HUMANITAS CONSOLATUR

Edited by
Lucija Krešić Nacevski &
Vojislav Sarakinski

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Table of contents

Preface

Humanitas consolatur

(Cic. *Ad fam*. III, ad Ap. Claudium pulchrum)

The phrase in the title, *humanitas consolatur*, was used by Cicero in a letter to his friend Appius Claudius Pulcher during a particularly difficult time in his life. While Cicero was away in Cilicia, his daughter Tullia married Dolabella, who, in turn, was prosecuting Appius under the *lex maiestatis*. In this context, Cicero writes that Appius' *humanitas* was a genuine source of comfort to him throughout that period, and he thanks his friend warmly for the support.

If the term *humanitas* had consistently meant "consolation" throughout the entirety of Roman and later Latin literature, medieval and early modern alike, there would never have been any need for a volume such as this. It is precisely the richness and variability of its meaning, shifting from period to period, genre to genre, author to author, and so on, that has made the term so conceptually challenging. This very complexity has drawn the full attention of the editors of the present volume, who have brought together this collection of essays by our esteemed colleagues, all centered on the exploration of a single, yet remarkably multifaceted concept: *humanitas*.

The task proved to be more than demanding. What initially appeared as an intellectually stimulating challenge was, more than once, replaced by a kind of speechlessness in the face of a concept so vast and profound. At first glance, the foundational meaning of *humanitas* seems deceptively straightforward. And yet, in every Latin dictionary, lexicon, and reference manual, *humanitas* comes with an extensive and nuanced entry. It is most commonly linked to the Greek concept of *paideia* – first as its Roman or Latin equivalent, and then as a point of departure for the term's later intellectual and cultural developments.

Among the various impulses behind the creation of this volume, one of the central driving questions was precisely the Greco-Roman connection between *paideia* and *humanitas*: does the Latin term *huma-*

nitas emerge as a conceptual translation – or transformation – of the Greek model of *paideia*? And to what extent does *humanitas* in Latin preserve, or reinterpret, the educational and formative dimensions inherent to *paideia*, the shaping of the human being?

This inquiry naturally led to a closer look at Greek authors and works that develop this idea of *paideia*, which can serve as a point of comparison, if not of direct equivalence, with Latin *humanitas*. Which Greek writers first articulated and developed the concept of *paideia*, and in which of their texts does this development take place? For which authors does *paideia* carry a meaning parallel, or even identical, to that of the later Latin *humanitas*? And for which, possibly, does it diverge significantly?

Does *paideia* evolve exclusively within Greek philosophical discourse, or can it also be identified in other literary forms – for example, in the Homeric epics? If so, how is it expressed, and which texts and authors are involved?

Later, once the link between *paideia* and *humanitas* had been established as foundational – as the conceptual core from which the Latin *humanitas* can be more fully understood – it became essential to examine which Roman authors first adopt and further elaborate the term. Do they in fact develop it, expand its meaning, adapt it to new cultural and intellectual contexts? Or does *humanitas* in Roman literature remain firmly anchored to the Greek *paideia*, functioning primarily as a direct continuation of its Hellenic predecessor?

Cicero's phrase in the title points to a development of the concept. In this synchronic and diachronic examination of humanitas and its connection to paideia, we may therefore ask: does humanitas evolve over time, or does its meaning become narrower? Perhaps even degraded? Is it possible that some authors "misuse" the term, interpret it incorrectly (intentionally?), distort it, or distance it from Greek paideia to such an extent that it becomes unrecognizable, disconnected, with no traceable core meaning? For instance, how might we interpret Suetonius' biographies in this context and his "obsession" with the imperial figure, portrayed in its "human" rather than "divine" aspect? Does such a way of writing contribute at all to the development – or instead to the degradation – of the concept of humanitas?

From a diachronic perspective, we might ask whether the variations in interpretation stem from the individual readings of different Roman (and even earlier or contemporary Greek) authors, or whether they result from the inevitable influence of shifting social circumstances. For instance – how might we describe *humanitas* in the time of Re-

publican writers, then in authors of the early Empire, and during the transition from one political order to another? In that sense, how does the concept of *humanitas* change (if it does) over the course of the first, second, and third centuries?

By the fourth century, Christianity had already brought profound transformation to society, and with it to systems of belief and conceptual frameworks. In that light: what are the equivalents or synonyms of *humanitas* among Christian authors? Is it limited to the frequently cited *misericordia*, or do we find, within Christian Latin, other terms that encompass the same meanings?

When it comes to individual authors, attention must certainly be given to works of both "high" and "low" literature. Is it possible (or not?) that Plautus and Terence, in their comedies, developed a primitive, simple, passionate, rough, even vulgar form of *humanitas*, one that is "natural" and "characteristic" of human beings, without much deeper reflection, perhaps even reducing the concept to its crudest expression in human habits – passions and excess – exposing both the "man" and *humanitas* to mockery and ridicule?

In contrast stands Cicero's elevated, unique, even ideal conception of *humanitas*. Do we find in his work a direct continuation of the Greek *paideia*? In which of his texts is this most clearly expressed? Does the concept evolve in Cicero, or does it remain stable?

Is there, then, a particular, distinctive *humanitas* of poetry – *humanitas artis poeticae*? From that perspective, can *humanitas* be reflected (and if so, how?) in short-form love poetry, or exclusively (and why?) in long epic poems of high literature? For example, how might one interpret *humanitas* in Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, where the concept seems to appear and vanish with the transformations of form? And again, centuries later, in the context of metamorphosis – the transformation of Apuleius' protagonist Lucius into a donkey – where is *humanitas* then?

The themes outlined above (which are by no means exhaustive) struck us as vast and profound. As a result, only some of them are represented in this volume, and the exploration of the concept of *humanitas* has proven far more complex than its initial association with the Greek term *paideia* might suggest.

That the question of *humanitas* remains urgently relevant today is evident in everyday life – in the people we meet and speak with, the films we watch, the books we read, the institutions we attend.

We are all too familiar with the attitude found in every period of human history – beginning with Livy, that great *laudator temporis acti*

– that the present age is the worst yet, and that anything of true value lies far behind us. Convinced that this is not the case, we present this volume *ad legendum vobis studentibusque,* in the hope of recognizing and reaffirming eternal values.

We extend our heartfelt thanks to all the authors who contributed to the making of this volume, *imo de pectore.*[1]

The Editors,

Lucija Krešić Nacevski
Vojislav Sarakinski

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[1] The attentive reader will quickly notice that almost every contributor comes from a distinct field within the social sciences and humanities – a fact that is particularly welcome, given that the subject of this volume is by its very nature both interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary. As a gesture of respect for the diverse methodologies employed by the authors and the specific scholarly traditions of their respective disciplines, the Editors made the difficult decision to allow each contributor to retain his or her preferred citation style. Ultimately, the editors believe that what matters most is the substance of the contributions; variations in referencing conventions are a minor concern, easily navigated by any dedicated reader.

1.

On Some (Dis)similarities between Near Eastern Scribal Education, *paideia*, nam.lú.ùlu and Humanitas

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A comparative examination of the traditions of παιδεία and *humanitas* alongside the scribal tradition of the Ancient Near East reveals not only some expected dissimilarities, but also intriguing parallels in pedagogical methods, educational objectives, and societal roles of the educated elite. It is undeniable that the scribal education which was going on in the *bit tuppi* was a kind of παιδεία that corresponds to the Greek one, at least in a technical, if not in a social context. Although the specific methods, content, and cultural contexts of the Near Eastern, Greek and Roman educational systems varied, they all shared the common goal of making the elite members of society effective administrators, scribes, and leaders. Moreover, a comparison between the Sumerian concept of *nam.lú.ùlu* and the Roman concept of *humanitas* reveals two distinct, but overlapping understandings of what it meant to be human and urban in the context of their respective cultures. While both *nam.lú.ùlu* and *humanitas* offer frameworks for understanding humanity, they reflect the different values and priorities of their respective cultures: the former was rooted in a communal, religious view of humanity that focuses on collective responsibility and divine order, while the latter emphasized individual moral development, cultural refinement, and civic responsibility within a more secular framework.

Greek παιδεία and Roman *humanitas* represent two cornerstone educational ideals that have shaped Western intellectual traditions. Παιδεία covered the holistic upbringing of Greek youths, blending physical, intellectual, and moral education aimed at cultivating well-rounded citizens. Similarly, *humanitas* in Roman culture highlighted the development of virtues, oratory skills, and a broad knowledge base to foster civic responsibility and personal excellence. These classical models are widely studied within their respective academic fields. However, a

comparative examination of these traditions alongside the scribal education of the Ancient Near East reveals not only some expected dissimilarities, but also intriguing parallels in pedagogical methods, educational objectives, and societal roles of the educated elite. Although the specific methods, content, and cultural contexts of the Near Eastern, Greek and Roman educational systems varied, they all shared the common goal of making the elite members of society effective administrators, scribes, and leaders.[1]

1. The development of literacy in the Ancient Near East paralleled the development of urban communities. At first, literacy was proclaimed as a gift from heaven, but also as a skill to be learned, cultivated, and developed under the watchful care of the elder scribes and the patron gods Ea, Nabu, and Nisaba. The ability to write quickly became an integral part of urban life, a necessary skill to meet the needs of society that were constantly changing and growing, just as the urban body was becoming more complex. Writing may have originated in decorative illustration, but it quickly became a tool for statistical and archival needs. Generations of scribes took the written sign farther and farther away from illustration, eventually tying it exclusively to language.

The spread of extensive grain farming throughout the region, combined with fruit growing, horticulture, and animal husbandry, opened the way for large surpluses of value, which in turn required a developed storage economy. Such an economy meant that wages and meals had to be logged, property, land, and rents had to be registered, payments for crops, transportation of basic products and materials, and many other similar transactions had to be recorded. The temple, otherwise the linchpin of social if not political order, was at the center of this complex system of circulation and distribution of raw materials. Temples were self-sustaining, autonomous institutions with their own land and settled population. Contrary to the common explanation of their time – that they were organized to provide an adequate dwelling for the divine presence – they actually functioned as the chief regulators of commerce and public affairs in general; it is reasonable to assume that temples were the very first institutions whose functioning literally depended on a literate class of administrators. In the same way, the Mesopotamian courts needed educated bureaucrats to run the affairs of the state – and thus some kind of schools to train them in their work. The preserved tablets[2] of economic, administrative, political, and lite-

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[1] *Cf.* the review of scholarship and the extensive bibliography in Oniga 2009, Elsner 2013 and Pušić 2023.

[2] Admittedly, most of the documents relating to the scribal education and economic and political record-keeping date back to the Third Dynasty of Ur and the Old Babylonian

rary content testify that the number of scribes who practiced their craft in the service of temples and palaces from Sumerian times onward was in the thousands.

To meet all these needs, a formal structure was established to ensure a steady production of scribes; it consisted of two parts - *bit tuppi* and *bit mummi*. *Bit tuppi* (in Sumerian *e-dubba*, 'the house of tablets') was the place where the general initial training of scribes was carried out; it produced scribes called *dub.sar* or *tupsar*. In turn, *bit mummi*, the 'house of counseling', was a place that offered higher educational preparation, producing *mar mummi*, 'sons of thought', namely, literate, cultured and educated people. It is true that such schools have been found only in a few places, including Nippur, Uruk, Sippar, and Mari; however, this does not mean that the teaching was limited to these places, but only points to the coincidence of the archaeological findings – otherwise, the training of scribes could have taken place within the family of the scribe.[3] In any case, it is certain that the beginnings of the 'house of tablets' were closely linked to the temple as the driver of life in the urban community, before this institution gradually became independent or received the patronage of the palace.

2. Thanks to the terminology used in connection with these schools, we have a rough idea of their structure.[4] In the 'house of tablets', the student who was expected to master the art of writing was practically an apprentice, called 'the little one' or 'the young one', fitting his nature and position. He began by making school copies, thus overcoming the initial difficulties associated with cuneiform writing; copies were made by reading and writing or by dictation, preferably without pauses and interruptions. Excerpts from older didactic or religious works were usually copied; it was noted whether it was a series of excerpts, a copy of the original text, or a commentary.[5] They wrote

Kingdom. *V.* Jones & Snyder 1961; Sollberger 1966; Oppenheim 1967; Jones 1976; Lucas 1979, 306.

[3] Groneberg 1980, 153. A formal educational institution is mentioned in at least two Old Babylonian letters. "Instruct my son to go to school," writes a parent to his son's teacher, "watch over his handwriting and help him" (*British Museum, Cuneiform Texts from Babylonian Tablets in the British Museum* 2, London, 1896-, T. 11, 29-31.) The second letter alludes to schooling in the context of a brief message that is passed between the teacher and the student: "I entered the house of tablets and read the composition beginning with 'ga-nu,' correcting the tablet of 'ga-nu' which you left" (*The Assyrian Dictionary of the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago*, Vol. 21, Z, 75). For a case study of scribal material in (admittedly very late) private houses, *v.*, *e.g.*, Clancier 2024.

[4] On this, *v.* Lucas 1979; Moreno 1989; *cf.* especially the wealth of details presented in Paulus (ed.) 2023.

[5] The level of critical attention is indicated, for example, by the note: "According to the dictation of a wise man; I have not seen the original writing". *V.* Hunger 1968, no. 486.

on clay tablets, but scribes also used waxed wooden tablets, similar to those used later in antiquity.[6] Each copy was cataloged and carefully interpreted, providing information about the original document, the library to which it originally belonged, a description of the material, the number of lines it contained, whether it was legible, where it was damaged or illegible, including the date the copy was made, as well as a warning to respect the original text. After the task was completed, the tablet was sent for examination and comparison of the two texts.

Thus the seed of literacy was sown, a remarkable achievement worthy of great praise. In a hymnic narrative, the speaker recounts:

> I was in the *edubba* since I was a child; I learned the scribal art on the tablets of Sumer and Akkad. Of all the young, no one could write a tablet like me; in the place of wisdom, where the scribal art is learned, people [...] I am perfectly able to subtract and add; I am skilled in counting and accounting; fair Nanibgal, Nisaba, has given me ample wisdom and intelligence; I am an 'open' scribe [...][7]

A further reference to the school is made later on in the same royal hymn:

> May the scribe stand ready for my prayer in the Ekur[8] [...] may he record it with his hand; may the singer stand ready for it and perform it; in the *edubba*, it will never be changed; in the place of learning, it will never cease.[9]

The art of the scribe was much more than an art of writing down thoughts in cuneiform script: it was called "the mother of orators and the father of the wise".[10] This is evidenced by the bilingual "Examination Text A", which preserves a wealth of details about a knowledge test in the 'house of tablets' and thus about the Babylonian curriculum.[11]

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[6] Such tablets are attested from the Middle Assyrian period – one tablet is mentioned to be a copy of an older wooden tablet; *cf.* Hunger 1986, No. 64.

[7] Castellino 1972, 30–31; Hymn B, 13-20, referring to the education of Ishme-Dagan of Ekallatum. *Cf.* Oppenheim 1964, 242.

[8] i.e., the Temple of Enlil in Nippur.

[9] Castellino 1972, 62. *V.* Römer 1965, 21 *sqq.*

[10] Lambert 1960, 213. The Mesopotamian scribes kept the traditional unity of their activities by calling themselves simply 'scribes' (*tupsarru*), and modern scholarship accepts this without having to elaborate further. In reality, these scribes acted in several distinct capacities (*v. infra*), so scholars tend to use modern terms and approximations, e.g. the scribe as bureaucrat, the scribe as poet, the scribe as scholar, etc. Each variation of the trained scribe had a specific function, though it was obscured by the general name for his craft.

[11] Musée national du Louvre, *Textes cuneiformes*, Paris, 1910, #1696; Driver 1976, 65-66.

The scene is the court of an *eduba*, where an *unmia* proposes to an 'assembly of masters' to informally examine a young scribe. The 'school father' asks the candidate: "You have sat in the tablet house from childhood to adulthood. Do you know the art of writing that you have learned?" The candidate answers with confidence, "What do I not know? Ask me and I'll give you the answer." The 'school father' reacts with suspicion, predicting that his young student will not answer all the questions, as it turns out.

Immediately, the young scribe is faced with a series of difficult and complex problems. He is asked to translate from Akkadian to Sumerian and vice versa; to demonstrate his mastery of various types of calligraphy and rare characters; to know the different classes of priests and other types of professions; to know how to prepare and seal official documents; to explain the different categories of songs; and to explain the problems of conducting a choir. The examiner asks the student to explain the technical terms used by the various classes of temple officials, followed by those of goldsmiths, shepherds, and porters. The teacher gives mathematical problems involving distribution of meals and division of land. Finally, various techniques for playing musical instruments are covered. At one point, the young scribe gives up and tells the examiner that he has not taught him enough. The 'father' responds with a stern warning:

> So, what have you done? What good has it done you to sit here? You are already a mature man, almost old! You are as teachable as an old donkey; you are past your season like withered grain. How long will you play around? But it's not too late for you! If you study day and night, if you make constant efforts with humility and without arrogance, if you listen to your colleagues and teachers, you can still become a scribe! Then you'll be able to share this craft – a fortune for its owner, an angel to guide you, a bright eye in your possession. And that's what the palace needs!

We find additional data in another text that describes an argument between two students, the elder Girnishag and the younger Enkimansi. Girnishag criticizes Enkimansi for not following his recommendations and instructions, and for behaving unbecomingly as a scribe, and Enkimansi retorts:

> What do you mean, I am not a scribe like you are? You write documents that make no sense. You write illegible letters. You go to divide an estate and it turns out you're unable to do the job. When you go to survey a field, you can't keep hold of the tape and the measuring rod; you can't drive in the pegs of the field;

you can't figure out the sense. [...] You don't know how to arbitrate between contesting parties; you make the fights among brothers worse. You are the most unfit of all the scribes. Can anyone say what you're good for?

Girnishag responds in kind, highlighting his own expertise. He claims to be a skilled surveyor, with experience in resolving disputes and settling disagreements effectively. He then turns to address the younger scribe's criticism, responding in a lighthearted but mocking tone: "You're incompetent in just about everything; the most negligent person one can imagine. Even when you multiply, your work is full of errors [...]"[12] Girnishag claims that Enkimansi doesn't know how to write a ritual prayer, can't transfer an inscription from a tablet to a stele, and can't explain the secrets of a ceremony. Once the teacher steps in, the fight calms down. Of course, we are not concerned with who won the argument, but rather with the function of this colorful one-act play. It is quite likely that this and other Sumerian school texts were actually written to demonstrate what would-be scribes should strive for, both in and out of school.

These two excerpts – along with many more – clearly show that the totality of the scribal training was not, to borrow a well known expression, οἷον σωρὸς, ἀλλ' [ἦν] τι τὸ ὅλον παρὰ τὰ μόρια. First, we note the development of two distinct strands of literary tradition. One strand consisted of a more or less fixed set of texts that became the basis of the educational system.[13] This strand provides the bulk of the data on the work of scribes who did not work in the temple or palace, but served as professional educators in Mesopotamian schools; virtually no other ancient source offers us such a vivid, detailed, and complete picture of the archetypal institutions of learning that preserved and transmitted culture to future generations. The second strand, on the other hand, included the informal or non-canonical literature through which the poet could express his artistic aspirations, the political thinker his ideologies, and the scholar his theories.[14]

With all this in mind, it is not difficult to imagine why the student of *bit tuppi* could, if he so wished, quickly detach himself from the limited horizon of administrative records. Because he possessed a key skill, the ability to record thoughts on a clay tablet, the scribe was inevitably given other strategically important social positions, such as temple official, court secretary, royal advisor, civil bureaucrat, trade correspondent, poet, or scholar. Oppenheim notes that the role and im-

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[12] Civil 1966, 123.
[13] Oppenheim 1967, 36.
[14] Lucas 1979, 309.

portance of scribes trained in this way can be compared to that of the clergy in medieval Europe, and their knowledge and skills to the extensive body of training, knowledge, and skills encompassed by the Islamic term *adab*.[15] But education in the ancient Near East did not imply only the utilitarian, technical training of personnel for the needs of the state. The education of the scribe pointed higher than the attainment of simple literacy: it aimed at the full and rounded formation of character and soul, which Marrou loosely calls 'wisdom'.[16] On a cultic level, the whole process culminated in the *bit-mummi*, the 'house of counsel', which was under the patronage of the gods Ea, Nisaba, and Nabu.[17] Unlike the *bit tuppi*, this 'house of counsel' remained forever attached to the temple. It included selected candidates who were ready to advance in the true training of the great sages – the esoteric knowledge;[18] there they delved into the secrets of divination, learned to debate the *omina*, the signs of the gods, they learned to observe the stars and perfected their arithmetic to enter the field of astrosophy. As Ashurbanipal points out in reference to his own preparation:

> I studied what the sage Adapa left us, the hidden meaning of all written knowledge. I was introduced and initiated into the omens of heaven and earth. I can take part in a discussion at a meeting of sages, I can discuss the heparoscopy series with the most learned doctors. I know how to solve reciprocals and products that have no given solution. I am an expert in reading learned texts where the Sumerian is enigmatic and the Akkadian difficult to decipher. I understand the meaning of the pre-flood stone inscriptions, which are hermetic, general and complex.[19]

This fictional praise of Ashurbanipal's abilities undoubtedly represents another idealized template, providing us with a picture of the abilities of a student who has completed the path of learning in *bit-mummi* and gone through a strand of professional training, acquiring not only literacy and knowledge, but all the prerequisites for a fruitful social, political, and scholarly life.

3. This calls for a contextualization of the system within the broader intellectual tradition. The peculiarities of scribal training, which at its foundation included the mastery of cuneiform writing, mathema-

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[15] Oppenheim 1965, 253; *cf.* Lucas 1979, 305.

[16] Marrou 1948, 23.

[17] *Mummu* can also be translated as 'thought' (*viz.* λόγος), 'wisdom', 'ability'. Ashurbanipal was fond of being called *mar mummi*, 'the son of wisdom', 'the Learned'; v. Seux 1976, 121.

[18] On *tupšarrūtu*, astronomy, astrology and astrosophy, as well as the transfer of knowledge in the cuneiform world, *v. esp.* Rochberg 2024.

[19] A somewhat differing translation in Labal 1968, 79 *sqq.*

tical skills, and literary knowledge, suggest an interesting parallel with the classical Greek concept of παιδεία. Just as scribal education in the ancient Near East was not a vocational training, but rather an immersive intellectual pursuit that fostered critical thinking, ethical understanding, and a deep appreciation of cultural heritage, the Greek notion of παιδεία similarly encapsulated a holistic educational philosophy aimed at cultivating well-rounded individuals who possessed both intellectual and moral virtues. While παιδεία was admittedly a uniquely Greek phenomenon, the goals and methods of scribal education were in many ways analogous to the Greek educational ideal, as both systems aimed to produce a well-rounded, educated elite capable of serving the state/community and preserving cultural traditions.

This parallel not only illustrates the sophistication of the scribal curriculum, but also underscores its role in shaping the intellectual and cultural ethos of the society it served. While it is true that the classical meaning of the term is not entirely clear, and is best understood through diachronic inquiry, παιδεία is broadly considered to be "a tool for social promotion; a *sine qua non* to the political power; and central to the topic of the elite".[20] This corresponds to all the functional characteristics of Near Eastern scribal training described above, so that it easily falls into the three categories defined many centuries later. These words of Isocrates follow Ashurbanipal's praise quite naturally:

> "... ἔτι δὲ τοὺς εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐλευθέρως τεθραμμένους ἐκ μὲν ἀνδρίας καὶ πλούτου καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀγαθῶν οὐ γιγνωσκομένους, ἐκ δὲ τῶν λεγομένων μάλιστα καταφανεῖς γιγνομένους, καὶ τοῦτο σύμβολον τῆς παιδεύσεως ἡμῶν ἑκάστου πιστότατον ἀποδεδειγμένον, καὶ τοὺς λόγῳ καλῶς χρωμένους οὐ μόνον ἐν ταῖς αὑτῶν δυναμένους, ἀλλὰ καὶ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐντίμους ὄντας."[21]

Fragmentary evidence from the time of the Third Dynasty of Ur indicates that the scribes considered themselves, probably not without reason, to be members of the intellectual elite.[22] The scribes themselves

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[20] Pušić 2023, 9 *sqq.* Respectively, Elsner 2013, 136-137; Van Hoof 2013; Watts, 2006; Brown 1992, 35–70.

[21] Isocrates, Panegyricus 49.

[22] *E.g.*, Many of the self-reflective documents from the Edubbaᵓa view Nippur as the center of the world; this perspective is reflected in the special relationship of the kings of Isin and Larsa to Nippur as the source of divine legitimation of kingship. The scribes of Nippur saw themselves in direct correspondence and service to the king; a satirical literary letter informs us that education at Nippur was unique and that nothing could compare. Paulus (2023, 10) remarks that this claim may be exaggerated, since we know that scribal training was comparable in many Babylonian cities, but there is little doubt that the edubbaᵓa trained the local elite and that this local elite aspired to national leader-

were not explicitly members of the ruling class, but they certainly enjoyed the patronage and respect of the rich and powerful. Because of the extensive training they had received, they felt that they belonged to a group with common interests, a strong and prestigious body of litterati, enriched also by all the past experience of their teachers; this sense of collegiality and particularity was in many cases stronger than the interests of the rulers in whose service they worked. [23]

At this point, one cannot help comparing the elite status of those who passed through this characteristic Near Eastern παιδεία with their Greek counterparts. At first glance, it seems strange to compare the social status of an individual in a Near Eastern monarchy with that of an ἐμπολιτεύων; but, as we will see in a moment, this comparison is not entirely out of place. The obvious divergent elements – the ἀγορά, democracy, the free academic pursuit of wisdom – are latecomers to the equation, and their importance should not be overstated. As late as Cleisthenes, the Greeks lived in a world dominated by broadly timocratic oligarchies and/or tyrannies. Democracy was hardly a part of the political landscape; it was Cleisthenes, ἐσσούμενος, who finally τὸν δῆμον προσεταιρίζεται, so that that the people of Athens began to believe that the former ally and now enemy of the Peisistratids was going to stand up for them against the aristocrats.[24] In a similar vein, Hanson points out that Greek culture and philosophy did not originate in the garden of the academy, nor in any sophisticated discussions in the ἀγορά; he believes that the intellectual life of the city, like its temples and buildings, was supported by the wealth of the farmer-hoplites who came to the city only occasionally to sell their produce or to cast their votes.[25] Thus, it seems that early social conditions in Greece were not so different from at least some of the Middle Eastern societies we know about.

Even if this line of thought probably overstates the importance of the farmer-hoplites – a question we will leave aside since enough ink has been spilled on it – it is perfectly on target in addressing the prerequisite for παιδεία – σχολή, 'free time' or 'leisure', a portion of the time which people demand for the cultivation of the mind. This 'abstention from labour' or even 'liberation from the necessity of working' required a man to be well off, or at least not to be toiling away in the fields; this

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ship. *V.* Paulus 2023, 10 *sqq.*, as well as the corresponding chapters in Paulus (ed.) 2023.

[23] On the difference between the concepts of the "strategic elite" and the "ruling class", *v.* Keller 1991, who does indeed explain the phenomenon in later societies, but nevertheless manages to draw out some general regularities.

[24] Hdt. 5.66.2; Samons 1995, 119.

[25] Hanson 1995, *passim*; Samons 1998, 100.

makes the concept of *παιδεία-requiring-σχολή* undeniably elite, the citizens who went through it being no less elite than the near Eastern *litterati*. [26] On balance, this is the concept that gave wings to the upstart κακοί and, in due time, made them the privileged ἀγαθοί,[27] superseding the old, largely discredited 'aristocracy of birth' with a new elite, the 'aristocracy of wisdom'.[28]

However, it is very difficult to apply the corresponding verb σχολάζειν to a near Eastern scribe. Σχολάζειν is a prerequisite for building democracy, a necessity for participation in the time-consuming system of government and administration of justice in a Greek city-state. In the same vein, σχολή is an exceptional basis for participation in politics, as it represents the factor of 'time at one's disposal' in a political aspect.[29] This is exactly what makes the two systems different: the elite παιδεία that one enters *sua sponte* is the so-called ἐλευθέριος παιδεία, the education of a free and noble person, which also implies the existence of ἐλευθέριοι τέχναι, free and noble occupations.[30] The contexts in which these terms are used make it clear that "free" in this case does not mean every person who is not a slave, but only the truly free – the members of the noble and wealthy upper class. This kind of παιδεία is neither χρησίμη nor ἀναγκαία, but ἐλευθέριος and καλή; in

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[26] Anastasiadis explains that the concept of leisure, as applied to ancient Greek sources, oscillates between two similar, though not identical, formulations. The first formulation would be "abstention from work", an indication of economic superiority and social prestige, which the ancient Greeks contrasted with work, indicating inferiority and subordination to a master. The second formulation identifies leisure with a state of liberation from the necessity of work or any undesirable activity, a state distinct from "spare time", which in itself constitutes an ideal state of existence, a concept closer in spirit to the idealization of leisure formulated by the Greeks. *V.* Veblen 1934, 35 *sqq.*; De Grazia 1962, 14; Anastasiadis 2004, 59.

[27] Hanson 1995, 195.

[28] Baldry 1965, 56. Even in a democracy, which seriously sought to provide general equality, the generals – who were usually also the political leaders – and some financial administrators had to belong to the highest census class for reasons of competence and security; despite general equality, merit and competence were not neglected; *v.* for instance, Thuc. 2.37.1; *cf.* Raaflaub 1983, 519. Until the end of the Periclean era, almost all political leaders belonged to aristocratic families: "in the paradoxical formulation which we find in Thucydides and in Plato, democratic equality was not equitable, because it distributed a kind of equality to the equal and unequal alike". *V.* Raaflaub 1983, 519; *cf.* Ps.Xen. *Ath. Pol.* 1.1 *sqq.*, Hdt. 3.81; 82.4; Eur. *Suppl.* 409 *sqq.*; *contra* Thuc. 2.37.1.

[29] Anastasiadis 2004, 78. For example, Plato often refers to σχολή as to the 'luxury' of intellectual culture, at a point when it was certain that people have sufficient necessities of life to survive; *v.* Plat. *Crit.* 110a; *Leg.* 828d.

[30] The formula ἐλευθέριος παιδεία, later used as synonym with ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία and translated into Latin as *artes liberales*, is alluded to in Aristotle and Plato; *v.* Plat. *Ep.* 7.334B; *Nom.* 643E-44B; Arist. *Pol.* 1338a 30-32. Furthermore, "persons who have been raised or educated freely" appear in Isocrates' Panegyric (380) and Xenophon's Memorabilia (after 393) as an established and familiar category.

contrast to professional training in a specialized discipline, which enables a person to earn a living, this ἐλευθέριος παιδεία aims to introduce a person to noble pursuits that fit a life of leisure, but also promote political skills and, most importantly, a career of political leadership.[31] By all accounts, the Near East was not aware of this aspect of engagement in παιδεία *sua sponte* with the specific goal of participating in the public life of the community and advancing in the sphere of τὰ πολιτικά. In the case of the great monarchies, this is quite understandable; in the case of many smaller states, however, we simply have far fewer sources from which to make an informed decision than we do for the Greek city-states.

Despite these differences, it is undeniable that what was happening in the *bit tuppi* was a kind of παιδεία that corresponds to the Greek one, at least in a technical, if not in a social context. In the same vein, one can look at the upgrading of the initial technical knowledge and skills, i.e. the process that continued in the *bit mummi*. *Bit mummi* is described as "a house with a foundation like the heavens; a house like a vessel covered with linen; a house like a goose standing on a firm foundation; one with eyes not opened went in, one with eyes open came out: [...] a school."[32] The metaphorical meaning of the open eyes in the second part seems clear enough: the purpose of the school was to transform the ignorant and illiterate into men of learning and wisdom. It was the place of transition from writing to interpretation, from reading to understanding, from apparent to esoteric knowledge, from knowledge to wisdom, from learning to applying what has been learned.[33] Did this application open a way to *humanitas*, and are we

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[31] Raaflaub 1983, 529.

[32] *Cf.* Kramer 1963, 236. It is important to note that alongside pedagogical work, artistic training, and scientific research, institutions for systematic education were also developed. It seems that the Assyrians had even established a kind of 'Academy', called *taphurti ummani* or "Council of Sages". During the reign of Sargon II, a certain Nabû-shallim-shunu held the titles of "Chief Royal Scribe", "Sage of King Sargon", and "Supreme Lord" (Hunger 1968, 264); perhaps he was the head of the supposed 'Academy'. Prominent scholars in the time of Esarhaddon were Nabu-ahhe-eriba, who bore the title "astrologer and interpreter of syllables", and the physician Adad-šumu-uṣur, who called himself "a noble of my lord the king" and was probably Ashurbanipal's teacher. The supposed 'Academy' should be associated with the establishment of Ashurbanipal's library. It would not have been a simple archive of tablets, but a sort of a scholarly, humanistic laboratory where academic discussion and collaborative work took place. Evidence from Ashurbanipal's self-praise suggests that the 'Academy' would be the most appropriate place for the scholar dialogue and research mentioned in the text. Most attention was paid to botany, divination, writing and medicine, astrology, chemistry, and various "cultural" disciplines; *v.* Hunger 1968, 320, 324, 326, 333; *cf.* Moreno 1989.

[33] Contrary to the traditional view in Assyriology, which in the past spoke of an unchanging flow of information called the "stream of tradition" that was merely copied

able to recognize its essential features, as we have recognized those of παιδεία? Again, this depends on how we understand the term *humanitas*.[34]

4. The word *humanitas* is often considered to be an original Roman concept. Building on two Greek ideas, φιλανθρωπία ('human kindness') and παιδεία ('education'), the Romans are said to have molded them into an ideology that was again greater than the sum of its parts: a definition of *humanitas* would thus encompass both a civilized attitude toward all people and a cultural background appropriate to that attitude. The concept may have first appeared in the late second century BC, when the circle of Scipio Aemilianus came into contact with Panaetius and Polybius; however, Bauman is right to remind us that the underlying ideas – *aequitas, iustitia, fides, venia, clementia, indulgentia, maiestas* – were known long before that.[35]

One would expect an overlap between the concepts of παιδεία, φιλανθρωπία and *humanitas*. Indeed, Aulus Gellius tries to set the record straight:

> Humanitatem non significare id, quod volgus putat, sed eo vocabulo, qui sinceriter locuti sunt, magis proprie esse usos. Qui verba Latina fecerunt quique his probe usi sunt, humanitatem non

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from generation to generation, today the emphasis is rightly placed on the power of creation and change in traditions. Robson (2019, 34) is right to point out that "scribal education – which, for Oppenheim, was what fed the 'stream of tradition' – was neither unchanging nor purely 'operational'. It did far more than simply impart the conventional technical skills necessary for the smooth transmission of ancient written knowledge. It adapted to socio-political upheaval by creating new traditions to stabilise itself, traditions that settled into custom in quieter times. Now, over half a century after Oppenheim, it would be eccentric to maintain that the choice of curricular material was entirely independent of current social forces, as he then had it, and was purely utilitarian in aim."

[34] We will not dwell here on the meaning and the most correct translation of the term *humanitas*, on which much more ink has been spilled than on the farmer-hoplites. It is enough to say that Braund notes the problems with the English term even before switching to the Latin one: "[...] The OED entry reflects contemporary thought and usage by connecting the word 'humanity' with the words 'human' and 'humane'. Thus 'humanity' as connected with the adjective 'human' is 'the condition of being human; the human faculties or attributes collectively; human nature; man in the abstract' and hence 'the human race; mankind; human beings collectively'. And 'humanity' as connected with 'humane' is defined as 'the character or quality of being humane; behaviour or disposition towards others such as befits a human being, disposition to treat human beings and animals with consideration and compassion; kindness, benevolence'. So much is uncontroversial. Yet what it is to be human is contested, particularly in discussions of topical issues like abortion and euthanasia and persistent vegetative state, and modern philosophers continue to debate the point. This is a salutary reminder that the concept of 'humanity' is not simple or monolithic." *v.* Braund 1997, 16. In any case, *humanitas* is an enormous topic which has been discussed extensively; for an overview, among many others, *v.* Rieks 1967; Veyne 1993, 342–369; Oniga 2009; Pušić 2023.

[35] Bauman 1996, 14; *cf.* Schadewalt 1973, 44; Oniga, 2009.

id esse voluerunt, quod volgus existimat quodque a Graecis *philanthropia* dicitur et significat dexteritatem quandam benivolentiamque erga omnis homines promiscam, sed humanitatem appellaverunt id propemodum, quod Graeci *paideian* vocant, nos eruditionem institutionemque in bonas artis dicimus. Quas qui sinceriter cupiunt adpetuntque, hi sunt vel maxime humanissimi. Huius enim scientiae cura et disciplina ex universis animantibus uni homini datast idcircoque humanitas appellata est. Sic igitur eo verbo veteres esse usos et cumprimis M. Varronem Marcumque Tullium omnes ferme libri declarant. Quamobrem satis habui unum interim exemplum promere. Itaque verba posui Varronis e libro rerum humanarum primo, cuius principium hoc est: Praxiteles, qui propter artificium egregium nemini est paulum modo humaniori ignotus. "Humaniori" inquit non ita, ut vulgo dicitur, facili et tractabili et benivolo, tametsi rudis litterarum sit – hoc enim cum sententia nequaquam convenit, sed eruditiori doctiorique, qui Praxitelem, quid fuerit, et ex libris et ex historia cognoverit.[36]

On this basis, Pušić identifies παιδεία as the earliest fixed component of humanism, with the concept of Roman *humanitas* "a result of the maturation of its Greek counterpart," which valued the education of a child *that would lead to the achievement of excellence in adulthood.* Thus, the concepts of παιδεία and φιλανθρωπία had arguably become the central premises for the development of Latin *humanitas* – meaning that *a liberally educated person was different from the professional,* "both in terms of the general knowledge of the culture that the former possesses and of the ability to solve the problems related to the human sphere."[37]

But there is more to the story and things do not seem to be particularly straightforward. Braund argues that the most important part of *humanitas* comes from context, as the concept of *humanitas* could be used *inclusively* or *exclusively.* This is an important distinction, considering that in ancient texts the exclusive usage is more common than the inclusive one, in contrast to modern texts that deal with the concept of "humanity". *Inclusive use* refers to a generalizing statement about phenomena that apply to the whole of humanity and connect all members of the human race, a common and expected concept from a modern perspective. Likewise, in Roman antiquity, Seneca[38] uses the

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[36] Aul. Gell. Noct. Att. 13.17.
[37] Pušić 2023, 13.
[38] Sen. *Ep.* 65.7: itaque homines quidem pereunt, ipsa autem humanitas ad quam homo effingitur permanet et hominibus laborantibus, intereuntibus illa nihil patitur.

term *humanitas* to refer to the Platonic form of humanity, Hieronimus defines *humanitas* as 'the entire race of humankind',[39] while Terrentius, of course, provides us with the most famous quotation on the subject.[40] Braund calls this an "essentially assimilating use, which ignores or overrides any differences, in order to emphasise shared 'humanness'".[41] However, much more often the term is used exclusively, i.e., in contexts where it distinguishes one group from another, to create a clear distinction between the proverbial "us" and "them". In some cases, this distinction is simply between man and beast, actually emphasizing the "non-beastliness" of being human. Often, however, the term "beast" is used metaphorically, distinguishing one group of humans from another by labeling one group as bestial or savage and another as civilized: this is often expressed by emphasizing an antithesis between "barbarism" and "civilization".[42]

The first century B.C. was a time of remarkable social and intellectual development in Rome, as well as a time of new concepts and semantic shifts in philosophical thought. The developments of the first century B.C. – for example, the gradual process of displacing the term *hellenismos* by the term *latinitas*, which began with the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* – opened the way for the virtual synonymy of the terms *humanitas* and *urbanitas*.[43] At this time the two words make their earliest unambiguous appearance in literature – *humanitas* in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and *urbanitas* in Cicero's speech for Roscius Amerinus. In Cicero, *urbanitas* is glossed by the word *humanitas* and is evidently almost synonymous, so that both *humanitas* and *urbanitas* denote a degree of refinement and culture.[44] In Cicero's words, *humanitas* was not

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[39] Hieronim. *Ep.* 55.3.4: "humanitatem" in hoc loco dicimus non mansuetudinem et clementiam, quam Graeci philanthropian vocant, sed omne hominum genus.

[40] Terr. *Heaut.* 77: homo sum; humani nil a me alienum puto; *cf.* Cic. *De Leg.* 1.33, *De Off.* 1.30; Sen. *Ep.* 95.52.

[41] Braund 1997, 19.

[42] Braund brings up the notorious example of Agricola's skill in dealing with the native Britons, describing their gradual conversion from barbarism to culture, *humanitas*, culminating in their appropriation of "delenimenta vitiorum, porticus et balinea et conviviorum elegantiam"; Tacitus goes on to comment that "idque apud imperitos humanitas vocabatur, cum pars servitutis esset" (*Agr.* 21.3). But even before him, in the famous *incipit* of *De Bello Gallico*, Caesar fixed this concept in the hendiadys *cultus atque humanitas*, "human civilization" (1.1.3).

[43] *Urbanus* was not used in earlier centuries with any positive extension of meaning; however, early in the 1st century B.C. it appears in an extended sense, which seems to have been generally recognized and accepted by that time. In the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (4.51.64), the double negative *non inurbanus*, used to describe a slave, is practically equivalent to the English "polished" or "clever". *Cf.* many other examples in Ramage 1963.

[44] *Rhet. ad Herenn.* 2.50, Cic. *Pro Rosc. Am.* 120-1; *cf.* Ramage 1963; Ramage 1973, 55 *sqq.*

a doctrine, but a style of reasoning typical of the open-minded members of the aristocracy – a style that found its full expression in individuals who possessed a special sensibility, sensitivity to delicate matters, and a literary education. The qualities of humanitas belonged to the domain of their private lives when they were on a break from public affairs.[45] Culture, as represented by the qualities of *humanitas*, was now rooted in the city of Rome, the Urbs, from which the noun *urbanitas* derives. This *humanitas* was a specific cultural construct that could be used to assert a crucial difference, to distinguish the in-crowd (as Gellius would have it, the ones who had *eruditionem institutionemque in bonas artes*) from the rest. The corresponding education taught the right way of thinking and behaving, if one was to be considered in possession of *humanitas*, which was more or less identified not only with *urbanitas*, but also with what Braund calls *Romanitas*.[46]

5. It is rather thought-provoking that we can recognize a similar idea in the Epic of Gilgamesh. The worldview of the Old Babylonian Gilgamesh is undeniably urban; one of the basic messages of the text is that a life worth living can only be lived in the city, so the Savage from the steppe must go to the city, which will be his path to humanity.[47] In this process of humanization, the presence of the urban woman also plays an important role: through her love, he comes closer to the gods; she opens new worldviews to him, "and taking his hand like a bridegroom she leads him". But this woman's love is only provisional, and one could almost say that it is only a mediator for another kind of love; after reaching humanity, the former Savage of the steppes discovers the gift of human companionship and friendly love.

On the other hand, despite living in a civilized society, the Great Man of the City is also a loner who knows no love, only violence. His only friend is his axe, whom "deeply drawn towards, he loves like a woman and wears at his side". In the Old Babylonian version, the city magnate is a friendless loner and oppressor, while the hermit from the steppe is a friendless savage who has only the company of animals. The only way to resolve this balance of imperfect and unsatisfied beings is the creation of a model situation of "a Great Man in Society". Enkidu realizes first the love of a woman, then the love of a friend, and thus, first humanized, then heroized, meets death; Gilgamesh realizes first the love of a friend, then the love of a woman, and finally meets

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[45] Pušić 2023, 16.

[46] Braund 1997, 30. Cf. Lee-Stacum 2014, who offers a deeper insight into the origins of the interlocking of these three terms.

[47] More on Gilgamesh as a "poem about civilization and wilderness, about war and peace, and about a world of cities" in Woolf 2020, 62 *sqq.*

death as a humanized hero. Accordingly, the Old Babylonian version of the epic can be arranged as follows: a) It is not good, even for a Great Man, to be alone; the urban hermit is an oppressor; the steppe hermit is a savage. b) The Great man, if he finds love, can be a hero; female love humanizes, and friendly love heroizes. c) Death relativizes and valorizes love.[48] The fragments of the Old Babylonian version invite us to reflect on the state of humanity, urban life, and the centrality of interpersonal relationships in an urban, civilized life.

The standard version of the text probes even deeper into the themes of life, city, and death. According to Moreno, the central idea of the standard version is "The City and Peace", where the point of view is monarchical and distinctly urban, the message being that only Uruk, the City, can be monumental, not the individual.

Everything begins in well-fortified Uruk, whose ruler is two-thirds god and one-third mortal; the trials of the city are the fruit of its ruler's unrestraint. The Savage is created to serve the city and its peace, but before he can face the king, he must qualify by embracing urbanity. The epic dwells on this process of education, entrusted to the *harimtu* Shamhat. In the steppe, the Savage turns away from his animal urges by sleeping with her and learning a new way of life, which is only possible "inside Uruk-Haven | where the people show off in skirted finery | where every day is a day for some festival | where the lyre and drum play continually, | where harlots stand about prettily | exuding voluptuousness, full of laughter | and on the couch of night the sheets are spread!"[49] Already qualified and made human – that is, having embraced urbanity – the new Man can fight against the old to achieve the ideal of harmony. The epic warns us that not everyone can confront the unretrained ruler: "it was you, Aruru, who created mankind | now create a *zikru* to it | let him be equal to his stormy heart | let them be a match for each other so that Uruk may find peace!"[50] The oppressed nobles, the youth, the warriors, have no recourse but to take their grievances to the Assembly of Gods, and they, in turn, have created someone who will "change the order of things".

In essence, Moreno suggests that the epic should be read as a roadmap to the attainment of wisdom as ruler through humanization. In the first part, Uruk is presented as a sublime cultural-political model; the City is the ideal of human life, not just any City, but a City where peace and harmony reign. The ruler is charged with ensuring harmony among the inhabitants, but also faces the danger of becoming

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[48] v. Moreno 1989.
[49] I, v, 6-11, tr. Maureen Gallery Kovacs.
[50] I, ii, 30-31, tr. Maureen Gallery Kovacs.

an oppressor through unbridled arrogance. It is necessary to balance his power and energy with another entity that is equal and opposite to him. Out of this tension comes harmony: "Let them be a match for each other, so that Uruk may find peace!"

The text insists on the figure of the ruler devoted to his own project, as opposed to the project outlined by the gods; however, he should really turn his attention to what is his primary task – managing the City in Harmony. A king can be 'rich in Wisdom' only in functional relation to his duty as scribe, thinker, and builder and guardian of the city – understood at this stage as the totality of civilized life, that is, of humanity. The glorious, even heroic, king is a mortal whose chief function, if he has Wisdom, is to build the City of Men (i.e., civilization). Thus, in the hands of the ancient Eastern scribe and creator, the epic provides a pedagogical proposal for the implementation of government, the establishment of organized order, and ultimately urban, i.e., civilized, human life.

6. Deeply intertwined with the concept of *urbanitas*, the Roman notion of *humanitas* represented an important cultural ideal that encompassed not only the intellectual and moral cultivation of an individual, but also the cultivated, urbane manners associated with city life. Going beyond a simple translation of 'humanity' or 'kindness', *humanitas* embodied a set of refined, cosmopolitan virtues that distinguished the educated and cultured members of society. This notion was particularly emphasized in the *Urbs*, which provided a fertile ground for social interaction, public discourse, and the arts. The principles of *humanitas* were vividly demonstrated through speech, behavior, and knowledge of literature and philosophy, marking a clear distinction from the seeming simplicity and rusticity of rural life.

In Sumerian literature, the term *nam.lú.ùlu* seems to be an equivalent of *humanitas* in the extensive palette of its meanings, from 'the collectivity of mankind' to 'the complete blossoming forth of human values, humanism'.[51] A comparison between the concept of *nam.lú.ùlu* and the Roman concept of *humanitas* reveals two distinct but overlapping understandings of what it meant to be human and urban in the context of their respective cultures. *Nam.lú.ùlu* is based on the principle of an interconnected collective with a shared destiny, with individuals deeply embedded in their community; social and moral order is paramount, and the well-being of the community depends on the fulfillment of each person's role within the urban collective. The destiny of the *civilized community-come-city-come-civilization* is based on the civilized individual and collective choices, with a strong emphasis on

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[51] *V.*, *e.g.*, Gordon 1960, 123; Oppenheim 1964, 181, *et. al.*

communal worship and ethical behavior to maintain divine favor. On the other hand, *humanitas* is based on the individual, emphasizing the cultivation of personal virtues such as wisdom, kindness, and a sense of duty. It is closely tied to the idea of becoming fully human through education, moral development, and the pursuit of excellence, and *only afterwards* contributing to society by embodying the highest human virtues, which in turn benefits the collective. Unlike the nature of *nam.lú.ùlu*, which naturally follows a divine order of things, *humanitas* is secular, focusing on the intrinsic value of human beings and their capacity for reason and ethical behavior;[52] however, education is central to both concepts, which place a strong emphasis on developing the intellect and moral character to fulfill one's potential as a civilized human being.

