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CHARILAOS TRIKOUPIS AND THE REFORMATION OF GREECE

In the history of each country there are times when it experiences major transformations that are necessary for its development, survival, and for achieving certain goals. Very often, reforms, as well as the transformation and modernization of a state, are the personal engagement of politicians who realistically perceive the needs of their country, but also know too well what is happening in the world. Such was the case with Greece in the last two decades of the XIX century. This first independent Balkan state has long been unable to reach the level of more developed European countries. Greece had territorial aspirations toward the neighboring Ottoman state, prompted by the Megali Idea, promoted in the Greek Assembly by Ioannis Kolettis. According to the Greek ideas, the future expanded Greece was to include the Ottoman regions of Epirus,

Macedonia, Thrace, and a part of Asia Minor. To that end, Greece had to have a strong army, which was impossible without the country's economic and infrastructural development. For that purpose, large financial resources were needed, which the state did not have. Charilaos Trikoupis, one of the biggest politicians in the history of Greece, entered the scene.

On the Greek political scene, after the end of the Great Eastern Crisis, a two-party system was created instead of the multi-party system, in which the leading role was played by the Progressive Party of Charilaos Trikoupis and the National Party of Theodoros Deligiannis.¹ In fact, the death of one of the most influential Greek politicians in the XIX century, Alexandros Koumoundouros on March 10, 1883, allowed such a development on the Greek political scene.²

In March 1882, Trikoupis became Prime Minister. With his return to the helm of the Greek government, he started a period that lasted until 1895, in which he left a major mark on Greek politics. Of course, here we should not forget the fact that Trikoupis was the first Greek Prime Minister to retain his position for more than three years.³ In the period from 1878 to 1910, 27 governments were formed in Greece with nine Prime Ministers.⁴

The Greek political scene in this period became a field of personal contention between two top politicians, "each one noticeable in his own way, one as a statesman of the highest

1 Κωνσταντίνος Βακαλοπούλος, *Νεοελληνική ιστορία 1204-1940*, Θεσσαλονίκη, 1992, σ.286

2 Σπ. Β. Μαρκεζίνη, *Πολιτική ιστορία της Νεότερας Ελλάδος*, τ. 2, Αθήνα, 1966, σ. 156

3 Σπυρος Τζοκάς, *Ο Χαρίλαος Τρικούπης και η συκροτηση του ελληνικου κρατους*, Θεμέλιο, Αθήνα, 1997, σ. 126

4 Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos and Dimitris Bourikos, *Ministerial Elites in Greece, 1843-2001: A Synthesis of old sources and new data in: Pedro Tavares de Almeida, Antonio Costa Pinto and Nancy Bermeo (ed.), Who governs Southern Europe? Regime change and ministerial recruitment 1850-2000*, Frank Cass, London, Portland, 2005, p. 153

rank, the other an irreplaceable parliamentarian, the Kolettis of modern times.”⁵ The political clash between Trikoupis and Deligiannis by some of the researchers of Greek society at the time was rated as the first major polarization in contemporary Greek society.⁶ The Trikoupis party advocated the rationalization of bureaucracy and the creation of a society that would be based more on wealth than on political power.⁷ Trikoupis and his closest associates believed that politics and the economy should be separated. That is why the development of the private sector was one of the main goals of his party.⁸ Deligiannis and his supporters had the opposite view. They vehemently opposed financial speculation and viewed the pursuit of “private interest and wealth as immoral and anti-national”.⁹

The following example shows us how different Trikoupis and Deligiannis were in the ways of political action. Deligiannis traveled all over Greece in order to get as many supporters as possible. Trikoupis did not have time for such a thing. He did not try to get to know the traditions and habits of the ordinary people. Charilaos stayed home and studied what the country needed, made plans, met with diplomats and other foreigners who stayed in Greece, and went abroad to promote the Greek cause.¹⁰ Here we would add the following example. At the time when Trikoupis, due to the economic needs of the state, raised taxes, his political opponent acted with the slogan “Down with taxes.”¹¹

5 William Miller, *A History of the Greek people 1821-1921*, London, 1922, p. 96

6 Roudometof, *Nationalism and Statecraft in Southeastern Europe*, p. 440

7 *Ibidem*, c. 439

8 *Ibidem*

9 *Ibidem*, c. 439-440

10 Alexander N. Damianakos, *Charilaos Trikoupes and modernization of Greece 1874-1894*, PhD dissertation, New York University, 1977, p. 77

