

FORCED MIGRATION AND CONFLICTS – CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES

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Abstract

The world has changed a great deal in the past decades. This outcome was propelled by the process of globalization which interconnected the world more than ever before. Societies all over the globe underwent vital transformations and had to cope with immense pressures resulting from the developments in the social, economic and political arena. Domestic politics also had to grip with pressing issues that advanced beyond state borders and state jurisdiction. And international politics seemed dated since it failed to anticipate key features of the political universe of today. One of those features are migration flows and most specifically forced migration due to conflict or war.

This article examines the relationship between migration and war i.e. forced migration due to conflict and war, the key categories of forced migration as well as the main challenges and responses.

Keywords: war, forced migration, responses, challenges

I. INTRODUCTION

The world has changed a great deal in the past decades. This outcome was propelled by the process of globalization which interconnected the world more than ever before¹. Societies all over the globe underwent vital transformations and had to cope with immense pressures resulting from the developments in the social, economic and political arena. Domestic politics also had to grip with pressing issues that advanced beyond state borders and state jurisdiction. And international politics seemed dated since it failed to anticipate key features of the political universe of today. One of those features are migration flows and most specifically forced migration due to conflict or war.

According to the 2020 Report of the Secretary-General on international migration, the number of international migrants worldwide reached an estimated 272 million in 2019, having grown by around 119 million since 1990². The same report stipulates that between 1990 and 2019, countries in more developed regions gained 69 million international migrants, whereas countries in less developed regions added 49 million, and by 2019, nearly 56 per cent of all international migrants, or 152 million, lived in more developed regions³.

According to the UNHCR at the beginning of 2020, 79.5 million people had been forced from their homes due to persecution, conflict, and human rights violations, including 45.7 million internally displaced people (IDPs), 29.6 million refugees and others forcibly displaced outside

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¹ *Interculturalism – The New Era of Cohesion and Diversity*, Ted Cante, Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2012, p.1.

² *International migration and development: report of the Secretary-General*, UN Secretary-General, A / 75/292, 5 August 2020, , available at: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3885869?ln=fr>, accessed on 28.02.2021

³ *Ibidem*.

their country, and 4.2 million asylum seekers⁴. In addition to the existing and new conflicts, the Covid-19 has dramatically affected their lives in 2020⁵.

II. MIGRATION AND WAR

Historically, migration has been caused by warfare, the formation of nations, the emergence of states and empires and the search for new economic opportunities⁶. These events have been responsible for voluntary and forced migration through the ages and today the main motives and most common reasons for migration produce several different migration categories: labour (economic), family, student and business (investor) migrants⁷. Aside from the prevailing notion of being regarded as a problem, migration has in fact contributed to human advancement and enacted processes that have transformed human lives – such as modernization and industrialization⁸.

There is no universally accepted definition of migration since determination on who is a migrant differs from country to country based on migration laws but also specific political and socio-economic interests. For example, King et al, define migration (especially international) as a permanent or long-term change in the place of residence, and therefore a fundamental change in the life situation⁹. According to the International Organization of Migration, migration is the "movement of persons away from their place of usual residence, either across an international border or within a State"¹⁰. And Lee defines it as a change in permanent or semi-permanent residence and as something that involves an origin, a destination and intervening obstacles, consequently taking into account both the temporal and spatial dimensions of migration¹¹.

Migration is relational because it raises high hopes on one end – hopes for the migrants and deep fears on the other end - fears for the receiving society¹². The hope may bring an end to economic, political or other difficulties to the migrants, and the fears are a direct result of enhanced diversity (ethnic, racial, religious and other) that migration generates, and affect the social, cultural and political fabric of societies in destination countries, particularly on the long run¹³. As Cantle underlines - conflicts are inevitable when many cultures, faiths, value systems and global forces interact and come to terms with each other¹⁴. Consequently, migration is often described as an inherently divisive political issue especially when identity, national security and sovereignty are at stake¹⁵. And in a conflict that tends to perpetuate war, the stakes are high not only because of the shift of balance in terms of politics but also in terms of

⁴ *Forced displacement passes 80 million by mid-2020 as COVID-19 tests refugee protection globally*, UNHCR Press Release, 09 December 2020, <https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2020/12/5fcf94a04/forced-displacement-passes-80-million-mid-2020-covid-19-tests-refugee-protection.html>, accessed on 26.02.2021

⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁶ *The Age of Migration – International Population Movements in the Modern World*, Hein De Haas, Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, The Guilford Press, New York, 2020, p. 93.

⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 31.

⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 93.

⁹ *Visiting friends and relatives and its links with international migration: a three-way comparison of migrants in the UK*, King, Russell, Lulle, Aija, Mueller, Dorothea and Vathi, Zana, Working Paper. Malmö University, Malmö, 2013, p. 6.

¹⁰ *Glossary on Migration*, International Migration Law N°34, IOM, 2019, https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml_34_glossary.pdf, p. 135.

¹¹ *A theory of migration*, Everett S. Lee, *Demography* 3, 1966, pp: 47–57

¹² Haas et al, p. 1.

¹³ *Ibidem*, p.1

¹⁴ Cantle, p.1.

¹⁵ Haas et al, p. 2 and 3.

economy in a national, regional and international context and most importantly in terms of human safety and security.

The list of issues that generate war is rather extensive and includes territorial spoils, national liberation/state creation, national unification or consolidation, maintaining the integrity of the state, defending or supporting and ally, ideological liberation, ethnic or religious unification, protecting national and/or commercial interest and so forth. According to Holsti, an analysis of the second half of the XX- th century period enumerates twenty-five issues and government composition is on the top of the list¹⁶, while his research of the wars and issues for the same period (1945-1989) lists a total of 58 wars or interventions out of which twenty-two were wars in the classical form of two states employing established military force against one another and the rest were wars of national liberation undertaken by irregular forces, various military interventions and several cases that can be labelled as “peacekeeping”¹⁷. His further research on the frequency of conflict-producing issues for the period 1648-1989 shows that territory as an issue has been the leading and although declining over time, a potent issue.

Research of issues that propel war and conflict are very important, especially in terms of response and selecting a pathway that may level down expectant consequences. Today frictions between the poor and the rich, rising inequalities among the global north and global south and tensions between nationality and liberty are also real¹⁸ and vivid, and hence arise as potential issues. The arms race, state borders (stable or unstable, recognized and unrecognized), primordial loyalties and many others are viable and determining factors in the behaviour of states and potent reasons for war.

For the purpose of this article, we will employ a particularly narrow definition of war – war as the presence of direct international violence, as outlined by Beer¹⁹. The definition incorporates only violence between states and includes a casualty condition by taking into account only direct violence²⁰.

Waging war is not an easy and likely decision taken upon by any group or even government. It is in fact a matter that rests upon a complex calculus of costs, advantages, degrees of threat, risk and the like²¹. Conversely, history illustrates that humanity has been exposed to war far more than to peace²². Therefore, we can most certainly claim that peace resembles a brief interval in human history filled with wars and interstate, international and world wars in particular. Attestation is offered by many (Wright, 1965, Singer and Small, 1972, Sorokin 1937, Richardson, 1960, Luard, 1988) and the numbers presented by their studies are astounding: Wright counted 200 world major wars in the period from 1480 until 1941, Singer and Small enlisted 90 world major wars from 1816 until 1965, Sorokin found 862 major nation-wars in Europe in the period from 1100 until 1925²³, and so forth.

A similar niche can be found by closer examination of the history of civil wars. Their occurrence is especially high in the past several decades, or more precisely in the period following the Cold War. In fact, Snyder and Jervis attest that civil wars have managed to dominate the international security agenda so the international community has felt compelled

¹⁶ *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989*, Kalevi J. Holsti, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998, p. 282.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*, p. 274-279.

¹⁸ See for example *Ways of War and Peace*, Michael W. Doyle, W.W. Norton and Company. New York, 1997, p.496.