While both *nam.lú.ùlu* and *humanitas* offer frameworks for understanding humanity, they reflect the different values and priorities of their respective cultures: the former was rooted in a communal, religious view of humanity that focuses on collective responsibility and divine order, while the latter emphasized individual moral development, cultural refinement, and civic responsibility within a more secular framework. Of course, these concepts, especially the concept of *humanitas*, were not set in stone.[53] By the time the Sophists crystallized the idea that a citizen's duty was to embrace παιδεία from the positions of both teacher and student and to develop those qualities that make him human, the concept had already moved from 'potentials and prospects' to 'civic duties and responsibilities'. Moreover, with Christianity, the Roman world embraced the idea of another eternal city beyond Rome, one that was universal for all humanity. Augustine came up with the famous *civitas Dei* and contrasted it with the *civitas terrena* that was

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[52] *Cf.* Finkelstein 1963, 463 *apud* Brown 1988, 130: "In Mesopotamian thought, man was not the center of the universe; an autonomous study of man would have made little sense [...] To the Mesopotamian, the crucial and urgent subject of study was the entire objective universe [...]." Incidentally, it is worth noting here that things were not much different in pre-classical Greece. In Homer, for example, Legaspi (2018, 18 *sqq.*) interprets something very similar to the ancient Eastern worldview: "[...] knowledge and power [*sc.* In Homer] lie with the gods. When it comes to power, humans are subordinate; when it comes to knowledge, they are consumers rather than producers. For this reason, the human field of action is staked not on knowledge and power but on character and choice within a much more limited span. This, in turn, brings wisdom into focus as the ability to understand and inhabit prudently one's allotted share."

[53] *Cf.* Elsner (2013, 151) on παιδεία: "I am not at all sure that even now we really know what *paideia* meant in antiquity or, rather, at different times in a changing antiquity. There is a unitary, holistic and arguably monolithic idealism at constant play in both Jaeger and Marrou, which remains the case whenever *paideia* is invoked by modern scholarship as an explanation of cultural background, which is its most common function in its current use."

Rome. This was the path that led to the development of the concept beyond the confines of Roman, or even ancient, culture, eventually leading to the emergence of the modern ideal of humanism.[54]

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[54] On this, *v.* Oniga 2009, with additional scholarship and a rich bibliography.

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2.

On the Advantage and Disadvantage of *Mimesis* for Life

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The paraphrase of Nietzsche in the title speaks of man as a necessarily historical being – man cannot exist outside the understanding of his own duration, his own progress, development, etc. However, history is then understood not only as a description of past events, but as normative and formative for the present and future of man and his culture. This is precisely the meaning of the usefulness and harmfulness of history for life; it is necessary for beings such as man, and it has the power to either deaden or bring to life man's abilities and talents. This paper will attempt to show that such a principle can be found as a characteristic not only of ancient art, but of ancient culture as a whole, and that it can be recognized in the Greek concept of *mimesis*, especially as Plato and Aristotle understood it. The philosophical concept of *mimesis* will be shown to be a principle that distinguishes human activity in antiquity, encompassing various disciplines, something that both positively and negatively defines theory, practice, and production, something that can be understood as detrimental or harmful, and simultaneously as useful and good for the ancient man.

Introduction

The very title of this paper paraphrases Nietzsche's *On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life*. The reasons for choosing such a title can, of course, vary, and here we will state what applies to this paper: (i) such a play on words may entertain the authors and can also draw additional attention from other experts – something I have been using for some time now and which is increasingly noticeable in academic and scientific production; (ii) because it can demonstrate a deeper connection between theory and philosophical reflection on the one hand, and practice or human activity on the other – which, it will be argued, is a specific or distinctive feature of ancient culture, or rather what constitutes the core of ancient culture; and (iii) the intention is to highlight a clear link between different authors, concepts, ideas,

and problems. This title clearly points to establishing a connection between Nietzsche's understanding of the concept of history and the concept of imitation – primarily the concept of imitation as seen by Plato and Aristotle, authors considered the foundation of ancient thought that shaped Western culture and civilization, science, and philosophy. But why should we even attempt to establish such a connection between the ancient Greek philosophers and Nietzsche? The shortest answer would be: because Nietzsche defined man as a historical being. In other words, man cannot be torn out of history. When Nietzsche speaks of man, he speaks of a necessarily historical being – to paraphrase: man cannot exist outside the understanding of his own duration, progress, development, etc. – but then, history is not understood merely as that which describes past events, but as something that regulates and shapes the present and future of man and his culture. This is precisely the meaning of the usefulness and harmfulness of history for life – it is necessary for a being such as man, and it has the power either to deaden or to bring to life man's abilities and talents.

We must then ask ourselves: what is culture, really? Is it simply material achievements (something we are likely not to accept), in which we could even include literature, various artistic artefacts, etc. – which certainly also encompass higher-order activities such as thinking, various intellectual concepts, and the like – or is it rather a deeper connection between what is considered the domain of theory and what is considered the domain of human action? Here, I will advocate for the latter conception and understanding of culture, and I will try to demonstrate this through two examples that have by now become commonplace not only in philosophy but almost in general culture as well. These examples show that even what Aristotle methodologically separates into *theoria*, *praxis*, and *poiesis* – that is, theory, practice, and production – actually represents a unified and specific form of human life, which is at the same time normatively shaped in terms of value, politics, ethics, morality (the latter two are not the same), and art. This specificity is what characterizes ancient culture, and it begins to erode long before the modern fragmentation of human life into various and often mutually opposed parts, which today may even seem to lack a common root (just consider the contemporary division between natural sciences and the humanities).[1] This separation of human activities – and, at the same time, the desire to prevent it – can already be seen

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[1] We do not advocate for an a priori critique of such a division—the more cumulative knowledge there is, the greater the need for, and likelihood of, its dispersion and the development of specific sciences and areas of research. The results, benefits, and progress that have followed from this cannot be disputed in any way.

earlier, in a somewhat irrational and extra-rational form during the later Hellenistic period and the Middle Ages, and later in an almost strictly rational form with, for example, the classical German idealists and especially with Immanuel Kant. Kant, at the same time, asks: What can I know? How can I know it? And what should I do based on that knowledge? – thus connecting the theoretical domains of metaphysics and epistemology with the practical domains of aesthetics and especially ethics.

Nietzsche's approach to history – which differs somewhat from that of Kant, Hegel, etc., but which nonetheless arises from the thinking of these earlier philosophers and still shares many features with their approaches – is an excellent example of a universally conceived culture founded on a dominant principle: history, which unites thought and action. Can we find such a principle that characterizes ancient culture? Something that marks human activity as a widespread principle, something that spans across disciplines, something that both positively and negatively determines theory, practice, and production? Something that can be seen as harmful or detrimental, and at the same time as useful and good for the human being? The central thesis of this paper is that such a principle does exist in antiquity – or at least in one part of it, which is often considered the most fruitful and important – and that this principle is: *mimesis or* imitation.

Nietzschean Framing: The Double-Edged Sword of History

As a reaction to the philosophy of classical German idealism, 19th-century philosophy strongly leans on the idea of *historicity* as the context in which human action and specifically human life unfold. Unlike the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, which likewise recognize specifically human qualities such as rationality, prudence, the use of (Greek) language, etc., but in which historical development, and indeed the very concept of historicity, are unrecognized, Nietzsche identifies this concept as genuinely human. However, it is not without its problems – problems that, without exaggeration, pose a danger to human life itself. Human life, of course, has its biological dimension. But Nietzsche, much like Plato and Aristotle, sees the danger to human life not in its biological elimination, but in its deadening or in leading a bad life. Unlike animals, the human being is a self-conscious being, aware of its own mortality and of the way in which it lives. What characterizes human life is a value system; everything one lives for and because of. In other words, "Life is not wholly something that happens to man; it is also something he engages in according to values he follows" (Preuss 1). Therefore, it is necessary to understand how Nietzsche arri-

ves at those values. Nietzsche is perhaps best remembered in the history of philosophy for his critique of morality grounded in Christian doctrine. The idea of the *revaluation of all values* (*The Will to Power*) goes beyond the rational foundation of Christian morality pursued by 19th-century philosophers and marks a radical shift away from what Nietzsche saw as the greatest threat to European morality and its inevitable destruction (*The Gay Science*, 343). As the conclusion of this endeavour, Nietzsche famously declares that God is dead (*The Gay Science*, 108). But if God is dead, and Christian doctrine destroys morality and human life, then values must arise from another source.

Unlike his contemporaries, Nietzsche does not begin with inherited moral values that he would then attempt to justify rationally and secularly. If life does not merely happen to a person, but is instead something they actively create in accordance with the values they choose to follow, then those very values can be shaped according to one's own will. By rejecting inherited values or moral intuitions that are supposed to guide us toward a specific set of truths, Nietzsche fully discards the axiological assumptions of any kind of essentialism in defining the human being. In this sense, he can rightly be considered a forerunner of existentialist philosophers:[2]

We […] are those who really continually *fashion* something that had not been there before: the whole eternally growing world of valuations, colors, accents, perspectives, scales, affirmations, and negations. … Whatever has *value* in our world now does not have value in itself, according to its nature – nature is always value-less – but has been *given* value at some time, as a present – and it was *we* who gave and bestowed it. Only we have created the world *that concerns man*! (*The Gay Science*, 301)

This approach to values is clearly defined in a subjectivist manner; values are not given, they do not exist in the human world in advance but are created solely by the individual in accordance with how they lead their own life. They are changeable in relation to the world and generally correspond to what in Nietzsche is recognized as a strong advocacy for individual action based on one's psychophysical strength (Anderson, § 3.2.). Without delving into the issues of precisely defining these values, nor into the anti-realist approach to values or even the skeptical position Nietzsche adopts regarding them,[3] it becomes clear that his critique of morality fits into a broader framework of human action as a historical process – one that must ultimately be brought to consciousness and rejected as predetermined, and instead

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[2] *V*. Aho, "Existentialism".
[3] *V*. Leiter, 2014; Leiter, 2015; Berry, 2011; and Berry, 2019.

replaced with the individual's own creation of values to be followed in accordance with the life they wish to shape and lead:

Nietzsche takes up the idea that moral consciousness consists fundamentally in altruistic concern for others. He begins by observing a striking fact, namely, that this widespread conception of what morality is all about – while entirely commonsensical – is not the essence of any possible morality, but a historical innovation. (Anderson, § 2.)

Morality, which shapes human life, is itself, therefore, a historical process. But a person's awareness of themselves as a historical being, in turn, influences what that life will be like. For Nietzsche, the discovery of human historicity is the discovery of the process through which one shapes oneself, as opposed to any essentialism that predetermines them in advance. Therefore, the history of humanity is precisely the history of its own creation of values and of the life lived according to them, it is "the activity of a historical being recovering the past into a present, which anticipates the future" (Preuss 1). Therefore, history is necessary. But is it possible that the necessary condition for humanity simultaneously negates that very humanity? According to Nietzsche, it is. Since Nietzsche's "psychology treats the self as something that has to be *achieved* or constructed, rather than as something fundamentally *given* as part of the basic metaphysical equipment" (Anderson, § 4.) knowledge of one's self can become perverted. History, as a way of gaining knowledge of the truth about oneself, must include human (good) life[4] – ultimately, life logically precedes any history, and history must serve that life. Any attempt to establish history as an objective account of past events in the way science does inevitably leads to the destruction of that life. Nietzsche's conviction in the failure of objectivity and the scientific method marks a radical break with the philosophical tradition in which truth is simply a matter of cognition, rooted in a worldview shaped according to human cognitive abilities. This tradition extends far beyond his contemporaries – the classical German idealists and Immanuel Kant – all the way back to Aristotle, Plato, and Socrates, who all prioritized reason and knowledge over the vitalist concept Nietzsche advocates. What is, in Nietzsche's view, deeply mistaken and harmful to human life in the concept of historicity is the idea that "that truthfulness itself, rigorously pursued through the discipline of science, has forced us to the conclusion that our cognitive powers lead us into 'delusion and error', so that those very demands of truthfulness cannot be satisfied" (Anderson, par. 3.2.4.).

Thus, the concept of history, as discovered in 19th-century philosophy and advocated by Nietzsche, proves to be both essential for

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[4] Also *v*. Leiter, 2025.

humanity as such, and at the same time extremely dangerous to that very humanity and life—if it is understood as disinterested and scientific reporting on past events. The further task is to show that a similar antinomy exists in ancient philosophy, in the concept of imitation, which so strongly marked at least one, and perhaps the most important, part of ancient philosophy and culture.

Mimesis in Plato's Philosophy

When speaking about *mimesis*, we most often associate this concept of with Plato's writings on aesthetics and tie it to art as a mode of representation that has epistemically harmful associations for humans. *Mimesis* is a concept by which humans are further removed from the presumed metaphysical truth, namely the hypostatized realm of ideas, a hierarchy of unchanging and eternal forms, the model of which the imperfect material world is based, misleading us into trusting our senses more than is necessary. Therefore, *mimesis or* imitation would represent a concept by which humans create something that is third from truth or third from ideas, and for this reason, art based on *mimesis* would have to be expelled from any state that seeks to be governed by the principles of reason. But is it really that simple? We will argue there are at least three problems we have to shortly adress here before moving on.[5]

The first potential problem we will briefly touch upon here is the understanding of the very concept of *mimesis*. This term is often used to denote any form of imitation as a copy, and often, unjustifiably, to refer to objects produced through imitation (where the term *mimêma* would be more appropriate). Although *mimesis* can indeed be used to some extent to denote imitation, it represents more than mere imitation. More precisely, it signifies representation based on similarity, perhaps the most intuitive and acceptable form of representation, but still a form that remains a convention. Thus, the use of *mimesis,* if we wish to represent beings from our world, does not imply the creation of a copy, and certainly not the creation of objects produced by copying (*mimemata*), but rather the representation of some X by some Y based on perceptible or other forms of similarity between their properties.[6]

The second problem is that the concept of *mimesis*, especially understood as the creation of new objects through imitation, which would then merely be copies of objects that had themselves already arisen as copies of ideas from the world of eternal and unchanging forms,

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[5] For an extensive explanation, *v.* Pappas, 2015.
[6] *V.* Kardum, 2021, 103-24; Robinson, 1978; Gombrich, 1984.

is most often associated with human activities such as painting or sculpture. The Greeks, of course, were unfamiliar with modern and contemporary methods of representation, so within painting and sculpture, imitation as a mode of representation was actually acceptable. As Pappas notes, "*Plato appears to consider painting on its own terms, and not merely as illustrating a process also found in poetry.*" Furthermore, Plato does not even regard painting and sculpture as artistic forms, but rather as *techne* – skill, craft, and profession, so it is not surprising, as Pappas concludes, that "Even the famously anti-poetic *Republic* contains positive references to paintings and drawings. Sometimes these are metaphors for acts of imagination and political reform (472d, 500e–501c), sometimes literal images whose attractiveness helps to form a young ruler's character (400d–401a), in any case visual arts appreciated on their own terms and for their own sake. When the *Republic* treats painting and poetry together, in other words, it does so possessed of an independent sense of visual depiction. It aims at developing a philosophy of art."

With that being said, we come to the third problem with Plato's use of *mimesis; can we really talk about Plato's aesthetics or philosophy of art at all?* Aesthetics, and especially the philosophy of art as a fully modern topic, is a relatively recent development as a philosophical discipline, and as such, it certainly does not exist in Plato's considerations. Even if we were to allow that in Plato we can speak of something akin to aesthetics or a philosophy of art, and of the definition and explanation of at least some important related concepts such as beauty, value, etc., it remains the case that in Plato these ideas are neither systematized nor clearly defined. Any reader interested in this topic would have to carefully approach various Platonic dialogues and meticulously extract elements that might form something resembling Plato's aesthetics. Furthermore, aesthetics or philosophy of art as a general or overarching concept would have to encompass various artistic forms, contents, modes of representation, and so on. Yet, right from the outset, we are faced with a serious methodological problem – if, for instance, painting and sculpture are not considered artistic forms at all, how can we even speak of aesthetics? Plato's focus on poetry in various dialogues reveals this difficulty as well; and although the different forms are often related to one another, they can only be considered artistic in a very general or preliminary sense and *mimesis* could of course be analyzed in the context of poetry, not as a general problem of aesthetics.[7] However, there is also a tradition of analogizing between art forms and "Plato's explication of poetic *mimesis* by means of the

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[7] Further reading in Griswold, "Plato on Rhetoric and Poetry".

mimesis in painting belongs in this analogizing tradition" as "painting and poetry belong together as fellow species within a larger artistic genus. However faulty the theory that joins them, it attempts to describe the broader genus." (Pappas).

Plato's most important dialogue that refers to *mimesis* is, of course, the Republic. There are three main parts that investigate *mimesis*, its' nature and importance – Book II, Book III and, of course, Book X that contains most famous passages of Plato's view on the human practice of imitation. In Book 2, after Glaucon and Socrates agree that the true guardian of a good polis is also a philosopher, Adeimantus joins the discussion on proper education. Socrates leads him to accept that education involves music, which in turn includes stories – stories that can be distinguished from one another as either true or false. At this point, Plato (377a–383a) begins to develop his argument that poets speak of things they have not witnessed and that they falsely and unjustifiably portray the gods as the source and cause of evil in the world. Therefore, such stories should not be presented to educators, children, or indeed to any members of the polis: "So our first task, it seems, is to supervise the storytellers: if they make up a good story, we must accept it; if not, we must reject it. We will persuade nurses and mothers to tell the acceptable ones to their children, and to spend far more time shaping their souls with these stories than they do shaping their bodies by handling them. Many of the stories they tell now, however, must be thrown out." (*Republic* II 377a)

Here, Plato is not concerned with aesthetic value, nor with general problems and questions of aesthetics and art, but rather with the issue of education. Likewise, he does not reject all poetry, but only that which leads to bad and evil within the *polis*. But what is the criterion by which certain forms of poetry can remain in the *polis*? It is clear that it is the kind of poetry that contributes to good upbringing and education. Yet how can poetry be divided in advance according to that criterion? At the beginning of Book III (*Republic* 392d), Plato therefore distinguishes between types of poetic narration: narration in itself, narration using *mimesis*, and narration combined with *mimesis*. Hence, Plato concludes: "One sort of poetry and storytelling employs only imitation – tragedy, as you said, and comedy. Another sort, which you find primarily in dithyrambs, employs only narration by the poet himself. A third sort, which uses both, is what we find in epic poetry and many other places." (*Republic* III 394c)

By *mimesis* or imitation, Plato here clearly means impersonation. Setting aside the question of whether impersonation is inherently bad or only bad to the extent that it involves impersonating bad cha-

racters, Plato emphasizes that education should not produce a ruler of the polis who impersonates, nor should anyone – ruler or not – be able to do so effectively in many different cases. Ultimately, a ruler, in preserving freedom and goodness in the polis, could only imitate what leads to good character traits, that is, what is beneficial for the polis. The question of imitation can be radicalized further: who is the actual imitator – the performer/actor or the poet? And while Plato seems to exploit the ambiguity about who exactly is involved, he nonetheless unequivocally concludes that all mimetic poetry should be excluded from the kind of polis he envisions (*Republic* 398a). From the starting point of education to the life of the entire polis, Plato, through Socrates, prepares *mimesis* for expulsion from the imagined ideal and wise community. *Mimesis* is clearly presented only as one part of poetry as a whole, and specifically as the part that inevitably leads to bad and evil, at least when it involves the imitation of bad characters. But for Plato, this is not enough. What remains is to show that *mimesis* is inherently harmful and that it is the enemy of rational, thinking people. Ultimately, it must also be shown that this applies not just to *mimesis* in poetry as one artistic form, but that it is harmful across other forms as well. From all that has been written, it follows that in Book III, Plato still left open the possibility that *mimesis* could lead to something good in the *polis*. In Book X, however, it will become clear why Plato had already concluded in Book III that all mimetic activity must be expelled from the ideal polis. Here, *mimesis* is no longer merely the impersonation of characters typical of (at least a part of) poetry, but rather involves *copy-making* and the creation of concrete objects that doubly imitate the unchanging reality. Therefore, Book X brings together Plato's metaphysics, epistemology, psychology, aesthetics, and philosophy of politics.

After this explanation, we can continue with the presentation of what is, in Plato, already considered almost common knowledge. Of course, this refers to Plato's psychology or his theory of the soul as presented in Book IV of his *Republic*. While in Book II Plato deals with the question of how to educate the citizens of the *polis*, and above all the rulers, his discussion of the soul in Book IV implies the question of whether every soul is suitable to be educated as a ruler. In his theory of the soul it is stated "that the embodied human soul has (at least) three parts or aspects, namely reason, spirit and appetite" (Lorenz). For Plato, the division of the soul is necessary in order to avoid the possible claim that the soul of an individual is simply such that it both wants to achieve something and can simultaneously prevent the individual from doing so: "It is obvious that the same thing will never do or suffer opposites in the same respect in relation to the same thing and

at the same time. So that if ever we find these contradictions in the functions of the mind we shall know that it was not the same thing functioning but a plurality." (*Republic* IV 436b-c)

After dividing the soul into *eros* (related to desires), *thymos* (related to spirit), and *logos* (related to reason), Plato assigned to each part a corresponding virtue and vice (with the exception of reason). Thus, Plato's theory of the soul "involves not so much a division of soul as an integration into soul of mental or psychological functions that had been assigned" (Lorenz, par. 3.2.), by which all functions are once again unified within each soul. But since every soul has its dominant part, those who are driven by desires or honour are not suited to rule the polis. They may instead be producers and merchants of various material goods (if *eros* dominates), or soldiers (if *thymos* dominates). Therefore, only those governed by *logos*, who are guided by reason, are fit to be rulers. The only just state of the polis is the one in which each of these classes performs its proper function, with each class defined by the function of the dominant part of the soul. All other arrangements lead to a contradictory state of injustice, in which the spirited are subjected to the appetitive, and the rational are either completely ignored by the other classes or subordinated to the task of satisfying desires. Here we also uncover the central idea of Plato's political philosophy – the ideal *polis* must be aligned with the virtues of each class. It must be temperate (in the sense of managing *desires*), courageous (the primary duty of soldiers, who are primarily *spirited*), and rational or wise if it is ruled by those guided by *logos*. The overall functioning of the *polis* thus achieves the highest ideal – *justice*, which defines a good *polis*. But connecting Plato's psychology and philosophy of politics[8] must also include metaphysics and epistemology, which, like his theory of the soul, have also become part of common knowledge so it will only be briefly explained here. Plato's metaphysics at its core is theory of Forms, an idea that the material world we perceive is not the most authentic reality. Instead, true reality lies in the realm of *Forms* – abstract, eternal, and immutable entities that exist beyond space and time. These Forms or Ideas represent the perfect essence of all things, while the physical objects we encounter are merely imperfect copies or reflections of these ideal models. But ideas are also arranged in hierarchical order. There are three ideas that Plato puts on top in his theory of Forms – good, truth and beauty. This explains why rulers have to use their reason – without it, they would only be associated with the phenomena of the material world, which are evidently nothing more than manifestations modeled after the eternal and immutable Forms. At

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[8] For further reading, *v.* E. Brown, "Plato's Ethics and Politics in The Republic".

this point, Plato also introduces epistemology;[9] true knowledge is intellectual, while the senses can lead us only to particular things, which are nothing more than shadows of the Ideas. The material world is useful only insofar as it aids in recollecting the world of eternal Ideas that our souls once beheld. If we keep in mind this integration of various disciplines in Plato's thought, it will be easier for us to consider the role of aesthetics or, more precisely, the negative role of *mimesis*, which Plato already indicated in *Republic's* Book II.

The problem of the ideal or good *polis* is therefore an excellent example because it enables an understanding of the role that *mimesis* plays within the complex network of epistemology, metaphysics, psychology, and political philosophy. It also reveals Plato's ambivalent attitude toward imitation, which ultimately proves to be harmful. However, despite being harmful, *mimesis*, at this intersection of various philosophical disciplines in Plato, shows itself to be much more than just an aesthetic principle of imitation. In this context, *mimesis* reveals itself as a principle that can be understood much more broadly – as a (harmful) practice that distances people, especially the citizens of a good *polis*, from knowledge and truth, thereby undermining the entire desirable culture, at least as Plato envisioned it in antiquity. In Book X (*Republic* X 595a–608b), Plato links *mimesis* to more artistic forms than poetry alone, primarily to painting, and shifts the focus from the process of imitation to the products of imitation themselves, the *mimemata*. More precisely, Plato focuses on all the negative consequences that the activity of producing *mimêmata* has on the individual, his potential to gain the true knowledge and his soul. Therefore, if the ontological whole consists of Forms or essences that exist in a separate world of eternal Ideas, of particular things produced by humans, and of images and other objects we call *mimêmata*, which are produced only by certain people, namely, imitators, then it is entirely understandable that Plato's argument about the harmfulness of imitation, especially as the production of copies, can be reduced to the following:

In all, Socrates presents three theses during this first half of Book 10:

1. Poetic *mimesis*, like the kind found in painting, is the imitation of appearance alone, and its products rank far below truth. (596e–602c)

2. Therefore poetic *mimesis* corrupts the soul, weakening the rational impulse's control over the person's other drives and desires. (602c–608b)

3. It should therefore be banned from the good city.

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[9] *V*. Silverman, "Plato's Middle Period Metaphysics and Epistemology".

The argument supporting (1) seeks to spell out how badly poetry and painting fare at grasping and communicating knowledge. Partly because they do so badly, but also for other reasons, mimetic arts bring moral and psychological ill effects (2). (Pappas, § 2.3.)

With all that being said, we can see now that *mimêmata are no imitations of imitations because* particular things produced by humans are by no means imitations. They are produced based on knowledge of them which their creators are able to recollect by recollecting the eternal Forms. Let us briefly return to Plato's theory of the soul. If a just polis is also a good polis, if courage and honor are reflections of the Ideas, and if moderation of our desires means moderation toward the material goods that surround us, then we need wise rulers who know the Idea of the Good, honorable soldiers who recognize courage, and skilled craftsmen who can approach the essence on the basis of which particular objects are made. The epistemological value of such an approach to the original Ideas, for Plato, is elevated by the closeness to the divine nature of the Forms. The epistemological and metaphysical balance achieved by a good polis is therefore disturbed by those who imitate, those who produce mere copies and thus divert souls from true, rational knowledge and metaphysical reality. In other words, that balance of a just and good polis is disrupted by those who stand in opposition to the divine and to all that the polis (and likely Athens itself) must and should desire – and thus imitators must exist outside the civilized polis ("The Impiety of the Imitator in *Republic* 10"). But have we not now returned, in a different way, to one of the earlier problems in which it was emphasized that the problem of *mimesis* is essentially a problem of (bad) poetry that takes bad characters as its base type, only now the issue is painting? Pappas concludes that this is the spot where Plato unifies the problem of *mimesis* in both poetry and pictorial art:

But Socrates springboards beyond pictorial art to condemn tragedy and its "father" Homer. Homer was ignorant, never taught a useful thing to anyone (599b–600e). This apparent *ad hominem* attack is designed to show that poetry too imitates appearance. For that purpose it suffices to show that one esteemed poet writes without knowledge. If great poetry can come out of someone ignorant, then poetry must not require knowledge. Even if ignorance is not necessary for the composition of poetry Homer's example demonstrates that the two are compatible. (par. 2.3.)

Although he initially approached *mimesis* as a problem of only one part of poetry, Plato ultimately develops the idea of imitation into a radical claim about the production of mere copies. While in earlier books of the *Republic*, Plato may have acknowledged a pedagogical

value in imitation, in Book X, and through the unification of various disciplines, he finally presents a complete argument for the previously announced expulsion of imitation from the ideal polis. For him, *mimesis* is not merely a copy of a copy that would be epistemically worthless; it is a political and ethical problem that deceives souls, keeps them in ignorance, and distances them from the metaphysical truth that can only be attained through reason. Thus, *mimesis* is a principle that may only seemingly be permitted for educational purposes – it is a concept that, at all levels, undermines the civilization of the polis as Plato envisions it. As such, it cannot belong to the culture of the polis and must necessarily remain outside of it.

Mimesis in Aristotle's Philosophy

Plato's harsh critique of *mimesis* was, in fact, necessarily so. It's nothing new to say that metaphysical claims tend to be highly restrictive in their final outcomes – the more radical the initial claims, the more radical the conclusions they generate across all fields. Indeed, Plato's starting point – the claim of a metaphysical reality that is inaccessible to the senses and lies beyond the material world, time, and space – had to, if Plato wished to remain consistent within his system, lead to the expulsion of *mimêmata* and *mimesis* as a principle from the good *polis*, and consequently, the exclusion of art insofar as it is based on mimetic principles. If we begin from even more rigid positions, the conclusions drawn from them will be even more rigid and harder to defend. Perhaps that is the core issue with *mimesis* – if we shift the perspective from general metaphysical claims to individual activities and objects, if we reverse the direction and start from the particular, we might come to understand *mimesis* as a useful and good principle, and all activities based on it as good and desirable. Of course, as soon as we express such a thought, we inevitably begin thinking of Aristotle. Aristotle, alongside everything he left as an intellectual legacy to humanity, and especially to Western science and culture, is also known as a fierce critic of Plato and a challenger of his metaphysical doctrine. That may well be the right place to begin a new analysis and reconsideration of *mimesis* and its desirability within ancient culture.

The natural place of *mimesis* lies in the productive sciences of rhetoric[10] and the arts, which "differ from the practical sciences of ethics and politics, which concern human conduct, and from the theoretical sciences, which aim at truth for its own sake" (Shields, § 13.). Although it may seem somewhat unusual to include everything with a

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[10] For further reading, *v.* Halliwell, 1986; Halliwell, 1993.

productive purpose – from artifacts and houses to persuasive speech (*Rhetoric* 1355b26) and the production of drama (*Poetics* 1448b16–17) – within the productive sciences, they can undoubtedly be understood as such, given their purpose. As such, they are most often viewed as descriptive, in contrast to the prescriptiveness associated with the practical sciences such as ethics and politics.[11] However, this raises the issue of the prescriptive nature that is also present in *Rhetoric* and *Poetics*. One common explanation of this issue is already well established in interpretations of Aristotle's philosophy in general:

There are, at any rate, clearly prescriptive elements in both these texts. Still, he does not arrive at these recommendations *a priori*. Rather, it is plain that Aristotle has collected the best works of forensic speech and tragedy available to him, and has studied them to discern their more and less successful features. In proceeding in this way, he aims to capture and codify what is best in both rhetorical practice and tragedy, in each case relative to its appropriate productive goal. (Shields, § 13.)

Although the interpretation according to which Aristotle generally takes the best existing forms, describes them, and from there arrives at more general propositions is common, such a descriptive method can also be found, for example, in his philosophy of politics, where he describes each existing form of government in order to then conclude which is the best and most suitable in a given context. From this it follows that no clear distinction between the descriptiveness of the productive sciences such as rhetoric and poetics on the one hand, and the prescriptiveness of the practical sciences such as ethics and politics on the other, would be possible. Of course, as Shields also shows, it would be naive to assume that the productive sciences are purely descriptive, and that the practical sciences are purely prescriptive. For that reason, we will argue here that these domains are more closely related than they might initially seem, and that *mimesis* is precisely the concept that can connect them. Such an approach cannot ultimately be considered a complete innovation:

By highlighting and refining techniques for successful speech, the *Rhetoric* is plainly prescriptive—but only relative to the goal of persuasion. It does not, however, select its own goal or in any way dictate the end of persuasive speech: rather, the end of rhetoric is given by the nature of the craft itself. In this sense, the *Rhetoric* is like both the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Politics* in bearing the stamp of Aristotle's broad and encompassing teleology.

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[11] *Cf.* Halliwell, 1986.

The same holds true of the *Poetics*, but in this case the end is not easily or uncontroversially articulated. It is often assumed that the goal of tragedy is *catharsis*—the purification or purgation of the emotions aroused in a tragic performance. Despite its prevalence, as an interpretation of what Aristotle actually says in the *Poetics* this understanding is underdetermined at best. (Shields, par. 13.)

Purposefulness (teleology) is highlighted as a fundamental property of Aristotle's thought and philosophy,[12] and here we will show that the goal of Aristotle's *poetics* and *ethics* – the *eudaimonia* (happiness or flourishing) of the citizens in the *polis* – is not found in the often misinterpreted concept of *catharsis*, but rather in the concept of *mimesis*. Aristotle's *Poetics,* as his central treatise on art, leaves little room for doubt or multiple interpretations, the central concept of art for Aristotle is precisely *mimesis*, and art is primarily defined as a mimetic or imitative activity:

When opening the *Poetics*, the reader is struck by the repetition of the word *mimesis* (and the verb *mimeisthai*), to the point that it defines what is (what we call) a work of art. Very roughly, one might say that the word *mimesis* has both a static, or "pictorial" aspect, and a "dynamic", or "theatrical" aspect. According to its "pictorial" aspect, *mimesis* designates the fact that in such and such mimetic work, the receiver recognizes a resemblance. (Destrée, par. 1.)

Given that *mimesis* is a necessary property of every artistic form, and that "it is the case that Aristotle considered tragedy and comedy to be paradigmatic works of art" (Destrée, par. Intr.), we must conclude that their fundamental principle is also *mimesis which then defines art and simoultaniesly enriches our understanding of it.*[13] In fact, we can argue that these very forms "constituted the most attractive and exciting parts of the civic and religious festivals that were such important events in the lives of most Athenians and, more generally, of the people of Greek cities" (Destrée, par. Intr.), and that *mimesis*, in this sense, was far more deeply embedded in ancient culture than as a principle pertaining exclusively to art. Although for this very reason questions of aesthetics (poetics) and ethics are often linked in Aristotle's thought, it seems that this connection is frequently misinterpreted. Namely, the most common link established between them is found in the concept of catharsis. Thus, Shields rightly observes and emphasizes the following: "Although he has been represented in countless works of scholarship as contending that tragedy *is for the sake of catharsis*, Aristotle is in fact far more circumspect. While he does contend that tragedy will effect or

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[12] *V.* Shields, "Aristotle"; Cohen and Reeve, "Aristotle's Metaphysics".
[13] *V.* Zerby, 1957; Brown, 1969; Kardum, 2021.

accomplish catharsis, in so speaking he does not use language which clearly implies that catharsis is in itself the function of tragedy." (§ 9.)

Indeed, Aristotle emphasizes catharsis as something that tragedy achieves. The basic idea behind this interpretation is as follows: citizens of the polis, by observing and reflecting on tragedy, its characters and their actions, along with elevated speech, noble gestures, and the motives that drive tragic heroes, witness moral exemplars. Through viewing tragedy, catharsis is achieved, after which citizens themselves are inspired to act similarly. The ethical function of tragedy, then, seems quite certain. However, the interpretation that catharsis is the key feature that connects aesthetics (poetics) and ethics is problematic for two reasons: (I) catharsis is not the function of tragedy, let alone of art in general, and (II) even if it were a function of tragedy, catharsis is not present in other artistic forms, not even in all poetic forms. This latter point is quite clear. Comedies, and especially works of painting or sculpture, may or mate not have catharsis as a function, nor does Aristotle ever clearly states that catharsis appears in them. Regarding the former point, Aristotle is not entirely explicit about the function of tragedy, but even if catharsis is necessary for every tragedy, it should not be understood as its function according to Aristotle, but rather as a means through which another end or function is achieved. "Tragedy, then, is an imitation of an action that is serious and complete, and which has some greatness about it. It imitates in words with pleasant accompaniments, each type belonging separately to the different parts of the work. It imitates people performing actions and does not rely on narration. It achieves, through pity and fear, the catharsis of these sorts of feelings." (*Poetics* 1449b21–29)

Thus, it is evident that there must be another property capable of connecting various artistic forms with one another, and subsequently linking them to the practical sciences, namely ethics and politics. Since Aristotle unquestionably defined art through *mimesis*, based on that fact as well as the previously cited passage from Aristotle's *Poetics*, it is reasonable to attempt to find such a connection precisely in that concept, not that it is without any controversy.[14] That this is indeed the case in the analysis of Aristotle's philosophy should come as no surprise, *mimesis* simply lies in human nature and, interestingly, comes just as naturally to humans as political association does. The well-known claim that characterizes Aristotle's *philosophy of politics* – that anyone who does not live in a *polis* must be either a beast or a god, could now be extended: anyone who does not imitate must be either a beast or a god. Imitation is essential to human life: this is how we learn language,

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[14] *V*. Halliwell, 1986, 115–130.

how we adopt values, and through imitation we build the broad network of what we recognize as the functioning of human (political) society and humanity in general. In other words, we often acquire *virtues* not through explicit intellectual reasoning, but by enjoying each concrete instance of virtue as it is realized in the community around us. However, acquiring those virtues is not enough: "We seek a deeper understanding of the objects of our childhood enthusiasms, and we must systematize our goals so that as adults we have a coherent plan of life. We need to engage in ethical theory, and to reason well in this field, if we are to move beyond the low-grade form of virtue we acquired as children." (Kraut, § 3.1.)

The entire Aristotelian ethical system can generally be reduced to two main parts – one that stems from reason, and one that does not require any particular theoretical understanding or justification:

"Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of virtue (1103a1–10): those that pertain to the part of the soul that engages in reasoning (virtues of mind or intellect), and those that pertain to the part of the soul that cannot itself reason but is nonetheless capable of following reason (ethical virtues, virtues of character). Intellectual virtues are in turn divided into two sorts: those that pertain to theoretical reasoning, and those that pertain to practical thinking (1139a3–8). He organizes his material by first studying ethical virtue in general, then moving to a discussion of particular ethical virtues (temperance, courage, and so on), and finally completing his survey by considering the intellectual virtues (practical wisdom, theoretical wisdom, etc.)." (Kraut, § 4.)

It cannot be simplistically claimed that only one of these components is specifically human, even though such an interpretation is quite common among those analysing Aristotle. While it is indeed true for Aristotle that what is uniquely human – what makes a person a "rational animal" – is reason or *logos*, it is also clear that Aristotle advocates for imitation, or *mimesis*, both as an artistic principle by which he defines human productive activity, and as a distinctively human activity in a broader sense. Since *mimesis* is natural to humans, it clearly emerges as a principle that must be followed – both in the cultivation of virtues and in the creation of artefacts and imitated objects. Therefore, when it comes to Aristotle, *mimesis* must be understood as a desirable principle that leads to the acquisition of ethical virtues through copying and imitating models, to the representation and depiction of similar and imitated objects, and as a principle that unifies aesthetics, ethics, and the philosophy of politics.

Citizens of the polis who possess learned virtues are precisely those who can take the next step – developing theoretical knowledge

and understanding of them, creating a good polis, and in that good polis, always striving for perfection. Again, thanks to the pervasive concept of *mimesis*, which plays a clear social and political role in marketplaces and public gatherings. Therefore, unlike Plato, Aristotle is a clear proponent of *mimesis* as a desirable principle that consistently contributes to the development of ethical virtues and the well-being of the polis as a political community. In contrast to Plato's restrictive metaphysical system, which ultimately expels *mimesis* from the ideal *polis*, Aristotle embraces imitation as a fundamental and constructive human activity. For Aristotle, *mimesis* is not only the foundation of artistic creation but a central mechanism through which individuals acquire virtues, develop ethical sensibilities, and engage in the life of the community. Its presence in both aesthetic and ethical spheres allows it to function as a conceptual bridge between the practical and productive sciences, uniting *poetics, ethics,* and *politics* into a coherent framework of human flourishing and good, happy life. Far from being a deceptive practice that corrupts the soul, *mimesis* becomes a natural and necessary means of moral development and social cohesion. In this light, Aristotle positions imitation as not merely a representational tool, but a deeply political and pedagogical principle, one that sustains the fabric of the *polis* and supports the cultivation of the good life. Through *mimesis*, citizens learn to act virtuously by encountering models of excellence, whether in drama, rhetoric, or everyday social practice. Thus, Aristotle does not merely defend *mimesis* – he reclaims it as a cornerstone of both individual and communal well-being.

Conclusion

In this paper we explored the relationship between Nietzsche's concept of history and the ancient Greek concept of *mimesis*, translated as imitation, arguing that both serve as foundational principles that unite theory and practice in shaping human life and culture. By paraphrasing Nietzsche's title *On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life*, we emphasized the dual role of history, not only as a record of the past but as an active force shaping present and future values. It asserts that culture should not be reduced to material achievements but understood as a deep integration of intellectual and practical life, especially in ancient Greek philosophy. The main thesis was that in antiquity, particularly in the works of Plato and Aristotle, *mimesis* functions as a core principle, one that, like Nietzsche's history, can be both beneficial and harmful, and which profoundly influences philosophy, politics, ethics, and art. Unlike Plato and Aristotle, who emphasized reason and timeless values, Nietzsche views *historicity* – the idea

that human life unfolds through historical processes – as a defining and uniquely human trait. For Nietzsche, morality is not a fixed set of values but a historical, self-created system that emerges from individual experience and will, rather than from inherited or divine sources like Christian doctrine. He argues that values are not objectively given but are shaped by individuals, making him a precursor to existentialist thought. However, Nietzsche also warns that this very historicity, while essential to human life and self-understanding, can be destructive if treated like scientific objectivity, which he sees as dehumanizing and misleading. History must serve life, not dominate or distort it. There is, however, a similar paradox – where a foundational concept is both necessary and dangerous – exists in ancient philosophy, particularly in the concept of *mimesis* (imitation).

In Plato's philosophy, *mimesis*, commonly understood as imitation or representation, is often viewed negatively, particularly in his *Republic*, where it is associated with misleading copies that distance humans from true knowledge and the eternal Forms. Rather than a simple notion of copying, *mimesis* refers to representation based on perceived similarities, which Plato critiques as epistemically and morally harmful. While art forms like painting and sculpture were considered *techne* (craft) rather than true art, Plato's focus was primarily on poetry, particularly mimetic poetry, which impersonates characters and influences emotions, thereby undermining rational governance and moral development. His critique evolves throughout the *Republic*, with Books II and III addressing its role in education and Book X presenting a comprehensive argument against imitation: first, that mimetic arts portray appearances far removed from truth; second, that they corrupt the soul by weakening reason; and third, that they must be banned from the ideal city. This rejection of *mimesis* stems from Plato's broader metaphysical and epistemological framework – where true knowledge is intellectual and rooted in the unchanging realm of Forms, while imitation traps individuals in a deceptive world of appearances. Moreover, his tripartite theory of the soul (reason, spirit, and appetite) underpins the political vision of a just polis governed by those whose rational faculties dominate. Mimetic practices, by appealing to the nonrational parts of the soul and offering emotionally manipulative representations, disturb this balance and mislead citizens, thus posing not just an artistic concern but a political and ethical threat. Ultimately, Plato sees *mimesis* not merely as an aesthetic issue but as a fundamental challenge to truth, reason, and the harmonious structure of the ideal society, warranting its exclusion from the culture of the polis.

In contrast to Plato's rejection of *mimesis* as a misleading and corrupting force, Aristotle embraces it as a fundamental and beneficial human activity that plays a vital role in ethics, aesthetics, and politics. While Plato's metaphysical framework necessitates the exclusion of mimetic art from the ideal polis, Aristotle repositions *mimesis* within the productive sciences, such as rhetoric and poetics, emphasizing its role in learning, virtue acquisition, and civic life. Rather than prescribing rules a priori, Aristotle studies exemplary works to derive principles that support human flourishing (*eudaimonia*). He sees *mimesis* not merely as imitation for its own sake but as a natural mechanism by which people learn and cultivate ethical virtues, beginning with emulation and culminating in rational understanding. Contrary to interpretations that center tragedy's purpose around catharsis, Aristotle's broader view emphasizes *mimesis* as the connective tissue between aesthetic representation and ethical development. Thus, imitation is more than an artistic method – it is a pedagogical and political tool essential for forming virtuous citizens and sustaining a well-ordered polis. Through *mimesis*, individuals participate in shared cultural practices, adopt communal values, and strive toward the good life, making it central to Aristotle's vision of human nature and societal harmony.

By paralleling Nietzsche's exploration of history with the ancient Greek discourse on *mimesis*, this paper highlights the ambivalence of imitation as both a vital educational and cultural force and a potential source of distortion or manipulation. While Plato warns of its dangers to truth and moral order, Aristotle reclaims *mimesis* as a natural and necessary process by which individuals acquire virtues, engage in civic life, and contribute to the common good. Just as Nietzsche argues that history must serve life rather than paralyze it, so too must *mimesis* be understood not as mere copying but as a dynamic practice that shapes identity, ethics, and communal experience. Ultimately, the advantage and disadvantage of *mimesis* for life lies in how it is employed – either to mislead and undermine rational autonomy or to cultivate virtue, solidarity, and human flourishing within the polis. This dual nature makes *mimesis* not only a subject of aesthetic theory but a cornerstone of philosophical reflection on what it means to live well.

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3.

When Humaneness Fails: Insulting, Futile, and Bad Humanitas

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This paper aims to explore the meaning(s) of *humanitas* in instances where the noun is paired with negative adjectives such as *contumeliosus* 'insulting', *inutilis* 'futile', and *vitiosus* 'full of faults or defects', 'faulty', 'bad'. The noun-adjective pairs *humanitas contumeliosa*, *humanitas inutilis* and *humanitas vitiosissima* appear in literary sources from the imperial age (Sen. *Ep.* 4. 10, *Dial.* 9. 15. 5 and Quint. *Inst.* 2. 2. 10). Since *humanitas* is typically associated with virtue, these three NA pairs pose intriguing questions: what does *humanitas* mean in these cases, and which specific human behaviors denoted by the noun were considered insulting, futile, or bad? The analysis reveals that in all three NA pairs, *humanitas* is employed in accordance with Storch's definition of 'intelligent and tactful affability' (*urbanitas*), which aligns with the notions of politeness, courtesy, and good manners. Both Seneca and Quintilian view certain humane behaviors unfavorably due to their potential negative consequences, whether ethical or educational. Seneca specifically criticizes acts of politeness towards inferiors and the expression of grief in response to others' misfortunes, cautioning that these behaviors can lead to humiliation in the former case and disrupt the pursuit of inner tranquility in the latter. Quintilian, on the other hand, condemns praise in the classroom for its detrimental effects on both the teacher's authority and the students' achievement. Neither Seneca nor Quintilian employ *humanitas* in the sense favored by Gellius, which involves the concept of παιδεία or 'cultured humanity'. This is surprising in Quintilian's case, given the expectation of his alignment with Cicero's doctrine of *studia humanitatis*.

Introduction

The understanding of what it means to be humane is not static but rather a dynamic concept, continuously evolving through the interplay of social and cultural influences. That humaneness is not an absolute value, as aptly noted by Schadewaldt (1973: 47), but rather con-

tingent upon specific historical contexts within society is readily evident as we examine ancient discussions of *humanitas*.[1] Gellius, in the 2nd century AD, drawing upon the testimony of those proficient in classical Latin, argued that, contrary to the widespread belief equating *humanitas* with φιλανθρωπία, the term instead aligned with what the Greeks referred to as παιδεία (Gel. 13.17.1).[2] Several centuries later, Nonius Marcellus provided additional validation to the dual connotations mentioned by Gellius, replacing παιδεία with *honestorum studiorum et artium adpetitum*.[3] The complexity of *humanitas,* as evidenced by ancient discussions on it, stems from the interplay of diverse historical factors, including interactions with the Greek world, the adoption of Greek philosophy into Roman culture, and the development of a unique Roman vocabulary. These factors collectively contributed to the formation of a multifaceted concept of *humanitas*, which presents challenges when attempting to compare it directly with any other modern notion that encapsulates the defining features of humaneness.

In contemporary dictionaries, the two facets of meaning delineated in antiquity – a sense of kindness towards others, akin to the Greek concept of φιλανθρωπία, and intellectual refinement, similar to the Greek idea of παιδεία – are included within sections denoted by Lewis

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[1] *Humanitas* is a quality noun (for quality nouns in Latin, see Fruyt 2011: 162; for quality nouns in general, see Rainer 2015). As widely familiar, it is derived from *humanus* ('of man', 'human', 'humane'), derivative of *homo* ('human being', 'man'), and *-tās/-itās*, suffix commonly used in Latin to form abstract nouns from adjectival stems. As it originates from *humanus*, *humanitas*, in its core, encapsulates the abstract concept of being human. While the ideas associated with this concept existed in early Roman thought (see, for instance, Pl. *Asin.* 495; *Bacch.* 1169; Ter. *Ad.* 107-10; 734-6; 934; *Heaut.* 77), the noun itself is absent from extant early Latin texts. It makes its first appearance in literary sources from the 1st century BC. It is present five times in *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, three times in the writings of Varro and Caesar each, and six times in Cornelius Nepos' sole surviving work, *De viris illustribus*; Cicero utilizes *humanitas* a remarkable 229 times, constituting almost half of all documented occurrences in Latin literature. In Latin texts from the imperial period, the noun is attested in the works of Livy, Petronius, Pliny the Younger, Seneca, Quintilian, Valerius Maximus, Velleius Paterculus, Vitruvius, Apuleius, Cornelius Fronto, Gellius, Suetonius, Tacitus, Zeno of Verona, Servius Honoratus, Iustinianus *etc.* The full list of authors can be found in Tombeur, 1999: 93-104.

[2] 'Humanitatem' non significare id, quod volgus putat, sed eo vocabulo, qui sinceriter locuti sunt, magis proprie esse usos. Qui verba Latina fecerunt quique his probe usi sunt, 'humanitatem' non id esse voluerunt, quod volgus existimat quodque a Graecis φιλανθρωπία dicitur et significat dexteritatem quandam benivolentiamque erga omnis homines promiscam, sed 'humanitatem' appellaverunt id propemodum, quod Graeci παιδείαν vocant, nos eruditionem institutionemque in bonas artis dicimus (Gel. 13.17.1).

