











## 12th CEE Forum Conference Vienna, 9-10 September 2020

## Populism, popular sovereignty and public reason

### **Conference booklet**









#### Day 1 | Wednesday 9 September 2020

#### 10:00 - 10:15 **Opening**

#### **Welcome Address**

Verena MADNER (Institute for Law & Governance, WU Vienna and Vice President of the Austrian Constitutional Court)

#### 10:15 - 11:00 **Keynote**

Renáta UITZ (CEU Budapest/Vienna) | Confronting Constitutionalism's New Normal

#### 11:00 - 12:00 **Panel I: Democracy**

Philip DINGELDEY (University of Greifswald) | A people's tribunate in a populist democracy?

Jan GÉRYK (Charles University Prague) | Milion Chvilek pro demokracii: What kind of populism is it?

Maria BEZÁKOVÁ & Lívia TRELLOVÁ (Comenius University Bratislava) | The quest for democracy or its reconsidering in the Slovak Republic?

#### 12:00 - 13:00 Virtual lunch break

#### 13:00 – 14:00 Panel II: Fundamental rights

Márton MATYASOVSKY-NÉMETH (ELTE Budapest) | Contemporary perspectives on the Hungarian human rights culture after 1989

Fruzsina GÁRDOS-OROSZ (CSS Budapest) | Toward a new paradigm of human rights? – attempts to redefine fundamental rights in a "populist" state

Virág Kornélia HELLENBARTH (ELTE Budapest) | Banished by law – being homeless under the Hungarian constitution

#### 14:00 - 15:00 Panel III: Constitutional courts

Gürkan ÇAPAR (Goethe University Frankfurt) | How a constitutional court could have survived from abusive constitutionalism

Evelin BURJÁN & Boldizsár SZENTGÁLI-TÓTH (ELTE Budapest) | The constitutional complaints of public authorities – the recent amendment of the act on the Constitutional Court in Hungary

Noémi NAGY (National University of Public Service Budapest) | The role of the Constitutional Court of Hungary in the protection of national minorities: a strong bastion or hollow promises?





#### 15:00 – 15:15 Virtual coffee break

#### **15:15 – 16:15 Panel IV: Sovereignty**

Daniel POENSGEN (Justus-Liebig-University Gießen) | Populism, antisemitism – and the question of sovereignty: impressions of group discussions with German party chapters

Marica MIŠIĆ (University of Nis) | Đorđe Tasić on ethical content on law and relativity of state sovereignty

Petra GÜMPLOVÁ (University of Erfurt) | Popular sovereignty over natural resources

#### 16:15 - 17:15 Panel V: Populist struggles I

Katarzyna GROTOWSKA (University of Wrozlaw) | Paternalism in law as an example of populistic in public dispute

Przemysław TACIK (Jagiellonian University Krakow) | Unwelcome excess of the law – on populist struggles with the language of the law

Bojan VRANIĆ & Milica KULIĆ (University of Belgrade) | Shaping the echo: populism, post-truth and voter mobilization – the case of Serbia

#### 17:15 - 17:20 Closing remarks Day 1

#### Day 2 | Thursday 10 September 2020

#### 09:45 - 10:45 **Panel VI: Open session**

Katinka TÓTH (ELTE Budapest) | "And you?" - The dialogue between theatre and society in the domestic democratic discourse

Szilárd TATTAY (Pázmány Péter Catholic University) | Hugo Grotius's etiamsi daremus hypothesis

Alexander KOVACEVIC (University of Belgrade) | The new forms of employment and its implication of labour conditions in the digital age





#### 10:45 - 12:15 **Panel VII: Europe**

Vesco PASKALEV (Brunel University London) | Is free movement of people subverting democracy and rule of law in Europe?

Isabel STAUDINGER (University of Salzburg) | EU Funds Conditionally in the light of equality and respect for the rule of law: Whoever pays the piper calls the tune?

Matthias UFFER (University of Berne) | Populism as unfair competition

Laura GHEORGHIU (Karl Franzens University Graz) | The social cost of populist sovereignty

#### 12:15 – 13:00 Virtual lunch break

#### 13:00 - 14:20 Panel VIII: Populist struggles II

Marko KRTOLICA (University of Skopje) | Causes and consequences of the rise of radical right populism in Macedonian society

Aydin ATILGAN (Bahçeşehir Cyprus University) | Populist facets of new dual states: a comparative analysis

Patrik SZABÓ (ELTE Budapest) | The borderline personality disorder of the Fundamental Law of Hungary? – a theoretical and comparative criticism of the Hungarian concept of constitutional identity

Eszter KIRS (Corvinus University Budapest) | Assisting Youth in Facing Authoritarian Tendencies through Education

#### 14:20 - 15:20 **Panel IX: Emotions**

Julia WESOŁOWSKA (Jagiellonian University Krakow) | Are religious feelings compatible with public reasons? The case of Polish law

Áron FÁBIÁN (ELTE Budapest) | Emotional politics and emotional courts? A preliminary analysis of the role of judicial emotions in populist regimes

Ondrej RUŽIČKA (Comenius University Bratislava) | What to do in the end times?

