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
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PREFACE

Dear readers,

You have in front of you the latest 33 issue of the international scientific journal “Contemporary Macedonian Defence”. This journal has been published for two-decades in continuation as a special publication of the Ministry of Defence for scientific papers from renowned authors from the country and abroad, dealing with defence and security issues and problems faced by countries on a national, regional and global level. Since 2012, this journal has become an international scientific journal for defence, security and peace and as such represents a special medium of the Ministry of Defence, through which we communicate with the global scientific and expert public, and share the experiences and achievements in the scientific thought with respect to the problems and topics related with the security and defence.

The Ministry of Defence is in the stage of accelerated reforms and finalization of the processes of adopting the necessary vital strategic documents, and in that respect this journal gives the opportunity to combine theory with practice and exchange different experience of people working in the defence with those who know the theory in this field and who can contribute to evaluating and valorizing the work of the Ministry of Defence and the Republic of Macedonia. We, with all our strengths and capacities, are trying to promote our country as a stable, secure and prosperous state. We strive to see Macedonia as a full-fledged member of NATO and the EU. Scientific elaboration and broad-based debate is an incentive to focus more on the right path to achieve these goals. The new Editorial Board of the journal “Contemporary Macedonian Defence” presents the first round from which expert assistance can be sought and expert contribution can be provided to the development of the security and defence system of the Republic of Macedonia and the achievement of the defined strategic goals.

The world has been facing new security threats and challenges that require constant consideration and explication, so that states can deal with and overcome them in an adequate manner. The threats ranging from modern terrorism, ideological extremism, hybrid warfare, new geopolitics, environmental challenges, the migrant crisis, and natural disasters are just some of the considerations that require constant scientific elaboration. The publication of scientific papers on these topics by domestic and foreign authors allows for greater citation and discussion of the expert public in relation to the problems that have arisen.

I hope that the new composition of the International Editorial Board, which includes professors and experts from several countries in the region and beyond, as well as from several important higher education institutions in the country and, of course, the Ministry of Defence and the Military Academy, will succeed to introduce a new era and enthusiasm, promote the reputation of the journal in the country and beyond its borders, and make a significant contribution to the progress of our country.

***Radmila Shekerinska
President of the Editorial Board of the
“Contemporary Macedonian Defence”***

THE MILITARY PLANNING AND CONDUCT CAPABILITY OF THE EU: NEW IMPETUS FOR THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

Aleksandar CHAVLESKI¹

Abstract: *The establishment of the EU Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPPC) in 2017 represents a significant step towards the creation of fully-fledged EU Military Headquarters. At least two developments were crucial for setting the scene for the Council Decision in this regard: 1) the calls from new the US administration for greater military spending by the European NATO members and more capable/autonomous European defence; 2) the negotiations for Britain's exit from the European Union and diminishment of UK's opposition towards greater EU defence integration. But, the British opposition is evident by the simple fact that there is no mention of the word "Headquarters", nor any use of the word "Commander/Supreme Commander" for the person in charge, anywhere in the title of this new institutional innovation. Also, MPPC will be in charge only for the so called "non-executive" military missions, i.e. military missions where EU does not overtake any sovereign powers from the authorities of the host country, but only performs advisory functions. The purpose of this particular article will be to give insight in this new institutional arrangement, its tasks and provide an early assessment of the future prospects.*

Keywords: *European Union, military planning, military missions.*

Introduction

The move toward an integrated EU military planning capability was a goal advocated by the staunch Europeanist states for a long period, but at the same time strongly opposed by Atlanticist states like the UK. With the advent of Brexit the circumstances changed in favour of the former, but the UK Defence Minister said that the danger from these developments was the duplication with NATO (Emmot, 2017). Already in 2011, France, Spain, Germany, Italy and Poland (The "Big Five") sent a letter to urge the then High Representative Ashton to seek "structured cooperation", a legal route never before used, to set up the HQ without Britain with "tangible results" demanded by the end of the year:

"We encourage you to examine all institutional and legal options available to member states including permanent structured co-operation to develop critical Common Security and Defence Policy capabilities, notably a permanent planning and conduct capability" (Waterfeld, 2011).

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Shortly after the Brexit referendum in June, Germany and France released a joint statement calling for a new focus on security. In mid-November, the European Union's top diplomat, Federica Mogherini, released a 13-point security plan that called for, among other things, a coordinated review of defence capabilities and priorities among members. Two weeks later, the European Commission released its European Defence Action Plan, which will fund EU's defence research at EUR 25 million (\$26.5 million) per year, with the sum potentially growing to EUR 90 million by 2020. The plan will also create incentives for members to purchase needed military capabilities to share with other nations (Deutsche Welle, 2017).

On 6 March 2017, the Council adopted conclusions on the progress in implementing the EU Global Strategy in the area of security and defence, endorsing a concept note for the operational planning and conduct of CSDP missions and operation. In its conclusions of 18 May 2017, the Council decided to establish the MPCC, pending a formal legal decision, which was adopted on 8 June 2017 (Council of EU, 2017).

Legal and institutional framework

Initially, there were debates in the Council whether the MPCC should be placed within the EUMS or separately, like its counterpart – the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC). Still, the Council decided to integrate MPCC into EUMS, and to be under the authority of its Director-General, Lieutenant General Esa Pulkinen of Finland. A new Joint Support Coordination Cell (JSCC) was created in order to provide a forum for military and civilian personnel so as to maximize synergies between simultaneous military and civilian CSDP missions and particularly to ensure coherence on the ground (European External Action Service, 2017). In the institutional hierarchy, both MPCC and CPCC are linked to the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), which is involved in the planning of CSDP civilian missions and military operations. They are subordinated to the Political and Security Committee and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (De Waele, 2017:47).

The MPCC will be initially composed of a staff of between 25 and 30 persons, but it will also benefit from the support of other departments of the EUMS. In comparison with the situation *ex ante*, these should spend less time lobbying Member States for support and more time on their missions. Certain support functions from the mission headquarters currently deployed could also potentially be centralised, providing the remaining necessary personnel required for the new planning and conduct capability (European External Action Service, 2017). Approximately, 10-15 officers will be reassigned to specific positions in the MPCC or will be double-hatted (a similar practice to OPSCEN, where some 20 officers were earmarked to all dedicated positions in case of activation); 8-10 officers from the former OPCEN-A, pending confirmation from the sending states, and 5-7 officers voluntary contributions of the Member States. Additional functional resources could be attracted or used from other directorates of EUMS or from the current mission headquarters. Therefore, a maximum of 32 strong core staff will be the basis for a subsequent augmentation, possibly making use

of existing database of manning the EU HQ (Bodescu, 2017:15).

On the EU level, before the creation of MPCC there was no such *permanent* command structure, but the strategic planning was conducted on *ad hoc* basis. The procedure for preparing CSDP operations was divided (artificially) in the so-called “politico-strategic” and “military” phases, as a by-product of the lack of consensus on permanent planning structures (Simon, 2010). EU operational planning itself consists of 1) advance planning and 2) crisis response planning. The first phase is concentrated on anticipating possible security threats on the terrain. This could be done via: a) generic planning (matching the available capabilities of the concrete ESDP operation with those needed for the possible standard scenarios) or b) strategic contingency planning (preparation of broad contingency plans for the political level of the Council). After the Political and Security Committee (PSC) decides that EU action is needed and appropriate, crisis response planning takes place. This means that the Conflict Prevention Group, Crisis Platform and Crisis Management Board (CMB) – will get involved in this process.

The Crisis Management Board triggers the development of the *Political Framework for Crisis Approach* (PFCA), in coordination with the European Commission. The PFCA sets the political context for the future mission, defining the crisis region/country, as well as the need and scope of a future EU action. The vast array of instruments available to the EU include: 1) economic sanctions, 2) diplomatic actions, 3) mediation, 4) humanitarian aid, 5) development aid or 6) CSDP missions. An in-depth analysis is provided for the desired political objectives, the end-state of the operation, restraints, constraints, expenses and capabilities needed (Council of EU, 2008). So far, this new approach (introduced by the revised crisis management procedures), was tested in several crisis situations, including Libya, the Central African Republic and Ukraine (Koenig, 2016:169-170).

The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) is to prepare the Crisis Management Concept (CMC) in consultation with all the relevant EEAS services, in particular the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), the EU Military Staff (EUMS) and other relevant Directorates, EU Delegations in third countries and the competent Commission services. If a military operation is to be launched, the Athena financial mechanism will be activated. The opinions and readiness for engagement of other international organizations (like UN, OSCE, NATO), international NGOs, third states will be taken into account during this preparatory process.

The next step usually is to send a Fact Finding Mission (FFM) into the particular country or region where the crisis is looming in order to establish the readiness of the local authorities for launching such operation by the EU and to research and develop the CMC. As a result, the available CSDP options will be set out, as well as their aims and ramifications, and the overall framework for the EU mission. The military input in the debate is provided by the EU military Staff (EUMS), the Military Committee (EUMS) as well as by the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) (before

the reform in 2008 that was the domain of DG E VIII and E IX of the Council General Secretariat and the CivMil Cell in the EUMS). The civilian aspects are prepared by the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM). After that, firstly the CMC is subject to review and approval by the PSC and then enacted on a session of the Council of Ministers.

The follow up is the development of the Military Strategic Options (MSOs) by EUMS and EUMC which give overview of the needed military resources and actions in order to achieve the prescribed political goals. Again, MSOs must be approved via the PSC and the Council itself.

Then, the Council Decision (or in the pre-Lisbon period a Joint Action) establishing the operation is being adopted by the Council, which states the purview of the operation, its objectives, Operational Commander, the OHQ and available budget. Then EUMC adopts Initiating Military Directive (IMD), which is a roadmap for the Operation Commander (Mattelaer, 2008:11).

Also, third states may be invited to participate and to offer contributions, and Status of Forces Agreement/Status of Mission Agreement (SOFA/SOMA) with the host country/countries is/are signed. Regarding the financial burden of the operation, an integral part of the Council decision is the following: 1) a Budget Impact Statement (BIS) for a civilian CSDP operation or 2) a draft reference amount for a budget for a military CSDP operation.

Both the mil OpCdr and CivOpsCdr start the Force Generation Process involving Member States and invited third states where applicable. In case contributions of staff from invited third states are accepted by the PSC, a Committee of Contributors (CoC) will be established (Laufer & Hamacher, 2014).

The highest level of military command in EU military operations rests with the Operation Commander. The Operation Commander will normally receive operational control over forces put at his disposal by the participating States via a transfer of authority (Naert, 2011:11).

Regarding the plans, Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and Operation Plan (OPLAN) are discussed and approved through the Council hierarchy. CONOPS represents a concise statement of the manner the Operation Commander will exercise his mission. On the other hand, the OPLAN is highly detailed schedule for every aspect of the operation (Mattelaer, 2010:5). Crisis response planning itself is performed both on politico-strategic level (which is concerned with the broad political outlook of the operation) and military level (which prepares in details every aspect of the operation on the ground).

Regarding the Operational Headquarters, previously EU had two military command options: 1) autonomous option and 2) recourse to NATO assets. In case of autonomous operations, it was possible to activate one of the five national military headquarters provided by Framework States and located in Ulm (Germany), Paris (France), Northwood (UK), Rome (Italy) and Larissa (Greece). For instance, for the

operations Artemis and EUFOR Tchad/RCA, the Council decided Paris to be OHQ, for EUFOR Congo RD Potsdam to be the OHQ. On the other hand, for EUFOR Libya, the OHQ was located in Rome, while for the counter – piracy operation Atalanta in Northwood. When responsible for strategic planning of an EU military mission, these national headquarters mount the EU flag, and during the operation they become the EU Operation Headquarters (EU OHQ). The second variant is to activate the Operations Centre (OPSCEN), which is a facility in Brussels of no permanent standing, consisted of four officers and the necessary security and communications equipment. It represents a useful tool for launching a fully – fledged Operations Centre on a very short notice (Merket, 2016: 148). This Centre should reach full operational capacity within twenty days, and although it has not been used as a permanent feature of CSDP so far, it has the potential to be more deeply entrenched in the future (Koutrakos, 2013:102). This option was for the first time exercised in March 2012, in order to improve coordination between three CSPD missions at the Horn of Africa (Council of EU, 2012). The third variant for the first option was the establishment of a Mission Headquarters (MHQ) to command a non-executive mission.

In case of the second option, EU will make recourse to the existing NATO planning capabilities at SHAPE, under the “Berlin plus” Agreement. Here, the Allied Command Operations serves as a basis for the operations. Such ESDP missions were carried out in Macedonia (“Concordia”) and Bosnia and Herzegovina (“Althea”). For instance, the NATO Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe is the Commander of Operation Althea. The EU Operation Headquarters (OHQ) in these situations is located at SHAPE (NATO:2009).

All variants operate at the military strategic level, except the MHQ which spanned both the strategic and operational levels. At the operational level there were several national headquarters offered by some Member States to set Force Headquarters (FHQ) in the area of operations. At the tactical level, the EU concept of command and control identified component headquarters responsible for the execution of missions and tasks assigned by the Force Commander (FCdr).

The record of the CSDP missions conducted so far is mixed: while the opinions about planning and conducting Operation Althea in Bosnia are positive, the planning for Operation EUFOR RD Congo was delayed for a whole month due to the uncertainty about which of the five Member States will provide the operational headquarters. As a consequence, EU was unable to deploy its forces before the initial date for the 2006 elections (which eventually were postponed). The EUFOR Tchad suffered from a force generation problem, *inter alia* due to the lack of operational expertise (which should come from permanent military structures) during the politico – strategic discussions in the Council (Simon, 2011:8-9).

Now, the MPCC is to provide a permanent military planning and conduct capability at the military strategic level for non-executive missions. The non-executive CSDP missions are those where no prerogatives of sovereign power are assumed and

exercised by the EU forces (like political and administrative duties, including establishment of interim administration with the authority over the legislative, executive and judicial structures – as most of CSDP missions were of this type). On the other hand, executive missions are those where such sovereign power is effectively exercised (for instance, EULEX Kosovo exercised some executive power on the territory of Kosovo) (Lauffer & Hamacher, 2014). The MPCC should operate at the strategic level for the operational planning and conduct of the EU's non-executive military missions. At present, EU conducts training missions in the Central African Republic, Mali and Somalia.

In order to avoid the existing difficulties in planning and conducting operations like the situations where soldiers were deployed in dangerous locations, in need of a more proactive support from a strategic level headquarters with access to more assets and to avoid concentrating the military, strategic, operational and tactical levels of command into Mission Commanders as field officers, now the MPCC will be an out-of-area, static centre responsible *inter alia* for the building up, launching, sustaining and recovery of European Union forces (European External Action Service, 2017). Now, the MPCC frees up the EU Commander from the obligation to periodically return to Brussels to brief governments and manage funding, so s/he can be focused on the everyday activities in the field (Emmot, 2017). Moreover, in the theatre of operations, when a mission is established, a Mission Force Headquarters shall assist the EU Mission Force Commander (Council of EU, 2017). Still, the EU Mission Force Commanders will continue to receive local political guidance from the EU Special Representatives, where applicable, and relevant Union delegations in the region. For instance, now the EU Force Commander of EUTM Somalia "...shall receive *local political guidance from the EU Special Representative for the Horn of Africa coordinated with relevant Union delegations in the region*" (Council of EU, 2017:Art.4 (6)). Moreover, "a support cell in Brussels of the Mission Force Headquarters *shall be included in the MPCC until the MPCC has reached full operational capacity*" (Council of EU, 2017:Art.4(2)). The same *mutatis mutandis* applies for the EU training Missions in Mali and the Central African Republic.

During the preparation of the operation, the MPCC will draft the Concept of operations (CONOPS), the Operation plan (OPLAN) and the Rules of engagement (RoEs). It will be included in the process of force generation. The MPCC will be conducting all non-executive military missions at the strategic (i.e. in Brussels) level. The DGEUMS, as mentioned above, will be the Director of the MPCC, and *de facto* 'commander' of all non-executive missions. In his purview will be the ATHENA mechanism (Council of EU, 2015), that provides (in part) common funding for the expenses of the operation. The Mission Commanders of the existing three training missions mentioned above, and any new missions will become Mission Force Commanders exercising military command authority on the ground, but acting upon command of the Director of the MPCC. In fact, the Director will have the same role as the military Operational Commanders (OpCdr). *In ultima linea*, he will be responsible for the overall budgeting,

auditing and reporting.

The MPPC will also be responsible for the relations with the Committee of Contributors, civil-military coordination with the Member States and the European Commission, harmonisation of procedures for the EU Training Missions, relations with other international organizations/security actors like the UN, NATO, OSCE, AU etc.

According to the Council Decision both the MPPC and the Joint Coordination Cell will be subject to a review on the basis of a report of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy one year after they achieve full operability. Nevertheless, the review shall take place by the end of 2018 at the latest (Council of EU, 2017: Art.7).

Conclusion

The establishment of MPPC is *saut qualitativ* in respect to the situation *ex ante*. Still, this is only a temporary situation until the establishment of a fully-fledged EU Military Headquarters. The omission of the term “headquarters” in the title of this new institutional arrangement speaks for the reserves that some Member States have towards such development, although since the referendum on Brexit there is no more British opposition on this topic, and generally towards further deepening of the EU defence integration. Moreover, there are no more opponents like the former US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to the more vociferous EU CSDP, autonomous military operations and the much resented “duplication with NATO” (i.e. the abolishment of US influence and control in Europe). With the constant criticism of the European Allies about not meeting the 2% GDP threshold (only Greece and UK have above 2%, and Estonia exactly 2% of GDP on military expenditure), it seems that the new US administration even openly favours the more autonomous European defence, and the further European Defence Integration is an American strategic interest. EU as a robust security actor in the future will be essential for curbing Russian military threats, but also for eliminating possible terrorist threats.

Still, some questions about the functioning of the MPCC remain: how well this unit of only 30 or so people will cope with the burden of managing the significant non-executive military missions that EU is conducting or will be conducting in the future? How successful will be the coordination with the CPCC? How soon will the MPCC become a fully fledged EU HQ? It is yet to be seen what will be the outcome on these issues.

Judging by the track record of other CSDP missions, the legal and institutional provisions *per se* do not automatically guarantee greater coherence. However, it can be assumed that this new institutional arrangement will contribute to the greater coherence of EU crisis management, effectiveness and overcoming (to certain degree) the inter-institutional rivalries, as well as overcoming the shortcomings present at some of the previous CSDP missions.

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THE ISLAMIC STATE-A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION, A CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION OR AN INSURGENCY?

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Abstract: *This paper explores ISIS activities primarily as an insurgent outfit, but also like a well-oiled organized criminal syndicate-like business, and, as the paper will focus later on, a state-building actor.*

The objective of this article is to examine more closely and explore the IS militancy under the "terrorist" nomenclature umbrella, and argue that the group has pushed beyond these ambits. The paper will conclude that the group is a hybrid organization with the characteristics of various non-state actors, while also demonstrating signs of a nascent de facto state.

Key words: *Islamic state, terrorism, insurgency, movement, crime.*

Introduction

From its birth in the late 1990s as the jihadist dream of terrorist leader Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the Islamic State (known by a variety of names, including ISIS, ISIL, and al Qaeda in Iraq) has grown into a massive enterprise, redrawing national borders across the Middle East and subjecting an area larger than the United Kingdom to its own vicious brand of Sharia law.

Indeed, the group has demonstrated the hybrid aspects of a militia, an efficient enterprise, and an organized criminal syndicate; more salient, however, is the group's ability to symbolically and physically establish the dawla (state, in Arabic)² as its name suggests, provide goods and services to a population under its control, and make moves to sustain its continuity as a proto-state entity. In essence, it can serve as an exemplar of an "intermediary body" that blurs the lines between the limitations of a non-state actor and the trappings of an emergent state in the international community (Rangwala, 2014).

Terrorist groups are commonly understood to be groups that carry out acts of terrorism, and their actions are viewed as terrorist campaigns. Yet, recent events are a reminder that the activities of even the most violent terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda or the Islamic State extend beyond the use of terrorist tactics. These actors usually employ classic guerrilla tactics as well, and their overall strategy combines both violent and political means. Furthermore, these acts of political violence do not merely constitute isolated campaigns of terrorism, but are usually part

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² "dawla" will be used to refer to the Islamic State's caliphate-state entity as opposed to the general "State" in international relations.

of a broader conflict such as an insurgency or civil war. Such an approach can help the policy analysts to adopt and employ a broader array of intellectual tools to understand the complex nature of the threat posed by these groups, and arrive at more adequate, comprehensive and longer-term solutions to the problems they pose.

That said, we believe that the concepts drawn from the insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN) theory, and from the study of civil wars, can make significant contributions to the scholarly analysis of terrorism and the groups that utilize this tactic.

To earn the “terrorist” label, do groups have to rely exclusively on terrorist tactics? Might they use a variety of tactics as long as terrorism is the dominant form of violence? What if a group uses terrorism only rarely, when compared to other forms of political violence? Does the “terrorist” label then continue to have merit? If so, when and how should that label be employed? If not, what terms and concepts may be used that more accurately portray the nature of these groups’ activities?

IS is broadly labeled as a terrorist group due to its use of terrorist tactics, while clearly demonstrating insurgent characteristics by engaging militarily against government authorities. However, like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Afghanistan’s Taliban, IS has demonstrated signs of a robust revisionist state-building capacity in the midst of the chaos it has created, thus showing the vibrant appearance of de facto proto-state.

Waging a traditional war of conquest to carve out the 21st-century version of the original Caliphate, IS uses modern technology to recruit and fundraise while engaging the local population in the day-to-day running of the new state. As Napoleoni writes, “Ignoring these facts is more than misleading and superficial, it is dangerous. ‘Know your enemy’ remains the most important adage in the fight against terrorism” (Napoleoni, 2014).

Jessica Stern and J.M. Berger, two of America’s leading experts on terrorism, dissect the new model for violent extremism that ISIS has leveraged into an empire of death in Iraq and Syria, and an international network that is rapidly expanding in the Middle East, North Africa and around the world. This new model traces the ideological innovations that the group deploys to recruit unprecedented numbers of Westerners, the composition of its infamous snuff videos, and the technological tools it exploits on social media to broadcast its atrocities, and its recruiting pitch to the world, including its success at attracting thousands of Western adherents (Stern, 2015).

Islamic State-short, medium and long term goals

In June 2014, ISIS officially declared the territory under its rule a caliphate and the group’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the caliph. In his acceptance speech for the caliphate, al-Baghdadi made clear that ISIS’s activities were not limited to any region, as the group sought global governance of all Muslims. Consequently, the organization changed its name from the “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria” (or the “Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham”) to simply the “Islamic State.”³

³ CEP uses “ISIS” (the acronym used for many English translations of one of the entity’s older names), even though the group now refers to itself *asal-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah* [the “Islamic State” (IS)]. The entity is widely known among English-speakers as ISIS. Further, using the the name “Islamic State” could be construed as validating the group’s claim that it represents Islam and has established a legitimate model of Islamic governance.

ISIS's *immediate goal* is to establish a caliphate throughout Iraq and Bilad al-Sham ("the Levant" or "Greater Syria"). Its short term goal is to consolidate the areas it already controls and capture more territory in Syria and Iraq.

The Islamic State's *medium term goal* is to consolidate and expand its control of territory in Iraq and Syria and in the next stage to advance into neighboring Sunni countries. It seems that Saudi Arabia and Jordan will be the next targets (Clarion Project, 2015).

Its *long-term* objective is to expand the caliphate across the world, with the primary focus on regions formerly under Islamic control, including the Iberian Peninsula ("al-Andalus") and large parts of Central and Southern Asia ("Khurasan") (Morre, 2014). Ultimately, the group aims at nothing short of total world domination.

Despite losing its formal alliance with al-Qaeda, ISIS has the same ideology and goals and uses the same brutal tactics as its former mother organization. In an attempt to defeat rival opposition groups, ISIS has conducted suicide-bombing attacks against rebel bases and has beheaded members of other fighting battalions (Wilgenburg, 2014).

IS's terror goals can be broadly divided into two categories, as stated above. The first is a casualty campaign against civilians, especially Shia, Alawites, and other Muslim minority groups in residential and urban areas.

The second category in the group's militant strategy is its goal to attrite its military opponents' armies, capabilities, and overall morale. By coupling its overall insurgent goals with tremendous brutality, Lister argues that IS "is able to acquire the leverage" needed to enforce local and regional authority (Lister, 2014). Importantly, while IS is primarily focused on its local threats and objectives, it has been vocal about its ambitions to strike its Western enemies (Ollivant and Fishman, 2014).

Insurgency outfit

In many ways, IS manifests signs of different types of political actors on its way to state-making. Not discounting its use of terrorist tactics, IS has pushed over the last several years beyond the "terrorist" label. It presently exhibits characteristics of a hybrid organization not unlike Hezbollah or the Taliban in Afghanistan, but with larger coffers and territory. To only focus on IS's terrorist ambitions is to provide an incomplete look at the organization, and is greatly detrimental to the policies aimed at countering its pernicious advances.

IS at its very core represents an insurgent militant group that is tactically and operationally attempting to wrest control of Iraq and Syria from its respective security forces and political authorities. The Institute for the Study of War, for instance, notes that IS's military plan resembles the "Clear, Hold, Build" approach common in insurgency dogma. It first aims to engage with and defeat government security forces through various methods, followed by a strategy of repulsion, which involves the penetration of a territory and maintaining control over it against attack. IS then imple-

ments its form of governance, and coerces civilians to follow the group's rules and ideology (Bilger, 2014).

The group's military configuration and fighters are critical to its goals of seizing lands and eliminating government security forces, also giving it the form of a powerful militia or army. IS has reportedly long-implemented policies designed to professionalize its army, highlighting its attention to its long-run objectives. Instead of viewing its fighters as "throw-away drones," Lister says IS is thinking like a state actor and is professionalizing its military for future operations (Lister, 2014). Emphasizing its military goals, it has been said that IS "may be less a state with an army than an army with a state" (Ollivant and Fishman, 2014).

Notwithstanding, IS's strongly disputed and polemical nature as a despised insurgent non-state actor, as well as its ideological rejection of the global economic system, means that it makes ample use of various illicit economies to fund its activities.

If we understand ISIS as an insurgency using terrorist tactics, their goals are comprehensible. Insurgency is the strategy; terrorism and guerrilla warfare are its tactics.

Islamic State demonstration as a criminal organization

ISIS funds itself through extortion, robbery, human trafficking, and the highly lucrative oil industry. Similarly, IS has demonstrated adept management as an entity that is partly organized crime syndicate, partly business enterprise. Many have likened the group to a criminal organization, like a mafia gang, due to its prowess in fencing, racketeering, and smuggling, as well as its ability to practice skimming (i.e. concealing profits made in areas not under its control). Howard J. Shatz from the RAND Corporation, for example, dismisses IS's religious inspirations and likens it more to an "organized criminal cult" (Shatz, 2014). The group, even before its takeover of Mosul in June 2014, had allegedly extracted up to (and likely more than) \$8 million from local businesses, much like a mafia with racketeering experience would (Woertz, 2014).