[3] Humanitatem non solum, uti nunc consuetudine persuasum est, de benivolentia, dexteritate quoque et comitate veteres dicenda putaverunt, quam Graeci φιλανθρωπίαν vocant; sed honestorum studiorum et artium adpetitum, quod nulli animantium generi absque hominibus concessa sit. (Non. *De comp. doct.* 1. 255 = pp. 73-4 Lindsay).

and Short as 'particular' uses of *humanitas*, identified by Ehlers in *ThLL* as an 'emphatic sense' (*emphatic dictum*). According to *L&S*, *humanitas* in general (under section I) signified: *human nature, humanity*, in a good sense; *the qualities, feelings, and inclinations of mankind*, or, in rare cases, *human race, mankind*. The 'particular' meanings (under section II) are divided into two subcategories: II. A. *Human* or *gentle conduct towards others, humanity, philanthropy, gentleness, kindness, politeness*; and II. B. *Mental cultivation befitting a man, liberal education, good breeding, elegance of manners* or *language, refinement*. *Comitas, facilitas, mansuetudo,* and *clementia* are provided as alternatives for the meaning outlined in IIA, while *doctrina, litterae*, and *eruditio* are given as equivalents for the significance discussed in IIB.[4] The entry on *humanitas* in *ThLL*, authored by Ehlers, shares similarities with the one found in *L&S*. Ehlers draws a distinction between a universal and an emphatic sense. The universal sense encompasses instances where the noun denotes the natural state of humans (*natura humana, hominis figura*, and *genus humanum*), as well as cases where it functions as a synonym for the adjective *humanus*. The emphatic sense, on the other hand, refers to qualities befitting individuals deserving of the title 'human beings'. Some of these qualities overlap with those attributed to the noun in *L&S*, such as *eruditio, doctrina, comitas,* and *clementia*, while others, such as *prudentia, dignitas, honestas, urbanitas*, and *benignitas*, are supplementary.[5] In both *L&S* and *ThLL*, *eruditio* and *urbanitas* are categorized together, unlike in some subsequent dictionaries. The *OLD* entry on *humanitas* identifies three primary clusters of meaning: 1. *human nature or character*; 2. *the quality distinguishing civilized man from savages or beasts, civilization, culture*; and 3. *human character, kindness, human feeling, good manners, polished language*.[6] The most thorough attempt to clarify the complex nature of *humanitas* is credited to Storch. In his entry on *humanitas* in *NP*, later published in English in *BNP*,[7] he identifies five distinct levels of meaning, providing synonyms for each one: 1. Philanthropic respect, particularly compassion (*misericordia*); 2. Intelligent and tactful affability (*urbanitas*); 3. Feeling for natural human solidarity (*sensus humanitatis*); 4. Cultured humanity (*eruditio, doctrina*); and 5. Civilization (*cultus*). The first level of meaning (*misericordia*) encompasses a broader sense of respect for others, particularly those considered inferior.[8] *Hu-*

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[4] See *L&S* 1879: under "humanitas", p. 869.

[5] *ThLL*, 6.3. 3075. 5-3083. 56.

[6] *OLD*, 1968: under "humanitas", p. 808.

[7] Storch 2005.

[8] Storch suggests that this meaning finds its origins in ancient Roman tradition, notably in the virtue of *clementia*, and is influenced by related Greek virtues like compassion,

manitas in the sense of *urbanitas* embodies a refined and relaxed life-style prevalent among urban Romans, especially among the elite class, and it encompasses various qualities such as cheerfulness (*hilaritas*), friendliness (*comitas*), affability (*facilitas, dexteritas*), kindness (*venustas, lepos, iucunditas*), refined wit (*facetiae*), elegance (*elegantia*), and jesting (*iocus*).[9] The third level of meaning (*sensus humanitatis*) relates to the shared sense of connection that binds all individuals.[10] *Humanitas*, understood as "cultured" or "perfected humanity" (*eruditio, doctrina*), as Storch points out, became associated with education from 63 BC onwards, largely due to Cicero, who emphasized the transformative influence of 'arts' and 'studies' (*studia humanitatis*) on human rational nature, ultimately guiding individuals toward true humanity.[11] The final level of meaning, in which *humanitas* is associated with 'civilization' (*cultus*), is linked to artistically crafted vessels, high-quality goods for trade and living, grand architectural structures like columned halls and baths, as well as sophisticated banquet settings.[12] In Storch's view, *humanitas* was often associated with *virtus* and ancient Roman values like incorruptibility, steadfastness, and uprightness. It served to uphold these values by preventing their rigid application and enhancing their influence. The ideal of *humanitas*, particularly as described by Cicero and Pliny the Younger,[13] was perceived as "a balance between the mixture of 'seriousness', *gravitas* (or 'strictness' *se-*

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gentleness, conciliation, softness, goodwill, and generosity. It was manifested in court rhetoric, where pleas for leniency were made to judges by highlighting mitigating circumstances and the unpredictability of fate.

[9] This lifestyle, as Storch observes, was closely associated with literary education, a domain Cicero believed was significantly influenced within what was known as the 'Scipionic circle'. His observation is based on Cic. *Mur.* 66; *De or.* 2,22; 154; *Rep.* 1,14ff.

[10] Attested in Cicero, who stressed the importance of prioritizing *sensus humanitats* over the pursuit of knowledge, condemning the prioritization of personal gain above the common good as a denial of humanity. See, for instance, Cic. *Fin.* 3,62-65; *Off.* 1,50-56, 1,62, 1,157.

[11] The concept held particular significance for Cicero's ideal of a perfect orator. Cicero, as Storch notes, emphasized the importance of literary education in shaping the perfect orator, viewing rational speech as a key element in social communication (see Cic. *Arch.* 4; Cic. *De or.* 3.58 and Cic. *Rep.* 1.28.). Most recent contributions on Cicero's *humanitas* include Stroh 2008; Altman 2009, Gildenhard 2010: 201-217; Høgel 2015: 41-67.

[12] This understanding of *humanitas*, as noted by Storch, is evident in Varro, *LL* 8,31; Caes. *B.G.* 1,1,3 and Tac. *Agr.* 21.

[13] Pliny the Younger echoed Cicero's views by integrating philosophy and philanthropy in his understanding of *humanitas*. He exhibits a comprehension of the concept of *humanitas* akin to that of Cicero, conceiving it as an ideal amalgamation of erudition (represented by the Greek concept of παιδεία) and a philanthropic disposition towards humanity at large (illustrated by the Greek notion of φιλανθρωπία). See Rieks 1967: 244-248, Braund 1998: 60-61, Mollea 2019: 49-75.

veritas) and *humanitas* in the sense of friendliness and affability"
(Storch 2005: 562).

2. *Humanitas* with negative adjectives

The prevalent instances of NA pairs with *humanitas* typically in-
volve possessive adjectives,[14] as expected due to the predominant use
of *humanitas* in its so-called 'emphatic sense',[15] denoting qualities in-
herent to human beings. Pairs with other types of adjectives are less
frequent. Among those attested more than once are *summa humanitas*
(9 instances),[16] *singularis humanitas* (8 instances),[17] *communis huma-
nitas* (6 instances),[18] *publica humanitas* (4 instances), [19] *omnis huma-
nitas* (3 instances),[20] and *eximia humanitas* (2 instances).[21] All remai-
ning NA pairs occur only once and are exclusively found in texts from
the imperial period. These include *humanitas contumeliosa* (Sen. *Ep.*
4.10.7), *inutilis humanitas* (*ibid. Dial.* 9.15.5), *vitiosissima humanitas*
(Quint. *Inst.* 2.2.10), *humanitas frequens* (*ibid. Decl.* 301.14), *necessa-
ria humanitas* ([Quint.] *Decl.* 9. 15. 2), *hospitalis humanitas* (V. Max.
1.1.10), *prompta et exquisita humanitas* (*ibid.* 5.1.1), *humanitas Ro-
mana* (*ibid.* 5.1.1f), *mansueta humanitas* (Vitr. 2.1.7), *humanitas ple-
beia* (Apul. *Met.* 10.23), *persingularis humanitas* (Fro. *Ver.* 1.3.1), *hu-
manitas erudita* (Gel. 19.14.1), *maior humanitas* (Plin. *Ep.* 5.19.2),
and *humanitas diligens* (*ibid.* 6.31.14). The adjectives in pairs such as
summa humanitas, *singularis humanitas*, *eximia humanitas*, *persingu-
laris humanitas*, and *maior humanitas*, serve to elucidate the extent or
intensity of the human trait denoted by the noun. In the pair *communis
humanitas*, predominantly encountered in Cicero's works, the adjective
typically suggests that *humanitas* is employed in the sense described by
Storch as "a feeling for natural human solidarity".[22] The adjective *omnis*

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[14] See, for instance, Cic. *Mil.* 33.16, *De orat.* 2.362, *Amic.* 8.5, *Fam.* 1.7.3, 1.7.11,
2.15.2, 3.1.1, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.12.2, 5.2.9, 5.19.2, 7.5.2, 7.28.1, 10.5.3, 10.34.2, 11.22.1,
11.27.3, 11.27.8, 13.15.3, 13.24.2, 13.64.1, 16.11, 13.21.1, *Att.* 1.7.1, 1.11.1, 3.18.2,
14.5.2 *etc.*

[15] I use this term in the same sense as Ehlers employs it in *ThLL*.

[16] Cic. *Fam.* 4.13.2; 5.21.3; 10.5.3; 12.27.4; 13.1.4; 13.3.1; 15.14.1; Nep. *Mil.* 8.4, and
Sen. *Ep.* 104.4.

[17] Cic. *Rab. Post.* 26.8; *Catil.* 4.11.11; *Fam.* 3.2.1; 13.65.1; 14.11.1; *Att.* 9.7b.5;
16.16a.4; Vell. 2.114.1

[18] Cic. *Quinct.* 51.11; *Sul.* 64; *Flac.* 24.8; *Dom.* 98.11; *Off.* 3.32; Quint. *Inst. orat.*
12.11.5.

[19] [Quint.] *Decl. min.* 254.6; 254.12; [Quint.] *Decl. mai.* 6.3.13; Apul. *Met.* 3.4.13.

[20] Cic. *Off.* 1.62.5; *Att.* 13.2.1; Sen. *Ben.* 2.11.4.

[21] V. Max. 4.2.7; Apul. *Apol.* 94.14.

[22] In a single occurrence of the NA pair *communis humanitas*, *humanitas* denotes *hu-
mankind*, that is, humanity in its entirety (Cic. *Off.* 3.32). Here, Cicero argues that when

in the NA pair *omnis humanitas* emphasizes the fullness or entirety of the human trait denoted by *humanitas*. In light of the fact that *humanitas*, in its so-called emphatic sense, consistently conveys a highly esteemed human characteristic, the juxtaposition of the noun with adjectives bearing negative connotations presents a perplexing phenomenon. What *humanitas* signifies in these NA pairs and which specific human behaviors denoted by the noun were considered insulting, futile, or extremely bad? I will try to answer these questions by examining the NA pairs: *humanitas contumeliosa, humanitas inutilis*, and *humanitas vitiosissima*.

2.1. *Humanitas contumeliosa*

The NA pair *humanitas contumeliosa* appears in Seneca's letters to Lucilius (Sen. *Ep.* 4. 10. 7). In the passage where the NA pair is found, Seneca advises Lucilius that, in order to banish hunger and thirst, it is unnecessary for him to seek favor from the proud or endure their disapproving looks and their *humanitas contumeliosa*:

> Ut famem sitimque depellas non est necesse superbis adsidere liminibus nec supercilium grave et **contumeliosam** etiam **humanitatem** pati, non est necesse maria temptare nec sequi castra: parabile est quod natura desiderat et adpositum. (Sen. *Ep.* 4. 10)[23]

Seneca's words can be paraphrased as follows: individuals can fulfill their essential needs for sustenance without relying on the wealthy for assistance or enduring their disdainful demeanor and insulting *humanitas* (*contumeliosa humanitas*); similarly, arduous journeys or military endeavors are unnecessary, as nature readily provides for these basic necessities. *Humanitas* in the NA pair *contumeliosa humanitas* obviously refers to acts and gestures of kindness exhibited by individuals of greater wealth, power, or status toward their inferiors. Although these acts and gestures of kindness, *per se*, do not inherently entail humiliation, they may foster a sense of humiliation if it seems that they arise not from genuine concern for the well-being of others, but rather

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facing tyrants such as Phalaris, there is no sense of camaraderie but rather a deep-seated enmity. He asserts that it is not contrary to the natural order to deprive individuals deserving of death of their lives and advocates for the removal of tyrants from a *communi tamquam humanitate corporis*, likening it to removing diseased limbs to preserve overall health.

[23] *In order to banish hunger and thirst, it is not necessary for you to pay court at the doors of the purse-proud, or to submit to the stern frown, or to the kindness that humiliates; nor is it necessary for you to scour the seas, or go campaigning; nature's needs are easily provided and ready to hand* (Seneca, *Epistles* 1–65, translated by Richard M. Gummere, p. 19).

from a desire to assert one's superiority over them. Here, Seneca apparently refers to kind acts and gestures that lack sincerity and engender a sense of inferiority in the individuals who experience them. The kind acts and gestures intended to diminish the dignity or worth of the individuals on whom they are bestowed involve behaviors contrary to sternness, such as insincere smiles, offering backhanded compliments containing hidden insults, using terms of endearment or diminutive language in a way that undermines the recipient's authority, and similar actions.[24] In this respect, Fantham's translation of *contumeliosa humanitas* as 'condescending courtesy'[25] accurately captures the behavior Seneca describes, emphasizing the implied sense of superiority conveyed by the giver of such courtesy towards the receiver.

2.2. *Inutilis humanitas*

The NA pair *inutilis humanitas* is found in Seneca's dialogue *De tranquilitate animi* (Sen. *Tranq.* 15.3 = Sen. *Dial.* 9.15.3), where Seneca offers strategies aimed at easing the feelings of anxiety, worry, and disillusionment experienced by his friend Serenus, with the ultimate goal of achieving *tranquilitas*. The NA pair appears in the passage where Seneca advises placid acceptance when confronting social norms and human flaws, advocating against both laughter and tears:

> Sed satius est publicos mores et humana vitia placide accipere nec in risum nec in lacrimas excidentem; nam alienis malis torqueri aeterna miseria est, alienis delectari malis voluptas inhumana, sicut illa **inutilis humanitas** flere, quia aliquis filium efferat, et frontem suam fingere. (Sen. *Tranq.* 15.5)[26]

The themes addressed in the passage can be summarized as follows: (1) Seneca advises against reacting excessively with either laughter or tears when faced with societal flaws and human vices, urging calm acceptance instead; (2) Seneca warns against the perpetual suffering caused by excessive empathy; (3) Seneca evaluates taking pleasure

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[24] Seneca's implicit notion that people are inclined to yield to the stern frown or empty courtesy of those with greater wealth or power to attain more than they require is influenced by the complex patron-client relationship within Roman society. Similar ideas regarding the behavior of those in positions of authority towards those beneath them can also be found, for instance, in Sen. *Ep.* 84. 12; Iuv. 5. 9; Plin. *Ep.* 2. 6. 3; Quint. *Decl.* 298.11.

[25] Seneca, *Selected Letters*, translated by Elaine Fantham, p. 8.

[26] *Yet it is better to accept calmly the ways of the public and the vices of man, and be thrown neither into laughter nor into tears; for it is unending misery to be worried by the misfortunes of others, and unhuman pleasure to take delight in the misfortunes of others, just as it is a useless show of humanity to weep and pull a long face because someone is burying a son* (*Seneca: Moral Essays*, vol. I, trans. by John W. Basore, p. 274).

in others' misfortunes as inhumane; (4) Seneca evaluates outward manifestations of grief during the burial of someone's son as an expression of *inutilis humanitas*. In the majority of English translations I have consulted, the NA pair *inutilis humanitas* is rendered using the English word *humanity* as a translation equivalent for *humanitas*.[27] Some translators opt for other solutions, linking *humanitas* with the concepts of compassion, kindness, and philanthropy.[28] Baillard's translation of the pair as 'une stérile politesse'[29] stands as the sole instance where *humanitas* is associated with politeness. This interpretation aligns with Anderson's translation of the pair as 'an empty compassion,' as both translators associate *humanitas* with a simulated display of compassion. These translations resonate with Balbo's assertion that in this specific context *humanitas* denotes courtesy.[30]

Deciding whether *humanitas* in this context denotes 'humaneness' in the sense of genuine compassion or empty courtesy largely depends on the interpretation of the phrase *frontem suam fingere*, which appears solely in *De Tranquilitate animi* and nowhere else. The phrase can be interpreted in two different ways: either as 'to display emotions through facial expressions' or as 'to fake emotions.'[31] The meaning of the phrase remains ambiguous, even under the assumption that it carries the same meaning as *vultum fingere*, which itself offers two interpretations: one involving altering the face to deceive and the other involving composing countenance to convey a particular emotion. In my view, *frontem suam fingere* is used here to indicate the act of feigning

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[27] Basore, for instance, translates the NA pair as 'a useless show of humanity' (*Seneca: Moral Essays*, vol. I, p. 274), Davie renders it as 'a useless display of a man's humanity' (*Seneca: Dialogues and Essays*, p. 136), while Fantham translates it as 'a pointless act of humanity' (*Seneca: Hardship and Happiness*, p. 204).

[28] In Anderson's translation, the NA pair is rendered as 'an empty compassion' (*Seneca: Selected Dialogues and Consolations*, p. 132.); in Costa's, as 'an empty show of kindnesses' (Seneca: *On the shortness of life*, p. 101); in Gunerman's, as 'nutzlose Menschenfreundlichkeit' (Seneca, *De tranquilitate animi/ Über die Ausgeglichenheit der Seele*, p. 69); Charpentier and Lemaistre render it as 'une compassion inutile' (Oeuvres de Sénèque le philosophe, p. 412); Pasquale Barini as 'inutile pietà' (Lucio Anneo Seneca, *De tranquilitate animi,* p. 48); and Ткаченко as 'бесполезное человеколюбие' (Ткаченко 2000: 196).

[29] *Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Oeuvres complètes de Sénèque le Philosophe, tome premier,* p. 259.

[30] Balbo 2012: 78-79.

[31] This ambiguity becomes apparent when examining the various translations of the phrase. For example, Basore interprets the phrase as 'to pull a long face', Davie as 'to assume a look of sorrow', Fantham as 'to feign an expression of grief', Anderson as 'to fake emotion on your face', Costa as 'to assume a solemn look', Gunerman as 'eine verfinsterte Miene zu mimen', both Charpentier & Lemaistre and Baillard as 'de composer son visage', Pasquale Barini as 'atteggiare il proprio volto ad un finto dolore', and Ткаченко as 'придавать своему лицу выражение печали'.

emotions, leading me to interpret *humanitas* as representing an insincere form of courtesy. I infer this based on the subsequent passage, in which Seneca argues that authentic expressions of sorrow should stem from natural impulses rather than societal conventions, and he also condemns the insincerity of mourning solely for public display:

> In suis quoque malis ita gerere se oportet ut dolori tantum des quantum <natura> poscit, non quantum consuetudo; plerique enim lacrimas fundunt ut ostendant et totiens siccos occulos habent quotiens spectator defuit, turpe iudicantes non flere cum omnes faciunt: adeo penitus hoc se malum fixit, ex aliena opinione pendere, ut in simulationem etiam res simplicisima, dolor, veniat. (Sen. *Tranq.* 15.6)[32]

Although Seneca addresses the appropriate attitude towards coping with one's own misfortunes (*in suis quoque malis*) in this passage, contrasting with his discussion of the misfortunes experienced by others in the passage where *inutilis humanitas* appears, he critiques social conventions related to expressing grief in both instances. This is suggested by the recognitional use[33] of the demonstrative pronoun *illa*, preceding the NA pair *inutilis humanitas*, as well as by the use of the conjunction *quoque* in the subsequent sentence. The demonstrative pronoun *illa* here does not refer to something previously mentioned in the text; instead, the pronoun is used to activate specific mutual knowledge. The referent in question is the convention, familiar to Seneca's readers, of outwardly expressing grief when confronted with the misfortunes of others. This convention, as implied by *quoque* in the subsequent sentence, is also an inadequate response to one's own misfortunes, as it contradicts Seneca's belief that, in dealing with misfortunes, whether experienced by others or oneself, the appropriate approach is to express sorrow in accordance with the dictates of nature rather than conforming to custom. Given this, I agree with Balbo's assessment that in the passage where *inutilis humanitas* appears, *humanitas* carries a negative connotation.[34] This form of humaneness, resembling our com-

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[32] *In the matter of one's own misfortunes, too, the right way to act is to bestow on them the measure of sorrow that Nature, not custom, demands; for many shed tears in order to make a show of them, and, whenever a spectator is lacking, their eyes are dry, though they judge it disgraceful not to weep when everyone is doing it. This evil of depending on the opinion of others has become so deeply implanted that even grief, the most natural thing in the world, becomes now a matter of pretence.* (*Seneca: Moral Essays*, vol. I, trans. by John W. Basore, p. 274).

[33] The recognitional or anamnestic use of pronouns refers to cases in which the speaker suggests to the hearers that the respective referent is part of their mutual knowledge and thus identifiable. See Himmelmann 1996: 240; Diessel 1999: 93, 105-109.

[34] Balbo 2012: 79.

prehension of courtesy, is deemed futile (*inutilis*) by Seneca because it urges individuals to conceal their authentic emotions, veiling their true feelings behind societal norms, and encourages them to succumb to passions, consequently undermining their pursuit of inner tranquility.

2.3. *Vitiosissima humanitas*

Humanitas is paired with the superlative *vitiosissima* in Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria* (Quint. *Inst.* 2.2. 10). The NA pair appears in the passage where Quintilian cautions against the habit of allowing students, particularly young ones, to show excessive praise during lessons, such as standing up or applauding. Quintilian stresses the significance of upholding discipline in the classroom and exercising restraint in such instances, arguing that excessive praise can undermine the teacher's authority and foster the misconception among students that their performance is satisfactory:

> Minime vero permittenda pueris, ut fit apud plerosque, adsurgendi exultandique in laudando licentia: quin etiam iuvenum modicum esse, cum audient, testimonium debet. Ita fiet ut ex iudicio praeceptoris discipulus pendeat, atque id se dixisse recte quod ab eo probabitur credat. Illa vero **vitiosissima**, quae iam **humanitas** vocatur, invicem qualiacumque laudandi cum est indecora et theatralis et severe institutis scholis aliena, tum studiorum perniciosissima hostis: supervacua enim videntur cura ac labor parata quidquid effuderint laude. (Quint. *Inst.* 2.2. 9-10)[35]

In the passage, Quintilian denounces the practice known in his times as *humanitas*, which involves exchanging mutual praise regardless of quality, comparing it to behavior more appropriate for the theater than for properly disciplined schools. The recognitional use of *illa*, akin to its usage preceding the NA pair *inutilis humanitas*, suggests that this expression of humaneness, involving the exchange of mutual and indiscriminate praise, was a common practice within educational settings during Quintilian's era. Reinhard and Winterbottom observe[36]

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[35] *We should definitely not allow boys (as happens in many teachers' classrooms) to stand up or jump out of their seats to applaud. Even young adults, when they are listening to a speech, should be restrained in their approval. In this way, the pupil will come to depend on the teacher's judgement, and think that he has spoken well when he approves. The extremely undesirable "humanity," as it is now called, which consists of mutual praise without any regard to quality, is unseemly, reeks of the theatre, and is quite alien to properly disciplined schools; it is also a very dangerous enemy of study, because, if there is praise on hand for every effusion, care and effort appear superfluous.* (Quintilian, *The Orator's Education, vol. I: Books 1-2*, trans. by Donald A. Russell, p. 215).

[36] Reinhardt-Winterbottom 2006: 59-60.

that *humanitas* is employed here in the sense of *benivolentia erga omnis homines promiscam*, a usage that Gellius rejected in the 2nd century AD.[37] It may be translated as 'politeness', as Butler and Murphy did in their translations of *Institutio Oratoria*,[38] or as 'good manners', 'good form', as Reinhard and Winterbottom suggest.[39] This usage exemplifies the third level of meaning outlined by Storch, characterized as 'intelligent and tactful affability (*urbanitas*)'. Quintilian considers this manifestation of *humanitas* extremely flawed (*vitiosissima*) within an educational context, particularly for its ability to hinder the students' genuine efforts and diligence, cautioning that excessive praise could breed complacency among them. *Humanitas*, as observed by Balbo, in this context takes an intriguing turn from its basic role of improving men's attitudes and becomes a way to reduce their capacities.[40]

3. *Humanitas* in the works of Seneca and Quintilian

In all three instances examined, *humanitas* is employed in the sense defined by Storch as 'intelligent and tactful affability', aligning with the concept of *urbanitas* and encompassing qualities such as cheerfulness, friendliness, affability, kindness, refined wit, elegance, and jesting. Storch observes that this sense originated from the connection between philanthropic and educated *humanitas*,[41] and it was associated with education, which Cicero regarded as notably distinctive and prominent within what was known as the Scipionic circle.[42] Furthermore, in all three instances, *humanitas* is not associated with virtue (*virtus*): in the first NA pair, *humanitas contumeliosa*, it conveys behavior fostering a sense of humiliation; in the NA pair *inutilis humanitas*, it denotes a form of humaneness that prompts individuals to yield to passions, consequently undermining their pursuit of inner tranquility; and, in the NP pair *vitiosissima humanitas*, it refers to behavior undermining the educational process. In the works of Seneca and Quintilian, the usage of *humanitas* as a synonym for *urbanitas* extends beyond these three instances. In Seneca's letters, dialogues, and treatises,[43] both

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[37] See footnote 2.

[38] In Butler's translation of Quintilian's *Institutio orarotia*, *vitiosissima humanitas* is rendered as '*the worst form of politeness*, (*Quintilian: Institutio Oratoria*, Books I-III, p. 273), whereas Murphy translates it as '*the most mischievous politeness*' (*Quintilian on the Teaching of Speaking and Writing*, p. 93).

[39] Reinhardt-Winterbottom 2006: 59.

[40] Balbo 2012: 84.

[41] Storch 2005: 561.

[42] The observation is based on Cic. *Mur.* 66; *De or.* 2,22; 154; *Rep.* 1,14ff.

[43] *Humanitas* is mentioned 24 times (*Dial.* 2.13.4; 4.28.2; 5.43.5; 7.4.2; 9.10.6, 9.15.5; *Ben.* 1.13.2; 2.11.4; 2.17.1; 3.7.5; 4.29.3; 5.20.5; 6.29.1; *Clem.* 2.5.3; *Ep.* 4.10;

humanitas and *inhumanitas* appear 27 times, while in Quintilian's *Institutio Oratoria*, *humanitas* appears only 7 times,[44] and *inhumanitas* is absent. According to Storch's criteria, as rightly observed by Balbo, both Seneca and Quintilian employ *humanitas* not solely in the sense of *urbanitas* but also in the sense of 'philanthropic respect, particularly compassion (*misericordia*)' and in the sense of 'feeling for natural human solidarity' (*sensus humanitatis*).[45] The last two levels of meanings defined by Storch, 'cultured humanity (*eruditio, doctrina*)' and 'civilization (*cultus*)', are not evidenced in the works of either author. In Seneca's works, none of the three attested levels of meaning holds dominance over the others, whereas in Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria*, the first level of meaning, philanthropic respect, predominates over the other two levels. The boundaries between the attested levels of meaning in Seneca often appear weak, as evidenced by the analysis of the NA pair *inutilis humanitas*. Despite *humanitas* not being associated with virtue in all three instances examined, both Seneca and Quintilian regard it as such, as will become evident in the subsequent discussion. First, I will focus on the use of *humanitas* in Seneca's works, and then, I will move on to Quintilian's use of the term in *Institutio Oratoria*.[46]

Seneca's perspective on *humanitas* as a virtue is depicted in epistle 88, where the philosopher emphasizes the priority of philosophical studies over *studia liberalia*, associating *humanitas* with the ideal of a perfect individual. In the epistle, he explicitly identifies *humanitas* as a virtue (*virtus*), alongside three other virtues mentioned (*fortitudo, temperantia*, and *fides*), which can assist individuals in acquiring an 'unchangeable knowledge of good things and evil' (*scientia bonorum ac malorum inmutabili*). He expounds on his understanding of *humanitas* as follows:

> Singulas lubet circumire <u>virtutes</u>. Fortitudo (…). Fides (…). Temperantia (…). Humanitas vetat superbum esse adversus socios, vetat amarum; verbis, rebus, adfectibus comem se facilemque omnibus praestat; nullum alienum malum putat, bonum autem suum ideo maxime quod alicui bono futurum est amat. (Sen. *Ep.* 88. 29-30)[47]

5.4; 65.7; 81.26; 88.30; 99.20; 104.4; 115.3; 116.5; *Nat.* 4a, pr. 18), while *inhumanitas* appears only 3 times (*Dial.* 2.13.4; 10.14.4; *Ep.* 99.15).

[44] *Inst.* 2.2.10; 5.13.6; 6.pr. 10; 6.1.22; 11.1.16; 11.1.42 and 12.11.5.

[45] See Balbo's classifications according to Storch's criteria in Balbo 2012: 71 (for Seneca's uses of *humanitas*) and *ibid*. 81 (for Quintilian's uses of *humanitas*).

[46] The Major and Minor Declamations attributed to Quintilian, which were likely not authored by him, were not the subject of our examination.

[47] *I should like to pass in review the several virtues. Bravery (…). Loyality (…). Temperance (…). Kindliness (sc.* humanitas*) forbids you to be over-bearing towards*

In this passage, *humanitas* emerges as a true virtue. Seneca's depiction of it resonates with his statement *Alteri vivas oportet si vis tibi vivere* (Sen. *Ep.* 48.2), which later became proverbial. *Humanitas* is employed in the sense defined by Storch as 'feeling for natural human solidarity' (*sensus humanitatis*). However, as observed by Balbo,[48] *humanitas* here also appears to encompass elements of courtesy and politeness (*urbanitas*). This impression arises from Seneca's contrast between the concepts of *superbia* and *amaritudo* with those of *comitas* and *facilitas* (*humanitas vetat <u>superbum</u> esse adversus socios, vetat <u>amarum</u>; verbis, rebus, adfectibus <u>comem</u> se <u>facilem</u> omnibus praestat*). Both senses, *sensus humanitatis* and *urbanitas*, coexist, and the demarcation between them is very subtle.

In Epistle 115, there is additional evidence supporting Seneca's perspective on *humanitas* as a virtue. Here, Seneca describes the sight one would witness if granted the opportunity to gaze into a good man's soul, imagining the visage illuminated by the four cardinal virtues of Platonic and Stoic tradition – justice, courage, temperance, and wisdom (*iustitia/δικαιοσύνη, fortitudo/ἀνδρεία, temperantia/σωφροσύνη* and *prudentia/φρόνησις*) – accompanied by virtues such as thriftiness (*frugalitas*), moderation (*continentia*), endurance (*tolerantia*), refinement (*liberalitas*), affability (*comitas*), and, humaneness (*humanitas*):

> Si nobis animum boni viri liceret inspicere, o quam pulchram faciem, quam sanctam, quam ex magnifico placidoque fulgentem videremus, hinc iustitia, illinc fortitudine, hinc temperantia prudentiaque lucentibus! Praeter has frugalitas et continentia et tolerantia et liberalitas comitasque et—quis credat?—in homine rarum *humanitas* bonum splendorem illi suum adfunderent. (Sen. *Ep.* 115.3)[49]

According to Storch's criteria, *humanitas* is employed here in the sense of 'philanthropic respect', akin to the Greek concept of *φιλανθρωπία*. As described by Seneca, it represents a very rare good among

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your associates, and it forbids you to be grasping. In words and in deeds and in feelings it shows itself gentle and courteous to all men. It counts no evil as another's solely. And the reason why it loves its own good is chiefly because it will some day be the good of another. (Seneca, *Epistles* 66 - 92, translated by Richard M. Gummere, p. 367).

[48] Balbo 2012: 74.

[49] *If we had the privilege of looking into a good man's soul, oh what a fair, holy, magnificent, gracious, and shining face should we behold—radiant on the one side with justice and temperance, on another with bravery and wisdom! And, besides these, thriftiness, moderation, endurance, refinement, affability, and—though hard to believe—love of one's fellow-men, that Good which is so rare in man, all these would be shedding their own glory over that soul.* (Seneca, *Epistles* 93 - 124, translated by Richard M. Gummere, p. 321).

humankind (*rarum bonum*), implying that achieving *humanitas* is a remarkable accomplishment attained by only a select few individuals. This rarity underscores the importance of *humanitas,* highlighting its esteemed status in Seneca's philosophy.

Quintilian primarily employs *humanitas* to convey 'philanthropic respect',[50] yet this is not its exclusive usage. As previously noted, he also employs the term to denote *urbanitas,* and, as we will soon discover, he uses it in the sense outlined by Storch as *sensus humanitatis.* In all instances, except for the one examined above, Quintilian links *humanitas* with virtue. This association is notably clear in the introduction of the sixth book of *Institutio oratoria,* where Quintilian warmly recalls his second son, who passed away at the age of ten. He praises his son's virtues (*virtutes*), among which *humanitas* stands out, held in equal regard alongside *probitas, pietas,* and *liberalitas*:

> Iuro per mala mea, per infelicem conscientiam, per illos manes, numina mei doloris, has me in illo vidisse <u>virtutes</u>, non ingenii modo ad percipiendas disciplinas, quo nihil praestantius cognovi plurima expertus, studiique iam tum non coacti (sciunt praeceptores), sed probitatis pietatis *humanitatis* liberalitatis,…. (Quint. *Inst.* 2 pr.)[51]

Humanitas is also implicitly linked with virtue at the end of *Institutio oratoria,* where Quintilian advises that an orator should gracefully retire from his profession before age catches up with him, ensuring that he departs at the height of his abilities. By doing so, he can preserve the fruits of his labor and continue to contribute to the field through writing, offering legal counsel, or mentoring promising young students. He will be inclined toward this by both the *officium humanitatis communis* and a personal passion for his work:

> Hos ille formabit quasi eloquentiae parens, et ut vetus gubernator litora et portus et quae tempestatium signa, quid secundis flatibus quid adversis ratio poscat docebit, non humanitatis solum communi ductus officio, sed amore quodam operis… (Quint. *Inst.* 12. 11. 5-6)[52]

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[50] See, for instance, Quint. *Inst.* 5.13.6; 6. pr. 10; 6.1.22; 11.1.16 and 11.1.42.

[51] *I swear by my own troubles, by the misery that my heart knows, by those spirits of the departed who are the gods of my grief, that I saw in him excellences (sc. virtutes) not only of natural capacity for learning (and I never saw anything more outstanding in all my experience) and of application, which even at that age needed no compulsion (as his teachers know), but also of honesty, piety, humanity, and generosity, ….* (Quintilian, *The Orator's Education, books 6-8.* Edited and translated by Donald A. Russell, p. 13).

[52] *The father of eloquence will educate them, and, like a veteran pilot, teach them the coasts and the harbours and the signs of the weather, what reason prescribes when the wind is fair and what when it is contrary. His motive will be not only the common*

In this passage, Quintilian employs the term *humanitatis* to denote the shared sense of connection among individuals, a concept akin to what Storch categorizes as *sensus humanitatis*. This sense of natural human solidarity is not merely incidental; instead, it carries a deeper significance, implying an obligation or duty (*officium*). The term *officium* holds significant weight due to its deep roots in Cicero's tradition, notably evidenced in his work *De officiis*. Considering the weight of *officium* as signifying a profound personal obligation, one might infer that, according to Quintilian, *eloquentiae parentes* are obliged to fulfill their duty of educating others. Failure to fulfill this obligation would disqualify them from being classified as ideal orators. As widely acknowledged, Quintilian defines an ideal orator as someone who embodies both moral integrity and proficiency in the art of rhetoric (*vir bonus dicendi peritus*).[53] Here, *humanitas* refers to the primary aspect of Quintilian's two-fold definition – *vir bonus*: the retired ideal orator will mentor promising young students not solely out of passion for his work but also because he embodies the qualities of *vir bonus*, which encompass, among other virtues, a sense of natural human solidarity (*humanitas*). This sense of natural human solidarity will motivate him to share his knowledge with others, ensuring the continuity of excellence in oratory among future generations. Ultimately, his motivation will be grounded in recognizing this mentorship as a moral duty.

Conclusion

In each of the three instances analyzed, *humanitas contumeliosa* (Sen. *Ep.* 4.10), *humanitas inutilis* (Sen. *Tranq.* 15.3), and *humanitas vitiosissima* (Quint. *Inst.* 2.2.10)*, humanitas* is employed in accordance with Storch's definition of 'intelligent and tactful affability', which aligns with the Roman concept of *urbanitas* or with the concepts of politeness, courtesy, or good manners. Both authors in which these instances are found, Seneca and Quintilian, employ *humanitas* not solely in this sense but also in the sense of 'philanthropic respect' (*misericordia*)' and in the sense of 'feeling for natural human solidarity' (*sensus humanitatis*). The last two levels of meaning delineated in Storch's classification – *humanitas* interpreted as "cultured" or "perfected humanity" (*eruditio, doctrina*) and *humanitas* understood as 'civilization' (*cultus*) – do not appear in the works of either author.

While both Seneca and Quintilian typically associate *humanitas* with virtue, they both acknowledge that certain behaviors associated

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duty of humanity, but a love of the work … (Quintilian, *The Orator's Education, books 11-12*. Edited and translated by Donald A. Russell, p. 327).

[53] Quint. *Inst.* 12. 1. 1.

with it might lead to negative outcomes within specific contexts. Seneca perceives certain humane behaviors as negative from an ethical standpoint, while Quintilian views others unfavorably in relation to their impact on the educational process. For Seneca, acts of humanity displayed by individuals of greater wealth, power, or status towards their inferiors can foster a sense of humiliation in those towards whom they are directed. He describes these acts as insulting *(humanitas contumeliosa)* because they have the potential to evoke feelings of humiliation in the recipients, when perceived as motivated by desire for dominance and superiority rather than genuine care or concern. Similarly, Seneca criticizes the convention of outwardly expressing grief when faced with others' misfortunes as futile *(inutilis humanitas)* because it prompts individuals to succumb to their emotions, ultimately impeding their quest for inner peace. These two particular behaviors – demonstrating kindness, whether genuine or insincere, to individuals of lower wealth, power, or status, and openly expressing grief in response to others' misfortunes – although inherently humane, are regarded unfavorably by Seneca due to the potential negative consequences they might entail. Quintilian also takes a critical perspective on a specific aspect of *humanitas*, emphasizing its potential adverse effects. In particular, he condemns the practice of excessive praise within the classroom, which, although initially seeming humane, Quintilian regards as severely flawed *(vitiosissima humanitas)* due to its capacity to diminish the teacher's authority and foster a misguided sense of achievement among students. Thus, both Seneca and Quintilian view these humane behaviors unfavorably due to the potential negative consequences they might bring about, with Seneca focusing on ethical concerns and Quintilian on educational implications.

In all three NA pairs analyzed, *humanitas* is used in the sense of φιλανθρωπία, a meaning Gellius rejected in the 2nd century AD (Gel. 13.17.1). Generally, in the works of Quintilian and Seneca, *humanitas* is never used in Gellius's preferred sense of παιδεία or 'cultured humanity' (*eruditio* or *doctrina*) as defined by Storch. This is surprising in the case of Quintilian, as we would have expected him to follow Cicero's doctrine of *studia humanitatis*, given that Cicero was his model for the 'ideal orator'.[54] Quintilian does not adhere to Cicero's principles as expressed in *Pro Archia* (*Arch.* 4) and *De oratore* (*De or.* 3.58), where Cicero underscores the importance of literary education in the formation of the ideal orator. Quintilian, unlike Cicero, emphasizes the impor-

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[54] Quintilian frequently referenced Cicero as the epitome of rhetorical excellence in his work *Institutio Oratoria*, praising Cicero's mastery of oratory, philosophy, and moral integrity. See, for instance, Quint. *Inst.* 10.1.105-112.

tance of the ideal orator's proficiency in philosophy, especially moral philosophy (*Inst.* 12.2), civil law (*ibid.* 12.3) and history (*ibid.* 12.4), considering them valuable mainly for their practical utility rather than mere intellectual enrichment. Quintilian's practical approach, rooted in his role as a rhetorician, is evident also in his understanding of *humanitas*, which, as demonstrated above, although is considered virtue (*virtus*), is perceived unfavorably in terms of its implications for the development of the future orator.

ABBREVIATIONS

All names and titles of works by ancient authors mentioned in the paper are abbreviated according to the *OLD*.

BNP = *Brill's New Pauly: Encyclopaedia of the ancient world.*
L&S = Lewis, Charlton T., and Charles Short. *A Latin Dictionary.* Clarendon Press, 1879.
OLD = *Oxford Latin Dictionary.* Edited by P. G. W. Glare, Oxford University Press, 1968.
ThLL = *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*, 1900–. Berlin (formerly Leipzig): De Gruyter (formerly Teubner).

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4.

Paideia vs. Humanitas:
the Basic Concepts of Roman Thought
from Terence to the Late African Authors

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Humanitas is a fundamental concept of classical Roman thought. It is not to be confused with the educational ideal the Greeks call *paideia*. Even etymologically, *paideia* (> *pais* 'child') refers to childish activities, while *humanitas* (> *humanus* 'humane') presupposes the domain of the adult human being. Despite Aulus Gellius, *humanitas* implies the idea of benevolence, so that it is comparable to the Greek *philanthropia*. A fundamental source in this respect is the Roman comic poet Terence, a native of Carthage, who is indebted to the ethics of the Greek New Comedy. Terence's humanism, however, is peculiarly focused on an unparalleled sense of universality. Late African writers such as Apuleius, Tertullian, Cyprian, Augustine, and others emphasize *humanitas* as the result of combining classical culture with ethical values of compassion and benevolence. During the Vandal period, the Carthaginian poet Dracontius used this term as a synonym for Romanitas, as opposed to Vandalitas as barbarian fury. All this said, Latin African authors made a decisive contribution to this conceptualization.

Humanitas / Paideia / Philanthropia

The identification of Latin humanitas with Greek paideia has been pursued by several scholars, following the suggestion of Werner Jaeger, based on the authority of the Roman scholar Aulus Gellius (c. 125 - after 180 AD) in a well-known passage of his Noctes Atticae:[1]

"Humanitatem" non significare id, quod uolgus putat, sed eo uocabulo, qui sinceriter locuti sunt, magis propie esse usos. 1. Quia uerba Latina fecerunt quique his probe usi sunt, "humanitatem" non id esse uoluerunt, quod uolgus existimat quodque a Graecis

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[1] XIII 17, 1, *See* Jaeger 1937, pp. 107-121; Id. 1944, p. xxiii; Elice 2015-2016, p. 253; Mollea 2018, pp. 149-154.

philanthropia dicitur et significat dexteritatem quandam beniuo-
lentiam erga omnis homines promiscam, sed "humanitatem" ap-
pellauerunt id propemodum, quod Graeci paideian uocant, nos
eruditionem institutionemque in bonas artis dicimus. Quas qui
sinceriter cupiunt adeptuntque, hi sunt uel maxime humanissi-
mi. Huius enim scientiae cura et disciplina ex uniuersis animan-
tibus uni homini datast idcircoque "humanitas" appellata est.

Humanitas does not mean what the common people think, but
the authors of good Latin used this word with a correct mea-
ning. 1. Those who created the Latin language and used it cor-
rectly, did not want to give to *humanitas* the meaning which the
common people think it has, namely, what the Greeks call *phi-
lanthropia*, signifying a kind of friendly spirit and benevolence
towards all men without exception, but they assigned to *huma-
nitas* exactly what the Greeks call *paideia*, while we define it as
education and training in the liberal arts. Those who earnestly
desire and seek these arts are the most highly humanized. Since
the pursuit and training of this kind of knowledge was granted
only to humans among all animals, it was defined as "humanity".

However, *humanitas* does not simply correspond to the educati-
onal ideal that the Greeks called *paideia*. In fact, the Latin term previ-
ously meant "benevolence", "compassion", "clemency". It can thus be
compared to the semantic range of Greek *philanthropia*. Gellius expli-
citly excludes the equation with philanthropy by rejecting it as a popu-
lar meaning. However, the Roman scholar is forced to admit that this
association was the common meaning of native Latin speakers. Gellius
develops a philological exercise aimed at defending his linguistic prefe-
rence for the correct use of *humanitas* and the precise meaning given
to this word by Latin authors known for their use of pure language.[2]
That is why he quotes Varro and Cicero in the following lines of this
chapter; he wants to demonstrate his thesis by referring to the authori-
tative Roman thinkers on *humanitas*.[3]

As the preface of the *Noctes Atticae* reveals, this work was clear-
ly conceived for pedagogical purposes: the author pursues his personal
learning objectives as far as the use of good language is concerned.[4] He
acted very similarly to the rhetorician and exponent of the Second So-
phistic, Pollux of Naucratis, who compiled his vocabulary of ancient
Greek, the *Onomasticon*, in order to teach *euglōttia*, the good choice of
words, to his pupil, the future emperor Commodus, and to every cultu-

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[2] *See* Aulus Gellius, *NA praef.* 1, 23, discussed by Heusch 2011, pp. 303-306.
[3] *See* Høgel 2015, p. 45.
[4] *See* Heusch 2011, pp. 6-8.

red member of the imperial elite.[5] However, Gellius's conclusions regarding this concept are marred by obvious errors of judgment, especially as far as the use of Latin sources is concerned. In particular, Cicero often uses *humanitas* as a synonym for philanthropy, the meaning rejected in this passage of the *Noctes Atticae*.[6] The philanthropic idea seems to be inherent to the previous semantic field of this basic Latin concept, before being assimilated to the educational process pursued through a hard training.[7]

In this regard, we need to consider a basic opposition that arises from the etymological history of these key concepts of human thought. Greek paideia is associated with the realm of the child (παῖς < *πάϝις). The root *paw- was first extended with an -i-, and thus also with a -d-, in order to protect this vowel and to develop a morphological scheme. We find the same root *paw-, with no vowels, in Latin *puer*, "child", as well as in Sanskrit *putra*, "son". The noun *pa(w)id-s (with a sigmatic nominative) produces *pais*, genitive *paid-os* in historical Greek; it designated a boy more often than a girl, generally a young person, and in Attic also a servant or slave. Two denominative verbs are derived from *pais*: first, the verbe παίζω has a peculiar meaning – "to play" or "to act like a child".[8] Second, the verb παιδεύω means "to build" (*esp.* a child), also "to educate". Accordingly, παιδεία, "education", comes from the same root as παιδιά, "play" and "game", both concepts being eminently conceived as childish activities, that is, typical of childhood.[9]

Indeed, *humanitas* derives from *humanus*, meaning "human" and also "civilized," "refined," as a result of the development of all human and behavioral qualities. It is a genuine linguistic product of Latin conceptualization rather than a translation from a Greek loanword.[10] Moreover, it refers to the domain of the adult (*homo*) and thus to the characteristics of adult life, which are related to already cultivated men, rather than to children to be educated from an early age, as has already been noted.[11]

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[5] *See* Zecchini 2007, pp. 19-21; Id. 2013, p. 20; Matthaios 2013, pp. 67-140; Tosi 2013, pp. 141-146; Costanza 2019, p. 2; Id. 2021, p. 361.

[6] Moreover, Gellius seems to misunderstand Livy XXXVII 7,15, where this word is accompanied by *dexteritas* which is referred to Philip V of Macedonia; *See* the remarks given by Elice 2015-2016, pp. 254-256.

[7] *See* also Stroh 2008; Mollea 2018; Id. 2021, pp. 378-379.

[8] *DÉLG, s.v.* παῖς; Meerwalt 1928, pp. 164-168.

[9] *See* Mendner 1978, col. 848; Casevitz 2018, pp. 52-54; Costanza 2019, p. ix; Id. 2021, p. 362.

[10] On the formation of this abstract noun with the suffix -*itas*, the most common way to produce the substantivation in Latin, *See* Schadewaldt 1973, pp. 50, 52.

[11] *See* Marrou 1948, p. 254; further discussion by Conti 2023, p. 65.

Terence's *homo sum*

The idea of "benevolence" and "moderation" is expressed in the archaic Latin comedy, which owes much to Menander's ethics.[12] In the Hellenistic period, cosmopolitanism is a crucial aspect of Greek civilization after Alexander's conquest of the East. Stoic philosophers such as Zeno of Cyzicus (335–254 B.C.) and Chrysippus (281–205 B.C.) show a special interest in foreigners with the result of developing universalist ideas. The Stoics shared the belief in human perfection and based their claims on the premise of *oikeiosis*, the coexistence and reconciliation of human beings governed by a common law: once the classical polis had definitively disappeared, man was conceived for the first time as a citizen of the world (*kosmopolitēs*).[13] Because of the decisive influence of the Greek New Comedy on Roman comedy, Menander, Diphilus, and other theater writers inspired playwrights to adapt or rewrite them. Roman poets of Greek-style comedy (*fabula palliata*) combined Hellenistic plays and used some typical plot patterns, comic codes, or conventional role types.[14] Menander shows an unshakable faith in the human sense of justice and solidarity.[15]

A valuable transfer of ideas also took place through the literary reuse of Greek models, especially by Terence (Publius Terentius Afer, c. 195–159 B.C.). The Romans were confident in creating their own literature in Latin by looking at these sophisticated models of Greek Hellenistic culture. In particular, Terence wrote after the Third Macedonian War (171–168 B.C.), during a period of great interaction with Greek culture. Many elements of Greek philosophy were familiar to the learned members of the Roman cultural elite. Greek philosophers and renowned scholars spent time in Rome. As a result of the increasing intercultural exchange, Terence's works emphasize humanistic and philosophical themes concerning the fate of the individual and the organization of social communities: he shows a greater human interest with respect to Plautus' *palliata*.[16] It is noteworthy to quote the famous saying of the Roman poet Terence in his *Heautontimoroumenos* ("The Self-Tormentor") v. 77: "I am a human being and I consider nothing human alien to me" (*Homo sum: humani nihil a me alienum puto*). The maxim is particularly remarkable: humanity is common to all human beings in a very inclusive sense. The comic poet suggests the identification

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[12] *See* Schadewaldt 1973, pp. 49-50; Oniga 2016.
[13] *See* Cleanthes, *SVF*, III, p. 329; Kristeva 2014, p. 61; Elice 2015-2016, p. 257.
[14] On the aptitudes of this theatrical translation and the adaptation of the inherited Greek tradition, *See* Telò 2019, pp. 47-62.
[15] *See* Rossi 2014, p. 206.
[16] *See* Manuwald 2019, p. 26.

of every human being (*homo*) with every other.[17] It is not coincidental that Terence himself was born in North Africa; as his *Life* attests,[18] he was an emancipated slave.[19] As an immigrant in Rome, he had the opportunity to become an intimate member of the political and cultural elite known as the Scipionic Circle. This philhellenic circle of important thinkers, writers, and statesmen, under the patronage of the Scipios, spread Stoicism to a prominent group of the late Republican era.[20]

Here Terence translated and adapted a lost comedy by Menander of the same name, which is known only in fragments. The corresponding section of the original Greek drama has not survived. The model for this significant verse is found in Menander's *Sent.* 1 Jäkel:[21]

ἄνθρωπον ὄντα δεῖ φρονεῖν τἀνθρώπινα.