¹⁹ *Peace against War*, Francis A. Beer, W. H. Freeman and Company, San Francisco, 1981, p. 6.

²⁰ *Ibidem*.

²¹ Holsti, p.17.

²² There are also other stances. For example, see Matthew Melko according to whom “Peace is far more common than war” in *The Remission of Violence in the West*, Matthew Melko, International Journal on World Peace, Vol. II, No. 2, APR-JUN 1985: 48-55, p. 48.

²³ Beer, p. 22-23.

to intervene²⁴ either by use of force, peace enforcement, peacebuilding and/or peacekeeping measures. What is of special concern is that the spiral of civil wars is no easily ended. That is to say, research has shown that civil war settlements frequently do not deliver the peace they promised and that ever since 1945, 57% of civil war settlements failed to prevent the re-emergence of conflict²⁵. Such are the cases in Columbia, Cyprus, India (Kashmir), Sudan, Zimbabwe, Lebanon, Uganda, Laos, Angola and so forth, all of which experienced a renewal of violence or renewed civil war²⁶.

Syria is unfortunately a textbook showcase for modern times' civil war. This country has a historical legacy of providing refuge to numerous groups of dispossessed and displaced peoples over the past 150 years²⁷. According to Chatty, this population movements have become embedded in the psyche of the modern Syrian state creating an even greater tolerance for movement, mobility and migration²⁸.

The civil war in Syria is considered as one of the gravest humanitarian crisis in modern history and the worst in the modern Middle East²⁹. As of 10th of February 2021, according to the UNHCR, there are 5.588.012 persons of concern /total registered Syrian refugees, out of which over 3.600.000 are hosted in Turkey, over 860.000 in Lebanon, over 660.000 in Jordan, over 240.000 in Iraq, over 130.000 in Egypt and over 30.000 in North Africa³⁰. In addition, there are currently 6.2 million people, including 2.5 million children that are displaced within Syrian borders, making it the biggest internally displaced population in the world³¹. UNHCR notes that over 1.8 million people have been displaced in 2017 and many of them for the second or third time.

Syria has and is an international humanitarian crisis in need of international cooperation and burden-sharing. The quantification exposes not just the severity of the situation but also the responsibility shared by other countries since Syrian refugees have and will continue to have a strong impact on the host countries, especially on the developing countries and neighbouring states³². Apart from the humanitarian, social and economic response, there must be a political one as well. As Betts and Collier punctually annotate - what happened in 2015 is not to be considered as a crisis in numbers but a crisis in politics³³.

²⁴ *Civil War and Security Dilemma*, Jack Snyder and Robert Jervis, in *Civil Wars, Insecurity and Intervention*, ed. Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, Columbia University Press, New York, 1999, p. 15.

²⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 306. See more in *The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars 1945-1993*, Roy Licklider, *American Political Science Review*, vol.89, no.3 (September 1995).

²⁶ Walter and Snyder, *op. cit.*, p. 307.

²⁷ Chatty notes that mass influx of forced migrant groups to Greater Syria occurred in the final decades of the Ottoman Empire; after the dismemberment of Greater Syria (due to the imposition of French and British mandates) the newly created state Syria (along with Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine) also received forced migrants; after the independence in 1946 modern Syria also continued to receive mass influxes of dispossessed and displaced migrants such as Palestinians (the 1940s and 1960s), Kurds (second half of the XX-th century), Lebanese ((1970s and 1980s, and again in 2006) and Iraqis (2000s). *Syria – The Making and Unmaking of a Refugee State*, Dawn Chatty, Hurst and Company, London, 2017, p.245.

²⁸ *Ibidem*, p.245

²⁹ *Syrian Crisis, Syrian Refugees – Voices from Jordan and Lebanon*, ed. by Juline Beaujouan and Amjed Rasheed, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020, p. 2.