In a similar vein, IS also resembles a company-like enterprise. We can compare IS to a legitimate business: "IS has diverse revenue sources, seeks and develops new profit lines, and focuses on its most successful products and competitive advantages" (Shelley, 2014).

Methods of funding

ISIS is widely believed to be the richest terrorist organization in the world, with its daily income estimated at up to \$3million (Levitt, 2014). At one point, ISIS raked in an estimated \$3 million daily from oil sales alone, (Al Arabiya English, 2014) though military air strikes and heightened tracking of ISIS's smuggling routes have successfully targeted ISIS's oil infrastructure and business (Levitt, 2014). Drops in oil prices have also affected the group's revenue from oil sales. As of February 2015, oil

is no longer the primary source of funding for the group, according to the Pentagon (Tanquintic-Misa, 2015)

ISIS's total assets are believed to be \$1.3–2 billion (Levitt, 2014). ISIS has continued to raise money through its seized oil reserves, looting and robbing banks, and extortion.

Below are some of the more prominent black markets and illicit activities IS partakes in:

Looted Antiquities

The sale of ancient archaeological artifacts is a very lucrative black market for IS due to their potential prices, increasing demand, and the difficulty in tracking pieces (Caulderwood, 2014). The antiquities trafficking that IS is alleged to control is said to be worth \$1 billion (Erciyes, 2014). ISIS has illegally exported valuable antiquities from Iraq to Turkey, resulting in hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue (Associated Press, 2014). While ISIS's destruction of antiquities has grabbed worldwide attention, the group does not wantonly destroy everything it finds. Authorities are uncertain to whom ISIS is selling antiquities, but they believe ISIS earns as much as \$100 million a month from the illegal sale of antiquities looted from captured territories, predominantly in northern Iraq. The United Nations has condemned ISIS's antiquities looting as "a form of violent extremism that seeks to destroy the present, past and future of human civilization".

Oil and Other Fossil Fuels

The sale of oil and other fossil fuels make up the largest portion of IS's funding resources—some 38% of IS's income is thought to be oil earnings and 17% gas (Whiting, 2014). UN experts estimate that IS garners about \$846,000 to \$1,645,000 a day from oil revenues (Sengupta, 2014). The group uses third-party tankers and pipelines, (Curry, 2014) and is also reported to employ part-time smugglers, including Kurds (Shelley, 2014). ISIS controls oil fields in its strongholds of eastern Syria and northern Iraq. Here, ISIS smuggles crude oil by truck in exchange for cash and refined petroleum (Luay al-Khatteeb, 2014). Customers include those who oppose ISIS, such as Syria and Turkey (Defterios, 2014). The group also continues to target for seizure key infrastructure, including Iraq's biggest oil refinery in Baiji, as well as factories and power plants (Carey, 2014).

Other Black Markets

Still, other capital comes from the sale of counterfeit cigarettes (despite a law against them in the dawla), pharmaceuticals, cell phones, and foreign passports (Shelley, 2014). IS has also boasted about trafficking women and children in Dabiq (UNSC).

Kidnapping and Ransom

Both of these activities are believed to comprise just 4% of IS's earnings (Whiting, 2014). Nonetheless, IS has received approximately \$35–\$45 million over the past year in ransom payments, according to the UN (Curry, 2014). The vast majority of those kidnapped were Iraqi and Syrian nationals (Associated Press, 2014). Other sources of ISIS revenues include extortion (including levies on local businesses) and kidnapping for ransom. The group has also made millions from the sale of women and children as sex slaves. According to an analysis at the Council of Foreign Relations, after seizing Mosul in June 2014, ISIS has raked in more than \$8 million each month from extortion payments such as forced taxes, looting, and ransom from kidnapped hostages (Associated Press, 2014). In 2014, ISIS made a minimum of \$25 million in ransom payments, although that figure is believed to be much higher (Bird, 2014).

Arbitrary Taxes and Extortion

As ISIL made its transition to IS, its revenue extraction from the civilian population grew to be more sophisticated, likely due to its subsequent attempts to consolidate territory and implement authority and control (Thorndike, 2014). We know that for more than a year, merchants in Mosul have been paying a 'revolutionary tax,' Fabrice Balanche, a French academic expert on the Middle East, reported (Carey, 2014). IS has several forms of taxation aside from the fees extracted for the provision of utilities. Business owners regularly receive official receipts stamped with IS's logo, indicating forms of standardization or professionalization seen in regularized tax collection (Thorndike, 2014). Regarding extortion, IS is said to raise as much as several million dollars through racketeering practices. Extortion is applied on residents and business owners of all religious confessions (UNSC). Prior to its June 2014 Mosul takeover, it had reportedly extracted about \$8 million from local businesses in protection rackets (Woertz, 2014).

Today, ISIS is believed to derive its income primarily from kidnapping foreign citizens and locals and holding them for ransom, controlling rent, and, to a lesser extent, selling its black market oil. The records also reveal the group required cells to contribute 20 percent of their locally generated income for redistribution to other local and provincial cells in need of funds.

ISIS as a terrorist organization

The term "terrorist organization" offers little insight and limits our understanding and approach. ISIS is an insurgent organization using terrorism as a tactic. While ISIS certainly employs terrorism as a tactic, and the label is one that de-legitimizes an

opponent, it also obscures the facts. To call it a terrorist organization is to mislabel it.

Traditionally, groups were identified as terrorist groups if their goal was ultimately to effect policy through intimidation. The policies in question were regionally specific: Ireland, Israel, even as specific as the green line separating Muslims and Christians in Beirut. What we are witnessing now is something closer to criminal psychopathology than terrorism. And the aims of these groups are not regionally specific but often international in scope. Moreover, the tactics have gone beyond intimidation to affect policy.

Terrorist organizations do not typically hold territory. They are generally comprised of small numbers, and they cannot prevail in a military confrontation. They pose an asymmetric threat. ISIS, however, has impressive military capabilities, has an estimated 30,000 man army, and conducts itself as a global criminal enterprise looting its victims, exchanging hostages for millions in ransom, stealing and selling antiquities, imposing taxes, routinely engaging in extortion, creating and imposing laws. It has demonstrated a disregard for national borders and is holding territory in Iraq and Syria. In the first six months of 2014 it took Fallujah, Ramadi, Mosul, Tikrit, and al Qaim, while the world watched in disbelief.

IS is widely regarded as a terrorist group by international actors due to its adherence to the threat and use of violent tactics—ranging from kidnappings and enslavement, to beheadings, crucifixion, and its use of improvised explosive devices, among other methods—deliberately conducted against civilian non-combatants and government entities for the sake of its political aims to establish its Islamic *dawla*.

Terrorism is just one tactic that groups like ISIS employ in addition to conventional military operations, unconventional warfare techniques, state-building and even humanitarian aid. ISIS has even issued its own currency.

Because ISIS is not simply a terrorist organization, what is required to deal with this threat goes beyond the CT strategies of any country.

Regional instability and non-functional states create a vacuum that terrorist organizations are ready to fill.

Even if it were possible to kill off every member of ISIS, new groups would form to take its place as long as core grievances are not addressed. When governments are too fragile to operate, and when fringe groups have greater capacity to address the needs of populations than their governments, some organization is going to take advantage of that vacuum.

However, it is important not to overstate IS “statehood.” IS fundamentally represents an insurgent movement that employs terrorism at a tactical and operational level. Yet, many of IS activities mirror those found in armies or militias, criminal organizations, and companies or financial enterprises. Classifying IS as *only* a terrorist group risks obscuring the group’s nature, which is deleterious to policymaking aimed at countering them. A fitting way to observe IS is to view it as a hybrid movement that encompasses all of the above characteristics, including aspects of state-building. It can serve as an example of an “intermediary body” that bridges the exemplars of state and

non-state actors (Rangwala, 2014)—one a few steps above the garden-variety militant group and perhaps a few steps below an internationally recognized failed state.

Conclusion

The world of international jihad has undergone a wholesale internal revolution in recent years. The dramatic recovery of the Islamic State group (IS), its expansion into Syria, and its proclamation of a Caliphate crossing established international boundaries set the stage for the intensive intra-jihadi competition seen today. The world no longer faces one Sunni jihadi threat, but two, as al-Qaida and IS compete to outperform each other on the global stage.

While its dreams of a stable global caliphate are unlikely to ever be realized, ISIS will continue to cause significant damage wherever it is able to gain a foothold. Initially, ISIS gained support within Iraq as a Sunni insurgency group fighting a partisan Shiite-led Iraqi government.

IS's growing dominance in Libya's Sirte, Egypt's northern Sinai, and areas in Afghanistan and Nigeria look potentially promising, as does its growing capacity to inspire spectacular attacks around the world (Lister, 2016).

A more refined, better-informed, and more precisely targeted set of policies aimed at directly countering jihadi militancy and its key pillars, neutralizing its foundations, and resolving sources of instability that fuel rebellion and armed resistance represents the best chance of methodically reducing the immediate and long-term potential of organizations like al-Qaida and IS.

Finally, IS risks detracting from its strategic vision and broader self-presentation as a movement when acquiring jihadi groups with histories of unpredictability, a lack of cohesion or central control, or even questionable "purity" of Islamic practice.

IS also underwent a consequential process of evolution in recent years, especially since it proclaimed the Caliphate in June 2014. Since then, it sought to exploit its well-established network of jihadi relationships around the world to co-opt armed factions, and most importantly, cells from within existing al-Qaida affiliates. Ultimately, IS evolved from being an Iraq-based terrorist organization in 2011 to a transnational insurgent movement with established fronts in 11 countries by mid-2015.

Consequently, IS's international expansion through its wilaya model focused primarily on areas of existing jihadi militancy and where active or easily initiated support networks existed.

The international community is faced with a more intense, complex, and rapidly developing threat from international jihad than ever before. The emergence of IS as a competitor to al-Qaida transformed what was a singularly focused counterterrorism issue into a phenomenon that consistently changes shape, nature, and trajectory.

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THE ROOTS OF POLITICAL DELICT

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Abstract: *Through an interdisciplinary approach, the authors insist on a critical approach to the notion of "political offense" in order to elicit the response to a series of hypothetical assumptions from a legal, criminological and counterintelligence point of view: "What is a political offense? How deep is the problem of political offense? What are its features? Who are the political criminals? What is the nature of political offense? Are there different types of political offense?" There are much more questions than answers related to political offense on the theoretical level. Political offense has evolved throughout history and it has been influenced by numerous social, political, environmental, economic, informational and technological factors because it has developed a phenomenological quantitation and morphological quality, which prevents the subjects from conducting efficient and effective social control in function of society. Political offense is definitely not a natural offense - malum in se, but legally prescribed - malumprohibitum.*

Keywords: *offence, factors, intelligence studies, features, function.*

1. Historical Review of Political Criminality

Political criminality is perhaps the oldest form of criminality (Schafer S., 1971) and laws in all civilized countries distinguish between natural (*malum in se*) and conventional criminality or in a law enacted criminality (*malum prohibitum*). In natural criminality are included cases such as murder, rape, arson attacks, theft, robbery etc. It is a criminality "itself" (crimes in themselves). Legal criminal acts are those which involve a violation of the eternal moral prohibitions. On the other hand, conventional criminality is conditioned by space and time i.e. by numerous societal, industrial and political conditions. Its definition varies from place to place. Political criminality is not a natural misdemeanor (Ferrari R., 1920). Dawn L. Rothe, considers under political

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criminality (State crime) the crimes against crime (The Crime of All Crimes) (Rothe Dawn L., 2009).

Certain criminal acts can be considered as crimes against the state. With the emergence of feudal kings and various national states in Western Europe, certain acts which are considered to be a distortion of peace and royal dignity were permitted. According to old English law, any crime committed by a citizen against another was considered a violation of royal peace if it took place within the boundaries of the land around the castle. Later, with the spread of the Kingdom throughout Europe, Scotland and Ireland, Royal peace encompassed the whole territory of the ruled crown. Today in England, criminal charges are pressed against a defendant who violates the peace and dignity of the kingdom. Many American states have kept this notion, with the modification relating to an attack on people, not the king. In Illinois, for example, the criminal indictment alleges that the accused has committed an offense against the peace and dignity of the people of Illinois (Elliott Mabel A., 1962).

There are many studies on the original criminal acts and they indicate that the transgressions the primitive societies punished covered the following categories of socially dangerous behavior: magic, betrayal, sacrilege and transgressions against religion, incest and other infringements of sexual morality, poisoning and related transgressions and offenses against hunting. These original criminal acts obviously posed a threat to the group. The magician was a terrible person that could revenge on anyone he chose. Betrayal, then as now, led to placing the security groups in the hands of the enemy. Poisoning has long been surrounded by fear and mystery, because death was caused with small amounts of lethal drugs, which were placed in the victim's food or drink without their knowledge. Few people have enough knowledge about the natural properties of drugs and chemicals to grasp the nature of the mysterious danger to any man; no one can predict the next victim (Elliott Mabel A., 1962).

2. Notion and Basic Features of Political Criminality

The term political criminality means illegality which is dimensioned to undermine the existing government and threaten its survival. Political criminality can include violent and non-violent acts with a broad scope – from disobedience, treason and espionage to violent acts such as terrorism or assassination (Siegel Larry J., 2010).

This chapter begins with a reference to Oppenheim. It is not because of his authority to ensure credibility, but primarily because all authors who deal with the exemption of the political part of extradition cite or paraphrase his view, and today it is perhaps the most commonly investigated topic in the West. Oppenheim presents the following pessimistic thought:

“All attempts to formulate a satisfactory conception of the term (political offense) to date have been unsuccessful, and this reason, I believe, will forever rule out the pos-

sibility of finding a satisfactory conception and definition.” (Srdanović B. R., 2002)

Mabel A. Elliott states in his book “Crime in Contemporary Society” that all crimes in some sense are transgressions against the state, but most criminal acts involve inflicting harm on individual group members. On the other hand, political transgressions are those that are threatening the survival of the established order.

Although some political offenders are actually spineless people who succumb to the extensive bribe whether by the state, or by a local group of political offenders, the vast majority are supporters of the political philosophy which threatens the survival of the order they oppose.

It was worth to attempt to take over the authority from the tyrannical monarch, but it is also worth today for those who seek to break down our own order or the order of any foreign state. Political offenders represent a paradox because they are perpetrators who carry out their illegal activities in order to achieve their ideals. They are not obsessed with gloomy plans to pull large funds from victims who do not suspect anything nor are motivated by basic desires to destroy or kill even though these crimes may be necessary in order to realize their goals. They are generally romanticized on one thing only (perhaps as a mistake), and that is placing their patriotism before their personal safety. In most cases, the traitors put their own work before the survival of their country. In cases of espionage, spies can be loyal agents of their own country that put its survival over the survival of the country whose national interests they would like to destroy or whose secret documents to seize. Or they may be the favorite agents of the foreign country and thus responsible for the betrayal. “All spies are heroes in their home countries or the countries where they work while being sworn enemies of those countries whose top secrets they want to grab” (Elliott Mabel A., 1962).

In this context, the afore-stated activities fall within the sphere of political criminality, which is not very elaborated in literature. Many authors reluctantly enter debates on this issue considering the etiological and especially motivational specificity which is typical of political crimes. Given their characteristics, such criminal acts pose a threat to national / national security, consequently the individuals and groups who engage in such illegal activities are subject to the work of the intelligence services. However, to the extent political criminality is explored among writers, there are different, often controversial, understandings of its nature.

This is somewhat understandable considering the existence of different social and political systems, whose laws determine incriminations that have a political character and are treated and interpreted by special bodies. This is, hence, the reason for the difficulty in determining the notion of political crime (Milutinović M., 1973). In this regard, it may be said that political criminality covers acts which attack the existing social order, and the social and political system, with a view to its destruction and overthrow. The perpetrators of such acts, as a rule, are opponents of the social system and generally foster certain ideological and political views and concepts that serve as the basis for the practice of breaking that order. They are mostly politically and ideologically motivated,

therefore some authors use the term ideological crimes (Milutinović M., 1973). In our criminal justice system, the term political crime is nowhere explicitly stated. Our positive criminal law is founded on the material conception of the notion of a crime that has been approved. Therefore, it is considered more expedient to talk about specific types of crimes than about the notion of political crime, which is noted to have a formal and generalized character.

3. The Early Stages in Understanding Political Criminality

Taking into account the fact that political offenses relating to the fundamental interests and positions in society have different evaluations for society and its members, as well as assessments an essentially ideological point of view, they are linked with different attitudes and motivations. In their book *Revolution and Political*, Lombroso and Laschi distinguish between different political culprits. On the one hand, there are those leaders who made a remarkable contribution to the development of society during the bourgeois revolution, and on the other, there are the political culprits who opposed the bourgeois political system, the Paris communards, the Italian socialists and anarchists, who believed that their behavior opposed society. Given that they were called amoral pathological entities, so-called insurgents and criminals, the death penalty was requested as a punishment for many of them (Ibrahimpašić B., 1963).

In the paper *Anarchists*, Lombroso stated that among the participants in the rebellions there were many anarchists and madmen with immoral urges. They were followed by people with impulsive nature without restrictions and prohibitions. According to him, in rebellions and revolutions, especially in their beginning, there are many criminals with impulsive energy that emanates from their abnormal and painful nature.

Similar statements are presented by E. Wulffen, F. Louvage, H. Freimark and other scientists. The latter distinguishes three types of people who participate in a revolution: ideological fanatics, aesthetes, and mentally ill and severe psychopathic individuals, explaining this phenomenon with the close relationship between a genius and a psychopath. According to Wulffen, normal people are not capable of carrying out a revolution, they cannot realize that cultural task, that belongs to the mentally retarded, unworthy and neurotics, who thereby help human development. To change history there must be primarily political and then ordinary criminals, because normal people reluctantly accept this task. The political hero and the political criminal have one thing in common and that is the brutal instinct which is expressed in revolutions. Many modern American criminologists identify communist activities with gangster behavior and similar organizations. Thus, they present extremely reactionary and vulgar thoughts (Milutinović M., 1973).

4. Subjective and Objective Theories of Criminality

In literature there is a widespread perception in which determining political criminality stems from the motive and intent of the perpetrator of the crime as the sole criterion and mechanism that can determine the political character. This occurs in the subjective theories of criminality. According to these theorists, there is an objective theory that tries to determine the term based on objective criteria. However, it should be borne in mind that it is almost impossible to determine criminality and particularly this form of distinction based on objective and subjective elements. For example, both elements are necessary to explain the political killings. In this context, it is necessary to take into consideration the fact that the conflict in a political system can be caused by both reasons. Thus, their justification is also considered normal. It serves as the basis for the emergence of various merge theories of criminality (Ibrahimpasić B., 1963).

5. Etymology of Political Crime

The etymology of political crime is complex and specific in relation to other forms of criminology. Basically this is a specific system of crimes that must be defined etymologically in a special way or differently than other types of criminal behavior. Their specificity is expressed in pure crimes that are motivated to topple down a particular social order. In this sense, we must start from the essence of the conflict which means a struggle for power and can be used as the basis for conducting a political incrimination. There may appear some other sources of conflicts that may be in some way related to systems and societies, including their institutions.

6. Political Offense in Totalitarianism and Democratic Societies

With the development of totalitarianism, the term “political offender” conveyed a new meaning and the number of offenders grew in geographical terms because the survival of a dictatorial state depended on the full acceptance of all State policies by all citizens. That is why in Nazi Germany those who were opponents of the totalitarian rule of the Nazis were expelled, sent to concentration camps or prisons or sentenced to death for political incompatibility. Millions of Jews were declared the most bitter enemies of the German people and sent to concentration camps or gas chambers. They were deprived of everything that was considered to be a trial (Mabel A. Elliot, 1962). The Dignity of human personality was hardly attributed any significance in the totalitarian system. In its relentless struggle for power, the state imagined itself as the ultimate goal of existence in front of which all other values had to be degraded and suppressed (Mabel A. Elliot, 1962).

Freedom of speech, press and word is also a relative issue, and when the state is

in danger, there is a tendency to increase the limit in the interest of national security. That is why civil rights are always in danger at times of international tension. For example, Elliott considers that the United States has never approached the fierce control that totalitarian states imposed in terms of research on political opinion. Within the by- partial system, strong offensive attacks of the ruling party are not forbidden. A democrat could criticize the program and practice of the Republicans and vice versa with no exposure to any danger. Political freedom, once enjoyed by American Communists, is limited considerably as a result of the increasing threat of communists. This was justified because the basic principles of Marxist communism had supported the overthrow of the existing political structure of our country ...

7. Difficulties In Defining Political Offense

Criminologists often take William (Chambliss Chambliss J.W., 1989) as the reference point for the study of political offense (Feirstein D., (Autumn 2015). In a speech in 1988, in the “role” of the president of the American Society of Criminologists, Chambliss defines political offense as: “criminal and committed by state officials in the pursuit of their jobs as representatives of the state” and from this definition it can be concluded that the criminal act committed by government officials in regular practice of representing the state, abusing state power and interests is in the focus of attention (Chambliss J. W, Michalowski R., and Kramer C.R., 2010). Raymond Michalowski finds it complicated to define state criminality. There is no generally accepted attitude. Some believe that state crime covers war crimes, genocide and terrorism. For others, it is every state action which is processed at national or international level, including relatively prosaic violations of regulatory laws and bilateral and multilateral agreements (Chambliss J. W, Michalowski R., and Kramer C. R., 2010). How should scientists explain and understand the crime committed by the state? This question offers two possible answers. A large group of scientists did not pose this question because they did not have much to say apart from the few who were ready to comment since they thought they had much to offer (Watts R., 2016).

There are many authors who have made a significant contribution to the study of political criminality, inter alia: Proal (Political Crime, 1898/1973), Schafer (The Political Criminal, 1974), Turk (Political criminality, 1982), Kittrie& Wedlock (The Tree of Liberty, 1986), Ingraham (Political Crime in Europe, 1979), Hagan (Political Crime, 1997), Kittrie (Rebels with a Cause, 2000), Ross (Dynamics of Political Crime, in 2003, Head’s Crimes against the State, 2011 An Introduction to Political Crime, 2012). (Ros J.I., 2015). The new millennium is famous after the interest in the so-called state crime. The following works of criminologists are among the most prominent: Ronald Kramer (1994), Kauzlarich, Matthews and Miller (2001); Raymond Michalowski (2010), William Laufer (1999), Stanley Cohen (2001), John Hagan and Winona Rymond-Richmond

(2008), Jon Shute (2014), Penny Green and Tony Ward (2000, 2004). It is important to specify the authors who highlight the importance of the study of genocide, such as: Morrison (Criminology, Civilisation and the New World Order, 2006) and Alvarez (Genocidal Crimes, 2010), (Feirstein D., No. 2 (Autumn 2015)).

Indeed, having first appeared in a formal sense separately from the so-called acts of ordinary criminality, political offense was not possible to define in a generally accepted way for extradition purposes. There is no international consensus on what constitutes a political offense. Srdanovic raises the question why this is so and gives a rational and theoretically acceptable answer. He believes that the problem in fact has axiological nature and the field of values is very fluid because its existence is subjective. It does not stem only from the individual, but from all countries, so, naturally, it prevents the objectification of the term “political offense” in extradition. It is in this area that many heterogeneous interests exist in different international manifestations (Srdanović R. B., , 2002). Most states in their internal law do not define political offense, with the exception of Germany (Ibrahimpašić B., , 1963). Only in Germany’s extradition status from 1992, there was an attempt to define this political act: Article 2 (3): “Political offenses are those offenses that are aimed directly against the safety of the state, the president or government members of the state and consequently against the rules laid down in the Constitution, against the rights of citizens to vote and voting against good relations with other countries.” (Srdanović R. B., 2002)

Political offense is not defined (except for rare examples, such as Germany) in any extradition law or contract. The definition of political offense remains subject to court interpretation and / or the free decision of the judiciary. Case law of the UK⁴, USA⁵, France⁶

⁴ The test developed in Britain and the United States in the literature is treated as Anglo-American incidence test. This test resulted from an exploration of the circumstances in which the crime was committed. Those circumstances had to meet three conditions: 1) the offender must be politically motivated; 2) the act must be done during a political unrest or political uprising; 3) the act must be part of a political uprising or support the uprising. In this regard, the incidence test, respecting, inter alia, the motive of the perpetrator, transforms ordinary crime into political offense, where it is clear that its dominant feature has an extremely diverse value. In other words, it is about respecting the ultimate subjective element in the qualification of political offense. Taking into consideration the motive of the perpetrator of the political offense led to the initial concept of political offense being too wide (case Castioni 1891 - Angelo Gastioni, a Swiss national who killed a government official and fled to Britain, the English Court refused extradition). See: Srdanović R. B., Međunarodni terorizam, Beograd: Javno preduzeće Službeni list SRJ, 2002, p. 95-101.

⁵ The major weakness of the incidence test is that it fails to address the issue of determining the political conflict. See: Srdanović R. B., Međunarodni terorizam, Beograd: Javno preduzeće Službeni list SRJ, 2002, p. 105-101.

⁶ The French test unlike the US, rejects the motive as a purely subjective element and accepts the objective definition of political offense, according to which political offense violates the rights of the state, found even in the case of Giovanni Gaetti in 1947. The basic item according to which the objective theory distinguishes between political and ordinary offense is the nature of the violated good or right. A major weakness of the incidence test is that it fails to address the issue of determining the political conflict. Srdanović R. B., Međunarodni terorizam, Beograd: Javno preduzeće Službeni list SRJ, 2002, p. 111-121.

and Switzerland⁷ divided 4 tests, methodological frameworks or approaches for identification of political offense in extradition cases.⁸ Only in Colombia and the United States alternative ways were used for handling this issue outside the regular legal-criminal system.

Colombia has a system of even three approaches: regular criminal justice, criminal justice for state enemies created through emergency legislation (directed mostly against Guerrilla) and criminal justice for those who fall under the mild regime of Peace and Justice (mostly paramilitary forces).⁹ Since 11 September 2001, the United States clearly showed the existence of a regime of two streams. That regime distinguished between criminals and enemy combatants. In the US, the events of September 11 year 2001 dramatically changed the traditional approach to offenses related to terrorism changing the paradigm of the regular criminal justice system (within which such offenses are traditionally persecuted), rather than the military criminal model (martial law), and used an emergency model based on the interests of national security. The US Patriot Act of 2001 and the Law on Treatment of Detainees since 2005 (Detainee Treatment Act) and the Military Commissions (MCA) of 2006 are clear examples of criminal law for emergencies that provide an alternative for investigation, prosecution and trial (Vervaele J., 16, 2009).