Terence's conception of humanism is centered on a sense of universality unknown to classical Greece. The Roman poet goes far beyond Menander's ideal.[22] In fact, the comic hero develops an interest in the whole of humanity. Compassion is extended to all human beings. There is also a component of *curiositas*, a genuine interest in others, as the personality of Chremes towards Menedemus shows.[23] It is not only a matter of interpersonal relationships in the inner circle of the social milieu staged by the main characters of the plot. Roman comedy exercised a political influence on Cicero's rhetorical works: his legal speech found an authoritative model and a code of ethical predictability in everyday life.[24] Terence soon developed into a 'classic' and became a model of style, so as to exert a noticeable influence on the conceptual framing of Ciceronian *humanitas*, which is charged with ethical undertones,[25] insofar as the Roman intellectual accepted the tenets of the Stoic school, especially the discussion of what is morally right and wrong given by Panaetius of Rhodes (c. 180–110 B.C.).[26]

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[17] *See* Valgiglio 1973, pp. 105-106; Parker 2011, p. 248; Rossi 2014, pp. 206-207; Elice 2015-2016, p. 265; Conti 2023, p. 71.

[18] Sueton./Donat., *Vita Ter.* 1.

[19] On the opposition of *humanitas* to the institution of slavery, given the presupposition of the equality of all men, *see* Høgel 2015, pp. 43, 49.

[20] *See* Strasburger 1966, pp. 63-65; Colish 1985, pp. 10-11; Heil 2012, p. 111.

[21] *See* Bickel 1942; Lefèvre 1994, p. 70.

[22] *See* Perl 1973; Conti 2023, pp. 65-66.

[23] *See* Lefèvre 1994, pp. 68, 70-71 on Chremes as "busybody" (πολυπράγμων, περίεργος, *curiosus*).

[24] *See* Germany 2019, p. 83.

[25] On the reception of *Heaut.* 77 by Cicero, *See* Hermand 2011.

[26] Panaetius' work *On Duty* (Περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος) in two books was paraphrased by Cicero in his treatise *De officiis*. The Latin author added a third book in order to express what was lacking in the exposition of the Greek Stoic; *see* Pohlenz 1934, pp. 139-141; Harder 1934; Høgel 2015, pp. 41-43.

Latin African writers on *humanitas*

Crucial to this transcultural idea, *humanitas* is also used as a synonym for *Romanitas* as opposed to *barbaritas*; the space of the Other is understood as a denial of civilization.[27]

The Middle Platonist philosopher Apuleius (c. 125–180) from Madauros, a Berber-Roman town in Numidia, uses the polysemy of *humanitas* as a consequence of philosophical knowledge and literary erudition in his own defense (*Apologia*), which he delivered in 158 AD in Sabratha, a coastal town in northwestern Tripolitania. The author of *The Golden Ass* was accused of practicing magic to bewitch and marry a widow named Pudentilla.[28] Apuleius claims to belong to the elite group that possesses *humanitas* – including the two proconsuls Maximus and Avitus – in contrast to his stepsons and the common people of Sabratha.[29] There is a widening of the gulf between all civilized men of learning, such as the Athenians, and the "barbarians" of Tripolitania.[30]

Humanitas also has an undeniable value of tolerance, as has been noted.[31] African Christian writer Tertullian (155–230) is a relevant source on this semantic evolution linked with the need of religious freedom. The African Christian writer Tertullian (155–230) is a relevant source for this semantic evolution linked to the need for religious freedom. This extremely prolific author from Carthage in the third century writes to Tertullus Scapula, proconsul of Africa (consul in 195), to defend this principle of free choice as a human prerogative:

> Tamen humani iuris et naturalis potestatis est unicuique quod putauerit colere; nec alii obest aut prodest alterius religio. Sed nec religionis est cogere religionem, quae sponte suscipi debeat, non ui.

> However, it is a fundamental human right, a privilege of nature, that every man should worship according to his own convictions: one man´s religion neither harms nor helps another man. It

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[27] *See* Braund 1997.

[28] The *Apologia* derives from a re-elaborated version of the defense read during the trial, *See* Bradley 1997, pp. 203-206; Mollea 2021, pp. 373-375.

[29] Apuleius praises the Athenians for not having read the letter written by their enemy Philip to his wife Olympias (*Apol.* 86: *Athenienses quidem propter commune ius humanitatis ex captiuis epistulis Philippi Macedonis hostis sui unam epistulam, cum singulae publice legerentur; recitari prohibuerunt, quae erat ad uxorem Olympiadem conscripta*), while his stepson divulged his mother's private letters, *See* Mollea 2021, pp. 375-376, with comparison of Plu., *Praecepta gerendae rei publicae* 799E, *V. Dem.* 22.

[30] *See* Mollea 2021, pp. 379: "If Apuleius was actually acquitted, it was also thanks to his strategy and his careful use of *humanitas*", 381, 383.

[31] *See* Schadewaldt 1973, p. 44; Schäublin 1975, p. 213.

is assuredly no part of religion to compel religion, to which free-will and not force should lead us.[32]

In the following lines of this chapter, Tertullian claims that Christians have the right not to be forced to sacrifice to pagan gods by addressing the leader of Roman North Africa.[33] He does not argue for religious freedom on the basis of the possession of truth granted by the Catholic Church, but he does base his argument significantly on human rights and the free choice of individuals.[34]

Moreover, Tertullian attempts to reconcile the Christians with public opinion, while they were generally portrayed as inhumane barbarians outside the Roman order. According to the African author, such anti-Christian accusations lack all credibility. On the contrary, the Christians embody both Romanitas and humanitas, establishing without exception the truest sentiments of fraternity.[35]

Local Christian churches had been caring for the disabled, widows, and the sick since the third century. Hospitals were organized according to the ideal of compassion proposed by the evangelical example of the Good Samaritan. In the beginning, health care was reserved for members of the same faith. On the occasion of the devastating plague of 250, however, Cyprian, Bishop of Carthage (d. 258), ordered that all the sick, Christians and pagans alike, should be helped without distinction. The Christian work of establishing hospitals was remarkable in North Africa and fostered a spirit of compassionate service.[36] The *Life of Cyprian*, allegedly written by the deacon Pontius shortly after the bishop's death, also emphasizes these aspects of pastoral care in the diocese of Carthage. The most ancient hagiography is also a panegyric and an apologetic document written in defense of the martyred bishop, praised as a hero of *humanitas*.[37]

Another African bishop, Augustine of Hippo (354–430), is a true heir of this ethical and philosophical ideal. In accordance with his Platonic and Stoic philosophical background, Augustine links the notion of humanitas to the concepts of exemplum (παράδειγμα) and imitatio (μίμησις), which are the basis of Greek paideia.[38] The paradigm of the teacher is crucial for the student. According to Augustine, Christ the

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[32] *Ad Scap.* 2, 2, *See* Schäublin 1975, p. 214, with a comparison of Valentinian I's edict (*Cod. Theod.* IX 16, 9: *unicuique, quod animo imbibisset, colendi libera facultas*).

[33] *See* Dunn 2002.

[34] *See* Cancik 2005, p. 98.

[35] Tert. *Apology*, 8.7-8 sharply ridiculed the anti-Christian accusations; *See* Antonova 2005, p. 78.

[36] *See* Cilliers 2019, pp. 215-216.

[37] *See* Mohrmann 1975, 17; Elm 2003, pp. 65-67.

[38] *See* Benne 2012, pp. 205-206; Feulner 2016, p. 85.

Didaskalos is the divine teacher who leads the believer toward the whole truth. It is the privilege and responsibility of every believer to imitate the Master and Lord. Such an opportunity, then, is a gift of divine grace that makes personal freedom consent. In fact, the Augustinian *humanitas* is the result of *Imitatio Christi,* since the infinite love of God allows each person to progress spiritually to the higher level of all human values: only if a person has received a good spiritual and cultural formation can he or she realize his or her humanity, that is, the true *humanitas,* and become one with heaven through the contemplation of such an order.[39] Subsequently, Augustine asserts that the Stoic and Ciceronian ideal of humanitas does not contradict *Christianitas* as belonging to the community of the redeemed.[40] Christ's compassion for mortals is linked to the power of his incarnation; his divine mercy thus proves to be a healing power for human weakness: *humanitas* is the sole source of the sentiment of solidarity.[41]

Quodvultdeus is also a leading voice in the debate. Bishop of his native Carthage since 437, he was exiled to Italy by Vandal rulers and died in Naples around 453. This African theologian linked *humanitas* with hospitality, almsgiving, and beneficence (*euergesia*). Generosity in almsgiving is seen as an essential virtue because the benefactor places his fellow citizens in a permanent relationship of solidarity with all other human beings.[42]

The Vandal conquerors professed Arianism and severely persecuted their African subjects in order to eradicate the Roman Catholic Church from their kingdom through regular confiscations, bans, and exiles, as Victor of Vita (d. after 490) recounts in his *History of African Persecution.*[43] This historian focused eminently on the opposition between *Romanitas* as *humanitas* and *Vandalitas* as *furor.*[44] The Christian writer describes the alacrity of the Vandal persecutors attached to the Arian heresy against the Catholic inhabitants of Africa proconsularis as a denial of *humanitas.* Women, children, the elderly and the sick, victims of famine, were all oppressed by the Vandal rulers. As Victor points out from the beginning of his history, the measures of the Afri-

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[39] Aug. *Conf.* I 1, *See* Feulner 2016, pp. 85-86.

[40] *See* Köhler 2000, p. 208, with respect to the heritage of the Augustinian notion of *humanitas* in Western Renaissance.

[41] Aug. *In Io. Ev. tractatus, Tract.* 8, 12: *commendanda erat humanitas Domini in ipsa compassione mortalitatis, See* Anker, p. 242.

[42] *See* Quodvultdeus, *Sermo adv. quinque .haereses* 4.9, in Braun 1976, p. 269; Finn 2006, p. 196.

[43] *See* Costanza 1976, p. 33; Id. 1980; Howe 2007, pp. 156-159, 183-213, 349-352; Vopřada 2020, p. 84.

[44] *See* Costanza 1964, pp. 231-232; Id. 1984, pp. 713-718; Howe 2007, pp. 235-236; Vopřada 2020, pp. 84-86.

can persecution, directed mainly against the Romanized elite, are incompatible with the humane treatment of subjects by their rulers. Indeed, the Arian kings of the Vandals disregarded any principle of benevolence and deliberately acted as cruel tyrants.[45]

The expropriation of the Catholic Church decreed by King Huneric (c. 420–484, reigned since 477) would exceptionally be expressed as a claim of mercy and *humanitas*, because this act was justified by the fact that it aimed at protecting the poor and helping to lift them out of poverty.[46]

Finally, it is worth focusing on the Latin writings of the Carthaginian poet Blossius Aemilius Dracontius (c. 455-505) as a mediating attempt to rethink *humanitas* in Vandal Africa. His secular poetry presents ancient mythological themes as a source of pride for the Romanized elite in the face of German invaders who held political hegemony. In fact, it was the main identifying feature for all cultivated people: mythological variants were commonly used for educational purposes.[47]

Thus, Dracontius' short epic Hylas was probably conceived as a school declamation under the guidance of the poet's tutor, the grammarian Felicianus. In *Romul.* 1 (*Orpheus*, vv. 6-11), Dracontius portrays his *magister* as an *alter Orpheus* because he restored literary studies in Carthage after the Vandal conquest of North Africa (439 AD). This intellectual promoted cultural unity among various ethnic and religious groups. In particular, Felician introduced both Romans and Vandals to his school in order to teach them rhetoric and the liberal arts. In spite of the violent confessional antagonism that existed in Vandal Africa, both ethnic groups were invited to be educated in classical culture in this school, so as to progress together in humane values.[48] The desired reconciliation between the Vandal invaders and the Roman African subjects could be achieved through the teaching of Felicianus and the poetic engagement of his brilliant pupil. Dracontius' mythological poems, such as *Hylas*, were intended to reverse the antithesis between the Romans as a model of *humanitas* in contrast to the Vandals as an example of savagery and frenzy.[49]

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[45] Vict. Vit. I 1-10, *See* Costanza 1964, p. 233; Id. 1981; Howe 2007, p. 248.

[46] Vict. Vit. III 14, *See* Hiltbrunner 1994, col. 741; Howe 2007, p. 259.

[47] In late Latin poetry from Africa, myth is more pronounced than ever before. On the use of combining myths for educational purposes in a Roman-Barbarian society, *See* Weber 1995, pp. 215-217; Simons 2005, pp. 365-368, 370; Bruzzone 2019, pp. 91-92.

[48] *See* Dracontius, *Romul.* 1 (*Orpheus*), vv. 14-16; Simons 2005, p. 370; Zwierlein 2017, pp. 21-22, 42; Bruzzone 2019, pp. 90-91; Nikolsky 2020, pp. 105-106; Costanza 2024, pp. 34-39.

[49] *See* Bruzzone 2019, p. 91: 'Il poeta si ripropone, alla stregua del suo maestro, come Orfeo civilizzatore dell'umanità'. Underlying this process of acculturation is the worth of poetical engagement of Dracontius, *See* Costanza 2024, p. 41.

Conclusion

Having said all this, we can conclude that African writers have long contributed to Western thought. During the Roman Republic, Terence added to the ideals borrowed from the Greek New Comedy. The Greek concept of *philanthropia*, Latin *humanitas*, acquired a special significance for Graeco-Romans and Christians in the changing world of Late Antiquity, especially in the province of North Africa. Leading intellectuals from this milieu played a crucial role in expanding and revitalizing this concept, combining the pride of refined, classical culture with the ethical values of compassion and benevolence.

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5.

Humanitas: Horizons and Boundaries in the texts of selected Roman authors

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The Latin term *humanitas* (Greek: *paideia*, *philanthropia*; Christian: *misericordia*) is a particularly complex and multifaceted concept. To a certain extent, it can be said to develop according to the periods of Roman literature. At the very beginning, in the works of the comedians, it is rarely mentioned. The most developed use of humanitas appears in Cicero in the Golden Age of Roman literature, and such a wide use of the term was not repeated later by any author of Roman literature. A certain *impetus* can be observed in Seneca, who discusses *humanitas* in a philosophical sense, and he is considered the last author of Roman literature to elaborate on the concept. Aulus Gellius gives the well-known "definition" of *humanitas* at the end of his work, while in Apuleius we can examine this concept indirectly. The work presents thoughts and concepts on *humanitas* through selected authors, chronologically and by genre, providing insight into a kind of evolution of the concept. authors in whom *humanitas* rarely appears are also considered.

1. De humanitate

The Latin term *humanitas* arose from the principles and premises of the Greek *paideia* and/or Greek *philanthropy*. In Roman civilization, literature, and culture, it was supplemented with other meanings. Together with the term *cultus/cultura*, it was woven into ancient literature, art, and civilization as a whole, being its integral, fundamental, and inseparable component. High ideas of upbringing, education, honesty, courage and fearlessness, humanity, honor and others, are contained in this concept from ancient times and as such were incorporated into modern Europe. Later, the whole period of time at the transition from the Middle Ages to the Modern Age was called *Humanism*, in which, among other things, ancient authors were rediscovered. In this way, the concept of *humanism* gained an even stronger and more permanent connection with ancient education.

When it comes to the interpretation of the term *humanitas,* dictionaries and handbooks are rather unanimous.

Thesaurus Linguae Latinae interprets *humanitas, atis, f.* (vol. VI, 3, 3075,5-3083, 56.):

I. in univ. dictum de hominum condicione naturali

A. usu stricto et pleno

1. i.q. natura humana (a respicitur natura in univ., b respicitur infirmitas humana),

2. usu philosophico i.q. hominis figura,

3. metonymice i.q. genus humanum, homines.

B. usu debilitato gen -is ponitur pro adi. q.e. "humanus"

II.c. emphasi dictum de condicione, quae hominibus nomine suo dignis convenit.

A. de sensu sano fere i.q. prudentia, φρόνησις

B. de generositate

1. significatur condicio ultra vitam barbaram provecta,

2. significatur perfectio sublimis naturae humanae

a. in univ. fere i.q. dignitas, honestas, γενναιότης (α usu generali, β usus speciali de lepore, facetia, elegantia, γ usu secundario de commoditate, liberalitate cibi)

b. fere i.q. erudition, doctrina, urbanitas (α generatim, β respicitur aequanimitas tamquam fructus doctrinae)

c. fere i.q. comitas, benignitas, clementia, φιλανθροπία notio aevo imperatorio vulgaris (α usu originario de affect, β usu secundario de bonis, quae -is causa praestantur)

This view is based on two levels. The first would be the basic one, *genus humanum*, which concerns only the human condition and nature. The second is based on the first and is its extension, drawing parallels with wisdom, generosity, nobility, honesty, education (although some of these concepts cannot be linked as they seem to be in the ThLL).

We can further highlight the one from *Lewis & Short*: the basic starting point is "*human nature, humanity, in a good sense; the qualities, feelings, and inclinations of mankind*". And here *humanitas* in the genitive is especially emphasized (with the note that in this form it occurs mostly in Cicero) in the meaning of adj. *humanus* (as in I above ThLL, I, B). Also highlighted are: A. humane or gentle conduct toward others, humanity, philanthropy, gentleness, kindness; B. Mental cultivation befitting a man, liberal education, good breeding, elegance of manners or refinement of language (syn. *doctrina, litterae, erudition*).[1]

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[1] Lewis & Short, s.v. *humanitas.*

Der Kleine Pauly[2] states, among other things, that the word *humanitas* is one of the most precious concepts and legacies of the Roman era, and it denotes that component in a person that makes him human. It is based on the belief that man is in himself something great and worthy of definition. Differences have been established between the understanding of the concept among the Greeks and especially the Romans. A similar understanding of *humanitas* and *virtus* is also emphasized, in which it is stated that *virtus* is more closely related to the idea of strength, tension, efficiency, ethics and service - which is very visible in Virgil's Aeneid, for example. On the other hand, *humanitas* symbolizes the softening of sharpness, moderation, freedom, togetherness, sublimation. It is also noteworthy that *humanitas became a central virtue precisely at a time when this concept was lacking.* The fact that directly connects this work and the entry from the Lexicon is several quotes that mention the development of the meaning of *humanitas* among certain authors and over a certain period of time, so in this context Aulus Gellius, Cicero, Plautus, Terence, Nepos, ... are also mentioned, and the particularly interesting assertion is that *the reach of this concept depends on the horizon of the author himself.*

As for dictionaries, the *Oxford Latin Dictionary*[3] (shortly) states that *humanitas* can mean: 1 Human nature or character; 2 The quality distinguishing civilized man from savage or beasts, civilization, culture; 3 Humane character, kindness, human feeling.

The meaning of *humanitas* in the *Lexicon Latino-Croaticum Encyclopaedicum*[4] is very broad and in accordance with the interpretation of ThLL. The basic meaning without additional extensions would be *humanity, that which concerns man, humanity, human nature,* (which will turn out to be the only meaning for some Roman authors); then, "*friendship, gentleness, mercy, nobility, the greatest virtue related to man, courage, heroism, moderation; then general civility, culture, gentility, that by which man differs from animals, for example; education, science, a characteristic by which an educated, cultured man of a large city differs from uncivilized savages.*

The connotations and understandings of the term *humanitas* in Roman literature vary from author to author and depend on the literary period, genre and type of text, as well as on the state-social-religious circumstances.[5] At the same time, *humanitas* almost never appears in some authors, although it is possible to infer indirectly from the author's

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[2] Der Kleine Pauly, s.v. *humanitas*, col. 1241- 1244.
[3] OLD 1997: 809.
[4] Marević 2000: 1345.
[5] Der Kleine Pauly, 1242.

text what *cultus atque humanitas* might mean and what, or to whom, it refers.

The survey of *humanitas* as a concept and a way of thinking in this work is diachronic, almost from the first significant classics of Roman literature, through selected representatives of high literature of the Golden Age, followed by significant authors from the early centuries after Christ. This work does not intend, nor can it, due to the limitations of the form, make an overview of all authors and their understanding of *humanitas*. Therefore, selected representatives of all periods of Roman literature are gathered here. The discussion of *humanitas* stops where a new chapter of literary and philosophical thought begins – Christian literature, which then continues to the period of late antiquity and the early Middle Ages.

2. Plautus and Terence

In the master of laughter and entertainment, Plautus, we do not find the term *humanitas*[6] explicitly mentioned at all, however, from his attitude towards theatre, human relationships and the established characters of comedy, we can infer Plautus's views and values. Therefore, in line with the „absence" of *humanitas* in Plautus, we can ask ourselves whether this comedian really had in mind in any of his comedies that his works and characters have, or could have, among other things, the role of exemplary behavior of a well-mannered, civilized and educated man.[7] The answer to this wuestion is obvious even to a reader who is not familiar with Plautus and can only be interpreted indirectly through the author's attitude towards the characters of his comedies, the comic masks, the situations he presents to the audience, and so on.

In Plautus there is no particular explication of the concept of *humanitas* as a parallel to the Greek *paideia* and *philanthropia,* nor do we notice in Plautus any didactic element that the behavior of the actors could have on the audience. Laughter is Plautus' only aim (*vos plaudite!*)[8] as a relief for man, in accordance with Aristotle's teaching on comedy and laughter: „Comedy, as we have said, is the imitation of men worse than ourselves, though not in every species of fault, but of that part of the vile which is ludicrous; but the ludicrous consists in some defect and deformity which does not cause pain or death: thus a face which is hideous and distorted without suffering is at once considered ludicrous."[9]

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[6] Ibidem.
[7] Budimir, Flašar 1978, 159–160.
[8] Plaut. *St.* 7.
[9] Arist. 1819.

   Plautus accepts the ugly, the bad, and people of any character, because all of this is part of the human *humanus*,[10] and is especially emphasized in the opposition to the *divinus*. In *Amphitruo, Asinaria, Trinummus*, Plautus mentions the opposition *divinus / humanus* in a few places to express the opposition between what is human and what is exclusively related to the gods. Thus, *humanus* (perhaps through this epithet we can observe the attitude toward *humanitas*?) is just that - that which relates to man, human, to the essential characteristics of man as opposed to animals and gods (*lupus est homo homini*).[11] Human is all that pertains to human beings, human virtues and vices, excesses, passions, and reasonable and unreasonable behavior, and these qualities are generally embodied in Plautus by the slave as a constant character in his comedies.[12] A somewhat longer thought stands out in the *Poenulus*: *Quid ei divini aut humani aequomst credere?*[13] in which he expresses the insurmountable difference between gods and men. Furthermore, in *Mercator* he mentions *humanas querimonias*, and in another place where it is quite obvious what is "*human*" for him: *humanum amarest, humanum autem ignoscerest and humanum facinus factumst*.[14] Examples from his other works show the same: *humana voce, humana vita, humana fortuna, humani ingeni*.

   Plautus and Terence suggest two understandings of man. In Plautus, the human is almost automatically associated with the act of ridicule. Plautus' comedies, based on recognizable masks and predictable behaviors (the stupid servant, the cunning soldier, the naive girl, the maid, the wise, stingy old man, ...), are regularly black and white, without nuance.

   The more subtle and thoughtful Terence[15] (*Homo sum, nil humanum alienum puto*)[16] continues the comic experience of Plautus in a milder way. Terence offers a gradation of human traits, a multidimensional man who notices wrong behavior and improves himself according to the length of his life. Therefore, this more characteristic man and his behavior in Terence cease to be black and white and typified, and appear with a moral and didactic lesson (*amor persuasit, nox vinum adulescentia: humanust*)[17]. An excellent example is *Adelphoe* and the clash between the concepts of raising two brothers. Terence's

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[10] Der Kleine Pauly 1242, p. 12, XI.
[11] Plaut. *Asin.* 495.
[12] Plaut. *St.* 7.
[13] Plaut. *Poen.*, 175-242.
[14] Plaut. *Merc.*, 430-478.
[15] Der Kleine Pauly, 1242.
[16] Ter. *Heaut.* 161-242.
[17] Ter. *Adel.*, 1857: 243-322.

compassion (and not mockery of the characters and the plot) is reflected in the comedy of the plot as developed by Plautus, and the sharp sting of the ridiculous and mocking is lost.[18]

3. Cicero: *"Etenim omnes artes, quae ad humanitatem pertinent, habent quoddam commune vinculum, et quasi cognatione quadam inter se continentur."*[19]

The term *humanitas* first appears explicitly in the 1st century BC in the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (5), as well as in Caesar (3), Cornelius Nepos (6) and Varro (3).[20] Cicero's use of *humanitas* reached a peak unparalleled by any other Roman author. In terms of numbers, it has been established that *humanitas* appears 229 times in Cicero, and a total of 463 times in all classical authors.[21] The use of the term *humanitas* in Cicero[22] is not limited to specific works, but his understanding of *humanitas* is found in all types of his works, his philosophical works, speeches and letters.

In the speeches *Pro Archia, Pro Murena, In Catilina, Pro Milone*, as well as in other speeches, Cicero associates humanitas with human education and training (*studium humanitatis ac litterarum*), which begins to be acquired in childhood, for the sake of illustration: *Nam ut primum ex pueris excessit Archias, atque ab eis artibus quibus aetas puerilis ad humanitatem informari solet se ad scribendi studium contulit, ... celeriter antecellere omnibus ingeni gloria contigit.*[23] Here *humanitas* with *studium scribendi* leads Archia to *ingeni gloria*. Moreover, the phrase *studium humanitatis* is often used not only in connection with the general schooling acquired in childhood, but also as a civilizing process that should be cultivated as long as a person lives. *Humanitas* is not only the foundation and basis of Roman culture, but also its fullness and goal. Along these lines, Cicero develops the concept of *humanitas* in more detail and depth in his philosophical writings (e.g. *De oratore, Cato Maior sive De senectute, Laelius de amicitia, De oficiis, …)*. Thus in *De oratore* he expresses his position on what kind of orator, as a person of the greatest authority and wisdom (among other things) should be: *... senatu statuisti oratorem in omni genere sermonis et humanitatis esse perfectum.*[24] In short, he should be a complete,

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[18] Ter. 2008: 253-259.
[19] Cic., *De arch.*
[20] Oniga 2009, 5.
[21] Ibidem.
[22] Der Kleine Pauly 1243.
[23] Cicero *De Arch.* 3.
[24] Cic. *De orat.* 1.35.

integral personality, realized and rounded in many virtues *(in singulari dignitate omnis tamen adsit lepos atque humanitas; humanitas atque virtus).*[25]

Cicero states in several places that there is no greater praise, higher goal, and greater achievement for a man than the acquisition of *humanitas*, for example: *Equidem te cum in dicendo semper putavi deum, tum vero tibi numquam eloquentiae maiorem tribui laudem quam humanitatis,*[26] ... Considering that Cicero developed the idea of what *humanitas* should/could refer to in detail, the relative absence of this concept in the work *De senectute* is surprising; the author mentions it there only a few times. Although mentioned there only three times, *humanitas* is obviously sufficiently developed and elaborated in Cicero to also mention its opposite in the concept of *inhumanitas: importunitas autem et inhumanitas omni aetati molesta est,*[27] and it is more than clear what attitude Cicero has towards the concept of *inhumanitas*; *molesta importunitas* sufficiently evokes a negative and repulsive attitude in the reader. As for *humanitas* and the development of this concept in Cicero's letters, the explication of the term continues there, especially in *Ad familiares*. There, Cicero associates *humanitas* with wisdom, integrity, (all) virtues, refinement and excellence in all activities, for example: *Sic enim tibi persuade, carissimum te mihi esse cum propter multas suavitates ingeni, officii, humanitatis tuae...;*[28] *Omnia me tua delectant, sed maxime maxima cum fides in amicitia, consilium, gravitas, constantia, tum lepos, humanitatis litterae.*[29]

Cicero has a considerable number of synonyms for *humanitas*, then words that for him have a similar meaning to *humanitas* and complement this term, and there are also expressions that the author cites as a kind of product, the result of the upbringing and education that a person formed by *humanitas* receives: *humanitas et officium, diligentiam; sapientia atque humanitas; humanitas et pietas; voluntas, humanitas, benevolentia; amicitia et humanitas; auctoritas et humanitas; humanitas et prudentiam; virtus, fidem, probitas, humanitas, amor; summa virtus et humanitas; humanitas et dignitas; summa humanitas et sapientia, summa humanitas et observantia, etc.* From *Ad familiares* we learn that Cicero not only discussed this concept, but was considered by his relatives to be the embodiment of the concept of *humanitas*: *Quare habeo gratiam Trebatio, familiari nostro, qui mihi dedit causam*

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[25] Cic. *De orat.* 3.29.
[26] Cic. *De orat.* 1.
[27] Cic. *De sen.* 7.3.
[28] Cic. *Epist.*, 11.27.
[29] Cic. *Epist.*, 11.27.

harum litterarum... me omnis oficii et humanitatis expertem iudica-ris.[30]

This brief contribution to Cicero's thought is only a cross-section and a modest glimpse into a very extensive and detailed discussion of *humanitas*, which Cicero masterfully and exemplarily developed in almost all of his works; if not explicitly, his position is clear even without using *humanitas* by this name. Numerous phrases are used that Cicero considered to go hand in hand with *humanitas*, not only complementing it but also demonstrating the author's ability to bring his concept of *humanitas* to perfection in the classical period of Roman literature. His thought was not surpassed by any later Roman author; in fact, in future authors we will witness more modest thinking, if not the degradation of the concept, which was caused, among other things, by the changing state order, and even later, by the emergence of new genres and imported from non-Roman authors who sought entertainment rather than instruction in literature.

4. Seneca: *Numquid liberalia studia hos animos facere possunt?*[31]

After Cicero, Seneca is the next author to write about *humanitas* in his works, but he does not devote as much time to the whole idea of *humanitas* as Cicero. He is also considered one of the last authors to refer to the concept in his works, and Seneca mentions the words *humanitas* and *inhumanitas* 27 times.[32] Although the number of mentions is relatively modest compared to Cicero, Seneca gave several important definitions of *humanitas*:

> Ep.V: *Hoc primum philosophia promittit, sensum communem, humanitatem et congregationem; a qua professione dissimilitudo nos separabit. Videamus ne ista per quae admirationem parare volumus ridicula et odiosa sint.*[33]

> The first thing philosophy promises is a shared community, humanity, and friendship with others. Our differences with others will keep us from that promise. We must examine whether the very values by which we hope to inspire admiration have become ridiculous and hateful.

> Ep. LXXXIV: *Numquid liberalia studia hos animos facere possunt? Temperantia voluptatibus imperat, alias odit atque abigit,*

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[30] Cic. *Epist.* 11, 27, 8.
[31] Sen. *Epist.*, 88, 29.
[32] Balbo 2012, 70.
[33] Sen. *Ad Luc.*, 5, 4.

alias dispensat et ad sanum modum redigit nec umquam ad illas propter ipsas venit; scit optimum esse modum cupitorum non quantum velis, sed quantum debeas sumere. Humanitas vetat superbum esse adversus socios, vetat amarum; verbis, rebus, adfectibus comem se facilemque omnibus praestat; nullum alienum malum putat, bonum autem suum ideo maxime quod alicui bono futurum est amat. Numquid liberalia studia hos mores praecipiunt? Non magis quam simplicitatem, quam modestiam ac moderationem, non magis quam frugalitatem ac parsimoniam, non magis quam clementiam, quae alieno sanguini tamquam suo parcit et scit homini non esse homine prodige utendum.[34]

Can the "liberal arts" produce such a spirit within us? Temperance controls our desires; some it hates and routs, others it regulates and restores to a healthy measure, nor does it ever approach our desires for their own sake. Temperance knows that the best measure of the appetites is not what you want to take, but what you ought to take. Humanity forbids you to be over-bearing towards your associates, and it forbids you to be grasping. In words and in deeds and in feelings it shows itself gentle and courteous to all men. It counts no evil as another's solely. And the reason why it loves its own good is chiefly because it will some day be the good of another. Do "liberal studies" teach a man such character as this? No; no more than they teach simplicity, moderation and self-restraint, thrift and economy, and that kindliness which spares a neighbour's life as if it were one's own and knows that it is not for man to make wasteful use of his fellow man.

Ep. CXV. *Si nobis animum boni viri liceret inspicere, o quam pulchram faciem, quam sanctam, quam ex magnifico placidoque fulgentem videremus, hinc iustitia, illinc fortitudine, hinc temperantia prudentiaque lucentibus! Praeter has frugalitas et continentia et tolerantia et liberalitas comitasque et (quis credat?) in homine rarum humanitas bonum splendorem illi suum adfunderent. Tunc providentia cum elegantia et ex istis magnanimitas eminentissima quantum, di boni, decoris illi, quantum ponderis gravitatisque adderent! quanta esset cum gratia auctoritas!*[35]

If we had the privilege of looking into a good man's soul, oh what a fair, holy, magnificent, gracious, and shining face should we behold – radiant on the one side with justice and temperan-

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[34] Sen. *Ad Luc.*, 88, 29.
[35] Sen. *Ad Luc.*, 115.

ce, on another with bravery and wisdom! And, besides these, thriftiness, moderation, endurance, refinement, affability, and – though hard to believe – love of one's fellow-men, that Good which is so rare in man, all these would be shedding their own glory over that soul. There, too, forethought combined with elegance and, resulting from these, a most excellent greatness of soul (the noblest of all these virtues) – indeed what charm, O ye heavens, what authority and dignity would they contribute! What a wonderful combination of sweetness and power!

In these quotations it is evident that Seneca's position on *humanitas* is more oriented towards philosophical interpretation than towards the meanings that Cicero elaborated from work to work. In the first excerpt, Seneca briefly discusses the *fruits* of philosophy, which would be a sense of community, humanism (here perhaps philanthropy?), and friendship. Here we can already see Seneca's position that philosophy is superior to *humanitas*, which he elaborates on in the following quotation. There he also mentions the meaning of *studia liberalia*, whose significance is limited in scope and true virtue cannot be a participant in *studia liberalia*. Seneca appreciates the fruits of this concept, such as *simplicitas, modestia, parsimonia*, and especially emphasizes *temperantia* and *humanitas. temperantia* governs passions, while *humanitas* controls pride and bitterness. This section is among the more impressive and discussed of Seneca's writings, since the philosopher considers *artes liberales* and philology to be less important than philosophy. The last paragraph is a kind of continuation of the previous one, where Seneca lists the four traditional values of a good soul (*animum boni viri*), namely *prudentia, iustitia, fortitudo, temperantia*. The following list, which includes *frugalitas, continentia, liberalitas* etc., is somewhat disappointing for our topic - Seneca lists humanitas only at the end of the list! Certainly, Seneca's consideration of this concept deserves a special in-depth discussion, which we will leave to a more specialized expert, but at this point we will mention only a few of the above examples.

5. Apuleius: *voluptates curiositatis*

On this occasion, we cannot fail to mention the ass-man Lucius in Apuleius' novel The Golden Ass, although the author hardly uses the term *humanitas*. The well-known plot of the novel in which the main character Lucius is transformed into an ass by means of a magic ointment, his wanderings, his riotous entertainments and obscenities, his carnal pleasures, all in the form of a donkey, leave even today's reader

stunned and amazed. The original goal of Apuleius' "hero" (can a donkey be a "hero"? is the question of the entire novel), is to regain his human form (*humanitas*?), which at first bored him. The fate of man was unattractive to him, dull and monotonous, without excitement and imagination. The donkey's tireless curiosity - he wanted to hear, see and experience everything - drove the benevolent Lucius to an extreme where there seemed to be no place or need for any questioning of *humanitas*. The beginning of the novel and the desire for entertainment disappear very quickly, replaced by the donkey's desire to regain his form, but also to restore a deeper meaning to life (*humanitas*?). The end of the novel comes as a logical sequence of events, and at the same time as a surprise – Lucius regains his human form in a procession dedicated to the goddess Isis, and he, spiritualized, becomes a priest of Osiris. The point of the novel is more than obvious: for a fulfilled and meaningful life (*humanitas*?), it is clearly not enough to simply possess the form of a human being. *Humanitas* is a very present but unspoken concept in this novel. Finally, Isis appears to Lucius in a dream, meaning that only a deity can pull him out of the recklessness he has so passionately embraced. Having regained his human form, Lucius dedicates his life to Isis, Mithras, and Osiris as their priest, gaining hope, happiness, blessing, and salvation (*humanitas?*) through the grace of these Eastern deities.

There is no mention of *humanitas* in most of the chapters of the novel; there are a few examples from the third book, mostly in the basic sense of "philanthropy, compassion, mercy"

a) liber III: *Sed si paulisper audientiam publica mihi trubuerit humanitas*[36]

b) liber III: *Cumque iam humanitate commotos misericordia fletum adfectos omnis satis crederem, …*[37]

c) liber III: *Per publicam misericordia per commune ius humanitatis*[38]

d) liber X: *Sed pietatis spectatae iuvenis et matris obsequium et sororis officium religiose dispensat et arcanis domus venerabilis silentii custodiae traditis, plebeiam facie tenus praetendes humanitate…*[39]

From the above examples, it is clear that Apuleius was not familiar with the Ciceronian constellation of meanings of *humanitas*, which could have served him well in describing the desires and intentions of the man-ass. Wasn't the donkey's goal to regain not only human form,

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[36] Apul. 3, 4.
[37] Apul. 3, 7.
[38] Apul. 3, 8.
[39] Apul. 10, 23.

but also human dignity? But *humanitas* does not appear anywhere in Apuleius where it is not logical or necessary in the context. The adjective *humanus* is mostly used to emphasize the human as opposed to the animal origin: *manibus humanis, de corporis humanis, laudibus humanis, humanis vultibus, humani cibis, humani capitibus*, etc.

6. Aulus Gellius

Gellius' work the *Attic Nights* is a precious, even miraculous, and certainly unique source of knowledge of literature and language, art, philosophy, the history of that time, the prominent figures, etc. Among these collections of various arts and individuals, we find Gellius' thought, almost a definition of *humanitas*:[40]

> *"Humanitatem" non significare id, quod volgus putat, sed eo vocabulo, qui sinceriter locuti sunt, magis proprie esse usos. I. Qui verba Latina fecerunt quique his probe usi sunt, "humanitatem" non id esse voluerunt, quod volgus existimat quodque a Graecis philanthropia dicitur et significat dexteritatem quandam benivolentiamque erga omnis homines promiscam, sed "humanitatem" appellaverunt id propemodum, quod Graeci paideian vocant, nos eruditionem institutionemque in bonas artis dicimus. Quas qui sinceriter cupiunt adpetuntque, hi sunt vel maxime humanissimi. Huius enim scientiae cura et disciplina ex universis animantibus uni homini datast idcircoque "humanitas" appellata est.*

> „That *humanitas* does not mean what the common people think, but those who have spoken pure Latin have given the word a more restricted meaning. I. Those who have spoken Latin and have used the language correctly do not give to the word humanitas the meaning which it is commonly thought to have, namely, what the Greeks call φιλανθρωπία, signifying a kind of friendly spirit and good-feeling towards all men without distinction; but they gave to humanitas about the force of the Greek παιδεία; that is, what we call *eruditionem institutionemque in bonas artes*, or "education and training in the liberal arts." Those who earnestly desire and seek after these are most highly humanized. For the pursuit of that kind of knowledge, and the training given by it, have been granted to man alone of all the animals, and for that reason it is termed *humanitas*, or "humanity."

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[40] Der Kleine Pauly 1242.

Someone would have possibly placed the quotation above at the very beginning, but the intention to begin with a chronological overview of the early periods of Roman literature and the development of the concept, but not without certain decadent examples, placed this famous quotation by Gellius at the very end. It is not surprising that Gellius gives the definition of *humanitas*; this was made possible by the unusual antiquarian structure of the Attic Nights. However, it cannot be ruled out that Gellius quoted another author and took over the text, as happens in other writings of the Attic Nights. Certainly, this short quotation seems to reflect the whole essence of this work. Gellius did not miss the Greek roots of the meaning – *paideia and philanthropia*. Furthermore, Gellius also emphasizes the kind of people who are characterized by *humanitas – dexteritatem quandam benivolentiamque erga omnis homines,* as well as those who possess it *eruditionemque institutionem in bonas artis.* Finally, he considers that the *humanissimi* are those who particularly eagerly seek and await the acquisition of *humanitas.*

Conclusion

In this paper, we have attempted to briefly discuss the meanings of the term humanitas among the Roman authors of different styles and genres. The selected authors also belong to different time and literary periods of Roman literature. First, the earliest examples from the comic writers Plautus and Terence were presented. Their attitudes can be inferred indirectly from the actions of the characters, the plot of the work, and some quotations, since they are not explicitly mentioned. In the works of Plautus, we could symbolically connect the concept of *humanitas* with the established and typified characters of comedy and the appearance of comic masks (which, as is known, suggest the expression of the function of the character in a particular comedy). Both suggest only the comic and the grotesque, without any moral lesson or didactic value of the text. In this way, Plautus evokes the lowest feelings in man, who clearly has no other dimension or need for anything more meaningful that could be associated with *humanitas.* Terence's comedy is based precisely on the analysis of the characters, their needs (thus sacrificing the sharp comedy that existed in Plautus), which opens up the moral-instructive dimension of comedy. Therefore, Terence's humanitas is heavier and more serious than Plautus', which came as a small surprise, since they were almost contemporaries (thus, comedy in the 3rd/2nd century BC seems to have had different models, motives and purposes). Furthermore, we also mention Cicero, who developed the idea of *humanitas* in detail, and present examples from his let-

ters, speeches and debates. Of all Roman authors, he used the term *humanitas* the most. According to him, a person acquires it through thoughtful and wise upbringing and education (*paideia*), and later improves it in life. For Cicero, this process never ends, it is always current and strives for progress. Cicero associates *humanitas* with the vast majority of positive skills, habits of character, temperament, honorable deeds and dealing with people (*philanthropia*). Seneca's position that this philosophical interpretation is more advanced than the *artes liberales* is surprising. He also states which characteristics he considers to be *humanitas*. The man-ass of Lucius is an example of many things. The man's saturation with everyday life and intemperance (neither of which can be associated with *humanitas*) leads to his transformation into a donkey (is there a more reprehensible animal?). It is precisely the symbolism of the donkey and the man in the donkey that leads to the true meaning of *humanitas* and the need of every man for its fruits. The end of the novel is not accidental: being consecrated as a priest to something higher than himself gives *humanitas* a more complete meaning. Finally, Aulus Gellius gives a very well-known definition of humanitas in the Attic Nights. He links it to the Greek *paideia* and *philanthropia*, which has been retained in all subsequent interpretations of *humanitas*, and declares that individuals who have worked toward *bonas artes* are also *humanissimi*.

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6.

Virtuosity instead of Humanitas. The Dominican Textualization of Jordan of Saxony's Legendary Acts

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The paper focuses on the compilation of legendary acts of Jordan of Saxony, contained in the mid-13th century Dominican *Vitae fratrum*. Firstly, it indicates its significance for instigating the sense of primordiality and authenticity of the Dominican program of building a virtuous person. It then presents concretely how the Dominican type of virtuous personality was shaped (i.e. which virtues were textualized). The paper indicates a way of creating the medieval man, which builds upon different axiomatic basis than the one based on the qualities of ancient *humanitas*. Because of that, I hope that the paper can contribute not only to the evaluation of medieval standards of virtuous behaviour but also to the future comparative studies of ancient and medieval attitudes towards the "self".

1. Introduction

Even the superficial insight into the medieval sources makes it clear that the formation of an individual in this period depended primarily on the interiorisation of Christian values and not on the qualities achieved by the classical education. The medieval authors were focused on the *conversio totalis ad Deum cordis*,[1] the Christian *aedificatio* and *imitatio Christi*, and on making an individual the Christ-like reflection, fully converted and capable for the battle with the sin.[2] The final product of these processes needed to be the "liminal" personality,[3] reflecting the awareness that the earthly behaviour is only the preparatory process for the encounter with God in the after-life.

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[1] PL, vol. 184, col. 1187.
[2] On the monastic *conversio* in Melville 2018, 39-60.
[3] For the conception of liminality see the classical study: Turner 1969.

The virtues were the fundamental operating system of such preparatory process. They were understood by medieval authors not only as moral qualities but also as the instruments of being habitually good.[4] They needed to become the integral part of the human nature, and constantly produce good behaviour: *Respondeo dicendum virtus humana est quidam habitus perficiens hominem ad bene operandum*.[5] Only a Christian with such nature was ready for the *Dies irae*.

The paradigmatic shift from the individual formed by the classical education to the individual produced by the Christ-like values is best reflected in the monastic texts. The monastery was understood as a school, but this school's curriculum was not producing the Ciceronian-like human dignity; it was the "school of the (God's) service".[6] This definition of a monastery, contained in the sixth century *Rule of Benedict* (one of the most influential monastic texts in general),[7] was based on learning obedience. To be a pupil meant to learn how to obey both the Christ's precepts and the superior.[8] To achieve such state, the *Rule* enlisted the *instrumenta bonorum operum*,[9] the virtues which were serving as the instructions for virtuous behaviour.

Despite differences in conceptualising the religious life, not only the Benedictine but also all other monastic communities were understood by medieval society as the most secure path to a greater spiritual state. From the Late Antiquity onwards, the Christian civilization was sure that the monastic life was the true *vita perfectionis*.[10] The eremitism (lived in the Egyptian deserts or in the European forests and mountains), the coenobitism (the communal life in a monastery), and the canonical life (lived either in greater contemplation or in the active ministry),[11] were the frameworks that were detaching a person from the world of vices and were securing him/her the regular training in virtuosity.

Indeed, the monastic texts of various genres contain a deep concern for virtuosity. The normative ones indicate the institutional practises of achieving virtues; the paraenetic ones educate a person in Christian qualities; the mystical ones provide the unification with God as a reward for being virtuous; the narrative ones transmit into the future

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[4] More in Pansters 2015, 99-102.
[5] Summa, 374; see also in Pansters 2015, 101, note 9.
[6] Benedicti Regula, 9.
[7] On the value of the *Rule* see e.g. in Hoffmann-Skambraks (eds.) 2016.
[8] Benedicti Regula, 38-41.
[9] Benedicti Regula, 31-37.
[10] On the general understanding of the monastery Melville 2016, 316-332, for the *vita perfectionis* esp. 318.
[11] On the forms of monasticism Melville 2016.

generations the virtuosity of religious founders; the hagiographic texts invite to follow the models of virtuosity provided by the hero saints. They edify, instruct, modulate, and organize a person within the framework of greater perfection; they are all educational tools of achieving virtuosity.

My intention is not to provide a synthesis of medieval techniques of shaping virtuosity. Such attempt would require more systematic preparatory studies on the larger body of monastic sources. Rather, I would like to deal with the "instruments of virtuosity", i.e. with the qualities and practises leading to a more perfect religious state, by presenting one concrete case study. It relates to a program of producing a virtuous man[12] that was textualized as the compilation of legendary acts of Jordan of Saxony, which, unlike the hagiographic texts of more popular medieval holy (wo)men, escaped the more systematic scholarly analysis.[13] This compilation was edited within the mid-13th century Order of Preachers (the Dominicans) and inserted into their bigger exemplary compilation entitled the *Vitae fratrum*.[14] The compilation of Jordan's legendary *acta* offers a model of both the interiorised and exteriorised virtuosity: it bases its program on mobilising the corporate sense that virtues must have the wider outer impact. In that way, this compilation tends to be a medium of creating not only a more perfect individual but also an individual capable of shaping the Christian society.

2) The general function of the text

Jordan of Saxony, on whose acts our text focuses, joined the Dominican order in Paris in 1220. At that time, he was already the Master of Arts and bachelor in theology. In 1221 he became the Provincial Prior in Lombardy. In 1222 he was elected by the General Chapter (the Order's highest corporate authority) as Master of the Order (the highest official), thus being the first successor of the Order's founder, Dominic de Guzmán (†1221). His governance was characterized with the expansion of the Order and the codification of its law. Besides, it was exactly Jordan who compiled the *Libellus de principiis ordinis*, the first account on the beginnings of the Order. He died in a shipwreck while visiting the Holy Land in 1237.[15]

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[12] The idea of analysing the "production" of individual was inspired by the famous study of Foucault 1977. I do not intend to deal with his theoretical conceptions but just use his interest in the forces which shape the person as the starting point for unfolding the medieval type of a virtuous self.

[13] The papers which dealt with it will be quoted throughout the paper.

[14] Edition by Reichert (1896) in VF, 1-320. The compilation concerning the Jordan's legendary acts is inserted as the third part of the VF. Hence, I quote it as the VF III, 99-146.

[15] For the biographical data and his works: Hoyer (ed.) 2002.

