed to avoid the post-modernist approaches of his western intellectual peers and epigones, Solzhenitsyn described contemporary western mass popular culture as: "The liquid manure of western culture" (p. 94). Otherwise, he was highly critical of elected, representative government since he believed that: "Democracy is a means whereby a well organised minority holds sway over an unorganised majority" (p. 68). By way of solving this problem, Solzhenitsyn advocated choosing respected members of the local community who were known to be of good character and ability. One might detect in this something of the yearning for a strong Russian leader again. A common Russian trait, from Ivan 'The Terrible', through to Peter 'The Great', and from Catherine 'The Great' to Stalin. It had been Catherine who had said: "The Russians love the feel of the whip" and Stalin who had written *Nastavnik* (teacher) in the margin of Eisenstein's script for his iconic film *Ivan the Terrible* (1944). Little did Solzhenitsyn know it at the time, but his wishes for a strong leader would be answered six years later, at the turn of a new millennium, when on 1 January 2000 Vladimir Putin would be installed as Boris Yeltsin's successor. Certainly, when Putin rose to power in 1999 he was admired by Solzhenitsyn for restoring Russia's national pride, whilst Putin's statements on Ukraine since that time have been reflected by Solzhenitsyn in his *Rebuilding Russia* (Coalson, 2014).

In the meantime, for Solzhenitsyn the solutions to Russia's problems in the 1990s seemed to lie in the need to rebuild Russia by using systems that had their roots in solid Russian institutions rather than borrowing from Western models. He advocated building on the Zemstva, set up by the Alexandrine Reforms of 1864 or the Zemski Sobor/Duma (pre-1613).

Whereas Solzhenitsyn argued that Russia's failure might have been traced to the employment of what he perceived to have been the acquisition and implementation of 'failed' ideas from the West, Igor Chubais had advocated that the only solution for Russia was a triune union of Orthodoxy, Communalism and Expansion. The resonance with Uvarov's Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality was not accidental, neither was Solzhenitsyn's reference to the 'liquid manure' of western culture.

Enter Alexander Dugin.

Alexander Dugin: Eurasia and Geopolitics

Nicknamed "Putin's Rasputin", it is said that Alexander Dugin is the articulator of the Kremlin-approved nationalist philosophy. Elsewhere, Dugin is: "...seen as a brilliant philosopher, but brilliance and madness are very close to each other" (Meyer and Ant, 2017). Otherwise, Dugin's detractors describe him as a neo-fascist and he would certainly seem to have had a rather dubious past, joining up with the ultra-nationalist group *Pamyat* in 1988 before taking a leading role in the re-founded Communist Party of the Russian Federation, founded by Gennady Zyuganov.

Apparently, Dugin is an enthusiastic devotee of the Russian Old Believers who had broken away from the official Russian Orthodox Church in the mid-17th century. A demagogue, he has advocated a retreat from the advance of western modernity, a rejection of western post-modern culture and a return to Russian traditionalism – just like the Slavophiles of the 19th century and not unlike Solzhenitsyn with his 'liquid manure' jibe and his Greater Russian, Orthodox nationalism. Dugin seems to disapprove of western liberal democracy, the West in general and American hegemony in particular.

As one of the earliest members of the National Bolshevik Party, Dugin associated with the poet Eduard Limonov. It was Limonov who was once filmed alongside Radovan Karadžić by the cable car on Mt. Trebević above Sarajevo, in 1992, promising Russian paramilitary mercenaries to the Republika Srpska and firing off occasional bursts from a heavy machine gun in the direction of the National Library on the banks of the River Miljacka, just for the effect. The library would later be completely destroyed by Bosnian Serb shell-fire on 25 August 1992 in an act that can be described as being little more than an act of pure cultural genocide, given the destruction of an estimated three million books (80 per cent of its stock) including the loss of 700 Islamic and Sephardic Jewish Ladino manuscripts and incunabula (Huseinović and Arbutina, 2012).

In May 2001, Dugin formed the Eurasia party and the Eurasian movement, the idea being to bring back a successful empire that had existed even before the Soviet Union. Essentially, Eurasia refers to the territory of the former Soviet Union.