On the other hand, state crime is a category of organizational deviance which correlates with corporate crime, organized crime, crime perpetrated by non-governmental and humanitarian organizations. Most authors perceive crime as a state execution of criminality by state officials or public servants, state or government. They agree that state crime can be committed by governments, deviant organizations and individuals. State crime involves abuse of official policy for individual interests, torture, tax evasion, giving subsidies to subjects that do not meet the conditions, omissions of state commissions, breaking the formal procedures of criminal law causing damage. Green, Ward and Chambliss, for example, consider that state crime is committed primarily for organized civil purposes, rather than for individual interests (Doig A., 2011). State political crime is divided into five different forms: political corruption, illegal internal monitoring, violation of human rights, state violence and state corporative crime (Doig

⁷ The main theoretical methodological feature of this approach is founded on the fact that the elements of political motivation in the political act are examined and on the other hand, the elements of general criminality are examined, which also are features of the offense. If the elements of the political crime are more dominant than the elements of the general criminality in a relative political offense, then the exclusion from extradition is applicable. A major weakness of the incidence test is that it fails to address the issue of determining the political conflict. See: Srđanović R. B., *Međunarodni terorizam*, Beograd: Javno preduzeće Službeni list SRJ, 2002, p. 121-126.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ In some countries like Colombia and the United States a wide difference between the category of entities, foreign enemies, hostile fighters, guerrilla fighters or paramilitary units, etc. is introduced. Due to various reasons, a new system is established to circumvent the regular criminal proceedings or even the regular military criminal procedure, Vervaele J., p. 933.

A., 2011).

From the conducted analysis, it can be concluded that from criminal justice and criminological- sociological aspect, the allocation of political crimes in a separate category is justified. That justification is based on the character of these acts, their etiological and phenomenological characteristics, the characteristics of the protected object, the motive of the perpetrators - who are very specific. Judging by these elements, these crimes are manifesting social danger to a greater degree, and given the frequency of their occurrence, the degree of social homogeneity and stability can be assessed, although in giving such assessments one must take into consideration other types of crime and also, the overall social pathology that occurs in society (Doig A., 2011).

8. The Nature of Political Crime

Political crime may originate from religious or ideological motives. Since its motivation changed through history, the following motives have been noted: selfishness, personal needs, selflessness, grace and / or altruistic desires. Political crimes often occupy the gap between conventional and punished behavior. It is easy to condemn violent interpersonal crimes such as rape or murder, because their goals are usually selfish and self-centered (e.g. revenge or profit). On the other hand, political criminals can be motivated by conviction and not by rapacity or hard feelings. Although it is true that in some political crimes profit is one of the goals (such as selling highly confidential state secrets for money), many political criminals do not consider themselves antisocial, but rather patriotic and altruistic. They are willing to sacrifice themselves for what they say to be “a stronger order”. While some use in the field “hiding tactics” or masks for their actions, others are quite impudent hoping to cause excessive government action. State bodies can participate in a series of revenge- oriented actions by acting in a way that can result in violation of human rights in order to provide security to citizens. But, what if the government is corrupt and authoritarian? Is it strong enough to resist to such security issues as political violence? Only a stable and consolidated state and its mechanisms for social control can protect the citizens and the constitutional order (Milutinović M., 1973).

9. Aims of Political Crime

While ordinary criminals may be motivated by rapacity, revenge and jealousy, political criminals have a somewhat different agenda. Instead of self- interest, their acts are aimed at achieving other common purposes: (1) *intimidation* - some political criminals want to intimidate or threaten the opponent who does not share their political opinion or has different views; (2) *revolution* - some political criminals can crash down

the existing government and replace it with another they consider to be acceptable; (3) *profit*¹⁰ - another aim of political crime is profit: the release of official secrets for personal enrichment or stolen weapon and ammunition trafficking; (4) *conviction* - some political criminals are motivated by altruism; they truly believe that their crimes are socially beneficial and thus are willing to break the law and risk to be punished allegedly to achieve social progress; (5) *pseudo-conviction* - these political criminals hide the already mentioned conventional pattern (for example, rapacity) behind masks of belief and altruism. They can form a revolutionary movement and pursue hidden desires, including violence to achieve the objectives of the allegedly reformed society. The motive *pseudo-conviction* is especially dangerous from a criminal perspective because they convince their followers to join them in their crimes, but they do not reveal their real motives (Doig, A., 2011).

Conclusion

The analysis of the available literature shows that political criminality is perhaps the oldest form of criminality, and that it originates from the time of the emergence of feudal kings, and that even today there are many definitions. However, we can freely say that we are talking about acts targeting the existing social order, social and political system of a country, aimed to destruct and disable it. These crimes often aim to achieve certain organized state goals rather than individual.

Political crimes manifest social danger to a greater extent. If we take into consideration the frequency of their occurrence, we can assess the degree of social homogeneity and stability, although in such evaluation one must take into account other types of crime, as well as all forms of social pathology that occur in a society.

The perpetrators of such acts, by rule, are opponents of a social system and generally foster certain ideological and political views and concepts that serve as the basis for destruction of that order. They are idealistic, loyal to one thing (no matter mistaken), which prevails over patriotism and personal safety.

Political crimes in literature are usually divided as clear and relative. When a clear criminal act occurs, the state is "the protector", or to be more precise, a political order in the case of relative political case, the individual and state interests and goods are at the same level. The latter, relative criminal cases are the border between political and ordinary crime, and therefore are called mixed political offenses. They also include political murders (murder of a head of state, head of government or president of the government), which are taken as a classic example of mixed political offenses, and those cases of ordinary criminality that in certain situations, such as war, revolution, etc., contribute to the political crimes - destruction of a political system.

¹⁰ Corruption is a severe form of government criminality that vividly stands out through a poster slogan: Do not steal! The government does not want competition, Guatemalan poster, quoted in Red Pepper, April 2003 15; Penny Green and Tony Ward, State Crime Governments, Violence and Corruption, London, Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press, 2004, p. 11.

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APPLYING THE METHODOLOGY DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS IN THE DEFENCE SECTOR: LITERATURE REVIEW

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Abstract: *In solving the problems, decision-makers should take into account the qualitative and the quantitative aspects. The discipline of operational research with its methods and techniques help decision-makers in making better decisions. One of its leading methodologies is the non-parametric methodology data envelopment analysis (DEA), which can be used in evaluating the efficiency of entities (decision-making units – DMUs) that use the same inputs to produce the same outputs. According to the last DEA bibliography published in 2017, from 1978, when the seminal paper of DEA was published, until the end of the 2016, there was rapid increase in the published articles in journals. DEA is applied in various areas: agriculture, defence sector, education, energetics, healthcare, public policy, sport, transportation, etc. In this paper we provide a literature review on the DEA application in the defence sector. Most of the analyzed articles have been published in journals, and we focus on the country where the research was conducted, the observed period, the sample of analysis, the used model, and the application.*

Key words: *efficiency, DEA, defence sector, literature review.*

Introduction

The word ‘efficiency’ has Latin origin, ‘*efficax*’, and presents an indicator of success. To measure the efficiency of entities there are two approaches: the econometric (parametric) approach and mathematical-programming (non-parametric) approach. In this paper the emphasis is put on the non-parametric approach, i.e. on the leading methodology data envelopment analysis (DEA). DEA is a methodology for measuring the relative efficiency of decision-making units (DMUs) that use the same inputs in order to produce the same outputs, which can be in different amounts. Cook and Zhu (2008, p. 25) point out that the term DMUs refers to the operating procedures, processes or entities that are assessed. Defining DMUs is generic and flexible, and

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they can be cities, governments, banks, universities, hospitals, information systems, etc. The seminal work of DEA was written by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes in 1978. Since then a large number of articles have been published, and there are several DEA bibliographies (Emrouznejad and Thanassoulis, 1996 a,b, 1997; Seiford, 1994, 1997; Tavares, 2002; Gattoufi, Oral and Reisman, 2004 a,b; Emrouznejad, Parker and Tavares 2008). In addition, Emrouznejad and Yang (2018) give a literature review on DEA in the first four decades (1978 – until the end of 2016), so they analyze only DEA-related articles published in journals. In the covered period there are 10.300 DEA-related journal articles, there are identified 11.961 distinct DEA authors, and most of the articles are published in the following four journals: European Journal of Operational Research, Journal of the Operational Research Society, Journal of Productivity Analysis, and Omega. The most popular application areas are: energy, industry, banking, education, and healthcare, including hospitals. In 2015 and 2016 the top application fields were: agriculture, banking, supply chain, transportation and public policy. In this paper a literature review is given on the DEA application in the defence sector. In addition to the introduction given in Section 1, in Section 2, the basis of DEA is given in Section 3 where the literature review of the application of DEA in the defence sector is presented, in Section 4 where the DEA application in the defence sector in Macedonia is described, and the last section which contains the conclusion.

The non-parametric methodology DEA

Data envelopment analysis evaluates the relative efficiency of decision-making units by constructing an efficiency frontier based on the data for the used inputs and outputs. Charnes et al. (1994, pp. 5-6) point out that the DMU that lies at the extreme frontier is efficient, while the DMU that lies below this frontier is relatively inefficient. DEA allows the sources and amounts of inefficiency to be determined, and based on this information, steps for improving the efficiency of the inefficient DMUs could be set. The advantage of DEA is that it does not require any assumption about the functional form.

Bowlin (1998, pp. 16-19) defines the basic issues which are important in using DEA. In the formulation of the DEA model the input/output values are required to be greater than or equal to zero and the functional relationship of inputs and outputs should have the mathematical property called isitonoisity. This property (isitonoisity) means that an increase in the input will result in the same increase in the output without decreasing any other input. In the case when there are multiple inputs and outputs chosen, while the number of DMUs that comprise the sample for analysis is small, the efficiency frontier will be created with more DMUs. A general rule of thumb is that the number of DMUs should be at least 3 times more than the total of the inputs and outputs. For example, if there are 3 inputs and 2 outputs chosen, the sample of analysis should be at least 15 ($=3 \times (3+2)$). One way to overcome the problem of multiple inputs and outputs and a small number of DMUs is to use the DEA technique known as window analysis, with the help of which the number of decision-making units can be increased, and also a time dimension can be included in the efficiency analysis. The next requirement, according to Bowlin (1998), is the control of the weights of inputs and outputs and the

homogeneity of DMUs. By solving the DEA model the weights of the variables are determined. Each weight is calculated to present the decision-making unit in the best possible light, relative to the other units that comprise the sample of analysis. In this way, an input or output can gain weight that is inadequate, so in order to overcome this problem DEA models with weight restrictions can be applied, details can be found in Cooper, Seiford and Tone (2007, pp. 178-194). Cvetkoska and Savic (2017) combine DEA with the most well-known multi-criteria decision-making method, the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) - so that the weights for the criteria that are obtained by solving the AHP model will serve to set restrictions on the weights of the variables of the DEA model. In addition, DEA requires a relatively homogeneous set of entities. This means that all the entities included in the evaluation set should have the same inputs and outputs, and their values must be positive.

What follows is a brief description of some of the basic DEA models.

The Charnes-Cooper-Rhodes (CCR) model, introduced in 1978 by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes, and the Banker-Charnes-Cooper (BCC) model, introduced by Banker, Charnes and Cooper in 1984, are basic DEA models. Cooper et al. (2007) indicate that the result that is obtained by solving the CCR model is known as (global) technical efficiency (TE), whereas the result that is obtained by solving the BCC model is known as (local) pure technical efficiency (PTE), and if the decision-making unit has a CCR and BCC result that is 100%, then its scale efficiency is highest, but if the unit is 100% BCC-efficient, and the CCR result is low, then this unit is operating locally efficient, but not globally, due to the size of the scale of the unit. Scale efficiency (SE) is the ratio between the two results: CCR and BCC result, and by decomposing the technical efficiency of its constituent parts, $TE = PTE \times SE$, the sources of inefficiency can be presented, i.e. inefficient operating is presented by PTE, and unfavourable conditions through SE. Inefficiencies can occur because of inefficient operation, due to the unfavourable conditions or because of the two stated reasons.

The CCR and BCC model enable to calculate the maximum efficiency of the DMU relative to other DMUs that comprise the sample. Those DMUs that are inefficient can be ranked based on their levels of efficiency, which is not the case for efficient DMUs, whose result of efficiency is 1 (100%). For more details when a DMU is CCR, or BCC efficient, see in Cooper, Seiford and Tone (2007, p. 45, p. 92). With these basic DEA models, the ranking of the identified efficient DMUs could not be performed, so Andersen and Petersen (1993) overcame this DEA disadvantage by proposing a modified DEA model for ranking efficient DMUs, i.e. for measuring super-efficiency.

DEA notes rapid growth in its application due to the developed DEA software that enables results to be obtained in a short amount of time, which enables decision-makers to devote more of their time in analyzing the results in order to make a good decision.

Applying DEA in the Defence Sector: Literature Review

A total of 16 studies published in the period between 1983 and 2016 have been analyzed (Table 1). Most of the studies are published in journals. The studies represent the efficiency and productivity in the defence sector and they have solely been concentrated around various maintenance functions in the military, especially in the US Army and Asian countries like Taiwan, China, Korea and etc. In the presented research, the Malmquist productivity index is used in three studies, the DEA technique window analysis is used in two studies, and according to the orientation of the model, in most of the studies the input-oriented model is used in DEA. The smallest sample for analysis comprises 5 DMUs, and the largest consists of 559 DMUs. In terms of the covered period, the shortest is 3 months, while the longest is 20 years (from 1990 to 2010).

Table 1. Literature review on DEA in the defence sector

	Author(s)/year	Country	Period	Sample	Model	Issues
1	Charnes et al. (1983)	US	October 1981 -May 1982	14 DMUs	Input-oriented (IO) CCR, Window Analysis	Efficiency of the maintenance units in the US Air Force
2	Bowlin (1987)	US	October 1982-March 1984	7 DMUs	DEA Window Analysis	Performance of US Air Force real-property maintenance activities
3	Roll, Golany and Seroussy (1989)	Israel	quarter	5 DMUs	IO CCR	Performance of maintenance units of the Israeli Air Force
4	Charnes (1990)	US	1 quarter of 1990	53 DMUs	Advertising Effective-ness DEA Model	The impact of advertising resources on the recruitment of high quality prospective soldiers for the US Army
5	Clarke (1992)	US	1983-1986	17 DMUs	IO CCR	Maintenance performance of US Army air bases
6	Sun (2004)	Taiwan	January-June and July-December 2000	30 DMUs	Output oriented (OO) DEA NCN-AR	Performance of maintenance shops in the Taiwanese Army

7	Nakabayashi and Tone (2005)	Japan	1984-1997	18 DMUs; 252 DMUs	Super-SBM-Input-Constant; Malmquist-Input-Constant	Verification of the end of the Cold War
8	Forika (2008)	Hungary	2006	559 DMUs	OO CCR	Efficiency measurement possibilities for military higher education
9	Lu (2011)	Taiwan	2007	31 DMUs	IO BBC	Supply of supplementary foods and products of the military outlets in the Taiwanese Army
10	Wen-Min and Mei-Hui (2011)	Taiwan	2006	28 DMUs	Modified super-Slack Based Measure (SBM) model	Operating efficiency and the benchmark-learning roadmap of Taiwanese military financial units
11	Hanson (2012)	Norway	3 years	11 DMUs	Specified IO DEA model for the units of one branch of the Norwegian armed forces: Malmquist-Input-Constant	Efficiency of the Norwegian armed forces
12	Hatami-Marbini et al. (2012)	Belgium, USA and Iran	1993-2012	18 DMUs	fuzzy DEA-BCC	The problem of NATO enlargement
13	Wang and Wang (2012)	China	unknown	12 DMUs	DEA model	Quantitative effect evaluation of engineerization management
14	Choon-Joo, Won-Joon and Bong-Kyoo (2012)	Korea	1993-2007	14 DMUs	Revenue DEA model	Offset trends
15	Zhou and Liu (2014)	China	1990-2010	21 DMUs	Malmquist Productivity Index (MPI) combined with DEA	The defence spending impact on economic productivity
16	Georgieva, Naumovski and Cvetkoska (2016)	Macedonia	2007-2009	36 DMUs	OO BBC	Efficiency of operating countries in NATO-led mission, ISAF

Source: Authors.

Three studies from this table have been selected and analyzed below.

Nakabayashi and Tone (2005) evaluated a nation's dependence on military forces, and verified the end of the Cold War. Through the establishment of the new Relative Military Index (RMI), they described the period after the Cold War. The new index, the RMI, represents the relative efficiency of a nation's military force, which they analyze. The study indicates the possibility of applying DEA for comparative analysis of different phenomena related to international relations and the defence sector.

In the study of Hanson (2012) the sample consists of yearly observations from eleven Home Guard districts over three years. The model, despite some drawbacks associated with the use of best practices in this area, enables a meaningful and measurable expression for the output of an operational unit, the Home Guard of the Norwegian armed forces.

In the study which addresses the problem of NATO enlargement, Hatami-Marbini et al. (2012, pp. 19-21) emphasized that, in political discussions, the enlargement process has sometimes been depicted as favouring socially and economically stable countries, with the only political uncertainty related to the issue of intra-member conflicts (e.g. Cyprus). The NATO enlargement process is a complex multi-criteria problem that embraces qualitative and quantitative data. Potential applicant countries must conform to a large number of quantitative and qualitative entry criteria established by NATO. By using DEA, the authors confirm the hypothesis that decisions are not based on socio-economic stability. In fact, even excluding statutory neutral countries such as Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland, the outcome correlates poorly with the real ascension. In detail, the order of integration of some former Soviet republics compared to the former Yugoslavian republics clearly suggests that other mechanisms are at play.

DEA Applications in the Defence Sector in the Republic of Macedonia

The first study in the defence sector in Macedonia that applies DEA is a part of the doctoral dissertation, by Naumovski (2015). That research was published in the proceedings of the XLIII International Symposium on Operational Research (SYM-OP-IS 2016) (Georgieva, Naumovski and Cvetkoska, 2016).

Georgieva, Naumovski and Cvetkoska (2016) measure the relative efficiency of participating countries in a NATO-led mission in Afghanistan, ISAF, for a period of three years (2007-2009) by using DEA, or more precisely, the output-oriented BCC DEA model. The sample consists of 36 DMUs (participating countries). Two inputs and one output have been selected. The inputs are: the total population of each participating country, and the GDP per capita of the participating countries (in US dollars), while the number of soldiers (troops) of each participating country per rotation is the selected output. Based on the obtained results, only 6 participating countries in ISAF were identified as relatively efficient, thus their contribution to ISAF was the largest. They

are: Albania, Estonia, Macedonia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Iceland, except in 2009 where Iceland was replaced by Luxemburg. Macedonia is one of the major contributors to the ISAF mission. The results also show that, in terms of all of the NATO-partner countries, Macedonia is the largest contributor to the ISAF mission. In addition, according to the results of the analysis in the observed period (2007-2009), the conclusion is that certain partner countries have expressed greater willingness and capability in terms of their contribution to NATO-operations and missions. Actually, due to the fact that the NATO-partner countries, such as Australia, Austria, Finland, New Zealand, and Sweden have far greater human and economic resources than Macedonia, their contribution to NATO missions should be more significant. Concurrently, compared with the NATO member countries, Macedonia's contribution is significantly larger than those NATO member countries that have a far larger population and greater economic opportunities (France, Germany, Netherlands, etc.). Additionally, compared to other countries in the region, Albania and Macedonia are major contributors to ISAF, as opposed to Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania. Regarding the NATO member countries, those relatively efficient are: Albania, Estonia, Iceland, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as Luxembourg, in 2009, instead of Iceland. As always, the lead in the NATO operations and missions is given to the United States, accompanied by the United Kingdom. The study also gives an overview of Slovenia's efficiency in ISAF, as a NATO member country. The country is also compared with Estonia, which is relatively efficient. The efficiency score of the Republic of Slovenia is 0.3095, 0.3002 and 0.2660 in 2007, 2008 and 2009, respectively. In order for Slovenia to be relatively efficient in ISAF, in the years that are the subject of analysis, it should increase the number of troops that are participating in the mission. Due to the fact that the participation of the Republic of Slovenia in the NATO-led operation in Kosovo is far different, the inefficiency in ISAF is probably influenced by the fact that Afghanistan is quite a distant region and the presence in the Western Balkans is in the focus of Slovenia's participation in international operations and missions. Additionally, the special interest in the stability and security of the region of South East Europe contributes to the increasing presence of the Slovenian Armed Forces in NATO operations on the Balkans (SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina and KFOR in Kosovo).

Stojanovski (2017) has also applied DEA in his doctoral dissertation and he has measured the efficiency of the US military interventions.

The results that are obtained with DEA confirm the actual situations and thus we believe that its application by researchers in the area of the defence sector will note an increase in the period that follows.

Conclusion

Making good decisions in this increasingly competitive and dynamic world is not at all easy. Decision-makers face numerous challenges, and the key to success is in their timely

response. If they are faced with a problem that is similar to the current one, experience can help them make a decision, but if the problem is new, complex, it is best to consider both qualitative and quantitative aspects.

Operational research practitioners can help decision makers to make better decisions for the problems they face by constructing models that best show the real situation, solving them by using adequate analytical methods of operational research and implementing the solution.

To measure the efficiency of entities that use the same inputs to produce the same outputs, the most widely used is the non-parametric methodology data envelopment analysis. The information obtained by this methodology enables taking steps to improve the efficiency of the identified inefficient entities. From the beginning of its application, until today, DEA has seen a rapid growth and numerous success stories in various areas.

This article provides a literature review on the application of DEA in the defence sector. The analyzed papers reflect the possibility of extensive use of DEA for measuring the efficiency in the defence sector, and in our country the first research on its application in this sector was made in 2015.

DEA is applicable for analysis of different phenomena related to a plethora of security challenges, therefore our next challenge should be to create a security and defence model that would respond to the global security challenges that the world is facing, and to which the Western Balkan countries are not immune (for example, the migrant crisis).

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DEFINING THE NOTION OF SUICIDE ATTACKS

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Abstract: *Suicide attacks have been filling the media worldwide for some time now, however this also brings to the surface the complex formulation of these events. Although suicide attacks are known and mentioned in history, they have always been covered with the veil of mystery whether they are feats for respect or the opposite. From a historical point of view, the followers of these forms of attack that end with the death of the perpetrator usually end their lives in agony. Later, with the development of explosive devices, the realization of this step became simpler, and perhaps more practical, from multiple points of view.*

The focus of this paper is on several terms that describe attacks of suicidal nature, such as suicide terrorism, suicide attacks, and suicide missions. These terms are often encountered in literature and are subject of debates in the scientific community. Our goal is to clarify these terms and at the same time try to arrive to the term that would be the most neutral as regards the labelling of these attacks ranging from one extreme (heroic) to the other extreme (insidious, cowardly, etc.).

Keywords: *attack, suicidal nature, suicide terrorism, suicide attack, suicide mission.*

Introduction

In the current events the terms ‘suicide attacks’ and ‘terrorist activities’ are often used interchangeably. The definition of what exactly constitutes terrorism, and hence terrorist activities, is still a dilemma and subject of discussion around the world. The concept of terrorism is one of the most controversial terms in international relations and the political arena (Koufa, 2001: 8). According to the most frequently cited definition of terrorism, the definition of the FBI, “terrorism is the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” or “terrorism is the premeditated use or threat of use of violence by individuals or groups to obtain a political or social objective through the intimidation of a large audience beyond that of the immediate non-combatant victims” (Enders and Sandler, 2012). The two essential components of terrorism are violence and political or social motives.

Research on the execution of terrorist attacks points to the following facts. The average number of victims in a terrorist attack that employs firearms is 3.32, in the event of terrorist attacks with a remote controlled explosive devices it is 6.92, in a suicide attack with an explosive

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vest it is 81.48, and in a suicide attack with an explosive-laden vehicle this number goes up to 97.81 victims per attack (Pedahzur & Perlinger 2006). These figures undoubtedly indicate the high average death rate achieved by the use of suicide bombers in suicide bombings (81.48 and 97.81).

The implementation of suicide attacks indicates the need for their definition or clarification what exactly the term suicide attack denotes. In the literature several synonyms for the act of sacrificing one's own life for a particular cause can be encountered, such as a suicide bomber or a homicide bomber; suicide operation; martyrdom operation, which is most often related to religious fanaticism; genocide bombing related to the victims of a particular conflict (Palestine and Israel); sacrifice bombing or in German *opferanschlag*, a German-speaking term, was proposed in 2012 by German scientist Arata Takeda, it is used to shift the focus from the suicide of perpetrators or their use as weapons by superiors in the command structure, (Takeda A., 2012) and others. Nevertheless, all these synonyms do not clarify the meaning of the term suicide attack, as they can contain elements of a subjective nature. The term suicide attack is often used as an association of suicide terrorism or suicide missions. For this reason, this paper shall analyze the terms suicide terrorism, suicide attack and suicide mission.

Suicide terrorism

The problem with the term suicide terrorism stems from the very term terrorism, which, as we have already mentioned, is subject to different interpretations. Terrorism is a pejorative word and most organizations refuse to be labelled by a concept for which a universal definition has not been accepted, as observed by researchers who investigate terrorism (Hoffman 1998; Ganor 2005), which makes the use of the term suicide terrorism as a sub-category of terrorism (Moghadam, 2006) very troublesome and disputable.

Also, the past reminds us of another issue related to the use of the term suicide terrorism. Historically, attacks which include elements of suicide (*modus operandi*) are also used as conventional weapons in military campaigns, which in turn is a subject of discussion regarding the identification of these phenomena with terrorism. Most definitions of terrorism make a strict distinction between acts of terrorism and conventional warfare, since the former are related to non-state actors (Moghadam, 2006). The example of the use of suicide pilots - *kamikazes* during World War II points to the use of suicide bombings by the Japanese government at that time and this represents a classic application for military purposes. Similar suicide missions were also conducted by Germany during the Second World War in the Battle of Berlin. The German Air Force-Luftwaffe carried out self-sacrifice missions (*Selbstopferereinsätze*) in the period 17-20 April 1945 against the Soviet troops. These self-sacrificing missions were carried out by the pilots of the Leonidas squadron. During the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, Iran's establishment also employed suicide missions called "human waves". These missions were carried out by the then Iranian paramilitary formations – the Basij or (*Sāzmān-e Basij-e Mostaz'afin*), formed in 1979 by Ayotalah Khomeini. The above examples of

suicide attacks are usually not categorized by scientists as acts of terrorism, that is, suicide terrorism. They are planned and executed by state actors in order to protect state interests and as such are presented as a conventional mode of warfare.