In 1245, the Order made the first official attempt to commemorate him. The General Chapter demanded from the members of the Order to collect the Jordan's *miracula*, together with the newly discovered ones of Saint Dominic (canonised in 1234).[16] The Order launched a more complex project in 1255-1256, when the General Chapter asked the friars to collect all Dominican exemplary tales.[17] By 1260 the project resulted with several versions of the *Vitae fratrum*, edited by Geraldus de Fracheto and Humbert de Romans.[18] The material concerning Jordan, gathered in 1245 and supplemented with the information from 1250s,[19] was inserted as a separate section into the *Vitae fratrum* (VF III),[20] following the section on the beginnings of the Order (VF I) and legend of Saint Dominic (VF II), and preceding the *exempla* from the lives of numerous other friars (VF IV) and their exemplary preparations for death (VF V).[21]

Despite the Jordan's institutional value, the Order did not choose to commemorate his "temporal" figure. The VF III is not concerned with reconstructing the Jordan's *curriculum vitae* or with evaluating his legislative or historiographical work. Following the *Vitae fratrum*'s general way of narration and structuring the text, the compilers accumulate the excerpts from the Jordan's life which can exemplify his virtuosity. This is indicated in the first chapter: *Imprimis igitur dicimus eum tamquam speculum tocius religionis et virtutum exemplar, utpote virum, qui castimoniam mentis ac corporis dicitur conservasse illesam.*[22] Hence, the function of this compilation was adapted to the general function of the *Vitae fratrum*, which was to make the early Dominicans the interface of exemplary virtuosity that can help the targeted readership (the next generations of the Order's friars) to progress spiritually.[23] In other words, the text utilized the historical figure of Jordan to provide its audience the transtemporal model of virtuosity.

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[16] ACG I, 33.

[17] ACG I, 77, 83.

[18] More on the evolution of the VF in: Tugwell 1997, 23-39; Tugwell 2001, 415-418; Wesjohann 2012, 398-400.

[19] Cf. Tugwell 1997, 29-30.

[20] VF III, 99-146 (see also the footnote 14 of this paper).

[21] VF I, 6-64; VF II, 65-98; VF IV, 147-230; VF V, 231-304.

[22] VF III, 101.

[23] VF, 4. For the intention of the VF: Wesjohann 2012, 400; and also: Schürer 1999, 169-214, where the author emphasises the value of the VF for preserving the permanency and durability of the Order (see esp. 178) and for building the Order's tradition about its own beginnings. For the role of VF in building and protecting the Dominican way of life in: Schürer, 2005, esp. 179-234. See also Füser 1999, 80-83, where the author claims that the purpose of the VF III was to preserve the normative standards and to strengthen the earthly goals of the community.

The Order's decision not to edit the gathered evidence in a form of the structured *vita* but as a set of edificatory tales had one other implication. The Dominican brethren needed to imagine their forefathers as imitators of the ancient asceticism. This is clear from the fact that, just as Alain Boureau already showed, the *Vitae fratrum* were modelled in accordance with the famous ancient monastic text known as the *Vitae patrum*.[24] The Dominican compilers followed the internal system of the *Vitae patrum* by insisting on the miraculous and edifying, rather than on the biographic aspect, and by collecting the adequate fragments from the lives of its protagonists to create a model of a sainthood based on a group hagiography.[25]

By using such approach, the Dominicans wanted to confirm their embedment in the authentic monasticism.[26] It was the textual strategy that was indicating the capability of the 13th century group of Christians to perpetuate efficiently the principles of the *vita perfectionis* established by the first monks. In such way, the *Vitae fratrum* were petrifying the antiquity as the standardized platform of building virtuosity. The legendary acts of Jordan of Saxony, understood within such strategies of textualization, became not only the way of building the model of virtuosity, but also the functional tool of supporting the transposition of the monastic conventionality into the medieval society.[27] They help to generate the corporate feeling of primordiality among its readership, i.e. the sense that their Order is the proper heir of the old virtuosity. The individual virtuosity of Jordan serves to support the group virtuosity of the Order, and the group virtuosity is built by deleting the historical line between the old and new monasticism.

This ahistorical connection was not the text's end-goal; the mobilization of a corporate feeling of authentic virtuosity in the VF III needed to be only a preparatory stage for the Order's higher cause – the salvation of people. At this point, it is necessary to have in mind the revolutionary character of the Dominican monasticism. In the old monasticism, the monastery was understood as a place of contemplation, providing the salvation for those living in "a renunciation of the external world".[28] The monasteries were, of course, the integral part of society, and some of them (regular canons in the first place) were also providing a pastoral care.[29] Others were seen as mediators between the outer

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[24] Boureau 1987, 79-100.
[25] See: Boureau 1987, 91.
[26] Cf. on that issue: Schürer, 2005, 183.
[27] Boureau 1987, 93-94 shows this excellently by analysing the Dominican textualization of the motive of desert.
[28] Melville 2016, 319.
[29] Cf. Melville 2016, 129, 131, 133.

society and Heavens, and were being asked to pray for the laymen' souls.[30] Yet, the Dominicans made a paradigmatic shift – for them, the care for the neighbour's soul was not something that *could* be joined to the contemplative life; such care was seen as their primary purpose.[31] They defined the *vita activa* (the preaching outside the convent and pastoral work) as the Order's *propositum vitae*: ... *cum ordo noster specialiter ob predicationem et animarum salutem ab initio noscatur institutus fuisse, et studium nostrum ad hoc principaliter ardenterque summo opere debeat intendere, ut proximorum animabus possimus utiles esse.*[32]

This orientation towards the universal salvation, supported by the Papacy,[33] meant that the monastery now needed to be a place of the apostolic evangelization. This conception influenced also the idea of virtuosity. In his *De eruditione praedicatorum* Humbert de Romans states that it is the virtue of love that enables the preacher to work for the benefit of others. And since he is doing such ministry, the preacher must accumulate more love then when caring only for his own soul. With the increase of love, he automatically benefits himself (the greater quantity of love the greater state of perfection) and earns himself a greater "substantial reward" (the salvation).[34] This argumentation proves not only the Humbert's scholastic intelligence; it also affirms the model of spiritual formation built on the idea of virtuosity being the force connecting cyclically the cloistered self-perfectioning and salvation-needed society.

Having in mind such context, it is possible to recognize the additional value of virtuous *instrumenta* in the Dominican order. Its intended purpose, the perfecting of individuals, was, at the same time, the perfecting of a group of preachers that needed to evangelize society. The preachers, living in a monastery, needed to become virtuous not only because it was a way of being a more perfect monk; they had to be virtuous to administer their pastorally-oriented vocation. The final product of a conventual training, the virtuous man, was visible and open to society, and the conceptions of good Christian manners were distributed among the lay people. The textualization of the Jordan of Saxony's *acta* is, thus, significant not only because it provided a sense

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[30] For the connections with society: Melville 2016, 353-359. For the connections with nobility see: Schreiner 1989 or Vanderputten 2013, 135-214.

[31] Cf. Cygler 1999, 386-387; Melville 2020, 253.

[32] Liber constitutionum, 29.

[33] Cf. Cygler 1999, 394.

[34] De eruditione praedicatorum, 388: *Probabile enim est quod charitas quae facit non solum circa se, sed circa alios laborare, ex hoc plus et plus augeatur in eo. Illa autem augmentata, necesse est praemium substantiale augeri.*

of primordiality and authenticity to the Dominican program of virtuosity, but also because it formulates the personality of men that were supposed to use their cloistered experience in shaping (by preaching) and administering (through sacraments) the Christian society.

3) Instruments of virtuosity

The threefold effectiveness

This chapter tends to unfold concretely the virtuous practices and qualities that were textualized in the VF III's 42 chapters. But first, it is necessary to underline that behind all of the numerous *instrumenta*, we can recognise one crucial intention – the VF III wanted to build the model of a greater perfection by exemplifying the main hero's threefold virtuous effectiveness. The first one relates to the Jordan's capability of behavioural self-regulation. The VF III demonstrates the Jordan's triumphant effect onto his own body and mind by disciplining the external behaviour and conscience. The second one is to demonstrate the effects onto his community.[35] As the Master of Order, Jordan was in charge of the entire transregional fellowship of friars. The instruments of virtuosity, placed in the context of his interaction with the Dominican brethren, mirror the Order's idea of the acceptable relational structure between the religious superior and the subordinate community. The third one relates to the effects of Jordan's virtuosity onto the outer world. Here we speak of the Jordan's virtuous practises which were influencing the improvement, healing, or repentance in society. Such threefold virtuous effectiveness indicates how the community themselves was thinking[36] of producing a virtuous man. The efforts to present the effects of virtuous practices in this way indicate that the readership of the VF III had to realize that only the symbiosis of three components – the self-virtuosity, the communitarian virtuosity, and the societal virtuosity – has a potential to formulate a virtuous person in its totality.[37]

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[35] This particular value was indicated by Füser 1999, 81-83 (see also the next note).

[36] On the institutional thinking: Douglas 1986. On the institutional thinking in religious orders: Jerković 2023, 259-301.

[37] My model of threefold effectiveness builds upon the functional approach to the hagiographic texts of Füser 1999, 27-105. By relying on the Peter von Moos' analysis, Füser distinguishes the types and functions of the *exempla* in the general Mendicant literary tradition. He indicates the functioning of the hagiographic models of heroic individual and the "Jedermannsbeispiel" (i.e. the category of multiple heroes, who collectively witness the God's working) by unveiling the exemplary forms of the *imitatio Christi*, the *exempla sanctorum* and the *exempla persuasionis* in various Mendicant texts (cf. esp. pp 35-36). By doing so, the author demonstrates not only how the saintly figure was shaped but also the effects of *exempla* onto identity and institutional coherence of Mendicant orders. The model of threefold effectiveness (devised to unfold the virtues which were

Steadiness of mind and constancy of action

The primary instruments of Jordan's self-discipline were regular prayer and contemplation, intersected with the sayings of a breviary.[38] Besides, the VF III mentions also the regular attendance of the Matins during his study.[39] By indicating such regularized practises, the editors were implicitly juxtaposing the Jordan's virtuous stability to the *levitas mentis*, which was disapproved by medieval authorities.[40] In other words, the idea behind the textualization of regularized practises was to instigate within its readership a sense that the virtuous man evolves from the steadiness of mind and the constancy of action.

Such textualization was also affirming the quality of the traditional monasticism. Steadiness and constancy were connected to the cloistered rhythm (canonical hours and breviary) and asceticism (prayer and contemplation), which means that – despite the Order's orientation towards the *vita activa* – the text served to keep the essential monastic values deeply rooted in the collective mind-frame of its readership. The preachers, that were constantly *en route*, needed to follow the example of Jordan, who, while not preaching, was meditating and praying.[41] In that way, Jordan functioned as the platform connecting the contemplative and active life, and as the message that the virtuous preacher cannot function validly if the early monastic practices and values were not accepted and interiorised.

The textualization of the Jordan's regular attendance to the Matins is instructive. Since the Matins were the midnight canonical hour, which intersected the person's normal cycle of sleep, the VF III affirms the necessity to preserve constancy in adapting the person's entire biological rhythm to the pre-conditioned monastic regulation of time. In other words, this Jordan's quality confirms the idea that virtuosity includes the superiority of traditional monastic rhythm over the human needs. Besides, the very textualization of the Jordan's attendance to the Matins is instructive. This practise was mentioned more coincidentally in the text,[42] indicating that it was nothing extraordinary but something to which Jordan was accustomed. Hence, the virtuous man is able to "routinize" the overcoming of human needs.

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shaping the individual's inner cosmos, the topic not in the Füser's focus) tends to devise deeper the relation between the exemplary role-model and its intended impact.

[38] VF III, 105

[39] VF III, 101.

[40] To indicate only one example – one of the Cistercian founders, Robert of Molesme, was criticised by the Papacy exactly because of "his usual inconstancy", i.e. because he lacked stability of mind in his way of monastic life. Exordium Parvum, 425.

[41] VF III, 105.

[42] VF I, 101: ... *cum ipse theologie studeret Parisius, et consuetudinis sue esset, omni nocte surgere ad matutinas* ...

Control over the bodily

Another important virtue of self-discipline was the capability to control the body and senses.[43] The virtuous religious had to formulate externally his internal disposition, i.e. the body itself needed to express virtuosity.[44] The VF III indicates that Jordan was always adequately posturing himself in prayer – he was humbly kneeling and crossing hands – and that he kept such posture even when he was exhausted from the long voyages.[45] Hence, to be virtuous, the religious had to tame his body, to join this corporal exercise with the virtue of humility, and – again – to show the perseverance in intention. This means that a virtuous person was once more triumphing, this time over the body. And this triumph was achieved with the weaponry of humility and persistence, the virtues of which the body was the visible symbol.

Another way of triumphing over the bodily was to overcome the senses. When Jordan lost the sight on one eye, he summoned the brethren to thank God for releasing him from the "enemy".[46] In religious mentality, the sight is a dangerous sense because of its interaction with the sinful world.[47] With that in mind, it becomes clear why the VF III presents the loss of a sight as a liberation – it implies the greater freedom from sin and the exaltation in virtuosity. Besides, as the VF III indicates, the senses must serve only the greater good, so Jordan praised God for leaving him the other eye since it will benefit the community and devotion[48] (he will remain capable of leadership and for the regular monastic practises).

Apart from overcoming the sense of sight, another way to virtuously triumph was the control the speech.[49] The Dominicans were aware of the dangers of speech – they considered it as the tool of transmitting sin.[50] Yet, it was also a vehicle of salvation, that had to be used by the preachers for edification.[51] Speech, thus, must not be eradicated but,

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[43] In Christianity, the body is considered as a "prison for the soul", and it often included the "effort to deny the existence of biological man". Le Goff 1988, 83. However, the religious communities devised the creative methods of utilizing the body to demonstrate virtuosity (see further the text above).

[44] The regulation of body was one of the crucial objectives of discipline already in the early monasticism. More in Diem 2010, 89-112, on posturing the body and bodily expressions of the inner state on pages 100-101.

[45] VF III, 105.

[46] VF III, 117.

[47] Cf. Diem 2010, 99-100.

[48] VF III, 117.

[49] Diem 2010, 99, and 100: "Mouths and eyes might cause harm and pollution through illicit communication."

[50] Expositio in constitutiones, 116.

[51] Expositio in constitutiones, 31-34.

again, controlled and directed towards the higher end. For that purpo-
se, Jordan was textually presented as a perfect speaking virtuous, in
whose speech everyone could recognise the word of God.[52] Even when
not preaching, so the VF III, he was providing the edifying examples to
society or was speaking of spiritually profitable things with the breth-
ren, inspiring them to do the same.[53]

This idealistic depiction of Jordan had a function not only to
educate the brethren about the fundamental value of virtuous speech
but also to indicate the necessity of exteriorizing virtues. The virtuous
person affects others by speech and creates the fraternal and societal
virtuosity.[54] Or, in other words, the virtuous exemplification by word
functions as a virtue itself.

Finally, Jordan was not only instructing the brethren to perseve-
re in the edifying conversation but he was also explicitly asking them
to avoid the idle talk.[55] By textualizing this instruction, the VF III invo-
ked the necessity to overcome the bad habits of gossiping and scandali-
zing talk. The function of this VF III's *exemplum* was to show, again,
that the virtuous person had to stand above the human way.

Detachment from the world

The VF III indicates that the lack of control could also be a vir-
tue. The text narrates that, while on the way, Jordan used to have the
spiritual outbursts – he suddenly started to sing the hymns and, taken
over by the ecstasy, was unexpectedly leaving a group.[56] Such uncon-
trolled behaviour, standing in opposition to the virtuous self-discipline,
was acceptable since it was signalling a capability to detach from the
world. It was not exemplifying the disorder of a mind but the working
of the zealous inspiration. The Jordan's uncontrolled behaviour was
becoming the manifestation of a control by a higher force, which was
working deeply inside him.[57] Consequently, the virtuous person was not
only the one that can control the body and mind but also the one which
manifests the controlling power of the Divine.

The virtuous value of detachment from the world was especially
emphasized in the chapter xxii: [58] *Sed quis posset dicere, quomodo se ab
exterioribus colligens totus, interius esset, ut nichil de forinsecis cogita-*

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[52] VF III, 108.
[53] VF III, 105, 108.
[54] On this, see the following chapters of this paper.
[55] VF III, 143.
[56] Cf. VF III, 105.
[57] On the effects of the invisible powers in religious communities: Melville 2005 (b),
19-43.
[58] VF III, 117.

ret vel perpenderet. The VF III indicates also the communal effect, i.e. the efficiency of the virtue of detachment within the Jordan's community: *Unde edificati fratres perpenderunt animum eis ad interiora intentum.*[59] Clearly, the building of virtuosity depended on the capability of a person to practice the self-disciplinary evaluation of conscience, just like the brethren around Jordan used to do. The necessary precondition for such evaluation was the exclusion from the world and the *vita contemplativa.* This internalization of faith is not only new clear evidence of the desire to preserve the attachment to the old monasticism. It is also a reflection of the 12th-13th century trends, demanding from religious (wo)men more personalized approach to God by building the internal *claustrum animae*,[60] which will prepare a person, purified in conscience by his/her own capacity to be virtuous, for the encounter with God.[61] Hence, this tale affirms the examination of conscience and contemplative diminishment of the temporal world as necessary instruments of virtuosity even for the clerical order, primarily engaged in the active ministry.

Marian devotion

Another virtuous instrument is the honouring of Virgin Mary. Jordan was deeply devoted to Mary, he was always giving thanks to Her, and he devised the special way of Marian prayer (connecting the thanksgiving with psalmody).[62] Clearly, Jordan's devotion included both the emotional aspect (devotion itself) and the practical aspect of virtuosity, manifested in capability to integrate regularly the Marian devotion into his praying schedule and create the authentic model of prayer.

The textualization of such self-disciplinary capability had several implications in building the virtuosity of the VF III's readership. In the first place, it was providing the model for acquiring the desired transcendental experience and getting closer to Heavens. This is exemplified by showing how Jordan, who was so eagerly praying to Mary, was granted with the mystical experiences by having the visions of Her.[63]

These visions were not granted to Jordan exclusively. They were also granted to other friars and were highly instructive.[64] In one of

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[59] VF III, 118.

[60] More in Bauer 1973.

[61] More on the conceptions of the interiorised spirituality and its functions in: Breitenstein 2014, 37-56; Breitenstein 2016, 19-55.

[62] VF III, 118-119.

[63] VF III, 119.

[64] VF III, 120-121. In other parts of the VF III, the visions of Mary also played a prominent role in the edification of community. See: Schürer 1999, 199-209; Schürer 2005, 199-203.

them, Mary and little Jesus were seen as walking through the choir of praying friars, implying their constant watch over the brethren.[65] Hence, the text wanted to indicate that the Marian piety was guaranteeing not only the mystical experience of Virgin, but also the Divine supervision over community, with Mary and Jesus as the controlling mechanisms over the brethren' conscience.[66]

The textualization of virtuous honouring of Mary had two other functional implications. We must have in mind that each day in a Dominican convent was beginning and ending with the liturgy dedicated to Virgin.[67] The emphasis on the spiritual effects of Jordan's prayer to Her (the edifying visions) was empowering the primacy of Marian devotion in the Dominican community,[68] and was assuring the brethren in the effectiveness of the Mary-centred daily liturgy in building a virtuous man.

And finally, the Dominican narrative of their own beginnings rested on the idea that the Order was founded by Jesus himself, after a plea for humanity exactly by Mary. The entire VF I is dedicated to this topic, providing its readership with the complex ideology of celestial beginnings of the Order with Mary being its inceptor and protector.[69] Hence, the Jordan's devotional practices were a continuation of the VF I's intention to promote the collective emotional affiliation to Mary, who, apart from being a mother of God, was textually devised as a mother of the Order.

Chastity and abstinence

The fundamental virtues of self-discipline were chastity and abstinence. The chastity of mind and body was defined as the most crucial characteristic of Jordan's virtuosity.[70] However, unlike the literal tradition of Saint Dominic which promoted the celibacy as a prominent leitmotiv,[71] the Jordan's *acta* are not engaged with textualizing such *exempla*. It seems that the main reason for this is the editors' conviction that

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[65] VF III, 121.

[66] Cf. Füser 1999, 82-83. For the similar role of Mary in other parts of the VF: Schürer 1999, 200.

[67] Expositio in constitutiones, 71.

[68] For the similar role of Mary in other parts of the VF: Schürer 1999, 200.

[69] VF I, 6-64, esp. 6-9. Cf. Wesjohann 2012, 400-401. On the role of this motive within the general VF's discourse on the Order's beginnings: Schürer 1999, 202: Schürer 2005, 207-224. The motive of Virgin playing the significant role in the beginnings and in the patronage over the Order can be found in other Dominican writings, e.g. in the *Bonum universale de apibus*. More in: Schürer 1999, 185-192.

[70] VF III, 101.

[71] Cf. Wesjohann 2012, 458-460.

all other virtues are, in fact, the various manifestations of the mind-body chastity. The Jordan's life-long chastity of mind and body is, as indicated earlier in this paper, the opening line of the VF III;[72] it is the established paradigm of the text, which the editors prove by accumulating all other virtues. In other words, the chastity of body and mind functions as the "arch-virtue" in building of a virtuous man.

The text is, however, concerned with the *exempla* showing the abstinence from food and drink. The chapter xxix exemplify the Jordan's virtuosity by indicating his firm intent not to refresh his body by consuming more quality wine in serious sickness.[73] Even when in fever, suffering from thirst, he did not submit to the corporal needs, but commended himself to God solely. A virtuous person is, thus, triumphant over the material existence even in existential threat. The additional value of such virtue is that it provokes another, the most exalted one – the trust in Providence. The sick body, controlled by the virtue of abstinence, must be the sign of the working of the power of God,[74] on whose will the spirit inside the body solely depends. The text clearly transmits the idea that the body refreshed by the earthly product becomes a body in comfort, i.e. it produces a state of pleasure, while the abstinence produces the better inner state, evolving from the closer connection to God to whom the bodily existence must be submitted.

But this virtuous abstinence is not the one that mortifies. It must possess a degree of rationality in itself. When Jordan was suffering from illness on another time, he refused to eat meat, in order to stay loyal to his religious vocation and customs.[75] After seeing that his sickness progressed, and that it will result in death, he finally decided to dispense himself from such abstinence.[76] The virtuous person is, as we saw, in hands of God, but he cares for its earthly life. The virtuosity of self-discipline must not destroy, but make a religious the efficient tool of Divine power.

The effect of the virtuous abstinence is, finally, a victory over temptations. The episodes about the Jordan's behaviour in sickness are narrated in a form of his resistance to the Devil's luring. It was Devil who offered a better wine to Jordan, and who advised Jordan to morti-

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[72] VF III, 101: *Imprimis igitur dicimus eum tamquam speculum tocius religionis et virtutum exemplar, utpote virum, qui castimoniam mentis ac corporis dicitur conservasse illesam.* (see also part 2 of this paper).

[73] VF III, 123-124.

[74] On the conceptions of the God's power in: Melville 2005 (b), 19-43. For the motive of the Divine power see also under *Detachment from the world* in the present paper.

[75] Liber constitutionum, 35: *Pulmenta nostra sint ubique sine carnibus in nostris conventibus.*

[76] VF III, 122-123.

fy himself by not using dispensations.[77] Because of his simplicity (hence, the other virtue resulting from a meek mind), Jordan was almost deceived, but in the end, with the help of God, he recognized the evil and successfully fought it.[78] The virtuous abstinence, thus, not only commends a person to God but enables the self-testing in the face of the Devil and the imitation of Christ's combat with temptations (cf. Lk 4,1-13). Hence, the significant element of virtuous mentality is a virtue of Christ-like courage. And since the Devil in these *exempla* is the symbol of one own's impurity of mind, the abstinence becomes textually approved as a crucial part of a disciplinary techniques of virtuous and Christ-like triumphing over the self. Finally, since the ability to fight the temptations was the fundamental self-disciplinary method of the desert fathers, the VF III additionally confirms the transposition of the desert-like asceticism into the thirteenth century system of virtuosity.[79]

Virtues of prelacy

As indicated in the previous chapters, the VF III exemplifies the Jordan's virtuosity not only by speaking of his self-disciplinary practises but also by demonstrating the edifying effect of his actions. His manner of prayer for Mary was observed by some brother, whom Jordan then learned this special method of devotion.[80] Furthermore, it was in the conventual chapter that he thanked God for losing the eye sight, and required the communal prayer to appraise such event.[81] Also, his speech was presented as a tool of moving the audience towards the spiritual perfection.[82] Hence, the VF III builds the image of the virtuous person by presenting Jordan as a perfect contemplative, perfect cloistered religious, and perfect edifier, capable to reform his spectators or listeners by disposing his inner state.

However, Jordan had to be more than the exemplary contemplative-cloistered-edifying religious. The figure of the Master of the Order had to be a platform of showing at what point the power becomes virtuous. The VF III's model of good prelacy was not based on the idea of sovereign authority over brethren. It was focused on demonstrating his care for friars.[83] Here we must have in mind that in the Higher Middle Ages the religious orders promoted the idea that to rule means to ser-

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[77] VF III, 122-124.
[78] VF III, 122-123.
[79] On the value of the motive of temptations for linking the Dominicans and desert fathers: Boureau 1987, 92-93.
[80] VF III, 118-119.
[81] VF III, 117.
[82] VF III, 108.
[83] Cf. Füser 1999, 83.

ve.[84] This conception, evoking the Christ's model of ruling servitude (for He came to serve and not to be served, cf. Mt 20,28), implied the rule of the superiors based not on commanding, as was the case in traditional monasticism,[85] but on responsibility for others and performances showing their lower status or unworthiness of power.[86]

The VF III forms the Jordan's servile prelacy around the virtues of kindness, gentleness, and mildness, on his readiness to regularly visit and advise the brethren, and on his ability to stabilize the brethren' emotional set-up by comforting them or by praying for them.[87] Hence, the acceptable image of a virtuous prelate is that of a good counsellor and not of a commander, of a good co-friar, and of a good shepherd, looking for a more personalized connection with his flock.

The Jordan's charity and counselling role with regard to the sick friars and novices is especially emphasised.[88] These two groups were of the particular importance for demonstrating virtuosity. The first one concerns those in pain and the second one those that are still not fully formed in the vocation. By textually affirming the Jordan's care for them, the VF III strengthens the value of fraternal sensitivity instead of the authoritative superiority in building the image of the virtuous prelacy.

The essential virtue of prelacy is the ability of good and persuasive instruction. Jordan was not only comforting or counselling the novices, but was also instructing them to persevere in their vocation and to preserve the virtue of constancy.[89] The VF III proudly states that not even one novice quitted the probation time because of Jordan, and many of them stayed exactly after his personal intervention.[90] The idea behind these textual insertions is not only to show that the virtuous prelacy implies the capacity to effectively instruct others but also that it brings stability to the community, which was the important institutional goal of each of the religious orders.[91] The capacity to preserve the virtue of constancy and novices within the Order served also to mobilize the collective feeling of a prosperous community.

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[84] More in: Dalarun 2023.

[85] On this extensively in Felten 1988, 147-296.

[86] More in: Dalarun 2023, esp. 5-44 for rituals and performances and 63-140 for the conceptions of unworthiness (throughout the chapters, the author indicates on which Scriptural episodes the conceptions of servitude were based); for the short overview of the Dominican conceptions of rule see the pages 103-110.

[87] VF III, 103-104.

[88] VF III, 103.

[89] VF III, 104.

[90] VF III, 114, and 104, 115. The motive of keeping the novices and friars in the Order is also prominent in other parts of the VF. See: Schürer 1999, 200-201.

[91] Cf. Schreiner 1992, 338.

Furthermore, the VF III builds the image of a virtuous prelate by depicting his techniques of disciplining others. The text states that Jordan was not punishing the misbehaviour but was correcting it. And, while doing so, he was a prudent corrector, always taking into account the circumstances that caused the deviance.[92] Indeed, it is more the image of a patient, charitable and prudent father than of a harsh inquisitor. However, to be virtuous, this father needed to use strictness when necessary.[93] This means that the virtuous prelacy included also a sense of justice and of a rationality in discretion.

Humility, patience, contempt for honour

The fundamental Jordan's virtues were, furthermore, humility and patience.[94] These were especially seen during the sessions of the General Chapter, where Jordan, as a Master of the Order, was being proclaimed of faults by the attending delegates (this was the usual practice at the assembly).[95] He was never defending himself or trying to find some extenuating circumstances for his misbehaviour; all the more, he was willingly humiliating himself, comparing himself with a thief, who must not be trusted:

In capitulo autem generali multum elucebat eius humilis paciencia. Nam cum proclamaretur a diffinitoribus de quocumque et diceretur ei, quod excusare se posset, si vellet, humili voce dicebat: Numquid credi debet latroni se excusanti? Quo verbo multi edificati sunt.[96]

Clearly, the virtues of humility and patience help to build the image of a good prelate. The virtuous religious, who is also the highest prelate, not only endures but also supports the exercise of authority from below.[97] Hence, to exercise power means to provide a model of virtuosity. The conception of governance forms itself around the radiant virtuosity instead of the right to use force. Only a humble, patient, and self-humiliated person, which is able to transpose the self-experienced power of community into the edifying force, can be considered as valid authority.

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[92] VF III, 103.

[93] VF III, 103.

[94] Füser 1999, 81 also indicates that *humilitas* was one of the focal points in building the Jordan's exemplary figure.

[95] On the procedures at the Dominican General Chapter see old, but still most detailed study: Galbraith 1925, 85-109. On functioning of this assembly briefly: Cygler 1999, 417-418.

[96] VF III, 117.

[97] On the general conceptions of the Dominican authority, in which the authority from below (the practising of power by the common friars) was the fundamental characteristic of governance see e.g. Cygler 2012, 61-78.

The virtue of humility served not only to create the model of good prelacy; it also functions as the tool in shaping the everyday relations within the community.[98] The VF III exemplifies this by narrating about the Jordan's humility in various situations. For example, in the monastery of Bologna, some deranged friar attacked Jordan and slapped him on the cheek. Jordan did not retaliate, but offered him the other one:

Quidam frater demoniacus fuit Bononie, cui casu solito contigit in claustro magistrum habere obvium, et elevata manu dedit ei fortissimam alapam. Sanctus autem pater, ut erat preditus paciencie et humilitatis virtute, alteram mox paravit maxillam.[99]

On some other occasion, when a certain friar was using the flattering words in communication with Jordan, the Master fought him with humility.[100] Hence, the humility served as the weapons against the worldly exaltation. It is not only a virtue but a tool of preserving the desired servile integrity of a prelate.

In short, by supplementing the virtue of humility with the ability to lower the self in everyday communication, or even in the cases of tension and threat, the VF III completes the image of the virtuosity built around the Christ-validated paradigm of ruling servitude.

A prominent virtue of Jordan, closely related to humility, was the contempt for the pomp and honour: *Fuit adeo humilis, quod omnem pompam seculi et honores sibi oblatos discrete et sapienter sciverit declinare.*[101] This virtue was exemplified by describing his entrance in Bologna. The great crowd assembled to welcome him, but Jordan – demonstrating his edifying humility – avoided the people and, going through the side streets, entered quietly, with no pomp, into the Dominican monastery.[102] The virtuous religious, thus, defies the ceremonial convention of the glory. It is the inner disposition of humility that must be achieved and exteriorized. The message is clear – the future superiors, together with the common brethren, must not glorify themselves or be glorified but understood as instructors of humility.

Building the virtuous fraternity

Evidently, the model of virtuous prelate rested on the perpetuation of a Christ-like model of humility. It promoted not the prelate's au-

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[98] On functioning of humility in the institutional set-up of religious communities: Jerković 2021, 35-60.

[99] VF III, 116.

[100] VF III, 125-126.

[101] VF III, 116.

[102] VF III, 116.

thority but the virtues of kindness, gentleness, mildness, charity, and just correction. It also promoted the capability to exteriorize the virtues by edifying brethren *verbo* (by advising or instructing them) *et exemplo* (by acting oppositely to the worldly conventions of glory and pomp, by avoiding command, and by always demonstrating humility).[103] Such modulation of virtuosity was, undoubtedly, targeting the superior's conscience; the Order's Priors needed to see in such behaviour the adequate model of ruling servitude. But, as indicated earlier, all the VF's exemplary tales were intended for the brethren in general – all of the friars had to find in them the moral lesson[104] and build themselves in virtuosity. This indicates that the function of the text was not to strengthen the vertical system of power but the notion of fraternity. The strongest message behind the virtues of prelacy is that the Order must function not as the group of individuals submitted to the superior but as the virtuous community.[105] This does not mean that the obedience was not present in the Order;[106] it simply denotes that the Dominican idea of the more perfect community rested on the strong sense of the communitarian spirit.

This orientation of the text was supported by the Augustinian tradition. We must have in mind that the Dominicans followed the *Rule of Augustine*,[107] which emphasized the communal emotional bonds, based on the precept of love for God and neighbour and the Apostolic principle of having "one mind and one heart in God" (cf. Acts 4,32): *Ante omnia, fratres charissimi, diligatur Deus, deinde proximus, quia ista praecepta sunt principaliter nobis data. … Primum propter quod in unum estis congregatis ut unanimes habitetis in domo, et sit vobis anima una et cor unum in Domino.*[108] Clearly, Augustine devised the *Rule* to inspire a life which was primarily aiming at recreating the inner disposition of the primordial Christian community. In other words,

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[103] On the principle of the instructions by the word and example in religious communities see: Bynum 1979. On VF III showing "die Kongruenz von Wort und Tat" in the exemplary tales about Jordan: Füser 1999, 81.

[104] See the chapter 2) of the present paper.

[105] Cf. Füser 1999, 82. Even though the author does not deal with the virtuosity he marks the central value of the *exempla* for the intra-monastic *aedificatio* (i.e. the building of the brethren. See also the note 37 of this paper).

[106] On the conceptions of obedience in the Dominican order: Melville 2005 (a), 181-204.

[107] Cf. e.g. in: Hinnebusch 1966, 44-45.

[108] Since there were many versions of the Augustine's *Rule* in medieval religious communities, I quote in accordance with the Humbert de Roman's commentary, which contains the version that was used for certain in the Dominican order. See: Expositio Regulae, 56 (the first sentence), 66 (the second sentence). On the textual tradition, content and impact of the *Rule of Augustine* in religious orders see: van Geest 2020, 127-154.

the *Rule* sets as the main objective the evocation of the authentic emotional confraternity. The formulation of the Jordan's figure around the virtues which tend to produce both the Christ's precept of the more exalted human condition and the virtuous community, reflects not only the hagiographic *topoi* of humility and servitude but also the mental structures, rooted deeply in the Augustinian tradition of fraternal monasticism.

Compassion and poverty

The important societal virtue is the compassion for the poor. Jordan was not only deeply emphatic towards the poor but was also regularly providing them food and clothes.[109] The poor were the perfect societal objective of virtuosity, for they were marginalized and in need. The compassion for them had a strong potential to mobilise the virtue of charity within the VF III's readership. So, the function of these chapters was to affirm the Augustinian quality of loving the neighbour, in accordance to the introductory precept of the *Rule*.[110] Consequently, the compassion, which had to be the working force of demonstrating virtuosity, was affirming the Dominican *vita activa*[111] and was assuring the brethren in the assumption that their *propositum vitae* was not restricted to the conventual neighbour.

The compassion was, furthermore, of the special importance for perpetuating the established Dominican hagiographic tradition. Compassion (not only for the poor but in general) played a prominent role in modelling the Saint Dominic's saintly figure.[112] The *exempla* which demonstrate this kind of the Jordan's emotional connection with the society had a purpose to preserve the established standards of sanctity. Besides, in this way the text was devising a stronger attachment to the Order's earthly founder, thus providing them a sense of the "Saint Dominic styled" spiritual identity.

The fundamental Dominican virtue was the life in poverty. As Mendicants, they, of course, had to live in the absolute poverty. This implies the dependence on alms, work by their own hand and begging if necessary, and not on the land-owning system, characteristic for the traditional monasticism.[113] Within that context, the figure of Jordan was

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[109] VF III, 101-102.

[110] See the previous chapter.

[111] Füser 1999, 81 also indicates the importance of this motive for strengthening the Order's earthly goals.

[112] See Wesjohann 2012, 442-446.

[113] On the economy in Mendicant orders see the volume *L'economia* 2004. On Mendicant involvement in society and economy: Berg 2001. On Mendicant poverty: Kehnel-

also used to show the value of such total, and not the manorial monastic poverty. However, the VF III did not focus itself solely on acknowledging the spiritual value of Mendicant poverty, but also on demonstrating the effects of being the perfect Mendicant on society. In this fashion, the chapter xxxiv narrates how Jordan and his companions once failed to get enough bread by begging. However, they started to praise God, thanking Him for such deprivation, and – following the Jordan's example – to act joyfully. A woman from the town, who witnessed the event, was first scandalised by the scene of the merry and laughing monks, but when she learned the reason for their joy, she was deeply touched and edified, brought them food and wine, and begged them always to pray for her.[114]

Such textualization had four important impacts on building virtuosity. Firstly, it was producing the sense of a close connection with the Divine within its readership. The deprivation of every material good, including food, was placing the friars into the God's hands, the Providence being the only force directing their lives.[115] Secondly, it was affirming the value of poverty for provoking their more perfect emotional state. By experiencing poverty, the friars, following Jordan, were not in despair but acquired happiness. Thirdly, the more perfect state was recognised and validated by the society (the woman from the example understood its spiritual significance). And fourthly, their state was provoking the better state of the people with whom they interacted. The society (represented by the woman from the example) was becoming edified and internally moved to compassion, i.e. motivated for the greater Christian deeds. In other words – the more perfect state of friars the more perfect state of their spectators. Hence, the function of the text was to assure the brethren that their form of poverty has a potential to provoke the virtuous reciprocity. The text was inspiring the emotional link between the friars and society, and was instilling into the members of the Order the idea that they are improving the world from which the Order can also benefit.

Efficient preaching

Clearly, the VF III was moving the focus away from the monastic separation towards the establishment of the appropriate link with society. Apart from the poverty, the most important textual instrument in

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Melville (eds.) 2001. On the conceptions of work in monastic communities: Schreiner 2013, 243-290.

[114] VF III, 127.

[115] The same motive is present in other Dominican writings. See e.g. De eruditione praedicatorum, 384-385.

this process was the efficient preaching. In accordance with the image of a good prelate (see the previous chapters), Jordan was presented as the efficient preacher within his own Order.[116] He was attracting so many co-friars that the monastery in Bologna and Paris, where he used to preach the Lent, resembled a bee-hive.[117] But, the VF III continues, the Jordan's preaching was also efficient among the outer society. It was the most successful tool in recruiting the new members. The text anecdotally narrates how, on single occasion, so many novices joined the Order that there were not enough habits (the symbols of reception) to provide for them.[118] All the more, the VF III emphasises the quality of Jordan's sermons by indicating Devil's jealousy of Jordan's success in attracting souls.[119] Devil felt so threatened and even promised Jordan not to tempt him ever again if he give up the preaching (Jordan, of course, refused such a pact).[120]

Evidently, the VF III transmits the threefold value of preaching: 1) the virtuous sermon of a Dominican preacher is the one that edifies both his brethren and laymen; 2) the virtuous preaching redefines the laymen' emotional set-up to the extent of converting them to the monastic life[121] thus not only improving the inner state of the converters but also regenerating the Order itself; 3) it diminishes the evil.

The VF III also testifies how Jordan's preaching was especially effective in the urban areas, among the scholars.[122] The textualization of this feature had several important implications. In the first place, by converting the minds of those who were well versed in the business of thinking and learning, Jordan approves the superiority over the worldly matters – to convert the academia means to virtuously triumph over the ratio. Furthermore, by indicating the success of the preaching among scholars, the VF III perpetuates the image of the Order oriented to the urban ministry and the *vita activa*.[123] Hence, the VF III textually preserves the Dominican institutional identity. And finally, the conversion of scholars provides the pool of intellectually skilled men (predominantly clerics), who can continue the work of Evangelization based on schooling, educated preaching, and study of Scripture,[124] after they

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[116] Cf. Füser 1999, 200-201.

[117] VF III, 108.

[118] VF III, 108-109.

[119] VF III, 108.

[120] VF III, 124.

[121] For his strong influence onto the audience see the excellent description in the chapter xiii: VF III, 109-110.

[122] VF III, 109-110.

[123] Similarly: Füser 1999, 81, where he indicates that the emphasis on the Jordan's preaching was empowering the pastoral orientation of the Order.

[124] For these Dominican activities see the synthesis in: Hinnebusch 1973.

enter the Order. So, the VF III, which sometimes states explicitly that the conversion of young scholars resulted with the progress in the Order,[125] textually affirms the value of the urban ministry for the regeneration of the Order.

The VF III offers also the validation of the preaching. This is demonstrated allegorically, by the vision of some brother, who saw a great river – symbolizing Jordan – overflowing and fertilizing the entire world.[126] Clearly, the virtuosity resulting in the societal efficiency had to be presented to the readership as the force with the strong prophetic component.[127] By integrating such component, the VF III affirms the personal virtuosity again as the platform on which the non-immanent force of Providence works.

The central topics of Jordan's preaching were penance and the announcement of the Heavenly Kingdom.[128] However, what attracts bigger attention is the performative aspect of his preaching. One of the textual versions of the VF III narrates that not only privately or during his instructions to brethren but also during his preaching Jordan used to shed tears extensively.[129] This indicates that the virtuous personality needed to be formed also around the psalmodic emotionality.[130] Furthermore, the textualization of such performative emotionality served to commemorate the fundaments of Christian religion. The Christianity is a religion of pain and glory; it both moans over the Christ's passion and celebrates His triumph over death. By textualizing the Jordan's tears, expressed privately and while preaching, the VF III wanted to show the ability of a virtuous preacher to demonstrate the co-passion with Christ and mobilize within his audience the belief in the triumph of the Heavens.[131] And finally, since the VF III was intended to primarily edify the brethren, it is clear that the Jordan's tears were making him the role-model in creating the Scripture-based emotional community.[132]

The preaching virtuosity included also the fidelity to Church. The chapter iv indicates that Jordan travelled the whole world, always

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[125] E.g. VF III, 109.

[126] VF III, 102. On similar visions in other parts of the VF, validating the *vita activa*: Schürer 1999, 207-208.

[127] On prophetic elements in other parts of the VF and in the Dominican tradition: Schürer 2005, 194-199.

[128] VF III, 102. On the context within which the Dominican preaching evolved see: Oberste 1999, 245-294.

[129] VF III, 105, note 14.

[130] Cf. Psalm 42,4 which the VF III, 105, note 14 quotes: Fuerunt *michi lacrime mee panes die ac nocte.*

[131] On various functions of tears in medieval religious texts: Schreiner 2013, 63-122.

[132] On the emotional communities see: Rosenwein 2006.

preserving the loyalty to the Church prelates.[133] This textual insertion serves to indicate validity of his preaching in dioceses (where the preaching is under the jurisdiction of Bishops)[134] and to show its readership that the virtuous preaching in society is permitted only when remaining loyal to the Church authorities.

Sacramental devotion and usefulness for the Church

The VF III shows that the building of a virtuous person must include the affirmation of the belief in the sacramental mysteries. While Jordan was suffering from a severe illness and was lying in fever waiting for death, he asked for the Holy Communion (as a part of the Last Rites). When offered with it, despite illness he devoutly prostrated himself, and was communed.[135] With this *exemplum* the VF III not only affirms the sacramental devotion but also the respect for the ecclesiastically administered rites. Consequently, this element of virtuosity was empowering the sense of the Order's embedment into the Church.

Besides, the VF III promotes the idea that the virtuous behaviour is able to protect the purity of the clerical class. Jordan was not only instructing the Order's friars and was successfully persuading his novices to persevere in virtuosity (cf. the previous chapters). He was also efficiently helping the non-Dominican clerics to remain virtuous. This is exemplified by the tale in which Jordan is counselling some cleric tempted by the impure thoughts, finally succeeding in preserving his chastity.[136] Hence, the virtuous individual is useful for the institution of Church, i.e. for the morality of its members.

Finally, let us note that the VF III demonstrates that, apart from being useful to Church, a virtuous person can also produce the usefulness of others for the greater Christian cause. This is exemplified by the tale in which the virtues of steadiness, courage, and Christian utility are indissolubly linked. On one occasion, a German nobleman sought to kill Jordan because the magnate's son decided to leave the paternal estates and enter the Dominican order. Jordan did not run away but fearlessly confronted the nobleman and, following the example of Christ (John 18,5), presented himself to a persecutor. When a nobleman saw this, he immediately converted and, becoming fully aware of the power of God working through Jordan, he accepted his son's choice and made a

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[133] VF III, 102.
[134] On the complex relations between the Dominicans and episcopacy: Sickert 1999, 295-319.
[135] VF III, 124, note 5.
[136] VF III, 112-113.

vow to join the crusades.[137] Here we clearly see the textual formation of virtuosity around the Christ-modelled courage and the message of efficiency of such courage in converting the laymen. But apart from the converting power of virtuous individual and the success of the Order's earthly mission, the *exemplum* tends to confirm the potential of virtuosity for executing the greater Christian cause – the liberation of Holy Land. The nobleman was not only convinced of his error but he also redirected his violent intention to the crusading mission, i.e. "in the service of God across the sea" (... *ultra marem in servicio Dei*).[138] The virtue of courage thus serves to provoke the sense of the broader utility; it shows the readership that virtuosity can motivate the action reaching beyond the Western societal-ecclesiastical milieu.

Virtues and miracles: A note on the relational structure

"... the miracle confirms a holiness; the hagiographic exemplum constructs it..." [139] In this way A. Boureau defined in a perfect way the relational structure between the miracles, holiness, and the *exemplum*. But what is the place of virtues in this structure? In what way the virtuous *instrumenta* fit in?

The significant part of the VF III is, indeed, dedicated to Jordan's miracles; he is not only a religious virtuous but also a miracle worker. The VF III follows the usual medieval way of textualizing the Jordan's miracles – we find those that were performed during his life and posthumous ones. Concerning the first category, we learn that Jordan multiplied bread for the poor and increased the quality of wine; he healed many (a friar from temptation, a priest from fever, a smith from the nose bleeding, and some other smith from a blindness on one eye); he tamed the deranged spirit of a friar; he tamed the wild animal; and he saved a life of a sinful woman who swallowed the poisonous spider.[140]

Concerning the second category, there are also miracles of healing – Jordan healed the prioress after she prayed to him and he brought back the senses to a friar – and a miracle of bringing the infant back to life. There is a miracle of bodily exaltation: after Jordan's death, his body radiated light and emanated the nice odour; and there are miracles of saving a nun from despair and a Carmelite from leaving his order.[141]

Evidently, the miracles served to textually support the Christ-like holiness of Jordan. Jordan triumphs over the nature and demons, he

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[137] VF III, 111.
[138] VF III, 111.
[139] Boureau 1987, 91.
[140] VF III, 104, 106-108, 113-114, 125, 128-129.
[141] VF III, 130, 132-136.

helps the people and saves them. At this point we can see that the textualization of virtues and textualization of miracles are the two intertwined pillars of making Jordan the platform of bigger saintly authenticity. In other words, the working of miracles and working of virtues share the goal of providing the Jordan's literal figure the more primordial outlook of holiness.

Furthermore, they both function as the textual strategies of showing the Jordan's effect onto the people. This effectiveness is, naturally, also the way of making the Jordan the Christ-like reflection. However, for the Order focused on the *vita activa*, this feature has one additional value. It makes the missionary goal of the Order acknowledged and legitimized by the miracles. So, the miracles have the strong value for preserving the identity and institutional orientation of the Order, just as was the case with many of the textualized virtuous practices.[142]

The miracle, by its nature, affirms the power that stands beyond the normal human capacities.[143] However, the virtuous practices are also textualized in the VF III as coming from God or in communication with the Heavens. To remind ourselves – Jordan's prayer (the self-disciplinary virtuous practise) and preaching and speech (the virtuous practises directed to community and society) were "special graces" from Heavens, while the virtuous devotion of Mary was rewarded with the transcendental experiences.[144]

Apart from the similarities, the VF III indicates more nuanced relation between the virtues and miracles. The virtues were also the helping tools for recognising the false signs of miraculous working. The chapter xxxii narrates how, on one occasion, the Devil tempted Jordan to fall through the sin of vanity by providing him with the sweetest odour. But Jordan realised that such miraculous working was the Devil's trick to make him believe in his own holiness.[145] This is not only a virtue of wisdom but, even more, the reflection of humility – Jordan was refusing to accept the signs of his own miraculous sanctification.

The text shows that it is not only the virtue that protects the miraculous orthodoxy; the miracles support the preservation of virtues as well. This is clear from the posthumous miracle contained in the tale of a disobedient Dominican friar. This friar was not satisfied with his allocation to another monastery, and, while on his way there, he disobediently murmured against this decision of superiors. Consequently, he

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[142] See the previous chapters.
[143] "... a miracle has a single author, God." Le Goff 1988, 35.
[144] VF III, 105, 108, 118-119. See also the previous chapters.
[145] VF III, 126.

was struck by the Divine power – the friar fell down to earth and lost his senses. Only after his travelling companion called for Jordan's intersession, the friar recovered his senses, and remained obedient until death.[146] The textualization of miracles here serves to affirm the value of fundamental monastic virtuosity.

Furthermore, the miraculous elements are textualized to demonstrate Jordan's constancy and courage. At one occasion a possessed friar threatened Jordan to bite his nose off. Jordan remained calm and brave, and with his firmness he made the deranged friar powerless.[147] This miraculous event textually enlarges the value of virtuous self-discipline.

The miracles protect the internal order of a community (within which the virtues are best practised). The prioress of some nunnery was paralysed. She did not want to burden her sisters anymore and asked them to release her from the governing duty. The sisters, however, did not want to accept her resignation, so she asked the deceased Jordan for help. Jordan intervened from the other world and helped her to walk again.[148] The textualization of miracle, thus, served to stabilize the internal order of the cloistered life.