³⁰ UNCHR Syrian Refugee Response, 28.02.2021, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria>, accessed 28.02.2021

³¹ UNHCR Internally Displaced People, 28.02.2021, <https://www.unhcr.org/sy/internally-displaced-people>, accessed 28.02.2021

³² See more the study on Jordan and Lebanon in *Syrian Crisis, Syrian Refugees – Voices from Jordan and Lebanon*, ed. by Juline Beaujouan and Amjed Rasheed, Palgrave Macmillan, 2020, p. 3.

³³ *Refuge: Transforming a Broken Refugee System*, Alexander Betts and Paul Collier, UK: Penguin Random House, 2018, p. 2.

III. FORCED MIGRATION

Forced migration is a broad term that encompasses refugees, asylum seekers, Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs), stateless persons and others³⁴. IOM defines it as a migratory movement which, although the drivers can be diverse, involves force, compulsion, or coercion³⁵.

Forced migration can be a result of many factors or so-called drivers of migration. These factors range from one to many including a span of motives that may underpin individual, family or collective forced mobility. Apart from political or ethnic violence or persecution, factors include development projects such as large dams, wildfire conservation projects and natural disasters like floods, hurricanes or earthquakes³⁶.

There are many operative definitions of forced migration i.e. forced migrants³⁷. The definition employed by this article is the one offered by Scheel and Squire, according to which forced migration implies a series of factors such as political persecution, ethnic conflict, inequitable access to natural resources, declining living conditions and chronic and pervasive human rights abuses marking a limited agency on the part of those migrating³⁸.

This article only deals with forced migration due to conflict so war stands as the backdrop of this article. In line with theories of conflict-induced displacement, a comprehensive analysis must focus both on the root and proximate causes of displacement. Root causes include persistent oppression and inequality and proximate causes are ethnic cleansing, riots and war³⁹. According to UNHCR: “the underlying causes of large scale involuntary population displacements are complex and interrelated and encompass gross violations of human rights, including in armed conflict, poverty and economic disruption, political conflicts, ethnic and inter-communal tensions and environmental degradation”⁴⁰.

Particularly valuable research on the extent of forced migration and violence in international crisis is provided by Ben-Yehuda and Goldstein. They have presented an index of forced

³⁴ *Forced Migration Magnitude and Violence in international crises: 1945-2015*, Hemda Ben-Yehuda and Rami Goldstein, *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol. 33, No.2, 2020, pp: 336-358, p. 337.

³⁵ *Glossary on Migration*, International Migration Law N°34, IOM, 2019, https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/iml_34_glossary.pdf, p. 77. According to the same source: while not an international legal concept, this term has been used to describe the movements of refugees, displaced persons (including those displaced by disasters or development projects), and, in some instances, victims of trafficking. On an international level, the use of this term is debated because of the widespread recognition that a continuum of agency exists rather than a voluntary/forced dichotomy and that it might undermine the existing legal international protection regime.

³⁶ Haas et al, p. 7.

³⁷ For example: Helton and Jacobs define forced migrants by taking into account two decisive factors: 1. Displacement for arbitrary reasons and 2. Existence of valid objections to return. This definition according to them is all-encompassing since it takes into account the protection of internally displaced persons as well as those crossing an international border and are found in a refugee-like situation but they do not fall under the confinements by the definition of a refugee according to the Convention. *What is forced migration?*, Arthur C. Heleton and Eliana Jacobs, *Georgetown Immigration Law Journal*, vol. 13, no.4, Summer 1999, pp: 521-532, p. 522-523. See more in *Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees*, July 28, 1951, and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, October 4, 1967.

³⁸ See in *Forced Migrants as 'Illegal' Migrants*, Stephan Scheel and Vicki Squire, in *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*, ed. Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, Katy Long and Nando Sigona, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, p. 188. See more in *Towards a Sociology of Forced Migration and Social Transformation*, Stephen Castles, *Sociology* 37 (1): 13-24.