As we have already mentioned, some scientists point out that attacks originating from state actors should not be labelled as terrorist attacks, if they are directly targeting members of the army, and the attacks directed against non-combatant population are usually considered as terrorist attacks (Moghadam, 2006). Bombings, shootings, kidnappings, and similar methods are commonly referred to as guerrilla warfare, insurrection or low-intensity conflict if they are targeted against uniformed men and women on duty (Moghadam, 2006). Other authors also point to the terminological differences between terrorism and crime, insurrection and guerrilla warfare. These differences between crime and terrorism can be perceived based on the following example. Kidnapping in order to collect ransom is a criminal act - extortion when the kidnappers are not pursuing or financing a political agenda. In the event that the kidnapping is related to a political motive, then it is considered a terrorist incident even with ransom demands being made (Sandler, 2014). The term insurrection refers to “a politically based uprising intended to overthrow the established system of governance and to bring about a redistribution of income” (Sandler and Hartley, 1995). In distinction to insurrections, guerrilla warfare generally involves a band of rebel forces (e.g., the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia [FARC], Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, or Shining Path in Peru) that controls a sector of the country, from which to dispatch its operatives to confront government forces (Sandler 2014). Terrorism as a tactic is employed by both insurrections and guerrilla movements, and as a consequence, many guerrilla groups are listed as terrorist groups despite their control of territory (Sandler, 2014).

The need for precise definition and guidelines for collecting data on suicidal operations, and also deciding whether attacks on military targets will be included or not, is extremely important for comparing data between researchers (Moghadam, 2006), given that some of the definitions of terrorism do not consider attacks on members of uniformed civil servants who are on duty as terrorist acts or terrorism, thereby creating a dilemma about suicide terrorist attacks and their classification.

According to Professor Ariel Merari of the Tel Aviv University, suicide terrorism “is intentionally killing oneself for the purpose of killing others, in the service of a political or ideological goal” and according to Merari, this definition does not include high-risk missions, fooled couriers, and suicide without homicide for a political cause in suicide terrorism research. Ami Pedahzur defines suicide terrorism as “a diversity of violent actions perpetrated by people who are aware that the odds they will return alive are close to zero”. “*Suicide terrorism is an attack where the perpetrator causes death or the largest possible degree of damage to the chosen target, ensuring the extent of that by non-existence of intent to survive the action*” (Matovic, 2006), a politically motivated violent attack perpetrated by a self-aware individual who actively and purposely causes his own death by blowing himself up along with his chosen target. Professor of

Political Science at the University of Chicago Robert Pape defines suicide terrorism as the most aggressive form of terrorism compared to demonstrative and destructive terrorism, pointing out that its purpose is to kill the maximum number of people from the opposing community (Crenshaw M., 2007). In addition, in terms of suicide terrorists he says, “a suicide terrorist is an attacker who is not expected to survive the mission and often employs a method of attack (such as a car bomb, suicide vest, or ramming an airplane into a building) that requires his or her death in order to succeed. In essence, suicide terrorists kill others at the same time that they kill themselves.” Similarly to Pape, Pedahzur says that such attacks are intended to create an atmosphere of terror and to harm as many people as possible, in most cases civilians. Walter Laqueur points out that before World War I most of the terrorism was actually suicide terrorism. The weapon used (a knife, a short-range gun, unstable primitive bombs) forced the assassin to get very close to the victim. In such a situation, the possibility of being arrested was very high for the terrorists at that time, and since the death penalty was in force, the prospect of returning alive from such a mission was minimal, a fact which was well known to terrorists (Laqueur, 2005).

The notion of suicide terrorism, like terrorism, is related to the absence of a generally accepted definition. Therefore, the question arises whether the subject of analysis is a special form of terrorism or the politically neutral terms suicide attack or mission (Crenshaw M., 2007). In defining suicide terrorism, some authors avoid the term terrorism, because in that case a wider range of acts of attack is considered. Among those who resist the term terrorism, some focus on the subjective interpretations of the perpetrators and the idea of martyrdom in specific cultures. Thus, the term suicide is avoided as well, because both labels are objectionable to those who practice or condone such violence (Crenshaw 2007). Other authors use the term suicide terrorism emphasising that it refers exclusively to attacks on civilian, not military, targets. Apparently, such use of the term terrorism leaves room for the reader to assess the implications of a particular attack if it is not characterized as a terrorist act in accordance with the positive legal regulations on the territory of the country where it occurred.

Diego Gambetta and contributors stick largely to the term suicide missions (SM), while other social scientists (for example, Mia Bloom, Hafez, Robert Pape, and Ami Pedahzur) prefer the term suicide terrorism. The historian Shaul Shay uses both terms suicide attack and suicide terrorism interchangeably. Another historian, Raphael Israeli insists on using the term terrorism to describe violence associated with Islam. Anne Marie Oliver and Paul Steinberg, who document the culture that supports Hamas, use the terms suicide bombings and murder-suicides, while they do not use the term terrorism at all.

The terms suicide attack, suicide operation or suicide mission appear to be more neutral terms compared to the use of the term suicide terrorism. Unlike the word terrorism, the use of the terms suicide attack/operation/mission are value-neutral and emphasize the specific mode of attack, one that involves the death of its perpetrator,

in contrast to the type of attack, in this case terrorism, and thus one's opinion over the legitimacy of the attack (Moghadam, 2006). Suicide terrorism requires the interplay of two conditions: a willingness to kill and a willingness to die (Merari, 1998:196; Moghadam, 2003). There is a general consensus that suicide terrorism is a tactic used by extremist organizations for rational purposes. It is, moreover, a form of political violence that presents advantages for a weaker party in an asymmetrical conflict, and also suicide assaults can mobilize sympathetic populations and attract both recruits and financial support for the realization of rational goals (Crenshaw, 2007). Or, suicide terrorism is a form of rational political violence that may be employed to coerce an adversary and mobilize popular support within a community for a terrorist organization, as well as to achieve more specific policy goals (Geller, Saperstein, 2014). The use of the term suicide terrorism implies extreme violence applied by a person or a certain terrorist organization with political or social connotation; however, the absence of a clear definition of terrorism, as well as the questionability of the act of sacrificing one's own life, leaves room for polemicizing the notion of suicide terrorism.

Suicide attack

The very act of killing others, and at the same time taking one's own life, only superficially indicates the simple conception of a suicide attack. A suicide attack is any violent attack in which the attacker expects their own death as a direct result of the method used to harm, damage or destroy the target. Suicide attacks are traditionally defined as attacks whose success is contingent upon the death of the perpetrator (Crenshaw 2002: 21; Ganor 2002: 140; Schweitzer 2002: 78). An example of defining a suicide attack is pointed out by Schweitzer. He defines suicide attack as a politically motivated violent attack perpetrated by a self-aware individual (or individuals) who actively and purposely causes his own death by blowing himself up along with his chosen target. The perpetrator's ensured death is a precondition for the success of his mission (Schweitzer 2002: 78). Boaz Ganor adds that "the terrorist is fully aware that if he does not kill himself the planned attack will not be implemented." The Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism (CPOST) defines a suicide attack as an attack in which an attacker kills himself or herself in a deliberate attempt to kill others. As suicide attacks CPOST considers only the attacks perpetrated by non-state actors; and holds an agnostic approach to the classification of the attack, whether it is a terrorist act or another form of violence (a guerrilla attack or an attack with no obvious political motivation).

Most commonly, suicide attacks are related to the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) which are defined in literature as "a device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic or incendiary chemicals and designed to destroy, incapacitate, harass or distract". Suicide Improvised Explosive Device (SIED) is defined as: "an IED initiated by the attacker at a time of

their choosing in which they intentionally kill themselves as part of the attack, or possibly to deny capture. Nevertheless, equally destructive are suicide attacks carried out without the use of explosives, among the “most spectacular” suicide attacks carried out without the use of explosives being the air strikes against the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001.

However, despite multiple attempts to define a suicide attack, there are certain shortcomings in the process. Regarding the key condition that implies a suicide attack, i.e. the death of the perpetrator of the attack being a condition for a successful attack, polemics arise over the motives of those attackers or perpetrators of attacks in which they were prepared to sacrifice their own lives, such as suicide bombers, but their death did not occur simultaneously with the act of the attack. We will cite two examples. The first example is the case of Baruch Goldstein, a member of the radical Jewish terrorist organization Kach (Pedahzur A., 2006). He killed 29 Muslim civilians during a prayer at a sacred site in Hebron, in February 1994. Goldstein was lynched by the rest of the attendees. His death did not occur immediately after he had begun the act of attack but during the attack. Although it was assumed that he had no delusion about surviving the attack, his death was not necessary for the attack to happen. Another example is the case of Israeli soldier Eden Natan-Zada (19). On August 4, 2005, in the northern Israeli city of Shfaram, the Israeli soldier Nathan-Zada, absent without an official leave, shot to death four Arab citizens in a bus wounding another 12 people. He was beaten to death by the enraged residents of Shfarram immediately after the incident. These examples indicate the complexity of the concept of a suicide attack.

Alex Mintz, Head of the Institute for Policy and Strategy and President of the Israeli Political Science Association, advocates for a broader definition of suicide attacks. According to him, a suicide attack is “any attack where the suicide act of the terrorist was an a priori objective of the mission” (August 5, 2005). The key deficiency of this definition is that it is actually impossible to find out whether the perpetrator of the attack was expecting to die or not in the very act of the attack. Mintz, Chatagnier, and Brule distinguish between a general and an operational definition of suicide attacks. Their general definition of suicide attacks includes “any attack where the suicide act of the terrorist was an a priori objective of the mission,” while the operational definition defines suicide attacks as (1) instances in which the very act of the attack “is dependent upon the death of the perpetrator” (i.e. the narrow definition), or (2) instances in which the attacker commits suicide in the course of the attack although the very act of the attack is not dependent upon his or her death.

Nevertheless, most suicide terrorism analysts seem to abide by the narrow definition of suicide attacks. This definition determines a suicide attack as an attack in which the death of the perpetrator is a prerequisite for a successful attack. (Moghadam 2002; Bloom 2005; Gambetta 2005; Hafez 2005). This definition implies that the death of the perpetrator is expected by him or her.

Defining suicide attacks is facing yet another problem in their conception, the

so-called false positives and proxy bombs. The first case refers to a suicide bomber who did not intend to commit suicide voluntarily or who did not technically commit suicide but was killed by other people. Leonard Weinberg points out that such cases have been reported in Iraq, where drivers of vans and cars committed suicide, but the explosives in the vehicles were detonated by remote control. Similar cases have been reported, although not fully proven, in Lebanon (in the 80s of the last century) where apparently some drivers of explosive-laden cars did not show a desire for a suicide attack (Merari 1998), while in yet other cases reported by Schweitzer, the dispatchers of car bombs had not intended the driver to detonate the explosives while he is inside the vehicle, but nevertheless it was detonated in the presence of the driver (August 3, 2005). The second case, proxy bombings, refers to cases where “proxies” are forced to carry a bomb under threat (such as having their children killed). The beginnings of the application of this tactics are related to the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in the 1990s, spreading from there to FARC guerrillas in Colombia, the Taliban in Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda in the Middle East, and other organizations. In both cases it could be said that they are suicide attacks. The presented forms of manipulation or threat further complicate the definition of suicide attacks, and we arrive to the essential need of a more precise framework that will include the criteria for a suicide attack. However, in the absence of other arguments, the authors of the paper accept the views of the so-called narrow definition that determines the suicide attack as an attack in which the death of the perpetrator is a prerequisite for a successful attack.

Suicide missions

Some of the scientists who investigate terrorism use the term suicide mission or missions in order to describe a particular act where the perpetrator sacrifices his life in the name of a particular cause. But, how is the term suicide mission defined in literature? A special task given to a person or group which involves killing or injuring others while annihilating one’s self is considered as a suicide mission. Also, a suicide mission signifies an attack against an enemy target in which the agent has no chance of escaping or saving himself (Ricolfi, Campana, 2004). The crucial element in this definition is the certainty of the agent’s death, and not the means used to carry out the attack. No importance is attached to the fact that the agent’s death is caused by the agent himself or by the reaction of others: the important point is that the action does not contemplate any chance of survival for the agent (Ricolfi, Campana; 2004). A standard case of a suicide mission consists of a violent attack designed in such a way that the death of the perpetrator of the attack is essential to the success of the mission (Gambetta 2005). An attack that has failed for various reasons, but the perpetrator/-s has died in it is also considered as a suicide mission. This is not the case if the perpetrator/-s has survived the attack, then we cannot talk about a suicide mission. This way of conceptualizing a

suicide mission suggests a broader aspect that encompasses such an attack as opposed to a suicide bomber whose death is instantaneous.

In the case of a suicide mission, the death of the perpetrator is inevitable with the possibility of its occurring as an indirect consequence of his action. From a psychological point of view, the two situations of suicide mission and suicide bomber are different from the aspect of occurrence of death, but in both situations it would be appropriate to distinguish between those who wish their death (martyrs) and those who do not seek their own death but accept it for a particular cause (heroes) (Ricolfi, Campana, 2004). The authors of the paper "Suicide missions in the Palestinian area: a new database" - Luca Ricolfi and Paolo Campana disregard those cases that do not seek their own death but accept it for a particular cause (heroes), and as a reason for this they point out that it is impossible these examples to be processed in an empirical manner, since in essence the two missions were separated - missions based on self-explosion (SB) and missions without an escape plan (NE), that is: $SM = SB + NE$. The database presented by the two authors contemplates suicide missions (SM) as a total number but separates them into two types: suicide bombing (SB) and missions without an escape plan (NE).

Herein further we shall explain the characteristics of the LUPA suicide missions database presented by Luca Ricolfi and Paolo Campana, which is explained in detail in the above stated paper, while in this case we will just mention the main choices (source, time and place and inclusion criteria) that were made during the selection of suicide missions.

Sources: The LUPA database integrates information coming from five types of sources. First, three large databases (ICT, MIPT, TRC), plus the international ICT database. Second, three general chronologies (MIPT, CDISS, Nash), plus Clara Beyler's chronology of female suicide missions. Third, all suicide murders reconstructed by Pape (2003). Fourth, a number of very specific pieces of news provided by two experts on Lebanon (Robert Fisk and Martin Cramer). Fifth, several press articles published on the Internet, in particular by the New York Times, by Haaretz and the Jerusalem Post.

Time and space: The period under investigation goes from January 1, 1972 to December 31, 2003. The area covered does not only include Israel and the occupied territories (West Bank and Gaza Strip), but also Lebanon. This choice depends both on the fact that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has almost always involved Lebanon as well, and on the fact that Hizbollah actions provided a crucial model to the Palestinian factions (Morris 2002, Schweitzer 2000, Ricolfi 2004). The territories covered in the paper - Israel, West Bank, Gaza Strip, Lebanon - are referred to as the IPC area (Israeli-Palestinian Conflict).

Inclusion criteria. The LUPA database exists in two different versions: *extended* and *core*. Also, in the database, the missions are distinguished as foiled missions (SM1), failed missions (SM2), successful missions (SM3), almost-suicide missions (VHRM: Very High Risk Missions). The successful missions (SM3) are further split into cer-

tainly suicidal (SM3c) and probably suicidal (SM3p) depending on the accuracy of the available description of the event.

The *extended version* contains all of the single episodes that meet at least five requirements: a) to be mentioned in at least one of the 12 mentioned sources; b) to have taken place in a known place and at a known date; c) to have taken place in the Middle East area in the period between 1970 and 2003; d) to have an Israeli or Israeli related target; e) to meet the essential requirements of a suicide mission (self explosion or no escape plan mission), or at least of an almost-suicide mission (very high risk missions).

The *core version* of the database focuses only on the most specific, reliable and recent data. It includes only executed and certainly suicidal missions, i.e. according to the formula $SM = SM2 + SM3c$. Suicide missions include failed missions (SM2), but excludes foiled missions (SM1 – because the number of these missions is too heavily dependent on the Israeli decision to inform about them), quasi suicidal missions (VHRM), and missions that were successful though only probably suicidal (SM3p).

The following example shall explain the manner of classification of suicide attacks in the extended and the core version of the Ricolfi and Campana's database.

Table 1

<i>Kind of mission</i>	<i>Code</i>	<i>Number</i>	
Foiled	SM1	24	
Failed	SM2	16	
Successful & (certainly) suicidal	SM3c	206+3	
Successful & (probably) suicidal	SM3p	32+3	
Very high risk		VHRM	33+1
<i>TOTAL</i>			318

Database–extended version (Palestinian area 1980–2003). Source: Ricolfi L. Campana P. (2004)

Only part of the total of 318 suicide missions performed in the Palestinian area in the period 1980 – 2003 falls into the definition of a suicide mission by Ricolfi and Campana. Specifically, as regards suicide missions in the narrow sense of the definition (SM2+SM3c), the total number of missions drops to 225.

Table 2

	<i>Successful</i>	<i>Failed</i>	<i>TOTAL</i>
Self-explosion	162	6	168
No escape mission	46	10	56
<i>TOTAL</i>	208	16	224

Database – core version

Source: Ricolfi L. Campana P. (2004)

The total number of the suicide missions³ can be split up into four main types, according to their outcome (success, failure) and to the adopted technology (self-explosion, no escape mission). The authors point out the database-core version, as a group where the focus is on research of suicide missions in the Palestinian area.

This way of classification of suicide missions is one of the sources that tries to present a more realistic picture of the missions carried out, and provide at the same time more relevant information about the missions. It should be taken into account that missions with no escape plan could refer to cases such as for example air strikes, where the death of the perpetrator of the attack would be immediate, but also to an attack with a motor vehicle in places where the death of the perpetrator could occur immediately or can result from the acts of other parties. Under these circumstances, the category “with no escape plan” includes a broader concept of the death of a perpetrator of a suicide mission.

Conclusion

There exists an interest among the terrorists with regard to the question of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and the number of potential offenders is growing, but many such groups have international networks, which do not depend on the financial and the technical support by the sponsors from a single country. There is a claim that the technology of turning biological and chemical materials in weapons today has been adopted by and is available to the terrorist groups.

In this context, a special problem is the internationalization and globalization of terrorist activities which by the potential use of weapons of mass destruction can endanger the safety of the planet.

Because of this fact, terrorism requires a response not only by the national security systems, but also as broad as possible international cooperation.

³ There is no data for one suicide mission, and therefore the initial total in the extended version (225) is reduced to 224 suicide missions in the core version.

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CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OF THE SECURITY SYSTEM OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

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Abstract: *Control and oversight of the security system is the backbone of the protection of democracy, as well as of human rights and freedoms. They are enforced across all security system instances, without exception, and must not be susceptible to political party influence and pressure. The control and oversight mechanisms of the country's security system specify the proper role and functioning of the security sector in a free and democratic state. The underlying democratic principles of control and oversight include: an adequate legal framework, a clear delineation between civilian and government control, strong and professional parliamentary committees for surveillance and control with access to classified information and a clearly set up system of government and non-governmental services that will oversee the work of the security intelligence services in the country. The purpose of this paper is to determine the weaknesses and shortcomings of the existing mechanisms of control and supervision over the security system, as well as to offer measures for their elimination, hence improving the security services control and oversight mechanisms.*

Keywords: *security system, control, surveillance, intelligence.*

Introduction

Historically, security has been a fundamental value in human relations, while its status was institutionalized with the emergence of the state as an organized creation, i.e. a community of people.

In everyday speech when we use the word *security*, it often means safety, to keep something safe, the protection of something, of some value, material or spiritual, or the protection of man. Man, as an individual and social being, cannot exist without being safe. Its existence in the environment is constantly exposed to various types of threats, not only to his person, but to the good he creates or possesses. That is why he cares for their safety (personal or human security, although the latter term has a broader meaning), and participates in achieving the security of the state (state security), society (social security), traffic, facilities, space, data, etc. (Ivanovski, Z. & Angeleski, M. 2005).

In literature, there is no identical clear commitment to the linguistic term that would determine the content of security. (Spaseski, J. 2005).

Etymologically speaking, the concept of security comes from the Latin word *se-*

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cures meaning security, absence of danger, certainty, protection. When we talk about security in the broadest sense, it encompasses the concepts of individual, global, international, regional security and others.

Security is inseparably linked with the state and its organization, bodies and functions. Modern debates on security are extended to the social and political sphere. Nevertheless, the term security is primarily associated with inner peace and peaceful life of the citizens, that is, freedom from threats, and indicates the state of defense against an external enemy and a threat to sovereignty. (Mojanoski, C. & Gjurovski, M. (2012).

We could say that “security in its broadest sense, is a state of stability in the country the nature of which is aimed at carrying out preventive arrangements to protect and defend, above all, the various sources of danger in order not to cause imbalances in society and nature that would endanger the physical, social and spiritual integrity of people.” (Mitrevska, M. et al. 2009).

The term security means removing all outside actions (acts) and omissions (omissions) that threaten or may threaten people, gender, public order, material and spiritual goods, facilities, certain areas or some other values. (Spaseski, J., Nikolovski, M. & Gerasimoski, S. 2010).

Security can be treated as a state in which the insured balanced physical, spiritual and material survival of the individual and of the community in relation to other individuals, communities and nature, or security essentially an imminent structural part of society which includes certain condition or certain features of the condition, and also activity or system. (Kotovchevski, M. 2000).

Security can be understood in three ways:

1. First, as a security feature of the state, given that the law and other legal norms, bodies and other entities will exercise that function;
2. Secondly, as a security function performed by the authorities - services (Intelligence Agency, the Directorate for State Security and Intelligence, Public Security Bureau), and
3. Third, as a security situation in society and state. (Ivanovski, Z. & Angeleski, M. 2005).

In all attempts to define security, the starting point is the view that security is an essential attribute of every state, which is associated with its protective function. Additionally, the notion of security implies a certain state of protection of the fundamental values of society, i.e. activities related to the protection of those values, an adequate organization, a function, or a system, or all together. Given its importance, size and severity, security is most often associated with the notion of the system, which includes multiple functions, activities and organizations that have a shared commitment (each within its scope of responsibilities) to provide security. (Ivanovski, Z. & Angeleski, M. 2005).

1. DEFINITION OF THE SECURITY SYSTEM

In every state and wider society, there is a security system. In organizational and functional sense, it is an important constituent part of the state whose implementers are the state institutions and stakeholders. (Doncev, A. 2007).

According to one acceptable definition, the security system is a form of an organization and functioning of society in the implementation of preventive and repressive measures and activities undertaken to protect against the threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state, its order guaranteed by the Constitution, the rights and

freedoms of citizens and other social values. (Stajic, Lj. 2004).

The purpose of the security system is the establishment of internal and external security, which would respond to all threats, risks and dangers, both external and internal. External security is performed in the implementation of foreign policy based on international law. Internal security is achieved on the basis of the manner and quality of life in the state union, based on the Constitution and other relevant laws. People exercise their human essence through the quality of life represented by complex economic, cultural and political values. (Tonovski, Gj. 2004).

The security system comprises the following elements:

1. A precisely determined and defined objective to be achieved;
2. Forces and means for achieving this objective, and
3. Structure - organization of activity provided for the achievement of the objective.

These elements are factors of the fundamental pillars that underpin the security system, as follows:

1. Security policy;
2. Security structure, and
3. Security self-organization of civil society. (Kotovceviski, M. 2000).

2. DEFINITION OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION

Control and supervision are social phenomena that are inherent in all areas of social life and present both man and the state. Control and supervision are a constant, never ending, never perfect and omnipresent. (Jugovic, S. 2013).

Control and supervision are a continuous action taken by the competent authorities to check the behavior, the way in which work is carried out and the results derived from it. The effectiveness of monitoring and control depends on the number of those who control the work performed.

Control and supervision is carried out in order to ensure legality and purposefulness of the work and the public interest within the legal system in terms of eliminating irregularities, correcting and streamlining certain procedures in their legal form, and protecting the citizens from the illegal actions of certain agencies and institutions of the security system.

2.1. Features of Control and Supervision

In order to be effective, control must have the following characteristics:

- control should be intact;
- control should be oriented toward a certain goal;
- control should be exercised at all stages of operation;

- control should be associated with the strategy;
- control should be accepted by all parties;
- control should be complete;
- control must be comprehensive;
- control should be timely and accurate;
- control should be objective;
- control should be clear;
- control should be non-selective;
- control should be discretionary;
- control should be irreversible;
- control should be timely;
- control should be flexible;
- control should be consistent.

Unlike control, supervision has a broader meaning and involves a broader action. In management, supervision may include oversight of the performance or operation of a person or group. (Bakreski, O. 2012).

Surveillance is a broad term that includes checks before an event (*ex ante*), ongoing monitoring and review after the event (*ex post*), and evaluation and research. (Born, H. & Wills, A. 2012).

2.1.1. Ex ante oversight

The most common *ex ante* oversight activities include: the creation of comprehensive legal frameworks for the intelligence services and the bodies that oversee them; the creation and approval of budgets for the intelligence services; and the authorization of intelligence operations that exceed a certain threshold of sensitivity. For legal frameworks to be effective, they must state clearly the mandate of the service or oversight body and the powers to which the service or body is entitled. Although perhaps not oversight in the conventional sense, this legislative activity is a starting point (and a *sine qua non*) for any useful oversight system. Without clearly defined mandates and powers, intelligence services and oversight bodies cannot function properly.

Government agencies cannot operate without funds. Thus, the parliament, which in a democracy controls the use of public funds, must enact annual budgets for all government agencies, including the intelligence services. (Bourne, H. & Geisler, G. 2012).

2.1.2. Ongoing oversight

Ongoing oversight can include investigations, on-site inspections, periodic hearings, and regular reporting on the activities of the intelligence services and of the oversight bodies themselves. In addition, in some states, judges periodically review ongoing information collection operations, such as wiretaps, to determine whether continuation of the operation is justified. (Bourne, H. & Geisler, G. 2012).

2.1.3. *Ex post* oversight

The most common forms of *ex post* oversight are thematic reviews, case reviews, expenditure reviews, and annual reviews. In certain situations, however, such as when alleged wrongdoing is revealed, *ex post* oversight can take the form of an ad hoc inquiry. Such inquiries are normally established to investigate and make recommendations concerning specific events. Another important area of *ex post* oversight is the handling of complaints which can be managed in a variety of institutional formats. Often, complaints are handled by the judiciary, but they can also be handled non-judicially, such as by ombudsman institutions (e.g. in Serbia), parliamentary committees (as in Hungary), or by expert oversight bodies (as in Norway). (Bourne, H. & Geisler, G. 2012).

3. DEFINITION OF CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OVER POLICE WORK

A frequently asked question when it comes to control and supervision of the police is what Roman poet and satirist *Juvenal* said: “*Quis custodiet ipsos custodes*”. In Western literature the issue comes across as: “*Who will guard the guards themselves?*”. These issues are constantly in the focus of current policy. But in this context, I would emphasize that the power of the police is immense and that power must be kept under control.

While citizens voluntarily give the police their consent to apply the monopoly of force to maintain social control and enforce their civil, political and economic freedoms, democratic police services have the obligation to have their powers checked and controlled by the public through the process of reporting. (Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, 1979).

Therefore, there is a need to develop “efficient measures to ensure the integrity and proper performance of police officers”. (The European Code of Police Ethics, 2001).

The control and supervision of police work today appears as an imperative of the rule of law and its fundamental element. Control over the police work is not an easy and simple operation, but a rather complex and serious process.

The police, as well as other institutions that make up the security system, exercise control as a management function, as an administrative inspection or as civilian control.