The deceased Jordan intervenes also for the monastic strata in its entirety. He appears in a vision to a certain Cistercian nun and helps her to recover from despair. As a best medicine, he advises her to pray for "our order" (clearly implying the entire monasticism, i.e. the *ordo* as a status, and not the particular order since Jordan and a nun belonged to different ones).[149] The miracle shows Jordan's care for the entire monasticism even from the other world, and indicates that the *vita religiosa* not only the earthly organization, but the eschatologically supported community.[150]

<p style="text-align:center">*</p>

It can be said that both miracles and virtues were textually constructing the conceptions of a more perfect human state, and were helping each other to affirm their own values. Also, they were affirming the value of both the monastic and specifically the Dominican life. And beyond these similarities and intertwined functionality, the virtues and miracles differ in one aspect of textualization. The textualization of miracles demonstrates the instant working of the Divine, with the main protagonist being the platform through which such force works. The textualization of virtues includes, however, the strong component of

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[146] VF III, 135-136.
[147] VF III, 125.
[148] VF III, 133.
[149] VF III, 132.
[150] On the eschatologically oriented communities: Jerković 2023, 286-288.

human capacity in acquiring a more perfect state. Always remaining in connection with the transcendental sphere, the virtuous hero is able to master the *instrumenta bonorum operum.*

4. Concluding remarks: The text as the productive force

From the analysis of the legendary acts of Jordan of Saxony, it is clear that the text was devised as a highly potent productive force. In the first place, it is important to state once again that the *Vitae fratrum* in general were producing a strong sense of belonging to the old monastic behavioural archetypes. Within that context, the VF III functioned as a platform of connecting the "virtuous primordiality" with the new form of religious life – the pastorally oriented preacher. Such platform, intended for the members of the Dominican order, was, consequently, the excellent ideological tool for producing the sense of ability of religious communities to integrate and perpetuate the ancient monastic system of virtuosity within the medieval world.

The text was, furthermore, a tool of producing the Jordan's ahistorical figure. Jordan textually functions as a transtemporal model and not as a real-life hero. His saintly outlook and monastic heroism are primarily the educational methods in acquiring virtuosity among the members of the Dominican order.

Accordingly, the text produces the set of practices and qualities that can be understood as the instruments of virtuosity. And this productive technique was based on targeting the three frameworks – the person himself (the body and mind), the religious community, and, finally, the society in which the virtuous person operates. These three conceptual "*loca* of virtuosity" modelled the figure of Jordan. He was a self-disciplinary virtuous (he was engaged in contemplative and classical monastic practices, he was taming the body, senses and speech, he was depriving himself of normal human needs) and a devout virtuous (he was honouring Mary in the first place); he had the ability of detaching himself from the world and be guided by the Divine force, thus demonstrating his contact with the transcendental sphere. His self-disciplinary practises were affecting others – he was either instructing explicitly or showing others by the example how to practise good discipline. His effects were especially seen in the virtues of prelacy: he was meek, gentle, caring, loving, just, patient, and comforting advisor and instructor. He was also a perfect model of Christ-like humility. His humility, patience and contempt for honour, together with the self-disciplinary practises were showing the necessity to overcome the worldly ways and the ability to recreate the authentic submission to the Evangelic precepts, despite the human nature. Finally, the society was affected

by the virtuosity of a main protagonist. The essential element of Jordan's virtuosity was his influence onto the outer world, i.e. on the laymen, who were highly edified, improved, converted, moved to charity, or stabilized in mind by the efficiency of his preaching (which included the high degree of emotionality in performance), or moved to compassion by the example of Evangelic poverty. Hence, by devising the *instrumenta* that were working within and on the main protagonist (in his conscience and on his body), and out of the main protagonist (in the community and in the society), the VF III was producing a sense that virtuosity had to be both interiorised and exteriorized.

The text is also a device that enables the virtuosity to cross the boundaries of literal exemplarity and anchor itself in both the conscience and performance of the preachers that were reading it. Furthermore, the text was aiming to instigate within the readership a sense that its *exempla* are not only the way of getting closer to the *vita perfectionis* but also a method of petrification of virtuosity. Namely, the new-styled religious, i.e. the Dominican preacher, had to realize that the textualized *exempla* formulate the standards of life-long constancy in virtuosity, just like the introduction into the VF III stated: *Imprimis igitur dicimus eum tamquam speculum tocius religionis et virtutum exemplar, utpote virum, qui castimoniam mentis ac corporis dicitur conservasse illesam.*[151] Clearly, the text was intended to produce not the virtuous man but the viable and durable virtuous personality.

The text was, finally, producing the improved community, either religious or societal. The exteriorisation of virtues as the fundamental feature of the program of building virtuosity was intended to upgrade the *societas Christiana* by making the cloistered experience more visible, more tangible, and more present in the lay environment.

The text is, thus, the interface that modulates virtuosity in a form that was acceptable to the Christian civilization. The VF III is, however, only one modulating program; it does not summarise the entire medieval quest for virtuosity. But, despite that, it can be seen that the VF III reflects the Christian tendency to shape the person in a form of the triumphant victor over oneself and over the world by the means of the submission to the Evangelical, old monastic, old ascetic, and apostolic-like archetypes. In such way, the medieval building of virtuosity is, fundamentally, the program of obedient, triumphant and primordially oriented reform, which results in the greater perfection. In such way, it reveals itself in a form of the most efficient aporia – it perfects the earthly existence by overcoming such existence.

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[151] VF III, 101. See also the chapter 2).

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7.

The Christian Humanism of Erasmus of Rotterdam and the Roles of St. Jerome and Marko Marulić

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Erasmus of Rotterdam is one of the most famous Christian-humanist thinkers, who was caught up in the fire of humanism at an early age. He read the Latin classics extensively and developed a great interest in classical antique literature (bonae litterae), and analogous to the return to these sources, the return to early Christian authors as sources of Christianity (sacrae litterae) became of great importance to him. Erasmus was particularly inspired by the life and work of the early Christian church father and teacher St. Jerome. His acquaintance with the life and work of Jerome contributed significantly to Erasmus' humanistic and church-reforming education and made him a great advocate of the restoration of true theology (vera theologia), which is based on complete devotion to the study of the Bible. Marko Marulić appreciated Jerome as a fellow countryman and developed his own concept of the philosophy of Christ as Christian ethics in the service of eternal bliss.

1. Introductory words

The philosophy of Christ as a concept occupies an important place in the work of the Dutch humanist Erasmus of Rotterdam. It is first and foremost a certain synthesis of Christian theology and moral life, i.e. a kind of philosophy as an ordered system of values that is not based on a purely intellectual basis, but represents a synthesis of wisdom and life. In order to understand the essence of the philosophy of Christ (*Philosophia Christi*) as conceived by Erasmus of Rotterdam, it is necessary to take into account the context of the time in which this Renaissance thinker lived and worked, i.e. the circumstances of the emergence of such a religious-philosophical concept. We will therefore discuss this in detail in the first part of the text, before turning to the ba-

sic statement of this concept and presenting its most important features.

In his restoration efforts, Erasmus was greatly inspired by the life and work of St. Jerome of Stridon, whom he held in high esteem, as can be seen from his texts. Due to his importance for Croatian culture and his origins, the 1600th anniversary of Jerome's death was widely celebrated in Croatia in 2020,[1] and in the third part of this article, we would like to present this connection between Erasmus and Jerome. It is also known that Erasmus of Rotterdam, as one of the most important representatives of Renaissance (and Christian) humanism, was appreciated in high esteem by many Croatian contemporaries. One of them is the father of Croatian literature and humanist Marko Marulić, whose 500th anniversary of death was also celebrated throughout Croatia in 2024.[2] In the last part of this article, the most important connections between Marulić and Erasmus of Rotterdam are shown with regard to the concept of the philosophy of Christ and Christian humanism in general.

As an outstanding thinker with an open mind, a connoisseur of classical languages and literature, a diligent reformer in the truest sense of the word, a man of broad culture and a pedagogue, Erasmus was inspired by good literature and thus became a role model for many. The two Croatian giants we associate with him in this text are an example of this inspiring interplay.

2. The foundations of Christian humanism by Erasmus

2.1. Erasmus' view of the philosophy of Christ

The broader context for the emergence of the idea of the philosophy of Christ in Erasmus was his belief in the need for ecclesiastical (and social) renewal – reform. The fundamental reasons for this were more than obvious: the secularisation of the church and the deformation of theological thought through scholastic divisions and petty entanglements. Erasmus claimed that the theologians of his time preferred

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[1] In 2020 and on the occasion of the 1600th anniversary of Jerome's death, several scientific conferences were held throughout Croatia and several publications were published. We refer here only to the collection of articles entitled "Sveti Jeronim u hrvatskoj kulturi (Saint Jerome in Croatian Culture)", Pavlović, Cvijeta and Gudelj, Jasenka (eds.), Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada (Croatian University Press), Zagreb 2024, and Prosperov Novak, Slobodan, "Sveti Jeronim Dalmatinac (Saint Jerome the Dalmatian)", Splitko-dalmatinska županija i Školska knjiga (Split-Dalmatia County and School book), Split-Zagreb 2020.

[2] To mark this important anniversary, the Government of the Republic of Croatia declared 2024 the Year of Marko Marulić; numerous scientific and cultural events were held and publications issued.

to stick to the letter of the law and devoted their attention to divination rather than the revelation of spiritual mysteries.[3] Erasmus saw the way out of the resulting situation in active piety, which was to replace pious thinking, i.e. in the simplification of theological statements and church ceremonies through a new revival of the original Christian idea. Such an orientation towards pure Protestant science in close connection with humanistic education was understood by Erasmus as the philosophy of Christ.[4] This is a completely new approach for the ecclesiastical-theological context of the time because it is not based on strictly intellectual and certainly not on doctrinal rules, but exclusively on the person of Christ, who was largely forgotten in the numerous theological debates of the time.[5]

Erasmus already wrote about the idea of the philosophy of Christ in his earliest works[6] and permanently maintained his conviction that classical (antique) thought and evangelical piety are not to be understood as opposites. This is precisely the basic guideline in his Handbook of the Christian Warrior (*Enchiridion Militis Christiani*) as the most important text for the consideration of the concept of the philosophy of Christ. He repeatedly emphasises that one should not reject anything in the writings of pagan poets and philosophers that contributes to the understanding of the divine law[7] or is useful for a righteous

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[3] Cf. Erasmus von Rotterdam, *Enchiridion Militis Christiani* (*Handbüchlein eines christlichen Streiters*), in: Erasmus von Rotterdam, *Ausgewählte Schriften* (Lateinisch und Deutsch) Bd. 1, str. 55.-375., this p. 88. Erasmus also wrote satirically about such theological speculative entanglements, claiming that "even the apostles themselves would need a different Holy Spirit if they were forced to cross swords with the new theologians on these issues". Cf. *Pohvala ludosti* (*Moriae Enkomion*), CID-Nova, Zagreb 2009., p. 111.

[4] He uses various terms such as philosophy of Christ, Christian philosophy, or evangelical philosophy for this concept. In any case, the texts of the Gospels are the source of this concept, and Erasmus took the name Philosophy of Christ from the Greek church Fathers as his most respected teachers. Cf. HALKIN, Leon-E., *Erazmo i kršćanski humanizam* (*Erasmus and Christian humanism*), Kršćanska sadašnjost (Christian Present), Zagreb 2005., p. 143.

[5] Cf. Wheatley, Jeff, *Erazmova Philosophia Christi* (Philosophia Christi by Erasmus). Web: http://jawntmw.freeservers.com/ttschhaa.html (Accessed: March 23, 2024)

[6] In his tragicomic dialogue on the excommunication of the then-controversial Pope Julius II, for example, Erasmus contrasts the divine simplicity of Christ's teaching with the worldly arrogance of the Pope in the person of Saint Peter. Erasmus writes: "The teaching of Christ [*Christi Disciplina*] requires a heart that is completely purified from the influence of worldly concerns. Such a great teacher did not come from heaven to earth to teach people a simple or familiar philosophy. Being a Christian is neither a carefree nor a peaceful profession". Cf. *Dialogus, Iulius exclusus e coelis* (*Julius vor der verschlossenen Himmelstür, ein Dialog*), in: Erasmus von Rotterdam, *Ausgewählte Schriften* (Lateinisch und Deutsch) vol. 5, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1995., pp. 6.-109., this p. 99.

[7] Cf. *Enchiridion Militis Christiani*, p. 82.

life,[8] for they educate and nourish the youthful mind and prepare it wonderfully for the knowledge of the divine scriptures. Everything is pure for the pure, Erasmus claims, and nothing is pure for the impure,[9] so that everything in classical literature is good as long as it does not contradict the teaching of the biblical texts as divine doctrine.[10]

Erasmus was one of the humanists who believed that the neglect of ancient writings was the cause of the darkness of the Middle Ages and that the revival of the Latin and Greek classics, the return to the New Testament and the writings of the church Fathers would lead man back to moral balance and spiritual values.[11] Their study would enable a clear understanding of Christianity and consequently contribute to a more significant progress of society, which was one of Erasmus' main humanistic goals.[12] In his Conversations (*Colloquia Familiaria*), he argues that anything that is pious and contributes to good behaviour should not be considered pagan,[13] and he considers the words of Socrates before he drank hemlock poison to be entirely appropriate for a Christian: "I do not know whether God will approve of our actions. In any case, we have made a serious effort to please him. I sincerely hope that my efforts will please him".[14] Alluding to these words of a philosopher who knew neither Christ nor the Holy Scriptures, Erasmus continues: "When I read such things about such people, I cannot help but say: Holy Socrates, pray for us."[15]

Erasmus' ideal is something quite different from the doctrine of unity (we would say dogmatism). He warned against intellectual arrogance, criticised an insufficient awareness of the limits of human cog-

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[8] Cf. *Ibid*, p. 84.

[9] Cf. *Ibid*, p. 86.

[10] Cf. *Ibid*, p. 126.

[11] The concentration of Christians on the classical writers would naturally lead to an interest in the Fathers of the Church, who are closer to the events of the New Testament than modern man, and their piety is more correct, their teaching richer and more ancient, their language strong and exquisite, and their interpretation of the sacred mysteries more appropriate. Cf. *Enchiridion Militis Christiani*, p. 88.

[12] Cf. Linkels, Nicole, "*Philosophy and Religion in Service of the Philosophia Christi*", in: *Erasmus Student Journal of Philosophy 5 (2013.), pp. 44.-55., this p. 47.*

[13] In this context, he adds the following: "Holy Scripture everywhere deserves the highest esteem; but yet I sometimes come across certain things said or written by pagans (...) that are so pure, so holy and so divine that I cannot believe that their reason was not guided by a good nature when they wrote them." In: "*Convivium Religiosum*", in: *Colloquia Familiaria, Ausgewählte Schriften* (Lateinisch und Deutsch) vol. 6,, pp. 21.-124., this p. 76.

[14] The German translation of this text states in note 53 that Socrates' words are simply not to be found at the end of Plato's dialogue *Phaedo*, where one would most likely expect to find them, or in other relevant places.

[15] "*Convivium Religiosum*", pp. 86.-87.

nitive possibilities and emphasised that it was appropriate to be intellectually humble, especially in relation to divine matters. Such an attitude was inspired by Erasmus both by his personal (religious) convictions and by the Socratic insight into his own ignorance of supposedly incontrovertible assertions, especially when it came to the ultimate truths of faith. In this sense, it is also true for the theologian that one must not exceed the limits of human knowledge: "In the divine scriptures, there are certain inaccessible places that God does not want us to approach; and when we try to reach them, we find that the deeper we go, the more obscurity there is, so that we also understand the unfathomable greatness of divine wisdom and the helplessness of the human mind".[16] He pleads for open and open-ended thinking, for a theology that (itself) constantly asks questions, and this alone shows the essential difference between Erasmus and his contemporary and opponent in dealing with the process of necessary reforms in the church of Martin Luther.[17] According to him, it is a philosophical wisdom that protects the humanistic belief in human dignity and man's ability to take care of himself and his actions.

2.2. The fundamental message of the philosophy of Christ

Erasmus' concept of the philosophy of Christ is expressed above all in the Handbook of the Christian Warrior (*Enchiridion Militis Christiani*), in which he concentrates entirely on the spiritual life of the individual. At the end of the work, he points out the strong influence of the ideas of humanism on his own life and responds to those who believe that knowledge of good literature (*bonarum litterarum scire*) is not essential for sublime piety. He explains that his early preoccupation with ancient authors and his efforts to learn classical languages were not a sign of youthful desire and glory-seeking but of zeal for the preservation of the temple of the Lord, which is too much dishonoured

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[16] *De libero arbitrio διατριβή sive collatio*, in: *Ausgewählte Schriften* (Lateinisch und Deutsch) vol. 4, pp. 1.-195., this p. 10.

[17] Cf. Nettlind, Astrig, "Erasmus im Streit mit Luther. "Heiliger Sokrates, bitte für uns! (Erasmus in dispute with Luther. "Saint Socrates, pray for us!)", Web: https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/erasmus-im-streit-mit-luther-heiliger-sokrates-bitte-fuer.2540.de.html, (Accessed: May 21, 2024.). The fact is that these two great men recognised the difficulties in which the church of the time found itself and the legitimate demands for its restoration, but they differed considerably in their ideas about how this restoration should be achieved. While Erasmus proposed a slow process of catharsis through the power of rational (self-)criticism, Luther was more inclined to take a radical step, so that his approach to ecclesiastical renewal can be described as revolutionary. You can learn more about the way these two great men approached church renewal: DŽINIĆ, Ivo, "Reformation and (or) Revolution: Erasmus of Rotterdam and Martin Luther", u: *Filozofska istraživanja* 38 (2018.) 4, pp. 737.-746.

precisely because of ignorance and lack of culture. His intention was to adorn this temple with a wealth of content that could inspire all noble souls to love the divine scriptures.[18]

The entire handbook is an incentive to return to the realisation of the inner spiritual life, following both the biblical and Platonic dualism between body and mind, and calling for perseverance in discovering the invisible reality and becoming aware of worldly obsessions. Erasmus believes that many Christians lose sight of this on a concrete, practical level and focus too much on external works, which he describes in a rather pointed and insightful way: "I am not a fornicator, you say, nor a thief, nor a blasphemer, and I keep what I have vowed. But what is this but: I am not like other men, robbers and adulterers, and I fast twice a week." Erasmus is clearly referring here to the Gospel text with its comparison of those who are convinced of their own righteousness and despise others (cf. Luke 18:11), and concludes: "I would rather have a humble tax collector who asks for mercy than such righteous people who plead their own merits."[19] Erasmus thus denounces the outward appearance and pretence of Christianity, which is not only based on the sacrament of baptism but must also manifest itself within the Christian and permeate his entire life.

It is similar with the human intellect, which, according to Erasmus, must also be subject to the authority of the spiritual life. Some things can be useful on the Christian path, including various teachings, but it is precisely from the perspective of Christ that the benefit and harm of these things must be judged. Everything that can help to recognise the Christ of Holy Scripture must be desired, so knowledge and art should not be loved for their own sake, but precisely for the sake of Christ. Thus, he utters the following words: "If you believe in yourself and hope for immeasurable gain in Christ, then, like a bold merchant, go into the writings of the pagans and use the riches of Egypt to adorn the temple of our Lord. But if you fear losing more than you hope to gain, return to the first rule: know thyself and measure yourself by your own measure. It is better to know less and love more than to know much and not love."[20] From all this, it follows that one should study only that which nourishes the soul, for it is precisely through learning that it is strengthened and ennobled. The basic assumption throughout the *Enchiridion* is that through such knowledge one can know God more closely. God should be worshipped with a pure mind, and according to Erasmus such a mind is not ignorant of worldly

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[18] Cf. *Enchiridion Militis Christiani*, p. 372.
[19] *Ibid*, pp. 210. and 212.
[20] *Ibid*, p. 173.

thought or philosophy, but entirely subordinate to the philosophy of Christ.[21]

The aim of this philosophy is to teach man the right way of restoration and to educate him to realise it. The basis for this is human nature, which was originally created as something good and submits to the guidance of Christ's teaching. Therefore, human nature and the philosophies of Christ are very compatible. What is most consistent with nature will easily take root in people's souls. Among the numerous examples of right living found not only in Christianity but also in the pagan world, Christ represents the universal archetype and model of life, the source of the ethical values that guide *humanitas*. Erasmus' image of Christ was torn out of the series of dogmas and sacraments and placed in the context of his universal philosophy. Not dogma and sacrament, but *eruditio* and *pietas*, education and piety – in other words, basically the moral life – form the space in which Christ takes the central stage for Erasmus. Erasmus approaches the biblical Christ not through the teachings of the church, but through the philosophical tradition.[22]

3. St. Jerome in the humanist view of Erasmus of Rotterdam

3.1. St. Jerome as inspiration

Erasmus of Rotterdam was greatly inspired by the figure and work of St. Jerome of Stridon, and there was a kinship between them that was of great importance to Erasmus in the realisation of his reformist goals. From his early years, he knew Jerome as both a saint and a scholar, for his brother monks, with whom he lived and studied as a young man, were called *Hieronymians* because of their devotion to this saint. Some have speculated that Erasmus' interest in Jerome was due precisely to these connections.[23]

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[21] This submission of the mind to the philosophy of Christ is another feature that distinguishes Erasmus from Luther, for whom the submission of the mind to Christ consists in a kind of certainty in doctrinal matters. Luther himself developed a certain systematic theology, although it is entirely unscholastic. For Erasmus and his philological approach, the awareness that some things cannot be grasped with great certainty is important, and his humanistic commitment did not allow him to overlook the contradictions in any systematic approach to God. Cf. WHEATLEY, Jeff, *Erazmova Philosophia Christi* (*Philosophia Christi* by Erasmus). Web: http://jawntmw.freeservers.com/ttschhaa.html (Accessed: March 23, 2024)

[22] Cf. Heidtmann, Günter, "Die Philosophia Christi des Erasmus (The Philosophia Christi of Erasmus)", in: *Evangelische Theologie*, 12. Jahrgang, 1952/1953, pp. 187-197, this p. 190.

[23] Cf. Olin, John C., *Erasmus, Utopia, and the Jesuits: Essays On the Outreach of Humanism*, Fordham University Press, New York 1994., p. 5.

Even as a young monk, he read and copied all of Jerome's writings and learned some important things from them, which further explains both his connection to their author and his early formation as a humanist thinker. Erasmus emphasised Jerome's texts as a model of beautiful writing and a profession of faith, and they became a literary treasure and a weapon of argument against uncultured and opponents of good literature. Thus, Jerome and his texts occupied a special place as inspiration and guide in his intellectual plans, and Erasmus soon began to edit and comment on the saint's writings, which further motivated him toward the planned reform goals. Erasmus was even surprised that so great a man had been neglected for so long in the transmission of Christian doctrine, and praised his general talents, which ranged from his knowledge of the classical languages to the finesse of his oral expression and his power of faith and inspiration. The complex adaptation of Jerome's texts culminated in their publication in nine volumes as the first *opera omnia* of this saint and the result of Erasmus's painstaking work on his revival.

Thus the nine-volume edition of the Church Father is the clearest expression of Erasmus' respect (veneration) for St. Jerome, and when he published Jerome's work, he wrote a dedicatory letter and the biography of the saint (*Hieronymi Stridonensis Vita*) with critical statements on hagiography in general as an introduction to the first volume.[24] Erasmus' preoccupation with St. Jerome and his writings were based not only on the greatness of this saint as a Christian teacher, but also on his neglect, about which he was very surprised. He therefore believed that he himself should follow the path to which St. Jerome and many ancient hymn writers invited him, in whose company he wanted to enjoy himself more than in the company of contemporary theologians.[25] In his opinion, Jerome's writings simply had to be preserved whole and intact, for their value is so great that, after the writings of the evangelists and apostles, there is nothing more worthy of a Christian's attention.[26]

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[24] Cf. Stieglicker, Roland, *Die Renaissance eines Heiligen. Sebastian Brant und Onuphrius Eremita* (*The Renaissance of a Saint. Sebastian Brant and Onuphrius Eremita*), Harrasowitz Verlag, Wiesbaden, 2001., p. 83.

[25] Indeed, Erasmus states the following: "I myself am inclined to follow the path to which St. Jerome and the famous choir of all those ancient writers invite me; and, heaven love me, I would rather go mad in their glorious company than be infinitely sensible with the mass of theologians of today." Adapted from: OLIN, John C., "Erasmus and Saint Jerome", in: *Thought* 54 (1979.) 3, pp. 313.-321., this p. 315.

[26] Cf. Olin, John C., *Erasmus, Utopia, and the Jesuits: Essays on the Outreach of Humanism*, p. 11.

3. 2. Jerome as the ideal of a Christian humanist

In addition to the dedicatory letter, Erasmus wrote a panegyric to Jerome and in the saint's biography, which, apart from its historiographical value, reveals Erasmus' understanding of Jerome and points to the central role that the holy scholar played in his reform plan. After the aforementioned critical remarks on hagiography in general and on the medieval biographies of Jerome in particular, Erasmus rejects any form of embellishment and declares that he will give a truthful account of Jerome's life since truth has its own power and does not tolerate invention or embellishment. The biography is therefore primarily based on Jerome's own works, which speak for themselves and provide a truthful picture of the saint's life.[27] In the following text, he then describes the moments of Jerome's education and preparation for great things, referring to his early preparation at home and his classical education in Rome and describing his travels, up to the decision to devote himself to the monastic life and the study of the Scriptures, which enabled him to become an outstanding theologian and teacher. According to Erasmus, it is precisely the aim of the study of Holy Scripture, just as it is the aim of the theologian, to draw his teaching from it as from the philosophy of Christ. This is the core of Erasmus' entire reform humanism and the restoration of true theology, which is the inspiring and living theology of the early church, and he presents Jerome here as a model and guide on this path.[28]

In the end, Erasmus defends Jerome against his critics, mostly scholastic theologians, who reduced theology to sophistical refinements, whereas Erasmus saw it much more as a living or embodying philosophy of Christ. For him, it is not primarily an academic discipline or speculative science, but a life according to the Gospel in word and deed, and in his eyes Jerome was a true representative of this theology and thus the ideal of a Christian humanist. For Erasmus, presenting Jerome's life also meant setting an example of the reforms he considered crucial, and defending what Jerome stood for also meant defending his own goals and ideals.[29]

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[27] Erasmus literally states: "For who would know better about Jerome than Jerome himself? Or who would give a truer picture of him? (...) That is why I have studied all of Jerome's works and put into narrative form the material that I was able to gather from the scattered parts of his writings. I have invented nothing because for me the greatest miracle is the miracle of Jerome as it is revealed to us in his many works of lasting and above all high quality." Adapted from: Olin, John C., *Erasmus, Utopia, and the Jesuits: Essays on the Outreach of Humanism*, p. 12.

[28] Cf. *Ibid*, p. 13.

[29] Cf. Olin, John C., "Erasmus and Saint Jerome", pp. 320.-321.

It is also interesting to note that Erasmus completed and published his Latin and Greek translation of the New Testament in the same year in which he finished the editing of Jerome's writings; in this way two great undertakings were completed and his great effort bore great fruit. His entire program presupposed the restoration of ancient Christian literature, and his translation of the New Testament, which always comes first, followed by the editions of the early Christian Fathers with St. Jerome as one of the most significant achievements, are a kind of benchmark for this enormous undertaking and the culmination of Erasmus' career as the goals he had set for himself many years earlier.

Erasmus also compiled a list of Jerome's works as part of his introductory material, and in it, one finds a surprisingly sharp remark embedded in the list of Jerome's lost works. He notes that Jerome translated the Scriptures for the people into his own language, i.e. Dalmatian, whereas today it is considered a sin to read the Scriptures in the vernacular. It was not unusual for Erasmus to cause a stir and make enemies with such translations, but all his annotations and commentaries on Jerome's texts enriched this edition immensely and lent its significance and influence as a work of humanist reform.[30]

3.3. Erasmus and Jerome – (self-)portraits

In the biography he prepared for the publication of Jerome's writings, Erasmus attempted to portray Jerome in the light of his own ideas and reforms, which were most important to him. As already mentioned, Jerome appears as an ideal and role model to be followed. Moreover, Erasmus identified with Jerome in many ways, so the biography represents both his own vindication and his defence against those who criticised his work. Some therefore regard Erasmus' text *Hieronymi Stridonensis Vita* as a kind of self-portrait of Erasmus.[31]

Ultimately, however, there are many similarities between these two giants. Jeronim was known as a fierce polemicist with a restless spirit, which is why he made many enemies. Erasmus fared similarly, whose views caused discomfort and anger not only among theologians but also among philosophers and other scholars who made themselves the target of his satire. Later, he was also criticised for his lukewarmness when it came to taking a clear position for or against Luther's vision and leadership of the Reformation process. Like Jerome, Erasmus was held in high esteem among the dignitaries and great men of his time who were politically influential, and as an intellectual, he was com-

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[30] Cf. Olin, John C., *Erasmus, Utopia, and the Jesuits: Essays On the Outreach of Humanism*, p. 17.
[31] Cf. *Ibid*, p. 14.

mitted to the realisation of his goals. As far as working qualities were concerned, Jerome often knew how to withdraw and seek his rest, which can also be said of Erasmus, who enjoyed his rest and his work, even to a certain degree of egotism in his *bonae litterae*.

Jerome studied the classical languages in Rome, just as Erasmus attached importance to their knowledge, and in their approach to the work of translating the Scriptures their mutual similarities are recognisable, namely the emphasis on the philological basis, and correctness, but also on the meaning of the text itself. Just as Jerome (347-420) lived in one of the decisive epochs of human history, characterised by the realisation of the freedom of the Christian religion, but also by further persecutions of Christians and the threat of the Roman Empire, Erasmus' lifetime was also a very significant time with a major historical turning point. The first was before the beginning of the Middle Ages, the second at its end, i.e. at the beginning of the modern era. It is obvious that these sketches from the lives of the two great men, and above all the enormous admiration Erasmus had for Jerome, make it clear why the biography of the saint written by Erasmus can largely be interpreted as a kind of self-portrait of the author.

4. Erasmus' and Marulić's *philosophia Christi* in comparison

4. 1. *In the footsteps of Christian humanism*

In addition to St. Jerome, in the following text, we would like to point out the numerous connections to Erasmus of Rotterdam of the zealous promoter and interpreter of the basic principles of Christian moral education with a pronounced humanistic education and great scientific interest, Marko Marulić from Split. In addition to the Holy Scriptures, the Fathers of the Church and classical antiquity, Marulić enthusiastically absorbed and read the works of Erasmus. He praised the author's piety, erudition, and stylistic excellence and replaced scholasticism with church fathers and ancient writers as true role models. The humanist from Split was thus a contemporary of Erasmus, who greatly appreciated his work and his contribution to the renewal of ecclesiastical literature. The best proof of this is certainly one of the most beautiful eulogies ever addressed to the great Dutchman, which Marulić himself wrote in a dedicatory letter to a fellow citizen and friend after the latter had sent him Erasmus' books to read, in which he pointed out that they radiate piety, erudition, and eloquence and remarked that he had enjoyed reading them. Marulić appreciates Erasmus' erudition and stylistic sophistication, but also recognises his concern for the

Church, which is why he accepts his texts without hesitation despite the many controversial reactions that were pervasive in Europe.[32]

There are many points of contact between these two great men, for they shared the views of Christian humanism and the intellectual movement of the *devotio moderna* of the time. In this sense, they were united by their advocacy of a return to the Bible and the church Fathers, in particular their affection for St. Jerome and his biblical translation work, as well as their sharp criticism of corrupted piety, especially on the part of church dignitaries, and their criticism of scholastic theology.[33]

4. 2. *The philosophy of Christ as ethics of the individual*

Marulić presented his own concept of the philosophy of Christ in the greatest detail in his most important moral and theological work *Evangelist* (*Evangelistarium*, 1480-1500, first known edition in 1516). It is a discussion in seven books and a practical Christian ethic based on three theological virtues as a summary of the entire Bible, namely faith, hope and love. However, there is also *A guide to a virtuous life according to the example of the saints* (*De institutione bene vivendi per exempla sanctorum*), which was written around 1496 (first known edition in 1507) and is a collection of instructive stories and anecdotes from the Bible and biographies of saints in six books.[34] The aim of the work is to encourage the reader to lead a virtuous life with vivid and concise examples without abstract considerations. The two works mentioned above brought Marulić worldwide fame and portrayed him as an ethically committed and religious-humanist thinker.[35]

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[32] Marulić did not have the opportunity to meet Erasmus of Rotterdam in person, as few Croats did. Lučin states that only Jakov Baničević, a "respected European diplomat", had the opportunity to meet Erasmus in person. Nevertheless, Erasmus' works were very popular among Croatian intellectuals of the time, and in this sense, Marulić himself should be highlighted. Cf. Lučin, Bratislav, "Erazmo i Hrvati XV. I XVI. stoljeća (Erasmus and the Croats of 15th and the 16th century)", u: *Prilozi* 59-60 (2004), pp. 5.-29., this pp. 5. and 18.

[33] St. Jerome thus represents another link between Marulić and Erasmus, and both wrote the biography of the saint in a not-too-long period of time. Marulić added to his version of the biography of St. Jerome (*Vita Diui Hieronymi*, 1507) a polemical discussion of his origins: *Against those who claim that St. Jerome was Italian* (*In eos qui beatum Hieronymum Italum fuisse contendunt*) and a *Hymn of praise to St. Jerome* (*De laudibus diui Hieronymi carmen*). Cf. Marulić, Marko, *Stihovi i proza* (*Verse and Prose*), Stoljeća hrvatske književnosti (A Century of Croatian Literature), vol. 137, Matica Hrvatska, Zagreb 2018, (the chronicle of Marko Marulić compiled by Bratislav Lučin).

[34] Croatian edition: *Pouke za čestit život s primjerima* (*Lessons for a virtuous life with examples*) (translated and interpreted by Branimir Glavičić), Globus, Zagreb 1986.

[35] As far as the number of editions is concerned, the *Institution* has far more editions than the *Evangelist*, but in terms of systematics and ethical determination, the *Evangelist*

Although he does not use the term *philosophia Christi*, it is present in Marulić in the form of Christian ethics and is identical with Christian science, namely that which has its true source in the Bible. True ethics is not an invention of man, for it goes beyond man, has its origin in God and is therefore the highest of all sciences. The acceptance and living of divine philosophy determine human and Christian life and its ultimate realisation. For Marulić, a desirable human life is a life full of virtues, which therefore become the focus of his interest.[36] A virtuous life is the vocation and ideal of man, and virtue itself is something innate to man. This already shows agreement with Erasmus' assessment of human nature as naturally created for the good and as one of the foundations for the realisation of Christ's philosophy as a way of life. By nature, man strives for happiness, and true happiness, according to Marulić, consists of a virtuous life. It is therefore about the interpenetration of ethics and religious option and the general harmony between faith and reason.[37]

For Marulić, therefore, man is by nature an ethical being, i.e. a free, conscious, and responsible being who has his own rights and duties. He is at the same time the main factor and the concrete bearer of morality, which determines his rank and qualification. Reason and reasonableness represent an essential quality of man, they are "innate to man", not greed, lust, hypocrisy, and everything that opposes this reason, while the strong man is the one whose reason does not abandon him and turns his will away from worldly pleasures and directs it towards that which is worthy of heaven.[38] Only by relying on reason and the judgment of the mind as a gift from God can one overcome and reject everything that the body drives and tempts man to do.[39] According to Marulić, by listening to and obeying the commandments and prohibitions of God, man follows only what is implanted in his heart and obeys the "reason of our nature", i.e. the natural voice of conscience.[40] He also emphasises freedom of will, from which true repentance and "every deed that deserves either punishment or reward" must arise. With the help of free will, the soul can turn either to bodily pleasures or spiritual virtues, i.e. "turn to the side it wants", and the

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is far more important in terms of moral and theological evaluation, cf. Šimundža, Drago, "Pogled u Marulićev evanđelistar (A Look at Marulić's Evangelist)", in: *Crkva u svijetu* (*Church in the World*) 21 (1986) 1, pp. 85.-88., this p. 85.

[36] Cf. Parlov, Mladen, "Marulićeva *philosophia christi* (Marulić's *philosophia christi*)", in: *Obnovljeni život* (*Renewed life*) 61 (2006) 3, pp. 289.-305., this p. 301.

[37] Cf. Šimundža, Drago, *Pogled u Marulićev evanđelistar*, p. 86.

[38] Cf. Marulić, Marko, *Evanđelistar*, Book I. Chapter XV.

[39] Cf. *Ibid*, chapter XVII. and the Book II. Chapter IV.

[40] *Ibid*, p. 165.

promise of future glory depends on this.[41] This emphasis on human free will and original human goodness is consistent with Erasmus' view that human will be guided by reason and self-conscious and independent human nature are prerequisites for the renewal of the individual and the world. With his rational and volitional possibilities and capacities, man is called to resist destruction and learn constant renewal, which, as mentioned above, is the true meaning of Christ's philosophy.[42]

Just as Erasmus placed a concrete individual and his spiritual life at the centre of his *Enchiridion*, for Marulić the individual in his life situation is important, no matter how it may be, even in the most desperate! Starting from man as the only one who can decide for or against a moral life, he simultaneously encourages him in his weaknesses and lets him know that the awareness of guilt and remorse knows no limits to forgiveness, because "the mercy of God is greater than all sins".[43] It is obvious that Marulić endeavoured to encourage and teach people to lead and embrace life according to evangelical principles, i.e. to act in an enlightened manner with the aim of implementing Christ's philosophy in the life of each individual. In addition, as with Erasmus and Marulić, there is a pronounced Christocentrism. Christ is the perfect man (*homo universalis*) and the ideal to which the entire Christian thread of the Renaissance and humanism aspired. In Marulić's vision, the search for the ideal of human life in general becomes a search for the universal man, i.e. for Christ. At the same time, the virtues move to the focus of his interest as something that is not important in itself and has nothing to do with something abstract, but with the concrete and practical life of the individual on his path to holiness. Through the virtues, man approaches the model of Christ and becomes like him.[44] In his *Teachings for a virtuous life*, he refers, like the evangelist, to numerous examples of holy persons, not primarily for the sake of hagiography, but to present a roadmap for a virtuous life and the realisation of a valid Christian life and ultimately eternal bliss. Already in his dedicatory letter, he explains that this is the purpose of the writing, namely to draw from the lives of the saints "examples of a virtuous life" and to present them "for those who aspire to become saints themselves".[45] In short, formation in the virtues, which should be lasting and courageous, is a genuine program of spiritual life, and this was also a very

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[41] *Ibid*, chapter 12., p. 200. and chapter XX., p. 312.

[42] Cf. Heidtmann, Günter, "Die Philosophia Christi des Erasmus", pp. 189.-190.

[43] Cf. Marulić, Marko, *Evanđelistar*, the book II. chapter XIV., p. 212.

[44] He explains this in chapter 24 of the third book of the *Evangelists* under the title "We must be conformed to Christ", pp. 322.-329.

[45] Marulić, Marko, *Pouke za čestit život s primjerima*, p. 3.

important feature of the *devotio moderna* movement to which Marulić belonged.[46]

It is clear from everything that Marko Marulić greatly appreciated the work and efforts of Erasmus for ecclesiastical and theological reform and the creation of a Christian-oriented humanism. He devoted himself to this task, for which the Dutch humanist was clearly an additional inspiration, perhaps not to the same extent as St. Jerome was for Erasmus, but in any case the connection is more than obvious. In conclusion, however, it should be mentioned that, unlike Erasmus, Marulić does not adhere to any wisdom that does not relate to Christian doctrine, i.e. not even the wisdom of the ancient philosophers. Rather, he makes it clear that he adheres strictly to the laws and the Holy Scriptures of God in his deliberations and wishes to ignore everything "other" as superfluous.[47]

At one point he writes explicitly: "So let Plato concern himself with his arguments, Aristotle with his proofs, and all the philosophers of the ancient academy with the cunning tricks of their sophistry! True wisdom consists in knowing God and obeying his commandments and prohibitions with all one's heart."[48] It is clear from the preceding text that Erasmus regarded the wisdom of pre-Christian philosophy as a kind of preparation for the acceptance of divine doctrine.

5. Concluding remarks

The concept of the philosophy of Christ can seem quite paradoxical, and Erasmus does so intentionally. It is undoubtedly philosophy as a system of harmonised principles, and not an irrational message suitable only for the inspired. It is a specific philosophy, which, according to Erasmus, is not human but divine, and which is open not only to the intellectuals but to all. In its essence, it is wisdom and life.[49]

Essential to Erasmus' conception of the philosophy of Christ seems to be the recognition that God gave humanity the gift of philosophy before crowning it with the ultimate truth of Christ's words. Christians must therefore recognise the value of the ancients and embrace them as part of the Christian way of life. Yet his defence of the ancient thinkers pales in comparison to his tireless defence of what he saw as forgotten Christian truths. Pagan philosophy was helpful in understan-

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[46] Cf. Parlov, Mladen, "Marulićeva *philosophia christi*", pp. 303.-304. (footnote 63.).

[47] This was well noticed by Mladen Parlov on p. 300 of his text, relying on Marulić's words in "Marko Marulić's Preface to Evađelistar", in: *Evanđelistar*, p. 46.-47.

[48] Marulić, Marko, *Evanđelistar*, knjiga II., poglavlje XVII., str. 164.

[49] This is how Halkin, Leon-E, describes, among other things, his presentation of Erasmus's concept of Christ philosophy. in: *Erazmo i kršćanski humanizam*, p. 143.

ding the Christian religion, but it could never contradict anything Christ taught.[50] In this sense, Erasmus' concept of the philosophy of Christ can be said to be essentially biased, since the truth of the Bible is predominantly assumed dogmatically. Although ancient philosophy was invaluable to him, he considered it a conditional religious doctrine.[51]

Erasmus was a reformer, and his scientific and literary works were an essential part of his reform program. His aim was to reform theology by returning it to the biblical and patristic sources. This required replacing the theology of the "modern" theology of the Occamists, Scotists, and other dialecticians with what Erasmus saw as the original theology of the early church: *vetus ac vera theologia*. Everything else would flow from this renewal of religion, both the reform of the individual Christian and the improvement of Christian society. This return to the sources of Holy Scripture naturally concerned primarily the Gospels and Epistles, but after this "literature of Christ" it was the turn of the early Church Fathers. Their authority is derived from their temporal and spiritual proximity to the divine source, and their greatest value lies in interpreting the sacred text and promoting its understanding and acceptance. The Church Fathers guide and inspire us in the Christian life, for theology, according to Erasmus, is essentially a practical science, a guide through life, and not a matter of discussion or transformation, but of speculation.

As can be seen from this text, it was St. Jerome who represented the avant-garde in this context, i.e. the model of what a theologian should be, a "golden river" for those who want to know and live the teaching of the Gospel.[52] As a model, Jerome was for Erasmus both security and justification for his own efforts to develop a Christian humanism, which is also a classic example of the revival (renaissance) of antiquity and the return to the sources, i.e. to the earliest theological tradition. The result was a strong ecclesiastical and theological reform, which he tried to implement in a subtle but very effective way, with the aim of restoring an authentic and lived faith within the Church.

An aim that can also be attributed to Marulić's important works of a moral and theological character, which in many respects correspond

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[50] Cf. Linkels, Nicole, "*Philosophy and Religion in service of the Philosophia Christi*", p. 53.

[51] Erasmus, for example, greatly admired Epicurus and his philosophy, but his understanding of Epicurean ideas did not go beyond what was compatible with Christianity. His most famous dialogue in this context is the *Colloquia Familiaria*, in which he relates Epicurean joy to the joy of Christian piety, thus presenting his own interpretation of Epicurean philosophy.

[52] Usp. Olin, John C., "Erasmus and Saint Jerome", str. 321.

to Erasmus' concept of the philosophy of Christ. It is obvious that both are supported by the ideas of Christian humanism and the profound renewal of the Church, which is why Marulić so praises and glorifies the works of Erasmus. For him, the philosophy of Christ is a true ethic necessary for the proper realisation not only of the Christian life, but also of human life in general, and like Erasmus, he is convinced of the goodness of human nature and man's ability to preserve it to the end. Basically, the trio presented here in its mutual reception and interaction is an example of theological reliance on the biblical sources and the grace of ancient theology, i.e. the Church Fathers, as well as an example of constant busyness in the sense of working on personal renewal or reform as the beginning of any other, including that of the Church.

8.

The *Studia Humanitatis* in Marulić's Library*

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Two lists of books from Marko Marulić's library have been preserved: one compiled by Marulić himself (Repertorium librorum) and another by his executors after his death (Inventarium librorum). Though incomplete, these lists offer valuable insight into his literary influences and intellectual profile. The approximately 190 works listed, both printed and manuscript, reflect his diverse interests. This study organizes the books according to humanist disciplines, with commentary to clarify obscure titles and assess their role in Renaissance Humanism. Notably, many books Marulić read do not appear in these lists, particularly Christian works, indicating his deeper engagement with religious texts than the inventory suggests. Conversely, the representation of Pagan authors in his writings is more cautious, as he endorsed only those useful for Christian moral instruction. As a writer, Marulić prioritized Christian moral teachings over secular themes such as love, satire, and Classical mythology, which appear mainly in his poetry. However, as a reader, he was deeply immersed in the broader intellectual currents of his time, engaging with a wide range of humanist and classical texts. This broader literary scope must be considered when assessing his intellectual alignment with Renaissance Humanism.

Two preserved lists of books that Marulić owned in his personal library can be an important auxiliary source of information for studying his literary work and, in general, the spiritual profile of the Split humanist.[1] The names of the authors and the titles of approximately

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* The Editors are deeply grateful to Professor Lučin for granting them permission to reprint this article, which fits perfectly within the scope of this volume. First published in 1997, the text remains a valuable contribution to the topic. However, as prof. Lučin himself notes, some aspects may no longer reflect the most current developments in the field. Readers are encouraged to approach the article with this in mind, while appreciating its historical and scholarly significance.

[1] The lists were published by Franjo Rački, "Oporuka Marka Marulića", *Starine JAZU*, knj. 25, Zagreb 1892, 152-163 (only the *Repertorium librorum*, compiled by Marulić himself); Petar Kolendić, *Marulićeva oporuka,* Split 1924 (The *Repertorium librorum* with-

170 recorded units, along with an even greater number of volumes (mostly printed but partly in manuscript form), indicate the broad and diverse range of interests of their owner. The extent to which Marulić was a thorough and systematic reader can be inferred both from the abundance of sources he used in writing his works and from his *Repertory* (which, as Branimir Glavičić recently pointed out, was incorrectly referred to as *Multa et varia* until recently) – a notebook in which he recorded quotes and references from his readings according to a specific, well-developed system.[2] Once the data from the *Repertory* is linked with those from the library catalog, it will be possible to determine the exact year and publisher of many of the editions that Marulić owned. Among the multiple benefits that such research will bring, we highlight just one: it will provide a crucial basis for establishing the chronology of the creation of Marulić's individual works. Such tasks, of course, remain beyond the scope of this contribution.

However, an insight into Marulić's reading can also be valuable from a different perspective: it can help us determine which texts contributed to his well-documented erudition, what the sources and scope of his knowledge and interests were (especially those that are not directly revealed in his own works), and to what extent he followed literary and intellectual movements of his time.

Here, we will limit ourselves to just one possible area of such research: the representation of humanistic disciplines in Marulić's library, specifically those encompassed by the term *studia humanitatis*, which formed the core of the new educational system that fully came into its own during the Renaissance.[3]

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in the will, and as a separate document, the *Inventarium librorum* – a list compiled by the executors of Marulić's will after his death. Rački likely transcribed the text from a manuscript held at the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts (HAZU) under the signature IV d 52 a, while Kolendić made a transcription from a manuscript preserved in the Historical Archive of Zadar (in vol. 64 of the Split department, ff. 28v–40v).

[2] *Cf.* B. Glavičić, *Marulićev latinski rječnik,* Split, 1997, VI. To avoid misunderstandings, in this text, we consistently refer to Marulić's work previously known as *Multa et varia* as *Repertory,* while the testamentary book inventory is called *Repertorium librorum.*

[3] The books from Marulić's library have been written about by:

Kerubin Šegvić, "Knjižnica Marka Marulića", *Nastavni vjesnik,* Zagreb, 34 (1926), no. 1. pp. 44-51; he pointed out a series of inaccuracies in Kolendić's edition and the ambiguities contained within the text itself.

Dušan Berić, "Biblioteka Marka Marulića", *Republika,* Zagreb, 6 (1950), no. 8/9, pp. 607-611; in this article, various incunabula from Split are attributed to Marulić's personal ownership without any basis.

Kruno Krstić, "Knjige iz Marulićeve knjižnice u zadarskom Državnom arhivu", *Vjesnik bibliotekara Hrvatske,* Zagreb, 1 (1950), no. 4, pp. 281-288; With much goodwill, but without evidence, Krstić claims that four books from the Zadar archive belonged to Marulić.