15:20 – 15:40 Balász FEKETE & Alexandra MERCESCU: The Central and Eastern European Forum for Legal, Political, and Social Theory Yearbook - taking stock and looking ahead

#### **Closing remarks**

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#### **ABSTRACT**

# Causes and consequences of the rise of radical right populism in Macedonian society

Marko KRTOLICA, PhD, University of "Ss. Cyril and Methodius", Skopje Assistant-Professor at the Law Faculty "Iustinianus Primus"

The fall of the Yugoslav Federation opened up the road towards realization of the longstanding dream of the Macedonian people for creating its own independent country. Additionally, the fall of communism brought about the process of transition which was supposed to lead to establishing democracy and market economy in Macedonian society. However, the initial euphoria in Macedonian society about creating an independent country, based on the principles of democracy and market economy, was quickly replaced with a number of political and economic challenges. Thus, during the 90s of the XX-th century and the beginning of the XXI-th century, the Macedonian political elites were faced with the Yugoslav bloody conflict, problems with Macedonia's international recognition, the Kosovo war, the Kosovo refugee crisis, internal conflict with Albanian rebels and separatists in 2001, as well as post-conflict building of Macedonian fragile society. Often, during these political uncertainties, in order to stabilize the Macedonian society, the Macedonian political elites were making unpopular decisions. In Macedonian society, such difficult and unpopular decisions were reality within the political as well as the economic sphere. Within the hunt for market society, during the 90s, the Macedonian political elites entered processes of privatization and reconstruction of Macedonian economy. Such processes led to a number of scandals, inflation, unemployment and poverty. All these political and economic uncertainties and troubles led to great disappointment among Macedonian citizens from the process of building Macedonian democracy. On the wings of such a disappointment, in 2006, VMRO-DPMNE and Nikola Gruevski came to power, which during the electoral campaign pledged revival of Macedonia in 100 steps. Although the slogan itself contained a dose of populism transformed through the promise for fast changes, i.e. the promise for revival in only 100 steps, still the first two years of VMRO-DPMNE's rule were more related to technocratic tendencies and reforms rather than with the rise of populism. However, Greek veto on Macedonia's accession in NATO in 2008 caused a complete change in the rule of VMRO-DPMNE. Starting from 2008 until 2017, the technocratic rule of Gruevski started to transform into classic populist rule. By representing themselves as a voice of the people, VMRO-DPMNE started to create THEM (traitors) V.S US (pure people) dichotomy in the Macedonian society. Over the years the content of the camp "them" (traitors) was constantly changing from one





group to another. It started with ex-communist and transitional politicians, after that it switched to mainstream media and intellectuals and in the end it finished with NGO's and foreign conspiracy forces. Such creation of dichotomy in Macedonian society was complemented by the fact that VMRO-DPMNE and Nikola Gruevski during their rule, tried to present themselves as protectors of the Macedonian national identity. That is why the project Skopje 2014 was launched under their auspices. Also, VMRO-DPMNE and Gruevski tried to abuse the favourite populist topic - refugee crisis. Such populist rule through the years produced great consequences in the Macedonian society. The populist rule by Nikola Gruevski and VMRO-DPMNE was followed by "occupation" of the state, clientelism, discriminatory legalism, corruption, nationalistic rhetoric and resulted with establishing an authoritarian illiberal system, huge division within Macedonian society and people, rise of the nationalism and interethnic conflict between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians, as well as, conflicts with Greece regarding who is true successor of ancient Macedonians and Alexander the Great. All this led to constant political crises in the Macedonian society. Such political crisis led to dramatic change of government in 2017 and VMRO-DPMNE after 11 years went in opposition. However, the rule of Nikola Gruevski and VMRO-DPMNE left great problematic legacy. Instead the promised revival in only 100 steps, Macedonian society after the rule of Nikola Gruevski and VMRO-DPMNE ended politically and economically devastated. Devastated and infected with populist virus because three years after the change of the government of Nikola Gruevski the populist energy in the Macedonian society is far from defeated. Quite the opposite. The radical right populist energy is still present in the Macedonian society and it's waiting for its new revival.

Key words: politics, democracy, populism, radical right, nationalism, authoritarianism, clientelism.

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