³⁹ *Conflict and Crisis Induced Displacement*, Sarah Kenyon Lischer, in *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*, ed. Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, Katy Long and Nando Sigona, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, pp: 317-330, p. 319

⁴⁰ UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusions No. 80 (XLVII) 1996, ‘Comprehensive and Regional Approaches within a Protection Framework’, Preamble.

migration magnitude by identifying 229 crises, designated as forced migration crises⁴¹. By analyzing 374 International Crisis Behavior crises that occurred in the period between 1945 and 2015, they classified 61% as Forced Migration Crisis and 39% as Non-Forced Migration Crisis⁴². Out of the 229 Forced Migration Crisis, only 14% did not involve any violence at all, while 23 % involved war. On the subject of the territorial aspect, they found that most Forced Migration Crisis were situated in Africa while most of the Non-Forced Migration Crisis happened in the Middle East, while the spread of both types covers all the regions with Asia as a major one to stand out⁴³.

The 2015 Refugee crisis, sparked by the civil war in Syria became a benchmark in human history due to many reasons. The impact of the crisis, not just regionally but also internationally was enormous. For example, only in 2015, Europe recorded a large increase in the number of refugee and asylum-seeker applications, rising from around 600,000 in 2014 to 1.3 million⁴⁴. However, Syria was not an isolated case. There are many other narratives that continue to exist or persist even after many years since a conflict or war has ended. Such as the civil war in Sri Lanka that lasted for twenty- six years (from 1983 to 2009) and produced a mass internal displacement and Tamil refugee outflows⁴⁵. Two years after the war ended, in 2011, there were 136,605 refugees and 136,617 in a refugee-like situation, as reported by UNHCR⁴⁶.

In the past decade countries that have traditionally high influx of migrants face a growing influence of the Right and Far Rights ideology, accompanied by anti-migrant and xenophobic populism⁴⁷ (such is the case with the UK, but also all around the global North and most specifically EU countries). The notable salience of forced migration as a political issue with global ramifications was noted by Ben-Yehuda and Goldstein in the study mentioned above⁴⁸. Their findings stipulate that the salience in the last decade was related to the Syrian Civil War⁴⁹.

IV. CHALLENGES AND RESPONSES

One of the most important challenges in need of response is related to burden/ responsibility-sharing⁵⁰. Burden sharing is about the impact of large scale arrival of refugees on host countries and it is becoming a more intricate issue when host and transit countries are bearing an uneven toll compared to others. The sharing of the burden may include material, technical, financial assistance and physical relocation of people through humanitarian evacuation or resettlement⁵¹ and should be done in an equitable and effective manner⁵², regardless of the fact that the host

⁴¹ Ben-Yehuda and Goldstein, op.cit.

⁴²Ibidem, p. 350.

⁴³ Ibidem, p. 352

⁴⁴ *Refugees welcome? Cross-European public opinion on asylum seekers following the 2015 crisis*, Sandra Bermúdez, Real Elcano Institute, 27.10.2020, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/riecano_en/contenido?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/ari119-2020-bermudez-refugees-welcome-cross-european-public-opinion-on-asylum-seekers-following-2015-crisis

⁴⁵ Haas et al, p. 183.

⁴⁶ UNHCR Statistical Yearbook 2011, 11th edition, (online), Annex, <https://www.unhcr.org/statistics/country/516282cf5/unhcr-statistical-yearbook-2011-11th-edition.html>, p.66 (accessed 25.02.2021)

⁴⁷ Cantle, p. 87. In the UK see more in *From Euroscepticism to Islamophobia: The changing face of UKIP*, M. Goodwin, R. Ford and D. Cutts, University of Nottingham Research Briefing, University of Nottingham, 2011.

⁴⁸ Ben-Yehuda and Goldstein, p. 351.

⁴⁹ Ibidem, p. 352.

⁵⁰ On the delicate understanding of these two terms, see more in *The Global Compact on Refugees and Burden Sharing: Will the Compact Address the Normative Gap Concerning Burden Sharing?* Meltem Ineli-Ciger, *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, 2019, 38, pp. 115-138.

⁵¹ Ibidem. p. 123.