The medieval educational system, as is well known, was based on the *seven liberal arts* (*septem artes liberales*: grammar, rhetoric, dialectic, arithmetic, geometry, music, astronomy), which served as a preparation for the study of theology, medicine, civil, or canon law. The characteristics of the new, Renaissance system, which emerged in communal schools, can be most succinctly defined by the key phrase *studia humanitatis*: it encompassed five fields of study (grammar, rhetoric, history, poetry, and moral philosophy), which replaced the previous seven. The new canon, as has been observed, is significant not only for what it includes but also for what it excludes.[4]

The phrase *studia humanitatis* appears in Cicero (cf. *Pro Murena* 61, *Pro Caelio* 24) and was later adopted from him by the Florentine chancellor and humanist Coluccio Salutati (1331–1406). The humanists formulated their new curriculum partly in letters addressed to rulers, opponents, or fellow humanists (Salutati, Guarino Guarini, Battista Guarini, Leonardo Bruni, Enea Silvio Piccolomini, Rudolf Agricola...), partly in academic speeches (Gasparino Barzizza, Francesco Filelfo, Georg Peuerbach, Konrad Celtis), and especially in pedagogical treatises (Pier Paolo Vergerio the Elder, Francesco Barbaro, Leonardo Bruni, Maffeo Vegio, Piccolomini, Matteo Palmieri, Erasmus of Rotterdam). The fundamental educational goal was entirely Ciceronian: to unite *eloquentia* and *sapientia* (eloquence and wisdom).

To this highly concise outline, at least two notes should be added: the transition from the old to the new did not mean a complete break with tradition. This is particularly evident in the continued use (well into the 16th century) of certain works and manuals that belong

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Antonin Zaninović, "Marulićeve knjige u dominikanskoj knjižnici u Splitu", *Zbornik Marka Marulića 1450-1950* (ed. Josip Badalić i Nikola Majnarić), Zagreb 1950, pp. 299-310; this is a thorough and well-documented account of six volumes that were indeed Marulić's property;

Hrvoje Morović, "Biblioteka Marka Marulića", *Povijest biblioteka u gradu Splitu, Dio I,* Zagreb 1971, and once again in *Izbor iz djela* (ed. Neda Anzulović), Split 1988, pp. 91-118; Morović reproduced *Repertorium librorum* from Kolendić's edition, correcting some errors, but he neither included nor commented on *Inventarium librorum*;

Tomislav Ladan, "Marulićev syllabus", *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine,* Zagreb, 1 (1975), no. 1/2, pp. 185-222, and once again in *Parva mediaevalia,* Zagreb 1983, pp. 85-182; in this otherwise valuable contribution, Ladan, surprisingly, used Rački's edition (which he also reprinted), which is why he did not take *Inventarium librorum* into account at all. Furthermore, he adopted some obvious errors that could easily be corrected with Kolendić's edition (e.g., Rački: *Pomponii Leti citaras* instead of ... *Cesares*; Rački: *Celibatus Nicolai Maruli Patris, Celibatus Marci Maruli* instead of *Collibetus...*).

[4] *Cf.* Leighton D. Reynolds e Nigel G. Wilson, *Copisti e filologi - la tradizione dei classici dall'antichità ai tempi moderni,* traduzione di Mirella Ferrari, Padova ³1987, pp. 129 (original title: *Scribes and Scholars,* Oxford ³1986).

to the typical medieval school. On the other hand, while the new educational system retained subjects that bore the same names as in the old system (such as grammar and rhetoric), *studia humanitatis* significantly altered both the scope of the material studied and the nature of interest in these fields. We will address both aspects in their respective sections in the further discussion.[5]

That Marulić became acquainted with the disciplines and authors introduced by the new *curriculum* during his schooling in Split can be reasonably inferred from the available data on the teachers who led the Split communal school in the 15th century.[6] For our insight into Marulić's pedagogical views, a valuable sentence from his letter to Marko Prodić reveals that he valued both education "in the fear of God" (*in Dei timore*) and instruction in the "more refined studies" (*in humanioribus literis*), that is, literary education based on reading classical authors.[7]

The question remains open as to how complete and reliable the lists preserved with the will are as a representation of the book collection that Marulić owned. This, in turn, allows for a certain relativization of their importance in determining the writer's intellectual profile. However, while we may reasonably doubt the completeness of the lists, there is no reason to question the accuracy of the information they do contain.[8] This examination does not claim to reach definitive conclusions, particularly because it scarcely considers the titles that the Split

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[5] Recent overviews of *studia humanitatis* that we have consulted in this work include:

AA. VV., *Renaissance Humanism: Foundations, Forms and Legacy*, edited by Albert Rabil, Jr.; Vol. I: *Humanism in Italy;* Vol. II: *Humanism beyond Italy;* Vol. III: *Humanism and the Disciplines; esp.* vol. 3: W. Keith Percival, "Renaissance Grammar" (p. 67-84); Danilo Aguzi-Barbagli, "Humanism and Poetics" (p. (85-170); John Monfasani, "Humanism and Rhetoric" (p. 171-235); Donald R. Kelly, "Humanism and History" (p. 236-270); Paul Oskar Kristeller, "Humanism and Moral Philosophy" (p. 271-309).

Paul F. Grendler, *Schooling in Renaissance Italy - Literacy and Learning 1300-1600*, Baltimore and London 1991 (*esp.* "Part II: The Latin Curriculum", pp. 109-271).

[6] *Cf.* Giuseppe Praga, *Maestri a Spalato nel Quattrocento* (Estratto dall Anuario del R. Istituto Tecnico "Francesco Rismondo"), Zara 1933; Francesco Lo Parco, "Tideo Acciarini, umanista marchigiano del secolo XV", *Archivio storico per la Dalmazia,* Roma, 4 (1929), vol. 4, fasc. 37, pp. 17-42.

[7] *Cf. Marcus Marulus uenerabili presbitero Brachiensi Marco Prodich salutem* (edited and translated by B. Lučin), *Colloquia Maruliana IIII,* Split 1995, pp. 110-111.

[8] The question of gaps in Marulić's catalog is indeed intriguing. As early as K. Šegvić (*op. cit.* (3), pp. 50) expressed surprise at the absence of Dante and Petrarch, *Judita*, Bernardin of Split's *Lectionary*, and the *Croatian Chronicle*, which had been discovered by Dmine Papalić and translated into Latin by Marulić. Additionally, neither Jean Gerson (i.e., Thomas à Kempis), whom Marulić translated into Croatian, nor numerous Church writers, nor others whose absence will be noted later in the text, are present. It is also worth questioning why *Repertorium* and *Inventarium* differ significantly.

humanist categorized under *Ecclesiastici.* However, our partial approach is justified – and, we believe, legitimized – primarily by the large number of titles in the *Libri zentilium* category, a number that in itself points to Marulić's strong interest in distinctly humanistic disciplines. An additional motivation for this focus is the striking correspondence between the titles in his library and those that were consistently used in contemporary humanistic schools.

In our study, we have relied on the text published by P. Kolendić, comparing *Repertorium librorum* with photographs of the manuscript of Marulić's will preserved in the Historical Archive of Zadar. This manuscript is evidently superior to the one used by Rački, but, as Šegvić has already pointed out, Kolendić's edition is not flawless (for instance, it does not record the so-called *"long-tailed e"*, abbreviations have been expanded without any indication, and some significant typographical errors remain). Nevertheless, the lists are cited here from Kolendić's edition, with interventions made only when necessary for the precise identification of a given title (such corrections are always accompanied by a note).

Kolendić's notable contribution lies in his discovery and publication of the posthumous inventory, *Inventarium librorum,* which includes several important titles absent from *Repertorium.* Unfortunately, however, he did not specify the location of this document within the Zadar archive, and efforts to locate it have so far been unsuccessful. As a result, it has not been possible to compare Kolendić's edition of the posthumous inventory with the manuscript itself.[9]

2.

Marulić classified his books according to thematic and genre criteria into several sections, whose titles and the number of listed units in each section are as follows:

Ecclesiastici – 35 (excluding Marulić's works)
Libri zentilium
Poetae – 15
Historici – 22
Geographi – 2

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[9] I sincerely thank Mr. Arsen Duplančić, who, at my request, reviewed the entire volume 64 in the Zadar archive during his visit in March 1996, where Marulić's will is located, as well as volume 66, unfortunately without success. I also extend my gratitude to Mr. Petar Runje, who reviewed his notes from the Zadar archive but was unable to find any trace leading to the document from January 1524, which contains the *Inventarium librorum.*

> *Gramatici* – 13
> *Comenta* – 4
> *Epistolae* – 6
> *De re rustica* – 4
> *Astronomi* – 3
> *Philosophi et oratores* – 32 (excluding *Item alie quedam minutie*)

This schematic overview allows us to draw several important conclusions. In the sections grouped under *Books of the Pagans* (which, in addition to classical authors, also include some medieval and contemporary writers), we find almost all five fields encompassed by *studia humanitatis* explicitly represented: grammar (*Gramatici*), rhetoric (*Philosophi et oratores*), poetry (*Poetae*), history (*Historici*), and moral philosophy (*Philosophi et oratores*). Notably, these sections contain far more titles than the others (with the exception, of course, of the *Ecclesiastici* category). If we consider the content of individual works, we can observe something further: two titles in the *Comenta* section also belong to poetic themes (*Servius' commentaries on Vergil's works*), while the remaining two pertain to oratory (*commentaries on Cicero's speeches*). One title in the *Epistolae* section directly belongs to the *Poetae* category (*Horace's epistles*), as do two works in the *Astronomi* section (*Hyginus' and Aratus' poems*).

The collection of books related to *studia humanitatis* is further enriched when we examine the posthumously compiled list, *Inventarium librorum*, which includes some works that, as far as can be determined, are not mentioned in the first list (*Repertorium librorum*). Here are just those new titles, which we will henceforth cite with the notation *(Inv.)*:

> *Cathena Sancti Thome Vita Diui Hieronymi*[10]
> *Expositiones Diui Hieronymi*[11]
> *Vita Sanctorum Patrum*
> *Joseph De bello Judaico*
> *Euangelia in caprinis scripta cum tabulis bubali*[12]
> *De oratore eiusdem* (i. e. Marci Tulij)
> *Seneca moralis*[13]

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[10] Perhaps this refers to Marulić's *Life of St. Jerome*, which, in the autograph manuscript, begins with the same words: *Vita divi Hieronymi presbiteri a Marco Marulo edita (...)*. The text was discovered and published by Darko Novaković (cf. *Colloquia Maruliana III*, Split, 1994, pp. 7–66).

[11] Perhaps it is the same as *Eiusdem (i.e., Divi Hieronymi) Commentaria, volumina duo* listed in the *Ecclesiastici* section of Marulić's catalog?

[12] Marulić mentions this volume in the very text of his will, *cf. pp.* Kolendić, *op. cit.* (1), pp. 13.

Johannes Bocatius super Dantem
Ethimologie Jsidori
Antonius Luscus Super orationes Tulij
Quidam commentarius antiquus Prima pars Genesis
Secunda pars Paralipomenon cum alijs
Tertia pars Jsaias
P...rutus Venetus
Franciscus Filologus super Plutarchum
Dialogus Sancti Gregorij
Dauidias Marci Maruli
Ehtna (!) Petri Bembi
Opuscula Luciani libellus
Suma Guidonis[14]
Genealogia deorum quadernus
Expositio super nonnullas orationes Ciceronis[15]
Orationes ex Laurentio Vala de greco in latinum
Plinius Primus De gestis Romanorum

It is now time to examine Marulić's library by individual disciplines. The brief comments accompanying specific titles serve two purposes: to identify at least some of those that have remained unclear until now and to outline the role these works played in the context of the early modern cultural and educational framework characterized by the term *studia humanitatis.*

3.

The fundamental characteristics of the early modern, humanistic approach to grammar, in contrast to the medieval method, can be summarized by the following key points: the speculative approach based on logic is abandoned; writing commentaries on older grammars is replaced by the creation of new manuals; newly discovered texts by Roman authors (Varro, Valerius Probus – actually his pseudepigrapha – Quintilian, Diomedes, Charisius, and others) are particularly valued; the study of Latin grammar is closely intertwined with the reading of

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[13] Perhaps it is the same as Senece opera listed in the Philosophi et oratores section of Marulić's catalog?

[14] Maybe the same as *Manipulus curatorum* in the *Ecclesiastici* section of Marulić's list, a work authored by Guido de Monte Rocherii or de Monte Rotierii (Guido de Montrocher), a theological writer from the 14th century (for information about this author, I thank Mr. Karlo Budor).

[15] Maybe the same as *Super quasdam orationes Ciceronis notanda* or *Super quasdam orationes eiusdem plenius* from the *Comenta* section of Marulić's list?

classical literary texts;[16] and finally, as a major innovation, the teaching of Greek is introduced.

Among the volumes in Marulić's Gramatici section, some belong to grammatical manuals, while others are various types of dictionaries. We will categorize the grammatical manuals into three groups based on a general chronological framework:

Antiquity:
Varro De lingua latina
Diomedes et alij quidam gramatici

Middle Ages:
Doctrinale

Humanism:
Cornu copie
Tortellius item Junianus
Laurentii Vallensis Elegantie
Erothemata cum interpretatione latina[17]
Compendium elegantiarum Valle

Marulić, it seems, had a modest collection of works by ancient grammarians, only one (though significant) medieval text, while early modern manuals were by far the most numerous. However, the presence of works by Varro and Diomedes certainly indicates an interest in ancient grammarians who were unknown in the Middle Ages. Surprisingly, there is no mention of Quintilian's *De institutione oratoria*, a work that was not only a first-rate rhetorical and educational authority but also valuable for its grammatical insights.

In the humanist school, after elementary instruction using manuals such as the pseudo-Donatan *Ars minor*, Priscian was particularly favored in teaching among the ancient grammarians. His name, however, does not appear in Marulić's library – unless his *Institutio de arte grammatica* was included in the volume *Diomedes et alii quidam grammatici*. For instance, there is a Venetian edition printed around 1475, in which *Diomedes, De arte grammatica* appears first, followed by *Phocas, De nomine et verbo*, and then *Priscianus, Epitoma*, among others.[18]

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[16] In accordance with Quintilian's definition, according to which grammar encompasses two areas: *"recte loquendi scientiam et poetarum enarrationem"* (the knowledge of speaking correctly and the interpretation of poets), cf. *Inst. or.* 1,4,2.

[17] In the Zadar manuscript and in Kolendić, it is incorrectly written as *Erethomata...*; in Rački's version, as *Erathomata...*; while the *Inventarium* lists it as *Erothemata de interpretatione latina*.

[18] *Cf.* Josip Badalić, *Inkunabule u Narodnoj Republici Hrvatskoj (Djela JAZU*, knj. 45), Zagreb 1952, no. 391.

Among medieval grammatical manuals, *Doctrinale* by Alexander de Villedieu (*Alexander de Villa Dei*, c. 1170 – c. 1250), written at the end of the 12th century, proved to be particularly resistant to changes in grammatical doctrine and pedagogical practice. It remained widely used until the late 16th century.[19] It is a versified Latin grammar that, in 2,645 hexameters, covers parts of speech, morphology, syntax, prosody, and metrics. The longevity of the work was undoubtedly due to the detailed treatment of its material and the fact that, compared to Priscian, it was "modernized" (i.e., it incorporated vocabulary and grammatical features of medieval Latin). Moreover, its survival was greatly aided by the fact that it was written in verse, making it well-suited for memorization and, consequently, for school use.

In Marulić's library, we do not find the first early modern Latin grammar, *Regulae grammaticales*, a concise manual written by Guarino of Verona (1374–1460) in the first half of the 15th century.[20] Marulić's library does not contain another significant grammatical work – indeed, the first comprehensive humanist Latin grammar – *Rudimenta grammatices* by Niccolò Perotti (1429–1480), first printed in 1473. However, in the *Gramatici* section, we find the title *Cornu copie* without an author's name. This is not strictly a grammatical manual but rather Perotti's *Cornucopiae sive commentarii linguae Latinae*, a highly detailed commentary on the works of Martial. In it, the ancient text is explained almost word by word, with extensive quotations from numerous Roman and Greek authors. The work remained unfinished and was published posthumously in 1489. Its comprehensive index allowed users to treat it as a kind of encyclopedic reference for the Latin language, which also made it a widely used educational tool in grammar instruction and in the study of classical authors.[21]

Lorenzo Valla (1407–1457) is, without a doubt, together with Angelo Poliziano, the most important 15th-century figure in Latin philology. His most famous work is *Elegantiae linguae Latinae*, first prin-

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[19] His 19th-century editor, D. Reichling, cataloged 250 manuscripts and 300 editions of the work up to the year 1588. The work was published in the 12th volume of the collection *Monumenta Germaniae Paedagogica* (Berlin, 1893).

[20] Guarino of Verona is listed in the *Philosophi et oratores* section (*Guarini Veronensis quedam opera*). However, the name *Guarinus Veronensis* was also used to refer to both Guarino Guarini and his son, Battista Guarini.

[21] Basic information on Perotti and his works can be found in pp. F. Grendler, *op. cit.* (5), pp. 173–174, and J. pp. Sullivan, *Martial: The Unexpected Classic (A Literary and Historical Study)*, Cambridge 1991, pp. 265–266. It is worth recalling that, thanks to a recently discovered Glasgow manuscript found by D. Novaković, we now know of a series of Marulić's epigrams composed in the best *Martialian* tradition. Marulić's interest in the Roman satirist is further confirmed by the title *Martialis cum comento* in the *Poetae* section of his catalog.

ted in 1471 and reissued at least 59 times by 1536. With this work, Valla aimed to restore the classical purity of Latin grammar, phraseology, and style as it existed before being corrupted by the "barbarians." He was the first, after Priscian, to support his assertions with quotations from classical authors. However, he did not uncritically accept everything he found in ancient texts; he even disagreed with authorities highly regarded by other humanists, such as Priscian, Donatus, Servius, Pompeius Festus, and Nonius Marcellus. Valla saw his work as a revival of the approach to Latin language studies developed in antiquity by Marcus Terentius Varro, and he particularly esteemed Quintilian – more than even Cicero. In the renowned prefaces to the individual books of his work, Valla discusses significant issues, including the Christian's relationship with pagan literature (in the preface to Book IV). He advocates for the acceptance of all humanistic disciplines and their achievements, provided they are infused with Christian content.[22]

Since *Elegantiae* were impractical for school use due to their extensive length, several abridged editions were prepared. One such edition was published as early as 1475 by Bonus Accursius and was reprinted ten times by 1500. In the 1490s, Antonio Mancinelli produced two condensed versions: *Elegantiae lima* and *Elegantiae portus*. In the latter work, he not only summarized Valla's material but also arranged it in alphabetical order.[23] It cannot be determined whether Marulić owned any of these editions or which one, but attention should be drawn to the title *Compendium Elegantiarum Valle*. Given Marulić's known inclination for compiling summaries, it is not impossible that he himself composed this compendium. In any case, the presence of Valla's work in two versions is a significant indicator of Marulić's interest in this author, whose *Elegantiae* truly mark a turning point in humanistic philology.

Marulić's copy of Tortelli's *De orthographia dictionum e Graecis tractarum* has been preserved to this day and is housed in the library of the Dominican Monastery in Split. The first edition was published in 1453, while Marulić's copy dates from 1479. The purpose of the work is to standardize the Latin spelling of Greek words and personal names, which were particularly common in poetry. Marulić's interest in transliteration from Greek into Latin is further evidenced by another title in his catalog: *Vocabula ex greco derivata*. Finally, it may not be insignificant

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[22] Valla's prefaces were printed in the book *Prosatori latini del Quattrocento*, edited by Eugenio Garin (Milan - Naples, 1952), pp. 594–631, with a parallel Italian translation.

[23] *Cf.* F. Grendler, *op. cit.* (5), pp. 192. The most well-known abridged version was prepared by Erasmus of Rotterdam: *Paraphrasis seu potius epitome... in elegantiarum libros Laurentii Vallae* (1st ed. in 1529).

that on a blank page of Tortelli's book, Marulić transcribed a letter by Bartolomeo della Fonte (*Bartolomeus Fontius*). While the letter discusses Roman measurements, it is noteworthy in this context that this Florentine humanist, a contemporary of Marulić, was also engaged in emending the texts of Roman authors by comparing the spelling of Greek words in their works with the original Greek orthography.[24]

The most significant innovation introduced by humanism in grammatical education was undoubtedly the teaching of the Greek language. At the end of the 14th century, the Byzantine humanist Manuel Chrysoloras composed a Greek grammar titled *Erotemata* (*Questions*) for his Italian students. In this work, he attempted to present complex grammatical material in a simplified manner, using a question-and-answer format. However, he wrote it in Greek. Guarino Guarini prepared an abridged version of this manual and translated it from Greek into Latin. This grammar was first published in 1475 as a bilingual edition. After the fall of Byzantium, two other Byzantine authors – refugees who had found asylum in Italy – also wrote introductory Greek manuals (again in Greek): Constantine Lascaris and Theodor Gaza. Lascaris' *Epitome* was first printed in 1476. In 1480, Bonus Accursius reprinted it with a parallel Latin translation (by Giovanni Crastone). After another edition in Vicenza in 1489, the renowned humanist and printer Aldus Manutius published a bilingual version in Venice in 1495, adding a short introduction to the Greek alphabet and a small selection of simple Greek texts, also accompanied by a Latin translation. The title of this edition was *Constantini Lascaris Erotemata cum interpretatione latina*. This title, word for word, matches the one listed in Marulić's *Gramatici* section, indicating that he likely possessed this particular edition.[25]

It is worth noting that relatively few humanists, especially in the 15th century, could read Greek works in the original. Interest in Greek literature was therefore largely satisfied through numerous translations. Thanks to the efforts of Chrysoloras and his students – among whom Leonardo Bruni particularly distinguished himself as a translator – by around 1475, most Greek authors, including the Church Fathers, were available in Latin translation. A particularly noteworthy fact is that Marulić's library contains a significant number of Greek authors (evidently

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[24] We have not been able to determine who *Junianus* is, mentioned in the *Gramatici* section alongside Tortelli. *Inventarium librorum* records the entry as *Junianus Vocabulista*.

[25] For an overview of humanist engagement with Greek and information on the editions of Greek grammars, see: Anthony Grafton and Lisa Jardine, *From Humanism to the Humanities: Education and the Liberal Arts in Fifteenth- and Sixteenth-Century Europe*, London, 1986, pp. 99–106.

in Latin translation), whom we will mention individually when discussing other disciplines of *studia humanitatis.*

The second category within the *Gramatici* section consists of dictionary-type manuals, which include:

> *Nonius Marcellus et Festus Pompeius*
> *Juris consulti de verborum significatione*
> *Vocabula per ordinem collecta*
> *Vocabula de greco deriuata*[26]

Sextus Pompeius Festus was a 2nd-century Roman grammarian, known as an *epitomator* for his abridgement of *De significatu verborum* by Verrius Flaccus, a 1st-century lexicon of rare words accompanied by etymological and antiquarian explanations. Nonius Marcellus, a 4th-century Roman lexicographer and grammarian, authored *De compendiosa doctrina,* in which the first twelve books discuss various grammatical issues, while the remaining eight contain descriptions of diverse cultural and material aspects (e.g., clothing, weaponry, types of ships). A significant feature of the work is its extensive use of quotations from earlier authors (a total of 41 cited writers). In the 15th century, this work was printed under slightly different titles, such as *De proprietate Latini sermonis* and *De proprietate sermonum.*

The title *Juris consulti de verborum significatione* may refer to *De verborum iuris significatione* by Maffeo Vegio. Marulić also owned another work by the same author, *Carmina et dialogi,* listed in the *Poetae* section.

The title *Vocabula per ordinem collecta* is too general to allow for definitive conclusions. However, it is possible that this alphabetical list was compiled by Marulić himself. It is also worth noting that the title bears a resemblance to the content of Mancinelli's second abridgment of Valla's work (*Elegantiae portus*).

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Today, perhaps the most influential definition of humanism as a cultural and historical phenomenon has been provided by Paul Oskar Kristeller. In numerous works, he demonstrates that humanism should primarily be defined as part of the rhetorical tradition that has continuously shaped Western civilization since antiquity.[27] The Middle Ages

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[26] In the Gramatici section, the title Eleganter dicta ex auctoribus is also listed; however, we have included it among collections of sententiae in Chapter 7 of this study.

[27] *Cf.*, for example, pp. O. Kristeller, *Renaissance Thought: The Classic, Scholastic, and Humanistic Strains,* New York, 1961, especially Chapters I and V. For a brief overview,

narrowed the vast rhetorical heritage of antiquity to just three branches: *ars poetriae, ars dictaminis,* and *ars praedicandi*; it fragmented and schematized theory, preserving relatively well only one of the five classical components of rhetoric: *elocutio.* Although humanism, as scholars like Kristeller remind us, does not represent a drastic break with the Middle Ages – being itself partly rooted in it – following the exceptionally influential studies of the aforementioned scholar, the revival of the classical rhetorical tradition is now seen as a decisive impetus for the educational and cultural program encompassed by the term *studia humanitatis.* It is telling that one of the leading modern researchers of humanist education emphasizes that a symbolic starting date for Renaissance Latin education could be May 1420, when the commune of Verona appointed the renowned Guarino Guarini to teach rhetoric and to interpret Cicero's speeches and letters to his students.[28]

From the views of the humanists themselves, it is sufficient to mention that Pier Paolo Vergerio, in his influential treatise *De ingenuis moribus* (1402–3), asserted that oratory, together with moral philosophy and history, forms the core of the humanist educational program. Similarly, Bartolomeo Fazio (1400–1457), in his work *De viris aevi sui illustribus,* classified most of the humanists of his time under the chapter *De oratoribus.*[29]

The primary impetus for the renewed interest in rhetoric came from the discovery of Cicero's speeches and his and Quintilian's theoretical works on rhetoric. Humanists found in these texts not only the rules of the art, instructions, and models but also – especially in Cicero's *De oratore* and Quintilian's *Institutio oratoria* – a comprehensive program for the education and development of a well-rounded, ethical individual capable of leading a harmonious life in society and engaging in public affairs. For rhetoric to fulfill its multifaceted function, it had to (once again) transform from the medieval *ars ornandi* into Cicero's *ars docendi, delectandi, movendi* – the art of teaching, delighting, and moving an audience.

In Marulić's time, humanist interest in rhetoric can be divided into five areas – five distinct genres, some of which include subgenres. These are: theoretical treatises on rhetoric, speeches, letters, commentaries, and compendia or epitomes.

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see A. Rabil Jr., *Preface,* printed in all three volumes of the collection *Renaissance Humanism* (*op. cit.* 5), pp. XII–XIII.

[28] *Cf. pp.* F. Grendler, *op. cit.* (5), pp. 127.

[29] For the importance of rhetoric in humanism, see also: Hanna H. Gray, "Renaissance Humanism: The Pursuit of Eloquence", *Journal of the History of Ideas,* 24 (1963), pp. 497–514

Given the abundance of extensive theoretical works by authorities such as Cicero and Quintilian, it is not surprising that humanists rarely ventured into writing new works of this kind. Instead, they preferred to fill gaps in areas where classical tradition was lacking: they compiled compendia and commentaries on classical works and wrote manuals on letter writing. Speeches were, of course, a vibrant literary form in humanism, with a notable subgenre in the form of sermons. In the field of epistolography, numerous important discoveries of new texts also led to an extensive body of humanist production and a strong inclination toward collecting letter collections.

Marulić's library contains works from all of these rhetorical genres (in our classification, we will not adhere strictly to Marulić's categorization, which can be easily consulted in Kolendić's edition):

Works related to rhetorical theory:

Rhetorica noua et vetus
De oratore eiusdem (i. e. Marci Tulij) *(Inv.)*

The "new" and "old" rhetoric refer, of course, to Cicero's *De inventione* and the pseudo-Ciceronian *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. Both works were widely circulated throughout the Middle Ages and continued to be used in humanist schools.[30] *De oratore* had been lost for centuries until it was rediscovered in 1421 in Lodi (southeast of Milan) by Geraldo Landriani. The rules and definitions of rhetoric were taught at the beginner level using the first two works, *De inventione* and *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, while *De oratore* was intended for more advanced studies. Marulić owned *De inventione* both in its full version and in an abridged form (*Retorice nove compendium*).

Speeches:

Tulij Orationes forenses
Orationes Marci Tulij (Inv.)
Tulij Philippice
Declamationes Quintiliani, volumen unum
Plinij Panegiricus ad Traianum
Isocratis Oratio de regno
Orationes ex Egesippo De excidio Hierosolimitano
Orationes ex Laurentio Vala de greco in latinum (Inv.)

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[30] It is telling that *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, after its first edition in Venice in 1470, had at least 28 more editions in Italy by the end of the century (cf. pp. F. Grendler, *op. cit.* 5, pp. 214).

It is characteristic of a humanist library that among ancient authors, Cicero is the most prominently represented. This is precisely the case in Marulić's book catalog as a whole, and naturally, in this section as well. Marulić owned two or three books of Cicero's speeches, although it is impossible to determine whether the different titles listed in *Repertorium* (*Tulij Orationes forenses*) and *Inventarium* (*Orationes Marci Tulij*) refer to two separate books or to the same volume. One of these contained the famous *Philippics*.

It is worth reiterating the surprising absence of Quintilian's *De institutione oratoria* – a work of great importance to humanism – while his much less significant *Declamationes* are present. These consist of two collections of speeches on fictitious legal cases, used as school exercises. Since late antiquity, both collections were attributed to Quintilian (though today, *Declamationes maiores* are generally considered not to be his, while *Declamationes minores* could plausibly originate from his hand).

Apart from the discovery of numerous Ciceronian speeches, one of the most significant humanist discoveries in the field of oratory was the *Panegyrici Latini*, a collection of 12 speeches, whose manuscript was found in Mainz in 1433 by Giovanni Aurispa. The first speech in the collection is *Pliny the Younger's Panegyric to Trajan*. This speech is marked by elaborate rhetorical flourishes and stylistic embellishments but also contains valuable historical information.

The presence of the Greek orator Isocrates in Marulić's library is highly significant. Isocrates was not only one of the finest Greek speakers and a master teacher of rhetoric – admired even by Cicero – but also one of the most beloved authors among humanists (among Greek orators, only Demosthenes rivaled him in popularity). His appeal to humanists lay not so much in the exceptionally high formal qualities of his speeches but rather in their distinctly moralistic content. Particularly popular were his speeches *To Demonicus* and *To Nicocles*. During the Renaissance, Isocrates was read primarily as an authority in moral philosophy rather than as a rhetorical model. Furthermore, in Greek language instruction, his speeches were often the first substantial texts read in the original after elementary grammar lessons. For the same reason, they were frequently translated into Latin. The speech *To Nicocles* – listed under the Latin title *De regno* in Marulić's catalog – had already been translated into Latin four times by 1460. It describes the

wisdom, moderation, justice, and kindness that a virtuous ruler must possess.[31]

The remaining two books on our list appear to have contained excerpts from historical works that included speeches. The enigmatic *Egesippus* (mentioned in the *Historici* section) is, as D. Novaković pointed out, actually the name of a supposed abridger and translator of the works of Josephus Flavius – the name being a distorted form of the Greek *Iósepos*.[32]

Finally, the repeated mention of Lorenzo Valla likely refers to one of his translations from Greek. Based on the information from the posthumous inventory alone, it is difficult to determine which work it was – perhaps excerpts from Thucydides' *History*? (In the *Historici* section, Marulić lists *Thucididis excerpta*). Valla translated into Latin works by Homer, Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, and Aesop's fables.

> Commentaries:

> *Super quasdam orationes Ciceronis notanda*
> *Super quasdam orationes eiusdem plenius*
> *Antonius Luscus Super orationes Tulij (Inv.)*
> *Expositio super nonnullas orationes Ciceronis (Inv.)*

As is evident, Marulić owned several volumes of commentaries on Cicero's speeches. Only one commentator is explicitly mentioned, but he was an important figure: Antonio Loschi (1368–1441) from Vicenza. Loschi was a student of Coluccio Salutati, a writer of one tragedy and numerous poems of political and other themes. For the papal chancery, he composed new document templates, striving to incorporate the elegance of Ciceronian Latin. However, his most significant work is *Inquisitio super XI orationes Ciceronis*, written in Pavia between 1390 and 1396 – a decade before Poggio Bracciolini discovered Asconius Pedianus' commentary on Cicero's speeches. Loschi's work is notable as the first commentary on classical speeches written after antiquity. Moreover, in analyzing Cicero's speeches, he sought the practical application of the principles and rules outlined in ancient rhetorical manuals. He believed that applying the classical rhetorical framework to the analysis of Cicero's speeches was the best way to teach students rhetoric and encourage them to use it creatively. Loschi's treatise had a significant impact: it inspired Gasparino Barzizza to start lecturing on

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[31] The fundamental study on Isocrates' Renaissance reception is: L. Gualdo Rosa, *La fede nella Paideia: Aspetti della fortuna europea di Isocrate nei secoli XV e XVI*, Rome, 1984.

[32] *Cf.* D. Novaković, "Šižgorićeve i Marulićeve latinske pjesme o apostolima", *Colloquia Maruliana* II, Split 1993, pp. 42, n. 10.

Cicero's speeches in Padua, influenced Leonardo Bruni, and was admired by Enea Silvio Piccolomini.[33]

Letters in prose:

Epistole electe De familiaribus
Ciceronis Tulij Epistole familiares cum comento
Epistole Plinij Junioris
Epistole Phalarij Tyrani
Epistole Symachi
Epistole Leonardi Aretini

In the Middle Ages, only two collections of ancient letters were known for school use: Seneca's *Letters to Lucilius* and the first hundred letters of Pliny the Younger. In 1345, Petrarch discovered Cicero's *Epistulae ad Atticum*, and in 1392, thanks to the encouragement of Coluccio Salutati, the *Epistulae ad familiares* were also found. This second collection, which contains 426 letters, became immensely popular in humanist schools – so much so that students often memorized many of the letters. The success of *Letters to Friends* was undoubtedly due to its exceptionally wide range of content (from political instructions to household advice) and varied tone (from deeply emotional to entertaining). Thus, the collection provided a model for writing about almost any topic and in nearly any situation. Cicero, as a supreme stylist, demonstrated how nearly any subject could be expressed with elegance and refinement, while also infusing his writing with dignity and loftiness of feeling – qualities particularly esteemed by humanists. Of course, Cicero wrote many of these letters anticipating a broader readership, ensuring their linguistic and stylistic polish. The pedagogical value of *Letters to Friends* in humanist education lay above all in their demonstration that maintaining a personal moral code was achievable even for someone actively engaged in public life, rather than withdrawn from society. It appears that Marulić owned two volumes of *Letters to Friends*, one of which, with a commentary, is listed in the *Philosophi et oratores* section of his catalog.

In his library, we also find another letter collection particularly beloved by humanists, that of Pliny the Younger. Until the early 15th century, only one hundred of Pliny's letters were known. Later, eight books were discovered, and at the very end of the 15th century, a Fran-

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[33] The speeches analyzed by Loschi are: *De imperio Cn. Pompei, Pro Milone, Pro Plancio, Pro Sulla, Pro Archia poeta, Pro Marcello, Pro Ligario, Pro rege Deiotaro, Pro Cluentio, Pro Quinctio, Pro Flacco.* For basic information on Loschi, *cf. Il pensiero pedagogico dello umanesimo*, a cura di Eugenio Garin, Firenze 1958, pp. XXVIII; J. Monfasani, *op. cit.* (5), pp. 188.

ciscan from Verona, Giocondo, found ten books of his letters in Paris – forming the corpus we have today. The *editio princeps* was published in Venice by Aldus Manutius in 1508.

Pliny's letters, many of which could be considered essays, have always been engaging reading material. Their literary refinement and wide range of topics also made them suitable for school use and as stylistic models. Additionally, they contain valuable historical information, particularly the correspondence with Emperor Trajan.

Under the name of Phalaris, the cruel tyrant of Acragas in Sicily from the 6th century BCE, a collection of 148 letters has been preserved. These letters, widely circulated in Latin translation during the 15th and 16th centuries, were a popular and widely read text.[34]

Quintus Aurelius Symmachus, the most renowned Roman rhetorician of the second half of the 4th century and a staunch opponent of Christianity, left behind, among other works, a collection of carefully composed letters, arranged in the style of Pliny the Younger (nine books of private and one of official correspondence).

Among the rich humanistic epistolary production, in Marulić we find only the letters of Leonardo Aretino (i.e., Bruni). The significance of his extensive epistolary work is emphasized by E. Garin, who notes that these letters reflect the cultural interests of his time.[35] Marulić's interest in this author is further confirmed by another title in the group *Philosophi et oratores: Leonardi Aretini Jsagoicum.*

Finally, we might even find a modern-era manual for letter writing in Marulić's collection, if *Sinonima et epitheta* (listed as *Sinonima et epitheta et Valerij Maximi compendium per Marcum Marulum*) is one of the many titles under which the work *De prosynonymis* or *Synonima sententiarum* by Stefano Fieschi (Fliscus) from Soncino (c. 1400–1462) was published. This work was created in Venice in 1437 and had 38 incunabula editions. In terms of content, it serves as a kind of exercise book for composing eloquent letters and speeches in Latin: it starts with a sentence in Italian, which is then translated multiple times into Latin, each time in a more complex and stylistically refined form. It is worth noting that Fieschi was the chancellor of Dubrovnik in 1441 and taught at the Dubrovnik school from 1444 to 1459.[36]

Humanists were also interested in the rhetorical works of patristic literature, primarily sermons. The Middle Ages knew only a limited number of such works, mainly those of St. Gregory of Nazianzus and St.

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[34] It was only at the beginning of the 17th century that Richard Bentley proved that these were apocryphal works composed by a sophist, probably in late antiquity.

[35] *Cf.* E. Garin, *op. cit.* (22), pp. 42.

[36] On Fieschi, *cf. pp.* F. Grendler, *op. cit.* (5), pp. 210-211.

John Chrysostom. However, in the 15th century, thanks to the efforts of Leonardo Bruni, Ambrogio Traversari, George of Trebizond, and several other humanists, a large number of works by the Greek Church Fathers were translated and subsequently published. By the middle of the century, all the works of Basil, Gregory of Nazianzus, Gregory of Nyssa, John Chrysostom, and others were already available in Latin translations (in manuscript form).

In the *Ecclesiastici* section, Marulić listed several homiletic works by the Church Fathers. His interest in them can be explained not only by his strong religious motivation but also by the humanist inclination to seek out original sources in all fields, including religious literature – and thus its rhetorical forms. However, just as contemporary rhetorical theory is absent from the rhetorical works he mentioned, there is also no *ars praedicandi* (art of preaching) among the church writers and preachers he included. It is worth noting, though, that Marulić possessed the homiletic works of his contemporaries Robert Caracciolo and Martin Nimira from Rab. Here are the relevant titles from the *Ecclesiastici* category:

> *Sanctus Bernardus super Cantica canticorum*
> *Eiusdem* (i. e. Augustini) *Sermones ad heremitas*
> *Omelie Origenis*
> *Sermones S. Leonis pape*
> *Sermones S. Effren heremite*
> *Opera Sancti Basilij Magni*
> *Sermones festiui fratris Roberti*
> *Sermones quidam Sancti Joannis Chrysostomi*
> *Sermo de pass. Domini per Nimerium, Arbensem archidiaconum*

Finally, it is worth recalling that Marulić himself, following the humanist tradition, engaged in rhetorical practice. It is known that as a young man, he delivered a speech in praise of Doge Niccolò Marcello, which we can assume belonged to the *genus demonstrativum*.[37] His sermon on the theme of the Last Judgment has been preserved, distinguished by its stylistic excellence. In it, one can recognize signs of the author's familiarity with both medieval and humanistic preaching techniques.[38] Regarding Marulić's letters, the most notable is his Epistle to Pope Adrian VI, a rhetorically polished text that still awaits interpretation from this perspective. Marulić also maintained correspondence

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[37] The speech is mentioned by Franjo Božićević in his biography of Marulić. *Cf.* Miroslav Marković, "Poetae Latini Dalmatiae inediti", *Živa Antika* 2.2 (1952), p. 293.

[38] I have previously covered this in "Generičke značajke *Propovijedi Marka Marulića o Kristovu posljednjem sudu*", *Colloquia Maruliana* III, Split 1994, pp. 73-92.

with numerous friends, composing epistles in both verse and prose. Unfortunately, only a few of what must have been a vast number of his letters are known to us, making it unwise to draw far-reaching conclusions based on such a limited sample. However, the fact that one letter to Jakov Grasolar includes a kind of treatise on friendship and the Last Judgment suggests that Marulić consciously infused a literary quality into his private correspondence. Overall, Marulić's understanding and application of rhetorical skill remain a largely unexplored field of study.

<div align="center">5.</div>

Interest in history was one of the key characteristics of humanism, and the teaching of history was the most far-reaching innovation in the contemporary school curriculum. Integrating a historical dimension into every subject and placing each phenomenon within its proper temporal context was precisely the *differentia specifica* that fundamentally distinguished the new worldview from the medieval one. The humanist approach to historiography was largely shaped by Petrarch, who viewed it primarily as a biographical genre and a source of exempla. He attributed to history a threefold purpose: moral, aesthetic, and critical – meaning that it should promote the reader's virtue, teach good style, and present the truth about past events. Petrarch himself wrote two historical works: *De viris illustribus* and *Rerum memorandarum libri IV*.

Humanists established a broad canon of historians, first favoring Roman authors, and later, as translations increased, Greek historians as well. For instance, Vittorino da Feltre emphasized that Livy, Sallust, and Caesar should be read for their stylistic qualities, while Valerius Maximus was valued for the richness and diversity of his themes. Leonardo Bruni, in his treatise *De studiis et litteris liber*, recommended to a woman, Battista Malatesta, that she read Livy, Sallust, Tacitus, and Curtius Rufus, particularly praising Caesar, *who, in his Commentaries, describes his achievements with supreme ease and charm*. Medieval chronicles were dismissed by humanists both for their "barbaric Latin" and because they were considered filled with lies and fables. Instead, they advocated reading exemplary ancient historians. As Battista Guarini pointed out in his treatise *De ordine docendi et discendi*, classical historians provided lessons on the customs, laws, and principles of various peoples, the mutability of human fortune, and the virtues and vices of the human spirit.[39]

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[39] On the corresponding places in Bruni and Guarini, *Cf.* E. Garin, *op. cit.* (33), pp. 159, 454.

In humanist schools, Caesar, Sallust, and Valerius Maximus were particularly favored. Caesar was admired for his clarity and linguistic precision, Sallust for his concise exposition and moral reflections, and Valerius Maximus – who had also been a popular author in the Middle Ages – was valued for his work *Factorum ac dictorum memorabilium libri IX,* an inexhaustible repository of examples illustrating human virtues and vices. Valerius Maximus served as both a model and a source for Petrarch in *Rerum memorandarum libri,* and it is well known that Marulić's *Institucia* owes much to this author.[40]

Marulić's *Historici* section includes as many as 22 entries, more than any other category within the *Libri gentilium* collection (if we consider that the 32 volumes in the *Philosophi et oratores* section belong to two distinct disciplines). For clarity, we have arranged the titles from this section in chronological order, separating works that were listed together but belong to different authors.

> *Herodotus*
> *Thucididis excerpta*
> *Quintus Curtius et Polibius, volumen vnum*
> *Commentaria Cesaris*
> *Aemilius Probus Salustius, in carta caprina*
> *Suetonius De xij cesaribus et Salustius cum comento*
> *Dionisius Alicarnaseus*
> *(Dionisius Alicarnasseus De antiquitatibus Romanorum, Inv.)*
> *Decades Liuij, duo volumina Valerius Maximus*
> *Idem cum comento*
>
> *Sinonima et epitheta et Valerij Maximi compendium*
> *per Marcum Marulum*
> *Vite Plutarchi*
> *Suetonius De xij cesaribus et Salustius cum comento*
> *Plinius De viris illustribus et Suetonius De grammaticis*
> *Quintus Curtius et Polibius, volumen vnum*
> *Orationes ex Egesippo De excidio Hierosolimitano*
> *Plinius De viris illustribus et Suetonius De grammaticis*
> *Vegetius de re militari in carta bona*
> *Fenestella De magistratibus*
> *Pomponij Leti Cesares*
> *Sabellicus Ab orbe condito*
> *Marinus Scodrensis De obsidione Scodre*

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[40] *Cf.* D. Novaković, "Generički kontekst Marulićeve *Institucije*", in: Marko Marulić, *Institucija* II (ed. Branimir Glavičić), Split 1987, pp. 9-31.

However, historical works can also be found in the *Ecclesiastici* section:

Josephus de antiquitatibus Judeorum
Eusebius De temporibus
Augustinus De ciuitate Dei

Finally, we list a few titles that appear only in the posthumous inventory (*Inventarium librorum*):

Plinius Primus De gestis Romanorum (Inv.)
Joseph De bello Judaico (Inv.)
Franciscus Filologus super Plutarchum (Inv.)

The inventory is, without a doubt, impressive. It includes a range of historical works from antiquity (Greek and Roman), Jewish and early Christian traditions, as well as modern historical writings.

Among the Greek historians, we find Herodotus, Thucydides (excerpts), Polybius, Plutarch (*Parallel Lives* and a volume of commentary; the author listed as *Franciscus Philologus* may refer to Francesco Filelfo or Francesco Barbaro), and Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Roman Antiquities*).

The Roman historians represented include Caesar, Aemilius Probus (actually Cornelius Nepos),[41] Sallust (*The Conspiracy of Catiline*, along with a commentary volume), Livy, Valerius Maximus (in three versions: one unspecified, one with commentary, and a compendium compiled by Marulić himself), Suetonius (*The Twelve Caesars* and *On Grammarians*), Quintus Curtius Rufus, Pseudo-Pliny (*On the Deeds of the Romans*), another Pseudo-Pliny (*On Famous Men*), Vegetius (*On Military Strategy*), and Pseudo-Fenestella. Notably, among the great Roman historians, Tacitus is absent.

The mentioned pseudepigrapha can at least partially be clarified here. Regarding the title *De viris illustribus*, as noted by D. Novaković, it refers to the text *De viris illustribus urbis Romae* by an unknown author, which was attributed to Pliny until 1579 and, from that year onward – again mistakenly – to Sextus Aurelius Victor.[42] Fenestella was a Roman historian and antiquarian from the 1st century, the author of *Annals*, of which only sparse fragments have survived. However, under his name, the work *De magistratibus sacerdotiisque Romanorum* by

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[41] *Cf.* D. Novaković, "Marulićeve *starozavjetne ličnosti* i antička biografska tradicija", in: Marko Marulić, *Starozavjetne ličnosti* (ed. Branimir Glavičić), Split 1991, pp. 33, n. 5
[42] *Cf.* D. Novaković, *op. cit.* (41), pp. 31-32.

Andrea Fiocchi (Floccus), secretary to Pope Eugene IV (1431–1447), was printed in the 15th and 16th centuries.[43]

The Jewish and early Christian historians on Marulić's list include Josephus Flavius (*The Jewish War* and *Jewish Antiquities*, as well as excerpts from his work under the name of the so-called Hegesippus) and Eusebius of Caesarea (most likely his *Ecclesiastical History*, which was translated into Latin around 400 by Rufinus of Aquileia). Augustine is also included here, as his *City of God*, alongside many other aspects, possesses distinctly historiographical attributes.

Among modern-era writers (Marulić's contemporaries) are Pomponius Laetus (1427–1497), whose work *On the Emperors* is a compendium of Roman and Byzantine history, first published posthumously in 1493; Marcantonio Coccio Sabellico (c. 1436–1506), whose original work is titled *Rhapsodiae historiarum enneades ab orbe condito ad inclinationem imperii Romani,* covering history from the creation of the world to 1504; and Marin of Shkodra (Marinus Barletius, Marino Barlezio, c. 1450 – no later than 1512), whose *The Siege of Shkodra* was first published in Venice in 1504.

It is noteworthy that certain historians, such as the Florentine Matteo Palmieri, whose work *De temporibus* Marulić used while writing his *Institucija*,[44] are not listed anywhere. Also absent are Jacobus Philippus of Bergamo (*Supplementum chronicarum*) and Flavio Biondo of Forlì (*Italia illustrata*), both of whom prompted Marulić's polemical response regarding the birthplace of St. Jerome (*In eos qui beatum Hieronymum Italum fuisse contendunt*).[45]

Humanists did not exclude saintly biographies from their broad biographical interests, but they often subjected them to the same historiographical and philological scrutiny as other texts – Erasmus's biography of St. Jerome is a striking example of this approach.[46] Marulić's inclination toward hagiography, however, was motivated almost exclusively by religious and moral concerns. The extraordinary extent[47] of his

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[43] Fiocchi himself was not responsible for the forgery, as his work explicitly mentions the Catholic Church hierarchy. *Cf.* M. Schanz – C. Hosius, *Geschichte der römischen Literatur*, II, 2, München ⁴1935, pp. 275.

[44] *Cf.* Marko Marulić, *Institucija* I (preveo, komentirao, priredio latinski tekst i dodao kazala Branimir Glavičić), Split 1986, pp. 435.

[45] *Cf.* the edition of the Latin text prepared by D. Novaković, *Colloquia Maruliana* III, Split 1994, pp. 54.

[46] On this, *cf.* D. Novaković, "Novi Marulić: *Vita diui Hieronymi* (British Library Ms. Add. 18.029)", *Colloquia Maruliana* III, Split 1994, pp. 21-22.

[47] *Cf.* "Kratice drugih izvora" and "Popis ostalih izvora" in: Marko Marulić, *Institucija* III (preveo, komentirao, priredio latinski tekst i dodao kazala Branimir Glavičić), Split 1987, pp. 647-650, 651-662.

familiarity with church history and the lives of saints is evident from the sources he used while writing his *Institucija*.

However, in the testamentary inventories, a remarkably small number of such works are recorded.

> *Compendium vite apostolorum per Marcum Marulum*
> *Vite sanctorum ac sanctarum*
> *Vita Diui Hieronymi (Inv.)*
> *Vita Sanctorum Patrum (Inv.)*

The first title could refer to Marulić's verse biographies of the apostles (*De duodecim apostolis*). The second is difficult to identify with certainty, while the third might be Marulić's recently discovered biography of St. Jerome (its title matches the opening words of the autograph: *Vita divi Hieronymi presbyteri a Marco Marulo edita /.../*). The fourth title refers to the renowned medieval hagiographic work *Vitae sanctorum patrum*.