11 Σ. Τζοκας, *Ο Χαρίλαος Τρικουπης και η συκροτηση του ελληνικου κρατους*, σ. 134

The political party of Deligiannis included supporters of former pro-France and pro-Russian groups in Greece, and their rapprochement was only due to their anti-British orientation.¹² There was no place for them with Trikoupis, who was decisively pro-British. Deligiannis was not against the economic development of his country. It would be illogical. Unlike his political rival, he believed that the state should control the economy.¹³

However, despite all the differences that existed between Trikoupis and Deligiannis, we can say that both of them were politically oriented toward the West. Deligiannis, for example, was convinced that Greece, in a geopolitical context, was a bridge between the West and the East. In his view, the Greek people had the advantage of being a sort of a Western envoy for civilizing the East.¹⁴ This attitude is reminiscent of the thoughts of Kolettis, who was the founder of the Greek Megali Idea.

Trikoupis was known for the phrases: “Greece is destined to live and will live” and “Greece will become the stock market of the East”.¹⁵ However, according to Veremis and Koliopoulos, Trikoupis was the first Greek politician after Capodistrias who had clear views about the goals and the power of the state.¹⁶ In order to accomplish the above-mentioned, he had to push for major reforms in the country.

The military reforms undertaken by Trikoupis constituted an important part of the policies of his governments. These military reforms were carried out under the motto “national readiness is a question of the existence of Hellenism,” and the goal was to

12 Varban N. Todorov, *Greek federalism during the nineteenth century. Ideas and projects*, East European Quarterly, Boulder, 1995, p. 113

13 *Ibidem*, c. 112

14 Νίκη Μαρωνιτη, *Πολιτική εξουσία και εθνικό ζήτημα στην Ελλάδα 1880 - 1910*, Αλεξανδρεία, Αθήνα, 2009, σ. 83

15 Σ. Τζοκας, *Ο Χαρίλαος Τρικούπης και η συγκροτηση του ελληνικού κράτους*, σ. 145

16 Θανος Βερεμης, Γιαννης Κολιοπουλος, *Ελλάς-Η σύγχρονη συνέχεια*, Καστανιωτη, Αθήνα, 2006, σ. 288

create a strong, modern and regular army.¹⁷ Measures had been taken to achieve this objective concerning the organization of military education, training, and armament.¹⁸

Military reforms that were carried out by the Trikoupis government were related to the future of Macedonia. According to the views of this Greek politician, a real battle would be fought in Macedonia between the Balkan states, which in the end would have to end in a war.¹⁹ The war required a ready army. Charilaos Trikoupis was aware that his country possessed weak military force on land and sea compared to the Ottoman army. Therefore, one of the main directions of his reform concerned the armed forces.

In 1882, the mandatory military service was reduced from two years to one, in order to make economy on soldiers' provisions, and use the money on training and equipment.²⁰ This move was probably not without reason. In the period from 1879 to 1882, the number of recruited soldiers reached 30,000.²¹ One Prussian general said that he hardly knew a politician who had a good knowledge of military affairs.²² During 1886 and 1887, the government of Trikoupis wanted to acquire new steam ships for the needs of the Greek navy. The Greek Prime Minister surprised the military officials and the shipbuilders with his knowledge of the matter, more specifically the needs of the navy.²³ Obviously, sometimes, when it comes to military needs, even generals make mistakes. These military purchases were

17 Νίκη Μαρωνίτη, *Πολιτική εξουσία και εθνικό ζήτημα*, σ. 84

18 *Ibidem*

19 Ν. Μαρωνίτη, *Πολιτική εξουσία και εθνικό ζήτημα*, σ. 81

20 Douglas Dakin, *The formation of the Greek state: Political developments until 1923*, in: *John T.A.Koumoulides (ed.) Greece in transition*, *Zeno, London, 1977*, p. 51

21 Thanos Veremis, *The military in Greek politics*, *Hurst & Company, London, 1997*, p. 33

22 Jeremiah W. Jenks, *A Greek Prime Minister: Charilaos Tricoupis*, *Atlantic Monthly*, v. 73, issue 437 (March 1894), p. 354