3.1. Need for control and supervision of police work

The need to establish control over the police stems from the specificity of power and the importance of discretion entrusted in them in the performance of daily tasks. Control and supervision of police work are an essential precondition for the functioning of modern democratic society.

Control means ensuring that the police service is in accordance with the legal regu-

lations. The systems of control (internal and external) provide assurance that the system of governance of the police service works in accordance with the rules and regulations.

The legal powers of the police are such that their misuse inevitably causes serious violation of the basic human rights and freedoms. Therefore, the protection of these rights is crucial to establishing lawful policing, i.e. harmonizing the procedures and the police with the applicable law. Without it, the functioning of democratic society is inconceivable. The overall police work, the behavior of every police officer, from strategies, police actions, to budget management, should be monitored by various control mechanisms that are responsible for control and supervision.

Monitoring the work of the police is of paramount importance if we take into account the capacity of those state bodies, the legal possibilities for legal use of means of coercion and authority that restrict human rights (detention of persons, search of persons and premises, seizure of property, interception of communications, etc.). (Nikac, Z. 2012).

3.2. Types control and supervision of police work

The mechanisms for protection from possible abuse of office and powers of police officers are nothing more than control mechanisms.

The mechanisms for control of the police work, which exist today in most countries, function in one of the following ways:

- assigning control and supervisory powers to the existing bodies of public authority;
- creating a new government, non-governmental bodies or joint control and supervision over the police;
- assigning explicit and implicit roles in the exercise of control or merely a right to institute proceedings for control or certain entities as informal means to control the police. (Milosavljevic, B. 2004).

Combined with the organizational criteria, the forms of control over the police can be divided as follows:

Forms of control	External	Internal
Exclusive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Parliamentary and governmental ad hoc - bodies to control the police - Citizen boards to control the police 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Hierarchical control - Control of the disciplinary Committee - Mutual supervision of police officers - Socialization processes
Inclusive	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Courts - Prosecution - Political parties - Media - Ombudsman 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Control of the union - Dedication to work - Awards - Communication with the community

Table. 1. Forms of control over police work

Internal control covers all aspects and activities initiated and carried out by the police. The control or surveillance measures conducted by institutions and individuals outside the police service are outside the control or supervision.

The supervisory institutions may include the executive (policy control, financial control and horizontal supervision by government agencies), the legislative (Members of Parliament, parliamentary commissions of inquiry), and the judicial branches, as well as human rights commissions or independent ombudsman. Moreover, the media can play an important role in informing the public about police work. Ultimately, democratic police services can be distinguished by their submission and acceptance of external control and supervision, as well as the degree of openness to these checks (inspections). (Bailey, D. 2001).

However, external supervision mechanisms have to be complemented by internal control and supervision, because in a number of instances internal investigation mechanisms might have structural advantages such as more resources, more available data (archives; witness reports; statements of cops), and better knowledge of the police environment. Furthermore, these structural advantages may inspire more confidence among accused officers that the inquiry will be fairly conducted; it will increase their cooperation with the investigating authorities. However, police agencies must investigate all allegations of misconduct to ensure the integrity of their operations. Minor offences could be investigated by an immediate superior, while more serious offences need to be investigated by an external body, but not the immediate command structure, for example, internal control units, ad-hoc disciplinary committees composed of senior police officers or external civilian supervision bodies, especially when it comes to investigations against high-ranking officials. Information on the procedures that will follow the complaint should be available to citizens to motivate them to submit justified complaints. Anonymous complaints should be investigated, although they are difficult to investigate, and the ministry should consider carefully to determine their validity before rejected or not to follow. (Miller, J. 2002).

3.3. Risk of excessive control and supervision over police work

In order to maintain the right balance, in addition to the obligations and rights of police officers, there should be a high degree of professional responsibility. Police work is public and it is always judged by the citizens who have very strict criteria when it comes to police work and the conduct of police officers.

It is important to consider the disadvantages and dangers of excessive control. Excessive control and lack of control have their price as everything else. The obvious danger when improving internal control is the tendency towards “excessive centralization” or holding the control and supervision on a high level within the organization and beyond the police offices rather than relying on written policies and monitoring activities to verify compliance. Also, it is important to be aware that the implementation

of control measures can send the wrong signals to the police. Control measures can be taken as a sign of distrust, and not taking personal responsibility on the part of police officers. One way to avoid this interpretation is to make a commitment to transfer the police officers who perform various control activities, promoting thus a control environment that will foster a positive attitude to control as “the best friend of the police officer.” Finally there is a risk to put too much focus on procedures at the expense of performance. All these challenges can have a negative impact on the motivation and initiative of the police officers. Each Police Service will determine whether it is aware of these negative consequences and act with compassion, ready to adjust and improve the control system, since the best driving force in any reform of the police are motivated police officers. (Toolkit on Police Integrity, 2012).

Very often the police and police officers see “enemies” in those who carry out various types of control and supervision of their behavior and performance. This negative attitude, i.e. that belief stems from the possibility of being sanctioned for certain errors and / or irregularities committed during the performance of their work activities and tasks. However, police officers must realize that the purpose of control and supervision of their work is not primarily to punish them, but to improve police activity and prevent any possible errors in performing their activities and tasks.

3.4. Harmonization with the international documents on police control and supervision

Every state needs to harmonize its domestic legislation on any kind of supervision and control over police work with certain international documents concerning the same topic.

These primarily include:

- Body of *Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment*;
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
- Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
- Declaration of the United Nations for Police;
- European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR);
- European Code of Police Ethics;
- European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, etc.

4. CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OVER THE ARMED FORCES

The term military means the totality of armed forces of a state. One of the basic conditions for the existence of the military is the defense of the country. The military

is autonomous and has its own standards, on the one hand, and it is an integral part of the state apparatus on the other hand. The military is tasked to prevent the occupation of the country by an aggressor, and act preventively or deter any possible aggressor's attempts or ideas to attack the country. One of the primary functions of the military is the defense or protection of the country's borders. Such a task is a function of protecting the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country. (Mojanoski, C. 2002).

The military, by definition, has been and remains an undemocratic institution. There is discipline, hierarchy and subordination, there is no room for development of individualism, freedom of thought and action. When we talk about the military in a democratic system, we should start from the premise that the military needs to be allotted a stable, legitimate and institutionalized status within the order. The main goal of any democratic government is to develop a dynamic system of civil-military relations that will maximize the military security of the country at the cost of the least sacrificing other social values. The essential values of democratic society stem from the human rights and freedoms, rule of law and the autonomy of civil society. (Slavevski, S. 2009).

There are no internationally accepted standards for monitoring and supervision of the *armed forces*, because the defense is considered part of the national sovereignty of each state. Control over the *armed forces* is an important function, where the state has the opportunity to inspect the work and the state of the *armed forces* and to take steps to improve this situation.

The purpose of the control and supervision of the *armed forces* is to bring the *armed forces* in a state of organization and functionality and provide the most optimal way for unobstructed execution of the legally defined tasks. To prevent the possibility of certain authorities to abuse the *armed forces*, it is controlled by both the President as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, and by the Parliament, of course on certain issues specifically identified with the positive legislation.

5. CONTROL AND SUPERVISION OF THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES

Intelligence services can be defined as public bodies which collect, analyse and process information related to threats to national security. They perform diverse and complex tasks in the interest of implementing the policy of the state, on internal and international level. (Jovanov, I. 2016).

Intelligence services are a key component and have a crucial role in each country, as they provide timely and effective information and independent analysis of information relating to state security and the protection of its vital interests. Given the threats and risks to internal security, many countries assign considerable power to the intelligence agencies.

The main purpose of the control and supervision of these services is to hold them

accountable for their policies and actions in terms of legality, decency, efficiency and effectiveness in the performance of their activities and tasks.

The process through which the supervisor calls for CSIS accountability usually has three clearly divided stages:

1. The supervisory authority collects information on intelligence;
2. Based on this initial information, the supervisory authority initiates dialogue with intelligence;
3. The supervisory Authority issues findings and recommendations. (Born, H. & Wills, A. 2012).

Therefore, to function effectively, the supervisory authority must possess the ability to access relevant information, to question the intelligence officers and issue findings and recommendations. Without those three powers there can be no real accountability and the supervision of the intelligence is unlikely to succeed.

Effective intelligence supervision requires not only coordinated action by several government bodies, but also an active review of the conduct of government by civil society and the media. Although all these bodies play important roles, these tools focus primarily on parliamentary and expert supervision bodies because these bodies do not report neither to the intelligence services, nor to the law enforcement authorities, which means they are in a better position to protect independently democratic accountability and respect the rule of law and human rights.

The three main reasons why states create systems for control and supervision of the intelligence are: increasing the democratic governance of the intelligence services, respect for the rule of law and ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the activities of the service.

Conclusion

Control and supervision of the security system are important elements of the legal order of every modern and democratic state, especially in the area of protection of human freedoms and rights. The effective and effective functioning of the state control and oversight bodies is one of the key preconditions for reducing the overstepping of power and potential abuses of the official position and power of the members of the security intelligence system in the country.

The country security system can function more efficiently only if its institutions are subject to full control and oversight by control mechanisms. It is precisely the establishment of an efficient and effective system of control and oversight of the security system that is one of the most serious challenges of any modern and developed democratic society. The institutions and services that make up the state intelligence and security system should be extremely professional, responsible and transparent in the performance of their work and the tasks that are within their competence, because only in this way can the citizens trust their work.

The control and oversight of the intelligence and security system is in function of strengthening the rule of law, which is an important prerequisite for protection of the freedoms and rights of the individual and the citizen and prevents their restriction and violation. To achieve all this, political will is needed, as well as establishment of an efficient legal and institutional framework and definition of clear control and oversight mechanisms, but also consistent and permanent respect.

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LOGISTIC SUPPORT IN NATO LED OPERATIONS

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Abstract: *Basic principles which explain the concept of logistic support for NATO operations are: collaboration, coordination, prioritization of operations, flexibility and synergies. This means that the concept must be flexible enough in creating conditions for the implementation of national concepts to support and recognize the advantages of logistic support of NATO member countries.*

NATO commander coordinates the overall logistic efforts to achieve better logistic support for their operating plan. This responsibility requires the establishment of coordination bodies inside the NATO command and management structure in order to ensure coordination of logistic support. Logistic coordination bodies are Staff (CJ4- Combined Joint) integration elements. In case of an increased number of logistic requests a central coordination, entity known as multinational joint logistic center (MJLC-Multinational Joint Logistics Center) could be established. The main focus of the NATO military bodies is to coordinate the logistic efforts and the need for establishment of units for multinational integrated logistic needs MILU (Multinational Integrated Logistics Units). The formation of these units is in support of the implementation of the principle of a "leading country" (LN-Lead Nation). At the end of this paper we conclude that the NATO member states have collective responsibility for the logistic support in NATO-led multinational military operations.

Key words: *logistic support, NATO, military operations, logistic information system, Lead Nation*

Introduction

Basic principles which developed the concept of logistic support for NATO operations are: collaboration, coordination, prioritization of operations, flexibility and synergy (*synergy* implies interaction, working together as a TEAM). This means that the concept must support the task and be flexible enough in creating conditions for the implementation of national concepts which should recognize the advantages of logistic support of NATO member countries. NATO commander coordinates the overall logistic efforts for achieving better logistic support for their operating plan. This responsibility requires the establishment of coordination bodies inside the NATO command and management structure in order to ensure coordination of the logistic support. Logistic coordination

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bodies are Staff (CJ4- Combined Joint) integration elements. In case of an increased number of logistic requests a central coordination, entity known as multinational joint logistic center (MJLC- Multinational Joint Logistics Center) could be established (NATO, AJP-4.6, 2014:45-48).

NATO has also developed a concept for logistic support of the units and rapid response task or known as (NRF-NATO response force) (NATO, Military concept MC 526, 2014:5-8).

NATO task units are the size of a brigade, comprised of highly trained: land, sea, air and special forces, which are able to deploy rather quickly. The system of command and control of these forces enables NRF to be deployed between 5 to 30 days.

NATO's rapid reaction units are usually hired for the initial entry into the area of operations. The main role of these forces is to carry out preparations and provide unfettered entry of allied forces, also known as multinational joint task units (CJTF - Combined Joint Task Forces) in the area of operations (NATO, Military concept MC 389/1, 2014:12-15).

Based on this, it can be concluded that logistics is one of the key factors that should enable the successful implementation of the mission of NRF units. In order to deploy these forces within 30 days, and at the same time ensure the success of their mission, the logistics needs to be rational and effective, i.e. the mission should be performed with a minimal logistics "footprint".

This concept for logistic support, allows the division of responsibility to supply and maintain the units and at the same time ensure the reduction and avoid duplication of logistic facilities and resources in the area of operations. The concept of logistic support of NRF forces is explained in detail in the NATO document "MC526". According to this document, the main logistic element for providing support to the NRF forces is the joint logistic support group or commonly known as NATO logistics (JLSG- Joint Logistic Support Group). This logistic unit with all its capacity and capability is providing support to the tactical level of various components of the NRF.

The main and key feature of the joint logistics support group is integrated logistics or providing effective and efficient support to the application of multinational options for logistic support through a unique logistic command. Integrated Logistics aims to generate support and maximize the effectiveness of the mission jointly.

Logistics concept, by applying JLSG, should allow the success of the operation for easy maneuver of the units, and maintain the desired level of combat readiness of the NRF and CJTF units (NATO, Military concept MC 526, 2014:12-15).




Figure 1. Position and relations of the JLSG in the area of operations

In order to achieve better understanding of the role and importance of JLSG we will explain the abbreviations used in the above figure (NATO, AJP-4.10, 2011:34-38).

JFC- Joint Force Command - Joint Operations Command;

CJTF and **DJTF** - Combined/Deployable Joint Task Force;

JLSGHQ- Joint Logistic Support Group Headquarters;

SOCC - Strategic Operational Command Centre;

LCC - Land Component Command;

ACC - Air Component Command;

MCC - Maritime Component Command;

NSEs - National Support Elements;

MU - Medical Units;

RSOM – Reception, Staging and Onward Movement of deployed units;

Theatre Log Base - Organic logistics base

The scheme does not show the position, the method of command and control and the established relationships of the JLSG in the joint area of operations. It is clear that this group is a major element of logistic support for all stakeholders in the area (land, air and naval units), which provides medical support to deployed units, hires units for operation of ports and airports and is responsible for the full acceptance of the communication and cooperation of forces with all logistics entities in the area, specifically with the National Support Element (NSE), cooperation and signing of agreements for logistic support with the host nation and others.

The Joint Group (JG) is formed to provide logistic support to NATO units for rapid deployment or (NRF). However, usually after the mission of these forces is completed or they withdraw from the area of operations, they continue with the logistical support of the Multinational affiliated units or task (MAUT), which are subsequently distributed within the area of operation (NATO, Military concept MC 526, 2014:15-17).

The NATO logistic concept is primarily a multifaceted concept, because all the elements for support should be flexible, mobile and able to quickly respond to the demands of the commander of the operation. There are requirements in order to increase cost-effectiveness which should be applied with the associated logistic activities from the lowest to the highest levels. Generally, this means that the elements of operational support could have a geographical area of responsibility in which they will provide support to the allied forces.

Based on the above-stated, we can conclude that the logistic support to units of the Army which take part in international military operations, will be often implemented gradually, in stages or levels of support. The support of these units must be carried out continuously and during the preparation, execution of the operation and return of these units in the country (i.e. pre-deployment, deployment and re-deployment). According to the national concept for logistic support in the ARM, the implementation of Level I logistic support, will be the responsibility of the organic logistic units. This support requires prior detail planning by the staff of the unit (NATO, AJP - 4.9, 2005:22-25). In all conditions and at all times, the commander has full command over the logistic units.

Coordination and cooperation between lower and higher levels of logistic support is implemented according to the established and prescribed notices, orders and requirements. The principle of Level II and III of logistic support are realized either by establishing a National Support Element (NSE), or by providing full support at this level through some of the options for multinational support when needed. And last but not least, the highest Level IV logistic support will be implemented through the national economy.

1. Implementation of logistic support in functional areas-Supplying

Supplying is the process of procurement, reception, storage, transportation and distribution of materials, including the determination of the type and quantity prescribed or required for each level. The supply chain system of the units in international military operations led by NATO has 5 classes (NATO logistic handbook, 2012:102-107).

- **CLASS I** - Individual items, raw materials and supplies used by humans and animals with standards during hostilities or peacetime. This group of supplies consists of food and water.

- **CLASS II** – supplies that advance a plan under the existing material combination. This class includes: clothes, shoes, personal weapons, equipment, armaments, vehicles, sets of tools, accessories and spare parts.

- **CLASS III** - fuel and lubricants. This group consists of oil and oil derivatives, lubricants, coal and gas.

- **CLASS III A** - fuel and lubricants for all type of warfare aircrafts.

- **CLASS IV** – supplies with no specifically approved plan, which is in harmony with the material combination. This group includes fortification resources, building materials, obstacles and all materials which are in Class II, but they are required as a basic or partial funding of already approved material formation (example: additional number of vehicles).

- **CLASS V** - All kinds of ammunition including: drills, explosives and all kinds of chemicals. The multinational logistical support is commonly implemented through the multilateral agreements and is usually administered for: food supply, water, fuel and medical supplies (NATO, AJP-4.10 (A),2011:55-57). The supply process is arranged during the planning of operations in coordination with all participating countries and depends from the degree of standardization and interoperability with the individual forces which are determined to carry out of the mission. After the release of the initial directive to start planning for a particular operation, NATO commander makes a statement or claim for supporting the forces assigned to carry out the operation, after which (s)he determines the days of supply (DOS) in the level of overall operation. (DOS - Day of supply, NATO adopted as a standard measure).
































US CLASS OF SUPPLY	TYPE OF ITEM	NATO CLASS OF SUPPLY
I	  	I
II	  	II
III	  	III
IV	  	IV
V	  	V
VI	   	I
VII	  	II
VIII	  	II
IX	  	II
X	  	IV

Figure 2. Classes of supply in US Army compared with NATO

The amount of days of supply is a national decision which depends on the criteria for spending under national documents. During the planning process it is very important to anticipate sufficient quantities of materials due to the sudden and rapid changes during the execution of the mission (for example: to be able to support the combat mission if there is a failure of the peacekeeping mission) (NATO Joint Publication 4-08, 2013:45-48).

Based on the above-stated the declared units which are planning the operations are provided with transportation and storage assets for 5 days of supply. Stocks of DS provided with any other option of a multinational logistics, combat units in the area of operations or its logistic units at any time should have supplies for 5 days of supply.

In NATO there are two basic principles for units supplies in the combat operations: “*from myself*” principle chain and “*to myself*” principle chain. The “*from myself*” principle chain applies when the higher command, which is responsible for performing the supply of funds to the underlying or lower unit, has assumed responsibility for the supply. Logistic units conduct the “push” principle which has been conducted through the assessment of the submitted requests or when they have a more complete standard material consumption (NATO logistic operations chain, 2008:5-8).

Generally, in this situation the materials are delivered closer to the units or consumers. In order to avoid creating large stocks it is necessary to have a good coordination between the operational and tactical level with effective use of information technologies for monitoring the consumption of materials.

The “*to myself*” principle chain is running through the allocation of funds for providing supplies to their units. Logistic units are implemented through the “pull” principle of supply. Under certain conditions this principle can be economical, but if there is a possibility of contact with the opposite side, that is the enemy, it is necessary to apply a method that offers a lower risk. In terms of military action when we have increased spending material resources or due the lack of transport supply facilities the units would typically apply the combined principle of supply, it means that the units have a high priority to perform direct hostilities filled according to the “*from myself*” principle. Actually, customers come with their own vehicles and the supplying is realized via the principle “*to myself*” (NATO Logistics Vision, 2013-2022, 2012:7-9).

2. Medical support

Organization and implementation of medical support to units deployed in mission is primarily a national responsibility. This includes: health maintenance, prevention, care, treatment and evacuation of patients, blood supply and health materials (NATO, AJP-4.10 (A), 2011, 33-37).

Health support must have the standards that will be acceptable to all participating countries, namely to ensure standards of health care which should preferably be better than standards in peacetime conditions, taking into account operational conditions.

Health doctrines applied to NATO provide listed standards. Member States are responsible for health support of its strength, but the use of more integrated national system for medical support should be used only in cases when it is cost-effective. Medical support includes the following features: a country specialist support in a segment of health support, lead country for support across the spectrum of health support, signing bilateral and multilateral agreements, support from the host establishment for more national health units needs with respect to the military operation.

The medical structure which performs medical support to NATO-led operations applies CE (Crisis Establishment) organization of medical staff. For CJTF (Combined Joint Task Forces) operations, the medical units have the following arrangements:

Line of Command - health counselor and staff must be deployed on all command levels during the execution of the operation.

Technical Health Line - extending health advisor in strategic command - SC (Strategic Command), through the chief doctor in the area of operations (Theatre Surgeon) and doctors from all health units in the area of operations. At each level, your doctor or health care adviser must have direct access to the commander.

The main doctor (Theatre Surgeon) in the area of operations is located in the headquarters of CJTF command. This doctor is the health adviser to the commander, which provides health related necessary information relevant to the overall process of logistic planning (NATO STANAG 2034, 2013: 3-4).

Health Coordination Center - (MEDCC Medical Coordination Center) is a center that operates under the supervision of the doctor in the area of operations and aims to coordinate the activities of the multinational health, joint and multi-health activities including all kinds of medical evacuation MEDEVAC (evacuation by earth, sea and air) (NATO, AJP-4.10.2, 2011:57-60).

The Health Coordination Center is part of MJLC when it is established. When MJLC is not established, this center may be a part of the CJ4 headquarters in the CJTF command. The basic principle of MEDCC operations are conducting health plans and implementation of health policies set by the chief doctor in the area of operations. Notifications - coordination of public health skills require maximum transparency of the health systems. So, while in the area of operations and during the operation itself, all medical units are obliged to report on their capacities and abilities. Timing of reporting depends on the requirements of the chain of command.

3. Logistics Information Systems for reporting

The organization and implementation of logistic support in all areas of logistics would be inconceivable if there are no modern systems that will be able to perform accurate and timely secure transmission of logistics information which is essential for the realization of the missions. The logistics information system in NATO is the LOGFAS

(Logistic Functional Area Sub-System). LOGFAS consists of logistical database (LOGBASE), information system for movement and transport ADAMS (Allied Deployment and Movement System) a system for optimizing the use of resources ACROSS - (Allied Command Europe Recourses Optimization Software System) and system for logistics reports LOGREP (Logistic Reporting System) (NATO, BI-SCD -80-3, 2012:8-10).

LOGBASE - this data base provides logistic resources, forces, geographic information, infrastructure, health, transport facilities, opportunities for supplying. This database provides information to the commanders about the capacity which must be performed in the mission. The database is designed with an application in a wide range of logistics activities of daily logistics operations for force planning. ADAMS, ACROSS LOGREP and information systems are essential for manning the LOGBASE (NATO. C-M (2003) 101/MC 319/2, 2012:9-11).

ADAMS is used in the planning, evaluation and simulation of operations, movement and transportation in support of NATO-led operations. This software provides assistance in the development of plans for developing forces and helps in checking the feasibility of the deployment plans.

ACROSS is a system which supports the planning of inventories, stocks of materials, both nationally and the level of NATO strategic commands. The system uses the methodology based on possible threats, which on the basis of expressed threats calculates the required quantities of conventional munitions for destroying all kind of threats.

LOGREP is a logistics reporting system for NATO-led operations. The tool through which the countries participating in the operation provide information concerning its logistic capacity for the commander of the operation.

During the planning of the operation the dynamics of information is defined by using the previously entered data in LOGBASE. Thus, operational commanders gain insight into the overall logistic capacities aimed for better planning and decision making, both in peacetime and in crisis situations.

Logistics Functional Area Services – The Modules




Figure 2. Modules of Logistics functional area of services

LOGFAS - Logistic Functional Area Sub-System

LOGBASE - Logistic Base

ADAMS - Allied Deployment and Movement System

ACROSS- Allied Command Europe Recourses Optimization Software System

LOGREP - Logistic Reporting System

Geo Man - Geographical Data Management

LDM -LOGFAS Data Module

SPM - Sustainment Planning Module

In the above figure we can clearly see the distinction of information systems and at the same time understand their interconnectedness. It is obvious that a well-designed database provides a wide range of information required to complete the logistics, which are essential for the successful planning and execution of the mission (NATO, Bi-SC AIS PROJECT OIS03042, 2007:12-15)

During the planning process, generating forces should fully consider the applicability, needs and benefits of multinational logistics. Unilateral, national logistics decisions can have a negative impact on the effectiveness of the mission. So, we need to understand who is the NATO Commander or the one who is responsible for the successful implementation of the operation (NATO MC 334/1, 2011: 20-24). Operational experience shows that once established, national logistic structure could hardly move for adjusted multinational logistics solutions. Therefore, it is necessary for the national concepts of logistical support to be formed in a way which will enable the implementation options of multinational logistics.

Sources of national logistic support activities include:

- Logistic Lead Nation (LN)
- Role Specialist Nation (RSN)
- Multinational Integrated Logistic Unit (MILU) and
- Third Parties Logistics Support Services (TPLSS) (NATO Centre of Excellence, 2015:101-105).

Multinational logistics could be planned in advance or be introduced during the operation, depending on its development. Based on the shapes, NATO nations might decide on the application of multinational logistics which can replace less efficient national solutions (AJP 4.4A, 2005:23-27).

Retaining the overall operational responsibility for the specific mission, the commander is an extremely suitable person, who acts as an intermediary between nations in enabling multinational agreements.

These agreements are typically realized by means of appropriate Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) or through Technical Agreements (TA) which define the operational, administrative and other issues related to material and other resources in more detail.

4. Logistic Lead Nation

Countries participating in the operation could not accept responsibility to be appointed for purchase insurance and a wide range of logistic support for all or part of the units and commands. Nation takes responsibility for logistic support to the logistic Lead Nation (NATO, AJP- 4.9, 2005:45-48).

This may be part of the plans that are made with respect to the management and control of multi-national operations. The Lead Nation takes the overall responsibility for coordination and implementation of the agreed range of logistic support for all or part of the multinational force including control. The support is realized within the assigned area. This responsibility may include the purchase of materials and services. Payment or compensation will be a subject to the agreement between the involved parties. The concept of a Lead Nation is based on a set of bilateral or multilateral agreements. The biggest burden for the implementation of these agreements falls on the Lead Nation, which includes activities related to finance, contracts, property and liability.

Funding is a primarily the responsibility of the Lean Nation. The Lead Nation is responsible for providing initial support (advanced payment) for activities which fall under its authority. Also the Lead Nation will negotiate and pay contractual obligations for performing all activities related to the management of calculations, including the remuneration or compensation (NATO, NFR - FRP, 2016:5-8).