This collection begins with the biographies of Egyptian desert fathers, originally written in Greek by Athanasius of Alexandria in the 4th century and soon translated into Latin. Over the centuries, additional saintly biographies were added, making *Vitae* a highly extensive work. It was widely circulated in manuscript form, printed Latin editions, and translations, and excerpts from it were commonly used in school instruction. During the Middle Ages and even the Renaissance, authorship was often attributed to St. Jerome. Notably, the famous historical-biographical work by Jerome, *De viris illustribus*, which Marulić references in the introduction to his *Old Testament Figures*, is missing from his book inventory.

Finally, Marulić owned several works of historical and biographical nature that cannot be definitively identified, but their titles still provide some insight into their content.

> *Vita Catonis Vticensis et Catonis prisci et M. Antonij*[48]
> *Repertorium historiarum per alphabetum*
> *Genealogia Judeorum et euangeliorum historie,*
> *in quibus conueniunt euangeliste*

This overview clearly demonstrates Marulić's profound and comprehensive interest in history. His own antiquarian and historical works further confirm this: *In epigrammata priscorum commentarius, In eos qui beatum Hieronymum Italum fuisse contendunt*. His engagement with national and regional history is particularly evident in *Regum*

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[48] Perhaps an excerpt from Plutarch's *Parallel Lives*?

Dalmatiae et Croatiae gesta, sections of the aforementioned work on ancient inscriptions, as well as his letter to Marko Prodić. Evidence of his knowledge of ancient history can also be found in the marginal notes accompanying *Judita*.[49]

It is entirely in line with what we know about Marulić that he was interested in contemporary political and military events, not just as a reader. His public engagement is expressed in the Croatian poems *Tuženje grada Hjerozolima* (*Lament of the City of Jerusalem*), *Molitva suprotiva Turkom* (*Prayer Against the Turks*), indirectly in *Judith*, as well as in his Latin letters to Popes Adrian VI and Clement VII, and certainly in the lost *De pace Italiae carmen heroicum*. His private concerns, on the other hand, have become known to us through recently discovered letters.[50]

<div align="center">6.</div>

In the Middle Ages, a considerable number of ancient Roman poets were read, most frequently Virgil, Horace, Ovid, Juvenal, Persius, Statius, and Lucan. However, poetry was not included in the list of the *septem artes liberales* because it was considered an offshoot of rhetoric, philosophy, and even theology. Humanists, however, granted poetry the dignity of a distinct discipline within *studia humanitatis*. By the mid-15th century, it was incorporated as an independent field into the educational curriculum, both in communal schools and in university instruction (for example, Cristoforo Landino taught poetry and oratory in Florence from 1452 to 1497). Humanists successfully defended themselves against the criticism that pagan poets corrupted Christian readers by interpreting their works allegorically. Some even argued that poetry was beneficial when read directly, without allegory, as it presented examples of great deeds from the past and encouraged readers to emulate them. All, however, regarded poetry as an excellent source of rhetorical education.

Marulić places the category *Poetae* at the forefront of the *Libri zentilium* group, listing fifteen entries within it. However, poetic works can also be found in the *Ecclesiastici* group, as well as again among the *Libri zentilium* in the sections *Epistolae* and *Astronomi*. Finally, several

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[49] For the letter to Prodić and the notes on *Judita*, see my works "Marulićevo pismo bračkom svećeniku Marku Prodiću", *Colloquia Maruliana* IIII, Split 1995, pp. 103-108; "O marginalnim bilješkama u *Juditi*", *Colloquia Maruliana* V, Split 1996, pp. 31-56, *esp.* 48-49.

[50] *Cf.* the letter to Jerolim Ćipik from July 19, 1501 in: Marko Marulić, "Sedam pisama", *Colloquia Maruliana* I, Split 1992, pp. 34-37 (the letters in Italian were edited, translated, and annotated by Miloš Milošević).

important new insights are provided by the posthumous *Inventarium librorum*. For clarity, we will here organize all the titles into a group of poetic works and a group of works on poetry, arranging them chronologically.

Poetic works:

Sphera theorica, <u>Iginus, Aratus,</u> volumen vnum
Virgilius in paruo volumine
Virgilius cum comento
Virgilij Bucholica
<u>*Oratius*</u> *et Juuenalis cum comento*
Epistole Oratij poete
Martialis cum comento
<u>*Electa ex Marciale et Siluis Statij et Hjgino*</u> *et quedam ex Platone*
Statij Thebais et Achileis et Silue cum comento
<u>*Statij Silue*</u> *et Saphos cum comento et opera Claudiani poete*
Oratius et <u>Juuenalis</u> cum comento
Opianus poeta De natura piscium
Ausonij Epigrammata et alia quedam
Statij Silue et Saphos cum comento et <u>opera Claudiani poete</u>
Sedulius, Juuencus, Arator poete
<u>*Maphei Vegij Carmina*</u> *et dialogi*
Carmina fratris Baptiste Carmelitani
Libellus Jacobi Boni Epidauri De raptu Cerberi
Mathei Andronici Traguriensis Epitalamium

Works on poetry:

Seruius super Bucolica et Georgica Virgilij
Idem super Aeneidem
Johannes Bocatius super Dantem (Inv.)
Genealogia deorum quadernus (Inv.)
Libellus De arte metrica
Omnibonus De quantitate sylabarum

The near-total absence of Greek poets is noticeable, including even Homer, whom Marulić nevertheless mentioned in the list of excerpted authors in *The Repertory*.[51]

The first volume in our sequence is not listed under the *Poetae* category but rather under *Astronomi*, and it most likely contains the works of Hyginus Mythographus' *Poeticon Astronomicon* and Aratus'

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[51] *Cf.* folio 10v of the autograph manuscript preserved in the *Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale* in Rome (Mss. Gesuitici 522); I have consulted photographs of the manuscript.

poem *Phaenomena*. The title *Sphera theorica* also refers to some astronomical work (perhaps in verse?), but it is difficult to determine anything more specific about it. These authors do not strictly belong to the core canon of *studia humanitatis*, but they do attest to Marulić's diverse interests.

The continuation of the list presents a series of names characteristic of a humanist library. Just as it is expected that the most represented prose author would be Cicero, in poetry, Virgil is an indispensable and most widely present writer. In Marulić's list, he is assigned three volumes (more than any other poet), one of which includes commentary. Among the poets of the so-called Golden Age of Roman literature, the essential Horace is also present with two volumes; the one in which he appears alongside Juvenal likely contains the *Satires,* while the other is specified as containing poetic epistles (including, undoubtedly, the famous *Epistle to the Pisos* on the art of poetry).

Notably absent are Horace's *Odes* (*Carmina*), which were highly valued in humanist circles at least as much as his hexameter corpus, which had been preferred in the Middle Ages. Surprisingly, Ovid is missing, even though Marulić certainly read him. This is evident from the reference *Ouidio Methamorph.* in the list of excerpted authors in *The Repertory* and from the Glasgow epigrams, which include several elegiac couplets that concisely paraphrase, likely as a school exercise, various episodes from *Metamorphoses.*[52]

Among the poets of the Silver Age, we find the satirists Martial (a newcomer to the corpus of ancient satirists, as it is believed that the manuscript of his *Epigrams* was discovered by Boccaccio in Montecassino in 1362–63) and Juvenal (notably, Persius is missing from the list, though likely not from Marulić's actual reading). Among the epic poets, Statius appears in two volumes, containing his complete corpus (*Thebaid* and *Achilleid,* along with the occasional poetry collection *Silvae*). The designation *Saphos* in the second volume of Statius' works does not refer to the famous Greek poetess Sappho but rather to one of the poems from Ovid's *Heroides* – the 15th epistle, *Epistula Sapphus,* whose authorship is now considered doubtful.[53] It is unusual that Lucan is absent, as well as Silius Italicus, whose epics were highly popular during the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. A volume contai-

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[52] It is interesting that in the 15th and 16th centuries, Ovid did not hold a particularly prominent place in school curricula in Italy. The most frequently read work was *Heroides,* as humanist teachers believed that it provided lessons in maintaining dignity in times of adversity. (P. F. Grendler, *op. cit.* 5, pp. 254-255).

[53] J. Badalić, *op. cit.* (18), under number 1015a, lists a book whose content closely resembles Marulić's description.

ning excerpts from Martial, Statius, Hyginus, and Plato is listed (presu-
mably due to the latter) under the section *Philosophi et oratores.*

Among later ancient authors, we find the didactic poem on fi-
shing by the 2nd-century Greek poet Oppian (which was published in a
Latin translation in 1517), as well as the 4th-century Roman poets De-
cimus Magnus Ausonius and Claudius Claudianus.

A particularly characteristic feature of Marulić's library is his in-
clusion of works by three early Christian poets: Juvencus (4th centu-
ry), Sedulius (5th century), and Arator (6th century). The first two ver-
sified the Gospels, while the third reworked the *Acts of the Apostles* in
poetic form. These three authors do not belong to the core poetic ca-
non of *studia humanitatis,* but they are of great significance for under-
standing Marulić's own poetic works.[54]

The preserved lists generally reveal a dominance of epic poetry,
satire, and epigrams, while elegiac poets and dramatists (e.g., Terence,
who was highly popular in humanist schools for moral and pedagogical
reasons) are notably absent.

Among early modern poets, five names appear: two Croatians –
Jakov Bunić from Dubrovnik and Matej Andreis from Trogir – along
with three Italians: Maffeo Vegio, Battista Spagnoli (*Baptista Mantua-
nus, Baptista Carmelitanus*), and Pietro Bembo, whom we include here
despite the fact that the listed work is not a poetic one.

The relationship between Marulić and Bunić (1469–1534), who-
se poem *The Abduction of Cerberus* (*Otmica Kerbera*) Marulić owned,
has already been discussed on several occasions.[55] The case of Matej
Andreis (1480 – first half of the 16th century) is entirely different. His
*Epithalamium in nuptias Vladislai... Pannoniarum ac Boemiae regis et
Annae Candaliae reginae serenissimae* was published in Venice in
1502. Only recently have we obtained the first substantive analyses of
this sole known work of his. However, we still know nothing about the
possible implications of the important fact that it was present on Maru-
lić's bookshelf.[56]

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[54] *Cf.* B. Glavičić, "Komentar", in *M. Maruli Delmatae Dauidias,* treće izdanje prire-
dio i uvod napisao Veljko Gortan; preveo i komentar sastavio Branimir Glavičić, Zagreb
1974, pp. 404; also, Andrea Zlatar, *Marulićeva* Davidijada, Zagreb 1991, pp. 13-19.

[55] *Cf.* Dunja Fališevac, "*De raptu Cerberi* J. Bunića i *Dialogus de laudibus Herculis*
M. Marulića", *Dani Hvarskog kazališta XVII - Hrvatski humanizam: Dubrovnik i dalma-
tinske komune,* Split 1991, pp. 67-80; B. Lučin, "Marulićev *Hercules moralisatus* (O ale-
goriji u *Dijalogu o Herkulu*)", *Colloquia Maruliana* II, Split 1993, pp. 16-35.

[56] On Andreis' *Epitjalamium, v.* Neven Jovanović, "*Epithalamium* Mateja Andreisa –
Žanrovski okvir i struktura djela", *Umjetnost riječi,* Zagreb, 38 (1994), pp. 57-64; Idem,
"Jedan rani humanistički epitalamij", *Forum,* Zagreb, 33 (1994), knj. LXVI, no. 9/10, pp.
717-727.

Maffeo Vegio (1407 – c. 1458), an Augustinian, is best known as a poet for his *Thirteenth Book of the Aeneid*. He also wrote the mythological epic *Velleris aurei libri IV,* the encomium *Convivium deorum* dedicated to Filippo Maria Visconti, as well as various epigrams. His effort to reconcile and synthesize classical and Christian educational ideals resulted in the important treatise *De educatione liberorum et eorum claris moribus.* Additionally, he composed several hagiographies and treatises on Christian and philological topics (*De perseverantia religionis, De verborum iuris significatione*).

Battista Spagnoli Mantovano (1448–1516), a Carmelite, was a highly prolific poet who often addressed contemporary themes (*De calamitatibus temporum,* 1489, on the plague and other threats to Italy in 1479; *Trophaeum pro Gallorum ex Italia expulsione,* 1502, dedicated to Francesco Gonzaga, etc.). He wrote eclogues (which gained great renown) and religious poetry (*Parthenicae,* in praise of the Blessed Virgin and various saints). He remained widely read until the 18th century, receiving praise from Pico della Mirandola and Martin Luther (his humanist-reformist approach to Christianity resonated with the Reformers). Erasmus even called him *Christianus Maro.* The brief notes in Marulić's inventory do not specify which of their works he owned, but there is a noticeable affinity between them and Marulić – one that would certainly be worth further investigation.

Pietro Bembo (1470–1547), known today primarily for his Petrarchan poetry in Italian, was also an accomplished Latin poet and the author of the influential dialogue *Prose della volgar lingua* (1525). Marulić owned Bembo's first printed work, *De Aetna* (published in Venice by Aldus in 1495), in which the author, in the form of a dialogue with his father, recounts his ascent of Mount Etna in the summer of 1493.[57]

Among works on poetry, Marulić lists only a small number of titles, especially considering that, unlike rhetorical theory, humanism developed a rich body of treatises and commentaries on poetry.[58] n addition to two volumes of the well-known commentaries by Servius on Virgil's works, Marulić's inventory includes two works by Boccaccio: *A Treatise in Praise of Dante* and *Genealogy of the Pagan Gods.* These are significant for understanding Marulić's implicit poetic views.[59] Also listed are two prosody and versification handbooks. One of these is attributed to Omnibonus, i.e., Ognibene Bonisoli (Leoniceno, c. 1412–1474),

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[57] Kolendić lists *"Ehtna (!) Petri Bembi" (Inv.).*

[58] For an overview, *cf.* D. Aguzzi - Barbagli, *op. cit.* (5).

[59] *Cf.* B. Lučin, *op. cit.* (55). It should not be overlooked that Marulić left a valuable testimony about his poetic views in the dedication of *Judita.*

a translator of Plutarch, Xenophon, and John Chrysostom, as well as the author of several school manuals (*De octo partibus orationis liber, De arte metrica*). He is also credited with a commentary on Valerius Maximus. Notably, Bonisoli prepared the *editio princeps* of the pseudo-Ciceronian *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (Venice, 1470) and wrote the first comprehensive humanist commentary on Cicero's *De oratore*.

<div align="center">7.</div>

Moral philosophy is incorporated into *studia humanitatis* in a distinctive way: it exists as a separate discipline, and we are familiar with numerous works on this subject written by humanists of the 14th–16th centuries. Since many of them were also teachers, a significant portion of these treatises were directed toward the education and up-bringing of young people. However, moral philosophy is also an inse-parable part of nearly all the previously discussed fields, as its material can be found equally in the works of poets, historians, and orators. It is therefore understandable that humanistic works related to poetry, his-toriography, and rhetoric, as well as humanist commentaries on anci-ent authors, frequently exhibit a pronounced inclination toward moral didacticism.

Works in the field of moral philosophy can be classified into se-veral genres. The *primary* category includes ancient and early modern treatises on ethics and moral philosophy, as well as educational tracts. The *secondary* category comprises works from other disciplines that contain explicit moral lessons or allow for moral interpretation through appropriate commentary. Somewhere between these two types are col-lections of maxims, proverbs, and instructive anecdotes, excerpted from various sources.

Regarding specific authors, those already well known in the Middle Ages – especially Aristotle, Cicero, and Seneca – gained even greater importance during the humanist period, as they were studied with increased care both philologically and in terms of their practical ethical teachings. Humanist philology also facilitated access to new sources, thanks to manuscript discoveries and translations from Greek. These included Plato and the Neoplatonists, the Stoics (Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius), the Skeptics (Sextus Empiricus), the Epicureans (Lu-cretius), and the significant compilation *Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers* by Diogenes Laërtius.

Humanists were particularly interested in ancient authors of po-pular moral-philosophical works who did not strictly belong to any sin-gle philosophical school, such as Xenophon, Isocrates, Plutarch, and

Lucian. This aligns with the fact that humanists themselves generally did not construct systematic philosophical doctrines or consistently adhere to a single philosophical viewpoint – they were not "professional" philosophers in the scholastic sense.

In Marulić's inventory, works of moral-philosophical significance are all grouped under the section *Philosophi et oratores*. Here, we will present them according to the aforementioned provisional genres, taking into account both preserved lists in their entirety.

Ancient authors:

Plato translatus de greco in latinum
Problemata Alexandri Aphrodisei, Aristotelis et Plutarchi, item Aulus Gelius, volumen vnum
Aristotelis Propositiones
Leonardi Aretini Jsagoicum et Tiranus Xenofontis
Laertius De vitis philosophorum
Opuscula Luciani libellus (Inv.)
Tulius De amicitia,[60] *De senectute, De somno Scipionis, De officijs, De paradoxis, volumen vnum manuscriptum*
Tulius de questionibus tusculanis, declamationes Quintiliani, volumen vnum[61]
Tulius De finibus bonorum et malorum
Tulius De petitione consulatus
Senece opera
Seneca moralis (Inv.)
Apologi quedam de Jsopo Greco

Modern authors:

Guarini Veronensis quedam opera
Maphei Vegij *Carmina et* dialogi
Eiusdem (i.e. fratris Baptiste Carmelitani) *opusculum De patientia*
Franciscus Barbarus De re vxoria
Pogij Facetie
Leonardi Aretini Jsagoicum *et Tiranus Xenofontis*[62]

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[60] In Rački and Kolendić, the text reads *Tulius de animantia*; in the Zadar manuscript, it appears as *Tulius de aiatia*, with a curved pen stroke over the entire last word. It is evident that this should be emended to *Tulius de amicitia*, as Ladan correctly does in *op. cit.* (3).

[61] In Kolendić, due to a printing error, the line *Tulius de amicitia...* has been repeated.

[62] We have not been able to determine any further details about the title *Laurentij Eustochij opusculum*, which is listed in the *Philosophi et oratores* section.

Marulić owned Plato's works in the Latin translation by Marsilio Ficino, which encompasses the entire Platonic corpus, making a detailed analysis unnecessary here. This is, without a doubt, a body of work that had a decisive influence on Renaissance culture as a whole. Ficino's translation, first printed in Florence in 1484–85, stands as the most magnificent achievement of humanist translation efforts and remained in use for more than three centuries. With some simplification, we might even say that the predominance of Plato over Aristotle is a defining feature, a *signum* of a humanist library.

The next volume contains three works titled Problemata. One of them is likely the collection attributed to Aristotle, possibly compiled in late antiquity, which covers a diverse range of topics, including natural science, mathematics, music, and literature. The second is authored by one of the greatest interpreters of Aristotle's works, the Peripatetic philosopher Alexander of Aphrodisias (2nd/3rd century).[63] The third, a work by Plutarch with the same title, is probably his *Symposiaka* (*Table Talk*), a collection of nine books of discussions presented as entertaining conversations on a wide variety of subjects, ranging from horticulture to literature.

This volume evidently brings together multiple ancient works from the *miscellanea* genre, a highly popular form in antiquity. Similar works include *Facta et dicta memorabilia* by Valerius Maximus, *Natural History* by Pliny the Elder (to some extent), and certainly *Attic Nights* by Aulus Gellius. Humanists eagerly engaged with such compilations because they offered a vast reservoir of information on antiquity, moral anecdotes, historical vignettes, and aphoristic wisdom. These texts were not only valuable for antiquarian and philological purposes but also for illustrating moral principles. Moreover, *miscellanea* were often lively and engaging reading material. As for the second Aristotle-related title, *Aristotelis propositiones*, we rely on the information that *propositiones* was the medieval term for collections of philosophical axioms. It is possible that this title refers to a compilation of excerpts from Aristotle's works.

Xenophon's treatise *Hieron, or The Tyrant* is a dialogue between Hieron, the tyrant of Syracuse, and the lyric poet Simonides. In it, Hieron explains how the life of a ruler is much more difficult than that of ordinary people, while Simonides advises how a ruler can gain the favor of his subjects by transforming tyranny into a form of governance that benefits all citizens. This text is particularly interesting from a hu-

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[63] Two works with similar titles are associated with Alexander of Aphrodisias: *Ethikà problémata*, which is authentic, and *Problémata anékdota*, which belongs to the *pseudepigrapha*.

manist perspective. In terms of content, it is worth noting that alongside pedagogy, the theme of the *good ruler* was a frequent subject of humanist treatises. Regarding its formal aspect, the rhetorical confrontation of two rivals or individuals with differing viewpoints (*paragone* in Italian) was an extremely popular humanist genre. Similar comparisons were made, for example, between Scipio and Caesar, republic and monarchy, or nobility acquired by birth versus nobility earned through merit. This type of discourse also includes Marulić's *Dialogue on Hercules* and *Dialogue Sulla* by Franjo Trankvil Andronik.[64]

Diogenes Laërtius' work *Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers* served humanists as a valuable source of additional information on various philosophical schools, particularly the Epicureans. It also provided abundant material for excerpting, as evidenced by Marulić's reference to *Philosophorum dicta ex Laertio*. Diogenes' work was translated into Latin by Ambrogio Traversari in 1433 and saw seven incunabula editions, with the *editio princeps* published in Rome in 1472.

Lucian (2nd century) is the most renowned Greek satirist. His translation into Latin during the humanist era marked an important addition to the corpus of ancient satire, previously dominated by Horace, Juvenal, and Persius – poets already well known in the Middle Ages, when their works were widely read for their scathing critiques of Roman vices. In this context, it is particularly relevant to highlight Lucian's satirical dialogues, in which he mocks the philosophers of his time and the ancient gods. Notably, he avoids ridiculing deities who still had significant followers in his era, such as Isis, Mithras, and Christ.

A significant part of Marulić's library is undoubtedly the three volumes of Cicero's philosophical works, which were essential reading in humanist education, particularly in the field of moral philosophy. A manuscript volume containing as many as five titles might be linked to a copy of Cicero's *De officiis* made by Marulić's father in 1440, who added a telling note: *"Nicolaus Marci Petri filius Dalmata Spalatinus scripsit sibi et suis, a. d. 1440."*[65] That Cicero, the foremost advocate of the ancient ideal of *humanitas*, influenced Marulić through his treatise *De amicitia* has been recently demonstrated by Anton Benvin in his study *"Friendship as a Theological Theme in Marko Marulić."*[66]

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[64] *Cf.* Vedran Gligo, "Prilog poznavanju književnog djela trogirskog humanista Franje Trankvila Andronika", *Dani Hvarskog kazališta XVIII - Hrvatski humanizam: XVI. stoljeće - protestantizam i reformacija,* Split 1992, pp. 73-84.

[65] *Cf.* Inge Šegvić - Belamarić & Joško Belamarić, *Stare i rijetke knjige u knjižnici Klasične gimnazije u Splitu,* Split 1995, p. 43, n. 30. The manuscript is preserved in the Venetian Marciana Library under the shelfmark *Ms. Marciano Lat. Cl. VI. n. 115. col. 3640. s.* and would merit a more detailed examination.

[66] Kačić, 25 (1993), sv. 25, pp. 193-210.

The volume *Tulius De petitione consulatus* is also listed by Marulić under the category *Philosophi et oratores*. This refers, of course, to the short work now commonly known as *Commentariolum petitionis* (*A Brief Handbook on Canvassing for Public Office*). It is generally believed to have been written by Cicero's younger brother, Quintus Tullius, in the form of a letter advising Marcus Tullius on how to successfully campaign for the consulship. It is worth noting that in the 15th and 16th centuries, the *Commentariolum* was regularly printed alongside Cicero's philosophical or rhetorical works, and even with his speeches.[67]

he title *Apologi quedam de Jsopo Greco* certainly belongs to the category of moral-didactic literature. It is undoubtedly one of the many late antique or medieval adaptations and translations of Aesop's fables. D. Novaković suggests that it could be one of the versions of the so-called *Romulus* – also known as *Romulus* or *Aesopus Latinus* – which is actually a prose adaptation of Phaedrus' fables, likely dating to the 4th century.[68]

Since no specific title is recorded, we cannot reliably determine which works by Guarino of Verona Marulić owned, nor even whether they belonged to Guarino Guarini (the father) or Battista Guarini (the son). Additionally, it is unclear whether these works were rhetorical or moral-philosophical in nature.

However, among the early modern works in Marulić's collection, three are more precisely identified, allowing for their recognition. Their authors – Leonardo Bruni (Aretino, 1369–1444), Poggio Bracciolini (1380–1459), and Francesco Barbaro (1390–1454) – are leading humanists of their time.

Bruni's work, *Isagogicon moralis disciplinae*, was written as his commentary on his own translation of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*. In it, Bruni follows Aristotle to some extent (especially in discussing moral and intellectual virtues), but he is also somewhat eclectic (particularly in his treatment of the highest good). The treatise, which also praises the *studia humanitatis*, was widely read in its time and served as a popular introduction to ethics.

Francesco Barbaro's treatise *De re uxoria* was extremely popular in the 15th and 16th centuries. He composed it in 1415/1416 as a wed-

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[67] *Cf. M. Tulli Ciceronis epistulae, vol. III: Epistulae ad Quintum fratrem, epistulae ad M. Brutum, fragmenta epistularum; accedunt Commentariolum petitionis et pseudo-Ciceronis Epistula ad Octavianum. Recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit W. S. Watt,* Oxford 31971 (Oxford Classical Texts), p. 184.

[68] *Cf.* D. Novaković, "Marulićeve parabole i tradicija tropološkoga pripovijedanja", in: Marko Marulić, *Latinska manja djela I* (preveo, komentirao, priredio latinski tekst i dodao kazala Branimir Glavičić), Split 1992, pp. 324-25, n. 17.

ding gift for Lorenzo de' Medici, the brother of Cosimo the Elder. Although Barbaro claims in the preface that he gathered all the wisdom of antiquity on marriage, scholars have established that he primarily drew from Plutarch's *Advice to the Bride and Groom*. Additionally, in the final section (*De liberorum educatione*), the influence of Plutarch's shorter treatise *On the Education of Children* is particularly evident. Further research is needed to determine any potential influence of Barbaro's treatise on Marulić, especially in relation to his pedagogical views.[69]

Finally, it is somewhat unexpected to find that Marulić owned *Facetiae* (*Witticisms*) by Poggio Bracciolini. This collection consists of 273 anecdotes characterized by unrestrained obscenity and buffoonery, primarily intended to amuse the reader through the ridicule of clergymen (at all levels), judges, lustful women, and peasants.

The absence of major Christian thinkers in the *Philosophi et oratores* section aligns with humanist views on the scope of moral philosophy within the *studia humanitatis* (we should also recall Marulić's title *Libri zentilium!*). The only exception is Augustine, whose presence is indicated by *Quedam ex Augustino De natura anime*, which appears to be some form of compilation, as no known work by Augustine bears the title *De natura animae*.[70]

Regarding works that belong to other disciplines within *studia humanitatis* but have moral-philosophical implications from a humanist perspective, we could mention almost all the authors already discussed. However, certain particularly significant authors and works stand out. In poetry, these include Virgil, Horace, as well as Juvenal and Martial in their "purified" versions. Among historians, especially Plutarch, Sallust, and Valerius Maximus. Among epistolographers, Cicero (*Ad familiares*) and Seneca, whose letters to Lucilius were referred to in the Middle Ages as *Epistulae morales* – a title that corresponds to the entry *Seneca moralis* in Marulić's posthumous inventory. However, the mention of *Senece opera* in the *Repertorium librorum* suggests that Marulić may have owned other works by Seneca as well. Among rhetorical works, which were considered highly valuable for moral instruction, Marulić owned Isocrates' *De regno*, Cicero's *De oratore*, and (pseudo-)Quintilian's *Declamationes*.

Collections of maxims, anecdotes, and excerpts are abundantly represented in Marulić's literary legacy:

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[69] *Cf.,* for example, Marulić's *Evanđelistar,* book V, chapters 6-10.

[70] There are, however, *De immortalitate animae; De quantitate animae; De duabus animabus; De anima et eius origine.*

> *Apophtegmata Plutarchi*
> *Philosophorum dicta ex Laertio*
> *Collibetus Nicolai Maruli patris*
> *Colecta Nicolai Maruli patris*
> *Collibetus Marci Maruli*
> *Eleganter dicta ex auctoribus*
> *Ex auctoribus dicta, libelli parui (Inv.)*

It is evident that Marulić owned the anecdotal collection attributed to Plutarch, another typical title in a humanist library, as well as a collection of philosophical sayings from Diogenes Laërtius. This is followed by five titles that clearly indicate excerpt collections from his reading; two of them are attributed to Marulić's father, and one to Marulić himself. The last two titles on the list have no attribution, but it is quite possible that Marulić compiled them as well. Perhaps one of these titles (the last one?) conceals the only surviving collection of this type from Marulić's hand – his *Repertory*.

Moral philosophy, as a discipline within *studia humanitatis*, primarily encompasses areas not directly related to Christian religion. Humanists believed that ethical principles were universal and that the Greeks and Romans, despite being pagans, fundamentally shared similar views on virtues and vices with contemporary Christians.[71] The effort to harmonize ancient and Christian ideals was further supported by the general reluctance of humanists toward theology as a theoretical discipline and their strong emphasis on moral practice.

Moral instruction, of course, could in principle be drawn from all writers within the Christian literary tradition. However, following their aspiration to return to the sources, humanists particularly favored the Bible (generally speaking, the New Testament more than the Old) and the Church Fathers. It could be said that the rediscovery of patristics began with Leonardo Bruni. In response to accusations that reading ancient authors led to irreligion and paganism, he defended himself by citing Basil the Great's treatise *To Young Men on How to Benefit from Greek Literature*. In this work, the Church Father unequivocally states that even pagan writings deserve to be read if they teach what is good,

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[71] Although it can generally be stated that such views were too liberal from Marulić's perspective, it is important to highlight the dedication of *The Interpreter of Ancient Inscriptions*. In it, Marulić draws Papalić's attention to the fact that even people in antiquity, despite not yet knowing the true God, held both spiritual and physical virtue in high esteem. On the latin text *cf.* Ivan Kukuljević Sakcinski, "Marko Marulić i njegova doba", in *Pjesme Marka Marulića*. Skupio Ivan Kukuljević Sakcinski (Stari pisci hrvatski I), Zagreb 1869, pp. LXII.

noble, and true.[72] Greek and Latin early Christian writers were particularly interesting to humanists because they presented theological themes in the refined language of classical rhetoric and aimed to emotionally engage their readers, inspiring them to actively change their principles and behavior. This approach to writing about faith – rather than scholastic, abstract theological reasoning presented within a strict dialectical framework and filled with neologisms – was more appealing and stimulating to humanists. Consequently, in the field of ethics, they rejected the Aristotelian and metaphysical direction of high scholasticism, turning instead toward *rhetorical theology* and the practical moral teachings of the Church Fathers.[73] Thus, it is precisely through rhetoric and moral philosophy that humanism firmly roots itself in the Christian tradition.

Marulić's well-known affinity for patristic literature is one of the key indicators of his humanist identity. The influence of early Christian literature on his moral views is a topic that extends beyond the scope of this study. However, we must not overlook his relationship with the rhetorical dimension of patristics, The significance he attributed to it is unequivocally expressed in his letter to Toma Niger. The fundamental importance of these statements in the context of our discussion cannot be overstated, especially considering that the author wrote them at the age of seventy:

> "I have received the books of Erasmus of Rotterdam that you sent me: they are distinguished by piety, learning, and no less by eloquence. I greatly enjoy reading them. Indeed, from the time of Saint Jerome up to our own days, our theologians have lacked the beauty of refined expression. We have praised the sharpness of reasoning and argumentation in many, but anyone who has even slightly enjoyed reading the ancient writers could not read their works without feeling boredom. Now, however, thanks to Erasmus, the very edifice of the Holy Church, which had been almost bare due to the negligence of these simple-minded thinkers, has once again been adorned with the ancient embellishments and shines anew, painted in the colors of eloquence. It is therefore most fitting that we rejoice and exult, for things, by the grace of God, have already begun to return to their original state. Once again, sacred literature and learning will have their

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[72] Marulić lists *Opera Sancti Basilij Magni* in the *Ecclesiastici* category.

[73] The phrase *theologia rhetorica* was introduced into scholarly discourse by Charles Trinkaus in his book *In Our Image and Likeness: Humanity and Divinity in Italian Humanist Thought, I-II,* Chicago 1970.

Jeromes and Ambroses, if only there are those willing to compete with Erasmus."[74]

<div align="center">8.</div>

Finally, it is necessary to add a few general remarks. Marulić's reading certainly included many works that he did not own on his shelves (or at least that are not listed in the preserved inventories). Therefore, we should not be misled by the numerical proportions between the *Ecclesiastici* and *Libri zentilium* categories. In particular, Marulić's familiarity with Christian authors was far greater than what might be inferred from the testamentary catalog. Simply looking at the previously mentioned list of sources he used while writing *Institucija* makes it clear that his actual knowledge and insight into the Bible, patristics, church history, theology, and Christian literature in general far exceeded the contents of the volumes recorded under *Ecclesiastici*. His entire opus, in fact, testifies to the exceptional breadth and depth of his knowledge in these areas.

When it comes to pagan authors and secular themes in general, the relationship between the information provided by Marulić's preserved works and what we learn from the testamentary documents is almost the opposite. In his writings, Marulić expresses notable caution and reservation toward reading pagan authors, insisting that only those works that can contribute to a Christian's moral improvement should be chosen as reading material. As an *active* humanist, meaning as a writer, the deeply religious Marulić prioritized the promotion of Christian values and moral-didactic engagement. Other themes – the pleasures and sorrows of everyday life, satirical jabs at contemporaries, interpretations of ancient mythology, and even expressions of love and erotic impulses – are present in his work to a much lesser extent, and almost exclusively in his poetry.

However, as a *passive* humanist, meaning as a reader, he was fully engaged with the literary and intellectual currents of his time, which were characterized by an unrestrained and lively interest in all aspects of human life and the entirety of the ancient heritage. The titles listed in the *Libri zentilium* section unmistakably indicate that Marulić's reading horizons were incomparably broader than what might be inferred solely from his works and the positions he explicitly expressed in them (with the exception of *Repertory*, *The Interpreter of*

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[74] *Cf.* Marko Marulić, *Latinska manja djela* I (preveo, komentirao, priredio latinski tekst i dodao kazala Branimir Glavičić), Split 1992, p. 19. Incidentally, Erasmus is also absent from the lists.

Ancient Inscriptions, and the recently discovered verses in Glasgow). Despite all the previously stated caveats, this is a fact that should not be overlooked – whether when discussing Marulić's worldview in general or when assessing his alignment with the European humanist movement.

9.

A Cybernetic View of
Darwinian Evolution in Language

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In this paper, we explore the intuitive notion of language evolution, and show that a simple cybernetic argument can be made regarding its very nature. We will showcase some of the crucial aspects of Lamarckian and Darwinian evolution, and demonstrate how several key aspects characterize evolution as a scientific theory as opposed to just a plain metaphor for language development. Among them are hegemony, homeostasis and postreproductional property inaccessibility. By studying the concept of humanitas as a case study, we will show how these crucial aspects of Darwinian evolution manifest themselves in the evolution of language, and how the evolution of language is evolution par excellence, and it is guided by true Darwinian principles.

1. Introduction

Although the foundations of evolution can be traced back to Lamarck (1809), it is Darwin (1859) who offered the paradigm we use today, evolution via natural selection. This theory claims that the inheritance and change in properties over generations is due to the fact that the reproductive potential of a species is far superior to the capabilities of the environment to sustain it, and, as such, only the offspring born with helpful mutations survive to the reproductive age to transmit its genetic material (Long et al. 2003) to the next generation. A corollary is that only properties that affect reproduction, and the life before reproduction can be changed by evolution. The idealized part of the genome that is responsible for a given (complex) property is called a "gene" (Pearson 2006:398).

It is tempting use evolution as a metaphor for other phenomena that seem to change over time, but evolution denotes a very specific type of change, and we argue that the change in language is Sarwinian by its very nature, and under cybernetic assumptions it is a true evolution satisfying the most peculiar aspects of evolution, such as hegemony

and postreproductional property inaccessibility. This fascinating phenomenon seems to explain in a natural way the shifts of meaning for complex terms, and we will showcase this on the term "humanitas".

2. Homeostasis and self-regulation

Cybernetics has always been something with a cool and high-tech name, but it is rarely correctly understood. Wiener (1948) derived the name itself from "kybernetes" or "steering", and from its inception it has been the science of control. For a detailed exposition, see (Pickering 2010) and (François 1999). Even though cybernetics is the interdisciplinary study of control, feedback and complex systems, it can be viewed as a different ontology, which unlike the traditional ontology focuses on processes. As Skansi and Sekrst (2021) demonstrate, the main idea is that two analogical processes, under cybernetic assumptions, can be decomposed in the same process. As such, two analogical processes are cybernetically the same process, and this result will prove to be crucial for applying Darwinian evolution to linguistic phenomena.

The British cyberneticist Ross Ashby was famous for studying homeostasis (Ashby 1945 and 1948). In short, homeostasis is the ability of a system to self-regulate in some way. Asbhy was famous for saying (Ashby 1956) that cybernetics and physics study the same things, but physics takes information for granted, and keeps a close eye on energy, while cybernetics does the opposite. The idea of the Ashby aquarium goes as follows. Imagine that you need to assemble an aquarium. Once the aquarium is completed with plants, sand, fish, etc., we will seal it shut for a number of years. You will be given any amount of energy you need (heat and sunlight), at any given time you need it, but there cannot be any introduction of information. It is enlightening to think what "information" would mean here. Surely fish do not read newspapers, but that is not what we mean here. Information is any active component which modifies a system and it is not energy. Here information can be a new plant which transforms the system, or four new predatory fish which control the amount of say goldfish. Even the presence of certain chemical compounds is information. Take for example the presence of natrium chloride, which is necessary for saltwater fish and dangerous to freshwater fish. If one is having problems with accepting the presence or absence of a chemical compound as information, you can think of it this way: Imagine that it is not just you putting together the aquarium, but that we are doing it together. If I tell you I will be putting in saltwater fish, I am submitting you the information that we need to have NaCl in the water. When you strip eve-

rything from this, it becomes clear that NaCl itself is the information, in the same way that a traffic jam is information itself, not the news covering the traffic jam.

The idea behind Ashby's aquarium is that we need to put it together with any components we like, and the goal is to have a stable self-regulating environment, i.e. a homeostat. The only thing you cannot do is to put a smaller homeostat in. Although the connection with evolution is more than obvious, the interesting part is that there are only two ways this can unfold. First, if it cannot be done, and the only way to have the larger system to be a homeostat is to have a component which is a homeostat, this begs the question of how homeostats come into existence, and if they cannot be created from ordinary components, it entails that there is a creator who created homeostats. This clearly has theological connotations. But what if we can in fact create a homeostat with non-homeostatic components? This is possible only if we know what we want to create, i.e. what kind of homeostasis we are after, or put in differently, what is the goal of the system. Think about human beings, that have (at least) two homeostats, body temperature, which are both achieved by the heart and blood vessels, but in different ways. The goal is of paramount importance when designing homeostats with ordinary components, since not every combination of ordinary components leads to a homeostat, and not all homestats are equal (Ashby 1945). The idea that we need the goal brings back teleology big time.

3. Hegemony and inaccessibility

Let us turn to hegemony. By combining the evolutionary forces defined in (Scott-Phillips, Laland and Shuker 2014: 1234-5) we can formulate an instructive example, and define hegemony. Imagine we have a natural arctic environment composed of wolves and rabbits. There might be other components, but we do not need them in our thought experiment. Imagine now that a white wolf is born as a genetic mutation, and that we have a dominant gene at hand. The white wolf clearly has a huge hunting advantage. Fast forward 30 years, what do you have? A barren wasteland. The white wolves were so successful that they hunted down all rabbits, and in turn died off. The apocalypse started with just one mutation that provided hegemony over the ecosystem. The problem with hegemony is that some mutations might turn out so powerful that they do not give the other participants the chance to evolve their defenses, and as result, the whole ecosystem collapses. This happens because one property spreads so fast

that there is no time to enable the evolutionary forces to work their magic.[1]

There are cases in which evolution is helpless, and "survival of the fittest" fails miserably to eradicate obviously harmful properties, and can be seen by "flipping" the findings of (Hamilton, Axelrod, and Tanese 1990: 3567-9). These "flipped" cases have in common a property whose negative consequences come into play only after reproduction. In the case of humans, such a property would be "Due to their eye physiology, people with blue eyes go blind after 50 years of age". Of course this is a made-up example, but its simplicity makes it a better example than the complex examples actually found in nature (relating to e.g. genetically caused cancers). So why is evolution helpless here? It is due to the fact that only negative properties which stand in the way of reproduction can be (in theory) eliminated with evolution by natural selection. Any property which becomes active after reproduction, cannot, even in theory, be eliminated by Darwinian evolution.[2]

4. Information and evolution

Evolution is not just for living organisms, but anything which follows the rules of Darwinism can be said to evolve in the true sense of the word. Evolutionary frameworks have been applied to biochemistry (Orengo and Thornton: 2005), but it is often thought that other applications of evolution are metaphorical and not direct, but anything that satisfies the rules of evolution is subject to evolution as such, not a process "just" similar to it.

Today we live in a world where we are bombarded with more data than we can absorb, and this is not just a metaphor – it is actually

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[1] It is an open, and perhaps very depressing question of whether human intelligence has enabled human hegemony over Earth as an ecosystem.

[2] It seems also that human civilization (and especially lack of warfare) has in fact made it very easy to reproduce before problematic biological properties become active. This is by no means a bad thing in sociological terms, but it does limit the power evolution has on our species, and future humans will stay the same as they are today. Evolution of the human species has in fact stopped, since there is very little mortality before the reproductive age in industrialized nations. The only way to move forward in terms of environmental fitness will in fact be cultural adaptation. Whether evolution will continue for the less fortunate parts of the world is a question that can remain open, but I am optimistic that in the near future there will be far less fatalities before the reproductive age. If this will happen, Homo Sapiens is the last species of man who will ever live--an evolutionary dead end. Perhaps the most puzzling thing here is that our hegemony by intelligence has produced a civilization with a care-free childhood, and this in turn marked the end of human evolution. The only thing left is cultural adaptation, also via intelligence, and as we have discussed before, intelligence acts as an expansion or contraction of a search-space.

essential for evolutionary forces to come about. In such a world, we find evolution again but with information. We receive data, and only the fittest data enters our mind as information. Notice that fitness has nothing to do with truth in the short run. But it does become almost the same as truth in the long run, and as such this constitutes a version of the pragmatic deflationary theory of truth as proposed by (Grover, Camp and Belnap 1975).

A quick example might be how anti-vaxxers accept, and even select data based not on complex validation patterns, but based on how the data fits the rest of their beliefs. This means that they are prone to accept and even diffuse false information. In the short run, the falsity of information has no bearing on its acceptance or diffusion and there are a number of studies exploring the spread of false news that point to the contrary (Chen, Xiao & Kumar 2023). In the long run however, the anti-vaxxers fall victim to their false beliefs in quite a natural way. Because of their views, founded on false information, their epistemic states diverge from reality and reality takes care of a new natural selection.

Even though we have used the example of anti-vaxxers, such patterns exist throughout society, and explain not only why people hold false views, but also how they spread in the short term, and how they disintegrate over the long run. This invariably happens when people holding false views get challenged by reality itself. This does not happen as often as one would like, but when it happens it tends to create problems for the person holding false views.

Information is subject to evolution, and this evolution is the same abstract force which governs the inheritance of properties in animals, governed by the same laws, but applied to different entities. Again, there is nothing "metaphoric" here--everywhere evolution occurs, it occurs as the same force: evolution. Animal evolution and to a smaller degree, plant evolution[3] is the most widely studied occurrence of evolution, and it makes sense to focus on it first, hoping to extrapolate concepts that might surprise us in other areas where evolution can be found.

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[3] The reason we are not too keen to talk about plant evolution is because plants usually do not have the same simple evolutionary bottleneck which we see in animals. The amount of food available to plants seems abundant (sunlight and soil), so it makes no direct sense to talk about a disproportion of the nutritive potential of the environment and the reproductive potential of the plant. This does not mean that we deny evolution for plants, but only that it happens in a less intuitive way. For plants the long time needed for their growth and its staticity are necessary components which makes most places unsuitable for growth, and the bottleneck needed for evolution via natural selection reemerges, albeit in a more complex setting. To put it in a nutshell, plants do not compete over food, but over living space which is their equivalent of food.

5. Hegemony and inaccessibility in languages

The paramount thing to identify is which linguistic entities have the potential to embody evolution. Words, and syntagms as such have only a limited potential, but there seem to be two candidates worth exploring. For simplicity's sake, the traditional grammatical categories need to be glossed over, so as not get bogged down by unnecessary details. In that vein, we are not going to scrutinize over details such as prefixes and suffixes – for our purposes they are simply things that modify the root of the word to form words with similar meanings. The first candidate is the meaning of a word. In today's world, we could use transformer embedding vectors, but other than that, they are inherently fuzzy and notoriously hard to concatenate. But we have a second, better candidate: roots of words. By tracing an evolution of a word by fixing the root, we can accommodate the idea of mutations, by varying prefixes, suffixes and other parts of the syntagm containing the word.

But meanings are not superfluous here. They can be viewed as the properties that evolution forwards to the next generations. So the word "Google" has a meaning, and its "child", "to google" has a related meaning. We could specify these meanings, but this is of little importance, since the important part is how the meaning M of "Google" is connected with the meaning M' of "to google". That first meaning, to which forms the basis of any subsequent meanings has a role similar to the homeostat relativized to a given goal (a pointer), and additions to the base word shift the meaning in the desired direction. The survivability of the new word is determined by how its meaning (properties) is received by its environment, i.e. its propagation between language users.

By taking a Wittgensteinian perspective (cf. Wittgenstein 1953: §1-§3), we could specify the evolutionary fitness function to be simply the utility in a given language game, summed over all current language games in which the word occurs. The evolved words with small utility die off over time, and the more pronounced ones survive and in turn produce new words. Even though a desired shift in meaning is the motivation for creating a new word, it is the newly created word that creates the new meaning and not the other way round.

Inaccessibility has a relatively simple transfer in the linguistic setting. Once a word has produced offspring that carry out their mutated meanings, the meaning of the old word is fixed. Any new meaning will be created by modifications on the offspring, even if in time a new word converges to the original word. A nice example is the Croatian "mjera > mjerenje > mjeriti > izmjeriti > izmjera", where "mjerenje" and "izmjera" mean the same thing. Most linguists when confronted

with these examples tend to dismiss words like "izmjera" as "incorrect", but this only confounds the issue, since words like that actually come into existence, and by fulfilling their societal utility, they survive and generate offspring.

The term "humanitas" held a more or less strict meaning in antiquity and (Traina 1960: 9) traces its base meaning to the idea of the human (thing) within the human (being), trying to point not to its essence as such but to the positive part of the essence. The very idea of exposing just positive parts points to a hegemony over concurring words with contrary meanings. One such word could be a word existent today in English "inhumane", but a more natural competitor would be a strong competitor with humanitas, such as "bestialitas" or "artefactum", whose meanings never stood a chance to survive in any greater extent alongside humanitas. The idea that humanitas captures the good in humans is delined by the meaning used in Caesar's *De Bello Gallico* 1.1.3., where "humanitas" is used to denote the Belgian civilization as such, focusing initially on the positives, but shifting towards just the group as such. We might be tempted to search for the contemporary idea of humane treatment, which by itself would not mean much as a practical maxim, but combined with the definition from (cf. Traina 1960), it reshapes the meaning to align with the modern usage of the syntagm "humane treatment". Humanitas served as the philosophical foundation of the education in liberal arts (cf. Tubbs 2014), and as such gave them the fixation needed to retain the "humanitas" as an additional branding inside education, retained today under the syntagm "humanistic education".

6. Conclusion

It is always tempting to use concepts in a metaphorical sense, and most people prefer to do so to avoid an ontological commitment, but sometimes the "metaphor" is so accurate that it is not even a metaphor. Such is the case with evolution of words within languages. By a simple cybernetic assumption, we can reopen the idea of the evolution of words, and it can be easily shown that even the trickiest aspects of Darwinism can be explained within this framework. Naturally, mapping the hard cases of a single word is a long way from a complete and mapped-out theory, but it is a beginning. Even though it is tempting to say that this beginning is by itself important, what is more important is the layout of the project. For example, it becomes quite clear that meanings must be able to move in a higher dimensional space (cf. Skansi and Lauc 2018), and as such they are naturally represented as vectors, and its shifts should be interpreted as vector addition,

which inturn has a genetic analogue in genetic modifications, which in turn reinforces the idea that real progress could be made by mapping out the Darwinian forces that shape our languages.

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If the term *humanitas* had consistently meant "consolation" throughout the entirety of Roman and later Latin literature, medieval and early modern alike, there would never have been any need for a volume such as this. It is precisely the richness and variability of its meaning, shifting from period to period, genre to genre, author to author, and so on, that has made the term so conceptually challenging. This very complexity has drawn the full attention of the editors of the present volume, who have brought together this collection of essays by our esteemed colleagues, all centered on the exploration of a single, yet remarkably multifaceted concept: *humanitas*.

That the question of *humanitas* remains urgently relevant today is evident in everyday life – in the people we meet and speak with, the films we watch, the books we read, the institutions we attend.

We are all too familiar with the attitude found in every period of human history – that the present age is the worst yet, and that anything of true value lies far behind us. Convinced that this is not the case, we present this volume *ad legendum vobis studentibusque*, in the hope of recognizing and reaffirming eternal values.