Reading through Dugin's works, such as *The Eurasian Mission* (2014) and *Last War of the World-Island: The Geopolitics of Contemporary Russia* (2015) it is clear that Dugin dreams of a Russian strategic alliance with European Middle Eastern states, primarily Iran. Indeed for European, read Western Balkan. The aim being to build a Turkic-Slavonic alliance in the Eurasian sphere with the Commonwealth of Independent states at its heart radiating out from Russia's near abroad to other spheres of former Soviet/Russian influence. In reading his work one is strangely reminded of the writings of Vladimir Zhirinovsky in the early 1990s, who claimed that one day, Russian soldiers would be bathing their feet in the warm waters of the Red Sea, or how Russia would soon be sharing a common frontier with Germany! (Frazer and Lancelle, 1994).

Dugin's writings on Eurasia bear some similarity with the earlier work of Halford John Mckinder, the one-time director of the University of London's LSE, who, in 1904 had written: "Who rules Eastern Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the world" (Mckinder, 1919).

Although his core book, *The Foundations of Geopolitics* (1997) which is used in Russian universities and military academies, has not yet been translated into English, Dugin's ideas have been translated elsewhere by Arktos. The following extract is illuminating:

In principle, Eurasia and our space, heartland Russia, remains the staging area of a new anti-bourgeois, anti-American revolution.... The new Eurasian empire will be constructed on the fundamental principle of the common enemy; the rejection of Atlanticism, strategic control of the USA, and the refusal to allow liberal values to dominate us. The common civilizational impulse will be the basis of a political struggle and union (Dugin, 2015).

He therefore advocates a conflict between Atlantis and Eurasia, between the thalassocratic and the telluric powers, so that all history can be interpreted as a battle between states and peoples. Admittedly, he climbs down a bit in a later version of *The Basics of Geopolitics* when he advocates that: "The principal conflict does not automatically mean war or a direct strategic conflict...." And he goes on to add: "Occasionally it can even soften into rivalry and competition, although a forceful

resolution can never be consciously ruled out.” (*Last War of the World Island*, 2015, p. 10). The implicit warning to the West lies there, and to quote Edward Lucas (2014, p.xiv) “Russia fears the West’s soft power, but not its will power.”

Earlier, Dugin had criticised Euro-Atlantic involvement in the 2004 Ukrainian presidential elections. Then, before war broke out between Russia and Georgia in 2008, Dugin visited South Ossetia and predicted: “Our troops will occupy the Georgian capital Tbilisi, the entire country, and perhaps even Ukraine and the Crimean peninsula, which is historically part of the Ukraine anyway” (*Der Spiegel*, 25 August 2008) and indeed they would! Once again one is reminded of some of the predictions of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy.

According to NBC News, Dugin is seen as being one of the authors of Putin’s initiative for the annexation of the Crimea by the Russian Federation. According to *The Financial Times*, in August 2014, Dugin had even called for a “genocide in Ukraine” (Sam Jones *et al.*, 2015). Dugin also described “Euromaidan” as a coup d’état carried out not only by Ukrainians, but also by the United States.

In his *Foundation of Geopolitics*, Dugin’s strategies include destabilization and disinformation campaigns by employing Russian special forces and asymmetric warfare, taking us straight back to the “little green men” who took part in the annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Hudson, 2014) and the way in which the Russian occupation of Georgia and Abkhazia was reported on *Russia Today* in the summer of 2008. To say nothing of: “...encouraging all kinds of separatism and ethnic, social and racial conflicts, actively supporting all dissident groups, thus destabilising internal political processes in the US (Ratner 2017, p.367),.

More recently, he is alleged to have played a key but largely clandestine role in patching up Russia’s relations with Turkey in the aftermath of Turkey’s shooting down of a Russian SU-24 jet fighter on its border with Syria on 24th November 2015 (Meyer and Ant, 2017). Then, after the inauguration of the new president of the United States, which Dugin declared to be the ‘happiest day of my life’ and commented that: “America not only isn’t an opponent, it’s a potential ally under Trump.” (ibid.)

There may be some hope for world peace yet; but, at the time of writing, what with the continuing debate over the alleged Russian Internet tampering of the US presidential elections and at a time when Anglo-Russian relations seem to be at an all-time low, as demonstrated by UK Foreign Minister’s recent visit to Moscow in December 2017 (Walker, 2017), and concerns in the UK of potential Russian cyber-

attacks or that a conflict with Russia could be surprisingly close (MacAskill, 2018) one can only keep one's fingers crossed and pray (Walker, 2017).

Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the changing nature of Russian Identity politics from three perspectives, covering two periods, over a time span of twenty-five years.