⁵² Ibidem. p. 118.

countries may have an open-door policy or that they are situated in the neighbourhood or close vicinity of the origin country of the refugees, so in a way, they are compelled to accept people of concern. As Ineli-Ciger notes, the burden becomes even harder to bear in protracted situations⁵³ and the solutions provided by the 1951 Convention are not working and there is a normative gap standing in a way of actual burden-sharing between states, and securing obligations from states to refugees only⁵⁴. International efforts to fill the gap have initiated the Global Compact on Refugees which was adopted in 2018 as a global mechanism for mobilizing international cooperation⁵⁵. This success of this response is yet to be seen, especially in line with the hard and soft law implementation, however, the political will and political reality remain as the leading challenges⁵⁶.

Another serious concern has to do with the relationship between forced migration and security. Namely, as Turk says, security issues arise not only as a cause of flight but also feature prominently during flights (for example as a result of unsafe travel routes or attacks by bandits and pirates or ongoing war in border areas or because of no other choice but to opt for criminal smuggling solution)⁵⁷. So according to this view, past the fact that refugees do flee because of threats to their physical security (due to their political, religious beliefs or nationality or ethnicity and so forth), they, the refugee can also face security threats when they find a safe haven in a host country (including abuse and sexual exploitation, forced equipment, infiltration of armed elements and so forth)⁵⁸.

One of the key responses is an integration⁵⁹. It is correspondingly one of the biggest challenges since integration tackles many aspects and requires the development of specific navigational skills and intercultural competences⁶⁰. Integrating refugees and immigrants into the host societies is vital in terms of cohesion and solidarity, and more broadly as an attestation to their belongingness to humanity, since as Douzinas writes – “humanity is a virtual category, being human as an abstract prediction of the real self” and “today, immigrants, refugees, the unemployed and the poor are outside the pale of humanity because they are economically redundant”⁶¹. The latter is best expounded by the migration taboo and the political, policy and moral response. The politics of migration is a salient issue, while the policy, as Collier notes,

⁵³ *The Global Compact on Refugees and Burden Sharing: Will the Compact Address the Normative Gap Concerning Burden Sharing?* Meltem Ineli-Ciger, *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, 2019, 38, pp. 115-138, p. 119. See more in *Conclusion on Protracted Refugee Situations*, UNHCR ExCom Conclusions, No. 109 (LXI), 2009. On the arguments for the need for equitable sharing of burden among all states see *Making International Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection*, J. C. Hathaway and R. A. Neve, *Harvard Human Rights Journal*, 10, 1997, pp: 115-211.

⁵⁴ *Ibidem*. See more in *Revitalizing the 1951 Refugee Convention*, J. Fitzpatrick, *Harvard Human Rights Journal*, 9, 1996, pp: 229-253, p.250.

⁵⁵ *Ibidem*, See more in *Global Compact on Refugees*, UNHCR, Annual Report to the United Nations General Assembly, UN DOC A/73/12.

⁵⁶ *Ibidem*. See more in *Political Realities Challenge Refugee Reform*, B. Frelick, *Open Democracy*, 9 March 2016, available at: <http://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/bill-frelick/political-realities-challenge-refugee-reform>, accessed on 28.02.2021

⁵⁷ *Forced Migration and Security*, Volker Turk, *International Journal of Refugee Law*, Vol.15, No. 1, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp: 113-125, p. 113-114.

⁵⁸ *Ibidem*. On refugee mobilization see the study *Recruiting Refugees for Militarization: The Determinants of Mobilization Attempts*, Roos Haer and Tobias Hecker, *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol.32, No.1, pp. 1-23.

⁵⁹ On the societal and systematic challenges deriving from integration see in *After the Flight. Dynamics of Refugee Settlement and Integration*, Morgan Potet and Shiva Nourpanah, Cambridge Scholars Publishing: Newcastle Upon Tyne, 2018; *Refugee Integration(s): Policy and Practice in the European Union*, Sigona, N. *Refugee Survey Quarterly* 24(4), pp. 115-122; *Understanding Integration: A Conceptual Framework*, A. Ager and A. Strang, *Journal of Refugee Studies* 21(2), pp. 166-191.