23 *Idem*

not accidental. They were part of the military reforms carried out by Trikoupis in order for the country to become an important factor in international relations, especially those in the region.²⁴ A major influence was probably the unpleasant experience of the past, when his country threatened military action against the Ottoman state, but was unable to enforce it because of its weak military.²⁵ When it comes to military reforms in Greece and relations with the northern neighbor during this period, I think that a slightly more expansive explanation is needed. Trikoupis paid more attention to reforming the navy. This was expected, because the Greeks had to protect their maritime communications, while at the same time to interrupt those of their opponents, the Ottomans.²⁶ He, therefore, felt that the expenses of the navy should have priority over those for the land army, if there was a restriction on spending.²⁷ It should be noted that, when buying warships in 1887, the Greek government took out a loan once again. This was already normal when it comes to Greece, but there is an interesting detail about this loan. The Comptoir d'Escompte from France approved a loan to the Greek government, as it would be used to buy two destroyers from a company where this bank held large stocks.²⁸ This detail concerning lending money to Greece closely resembles today's lending to poorer countries by wealthy banks. Margarita Dritsas, who writes about foreign capital and Greek development, notes that during 1887 and 1889, the Greek state was on the verge of bankruptcy, but it was precisely at that time that the loan was given, and there was a solid reason for that. At the time,

24 Θανος Βερεμης, Γιαννης Κολιοπουλος, *Ελλάς-Η συγχρονη*, σ. 292

25 *Ibidem*

26 Zisis Fotakis, *Greek naval strategy and policy 1910-1919*, Routledge, London, 2005, p. 6

27 *Ibidem*

28 Margarita Dritsas, Foreign capital and Greek development in a historical perspective, *Uppsala papers in economic history, working paper n. 10*, 1993, p. 10

the shares of the Greek state were bought very cheaply and were used for stock market speculation.²⁹ On the other hand, the Greek state continued to have problems with finances. The loans out taken by the Greek state were in fact used for other purposes, and not for those for which they were intended.³⁰

Trikoupis tried to apply his new strategy to reform the army and the navy in a relatively short period of time because he feared that the Ottoman state would, in the meantime, build a network of strategic rail lines in southern Macedonia, or assemble a solid navy.³¹

Military reforms sought funding, but also advice from the side. However, Greece did not have the capacity to carry out by itself Trikoupis' ambitious plans for transforming the army. As a proven, zesty anglophile, Trikoupis initially sought help from the British for the reforms he had planned for the Greek army. However, the answer was not positive. The government in London believed that support for Greek military reform could lead to a situation in which it was bent on supporting the rebellion of the Greek population in the Ottoman state.³²

British indifference was not discouraging for the experienced Greek politician. He now turned to the French. The answer from Paris was positive. Toward the end of 1883, 12 officers, headed by General Koronaios, were sent to France in order to see the capabilities of the French, which could then be applied to the Greek army. That is why a French military mission was called to Athens. France had sent a military and naval mission to Athens to help reform the Greek Armed Forces. In 1884, the mission of General Vosseur arrived in Greece. The work of reforming the Greek army began. When it comes to reforming the Greek army, it should be mentioned that Trikoupis attempted to reform the military academy as well. The time of study was shortened to

29 *Ibidem*

30 *Ibidem*, c.11

31 Z. Fotakis, *Greek naval strategy and policy*, p. 6

32 Z. Fotakis, *Greek naval strategy and policy*, p. 7

five years, instructing cadets to study more military-related subjects instead of science, as had been previously.³³ However, the possibility of studying at the military academy in Athens remained a privilege intended only for those who could pay for it. Nevertheless, in 1884 the School of Naval Cadets was formed.³⁴

His efforts to make the Greek army an important factor in the region, one that would help the state step up its influence, did not yield significant results. The best indicator for this was the military disaster of 1897, when the Greek army was trampled during a short war with the Ottomans.