Joint financing may be possible to support the activities of the Lead Nation, therefore it should be agreed between the Lead Nation and competent strategic command. The legal basis for any agreement between the Lead Nation and supported countries or the strategic command will be established at the same time with the negotiation of financial and logistic agreements with the Lead Nation. If a certain state carries out a rotation of its forces in the area of operation to achieve the status of supported state, it has to prepare a specific technical agreement with the Lead Nation or to continue with the application of the existing technical multinational agreements. When a country takes the role of Lead Nation, the agreed duration of the task must be regulated by a Memoranda of Understanding or a similar document between the Lead Nation and the strategic command (or the commander of the allied forces) or to be defined in the force generation (NATO, BI-SCD 80-3, 2012:12-15).

A contract which establishes the lead nation must contain clear provisions on how the country took this role. To ensure long-term sustainability of the operation, the Strategic Command, should prepare a plan which would ensure that the responsibility of Lead Nation will be agreed with respect to the logistic support of another nation or organization that can be transmitted during the operation.

If no other country takes the role of a Lead Nation the logistic support should prepare plans which would allow the return of logistic support by the states (NATO, STANAG 2132, 2013:3-4).

5. Role Specialist Nation

This nation might have some logistic forces and capabilities which enable voluntary basis for providing services for supplying certain materials for all forces or part of them. The provisions of document, MC 319/1, write that a state could secure funds and should provide specific support for the overall forces or part of them, while the supported state will provide compensation for the role nation support. Specialist support from the country can be realized with the agreement which will define the support for the provision or purchase of a defined class of supply during the entire duration of the military operation. The responsibility of the specialist includes preparing the assets required for delivery of the goods (materials and equipment) or services. The support will be provided by the country's specialized role coordinated by the commander of the operation. The financial aspects relating to reimbursement or compensation will be developed through appropriate agreements on mutual support or through contracts for Standardization. The relations between the countries which receive logistical support and specialist might be based on formal agreements or through the provisions of "STANAG-2034", which describes the standard procedures for mutual logistical support (NATO STANAG 5524, 2013: 2-4). Funding is the responsibility of the specialist. Role Specialist Support nations should provide resources for funding and establishing the requested service. Therefore, it will negotiate with the countries which will support the logistics and that would provide compensation as concluded in the contract which will take account of all relevant governing financial activities including the remuneration or compensation. Joint funding may be available for supporting the activities of the Role Specialist Support nation. It should be agreed between the specialist country and Strategic Command which is responsible for executing the operation (NATO, Bi-SC AIS PROJECT OIS03043, 2007:10-15).

If a certain state carries out a rotation of its forces in the area of operations, it should be able to receive support for developing a special agreement with the specialist or to continue with the application of existing multinational contract (NATO, AJP- 4.9, 2005:44-49).

Table 1. *Supplying all classes of materials, from national, multinational and host nation sources*

No	Type of support	National	Multinational Logistic (MJL)	IMLU (Integrated Multinational Logistic Unit)	Logistic Lead Nation	Role Specialist Nation
1.	Class I Fresh produce		x		x	x
2.	Class I Combat rations	x				
3.	Water Tanks		x		x	x
4.	Drinking water in bottles		x		x	x
5.	Class II Basic resources	x				
6.	Class III Fuel		x	x	x	x
7.	Class III Oils and lubricants	x			x	
8.	Class IV Engineering resources		x			x
9.	Class V Ammunition	x	x		x	
10.	Transport		x	x		x
11.	Ports Operations		x	x	x	
12.	Maintenance / Repairs	x	x		x	
13.	Maintenance / Extraction	x	x	x	x	
14.	Laundry / Bath		x		x	
15.	Protecting the environment	x	x	x		
16.	Post Office	x	x		x	
17.	Mortuary Services	x				
18.	Sanitation	x	x			
19.	Morale, welfare and recreation	x				
20.	Labor pool		x	x		
21.	Warehousing		x	x		
22.	Equipment Material Handling	x	x			
23.	Blood Products	x				
24.	Medical Supplies	x	x		x	x
25.	Medical Support	x	x	x	x	x
26.	Air Medical Evacuation	x	x		x	

Conclusion

The NATO concept for logistic support is defined as: addition for military use and civilian contractors to perform selected logistical support (NATO JP 4-08, 2013:101-105).

This is provided in order to enable competent commercial partners to provide adequate logistic support, which will contribute to the optimal and most efficient use of resources. This variant is intended as a long-term approach, according to the logistic support and supplies, which require detailed negotiations with one contractor whose capabilities for providing logistic support are identified in size and standard (NATO, NCIA - Technical Report TR/2012/SPW008384, 2013:8-12).

Multinational resources for logistic support which are provided for the Army of Republic of Macedonia, when it participates with small contingents as part of coalition forces together with another nation, had the ability to provide logistic support to our troops. The advantage of these options provides a shortened procedure and could be applied as needed.

Agreements are signed in the Ministry of Defence, with the obligatory participation on the planning authorities of the staff, because of the expression of submitted operational needs for the units. The development of the overall security situation in the world sets before NATO's new challenges are taking new steps to adjust its unit commands and troops for performing the so-called "*expeditionary operations*" (NATO AJP 3.35, 2013:20-25). In a real sense it means that NATO should be able to transfer and deploy troops in all places, where necessary for performing remote support operations in order to achieve their goals. By putting the focus on expedition operations, including terrorist operations, where necessary by quickly transferring forces out of the area of NATO countries have a significant impact on the organization of NATO logistics. During operations there is a need to send and deploy forces in areas which have a long distance with poor local resources and limited communications, which require development of logistic facilities and mobile units to carry out strategic transport. This collective responsibility should encourage the countries and NATO to cooperate with respect to the preparation and use of logistics facilities and resources for efficient support of forces (NATO AJP 4.5, 2013:89-92).

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LEGAL BASIS FOR PARTICIPATION OF THIRD COUNTRIES IN EU-LED PEACE MISSIONS

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Abstract: *A number of third countries which are not EU members, including EU membership candidate countries, are actively contributing to the European common security and defense policy by participating with their own staff and forces in EU-led peacekeeping missions. The legal basis for the participation of these states in peacekeeping missions are the agreements on participation in EU-led crisis management operations, which the EU has signed with each interested country. These agreements determine the general conditions for the participation of non-EU Member States in EU-led peacekeeping missions. These agreements do not imply the compulsory participation of contracting parties in every peacekeeping mission/ operation. This paper will analyze the content of the agreements for participation in crisis management operations led by the European Union. The focus of the analysis is the rights and obligations of third countries arising from the concluded agreements for participation in peacekeeping missions, the costs associated with their participation in peacekeeping missions, as well as the security procedures for the exchange of classified information during EU-led peacekeeping missions. The objective of the analysis is to determine whether third countries participate in the planning and decision-making process related to crisis management operations in which they participate, and whether they have the same rights and obligations as the Member States of the Union in the operation management.*

Key words: *European Union, third countries, countries candidate for EU membership, peacekeeping missions, framework agreements for participation in crisis management operations.*

Introduction

European Security and Defense Policy is a relatively new policy of the European Union (EU), established at the European Council held in Cologne in 1999. By the EU Treaty of Lisbon, this policy was introduced for the first time in the founding treaties and renamed the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). CSDP is based on the tasks of the Declaration of Petersburg:³

- Humanitarian and Rescue tasks;
- Peace Keeping Tasks;
- Tasks of Combat Forces in Crisis Management, including the Establishment of Peace.

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³ Western European Union, Council of Ministers, Bonn, 19 June 1992, Petersberg Declaration, p. 6, Retrieved from: <http://www.weu.int/documents/920619peten.pdf>, Accessed 12.09.2017.

These tasks were extended by the EU Treaty of Lisbon;

- Disarmament Operations;
- Missions for Military Advice and Assistance; and
- Operations to Combat Terrorism.

The European Union conducts two types of peacekeeping missions - military operations and civilian missions. Depending on the needs for response to a crisis or conflict, they can be combined as civil-military peacekeeping missions. In order to carry out CSDP peacekeeping missions, the EU may use the resources and capacities of NATO, based on the Berlin-Plus agreements of 2003.⁴

During the operational activities of the CSDP, that is, from the beginning of 2003 to date, EU has launched a total of 35 peacekeeping missions in four regions: Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Asia. The bulk of the peacekeeping missions, or rather 22, are civilian, 11 are military, and 2 are civilian-military peacekeeping missions. The Union has completed 18 peacekeeping missions to date and 17 are currently underway (11 civilian missions and 6 military operations).⁵ All EU-led peacekeeping missions are being conducted outside of its territory, and the most numerous are peacekeeping missions in Africa, with the largest number of military operations.

The first EU peacekeeping mission, the "EUPM" police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, started in January 2003. Two months later, the first EU-led operation, "Concordia", started in the Republic of Macedonia. That was also the first operation in which NATO funds and capacities were used on the basis of the Berlin-plus agreements. As can be noted, the implementation of the CSDP in the early years was primarily focused on the Balkans, which, due to the geographical proximity and latent present potential for crisis, remains at the focus of EU's attention. The long-standing and still active peacekeeping missions in the Balkans, the "EUFOR Althea" military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the "EULEX" mission in Kosovo are proof of this. However, as early as June 2003, the Union launched its first military operation outside the European continent. It was the military operation "Artemis" in the Democratic Republic of Congo, which was carried out without using the means and capabilities of NATO. Through the establishment of this military operation, and primarily through its successful implementation, the European Union has demonstrated its ability to quickly respond to crisis situations, and at the same time accelerate the further development of EU's security and defense policy.

During the planning of the first EU peacekeeping mission, the EUPM police mission in BiH, the interest in contributing to international peace and security was shown by a number of third countries, as well as EU membership candidate countries. Since the beginning of the CSDP operational activities in 2003, approximately 45 non-EU member states have participated in EU-led peacekeeping missions.⁶ With the enlargement of the Union in 2004, 2007 and 2013, some of the candidate countries that participated in the first peacekeeping missions in the CSDP framework, became its full members. Also, the countries that are still candidates for EU membership (the Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Turkey, the Republic of Serbia, the Republic of Albania and Montenegro) actively participate in peace missions within the CSDP framework. The Republic of Turkey has the largest contribution and greatest experience, both

⁴ The "Berlin-plus" agreements have enabled the EU to use the collective assets and capabilities of NATO in EU-led operations, that is, to enable the Alliance to support EU-led operations in which NATO as a whole does not participate.

⁵ For a more extensive explanation of all peace missions on the website: https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations/430/military-and-civilian-missions-and-operations_en, Accessed 24.09.2017.

⁶ Tardy, T., *CSDP in Action – What Contribution to International Security?*, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris, 2015, p. 31.

in civilian missions and in military operations led by the EU. It is interesting to note that the Republic of Turkey is currently the largest contributor of soldiers in the “EUFOR Althea” military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Operation “EUFOR Althea” is also significant for the Republic of Macedonia, as the first international mission of the Macedonian military aviation.

Legal Basis for the Participation of Third Countries and EU Membership Candidate Countries in EU-led Peacekeeping Missions

One of the main features of EU-led peacekeeping missions is the participation of third countries, that is, the use of third-country capabilities in order to increase the level of mission efficiency. For example, only in 2014, 15 non-EU countries participated in CSDP operations and missions.⁷ The legal basis for cooperation with third countries stems from Article 37 of the EU Treaty, as well as from Articles 216-218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which define the procedures for concluding international agreements by the Union, which, after the entry into force of The Treaty of Lisbon can to act as a legal entity. The most common form of establishing cooperation with third countries is the bilateral agreement as a framework for the participation of a country in EU-led crisis management operations. By mid-2017, the European Union had signed agreements establishing a framework for participation with 18 third countries.⁸ These agreements define the legal framework, rights and obligations of the EU and third countries with regard to the participation of the country’s military and civilian capabilities in crisis-management operations led by the EU.

Namely, the preparation of the political guidelines for regulating cooperation with non-EU countries began in 2001. In December 2002, the EU Council adopted a document titled “Consultations and Modalities for the Contribution of Non-Member States to EU Crisis Management Operations”.⁹ However, the first civilian mission in the history of the CSDP, the “EUPM” police mission in BiH (2003-2012), has shown an exceptional weakness in terms of the length of the planning process and the procedures for participating in the mission of EU non-member states.

Based on the experience of the aforementioned peacekeeping mission, already in 2004, the European Union began to institutionalize relations with third countries through the signing of the Framework Agreement for participation in crisis management operations led by the Union. In this sense, the EU has signed agreements with a number of European third countries (the Kingdom of Norway, the Swiss Confederation, the Republic of Iceland, Ukraine, etc.) and non-European third countries (Canada,

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ EU Missions and Operations - As part of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy – Factsheet, European Union External Action, Bruxelles, 2017, p. 2, Retrieved from: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/csdp_missions_and_operations_factsheet.pdf, Accessed 20.11.2017.

⁹ Tardy, T., CSDP: getting third states on board, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Brief Issue, March 2014, p. 2.

the United States, New Zealand, Argentina, Morocco, Chile, the Russian Federation, Australia). Between 2006 and 2012, this agreement had been signed by all current EU membership candidate countries, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. *Overview of the signed agreements between the European Union and the EU membership candidate countries for establishing a framework on their participation in EU-led crisis management operations*

State	Agreement	Signed on	Into force
Republic of Turkey	Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey establishing a framework for the participation of the Republic of Turkey in the European Union crisis management operations ¹⁰	29.06.2006	01.08.2007
Montenegro	Agreement between the European Union and Montenegro establishing a framework for the participation of Montenegro in European Union crisis management operations ¹¹	22.02.2011	01.04.2012
Republic of Serbia	Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Serbia establishing a framework for the participation of the Republic of Serbia in European Union crisis management operations ¹²	08.06.2011	01.08.2012
Republic of Albania	Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Albania establishing a framework for the participation of the Republic of Albania in European Union crisis management operations ¹³	05.06.2012	01.02.2013
Republic of Macedonia	Agreement between the European Union and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia establishing a framework for the participation of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in European Union crisis management operations ¹⁴	29.10.2012	01.04.2013

¹⁰ Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Turkey establishing a framework for the participation of the Republic of Turkey in the European Union crisis management operations, OJ L 189/16, 12.07.2006, Retrieved from: [http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1474125899197&uri=CELEX:22006A0712\(01\)](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1474125899197&uri=CELEX:22006A0712(01)), Accessed 04.09.2017.

¹¹ Agreement between the European Union and Montenegro establishing a framework for the participation of Montenegro in European Union crisis management operations, OJ L 57/1, 02.03.2011, Retrieved from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2011.057.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2011:057:TOC#L_2011057EN.01000201, Accessed 04.09.2017.

¹² Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Serbia establishing a framework for the participation of the Republic of Serbia in European Union crisis management operations, OJ L 163/2, 23.06.2011, Retrieved from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2011.163.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2011:163:TOC#L_2011163EN.01000201, Accessed 04.09.2017.

¹³ Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Albania establishing a framework for the participation of the Republic of Albania in European Union crisis management operations, OJ L 169/1, 29.06.2012, Retrieved from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2012.169.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2012:169:TOC#L_2012169EN.01000201, Accessed 04.09.2017.

¹⁴ Agreement between the European Union and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia establishing a framework for the participation of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in European Union crisis management operations, OJ L 338/3, 12.12.2012, Retrieved from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2012.338.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2012:338:TOC#L_2012338EN.01000301, Accessed 04.09.2017.

Structure of Framework Agreements for Participation in EU-led Crisis Management Operations

The agreements between the EU and third countries for establishing a framework for their participation in EU-led crisis management operations have almost identical content. The third states have the same rights and obligations regarding the management of the operation on a daily basis as the EU Member States participating in the mission/operation. By signing the agreement, third countries express their readiness to contribute to security beyond their borders by participating in peacekeeping missions and operations led by the European Union. At the same time, the Union receives additional capacity in terms of personnel, resources and expertise. Considering the fact that the main foreign policy goal of the Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of Turkey, the Republic of Serbia, Montenegro and the Republic of Albania is membership in the European Union, one of the ways to achieve this goal is their participation in the EU-led peacekeeping missions.

Contracts are basically divided into four parts: General provisions; Provisions for participation in civilian crisis management operations; Provisions for participation in military operations for crisis management; and Final provisions.

In the part of the General provisions, it is pointed out that the European Union should as early as possible indicate to the country about the financial aspects of the common costs for the forthcoming mission in order for the state to formulate its bid in a timely manner. The status of personnel and forces¹⁵ deployed in EU peacekeeping missions/operations is regulated by a separate agreement between the European Union and the State/States on whose territory the mission/operation is conducted. The status of staff allocated to headquarters or command elements located outside the country in which the mission is carried out are to be regulated additionally by a separate agreement between the headquarters or the command elements and the participating state. In accordance with the agreement on the status of personnel/forces, the participating country retains the full competence over its personnel/forces participating in the EU mission/operation. When the forces of the participating State are deployed on a vessel or an aviation facility of a Member State of the Union, that State shall apply its jurisdiction in accordance with its laws and procedures. The participating state is obliged to respond to all remarks relating to its members and to implement appropriate legal or disciplinary measures against its personnel in accordance with its laws and procedures. This section states that the contracting parties waive all claims for the material damage or injury/death of the staff arising from the activities during the implementation of the mission, except in cases of negligence or willful misconduct.

Article 4 of the Framework Agreements is related to security procedures for the exchange of classified information. Security procedures are governed by separate

¹⁵ The term “personnel” is used for participants in civilian missions, while the term “forces” is used for participants in military operations.

agreements between the European Union and the participating countries which are applied in the context of EU crisis management operations. Only the Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro had previously signed agreements with the EU on the security procedures for the exchange of classified information. The Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Albania signed the agreements with the EU on those security procedures later, and the Republic of Turkey has not yet signed the agreement with the EU. Table 2 provides a chronological review of agreements between the European Union and the EU membership candidate countries on security procedures for the exchange of classified information.

Table 2. *Overview of the signed agreements between the EU and the candidate countries for membership in the Union on security procedures for the exchange of classified information*

State	Agreement	Signed on	Into force
Republic of Macedonia	Agreement between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the European Union on the security procedures for the exchange of classified information ¹⁶	25.03.2005	01.08.2005
Montenegro	Agreement between the European Union and Montenegro on security procedures for exchanging and protecting classified information ¹⁷	13.09.2010	01.12.2010
Republic of Serbia	Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Serbia on security procedures for exchanging and protecting classified information ¹⁸	26.05.2011	01.08.2012
Republic of Albania	Agreement between the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Albania and the European Union on security procedures for exchanging and protecting classified information ¹⁹	03.03.2016	01.09.2016
Republic of Turkey	/	/	/

¹⁶ Agreement between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and the European Union on the security procedures for the exchange of classified information, Retrieved from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2005.094.01.0038.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2005:094:TOC#L_2005094EN.01003901, Accessed 12.09.2017.

¹⁷ Agreement between the European Union and Montenegro on security procedures for exchanging and protecting classified information, Retrieved from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2010.260.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2010:260:TOC#L_2010260EN.01000201, Accessed 12.09.2017.

¹⁸ Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Serbia on security procedures for exchanging and protecting classified information, Retrieved from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2011.216.01.0001.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2011:216:TOC#L_2011216EN.01000201, Accessed 12.09.2017.

¹⁹ Agreement between the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Albania and the European Union on security procedures for exchanging and protecting classified information, Retrieved from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2016.074.01.0003.01.ENG&toc=OJ:L:2016:074:TOC, Accessed 12.09.2017.

The second part of the framework agreements for participation in crisis management operations is related to the participation in civilian crisis management operations. According to Article 5, personnel deployed in EU-led civilian missions should respect the decisions of the EU Council, the operational plan and the implementation measures. For any change in terms of contribution to EU civilian missions, the signatory State is obliged to notify the Head of Mission and the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in a timely manner. The staff remains under full control of the national government, but the operational command is transferred to the EU. The mission head assumes the responsibility for the mission and conducts command and control in the area where it is implemented. He is responsible for the disciplinary control of staff deployed in the mission, and, if necessary, disciplinary measures can be taken by the national authority as well.

The participating States assume all the costs associated with their participation in civilian missions, with the exception of the current costs set in the operational budget of the mission. According to Article 8 of the Agreement, the participating States are obliged to contribute to EU's operational budget for civilian missions, on the basis of one of the offered models:

1. The participating State shall contribute proportionately to its gross national income in relation to the overall gross national income of the participating States in the operational budget of the mission; and
2. The participating States shall contribute proportionately to the number of personnel deployed in the mission in respect of the overall staff of the participating States in the mission.

The participating State may choose a more favorable model and has no obligation to contribute to the funding of staff from other participating States, including staff from the Member States of the Union. To a specific EU civilian mission the European Union may release the contributing State from a financial contribution if:

1. The participating country provides a significant contribution, which is essential to that operation; or
2. The gross national income per capita of the participating country shall not exceed that of any of the Member States of the European Union.

Payment of the contribution of the participating State to EU's operational budget for civilian missions is regulated by the signing of a separate agreement between the Head of Mission and the relevant administrative services of the participating State. This agreement, *inter alia*, shall contain the actual amount, the manner of payment and the manner of controlling of the payment.

The third part of the agreements contains provisions on the participation of signatory states in EU military operations. As with civilian missions, the forces deployed in the Union's military operations should respect the decisions of the EU Council, the operational plan and the implementation measures. For any change related to its participation in the EU military operation, the signatory state shall promptly notify the operation

commander. The forces remain under the full command of the national government, but the operational and tactical command and/or control is transferred to the EU military commander, who is further entitled to convey his/his powers. Upon consultation with the participating states, the operation commander, may withdraw forces at any time.

The participating states should appoint a senior military representative who will represent national contingents in the European Union military operation and who will be responsible for the contingent's discipline. He/she will consult with the EU Force Commander on all matters pertaining to the operation.

Financing of the military operations does not differ from the financing of civilian missions. As is usual for EU-led military operations, the individual costs of financing national contingents are at the expense of those who create them, that is, the national budgets of the EU Member States and other participating states in the operation. In contrast to this, the provisions of Article 11 paragraph 1 of the Framework Participation Contracts, refers to the "Athens" mechanism. Namely, on February 23, 2004, the Council of the EU adopted a Decision establishing a mechanism for managing the financing of common costs for European Union operations that have military and defense implications.²⁰ The aim of the "Athens" mechanism is to reduce the costs of the participating states and to encourage other countries to participate in the financing of military operations. The "Athens" mechanism ensures efficient financing of the common operational costs of military operations. The "Athens" mechanism determines the types of common costs that refer to the preparatory, active and final phase of the operation, as well as those costs covered by "Athens" regardless of the period in which they occurred.²¹ Following the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU Council decision was adopted on December 19, 2011, which envisages that the "Athens" mechanism should be reviewed at least once every three years if this does not happen after completing each of the operations.²² In December 2011 this decision was replaced by the EU Council Decision adopted on March 27, 2015. This decision establishes a mechanism for managing the financing of common costs for European Union operations that have military and defense implications.

²⁰ Council Decision 2004/197/CFSP of 23 February 2004, Establishing a Mechanism to Administer the Financing of the Common Costs of European Union Operations having Military or Defence Implications, Official Journal of the European Union, L 63/68, 28.02.2004, Retrieved from: <https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/8a6a571b-f36b-4b60-ae67-fc2da28425ee/language-en>, Accessed 26.09.2017.

²¹ Member States of the Union, with the exception of Denmark, decided not to participate in the military affairs of the CSDP, contribute to the "Athens" mechanism. The contribution of the EU Member States depends on their gross national income, whether or not the State party participates in the operation. Third countries may also contribute to the financing of certain military operations.

²² Council Decision 2011/871/CFSP of 19 December 2011, Establishing a Mechanism to Administer the Financing of the Common Costs of European Union Operations having Military or Defence Implications (Athena), Official Journal of the European Union, L 343/35, 23.12.2011, Article 43, Retrieved from <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN-HR/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32011D0871&from=EN>, Accessed 19.09.2017.

Conclusion

Signing framework agreements between the EU and each interested state is the main condition for the participation of third countries in EU peacekeeping missions. The main goal of the framework agreements is to define the obligations between the EU and third countries which participate in EU-led crisis management operations. The main elements of the agreements are related to abiding by the relevant decisions adopted by the EU in relation to the implementation of the mission by the third participating countries (joint actions and other decisions on which the peacekeeping mission is established), the status of staff and forces, the exchange of classified information, as well as the chain of command and financial aspects. However, these agreements do not imply the compulsory participation of contracting parties in every EU-led peacekeeping mission.

By signing framework agreements, the third countries accept the obligation to place their participation within the framework of EU's previous decisions and to transfer the operational control to the head of the EU mission (in the case of civilian missions) or the EU operation commander (in the case of military operations). However, according to the agreements, all forces and personnel remain under the full command of their national authorities.

Regarding exchange of classified information in the context of the operation, the third countries guarantee that they will respect the relevant principles and standards. Paradox of sorts is the fact that the Republic of Turkey is the biggest contributor to the EU peacekeeping missions, but it is also the only candidate country that has not signed the Security Procedures Agreement on the Exchange of Classified Information. In terms of funding, third countries undertake all costs associated with their participation in the operation, in addition to the costs that are subject to joint financing. According to the agreement, third countries have the same rights and obligations in terms of day-to-day management of the operation.

However, it is evident that the network that the European Union has been building with the third countries participating in peacekeeping missions for more than a decade remains loosely institutionalized compared to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council of NATO. The contribution of third countries in the operations of the CSDP must not be contrary to the Union's decision-making autonomy. This fact creates some confusion. On the other hand, third countries have the same rights and obligations as the EU Member States in the operation on a daily basis and in relation to the financing of military operations in which third countries take over the costs of their participation, except the common costs that are subject to joint financing.

It can be freely conceded that participation in CSDP operations by third countries, including candidate countries for EU membership, requires a degree of acceptance of the Union's practices, but also a degree of subordination. In fact, relations with third countries are complicated by the very nature of the EU planning and decision-making process. Namely, the third countries are involved in the process of planning the peacekeeping missions very late, actually, they are not involved at all in the development of the concept of operations (CONOPS) or the Operational Plan (OPLAN), nor do they participate in power generation conferences.

However, the participation of the EU membership candidate countries in the CSDP peace missions is of mutual benefit. Through their participation the candidate countries contribute to security, gain operational experience, get acquainted with the various components of the EU and its procedures i.e. establish and deepen operational and political ties with the Union. On the other hand, the Union gets additional capacities in terms of staff, resources and expertise that are always welcome. Regarding the political dimension, the participation of candidate countries, as well as other third countries, testifies to the EU's growing role in the field of security.