⁶⁰ Cante, p. 206- 212.

⁶¹ *The Radical Philosophy of Rights*, Costas Douzinas, Routledge, OX, 2019, p. 47.

ranges from the open door (favoured by economists) to closed-door (favoured by electorates)⁶². As far as the moral response is concerned, he justly maintains that the moral positions are confusingly bound up with those on poverty, nationalism and racism and that the current perceptions of the rights of migrants are shaped by guilty reactions to different past wrongs⁶³. In addition, integration is challenged by processes that develop beyond state borders and even frame of national identities, therefore Cantle seems spot-on when he states that investment in navigational skills enables citizens to acquire the ability to explore other identities and build the ability to understand and embrace other cultures, is vital. In fact, this process can lead to the development of another layer of identity, one that is cosmopolitan or as a global citizen, and this according to him may have an effect of minimizing conflicts if it is gradually added to the already growing complexity of personal identity⁶⁴. The latter is significant since today's societies are becoming more and more complex and even super-diverse despite many attempts by nation-states to protect the integrity of their borders and to resist migration⁶⁵. One of the utmost steps is to rethink and reconstruct durable solutions. The UNHCR has long worked on establishing comprehensive durable solutions that aim to leave a refugee or stateless person to be able to enjoy all their rights to the same extent as nationals⁶⁶. According to UNHCR - a comprehensive solution has legal, economic, social and cultural and political and civil dimensions, each of which needs to be addressed for a solution to be sustainable⁶⁷. These solutions take time and involve many partners, but the key to solutions is linking all dimensions. Furthermore, the pathways to protection and solution include: voluntary repatriation (displayed in cases such as Angola, Rwanda and other), local integration (displayed in cases such as Brazil, Uganda and other), resettlement (displayed in cases such as Egypt and activities by the Syria Core Group)⁶⁸. However, study but most importantly practice has shown that these traditional durable solutions (local integration, repatriation and resettlement) are not working, the existing framework is facing limitations and the numbers of people being trapped in protracted displacement are rising⁶⁹. UNHCR has been working to expand solution opportunities. One of the modes are the promotion of complementary pathways - such as family reunification and humanitarian visas for refugees and work with States to address some of the barriers for refugees to access these pathways⁷⁰. And in some cases, there is limited success, but the implementation of a durable solution still stands as one of the utmost challenges. To end with, and in a meticulous relation to the topic - the fragile nexus of international security and forced migration, as a major challenge. The two-way impact of forced migration and

⁶² *Exodus – How Migration is Changing Our World*, Paul Collier, Oxford University Press, 2013, p. 15.

⁶³ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁴ Cantle, p. 207.

⁶⁵ *Ibidem*, p.12

⁶⁶ *The 10-Point Plan in Action, 2016 Update, Chapter 7: Solutions for Refugees*, UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), December 2016, available at: <https://www.refworld.org/docid/583714a44.html> [accessed 28 February 2021]

⁶⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁹ *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*, ed. Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, Katy Long and Nando Sigona, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, p.11. See more in the chapter *Rethinking 'Durable' Solutions*, by Katy Long, *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*, ed. Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, Katy Long and Nando Sigona, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, pp. 475-488. See also in *Understanding refugee durable solutions by international players: Does dialogue form a missing link?* Fred Bidandi (2018), *Cogent Social Sciences*, 4:1, 1510724 and in *The Challenge of Durable Solutions for Refugees at the Thai–Myanmar Border*, Sebastien Moretti, *Refugee Survey Quarterly*, Volume 34, Issue 3, September 2015, pp: 70–94.