One of the main features of the governments of Charilaos Trikoupis was the development of infrastructure in the country. The infrastructure investment policy was not without foundation. Greece did not have good roads, and the railway connection was weak. This was one of the reasons for the poor development of the Greek state and economy in comparison with the European ones. Therefore, "Trikoupis thought that the only wise policy, if one looked at the future, was to build good roads and railways as soon as the state could afford it."³⁵ That is why he commenced major infrastructure projects, which later proved to be a worthwhile investment. One of the priorities of Trikoupis was the construction of a good railway infrastructure in the country. He pledged his political authority in order to convince Greek politicians of the necessity of a better rail link to Greek cities. Many consider Trikoupis' address to the Greek Parliament on May 20, 1882 as a key to the further development of railways in Greece.³⁶ In fact, the speech by Trikoupis was not accidental. It was preceded by the conclusion of contracts by which the Trikoupis government foresaw the construction

33 *Ibidem.*

34 Z. Fotakis, *Greek naval strategy and policy*, p. 8

35 *Ibidem*, c. 357

36 John A. Paravantis, *Past, Present and Future of railway transportation in Greece*, *Archives of Economic History*, v. XII, n. 1-2, Athens, 2001, p. 240

of 700 km of tracks in Thessaly, Peloponnesus and Attica.³⁷ Perhaps the problem would not have been that big, if Trikoupis had not cancelled another rail construction contract, concluded by his predecessor, Koumoundouros.³⁸ Trikoupis convinced the MPs of the necessity of building a railroad as he had envisioned. The beginning of the construction of railway lines in Greece was interwoven with long discussions, accusations and misunderstandings, but until the death of Trikoupis in 1896, about 1,000 kilometers of railways were built in the country.³⁹ However, there was one issue that no Greek politician could resolve: connecting the Greek with the Ottoman Railways.

Trikoupis' biggest project was the construction of the Corinth Canal. The idea of its construction went back to 1869, when a French company was established in Greece in order to obtain a concession for the construction of this canal.⁴⁰ Its construction, however, began later, more precisely in 1883, and finally ended in 1893.⁴¹ However, despite the great shortening of the sea route from the Aegean to Italy, the financial benefit of this canal was initially very small.⁴² In 1906, this forced the French company that built and managed the canal to sell it at an auction of the National Bank of Greece for a sum of 430,000 drachmae.⁴³ However, this initially bad economic project, began to yield results in the future.

Greece did not have enough financial resources for major investments. Therefore, like many other economically weak

37 Irene Anastasiadou, *Constructing Iron Europe: Transnationalism and Railways in the Interbellum*, Amsterdam University Press, 2011, p. 212

38 *Ibidem*

39 Ричард Клог, *Историја Грчке новог доба*, Клио, Београд, 2000, с. 70

40 M. Dritsas, *Foreign capital and Greek development in a historical perspective*, p. 13

41 Р. Клог, *Историја Грчке новог доба*, с. 70

42 *Ibidem*

43 M. Dritsas, *Foreign capital and Greek development in a historical perspective*, p. 14

states, the government of Trikoupis began to borrow from the side. Trikoupis complemented the lack of funds by obtaining new loans. Thus, in the period from 1879 to 1890, six loans were obtained in the amount of 630,000,000 drachmae, and starting from 1887 the government had to spend 40% of the budget for servicing the debts.⁴⁴ During 1883 and 1884 Trikoupis' government took out large foreign loans, but at the same time increased taxes. In a society such as the Greek one, paying taxes was not a popular measure, and we can only assume the reactions. Trikoupis also felt it on his own skin. Although he was the Prime Minister who had set a record during the first half of the 1880s for a three-year unhindered leadership of the state, he lost the elections in April 1885. At that time, some noted that it was a real shame that a politician like Trikoupis had lost the elections for wishing to develop his own country.⁴⁵ The bill for the reforms was paid. Deligiannis, when it comes to state expenditures, held opinions quite different from his political opponent. According to him, the costs should not put an additional burden on the taxpayer.⁴⁶

When it comes to Trikoupis' policy of putting the country in debt, one of his opinions is particularly interesting. At the time, Greece was not a rich and developed country, just like the other Balkan countries. According to Trikoupis, taking out loans was not a burden on the Greek economy, and, according to Jeremiah Jenks, that was the opinion of the British economic experts as well.⁴⁷ The economic policy of Trikoupis, however, was not accepted by some prominent Greek economists. Thus, Ioannis Soutsos, a Liberal, criticizing Trikoupis in regard to his economic reforms, reckoned that the economy should have

44 Tomas Gallant, *Modern Greece*, Arnold, London 2001, p. 50

45 Φειδας Κωστα Κυπρης, *Η Ελλάδα 1821-2004. Ιστορική διαδρομή και οικονομική-τεχνολογική εξέλιξη*, Μιχαήλ Σιδερέη, Αθήνα, 2007, σ. 71