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SYNERGY OF THE LEADERSHIP AS AN IMPERATIVE FOR SUCCESS IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

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Abstract: *Combating terrorism is a complex process as opposed to coping with conventional threats. Due to the specifics of modern terrorism as an irregular and asymmetric threat, there is an urgent necessity for states to pursue specific measures and activities to integrate all elements of national power. For achieving success in combating terrorism it is essential to have efficient leadership at all levels. The purpose of this article is to explain the role and meaning of the strategic, organizational and direct leadership in the fight against modern terrorism and to stress their synergy as an imperative for success. The three levels of leadership should be mutually synchronized and coordinated in order to implement the strategy for combating terrorism. Each level of leadership has its own distinctive characteristics. However, in addition to the ability to motivate and inspire people, critical for success in combating terrorism is the mutual linking of the ends, ways and means.*

Keywords: *terrorism, leadership, strategic, organizational, direct.*

Introduction

The effects of globalization and the shift of power in the international arena in the last thirty years incited global changes which led to the emergence of unstable or so-called “failed” states. In many of them, rogue non-state actors, groups and organizations, used this emerged security vacuum to carry out their ideology and policies with indiscriminate, extremely violent methods. In many countries around the world terrorism is identified as one of the major threats to national, regional and global security.

The fight against terrorism is far more complex than confronting conventional threats. The main problem is that the international community still has not agreed on a single universally accepted definition of terrorism. It is a clandestine, perfidious and criminal act very difficult to prevent, which has developed a transnational character in the last several decades. This threat triggered states to pursue complex and expensive measures and activities because the terrorists’ strategy is a long-term violence aimed to exhaust the moral and physical power of the state. (Bradley, 2012)

In the fight against terrorism the states must synchronize and combine all elements of national power: diplomatic, information, military and economic. (US Army, 2012) However,

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in order to successfully link the ways and means to achieve the desired end state - to defeat terrorism, it is essential to have excellent leadership at all levels: strategic, organizational and direct. (US Army, 2006) The purpose of this article is to explain the role and meaning of all three levels of leadership in the fight against modern terrorism and to stress the importance of achieving synergy as an imperative for success.

In order to implement the proper counter terrorist strategy, the leadership at all levels must interconnect and complement each other. Each level is specific and requires a deep understanding of the problem in the wider context. One of the main reasons for failures in combating terrorism is having uncertainties and lack of clear communication between the different levels of leadership. There are many examples of neglecting the root causes of terrorism, wrong choice of ways and means, and inefficient synchronization and coordination of state capabilities which are crucial for fighting terrorism.

Characteristics of modern terrorism

The threat of terrorism changed after the end of the Cold War due to the geopolitical changes that emerged from the loss of bipolarity in the world. Unlike the terrorism in the 70s and 80s, it has mutated, developed new characteristics and become a transnational, global threat. (Ganor, 2009) This is essential to understand because the states tend to develop counterterrorist measures and activities at all levels based on the nature of the threat. The modern day terrorism has several new characteristics: its ideological base is religious extremism; it has highly developed and widespread organizational structure; it applies asymmetric warfare and various operational approaches; terrorists carry out operations globally; the intent is to increase the mortality of attacks; it is aimed primarily against the civilian population, and has ambitions to attack critical infrastructure.

The terrorist groups and organizations in the 70s and 80s were mostly stimulated by political and nationalist motives. Today, it is evident that the ideological base of modern terrorism is religious extremism. This trend has intensified after the end of the Cold War and the increased presence of the West in the Middle East. Since then, more terrorist organizations have begun to use religion as the main source of motivation, recruitment and justification of violence.

Contrary to the terrorists during the Cold War when they usually had one major leader controlling all subordinate cells, modern day terrorist groups and organizations have more decentralized structure. They have more leaders running their own network, or the so-called "Hydra" system. (Rapoport, 2003) Al Qaeda started this trend in order to project its ideology globally and act without direct involvement of the key leadership. There have been cases, such as the Madrid train bombings in 2004, when a terrorist cell was independently organized, conducting the attack without any external direction from another organization. (Hamilos, 2007) It was found that the perpetrators were not in contact with Al Qaeda at all as originally assumed, but only motivated from its propaganda that called for war against the West.

Since terrorists predominantly use methods of irregular warfare, urban guerrilla warfare, sabotage and subversive actions, terrorism is usually perceived as a purely unconventional threat. This changed with the emergence of DAESH (ISIS, ISIL or IS) in 2014. Due to the vast amount of seized conventional weapons and obtained personnel with military experience, this terrorist organization became a conventional threat. They fought combining all assets available, allowing them to occupy and control a large territory for nearly three years.

In the past ten years, terrorism affected a quarter of countries in the world. There is no front line and geographically it occupies the entire global battlefield. The attacks in New York City in 1993 and 2001 were a clear sign that terrorists have capabilities to act globally and launch long-range attacks. In the 70s and 80s, the terrorists aimed to attract attention and intimidate governments and people in order to extort their demands. In the past decades, the attacks in New York City, Madrid, London, Paris and Brussels started a trend of inflicting as many casualties as possible. This change in behaviour suggests that modern day terrorists would not hesitate to use weapons of mass destruction if they had it.

Before the end of the Cold War the attacks were aimed primarily at military targets, such as the Beirut bombing in 1983. (Moghadam, 2005) However, in the past two decades the terrorists demonstrated that their goal is to attack primarily the civilian population. The modern terrorists learned that inflicting civilian casualties has far greater effect than inflicting casualties among the security forces. Consequently, the civilian population can be indirectly killed or injured if terrorists attack critical infrastructure, causing catastrophic secondary effects. This threat inflicts damage even if there is no attack, because all states spend resources in order to protect the critical infrastructure from terrorism. (Chalk et al, 2005)

Changes in the behaviour of modern terrorist groups and organizations are evident. Modern terrorism is a much more complex threat than before and it requires a comprehensive approach to defeat it. States must overcome their inertia in following the latest trends to properly respond to new terrorist patterns. This will primarily depend on the synergy of leadership responsible for combating terrorism.

The role of leadership in the fight against terrorism

The specifics of combating terrorism derive from the fact that terrorism is an irregular, non-conventional, asymmetric threat that is unpredictable and goes beyond the framework of conventional doctrine. Since terrorists have no regards to the rule of war and international conventions, dealing with such opponents has specific demands from the leadership at all levels. Due to the subjective nature of combating terrorism, the leaders must analyze, predict and plan in a rather complex and uncertain environment.

The fight against terrorism begins at the highest, strategic level, which includes

both the civil and military leadership of the state. Strategic leadership should skilfully manage and allocate resources across the system, make decisions of strategic importance and accept public responsibility for those decisions. Organizational leadership is at the operational level with the task of translating the state's counterterrorist strategy and policies into a practical language for the direct leadership to understand and apply it at the tactical level. The ability of leaders to synchronize the ends, ways and means from the highest to the lowest level is crucial for success.

The fight against terrorism covers all preventive, defensive and intrusive measures and activities aimed to protect the security forces, people, government and infrastructure by reducing their vulnerability from the terrorist threats, as well as responding to acts of terrorism. Leadership at all levels should take proactive measures to prevent terrorist attacks, prevent sympathizers from becoming terrorists, protect critical infrastructure and physically neutralize the terrorists. For the successful fight against terrorism, leadership at all three levels should take several important measures: (JP 3-26, 2014)

- *Define the threat.* The strategic leadership defines the terrorist organization as a whole, the organizational in the wider area of operations, and the direct leadership in close combat against a particular group.
- *Identify the objectives.* For the strategic leadership, this may be the leaders of the terrorist organization, for the organizational leadership the decision-making moments and the key terrain that allows terrorists freedom of movement, and for the direct leadership the specific physical targets on the battlefield.
- *Determine the means of combat.* For the strategic leadership, these are all available state resources and for the organizational leadership the logistical requirements for the engaged forces. For the direct leadership, these are kinetic assets and weapons as tools for direct fight with the terrorists.
- *Establish the principles of combating terrorism.* This starts from the strategic leadership and their transparent definition of the terrorist threat, restraints from overwhelming reaction, limited use of military force and the adjustment of the legal framework for combating terrorism. At the organizational level it is a proper choice of ways and means to minimize collateral damage. At the direct leadership it is following the rules of engagement and the basic principles of humanitarian law.

There are two general models for combating terrorism, either to be treated as a criminal act or to be treated as a military threat. In the first case, leadership priority is prevention by deploying police forces, with the risk of reducing the effectiveness of the counterterrorist measures because they lack capabilities. The second model is to deploy the military forces to annihilate the threat, with the risk of using excessive force and causing collateral damage. In both cases, the strategic leadership is the most responsible for taking several basic counterterrorism measures:

- Identify terrorists and their ideology,
- Secure legitimacy in the international arena,

- Integrate intelligence, interagency cooperation and information sharing,
- Attack the terrorists' financial sources,
- Educate the population,
- Military cooperation with partners,
- Secure the state borders.

In the fight against terrorism the leadership should be able to continuously analyze the trends of modern terrorism and how it affects the states' defence system, military organization as its part, and other institutions and security structures. Terrorism is an unpredictable and covert threat that causes great physical and moral harm in a short period of time. If the leadership is not prepared to lead in a chaotic and uncertain environment, the vulnerability from terrorist attacks will be even greater because of erroneous or delayed counter measures.

Because of the specifics of modern day terrorism, leadership at all three levels must be flexible, adaptable and proactive. At the same time, since terrorism is an unconventional threat, to take the initiative from the terrorists, sometimes it is necessary for the leadership to counteract properly using unconventional measures as well. For that purpose, the leadership in the fight against terrorism should rely on critical, creative and system thinking, but also motivate and inspire subordinates to develop such qualities.

Synergy of leadership at all levels

The most common criticism when failing to unite the ends, ways and means in the fight against terrorism is the lack of coordination and cooperation among the state institutions. While this is the visible part of the problem, there is also a less noticeable problem, lack of synchronization among leadership levels. To produce a combined effect far greater than the sum of the effects of each level separately, it is necessary to achieve full synergy within the system. The strategic, organizational and direct leadership can achieve such efficiency only through joint, coordinated and synchronized action.

The strategic leadership implies the impact on a group of organizations or institutions spread over large distances without having direct contact with the majority of people in the organizations. The strategic leadership deals with the long-term care for the organization by achieving goals that have long-term consequences. (Martin, 2011) The purpose of the strategic leadership is to influence the development of the institutional capabilities that will last, improve and function in different circumstances. The defence and security system of the state is an example of a complex system in which the strategic leadership plays the major role.

The strategic leadership begins from projecting a clear vision that the organization or the institution needs to achieve. It should inspire and motivate people as the most important element of the system to join the organization and stream their energy in meeting the organizational goals. (Rowe et al, 2009) In modern society, having

all-volunteer military forces requires influential strategic leadership that will attract and recruit people to join. For example, in some wealthy countries with higher social standards the military service is not of particular interest to the average citizen. In those countries, the strategic leadership has the challenge to identify proper recruitment mechanisms. The competitive labour market puts high pressure on the military organization to either lower the criteria for enrolling or to offer better working conditions.

The strategic leadership is a source of morality and it sets the standards of the organizations. The strategic leaders in the military cope with many difficulties, uncertainties and ambiguities because the operational environment, conditions and policies in a modern society are changing rapidly and unexpectedly. (Snider, 2008) Sometimes it is difficult to explain the “big picture” to the lower echelons, and sometimes there is simply no time for it. In the military this happens often, therefore the strategic leadership must enforce trust and loyalty to the lowest echelons through organizational leadership. In a crisis or war, time does not always allow thorough explanation of all decisions on the strategic level. The organizational leaders have to develop a mindset of trust and endurance at tactical level so the direct leadership can execute the mission. (Jans et al, 2013)

Since the strategic leadership focuses on the future, it relies on a holistic approach to events, simultaneously taking into account all internal and external factors that could influence fulfilment of the vision. (US Army, 1999) Unlike the direct leadership, today’s strategic leadership relies heavily on computer technology, media and information. With every novelty in technology, strategic leadership is aimed at new solutions to increase combat readiness.

The strategic leadership in the military follows the political directives regarding the defence of the state. Its most important task is translating political goals into military objectives. (Gerras, 2010) The strategic leadership in the military advises the political leaders about the physical threat from the terrorist groups and organizations. However, the nature of terrorism requires a more diversified military approach than against the conventional threat. If the terrorist threat is not properly and timely identified, the use of military on the ground may be inadequate.

At this level, it is absolutely essential to have a consensus among the strategic leaders about the nature of the terrorist threat, force generation and adequate operational approach. (Gerras, 2010) The strategic leaders communicate directly with the political leaders. The biggest challenge is the fact that more than often, the civilian leadership will provide only general, wide guidance that gives open options, while the soldiers’ mindset is pursuing more pragmatic solutions. Because of this, it is not unusual to have misunderstandings at the strategic level among the civilian and military leadership.

The organizational leadership involves influencing a team or teams without direct, personal contact with the majority of the people in the organization. The organizational leadership in the military is also known as operational leadership because they are working at the operational level of war. Organizational leaders are the link between the strategic and direct leadership. (Vego, 2015) The organizational leader-

ship is concerned with developing organizational culture and values. They participate in the creation of the organization's structure that needs to materialize the vision of the strategic leadership and provide guidance to the direct leadership. (Martin, 2011)

At the operational level, the leaders see the organization as a whole, as opposed to the work of individuals and small groups at the tactical level. The organizational leadership deals with processes, support systems and structures that make the organization, and provide tools for the operations. (Vego, 2015) The operational leaders analyze and understand the strategic and tactical levels. They think of the necessary physical and moral infrastructure of the organization. At the operational level, leaders must understand the disadvantages and strengths of the organization much better as they influence its development.

At the organizational level, the leader leads through subordinate leaders, and they transfer his ideas down towards the direct leadership. This requires an even better ability to communicate ideas because incorrectly transferred strategic vision to the tactical level will not achieve the expected results. (Neason, 1998) Since the operational leader directly communicates with his immediate subordinates, he also exercises direct leadership in relation to them. However, the difference is in the degree of influence and motivation for them, because at the organizational level leaders primarily influence the structure and build organizational culture. (Canuel, 2009)

The military organizational leadership begins from the battalion level, at the joint tactical level and the civilian equivalent structures in the defence system. At the organizational level, leaders have greater responsibilities for the functioning of the system as a whole. (Vego, 2015) In the military they deal with staffs and commands. The organizational leader is farther away from the people in the lower echelons. In order to send the information to the last soldier, they must be certain that the direct leadership understands and implements the guidelines.

In the fight against terrorism, the organizational leadership must have a clear understanding of the enemy, the operational environment, the conditions and the forces available. The specific requirements of such engagement demand a comprehensive approach in applying different capabilities through the organization. It involves more forces and assets which must be coordinated and synchronized at joint, combined and interagency level. Organizational leadership should have detailed knowledge and understanding of the political situation, legal aspects, the influence of the international community, the relationship with partner countries, and other factors that directly affect the success.

The direct leadership is practiced through direct contact with the people in the field. In the military doctrine the direct leadership is known as a tactical leadership. (Grandstaff & Sorenson, 2009) It is characterized by short-term decisions in order to achieve immediate goals. (Martin, 2011) The direct leader often has to balance between the needs of the people and the necessity of the mission. In order to motivate people to work and obtain loyalty, the direct leader must personally engage in working and lead-

ing by example. Direct leadership is considered to be the first level of formal leadership and involves personal interaction with people, so the personal qualities of the leader are truly important. In addition to physical, intellectual and professional characteristics, direct leaders connect with people using empathy and intuition.

In the fight against terrorism, the direct leadership is practiced by commanders in the tactical units where there is a need for “face to face” communication. The direct leader should communicate, motivate, and inspire teamwork. To respond to the specifics of tactics, techniques and procedures in the fight against terrorism, the direct leader needs to be creative, analytical and capable of critical thinking. This flexibility must not be understood as a lack of demand for discipline and high military standards. On the contrary, those characteristics should be integrated into the soldiers’ mindset as necessities to deal with complex and unpredictable situations on the battlefield with no front and obscure opponent.

In order to build effective counterterrorist skills, the direct leadership at the tactical level should impose on the subordinates a healthy organizational climate, learning environment and constant improvements based on lessons learned. Especially in the fight against terrorism the discipline at the tactical level remains an essential tool for success. Improvisation and innovation should be understood as skills that give preference against an opponent that uses unconventional methods himself.

Conclusion

Modern day terrorism is a threat that many countries worldwide will face for a long time. It is one of the greatest security challenges and its defeat will inevitably require a global strategy. The basic requirement for the countries to successfully cooperate in the fight against terrorism is first to identify their own weaknesses and clearly define the problem of terrorism. In the fight against terrorism, it is crucial to have internal consensus on how to integrate all instruments of national power and synchronize the ends, ways and means.

In order to achieve this, it is necessary to have effective leadership at all three levels: strategic, organizational and direct, capable to create a synergy through increased coordination, cooperation and synchronization of all measures and activities. Since many institutions of the state are involved in the fight against terrorism, alongside leadership in the security forces, it is not less important to have equally effective leadership in other civilian institutions as well.

The strategic leadership is the most responsible for setting a clear vision, giving general guidance and approving resources for the fight against terrorism. Organizational leadership is responsible for implementing policies of the strategic leadership and translating directives into tactically understandable language for the direct leadership. Although it is the last in the hierarchy, the direct leadership is not least important. The leadership at the tactical level has the important task to directly implement measures, actions and procedures to fight terrorists on the ground.

The most responsible for cooperation and coordination among institutions that directly or indirectly have a role in the fight against terrorism are the leaders at all levels within the institutions. They are the ones that ultimately link the instruments of national power. Achieving full synergy between the three levels of leadership is the best guarantee to unite and exploit all efforts that individuals and institutions produce.

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IMPROVING THE WORK, COOPERATION AND COORDINATION AMONG THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES AS A PRECONDITION FOR DEALING SUCCESSFULLY WITH TERRORISM

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Abstract: *Intelligence and intelligence cooperation are increasingly gaining importance within the framework of the national security-defense strategies, but also within the international community and collective security and defense systems. This is due to changes in the security environment, primarily because of the emergence of new types of security threats, among which the most endangering for world peace and security is the present terrorism with its new features. Terrorism does not have genesis in one state. It is global and necessitates new mechanisms as to be prevented and addressed. Individual countries and their institutions are no longer able to handle it themselves without assistance and co-operation regionally, but also globally. In this regard, intelligence activity is the basic tool in preventive action against possible terrorist activities.*

The primary goal of the intelligence services is to expose security threats as quickly as possible and make proper assessment of the possible effects of their actions, as well as to propose the most appropriate measures and activities for their prevention and elimination. This means that the emphasis should be placed on the effectiveness of these services in the area of counterterrorism.

It also means greater responsibility and proper position and co-operation among the various intelligence elements in a state, as well as among the intelligence agencies from various countries.

This paper aims to underscore the significance of the intelligence services, as well as their cooperation and co-ordination in the global fight with the contemporary terrorism as one of the thorny problems of the 21st century.

In addition, an attempt has been made to briefly present the current state of this segment in our country as to improve the work and coordination of all entities in the intelligence community of the Republic of Macedonia in case of a security threat.

Keywords: *Intelligence, terrorism, security, intelligence services.*

Introduction

Addressing numerous terrorism-related issues and creating an effective policy and strategy to deal with them are broadly related to the activities of the intelligence services. No doubt, terrorism will continue to be a serious threat. Hence, the question whether the current positioning

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and operation of the intelligence services globally, but also in the Republic of Macedonia, are at the level adequate to the challenge comes to the surface.

Internal work of the intelligence services is an important aspect for the proper creation of a national anti-terror strategy.

Regarding the successful handling of terrorist activities, some countries have succeeded in preventing possible terrorist attacks due to the preventive actions of the intelligence services. Moreover, it is a result of the effectiveness of the intelligence services in the counterterrorism fight. However, according to the analyses of most terrorist acts, especially those that occurred in the last period, it seems that the intelligence services had major work failures.

In the Republic of Macedonia, the situation in this area has long been silenced, until it came to light when the activities of this kind were most needed. The analyses of the 2001 Conflict in the Republic of Macedonia, which according to the characteristics of the conducted attacks and activities can be defined as terrorist-related, have indicated all the weaknesses and undefined segments of the intelligence-security community of the Republic of Macedonia. Such have been the timely processing of the intelligence and information received at a tactical level in order to develop appropriate security assessments at the operational and strategic level and timely taking measures and activities to prevent such attacks.

It is obvious that not all the challenges for effective organization and effectiveness in the work of the intelligence services in the Republic of Macedonia have been overcome. Hence, their complete transformation and reorganization is essential in order to improve the work, coordination and effectiveness of all services in the Republic Macedonia.

Intelligence, intelligence services and their activities

The essence of intelligence activity and service as a socio-political phenomenon and state product is still not sufficiently scientifically and theoretically explained and defined. Many of these notions do not cover the true content of this activity. Moreover, the subject of this research is simplified (Bakreski, 2012). To give a simple definition of intelligence and intelligence services is not a straightforward matter and it is a great challenge for analysts and theorists of the security sciences. Theorists who analyze the work, i.e., the reasons for the poor efficiency of these services in dealing with terrorism, are not many.

The term intelligence activity usually involves secret collection of information about the potential opponent and data that will be in function of the state security system. It is related to the efforts of the persons involved in the process itself. It also means keeping the findings under the veil of secrecy and away of the public (Bakreski, 2012).

According to Ljubomir Stajikj, intelligence service is defined as a specialized, relatively independent institution from the state apparatus authorized to employ legal, but also secret means and methods to collect significant intelligence and information for other states or their institutions and possible internal opponents of the state, necessary for pursuing the state policy and undertaking other procedures in war and peace. It is carried out independently or with other state bodies in order to implement part of the state and political goals of the country (Stajikj Lj. 1999).

The effectiveness of the intelligence services operations is a result of the way in which the intelligence services function. However, it is a topic not often discussed during the theoretical elaborations of the theorists dealing with terrorism.

Regarding the definition of the intelligence service, Hans Born, considers intelligence services as an instrument in the hands of state institutions that can be used in two ways - good and bad. According to him, if the intelligence services are in the hands of responsible democratic leaders, they function well and vice versa, if the intelligence services are in the hands of people who are interested in conflicts and corrections, then these services are used for bad purposes (Born H. 2006). Born simply describes the services as government institutions responsible for collecting, arranging and providing information in order to ensure the security of society and the freedom of its citizens. In addition, intelligence services can also be understood as a political function of the state, i.e., a set of activities and measures that protect the state from an actual or potential enemy and as a specialized organization that performs activities by applying measures and means through which it exercises a security function (Stamenkovski A 1999).

According to Peter Manning, theorist of terrorism, intelligence services are constantly maintaining the mystery of action in order to maintain the power through secret control of the data, which can have serious implications over the vulnerability of states from terrorist and other types of security threats. According to this author, these institutions claim to have a monopoly over the social violence. Realistically, that is not the case. The weaknesses of the services are camouflaged with constant conspiracy and untruths. According to Manning, "the service is first taught to collect data, and then learn how to hide them ...". Secrecy, in turn, hinders the conduct of anti-terrorist activities, i.e., mystery hinders the efficient utilization and sharing of information (Manning P. 2006). This problem can also be viewed from the aspect of unwillingness of these institutions and organizations to cooperate with other services of this kind, the weak or lacking supervision and control over these services. However, it can be concluded that the intelligence services are a key component of each state, which provides independent analysis of information concerning the security of the state and society and protection of its vital interests.

Most states have declared themselves successful in the fight against terrorism and many activities have been prevented by proper action, proper measures and activities undertaken by their intelligence services. In the past, and even today such cases have been more about detection and imprisonment of individual terrorists. Unfortunately, it is still very difficult without full co-operation and interaction with more intelligence segments within the international community to enter the trail and disclose and prevent activities of terrorist organizations, which often assume responsibility for the activities of individual terrorists that are most often fully secured from the breakthrough of the intelligence-based preventive activity. According to numerous analyzes of the events of September 11, 2001 in the United States, it was concluded that there were major flaws and inefficiency in the sphere of counterterrorism when it came to terrorist or-

ganizations such as “Al-Qaeda”. Analyses have indicated the existence of reports, i.e., the White House received an intelligence report warning that “Bin Laden is likely to organize a major terrorist act against the interests of the United States and Israel over the coming weeks and that the attack will focus on important US facilities and will be carried out without warning, “and yet the most appropriate measures and activities have not been undertaken, due to poor co-ordination and cooperation between services (Malcom N., 2002).

Analyses of September 11, 2001 in the US territory events showed other failures in the work of US agencies, such as disregard of information written in Arabic that reported possible terrorist attacks on the Pentagon and other important facilities in the territory of the United States not been translated on time. Consequently due to the inaction of the services no timely preventive activities were undertaken, etc. Given the size and the scope of the US services, the issue of effectiveness of these numerous services is debatable. It is not possible not to wonder how Osama bin Laden managed, hidden in Afghanistan, to communicate freely and maintain a connection with the operatives of his organization located in the United States. How could the telephone and courier traffic go smoothly, although Bin Laden was a person who had been on all lists of agencies for years. Does this mean that even intelligence in the United States is not up to security within the framework of terrorist organizations (Davies B., 2004)?

However, over the next decade following the events in the United States, the situation not only failed to resolve and improve, but terrorism in its most extreme forms spread over the territory of Europe, causing many civilian casualties and material damage and, above all, accomplished its primary goal, to cause fear and sense of endangerment in every place of the territory of the Western world. In the past few years, the EU faced a number of terrorist threats and attacks, mostly of violent jihadist nature, from network-linked terrorist groups and individual perpetrators. The analyzes of the terrorist attacks that took place in Paris, Brussels, Nice, Berlin, London and Manchester, in which many people were killed, only confirm the conclusion that the required level of intelligence activity and proper co-operation and co-ordination between the intelligence services for possible activities in these places was not achieved, although Europe is constantly under increased security due to possible terrorist attacks. These events also confirm that the hardest thing is to break through the terrorist conspiracy, as it also requires proper activity and perseverance as well as inventiveness by the intelligence community. However, it must be noted that according to statistics, the effectiveness of the services in this field is increasing. However, this is mostly in the area of detecting the perpetrators of these terrorist attacks in EU member states, not in preventing their intention.

With respect to dealing with modern terrorism, it should be emphasized that the most effective role of intelligence should be in the counter-terrorism sphere. In this sense, intelligence is expected to succeed in uncovering the details of terrorist conspiracies so as to prevent them before they are realized. In addition, intelligence in the

sphere of counterintelligence can enable protection of the planned goals by increasing the security of or by timely cancellation or displacement of events. This would be the most successful way in which intelligence could help fight terrorism. At the same time, this is also the hardest possible way, given the terrorist conspiracies and their organizations. The greatest contribution, as elaborated earlier, intelligence gives in the context of counterterrorism by collecting information about individual terrorists. Although, in some cases, the discovery of an individual terrorist leads to breakdown of the network and discovery of an organization, cell, and other (Cronin O. and Luds J., 2009).

Terrorist organizations are extremely conspirable and their members are subject to the most stringent checks and tests of their loyalty and dedication. The very organization of cell-type terrorists with a small number of members who may even be unaware of each other, ensures a high level of conspiracy and at the same time gives an opportunity to plan and execute terrorist actions on the largest scale, and yet remain undisclosed.