⁷⁰ *UNHCR Turkey: Working towards Durable Solutions - Fact Sheet*, July 2019, available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/tr/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2019/10/7.5-UNHCR-Turkey-Working-towards-Durable-Solutions-Fact-Sheet-July-2019-FINALV22.pdf>, accessed on 28.02.2021

security is a grave concern raised by scholars. Several studies (Loesher 1992,1993; Weiner 1993, 1995; Stedman and Tanner 2003; Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006) have indicated the relationship between refugee movement and conflict. Some have gone beyond, like Weiner and asserted that regional effects may affect forced migration and that “conflicts within countries often spill across borders sometimes because the conflicts themselves are rooted in the division of ethnic communities by international boundaries, sometimes because the weaker party in a conflict successfully finds allies in a neighbouring country and sometimes because the refugees themselves become the source of conflict within or between countries”⁷¹. Hence, exploration of the root causes for war and conflict in order to gain a deeper understanding of the characteristics of violence may assist the prevention and utilize predictions on possible migration crises so the political, policy and moral response become sustainable and effective.

V. CONCLUSION

There is a little clarity on what the future of migration will bring. Yet, if we are to judge upon projections of competent sources – migration will most certainly intensify and grow. Namely, according to IOM, in 2010 there were 214 million international migrants and if they continue to grow in number at the same pace, there will be more than 400 million by 2050⁷². In its 2019 International Migration Stock Report UN DESA states that in 2019, the number of international migrants worldwide has reached nearly 272 million raised up from 221 million in 2010⁷³. Furthermore, UN DESA reports that the global number of international migrants has grown faster than the world’s population, consequently, leading to the increase from 2.8 per cent in the year 2000 to 3.5 per cent in 2019 of the share of international migrants in the total population⁷⁴.

There is to be no doubt that every migration flow is politically and economically charged before all other aspects. There are however different implications with regard to the burden-sharing for the origin and the host country, and the country of transit. Betts pinpoints that forced migration is by definition indicative of a breakdown of the nation-state system and that all forms of forced migration go to the core of questions of state sovereignty and open a lot of others relating to security and the international political economy⁷⁵. The world today is still one of the nation-states and many of the national identities were hammered out in the course of many wars and conflicts that were waged in their name. So the national laws on migration are mirroring the idea to protect this distinct reality. Therefore, in respect to migration, there are political and economic resonances articulating very narrow and specific national interests even despite the exceedingly accurate argument provided by Betts that migration (its causes, consequences and responses to refugees) is closely intertwined with world politics⁷⁶.

⁷¹ Citation from *Conflict and Crisis Induced Displacement*, Sarah Kenyon Lischer, in *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*, ed. Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, Katy Long and Nando Sigona, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, pp: 317-330, p. 321. See more in *Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows*, M. Weiner, *International Security* 21(1) (Summer): 5-42.

⁷² Cante, p.5. See more in *World Migration Report2 2010*, International Organization for Migration, Geneva, 2010

⁷³ *International Migrant Stock 2019*, UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, available at <https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates19.asp>

⁷⁴ Ibidem.

⁷⁵ *International Relations and Forced Migration*, Alexander Betts, in *The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies*, ed. Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, Gil Loescher, Katy Long and Nando Sigona, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016, pp. 60-74, p. 60.

⁷⁶ Ibidem.

Research of war in modern terms developed the idea that the causes of war lie in the nature of social systems and human beings⁷⁷ and research of forced migration magnitude attested that forced migration crises must be dealt with in line with the understanding of the need to cope with them as social-humanitarian and political problems⁷⁸. In a realistic tone Beer once underlined that the catharsis of violence decreases the general level of important values in society – domestic and international but war is unlikely to disappear so according to him we are all prisoners of war and we do not have many choices⁷⁹. Yet, for the ones we have - we need to put them in use so further suffering related to forced migration because of war and conflict is prevented and minimized in an organized manner and by international response.

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⁷⁷ Beer, op.cit., p.2

⁷⁸ *Forced Migration Magnitude and Violence in international crises: 1945-2015*, Hemda Ben-Yehuda and Rami Goldstein, *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol. 33, No.2, 2020, pp: 336-358, p. 355.

⁷⁹ Beer, op.cit., p. 324

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