46 *Ιστορία του νέου ελληνισμού 1700-2000*, τ. 5, Ελληνικά γράμματα, Αθήνα, 2005, σ. 22

47 J. W. Jenks, *A Greek Prime Minister: Charilaos Tricoupis*, p. 357

developed without a “suffocating hug” by the state. Soutsos, together with Aristides Oikonomos, predicted that the state would go bankrupt due to its borrowing, and the way it was being developed.⁴⁸

Writing about the issue of borrowing from foreign creditors, we should bear in mind that the Balkan currencies, including the Greek drachma, were formally or informally bound by the rules of the Latin Monetary Union with the golden franc at the rate of 1:1.⁴⁹

The borrowing, but also the weak industry, contributed to Greece having a large trade deficit by the end of the XIX century. During our research, we encountered data on Greece's trade deficit in the last two decades of the XIX century. In the period from 1886 to 1890, Greek trade deficit was 26 million drachmae; in the period from 1891 to 1895, it grew to 29.3 million, while from 1896 to 1900, it rose to 38.9 million drachmae.⁵⁰ These indicators best illustrate the poor condition of the Greek economy. In fact, one should not forget that the trade deficit in Greece in this period was a permanent state,⁵¹ although the share of foreign trade was in the range of 32.9 to 35.6%, a figure that researches of Greek economic history see as a sign of a strong Greek integration within international trade.⁵² Unlike the rest of the Balkan states, Greece had to import about a quarter

48 Μιχαλης Ψαλιδοπουλος, Η σχέση πολιτικός και οικονομικός θεωρίας στην Ελλάδα 1870-1940, Πασχαλης Κιτρομηλιδης – Μαρσιος Χατζοπουλος (επιμελεια), Διακυμανσεις του νεοελληνικου πολιτικου στοχασμου απο τον 19ο στον 20ο αιωνα, Τετραδια εργασιας 35, ΙΙΕ, Αθηνα, 2014, σ. 143-144

49 John R. Lampe, Varieties of unsuccessful industrialization: The Balkan states before 1914; *The Journal of Economic History*, v. 35/1, (Mar.1975), p. 58

50 *Ibidem*, c. 63

51 P.E. Petrakis, H. Panorios, Economic fluctuation in Greece:1844-1913, *Journal of European Economic History*, vol. 21/1, 1992, p. 34

52 *Ibidem*, c. 36

of its grain needs in the last two decades of the XIX century,⁵³ although it had been given Thessaly from 1881 onwards. The main Greek export products were grapes and grape products, amounting to 54.7% of the total Greek exports in 1890. Most of these exports went to France, where a disease of the vines had appeared, leaving severe consequences on French viticulture. The development of viticulture was not just an idea of the Greek farmers, producers and merchants. According to Joseph, the production was stimulated by the large French demand.⁵⁴ However, after 1892 the situation with the vines in France had been dealt with. As the disease of the grapevine caused problems in France and prompted Greek exports, the overcoming of this problem meant serious headaches for the Greeks. In 1892, there was a sharp decline in Greek grape exports to France, while the demand on the British market, the second largest partner for the export of Greek grapes, remained the same.⁵⁵ Salvation could not be sought in commercial activities, especially not in the industry. During this period, Greece was far from an industrialized country. Thus, in 1889, according to some research, there were 145 factories in the country.⁵⁶

Economic weakness was not random. It was related to the way of practicing politics in the Greek state. Writing on the nature of the Greek state, Keith Legg emphasizes the two characteristics which are most often noticed by Greeks and foreigners concerning modern Greece: the preponderance of the patron-client relationship and the importance of foreign

53 John R. Lampe, *Varieties of unsuccessful industrialization: The Balkan states before 1914*, p. 64

54 Edgar William Joseph, *The politics of westernization, Eleftherios Venizelos third administration of Greece, June 1917-November 1920*, PhD dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1980, p.24