In terms of detection and prevention, it could be said that according to statistics, in 2016, a total of 142 attempts of terrorist attacks in eight EU member states were discovered and prevented. More than half (76) of them were committed in the United Kingdom, 23 attacks in France, 17 in Italy, 10 in Spain, 6 in Greece, 5 in Germany, 4 in Belgium and 1 attack in the Netherlands. In these attacks, there were 142 casualties and 379 were injured. The total number of terrorist attacks in 2016 is a continuation of the downward trend that began in 2014 when there were 226 attacks and 211 attacks in 2015.

Activities for a breakthrough in a terrorist group or organization

A breakthrough in a terrorist group is an extremely difficult action as “terrorist groups are small, unique, disciplined, and fanatical, with a high degree of practicing conspiracy, high degree of security awareness, culture and knowledge” (Kotovcevski M., 2004). The preparations for committing a terrorist activity consist of timely and successful communication among the perpetrators. The development of communications technology has contributed to constant connection and communication among the perpetrators of terrorist activities. The contact between terrorists is accomplished in different ways, such as by using telephone connections (wired and wireless) and via e-mail. On the other hand, the development of special technologies also enables monitoring of these communications and timely reception of information relating to the preparation and execution of terrorist acts.

A tactical situation in each individual case and fulfilled legal conditions would give an answer to the question which operational and technical means could be used for the above stated purpose, whether it be e-mail observation, wiretapping of phones and control of postal items, chemical and other pitfalls, night observation with appropriate technical means, secret photography and video recording (Angeleski M., 1993)

With respect to monitoring the activities of such organizations, the only efficient

way for timely detection, documentation and disruption of a planned terrorist activity is by obtaining insider's information, i.e., from one of the members of the terrorist organization, who participates in the preparation of the terrorist actions, or by embedding a covert agent in the terrorist group. However, it is also the most difficult way for a breakthrough in the organization. In such counter-terrorist activities, it is best for the informer to be an inside member, which is a long and difficult process. Moreover, an already prepared informer in the ranks of the terrorist organization can also be used.

The informer should be in constant contact with the designated operations worker.

A well-instructed informant, involved in the terrorist structures, with a well-prepared scheme could deliver high-quality information to the operations worker.

For an informant to be quality instructed to detect the preparation and execution of an act of terrorism, it is primarily necessary that there is an operational worker who keeps the informant in contact, and who is well educated in the field of detecting acts of terrorism. Usually, in practice, the perpetrators of terrorist acts always use secret ways and means of committing terrorist activities that prevent the persons in charge of their prompt detection and prevention, which leads to a series of terrorist activities with huge consequences and inability to uncover them.

In the past years, dozens of terrorist attempts in the US inspired by al-Qaeda have been prevented. In general, the capacity and competence of those planning the attacks is low-scale. Operative security intelligence officers have great credit in preventing attacks. In addition to those charged with terrorism, there are many individuals for whom there is no sufficient evidence to be indicted and convicted of terrorism, and they are sentenced to short sentences and will be again released in the near future. Also, it is unlikely that many terrorist attacks are deterred due to the taken security measures. The wide range of very costly security measures undertaken in the past years greatly increased the security of military bases, airports, commercial aircraft, and can be said to have made it difficult to plan and carry out terrorist attacks.

It should be noted that the greatest efficiency, however, is achieved by cooperation and exchange of information and data at the international level. This is done through the work of European agencies within Interpol (Davies B., 2004).

The situation in the Republic of Macedonia

The Security Intelligence System of the Republic of Macedonia comprises the Intelligence Agency, the Security and Counter-Intelligence Directorate within the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Macedonia and Military Security and Intelligence Service within the Ministry of Defense. With respect to terrorism as a modern security threat, there are specialized departments within all entities of the security-intelligence community of the Republic of Macedonia. Thus, within the Intelligence Agency, there is a Directorate for Intelligence of International Terrorism and Organized Crime as the

main pillar of intelligence work in the Republic of Macedonia. Within the Directorate for Security and Counter-Intelligence in the Ministry of Interior, which performs the tasks of the state security system, there is an organizational unit with the basic task of countering terrorism. The Military Security and Intelligence Service in the Ministry of Defense organizes and implements intelligence, counterintelligence and security for the defense needs and for the Army of the Republic of Macedonia in terms of its participation in missions abroad, which also includes activities related to counterterrorism and anti-terrorism (Bakreski O., 2012).

Regarding the period prior to the outbreak of the Conflict in the Republic of Macedonia, the failures in the activities of the intelligence services were primarily in the domain of coordination and effectiveness of these services at operational and tactical level, i.e., as part of the intelligence security in the conduct of operations. Strategic Intelligence Activities for early warning of a possible security threat in that period did exist. The analyzes of Prof. D-r Tome Batkovski on the activity of the strategic intelligence component in the Republic of Macedonia in the period immediately prior to the outbreak of the armed conflict in the Republic of Macedonia, indicate that “in the systemic analyzes of the security situation there were relevant facts about possible threats to the security of the country, which were collected, processed and timely delivered to the relevant institutions. However, not enough attention was paid to these initial findings within the security institutions, especially in terms of the early warning on possible threats to the territory of the country by armed terrorist activities (Batkoski T., 2011).

After the Conflict in the Republic of Macedonia in 2001, an evaluation was initiated. The gaps were detected and a complete transformation of the defense and security system of the Republic of Macedonia began. This means that the intelligence components were evaluated and measures were taken to improve the efficiency, co-operation and co-ordination of these services at national and international level.

The terrorist activities on territory of the Republic of Macedonia, which occurred before the outbreak of the Conflict in 2001, as well as during the crisis in the Republic of Macedonia, and after its completion, only partially opened the issue of the effectiveness of the intelligence segment in the Republic of Macedonia related to the possibilities for timely perception of all security threats posed by the actions of terrorists and their organizations on the territory of the state. A lack of coordination in the intelligence and security community is still present and there is dispersion in relation to intelligence activity because it is organized in several institutions and there is no joint coordination among them. There is a functional dependence and connection between the Intelligence Agency, the Military Security and Intelligence Service and the Security and Counterintelligence Directorate. Yet, these structures are not vertically or horizontally connected, but along the lines of cooperation and vocational guidance. This means that the intelligence and security system is still not built, especially in terms of co-ordination, despite the implementation of the defense and police reforms. However,

without a proper set of intelligence services there is no efficiency in the operation of the national security system.

Therefore the need for legal regulation of the intelligence segment, and uniting the intelligence and counter-intelligence activities and establishing a new reorganized security intelligence system in the Republic of Macedonia is justified.

Terrorist attacks on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia, which could endanger the security of the Republic of Macedonia, their possible connection and preparation on another territory, as well as the involvement of persons from other countries in committing terrorist acts on the territory of the Republic of Macedonia, cannot be successfully controlled and countered without good co-operation and co-ordination between the services, as well as adequate international cooperation, primarily with the Interpol, as well as with the intelligence services of the neighboring countries. Only in such organized way is it possible to expect positive results in the fight against this type of crime.

In order to have a functional and good cooperation between the three security intelligence services of the Republic of Macedonia, the Security and Counterintelligence Directorate (in the original language: UBK), the Intelligence Agency (in the original language: AR) and the Military Security and Intelligence Service (in the original language: VSBiR), these institutions should cooperate. In addition, cooperation both at bilateral and multilateral level, but also with other relevant institutions is also needed. Moreover, cooperation is necessitated with other institutions with competencies in activities related to terrorist threats, like the Customs Administration and the Directorate for Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, which was established based on the latest evaluations and analyzes. Full reorganization to improve the situation within the security community of the Republic of Macedonia is expected.

Regarding possible terrorist threats within the territory of the Republic of Macedonia, the activities of people directly or indirectly involved and associated with certain terrorist organizations such as the Islamic state, for example, should be further monitored and analyzed. No doubt that the media daily reported about the participation of Balkan people in the war in Syria. It has been confirmed that a certain swarm of fighters killed in Syria originated from the Balkan region. For that purpose, cooperation of the security intelligence communities in the Balkans is needed so as to monitor and prevent their possible activities after they return home. Russia argued that the participation of its citizens in these wars should be treated as a punishable offense. On that note, in numerous debates and debate shows, especially in neighboring countries, the danger of these returnees from the war in Syria was discussed, with a proposal for a similar model and treatment of these mercenaries. Security analysts gave their views on the common danger and the need to prevent it. Also, the analyses found that the majority of participants are former fighters from the ex-YU-area, as well as from the conflict zones in Chechnya, Georgia or Libya. The possibility of participation of former members of regular armies, who can, as returnees, cause, or be a source of endangerment to the

domestic stability and security of the states, is not excluded.

According to the security services in the region, the transfer of fighters from the Balkans to Turkey and later Syria is constantly being controlled. Hence, they are still not a direct threat to domestic states. According to some analytical centers (recently published in some Macedonian media), the transfer of fighters from the Balkans takes place through Turkey. Namely, they are taken in the town of Ceylanpinar near the Syrian border, located at 1000 km southeast of Ankara. From there, they are directed to training centers located west of the city at a distance of several tens of kilometers for a few weeks, after which they are later divided according to specialties and directed to the zones of combat actions. Officially, there were about 140 fighters from the Republic of Macedonia, of whom 30 were killed in Syria. About 20 were imprisoned with the "Cell" action 1, 2 and 3. The situation is much more critical in Bosnia, since many foreign fighters remained in Bosnia after the war.

Noteworthy to mention is the great migrant crisis that occurred in the past period and had implications in increasing the number of persons with terrorist provenance who under the cover of migrants and refugees managed to enter the territory of Western Europe and passed through the territory of the Republic Macedonia and its neighboring countries.

Analogously to the foregoing, the danger of expansion of radical Islam is present in our country. Thus, in addition to the activities and cooperation among the elements of the security-intelligence system in the country, relevant cooperation and information exchange is needed both within regional framework and beyond.

Regarding the fight against terrorism and international cooperation, the Government of the Republic of Macedonia has signed several bilateral cooperation agreements in the fight against terrorism with the governments of the Republic of Turkey, the Republic of Slovenia, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Serbia, Montenegro, the Republic of Albania and others.

According to their competencies and tasks, the Macedonian intelligence services should have permanent cooperation and exchange of information with foreign intelligence services in order to act more effectively in the field of counterterrorism. The Security and Counterintelligence Directorate and the Intelligence Agency are permanent members of the Conference of the Intelligence Services of South East Europe. The Military Security and Intelligence Service, through the participation of the Army of the Republic of Macedonia in international missions, is consistently harmonizing its activities in this field. However, as the Republic of Macedonia is not a NATO member, there are still problems in terms of direct access to the Alliance's intelligence data.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs should work and develop fruitful cooperation with the Ministries of the Southeast European countries through the SEE Police Cooperation Convention and with Europol by conducting appropriate training in a number of areas related to this issue and by signing agreements for mutual cooperation.

The cooperation with INTERPOL has been being intensified by the accession of the Republic of Macedonia in the INTERPOL global police communication system,

which enables communication and data exchange among the members and the Interpol General Secretariat.

Conclusion and recommendations

The primary role of the intelligence structures in the fight against terrorism is to enable effective prevention, i.e., detection before the terrorist act takes place. All this brings forth the need to follow the world experiences in countering this type of criminal offenses, to organize appropriate training of the services members under whose jurisdiction such acts are processed, as well as to provide appropriate operational and technical means to detect, document and prevent the perpetrators of terrorist activities on time.

The persons in charge of detecting this type of threats should be educated by well-known experts who would transfer their knowledge acquired in the field. All security services in the world put the work with informers within a legal framework. Thus, the activities of the informants are legally regulated. This would be a motivational mechanism for obtaining timely information in the preparation phase before the terrorist act takes place.

The developed countries around the world use various ways to protect the agent-informer link. These programs include changing identity, providing new documents, new residence, and a plastic face surgery. This way of providing information is most effective, but also quite sensitive in terms of legal regulation and providing adequate protection of the person.

Considering the fact that the detection of the crime of terrorism is under jurisdiction of the secret services, the services of the Republic of Macedonia, in addition to good mutual cooperation and coordination, should further develop their cooperation with Interpol, as well as their efficient cooperation with friendly intelligence services in order to detect successfully this type of acts. The aim is to exchange information about the existence of terrorist organizations on their territory. In addition, their work encompasses the findings about preparation and execution of terrorist acts, for which both parties are interested.

Exchanging data between the intelligence services in the region, but also with the services of greater states, such as the United States, Russia and Turkey enables prevention of actions of radical Islam in the Balkans, in the context of which, the region is currently seen as a recruitment center of the militant organization called Islamic State. Not a single country, especially one from the region, can deal with the issue that already has dimensions of an international problem. Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Albania, Kosovo and Serbia are countries with a territorial connection when it comes to organizing radical Islam. It is a starting point to act together against it. Hence, updating information on whether there are attempts for indoctrination, forms of illegal organizations and possible existence of training camps could prevent an endangerment of the security of the countries in the region, including Macedonia. The security assessments made by States' intelligence components with respect to potential terrorist threats must be properly updated, integrated and shared.

The Republic of Macedonia, as a candidate country for admission to the European Union, should regulate the legal position and activity of its intelligence segments according to European standards. It requires an effective regulation of the coordination and cooperation in relation to the exchange of data between entities through a common database, cooperation in planning and execution of joint operations. A Joint Analytical Center or a joint co-ordinating body tasked to ensure the integration of individual entities within the security system would be the most appropriate to establish.

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IN WHAT WAYS CAN THE GROWTH OF AN INSURGENCY BE CONSIDERED TO BE A PROCESS?

Atanas PANOVSKI ¹

Abstract: *The spread of irregular warfare, the cost of internal conflicts, and the problems that face the conventional understandings of war have caused the military theorists to take a closer look on the phenomenon of an insurgency. In addition, the growing interest in understanding and effectively fighting an insurgency has raised a question of whether the growth of an insurgency is a process. The purpose of this paper is to critically analyze the growth of an insurgency in general, examine the way an insurgency grows, provide sound argument whether it is a process or not, and find out what the growth of an insurgency has to be in order to achieve its final objective of defeating or displacing the state. The findings suggest that the growth of an insurgency is a process because an insurgency must follow specific steps in order to grow, these steps are common to all insurgencies, and if an insurgency does not follow them, it will fail to achieve its final objective.*

Key words: *insurgency, growth, process, phase*

Introduction

Since 1945, the world has faced a different kind of warfare and traditional conventional military organizations have failed to provide an appropriate response. Representing three quarters of all armed conflicts and taking in account that more than 20 million people died, an insurgent conflict is numerically predominant, and at the same time, bloodier than any other. In addition, the costs of internal conflicts were much greater than the costs of the inter-state wars (van Creveld, 1991). Furthermore, detailed analysis show that in the same period of time, around 90 percent of all concluded conflicts between the insurgents and the states were resolved by force, and ended on the battlefield. Either the insurgents or the state was able to win (H McCormick, 2007).

In order to properly address the question, it is essential to understand the meaning behind the term 'process' and to explain the growth of an insurgency. While there is sufficient literature in regard to the growth of an insurgency, little information is provided in regard to explaining it as a process. According to dictionaries, a process is defined as follows: "a series of actions or operations concluding to an end", "typically describes the act of taking something through an established and usually routine set of procedures to convert it from one form to another;" and "a systematic sequence of actions directed to some end" (online). In addition, a process can be

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defined as "... an activity which takes place over time and which has a precise aim regarding the result to be achieved. The concept of a process is hierarchical, which means that a process may consist of a partially ordered set of sub-processes" (online). One more elaborate approach defines process as "... repeatable sequence of predictable actions that change a known undesirable condition to a predictable, hopefully more desirable condition" (Kesel, 2010).

When explaining the growth of an insurgency, there is a need to examine and analyze what are the reasons for revolution in first place. According to Chalmers Johnson in his book '*Revolutionary Change*,' the key lies in social system analysis and the reasons for a revolutionary situation are found in the low level of equilibrium and the dysfunctional homeostatic mechanism in a society. If the division of the population in a society in opposed groups with different values is low, then it does not represent a threat to the state, but if the division is high, it becomes a threat and it is likely that revolution will occur (Jonson, 1982). Those are the preconditions for a revolutionary situation in a society. Not all of the societies have perfect social systems, so-called 'utopia', but it is evident that not all of them have revolutions. The agenda of an insurgency is to take the given opportunity and change the system in the society. As evidence, since 1945, there is no case where a country did have an insurgency and the division of the population was not present. Having the preconditions in place, an insurgency starts as a small number of 'hard-core' believers with a big idea; namely, to attain their political goal by means of violence. This is the starting point of all insurgencies.

Phase one

From the very starting point, all the insurgencies face their first challenge: to overcome the opening mobilization dilemma. Because of their small size and force disadvantage, an insurgency has a low probability of winning and the expected costs are high. In this situation the number of people willing to join the insurgency is obviously small. The group of core believers has to take action in order to overcome the challenge. If successful, they achieve and maintain positive growth (H McCormick, 2007). This is the first stage in Mao's concept of revolution, known as 'strategic defensive.' Although this first stage in the growth of an insurgency is named differently by different revolutionaries, the idea and the understanding of how to overcome the challenge and succeed in achieving their intermediate goal are the same. At the early stage, an insurgency is weak, and its first and most important objectives are to recruit new members, to increase the number of believers, and to grow in size. At the same time, the main concern of an insurgency is simply to survive (H McCormick, 1999). When an insurgency successfully achieves its objective and overcomes the concern of their small size, the first stage of development and growth is considered to be finished; new realities and conditions lead to the second stage.

Phase two

The objective of an insurgency in the second stage is to isolate, restrict and disconnect the areas that are still influenced by the regime. This stage in Mao's concept of revolution is known as a 'strategic equilibrium' and refers to a period when an insurgency has achieved a balance with the regime (H McCormick, 1999). The initial indirect approach continues in the second phase and the established access to the population becomes essential. As long as an insurgency is able to maintain the support of population, it can extend its control. As any other organization, an insurgency needs resources in order to be functional and able to grow. The political support from the population is now exploited and it becomes a source of existence by providing manpower, food and shelter. At same time, the regime is losing control and access to the resources (F.Krepinevich, 1986).

Phase three

The main concern of insurgencies in the third phase is to exploit what they achieved in first two phases, create momentum, and directly confront the regime. This stage in Mao's concept of revolution is named as 'strategic offensive' (H McCormick, 1999). In this final phase, conventional-style forces are formed and full-scale battles occur. Offensive actions are coordinated with massive popular uprising, and sometimes supported by external forces. It is considered that the external support has a secondary role in first two stages, and a primary role in this final phase (F. Krepinevich, 1986).

The growth of insurgency is a process

When the definitions and explanations of the term 'process' are applied to the growth of an insurgency, they lead to the several conclusions.

First, the growth of an insurgency is a process because it grows methodically, step by step, in three different phases. This implies that there is a clear order of phases: the first, the second and the third, and that one must follow another. In order to increase the likelihood of success in growing, an insurgency must know the order of phases and the criteria for where the phases start. In addition, an insurgency must know the criterion that shows the completion of a certain phase. These all lead to a conclusion that an insurgency must know the phases, how they relate, and frequently conduct a series of assessments in order to correctly control the process of growth.

Second, the growth of an insurgency is a process because the need for growth is based on known undesirable conditions. This means that before the concept of growth is applied, an insurgency must analyze the situation and recognize that the conditions do exist. The opening undesirable condition of an insurgency is the force disadvantage,

and this is the reason why it needs to grow. In addition, this also means that if an insurgency was not a 'force-in-development,' the concept of growth would not be necessary.

Furthermore, the growth of an insurgency is a process because the phases of growth and new desirable conditions are predictable. This means that, regardless of the initial force disadvantage of an insurgency, all possible outcomes of the growth have been anticipated. In addition, since the desirable conditions are predictable, they define the success and failure of the growth of an insurgency. This also implies that the risks in the growth process are recognized, and appropriate actions are developed in response.

Moreover, the growth of an insurgency is a process because the actions in each of the phases are repeatable. This means that actions in lower stages continue in order to support the actions in higher stages. In addition, this implies that the concept of growth is developed as an appropriate response to the problem of force disadvantage. It means that an insurgency needs resources – people, goods and time -- in order to overcome its disadvantage as an insurgency.

Therefore, the growth of an insurgency has all necessary characteristics to be considered a process. It is a concept in which the actions and activities are executed in sequence; actions are developed in order to change known undesirable condition of force disadvantage, and they are repeatable over an extended period of time. If an insurgency follows this concept, it will be successful in achieving a new desirable condition; force strong enough to defeat the regime.

Characteristics of the growth of insurgency

Not only is the growth of an insurgency a process, the way an insurgency grows is common to all insurgencies. Findings suggest that there are some principles that characterize the process of growth of insurgencies. These principles and characteristics describe the growth of an insurgency as a predictable process. This means that we can almost predict the rate of growth and the dynamics of the growth process of insurgencies. Although insurgencies have different ideologies and motives, different strategies and challenges, the characteristics of the growth of insurgencies seem to be universal.

The first characteristic of the growth of an insurgency is that the source of growth is the population. In order to grow, an insurgency needs resources, and the population is its source of people, goods, and finance. The support of people will provide an insurgency with manpower, logistics, information and shelter. In addition, this characteristic explains the indirect approach of an insurgency. Instead of direct confrontation with the regime, the target of an insurgency is the population (F. Krepinovich, 1986).

The next characteristic of the growth is that development proceeds from simple to more complex. In the early stages, an insurgency is a small group in a struggle to gain the support of the population. Later, not only is an insurgency in control of the

population, it is able to attack the administrative architecture of the regime. At the end, an insurgency has the capability to confront the regime directly. This characteristic describes the direction of development, as well. According to this characteristic, an insurgency gains control of the population first, then the administration, and then the state.

Another characteristic of the growth of an insurgency is that the growth is a continuous process. As an insurgency develops, it adds to the already achieved capabilities and the new capabilities become the basis for further development. In addition, one stage of growth becomes a foundation for the next stage of growth. Having the capability to control the population allows an insurgency to develop the new capability of controlling the fight against the regime. At the same time, the capability of gaining control over the behavior of the small number of population allows to an insurgency to control the behavior of the population that is greater in number.

Most important characteristic of the growth of an insurgency is that the growth is a “self-generating” process. Both an insurgency and the state fight for a fixed control over the population, political space, and territory. This means that either an insurgency or the regime has control. In addition, this means that the control is mutually exclusive. At the same time, not only is the capability to control allowing an insurgency to control more in the future, it makes less and less control available for the regime. Over the time, an insurgency grows bigger and bigger, and the regime becomes weaker and weaker.

Insurgencies start with an idea or cause. In the past, they were inspired by the success of the Russian revolution and shared the same Marxist-Leninist ideology. Nowadays, we witness that they share the idea of establishing an Islamic caliphate. Regardless of their different ideas and motives, the way an insurgency grows is the same.

Insurgencies start as small groups with big ideas. Faced with limited resources they have to make an important decision—to choose a strategy. With regard to where actions take place, strategies are classified as urban or rural. At the same time, with regard what comes first, the organization or the fight, strategies are classified as low or high profile. Regardless of their strategies, all insurgencies grow same way.

Some regimes are strong and some are weak. In regard to how much the regime is weak or strong, as an opponent, it represents a different challenge for an insurgency. An insurgency starts as a small emerging group and represents ‘force-in-development.’ At same time, the regime represents ‘force-in-being,’ and an insurgency needs to grow in order to win. Regardless how weak or strong the regime may be, the way an insurgency grows is the same.

Not only is the growth of an insurgency a process because an insurgency must follow specific steps in order to grow, and these steps are common to all insurgencies, but if an insurgency does not follow them, it will fail to achieve its final objective. From the perspective of the growth of an insurgency, findings suggest that the struggle between an insurgency and the regime has three possible outcomes. The first outcome is the defeat of an insurgency. In this case, an insurgency is unable to grow enough

and become a serious threat. The second outcome is continuous conflict between an insurgency and the regime because the growth rate of an insurgency is stable but insufficient. The third outcome is the defeat of the regime. In this case, an insurgency is able to maintain a positive growth rate. Closer look at these outcomes unveils the fact that they define the stages of the growth of an insurgency (H McCormick, 2007).

In the early stages, direct confrontation with the regime is not an option for a small group of hard believers. Any attempt to fight with regime forces will lead to inevitable defeat. This was the case when Fidel Castro and his supporters failed to initiate a popular uprising by attacking an army barrack. Their second attempt to 'invade' Cuba failed as well. Although the aim of those attacks was to initiate a fight, they failed (H McCormick, 2007). In order to overcome the force disadvantage, these groups need to grow in size and gain popular support; otherwise they will never become a serious threat for the regime. If successful, they will become an insurgency, and conclude the first phase of their development. This was the case when Fidel Castro established a remote permanent guerrilla base and a common front against Batista's regime was formed (H McCormick, 2007).

In the second phase, the growth of an insurgency continues. The initial support from the population becomes a foundation for further growth of an insurgency, and a balance of forces with the regime is achieved. If an insurgency does not grow in size to the point where it is sufficient to win, and at the same time, the regime applies an appropriate strategy, an insurgency will eventually be defeated. This was the case with the Huk insurgency in Philippine. Although by 1949 the Huks had over 12000 armed fighters and over 110000 active supporters, they never succeeded in outnumbering the government forces. Their plan for final attack was never executed. After developing a new counterinsurgency strategy, the regime was able to stop the advance of the Huk, and ultimately defeat it (H McCormick, 2007). If an insurgency is unable to grow and outnumber the regime forces, it will not finish the second phase of development.

Conclusion

All insurgencies start as a small group with a force disadvantage. In order to achieve their goal, they need to grow in size. The analyses suggest that the growth of an insurgency is composed of three different phases. In the first phase, an insurgency seeks to increase the number of believers and recruit new members. The main concern of an insurgency in this phase is to survive. During the second phase, guerrilla units are formed, and an insurgency has the objective of expanding its base of support. In the third phase, an insurgency seeks to exploit achievements and create irresistible momentum.

First, these findings suggest that the growth of insurgency is a process. The growth of an insurgency has starting and ending points; actions and activities are executed in a sequence of three different phases; those actions are developed in order to overcome the force disadvantage of an insurgency; and actions are repeatable over an extended period of time. Findings also suggest that an insurgency has all the necessary resources to execute the growth process, and

that the outcomes of the process are predictable.

Second, findings suggest that the process of growth is followed by certain characteristics that are common to all insurgencies: the source of growth is the population; actions are developed from simple to more complex; the growth is a continuous process; the growth is a function of the capability of an insurgency to control the behavior of the population.

In addition, findings conclude that an insurgency must follow specific steps in its development in order to achieve its final objective. The growth process is gradual, and phases have different intermediate goals. Only by achieving the first two intermediate goals will an insurgency be able to defeat the regime.

The purpose of this paper was to critically analyze the growth of an insurgency. The findings that the growth of an insurgency is a process are very important. They unveil the fact that characteristics of the growth of insurgencies seem to be universal, and give us an opportunity to understand that the growth of an insurgency is a predictable process. They offer an alternative for the problems of conventional understanding of war and may ensure effective and efficient fight against insurgencies.

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