The three perspectives included:

1. Representations of Russia to the western world by Samuel Huntington in 1993 and 1997.
2. Parallel with Huntington, the Russian quest for self-identity in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union as expressed in the works of Igor Chubais and Alexander Solzhenitsyn, as Russia negotiated the crisis years of the 'Wild 1990s', and finally
3. The writings of Aleksander Dugin since Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000.

As with the discipline of history, where interpretations of events past and present are frequently fluid and subject to changing interpretation, so with the field of Identity Politics in which representations of national identity can not only fluctuate, but can also greatly influence the spirit and mood of the times. Identity Politics, as expressed through the published opinions of intellectual authors can frequently impact upon populist public opinion and political leaderships which in turn can affect international relations, security and stability.

Just as students of Russian history in the nineteenth century might well turn to Turgenev, Tolstoy or Chekhov *inter alia* to gain a better understanding of the last fifty years of Tsarist Russia, so they can also turn to writers such as Huntington, Chubais and Solzhenitsyn and the role that they played in helping to define Russian identity in the New World Order that was ushered in at the end of the Cold War. Likewise, Solzhenitsyn and Dugin both provide us with immense insight into understanding the ideas behind the resurgent Russia that have been developing under Vladimir Putin over the past two decades.

In the light of reading these four authors one can denote a sense of continuity between them. Huntington's work demonstrated that whereas international politics had previously focused on relations between sovereign states, one should now consider relations not only between states and sub-state nationalisms, but also between potentially conflicting ethnic identities themselves. This was especially the

case when those ethnic communities were emerging from the collapse of greater multi-national states. *The Clash of Civilizations* therefore laid down the basic foundations of a clearer understanding of identity politics through the perceived lines of fissure between different ethnic entities, providing useful tools with which to understand the inter-ethnic warfare that seemed to dominate the 1990s. This interpretation was taken up in the writings of Chubais and Solzhenitsyn in the new world order that emerged at the end of the Cold War, parallel with the period of crisis ensued in the first decade of post-Soviet Russia. In their works, Chubais and Solzhenitsyn advocated a retreat from western culture and a return to Russian traditionalism. These ideas, not that far removed from the Slavophile tradition of 19th century, when mingled with a desire for a new, resurgent Russia at the turn of the century, feed directly into the themes that have been expressed more recently by Dugin at the 'End of the End of the Cold War'.

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Ivo Josipović (Zagreb, 1957) graduated in law and music at University of Zagreb. From 2010 to 2015 he served as the President of the Republic of Croatia. Before winning the Presidential Election, he had been a university professor, Member of Parliament and composer, and director of the Music Biennale Zagreb and Secretary General of the Croatian Composers Union. At the Law School of Zagreb University he taught Criminal Procedure, International Law and Criminal Offence Law. He has published several books and 85 research papers in Croatian and foreign journals dealing with international criminal law, criminal procedure and human rights. As a composer, he composed around 60 pieces for orchestra, chamber groups and solo instruments. Compositions were performed in many European countries, the USA, Canada, China and Japan and recorded on more than 20 CDs. Ivo Josipović is a member of many national and international cultural, legal, scientific and human rights organisations, such as the World Academy of Art and Science, the European Academy of Art and Science, and the Croatian Composers Society. He was awarded with international prizes, decorations and honorary doctorates for art, science and politics. Prof. Josipović is an honorary member of the non-governmental organization "Hrvatsko-makedonska tangenta" from Croatia.

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
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What might be the impact of 'Brexit' upon the other member states of the European Union? How are Europe's relations developing with the United States, six months into President Trump's administration; and, how is the recent influx of an estimated 80,000 migrants and refugees impacting upon cross-border cooperation across the EU and among EU-aspirant states? These are some of the questions addressed in this volume, which also includes chapters on European security and responses to terrorism, the recent rise of populism in Europe, and economic predictions for the EU and its member states.

As such, the chapters in this volume were gathered together at a time when European solidarity was confronted with quite a number of demanding issues. These could impact upon European economic growth, potentially threatening the very existence of the European Union. Meanwhile, the threat of terrorism in Europe continued to raise its ugly head, and there was concern too about the influence of Putin's resurgent Russia upon EU member states and their neighbours. The continued conflicts in countries such as Syria, Libya and Iraq had added to the burdens of migration flows into Southern Europe in 2017, so that rethinking migration and its challenges to European solidarity and security would prove to be one of the main themes addressed in this book.