55 P. E. Petrakis, H. Panorios, *Economic fluctuation in Greece:1844-1913*; p. 38

56 E. W. Joseph, *The politics of westernization, Eleftherios Venizelos third administration of Greece, June 1917-November 1920*, p.27

influence.⁵⁷ One of the weaknesses of the Greek state in the last two decades of the XIX century was the inability to create classical political parties with clear programs. Although Trikoupis and Deligiannis had target groups among Greek citizens, their political parties were far from being classical political parties by modern European standards. Perhaps one of the reasons for this lies in the way political parties or groups were formed in Greece. The basics of almost all political parties in Greece at that time were located in the Greek Assembly.⁵⁸ The capable or elusive individuals managed to influence a part of the MPs and, thus, create a party. Such was the case with Trikoupis and Deligiannis; and later on, with Rallis and Karapanis. Trikoupis, for example, was a supporter of Koumoundouros, but in 1872 he founded a group of several members in the assembly and, thus, began acting as party leader. Trikoupis, most likely, of all Greek politicians before the Balkan Wars, has contributed the most to the development of democracy in his country, and respect for election results. But his success was neither easy nor without consequences. On June 24, 1874 in the newspaper *Keri* he published a text entitled "Who is to blame?" Above all, here he meant the blame for the political instability in his country. Trikoupis pointed to the Greek King George, whom he accused of misinterpreting the constitution and the way he appointed and replaced Prime Ministers and ministers.⁵⁹ The king's answer was fierce. Charilaos was arrested and the issue of the newspaper was confiscated. But the end of this clash was favorable for the Greek politician. He was released

57 Keith R. Legg, The nature of the modern Greek state in: *John T.A.Koumoulides (ed.) Greece in transition*, p.283

58 Jeremiah W. Jenks, A Greek Prime Minister: Charilaos Tricoupis, p. 359

59 Ioannis A. Tassopoulos, Constitutionalism and the ideological conversion to national unity under the Greek constitution of 1864, in: Anna Frangoudaki and Caglar Keyder (ed.), *Ways to modernity in Greece and Turkey. Encounters with Europe 1850-1950*, I.B. Tauris, London – New York, 2007, 17

on bail, and in 1875 the king appointed him to be the new Greek Prime Minister. George understood his mistake. In his address to the assembly, the Greek monarch emphasized that in the future only he who had the greatest confidence of the assembly would be appointed Prime Minister.⁶⁰ In Greece, since then, the government is led by a politician who has a guaranteed majority in the assembly. Greek politicians have recognized, and recognize, electoral defeats, no matter how tight and painful they are for their careers. Trikoupis undoubtedly has credit for the further development of his country, like no other Greek politician before him, and but a few after him.

Trikoupis, according to one researcher of his work, did not regard the Greek assembly as a tool of the will of the people, but rather as an institution through which the necessary modernization could be achieved.⁶¹ Namely, he intended to bring the many political groups that were present in parliament down to two parties: “the free functioning of the parliament will turn the parties from personal to real, from many to two.”⁶² When it comes to the assembly, he introduced a novelty, which had not previously been done by any Prime Minister. We can freely say that Trikoupis established the foundations for the functioning of the political parties in Greece. He did not succeed in everything he intended to achieve, but none of his predecessors managed to change the Greek political scene like he did. In 1886, the Trikoupis government reformed even the Greek assembly itself. The number of MPs was reduced to 150. The purpose of limiting the number of people in the assembly was not pointless. The MPs, according to Trikoupis, should have more to do with the electoral districts and the district factors,

60 *Idem*, 18; Πρακτικά των συνεδριασεων της Βουλης, 1876, 5

61 Делян Русев, „ За съжаление фалирахме“: Двупартийният експеримент на Charilaos Trikoupis или един неуспешен опит за стабилизация на гръцкия политически живот, *Via Balcanica* 2/2013, София, 2013, с. 19

62 *Ibidem*

that is, to work in the direction of local interests.⁶³ In contrast to this, Trikoupis' rival, Deligiannis, thought that the number of members of the Greek assembly should be greater.⁶⁴

The establishment of this two-party system, which enabled clientelism and patronage, shows us something that was not very logical, given that Greece was still an agrarian country with a large rural population. There was a flaw in that society. Namely, there was a lack of political formations that would reflect the interests of the majority of the population - the peasants.⁶⁵ Trikoupis was not very interested in them, while Deligiannis, on the other hand, did not have great ideas that would be in their favor. In Greece, during this period, the so-called agrarian issue remained unsolved.

Trikoupis was convinced that Greece possessed the human potential to become the perfect country. To do this, Greece needed a good technical education,⁶⁶ which it did not have. That was the direction of the reforms that he implemented in the educational system. However, it took time to develop the sciences that would be favorable for the development of the country. In Athens, the Commercial and Industrial Academy of Rousopoulos was founded, which gradually attracted the attention of young Greeks for the sciences that would help develop Greece.⁶⁷ But, there was only one school in the field of mathematics.

The process of reforms and modernization of the Greek state and society led to a change in the structure of the population, i.e., the number of people who lived in Greek cities increased. Thus, from 1879 to 1889, the number of inhabitants of Athens

63 *Ιστορία του νέου ελληνισμού 1700-2000*, τ. 5, 21

64 *Ibidem*, c. 23

65 George Andreopoulos, State and Irredentism; Some reflections on the case of Greece, *The Historical Journal*, v. 24/4 (Dec. 1981), p. 957

66 Alexander N. Damianakos, *Charilaos Trikoupes and modernization of Greece 1874-1894*, p.82

67 William Miller, *Greek life in town & country*, p.153

increased from 63,374 to 107,251; of Piraeus from 21,055 to 34,327; and of Patrae from 25,494 to 33,529.⁶⁸ However, the population of Larissa went down from 19,800 to 13,610 because of the expulsion of the Muslim population of this city after the addition of Thessaly to Greece. The increase in the number of people in the urban areas was due not only due to a natural increase, but also to the migration of the rural population, who saw a better future in the urban areas.

Historian George Mavrogordatos rates the period in which Trikoupis and his political group were the leading force in Greece as a not quite spectacular time, in which the power and aspirations of the domestic commercial bourgeoisie still grew significantly.⁶⁹ Gerasimos Augustinos, in the context of Trikoupis' attempts to modernize the Greek state, wrote that the competition with his political opponent, Theodoros Deligiannis, as well as the need for moderate reforms in order not to expel potential investors, had a part in Trikoupis' program being achieved only partially.⁷⁰ Reforms undertaken by Trikoupis as a strategy of his governments did not only aim to change the appearance of Greek society, but also to ensure a continuous stride toward the country's progress.⁷¹ How difficult it was for Trikoupis to accomplish his ideas can be seen from the following example.

Due to excessive borrowing, in 1893 the Greek state could no longer function economically. Namely, its debt was enormous, with the interest rate reaching 70%.⁷² Trikoupis

68 *Ιστορία του νέου ελληνισμού 1700-2000*, τ. 5, 58

69 Geogre Th. Mavrogordatos, *Stillborn Republic. Social coalitions and party strategies in Greece 1922-1936*, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1983, p. 124

70 Gerasimos Augustinos, *Hellenism and the Modern Greeks*, in: Peter Sugar (ed.), *Eastern European Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, The American University Press, Washington, 1995, p. 172

71 Ν. Μαρωνιτη, *Πολιτική εξουσία και εθνικό ζήτημα*, σ. 82

72 Κωνσταντίνος Βακαλοπούλου, *Νεοελληνική ιστορία 1204 -1940*, σ.

was in an extremely difficult situation. His policy of economic strengthening of the state, as a precondition for achieving its territorial aspirations, suffered an undoubted collapse. Trikoupis could no longer manage the country. In August 1893, he resigned as Prime Minister, but the economic problems in Greece could not be resolved for quite some time. That was precisely the chance for Trikoupis to return to the helm of the Greek government; he managed to achieve this in late October 1893. But the only thing he could do was to recognize his country's economic inability. At the beginning of December, in the Greek parliament, he declared bankruptcy of the state. In a way, this was salvation for the Greek state, as bankruptcy also meant avoiding obligations for the repayment of loans. But it was also the beginning of Trikoupis' end on the Greek political scene. Soon Trikoupis completely withdrew from politics. In April 1895, his party suffered a major defeat in the election. He did not even win a seat in the Greek assembly. Trikoupis' defeat by his political opponent Deligiannis was disastrous. His once-popular party got 20 seats, while his fierce political opponent managed to get 150 seats in the Greek assembly.⁷³ Most likely disappointed by his own failure, Trikoupis left Greece, the country he had worked so hard for. He went to Cannes, France, where he died in March, 1896. In April the same year, he was buried in the Greek capital.

73 N. Μαρωνιτη, *Πολιτική εξουσία και εθνικό ζήτημα*, σ. 121